Posted tagged ‘U.S. military’

Exclusive: Obama Refuses to Hit ISIS’s Libyan Capital

February 18, 2016

Exclusive: Obama Refuses to Hit ISIS’s Libyan Capital, Daily Beast, Nancy A. Youssef, February 18, 2016

(Please see also, ISIS Leader Moves to Libya. — DM)

Islamic State in Libya

Despite the growing threat from the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Libya, the Obama administration has turned down a U.S. military plan for an assault on ISIS’s regional hub there, three defense officials told The Daily Beast. 

In recent weeks, the U.S. military—led by its Africa and Special Operations Commands—have pushed for more airstrikes and the deployment of elite troops, particularly in the city of Sirte. The hometown of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, the city is now under ISIS control and serving as a regional epicenter for the terror group.

The airstrikes would target ISIS resources while a small band of Special Operations Forces would train Libyans to eventually be members of a national army, the officials said.

Weeks ago, defense officials told The New York Times that they were crafting military plans for such strikes, but needed more time to develop intelligence so that they could launch a sustained air campaign on ISIS in Sirte.

But those plans have since been put on the back burner.

“There is little to no appetite for that in this administration,” one defense official explained.

Instead, the U.S. will continue to do occasional strikes that target high-value leaders, like the November drone strike that killed Abu Nabil al-Anbari, the then-leader of ISIS in Libya.

“There’s nothing close to happening in terms of a major military operation. It will continue to be strikes like the kind we saw in November against Abu Nabil,” a second defense official explained to The Daily Beast.

The division over what action the U.S. and the international community should take in Libya speaks to the uncertainty about when and where ISIS should be countered.

For Europe, Libya is uncomfortably close and already a jumping off point for migrants willing to take on the rough Mediterranean waters in search of asylum. ISIS pronouncements have previously pointed out that Rome is nearby.

For the United States, there are major concerns about allowing another ISIS hub to emerge in the region. The Libyan city of Sirte is under ISIS control and some believe the terror group seeks to turn Sirte into a center of operations, like Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq.

Leaders across Europe have hinted that more should be done in Libya but have fallen short on specifics. In an interview with Der Spiegel last month, the German envoy to Libya said: “We simply cannot give up on Libya.”

According to U.S. military figures, there are roughly 5,000 ISIS fighters in Libya, a spike from 1,000 just a few months ago. Defense officials believe that ISIS supporters are moving toward Libya, having found it increasingly difficult to travel to Iraq and Syria.

Perhaps because of that, Sirte, and areas around it, are increasingly falling victim to ISIS’s barbaric practices. And some are urging the international community not to wait until Sirte falls further under ISIS control, and filled with fighters mixed in with civilians.

According to this report, residents there cannot leave the city freely as ISIS fighters—many of them from Egypt, Chad, Niger, and Tunisia—inspect cars for signs of residents trying to escape. As in Raqqa and Mosul, residents do not have access to cellphone or Internet networks and live under an ISIS judicial system that issues death sentences to those who do not practice the terror group’s brand of Islam.

Moreover, in nearby cities like Ras Lanouf, ISIS is destroying oil installations, cutting off a key potential source of revenue for any newly cobbled unified Libyan government. ISIS has set its sights across the country, from Misrata in the west to Derna in the east.

Some fear the terror group is hunkering down in places like Sirte in preparation for a potential U.S. offensive.

The administration had said that it would not intervene until Libya, which now is governed by two rival governments on opposite sides of the country, had created a single entity to govern the state.

At a press conference Tuesday, during this year’s summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, President Obama referred to United Nations efforts to help build a government in Libya, suggesting any military effort could create even more political fractures. On Sunday, a member of Libya’s Presidential Council announced that a list of 13 ministers and five ministers of state had been sent to Libya’s eastern parliament for approval.

But while the president said the U.S. would go after ISIS “anywhere it appeared,” he stopped short of saying the U.S. would expand its effort in Libya unilaterally.

“We will continue to take actions where we’ve got a clear operation and a clear target in mind. And we are working with our other coalition partners to make sure that as we see opportunities to prevent ISIS from digging in, in Libya, we take them. At the same time, we’re working diligently with the United Nations to try to get a government in place in Libya,” the president said. “And that’s been a problem.”

Some military officials believe Obama feels that France and Italy, which both have hinted at intervention, should take the lead on any military effort. Both countries were key to the NATO-led campaign in 2011 that led to Gaddafi’s fall. Still others believe the United States wants to limit its war against the Islamic State to Iraq and Syria.

Since Gaddafi’s death in October 2011, the state has become especially susceptible to outside extremists. With no tradition of an independently strong state military, militias have served as security forces and now are unwilling to disarm.

With no stable government or security forces, parts of Libya have become vulnerable to groups like ISIS looking for territory to set up a self-described caliphate.

As many as 435,000 of the country’s 6 million people are internally displaced, according a recent UN report. An estimated 1.9 million require some kind of humanitarian aid. And as of August, 250,000 migrants had entered, turning Libya into a key hub for those seeking to enter Europe.

Tuesday marked the five-year anniversary of Libya’s Arab Spring. It’s now considered a bittersweet day, rather than the beginning of a democratic movement the protests launched that day once promised.

US-Russian marines set up bridgehead in E. Libya for campaign against ISIS

January 24, 2016

US-Russian marines set up bridgehead in E. Libya for campaign against ISIS, DEBKAfile, January 23, 2016

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President Barack Obama resolved earlier this month, much to the surprise of Washington insiders, to open a third anti-terror front in Libya to eradicate the Islamic Front’s tightening grip on the country.

This top-secret decision was first revealed by DEBKA Weekly 692 on Jan. 1.

While collaborating with Russia in the Syrian arena, and with the Iranians and the Iraqi army and Sunnis in Iraq, Obama took his close aides by surprise by another decision – to lead the Libya campaign again in conjunction with Russia, as well as with concerned Western Europe allies.

The first step in this campaign took place this weekend: A group of US, Russian, French and Italian Special Forces quietly landed at a point south of Tobruk near the Libyan-Egyptian frontier. Standing by after preparing the ground were some 1,000 British SAS troops.

The landing area is located some 144 kilometers from Darnah, the main bastion of extremist Libyan Islamic groups linked to Al Qaeda or ISIS, of which the ultra-violent Ansar al Sharia is the most powerful.

The joint US-Russian war offensive building up in Libya, the first such collaboration in many decades, may be seen as an extension of their expanding military partnership in Syria, DEBKAfile’s military sources report.
Preparations for the campaign were assigned to two special operational commands set up at the Pentagon and at the US Central Command, CENTCOM, in Tampa, Florida.

According to the scenario sketched in advance by DEBKA Weekly, large-scale US air, naval and ground units are to spearhead the new coalition’s combined assault on the main Libyan redoubts of ISIS, Al Qaeda, Ansar al-Sharia and other radical Islamist organizations. Cruise missiles strikes will blast them from US, British, French and Italian warships on the Mediterranean.

At the peak of the assault, large-scale US, British and French marines will land on shore for an operation first billed as the largest allied war landing since the 1952 Korean War. The attachment of Russian forces was negotiated later.

According to this scenario, one group will be dropped ashore from the Gulf of Sidra (see attached map) to seize the town of Sirte, a city of 50,000, where ISIS has located its central military command center in Libya.

This group will then split up into two task forces.

One will head south to take over Tripoli and its oil fields 370 kilometers away and reinstate Libya’s central government, which had been exiled to Tobruk, at its seat in the capital.

On its way to Tripoli, the force will take control of three renegade towns: Misrata, Zliten and Khoms.

The second task force will head north to capture the eastern Libyan capital of Benghazi, seizing Ras Lanuf, 200 kilometers east of Sirte, en route. A second marine force will meanwhile land in eastern Libya to capture the radical Islamist stronghold of Darnah, a port city with 150,000 inhabitants.

The Obama administration will therefore be going into Libya for the second time in four years – only this time up front and on the ground – for three objectives:

1. Control of Libya’s oil and gas fields.

2. Stripping ISIS of its jumping-off base for terrorizing Europe, especially Italy, from across the Mediterranean.

3. Saving Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco from the noose ISIS and Al Qaeda are pulling around them from their back yard.

The scenario was first published in DEBKA Weekly 692 (for subscribers) on Jan. 1, 2016

Humor| Navy Downgraded To ‘Regional Force For Good’

January 14, 2016

Navy Downgraded To ‘Regional Force For Good’ Duffel Blog, January 13, 2016

sailors-iran-1000x600

PERSIAN GULF — Following the recent capture and release of two US Navy riverine war vessels by Iran on Tuesday, the Navy has officially rebranded itself as a “Regional Force for Good,” sources report. The Navy backed off from its previous “Global Force For Good” branding earlier this year, replacing it with a series of giant red blobs meant to emphasize “presence.”

“Let’s be honest,” Adm. John Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations said. “The F-35 has sucked our budget dry like one of those Twilight vampires giving a horny teenager an undeath-hickey.”

“We can’t afford to be in more than a couple places at a time, and once we get there, we usually have to fire the skipper and come right home.”

Though the new brand had been under consideration for some time, he contentious “catch and release” of 10 Navy sailors in Iranian waters prompted a rapid decision on it. The Navy has not announced how these sailors let their boats drift into Iranian territory, although some are blaming the Naval Academy’s Celestial Navigation training.

The sailors were released without harm, but Navy officials are scrambling to manage the negative optics of the situation.

“We thought about playing it off as a stunt raising awareness for the ‘Hands Up Don’t Shoot’ initiative,” a Navy public affairs official admitted, “but ultimately we decided to just pull a Blackwater and re-brand instead.”

“We’ve really been a regional force since Clinton anyway,” Richardson added. “‘Global’ set the bar too high, and between scary Chinese island-building and sequestration, we’re just not living up to our advertisements. Regional is definitely more in our comfort zone.”

Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus revealed another spin during a press conference, remarking that “this historic event with Iran proves that women can be prisoners of war just as well as men can. I look to the Marine Corps to emulate this shining example.”

 

Re-evaluating the law that benefits the terrorists

January 5, 2016

Re-evaluating the law that benefits the terrorists, Washington Times, Fred Gedrich, January 4, 2015

In the aftermath of Islamic terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, Calif., U.S. presidential candidate Donald Trump created a political and media firestorm by provocatively suggesting the United States is fighting a “politically correct” war, and since jihadists “don’t care about their lives you have to take out their families.”

Predictably, critics such as Jeb Bush, Rand Paul and others immediately pounced on his comment as a non-serious response or, if implemented, would be tantamount to engaging in international war crimes. Once again, Mr. Trump succeeded in putting a topic on the debate table that needs to be discussed, even though it might have been better if he advocated hitting jihadis when family members are present as opposed to specifically targeting family members.

To be fair, Mr. Trump’s critics should acknowledge that President Obama has already admitted that U.S. drones (the president’s covert program that targets terrorists from afar) have killed civilians, but the United States insists that terrorists themselves are to blame for using family or other civilians as human shields. Also, the United Nations and groups such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and others disagree, stating that current U.S. policy may constitute international war crimes.

Why would Mr. Trump bring up this issue? A recent CNN/ORC Poll offers an answer: 75 percent of those polled say they are unhappy with Mr. Obama’s progress in the war on terror. And it’s clear to many of them that something else needs to be done to deter jihadists.

What should be done? A good start would be for U.S. leaders to acknowledge that jihadists use international law and political correctness as a tactical weapon against the West, and their success is being enhanced by the support of witless enablers in America and elsewhere.

Terror groups like the Islamic State (ISIS), al Qaeda and others know their adversaries fight based on the idea that the rule of law is what separates the civilized world from the barbarians. They have shrewdly and callously exploited civilized rules of warfare to their advantage.

Jihadists’ weapons of choice are improvised explosive devices, suicide bombing attacks, videotaped beheadings, and caged executions by fire and drowning. They seek to inflict as much mutilation, death, destruction and terror on civilian and military targets as possible.

In the regions of the world that bore them, many jihadists are treated as heroes and, shockingly, in many quarters of the civilized world, including the United Nations and some media, they are considered freedom fighters, insurgents or militants — even though, among other things, they disguise themselves as civilians; use willing family members and civilians as human shields; store weapons in hospitals, schools and mosques; and kill, maim and torture with impunity.

When attacked, jihadists respond by claiming the retaliatory violence is misdirected against civilian populations and religious, educational and humanitarian institutions.

If killed, fellow jihadists claim innocent civilians have been killed.

If captured, the terrorists claim they have been denied legal rights as prisoners of war under Geneva Conventions and Protocols.

If questioned by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent, they claim they have been tortured and abused.

The flagrant barbarism of the region would, a reasonable person might think, lead to a quick and general consensus on the need for military action and swift and appropriate justice for the terrorists — but they haven’t. Since his capture in 2003, Sept. 11 accused mass murderer Khalid Sheikh Mohammed still hasn’t stood trial owing to a string of legal wranglings.

The Geneva Conventions and Protocols of 1949 and 1977, behind which the terrorists attempt to hide, are the civilized world’s most recent attempt to control wartime behavior. These rules established, among other things, laws governing the conduct of soldiers and the treatment of prisoners and civilians during conflict.

At the heart of the conventions and protocols are clear distinctions between warring parties (combatants) and civilians (noncombatants). Their chief benefits are to make it easier for combatants to avoid targeting noncombatants and for lawful combatants (soldiers) from being prosecuted for acts of war.

To qualify as a lawful combatant under Article IV of the Geneva Convention, a soldier must:

1. Be commanded by a person responsible for subordinates;

2. Have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance (a uniform);

3. Carry arms openly;

4. Conduct operations in accordance with laws and customs of war.

Conversely, an unlawful combatant (jihadi) is a fighter who does not conduct operations according to these rules — and arguably is not entitled to Geneva Convention protections. This is the type of combatant the world and humanity currently faces.

It’s beyond time for White House decision-makers and policymakers, and congressional lawmakers and others — instead of reflexively criticizing someone like Mr. Trump — to recognize that this is a battle against stateless, lawless and uncivilized Islamic jihadists who have no regard for the civilized world’s laws of war but are effectively using those laws against it. Action should be taken to debate, re-examine and change those laws, international or otherwise, that impede successful prosecution of this war against Islamic jihadists that threaten Western civilization. The international order and humanity depend on it.

A year of Taliban gains shows that ‘we haven’t delivered,’ top Afghan official says

December 28, 2015

A year of Taliban gains shows that ‘we haven’t delivered,’ top Afghan official says, Washington PostSudarsan Raghavan, December 27, 2015

As the fighting intensifies, the stakes are growing higher for the United States in its longest war. “I will not allow Helmand to fall,” Campbell told the Afghan officials in the recent meeting with the Afghan National Security Council. “But I can’t make you fight. You’ve got to want it more than we do.”

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As the Afghan convoy entered the battered village, Taliban fighters opened fire. U.S.-trained Afghan policemen poured out of their Humvees and began wildly shooting their AK-47 rifles in every direction.

“The enemy is firing one bullet, and you are responding with dozens!” their commander, Col. Khalil Jawad, screamed into his radio in frustration. “Aim, then fire!”

A minute later, the militants melted away. On this day in early December in the southern province of Helmand, they had delivered their message: The Taliban is back, its fighters showing a battle discipline and initiative far superior to the Afghan security forces trained and equipped by the United States.

In private, top Afghan and American officials have begun to voice increasingly grim assessments of the resurgent Taliban threat, most notably in a previously undisclosed transcript of a late-October meeting of the Afghan National Security Council.

“We have not met the people’s expectations. We haven’t delivered,” Abdullah Abdullah, the country’s chief executive, told the high-level gathering. “Our forces lack discipline. They lack rotation opportunities. We haven’t taken care of our own policemen and soldiers. They continue to absorb enormous casualties.”

[Please refer to map here.]

With control of — or a significant presence in — roughly 30 percent of districts across the nation, according to Western and Afghan officials, the Taliban now holds more territory than in any year since 2001, when the puritanical Islamists were ousted from power after the 9/11 attacks. For now, the top American and Afghan priority is preventing Helmand, largely secured by U.S. Marines and British forces in 2012, from again falling to the insurgency.

As of last month, about 7,000 members of the Afghan security forces had been killed this year, with 12,000 injured, a 26 percent increase over the total number of dead and wounded in all of 2014, said a Western official with access to the most recent NATO statistics. Attrition rates are soaring. Deserters and injured Afghan soldiers say they are fighting a more sophisticated and well-armed insurgency than they have seen in years.

As of last month, about 7,000 members of the Afghan security forces had been killed this year, with 12,000 injured, a 26 percent increase over the total number of dead and wounded in all of 2014, said a Western official with access to the most recent NATO statistics. Attrition rates are soaring. Deserters and injured Afghan soldiers say they are fighting a more sophisticated and well-armed insurgency than they have seen in years.

As Afghan security forces struggle, U.S. Special Operations troops are increasingly being deployed into harm’s way to assist their Afghan counterparts. Since Nov. 4, four members of the U.S.-led coalition have been wounded in Helmand, said U.S. Army Col. Michael Lawhorn, a military spokesman. Officially, U.S. military personnel have a mandate only “to train, advise and assist” Afghan forces.

In the confidential October meeting, Gen. John F. Campbell, the commander of U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan, told his Afghan counterparts that he was as guilty as they were of “just putting our finger in the dike in Helmand.”

But he was highly critical of Afghan security officials for “not managing” their forces in a way that ensured they got enough training, and for allowing “breakdowns in discipline” in the ranks. “The Taliban are not 10 feet tall,” he said. “You have much more equipment than they do. You’re better trained. It’s all about leadership and accountability.”

Campbell vowed “to fix Helmand.”

“I will use more of my SOF and enablers to buy you more space and time,” he said, referring to Special Operations forces. A senior U.S. defense official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of military rules, said Campbell’s comments represented “an attempt to encourage the Afghans to take action in Helmand province.”

Progress unraveling

Helmand was a key focus in a major American offensive launched in 2010, after President Obama dispatched a “surge” of 30,000 troops to Afghanistan. Marja was the first place Marines launched operations, and by the end of the surge, in late 2012, the Taliban had been subdued in much of its southern heartland.

Now, the fresh concerns over Helmand arrive at the end of a year in which the Taliban and other insurgent groups, including the Islamic State, have steadily advanced, particularly in the north. They have taken advantage of the end of the U.S. and NATO combat mission, which has left a military and political vacuum, forcing Obama to extend the U.S. role by keeping at least 5,500 U.S. troops here after he leaves office.

A Pakistani military operation has also flushed hundreds of well-trained foreign fighters into Afghanistan, bolstering the Taliban and the Islamic State.

Meanwhile, the government is grappling with its own problems. The economy is crippled; high unemployment and corruption remain entrenched, breeding public resentment. Political infighting, policy disputes and leadership woes have deepened inside the administration of President Ashraf Ghani, who shares power with Abdullah, the chief executive. The cabinet remains incomplete, with no defense minister as the security issues become more serious.

The gains by the Taliban have come amid internal divisions and a leadership crisis triggered by the surprise announcement in the summer that its leader, Mohammad Omar, had been dead for more than two years. The contest for power and territory among Taliban factions, rather than weakening the movement, has spawned more uncertainty and violence.

The group’s infighting has blocked efforts by Ghani to bring the Taliban to peace talks. The insurgents’ new leader, Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, appears determined to prove his mettle and strengthen the Taliban’s bargaining position by escalating attacks, Western diplomats and analysts said. In September, the Taliban briefly seized Kunduz, the first city to fall since the demise of its regime, prompting the U.S. military to dispatch Special Operations troops and stage airstrikes to help the Afghan security forces retake control.

Now, the insurgents are on the doorsteps of several provincial capitals, applying more pressure on urban areas than in any year of the conflict. The clashes in Helmand have reflected the Taliban strategy that led to the takeover of Kunduz — seizing surrounding districts before moving in on the provincial capital. Already, the Taliban are in the enclave of Ba­baji, within the borders of Helmand’s capital, Lashkar Gah.

Helmand, which lies along the Pakistani border, is the source of much of the country’s opium, providing lucrative funding for the insurgents, who also collect “taxes” from the marble mining business. The province is home to the Kajaki Dam, which provides electricity to Helmand and to neighboring Kandahar, the cradle of the Taliban. In some districts, electricity bills are paid to the Taliban.

In the Afghan National Security Council meeting, Rahmatullah Nabil, the nation’s intelligence chief, described the province as “the biggest recruiting tool for the Taliban” and its “primary source of revenue.” Nabil resigned Dec. 10 to protest Ghani’s peace overtures to Pakistan, which is viewed with suspicion by most Afghans for its backing of the Taliban.

Losing control of Helmand

The 21-mile-long road from Lashkar Gah to Marja is peppered with craters from bombs planted by the Taliban. Stores are shuttered; villages are silent. The residents have fled.

A mile from a civil-order police base, built by U.S. Marines for $17 million, a charred, mangled Humvee lies in the middle of the highway. A rocket-propelled grenade tore into it, and the Taliban later set it afire. On a recent day, the base was as far as anyone could go, at least by road: Less than a mile ahead, the Taliban had buried more mines.

“They have destroyed bridges. They have burned our houses,” Ghul Mawla Malang, a tribal elder who leads Marja’s Afghan Local Police (ALP), a U.S.-funded pro-government militia, told top police commanders in a meeting at the base.

A few minutes later, the Taliban fired a few rounds toward the base. The senior officials cut short their visit and left in their Humvees.

If there was one province in Afghanistan that the Taliban should have found impenetrable, it was Helmand. The Afghan army has its entire215th Corps based here, numbering more than 18,000 soldiers. There are also thousands of Afghan police officers. Yet a few hundred Taliban fighters managed to overrun parts of Marja and other districts. Soldiers and police officers fled with little resistance or surrendered to the insurgents.

In Babaji, nine police officers including Abdul Qadim Hemat were unprepared last month when the Taliban fighters attacked their outpost. They were running out of ammunition. And reinforcements they had requested never turned up. “I watched seven comrades killed in front of me,” recalled Hemat, who soon fled along with the remaining officer. Both then deserted.

“We were surrounded, but we didn’t get any help,” Hemat said. “I will not shoot one bullet for the government again.”

In parts of Marja, villagers pine for U.S. troops — and the British forces who were once based here — to return.

“When they were here, Marja was as peaceful as this city,” said Ahmed Jan, who was bringing his 13-year-old nephew to a hospital in Lashkar Gah. A bullet had struck the boy in their village during fighting. “Now, the Taliban are like the government in my village. They drive police vehicles and Humvees, and they have raised their white flag over houses.”

A well-equipped enemy

In an interview, Gen. Mohammed Moeen Faqir, the commander of the 215th Corps, said that “only half of a percent” of his force may have deserted and that new recruits were filling the void. He noted that the police and ALP forces in Helmand were also under his command and that “whenever they needed reinforcements, I sent them.”

But the confidential transcript of the minutes from the National Security Council meeting presents a grimmer picture.

The Afghan army’s chief of staff, Gen. Qadam Shah Shaheem, said that limited reinforcements and new recruits couldn’t make up for force attrition in Helmand, according to the transcript, which was provided to The Washington Post by an official concerned by the insecurity in Helmand.

Some 40 percent of Afghan army vehicles in Helmand are broken, Shaheem said. He described a leadership crisis within the security forces, where “clashing personalities exist between the security pillars,” according to the transcript.

The morale of the security forces was low, said Nabil, the intelligence chief, and some soldiers had complained that they had not been home in two years. Junior commanders, he added, were “openly defying their superiors.” Gen. Mohammad Salem Ehsas, the top ALP commander, said that troops were tired and that there was poor coordination among the various security organs.

Campbell said that only about half the troop positions in the 215th Corps were manned. Western and Afghan officials said that was largely because of desertions, high casualty rates and a lack of new recruits.

“The blame game must stop now,” Campbell said. “If I hear one more policeman complain about the army or vice versa, I will pull my advisers immediately. It’s over. You’re Afghans first. Work together.”

Soldiers and police officers on the front lines say they face an enemy that is well trained and equipped with heavy artillery and machine guns, rockets and mortars — and a seemingly endless supply of ammunition. Taliban snipers now have night-vision scopes on their rifles. And as they have overrun bases, the militants have seized an arsenal of U.S. weaponry provided to the Afghans.

Nabil said the insurgents have night-vision goggles and have captured more than 45 Humvees in Helmand. They also have Russian-made ZSU antiaircraft guns with night capability, an abundant supply of mortars and a communications network that is difficult to infiltrate.

Stakes grow higher

U.S. Special Operations troops arrived in early November at an empty school in Chanjar, a front line about 15 miles west of the provincial capital. The walls of the compound bore the impact of shells the size of baseballs. A group of soldiers and police officers was stationed there. Taliban militants were in houses less than 20 yards away.

“The Americans told us that they wanted to push the Taliban back,” recalled Sgt. Abdul Mohamad. “They were here to give coordinates for an airstrike.”

But the Taliban fired a mortar, the men said, wounding one of the Americans. The Americans quickly left the area, in Nad Ali district, with their injured comrade.

Lawhorn, the U.S. military spokesman, confirmed that a U.S. coalition member was injured in the district Nov. 4.

Brig. Gen. Wilson Shoffner, the U.S. military’s top spokesman, said in an interview that U.S. troops were adhering to their limited mandate of “train, advise and assist” and that their Afghan counterparts were taking the lead.

But Afghans, including senior military officials, no longer even pretend that they can fight the Taliban effectively on their own.

“When the foreigners were here, we had plenty of facilities and equipment,” said 1st Lt. Naseer Ahmad Sahel, 30, a civil-order police company commander who was wounded last month in a firefight in Marja. “There were 100 cameras overlooking Marja alone.”

Faqir, the commander of the 215th Corps, said, “We don’t have the air support that we should have.”

As the fighting intensifies, the stakes are growing higher for the United States in its longest war. “I will not allow Helmand to fall,” Campbell told the Afghan officials in the recent meeting with the Afghan National Security Council. “But I can’t make you fight. You’ve got to want it more than we do.”

US-Iranian-Russian-Iraqi offensive launched to recover Ramadi from ISIS

December 22, 2015

US-Iranian-Russian-Iraqi offensive launched to recover Ramadi from ISIS, DEBKAfile, December 22, 2015

Ramadi_Map

Ramadi, the capital of the vast Anbar Province, was the second major Iraqi city to fall to the Islamic State after the devastating loss of Mosul. The importance of the offensive launched Tuesday, Dec. 22 for its recapture from ISIS lies chiefly in the makeup of the assault force, which is unique in contemporary Syrian and Iraqi conflicts.

DEBKAfile’s military sources name its partners as US and Russian army and air force elements, two varieties of Iraqi militia – Shiites under Iranian command and Sunnis, as well as the regular Iraqi army.

The Iraqi army is depicted as leading the assault. But this is only a sop to its lost honor for letting this Sunni city fall in the first place. The real command is in the hands of US Special Operations officers alongside Iraqi troops, and the Russian officers posted at the operational command center they established last month in Baghdad.

This Russian war room is in communication with US military headquarters in the Iraqi capital. It is from the Russian war room that the top commanders of the pro-Iranian militias send their orders. The most prominent is Abu Mahadi al-Muhandis, who heads the largest Iraqi Shiite militia known as the Popular Mobilization Committee.

Noting another first, our military sources disclose that Iranian officers liaise between the Americans and Russians on the front against ISIS. If this combination works for Ramadi, it will not doubt be transposed to the Syrian front and eventually, perhaps next summer, serve as the format for the general offensive the Americans are planning for wresting Mosul from the Islamic State.

When US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter was in Baghdad last week to review the final preparations for the Ramadi operation, US officials were still insisting that the Iraqi army was fit for the heavy lifting after being trained by American instructors.

By Tuesday, US sources were admitting that pro-Iranian militias were also part of the operation.

DEBKAfile’s military sources report on the division of tasks as follows:

Iraqi army forces are attacking the Ramadi city center from the north; Shiite militias from the south. The US air force is pounding ISIS targets inside the town in order to cripple its ability to fight off the oncoming forces. The Russian air force is standing by, ready to destroy any ISIS reinforcements attempting to cross in from Syria to aid their comrades in beleaguered Ramadi.

Experts keeping track of the offensive have no doubt that it will end in success. The jihadists holding Ramadi are few in number – 400-500 fighters at most. However, cleansing the town after victory will presents a daunting difficulty. In Tikrit and the refinery town of Baiji, ISIS split its defense structure into two levels – one on the surface and the second hidden underground.

The top level was thinly manned by fighting strength, but crawling with mines, booby-trapped trucks and IEDs detonated by remote control.

The lower level, consisting of deeply-dug interconnected tunnel systems, was where ISIS fighters hid out and jump out at night for attacks. According to the experience gained in other Iraqi battle arenas against ISIS, neither the Iraqi army nor local Shiite militias have been able to plumb and destroy these tunnel systems. And so they could never really purge the Islamic State from “liberated” towns.

Ramadi will face the same quandary.

The stories we tell ourselves – South China Sea.

November 6, 2015

The stories we tell ourselves, Foreign Policy Situation Report, November 6, 2015

It appeared to be a simple enough story, but over the last week, Pentagon and Obama administration officials have struggled to explain exactly what the USS Lassen did when it sailed near Subi Reef in the South China Sea. FP’s Dan De Luce and Keith Johnson have been following the ship’s wake, and have found conflicting accounts of what the ship was up to. When questioned by FP, “officials offered conflicting accounts as to whether the ship took steps to directly challenge China’s maritime claims in the strategic waterway — or whether it pulled its punches, tacitly conceding Beijing’s position,” they write.

Good idea, bad P.R. You’ll have to read the story to get a full sense of the linguistic knots the Pentagon is tying itself in, but the crux of the issue is that officials originally insisted the Lassen carried out a “freedom of navigation” operation, which could mean the vessel operated sonar, had its helicopters take off from the deck, or lingered in the area. But some officials weren’t ready to go that far, suggesting the ship might have just sailed through quietly without doing any of those things, making the trip an “innocent passage,” which carries with it the recognition of China’s territorial rights over the area. But doing so would undermine the whole point of the mission in the first place. Read the story.

Fair winds. While debate swirls around what to call the Lassen’s trip, the commanding officer of the ship has been telling reporters that the Chinese warships that shadowed his vessel for 10 days were full of nice, talkative people. Speaking aboard the the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt during Defense Secretary Ash Carter’s visit this week, Cmdr. Robert Francis said the Chinese “were very cordial the entire time … even before and after the Spratly islands transit.” Finally, “when they left us they said, ‘Hey, we’re not going to be with you anymore. Wish you a pleasant voyage. Hope to see you again’.”

Satire | Drones In Syria ‘Serving Strictly In An Advisory Role’

November 2, 2015

Drones In Syria ‘Serving Strictly In An Advisory Role,’ Duffel Blog, November 2, 2015

Drone-ADvisoryUS AIR FORCE PHOTO.

RAQQA, Syria — Recent increases in the tempo and nature of US operations against the Islamic State do not indicate a change in US policy, according to senior US officials, in spite of criticism that the Obama administration escalated the mission in Syria from an advisory role to a more active combat mission.

“Let me be clear: our brave drones are serving in a non-combat role,” White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest said. “Sure they might deliver sweet justice to our jihadi friends, but that’s just ‘leading by example.’”

A Predator drone operating in Syria who uses the pseudonym “Vengeance of Lindsay Graham,” spoke to Duffel Blog last week. “We’re not doing combat. Well, sort of. I led a patrol last week and we came across some ISIS jack-wagons in the clear, but the rebels I was leading weren’t ready. The training model is crawl, walk, run; they were still in a crawl phase but I was sprinting like Usain Bolt, baby!”

Despite this story, administration officials maintain that the Syrian conflict remains a strict train-and-advise mission. According to one Air Force general, who asked for anonymity because he was not authorized to talk trash on the record, “We’re advising the ISIL fighters to die, and we’re training them very quickly.”

“Besides,” Earnest said, “If we said our drones were in combat we’d probably have to get a new Authorization of Force.”

 

Russia warns that Syria war could become a ‘proxy war’

November 1, 2015

Russia warns that Syria war could become a ‘proxy war’ BreitbartJohn J. Xenakis, November 1, 2015

g151031bL-R: Sergei Lavrov, United Nations Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura, and John Kerry in Vienna on Friday (state.gov)

Russia has poured millions of dollars of heavy weapons into Syria, and is now sending in Russian troops to establish bases there. Recently, Russia launched 27 cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea to targets in Syria. Iran is pouring new troops into Syria. Iran has also given Lebanon’s Hezbollah terrorist group a great deal of money, and Hezbollah has sent thousands of troops into Syria to support Syria’s president Bashar al-Assad.

Al-Assad’s genocidal attacks on innocent Syrian Sunnis, killing hundreds of thousands and forcing millions from their homes, has caused Sunni jihadists from all of the world to fight against al-Assad, Russia, Hezbollah, and Iran in Syria. Along the way, these jihadists formed the so-called Islamic State (IS or ISIS or ISIL or Daesh).

And now, on Friday, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made a pronouncement that Barack Obama was going to trigger a “proxy war” in Syria by sending in 50 special operations forces, as we reported yesterday.

You can’t make this stuff up.

Thanks to Iran, Russia, al-Assad and Hezbollah, there are now tens of thousands of foreign troops fighting each other in Syria, with al-Assad in particular supported by massive amounts of foreign weapons.

But somehow, those tens of thousands of foreign fighters don’t make it a “proxy war,” but America’s 50 special forces troops do.

You can’t trust any garbage that comes out of Lavrov’s mouth, or out of al-Assad’s mouth, or out of Vladimir Putin’s mouth, but I listen to BBC, al-Jazeera, FOX, CNN, and other media sources all the time, and I see these news anchors report this crap with a straight face all the time. I don’t know whether it is more sickening to watch those fatuous news anchors, or to watch the fawning Secretary of State John Kerry suck up to Lavrov and Putin, which has happened in issues involving Ukraine, Iran’s nuclear development, and Syria.

All this verbiage is coming out of a meeting in Vienna whose purpose is to find a “political solution” to the Syria problem. With hundreds of thousands of Syrian migrants pouring into Europe, and with hundreds of ISIS militants returning to Russia to fight Putin, there is a lot of pressure to find a “political solution.” But this week’s announcement that Iran will fully enter the war in Syria on the side of the Syrian regime makes any “political solution” farther away than ever. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries will never agree to anything like the emerging situation. Actions by Russia and Iran, intervening militarily in Syria, is an emerging disaster, likely triggering a sectarian Sunni versus Shia war throughout the region. BBC and International Business Times and Reuters

Syria’s civil war and Generational Dynamics

In the 12 years that I’ve been doing this, I’ve posted about 4,000 articles with hundreds of Generational Dynamics predictions.

In 2011, when the Syrian civil war began, I said that the war should fizzle within a year or two. Of all the hundreds of Generational Dynamics predictions, this is the one where I’ve clearly been (depending on how you look at it) either wrong or poorly described.

Syria’s last generational crisis war was civil war that climaxed in 1982 with the massacre at Hama. There was a massive uprising of the 400,000 mostly Sunni citizens of Hama against Syria’s president Hafez Assad, the current president’s father. In February, 1982, Assad turned the town to rubble, 40,000 deaths and 100,000 expelled. Hama stands as a defining moment in the Middle East. It is regarded as perhaps the single deadliest act by any Arab government against its own people in the modern Middle East, a shadow that haunts the Assad regime to this day.

(As a related matter, the civil war in Lebanon also climaxed that year, with the bloody massacre at Sabra and Shatila occurring in September 1982. And it occurred as the Iran/Iraq war was ongoing, three years after Iran’s bloody Great Islamic Revolution in 1979. At that time, much of the Mideast was re-fighting World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, 60 years earlier.)

So, in 2011, I said that the civil war in Syria would fizzle, and could not turn into a crisis civil war. And that’s both wrong and true. There are too many survivors who remember the 1982 slaughter, and do not want to see it repeated. And so there’s been no massive anti-government uprising, as there was in 1982, and Bashar al-Assad’s Shia/Alawite troops have been fighting half-heartedly, with many soldiers defecting or deserting.

But the war did not fizzle.

It should have fizzled in 2011 or 2012, but Hezbollah and Iran starting pouring troops in to support al-Assad. And foreign fighters from around the world arrived to fight al-Assad and to form ISIS. That’s not something that Generational Dynamics could have predicted.

Earlier this year, it looked like al-Assad’s army was near collapse. In July, a desperate al-Assad gave a national speech in which he admitted he was losing. The war should have fizzled this year. But now, Russia and Iran are pouring tens of thousands more troops into Iran to bolster al-Assad. And that also is not something that Generational Dynamics could have predicted.

So the problem for me is: How should I have characterized the situation in 2011? The prediction that it wouldn’t turn into a crisis civil war was correct, but the war did not fizzle, because it turned into a proxy war.

Well, I don’t think there’ll be a next time, but if there is, I’ll try to characterize the situation differently, without simply using the word “fizzle.” NPR (1-Feb-2012)

Generational Dynamics and crisis civil wars

I write about a number of civil wars going on in the world today, so this is a good time to discuss civil wars from the point of view of Generational Dynamics.

Among generational crisis wars, an external war is fundamentally different than a civil war between two ethnic groups. If two ethnic groups have lived together in peace for decades, have intermarried and worked together, and then there is a civil war where one of these ethnic groups tortures, massacres and slaughters their next-door neighbors in the other ethnic group, then the outcome will be fundamentally different than if the same torture and slaughter is rendered by an external group. In either case, the country will spend the Recovery Era setting up rules and institutions designed to prevent any such war from occurring again. But in one case, the country will enter the Awakening era unified, except for generational political differences, and in the other case, the country will be increasingly torn along the same ethnic fault line.

The period following the climax of a crisis war is called the “Recovery Era.” One path that the Recovery Era can take is that the leader of one ethnic group decides that the only way to prevent a new civil war is for him to stay in power, and to respond to peaceful anti-government demonstrations by conducting massive bloody genocide, torture and slaughter of the other ethnic group, in order to maintain the peace. (Dear Reader, I assume you’ve grasped the irony of the last sentence.)

For example, in a July article about Burundi, I described how Burundi’s Hutu president Pierre Nkurunziza was using such violence to quell Tutsi protests, supposedly to avoid a repeat of the 1994 Rwandi-Burundi genocidal war between Hutus and Tutsis.

As another example, in a June article about Zimbabwe, I described how Zimbabwe’s president Robert Mugabe was even worse. His 1984 pacification campaign was known as “Operation Gukurahundi” (The rain that washes away the chaff before the spring rain). During that campaign, accomplished with the help of Mugabe’s 5th Brigade, trained by North Korea, tens of thousands of people, mostly from the Ndebele tribe, were tortured and slaughtered. Later, Mugabe single-handedly destroyed the country’s economy by driving all the white farmers off the farms, resulting in one of the biggest hyperinflation episodes in world history.

That is what Bashar al-Assad is doing in Syria. Fearing a Sunni uprising, like the one in 1982, al-Assad is conducting a massive “peace campaign” by slaughtering and displacing millions of innocent Sunnis. As I wrote above, this should have fizzled in 2011 or 2012, but it’s turned into a proxy war, and it’s a disaster for the Mideast and the world.

But none of the above three examples is a crisis civil war. A crisis war has to come from the people, not from the politicians. So, for example, there’s a massive crisis civil war going on today in Central African Republic (CAR), between the Muslim ex-Seleka militias fighting Christian anti-Balaka militias.

Unlike the previous examples, CAR is in a generational Crisis era. CAR’s last generational crisis war was the 1928-1931 Kongo-Wara Rebellion (“War of the Hoe Handle”), which was a very long time ago, putting CAR today deep into a generational Crisis era, where a new crisis war is increasingly likely. That’s why the CAR is a genuine crisis civil war, and won’t fizzle out. In fact, it won’t end until it has reached some kind of explosive conclusion — of the kind we described in Hama or Sabra and Shatila. ( “2-Oct-15 World View — Violence resurges in Central African Republic crisis war”)

Generational Dynamics and war between Palestinians and Israelis

I’ll discuss one more example — not a civil war, but very similar to a civil war, with the same kinds of issues.

In the last few years, there have been three non-crisis wars between Israelis and Palestinians in Gaza. In each case, the Israelis destroyed Hamas’s infrastructure, ending the war. The war began again each time when Hamas’s infrastructure was rebuilt.

But the point I want to make is that these three non-crisis wars were all directed by politicians. Palestinians attacked when the leadership told them to, and stopped attacking when the leadership told them to stop.

What I have been describing in numerous articles recently is that there is emerging a major, fundamental, historic change.

In the emerging situation, young people today are no longer willing to listen to these leaders. According to the CIA World Fact Book, 20% of Gaza’s population are in the 15-24 age range, and so are 21% of the West Bank — about 200,000 males in each territory, or 400,000 young males total.

On the Israeli side, there are over 600,000 young males in the same age range. There have been unconfirmed reports of young Israelis also disgusted with the leadership. It is possible that, like the young Palestinians, they are willing to take matters into their own hands.

So in this environment, what could happen next? The last three Gaza wars were non-crisis wars, but the next one could be a crisis war between Israelis and Palestinians.

How can a crisis war begin? How about if those 200,000 young male Gazans blow holes in the walls, pour across into Israel and start killing Israeli citizens en masse in their homes and villages? And how about if they are joined by those 200,000 young male Palestinians on the West Bank, who start with the Jewish settlers and continue with the Jews in Jerusalem. And how about if the young Israeli males strike back and start killing Palestinians in their homes and villages?

Israel’s tanks and bombers would not be of much use. You can’t bomb Jerusalem, and you can’t bomb Israeli villages and settlements to kill Palestinians.

That is the difference. That is what a generational crisis war is like. It is not two tanks shooting at each other. It is hand to hand combat in homes, neighborhoods and streets by people armed with sticks and knives. It is what happened in Central African Republic last year, it is what happened in Rwanda in 1994, in Bosnia in 1994, and in Palestine in 1947.

And by the way, that assumes that the bloody mess stays confined to Israel and the Palestinian territories. The Palestinians are likely to be joined by tens or hundreds of thousands from Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt.

The recent widely reported changes in the attitudes and behaviors of young Palestinians is a sign that this kind generational crisis war is coming.

Putin has no long term strategy, says administration w/no long term strategy

October 31, 2015

Putin has no long term strategy, says administration w/no long term strategy, Front Page Magazine, Daniel Greenfield, October 31, 2015

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This is an administration that believes you win wars with word games

Obama claimed that Putin is acting in Syria out of weakness and is being all reactive. Then he reacted by shipping weapons to Sunni rebels, a move he had originally rejected, and sending American soldiers into combat as boots on the ground.

Now DNI James Clapper is claiming that Putin is being impulsive and has no long term strategy. This comes from an administration that changed its mind several times about intervening in the Syrian Civil War and keeps saying it still doesn’t have a plan for defeating ISIS.

Clapper said Putin was “very impulsive and opportunistic” as he increased Russian support for close ally President Bashar al-Assad in Syria’s roiling civil war.

“I personally question whether he has some long-term strategy or whether he is being very opportunistic on a day-to-day basis,” Clapper told CNN’s Jim Sciutto. “And I think his intervention into Syria is another manifestation of that.”

Being “opportunistic” is actually how real life battles are fought. You have a strategy, but you seize advantages based on the evolving situation on the ground.

So far Putin’s long term strategy has been to expand Russian influence in the region. It’s working really well. Russia is back to being the regional alternative to the US. It’s securing strategic territories and its allies are expanding their sphere of influence.

On top of that, Putin managed to avert US air strikes on Assad with his fake WMD deal. Then he helped Iran secure its nuclear weapons program with the Iran deal. (I’ll grant that he had a lot of help from Obama and Kerry there.) Now he’s angling to get Obama on board a peace deal that keeps Assad in power and ends US support for the rebellion. Considering this administration’s foreign policy track record, he’ll probably get his way. While the administration clown car taunts him as weak and opportunistic and reactive and impulsive.

In the Cold War, the Soviets trash talked while the US got things done. Under Obama, the US talks trash and Russia gets things done. But this is an administration that believes you win wars with word games.

How is that working out for them?