The status quo survives in France, but in ruins

Posted April 25, 2017 by danmillerinpanama
Categories: Deplorables, French elections, Immanuel Macron, Marine Le Pen

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The status quo survives in France, but in ruins, The Washington TimesWesley Pruden, April 24, 2017

Marine Le Pen (Associated Press)

Madame Le Pen will make a lot of these people very uncomfortable over the next fortnight, if in the end she cannot shake her father’s rough reputation written in a presidential campaign before hers. But the deplorables of France, like the deplorables in America, are not going away. Other seasons will produce other candidates. Things must change to stay the same.

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The French easily embrace contradiction and chaos. It’s what makes their politics work: “Plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose,” and they said it first: “The more things change, the more they stay the same.” The Sunday national election in France proved it again.

The two established political parties finished far out of the money, and Immanuel Macron, the new front-runner, is a banker who is the preferred candidate of the current Socialist president, Francois Hollande, who is so unpopular that he was the first president not to stand for re-election since World War II. He was so unpopular, in fact, that he didn’t publicly endorse M. Macron lest it be the kiss of death.

M. Macron polled 24 percent of the vote in the first round, barely 2 percent more than Marine Le Pen, the most charismatic candidate but who is counted out in the May 7 run-off because she is thought to be too far to the right of everybody else. The only left-wing candidate thought to have a chance to make the run-off was Jean-Luc Melenchon, who wanted to lead France out of the European Union and NATO and join Cuba and Venezuela and Cuba in something called the “Bolivarian Alliance.” In addition to chaotic, French politics can be ideologically nuts.

Everybody counts Marine Le Pen out, and conventional wisdom is often but not always wrong. The public-opinion polls were wrong in predicting the outcome of the referendum of the British vote to leave the European Union, and of course spectacularly, dramatically, comically, farcically, tragically (pick your adjective) and famously wrong in crowning Hillary Clinton the first woman as president of the United States.

The closest thing to a “normal,” i.e., conventional, candidate was Francois Fillon, a former prime minister who posed as a disciple of Maggie Thatcher and who was nevertheless regarded by many of the elites as respectable enough. But there were skeletons in his closet and he couldn’t keep the closet door shut. Scandal followed scandal. There’s a current investigation now in the juiciest of these, his paying of more than $1 million in government money to his wife and others in his family who were hired as “parliamentary assistants.” He didn’t even have to teach them to type.

In the end, he emerged as the status-quo candidate of an electorate yearning for someone to upset the status quo. He’s young, energetic and attractive, and naturally compared to the icon of charisma, John F. Kennedy. JFK was a long time ago, but political writers on both sides of the Atlantic are fond of cliches.

M. Macron goes into the run-off with Marine Le Pen all but staggering under great expectations and good wishes of “respectable” institutions and individuals who are terrified of Madame Le Pen and what would be the “deplorables” of Hillaryworld. Nice people don’t let nice people vote for candidates who aren’t very nice, neither here nor there. Lightning of a rare and serious kind would have to strike and lightning in France is not like the lightning of what the French, with a sneer, call “the Anglo-Saxons.” In the French vernacular, everyone else, like it or not, are “Anglo-Saxons.”

But the French world, like the world of everyone else, has been turned upside down, and making sense of elections is difficult. The usual beliefs and values of ordinary Frenchmen — the certainty that French culture, the verities of the permanently true, the very ideal of French citizenship — have been called into question. One inquirer into the nooks and shadows of the French election campaign, Charlie Cook of City Journal, writes that ordinary Frenchmen he encountered were reluctant to talk about politics lest they fall into the “many trapdoors of political conversation,” especially voters of the National Front.

That would be the party of Marine Le Pen, who has made talking about the forbidden in polite parlors possible for the brave and daring. She campaigns boldly in defense of borders and national identity, opposes the mass migration that is strangling French identity, and national sovereignty and the transfer the authority of national governments to international bodies.

These are the values and considerations that the elites, in France as in Britain and the United States, don’t want to talk about and don’t want anyone else to talk about. Silence won’t make them go away, but the wealthy and the well-connected can still live lives oblivious to things unpleasant.

Madame Le Pen will make a lot of these people very uncomfortable over the next fortnight, if in the end she cannot shake her father’s rough reputation written in a presidential campaign before hers. But the deplorables of France, like the deplorables in America, are not going away. Other seasons will produce other candidates. Things must change to stay the same.

Israel appoints country’s first female Sharia judge Hana Khatib

Posted April 25, 2017 by danmillerinpanama
Categories: Israeli female judge on Sharia court, Israeli religious courts, Israeli Shari courts

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Israel appoints country’s first female Sharia judge Hana Khatib, Al Arabiya, April 25, 2017

(How will Muslim men in Israel feel about this? — DM)

Hana Khatib is the first woman not only for the Muslim sharia courts but for all the religious courts in Israel, as no women serve as judges in the Jewish or Druze courts. (via Israel’s Justice Ministry)

Israel has appointed its first female judge in its Muslim sharia court system on Tuesday, officials said, a move hailed as historic.

Hana Khatib, an attorney from the northern town of Tamra, was selected by an Israeli justice committee alongside three men to become a religious judge, or qadi, in the courts ruling on personal law for Muslims inside Israel.

Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked, from the far-right Jewish Home party and head of the committee that selected Khatib, said the appointment of a female religious judge “should have happened a long time ago.”

“This is great news for Arab women and the Arab society,” she said in a statement.

“I’m excited over the choice, and hope this is the bellwether for further appointments of women.”

Aida Touma-Sliman, a female Arab lawmaker from the Joint List coalition, called Khatib’s appointment “a historic move” that was the result of a long legal struggle, adding it would benefit all Arabs in Israel.

“It’s time to believe in the power of Arab women in filling any role, making decisions and being in positions of influence in society and state, and removing the obstacles from the way,” she said in a statement.

In Israel, family law — divorce, marriage, endowments — falls under the jurisdiction of religious courts, and separate systems exist for the country’s different creeds.

Khatib is the first woman not only for the Muslim sharia courts but for all the religious courts in Israel, as no women serve as judges in the Jewish or Druze courts.

There are not many women qadis around the world. Two women serve as sharia judges in the neighboring Palestinian Authority.

Khatib will be sworn in by Israeli President Reuven Rivlin in a few weeks.

There are nine regional sharia courts in Israel as well as an appeal courts, with today’s appointments bringing the number of qadis in the Muslim system to 18.

Obama Denounces “Special Interests” At The University of Chicago . . . And Then Quietly Accepts $400,000 For First Speech From Wall Street Special Interests

Posted April 25, 2017 by danmillerinpanama
Categories: Hypocrisy, Obama post-presidency

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Obama Denounces “Special Interests” At The University of Chicago . . . And Then Quietly Accepts $400,000 For First Speech From Wall Street Special Interests, Jonatan Turley’s Blog, Jonathan Turley, April 25, 2017

(Obama learned much from Bill and Hillary. — DM)

President Barack Obama was at my alma mater yesterday and used his first public statements to decry how  “special interests dominate the debates in Washington.” Then will now be setting off for his first speech . . . to Wall Street special interests at Cantor Fitzgerald, which will pay him $400,000.  This is the same politician who called such banks “fat cats” who exercise undue influence over our leaders.

Cantor Fitzgerald, a bank, has been touting how it is making a killing on health care investments.  Now, the man who created the health care program will be receiving almost half a million dollars for a single brief speech.  It raises visions of Hillary Clinton who cashed in on Wall Street  speeches while denouncing the influence of Wall Street (and later refused to disclose the content of those speeches to the public).

One distinction is that Hillary pulled in only half of what Obama is demanding from Wall Street and powerful interests.

Of course, Obama was criticized for the level of influence of both Wall Street investors and powerful lobbies like the pharmaceutical industry on his policies. He was accused of packing his administration with lobbyists and breaking his promises on limiting the power of lobbies.

What is hilarious about our current system is that we have all of these bribery and influence peddling laws in place.  However, if Wall Street or lobbyists give a former president half a million dollars for less than one hour of speaking soon after leaving office, it is entirely acceptable from a legal standpoint. So long as there is no quid pro quo, there is nothing legal wrong with absurd amounts of money going to a president as soon as he leaves office.  At this rate, just 100 hours of work will put Obama near the $100 million goal surpassed by the Clintons, who virtually walked around with credit card swipers on their belt to facilitate payments from special interests.

In his speech, Obama encouraged people to work on the community level to influence change.  He appears to be starting with the small Wall Street community of influence peddlers in his own quest for social justice.

Germany: Iran Plotting Terror on Jewish and Israeli Targets

Posted April 25, 2017 by danmillerinpanama
Categories: Iran - illegal importation of dual-use nuclear material, Iran - world's worst sponsor of terrorism, Iran and Europe, Iran and Hezbollah, Iran and Israel, Iran and Jews, Iranian proxies, Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Quds Force

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Germany: Iran Plotting Terror on Jewish and Israeli Targets, Investigative Project on Terrorism, April 24, 2017

Last month, Bahrain security authorities arrested members of an Iranian-sponsored terrorist cell, accusing them of planning to assassinate senior government officials. The IRGC reportedly provided military training to several cell members.

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Iran is responsible for a significant amount of espionage activity in Germany over the past decade, and is responsible for planning terrorist attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets, the Jerusalem Post reports.

In a letter sent to a Left Party deputy from German’s interior ministry, the federal government launched 22 criminal investigations concerning Iran’s illegal espionage activity – more than China and Turkey who were suspected in 15 spy cases each. Only Russia, with 27 cases, is involved in more suspected espionage activity than Iran.

In one case, German prosecutors allege that Haidar Syed-Naqfi was ordered to identify Jewish and Israeli institutions in Germany and other Western European countries as potential targets for terrorist attacks. For example, he was accused of monitoring the headquarters of a Jewish newspaper in Berlin. Syed-Naqfi also identified several Israel supporters, including the former chief of the German-Israel Friendship Society and a French-Israeli business professor. German authorities believe his preparations were “a clear indication of an assassination attempt.”

Between July 2015 and July 2016, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps’ (IRGC) al-Quds Force paid Syed-Naqi more than $2,200.

Half of Germany’s state governments reported Iranian attempts to acquire material related to nuclear activities in 2015, the Post reports. An examination of intelligence sources in 2016 also produced new revelations surrounding Iran’s chemical and biological weapons programs.

Iran pursued German businesses in the Rhineland-Palatinate state seeking dual-use goods that could be “used for atomic, biological and chemical weapons in a war,” according to that state’s intelligence report.

An estimated 250 active Iranian-backed Hizballah operatives, out of about 950 Hizballah members throughout Germany, according to a 2014 Berlin intelligence report summarized by the Post.

Last month, Bahrain security authorities arrested members of an Iranian-sponsored terrorist cell, accusing them of planning to assassinate senior government officials. The IRGC reportedly provided military training to several cell members.

Iran has been accused of plotting terrorist attacks in recent years – mainly through proxies like Hizballah and IRGC’s Quds Force – in countries such as Egypt, Cyprus, Georgia, Thailand, India and others. In July 2012, a bus bomb widely attributed to Hizballah killed five Israeli tourists and a bus driver in Bulgaria.

In October 2011, the United Stated disrupted an Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador in Washington D.C. and bomb the Saudi and Israeli embassies in the U.S. capital.

Thunder Run to Seoul: Assessing North Korea’s War Plan

Posted April 25, 2017 by danmillerinpanama
Categories: China and North Korea, North - South Korean war

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Thunder Run to Seoul: Assessing North Korea’s War Plan, Real Clear DefenseRaymond Farrell, April 25, 2017

(A North Korean invasion seems highly unlikely for several reasons.

By 1950, Kim Il-sung had convinced Stalin that an invasion would be relatively easy because Dean Atcheson, the U.S. Secretary of State, had omitted South Korea from a list of countries the U.S. would defend if attacked. (When North Korea attacked, Atcheson advised President Truman to defend South Korea.)  Moreover, the few U.S. troops in South Korea when the invasion occurred were under the control of the State Department, not the U.S. military, and their primary job was to prevent South Korea from invading North Korea. The South Korean troops were, at best, largely untrained and poorly equipped. Stalin accordingly provided substantial new equipment, training and logistical support to the North Korean troops. Now, there are now approximately 28,000 U.S. military personnel in South Korea and many of them train on a regular basis with their well equipped South Korean counterparts.  

China has warned that although it will take no action to help North Korea unless the U.S. invades. It seems highly unlikely that we will do so, unless North Korea invades South Korea first. That suggests that to prevent a retaliatory US invasion of North Korea, possibly resulting in US forces approaching the Yalu river (which brought China into the fight against US and allied troops), China will take whatever steps may be necessary, perhaps even invading North Korea herself, to prevent North Korea from crossing the DMZ into South Korea. Kim Jong-un-may be crazy, but he does not appear to be stupid.- DM)

 

AP Photo/Wong Maye-E

For Westerners, North Korea is perennially on and off of the headlines. This year, the confluence of a new US president, the US missile attack in response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria, and an apparently in-your-face program of missile and nuclear tests on the part of North Korea has returned the world’s last Stalinist state to comment threads and coffee-room speculation. Military professionals obviously follow these events even more closely, and Maj. ML Cavanaugh’s recent thoughtful pieces for MWI serve as an example.

But for military planners in South Korea (the Republic of Korea or ROK) and the United States, planning for war with North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) has been constant since the last Korean War ended in 1953. Indeed many will be aware that the Korean War ended in an armistice only, rather than a formal peace treaty, so that the two sides remain technically at war. An interesting consequence of this is that while Western military staff colleges spend a great deal of time studying strategy and campaign design, ROK planners focus purely on one strategic problem and one campaign: Korean War II.

While there are some variables, ROK (and DPRK) leaders know who their enemy will be, what his capabilities are, what the war aims of each side will be, and under what terrain, weather and population conditions they must fight. It is therefore possible to wargame the campaign with an unusual degree of precision. Based on my studies as an exchange officer at ROK Army Staff College and training with US planners, I am convinced that the combined ROK/US forces would quickly win the military conflict, though it would be hard-fought and civilian casualties would be high. But what is the ROK estimate of how such a war would unfold? And what are the major assumptions and variables that might alter that story?

The China Wildcard

The first and biggest assumption is that China would not intervene. It is of course possible that renewed fighting on the Korean peninsula could arise as a consequence of Sino-US conflict elsewhere. On one hand, this scenario is actually better for the defending ROK/US forces since the outbreak of Sino-US conflict elsewhere would presumably trigger heightened readiness in South Korea and this would eliminate one of the main pillars of North Korea’s war strategy—operational surprise. On the other hand, even limited war elsewhere in Asia would reduce the numbers of US forces available to fight in Korea and threaten ROK/US plans to establish air supremacy over the peninsula.

Regardless of how war breaks out, a Korean campaign would still most likely begin the same way: with an attack by in-place North Korean forces which will likely be defeated. Once that initial attack is absorbed and ROK forces have been fully mobilized, ROK/US forces will be in a position to go over to the offensive, advance into North Korea, and decisively defeat DPRK forces. The main factor that will determine the later outcome is the potential presence of Chinese forces: If China stays out, expect a fairly quick defeat of North Korean forces, and presumably the regime. But Chinese intervention would probably result in the war becoming stalemated just as the first conflict did. The terrain in Korea favors defense and limits the forces which can be employed, so that with Chinese forces committed, neither side could be expected to achieve a decisive advantage.

It is also possible to imagine scenarios in which China signals a willingness to intervene—or actually intervenes—to prevent the complete collapse of a DPRK that has been defeated on the battlefield. These kinds of what-happens-once-we-defeat-Kim problems are difficult and professionally fascinating, but this article is concerned with how we get there and so will assume that, whatever diplomatic end-game is developing off-stage, China has not intervened in any significant way.

The North’s Attack Plan

So what would the initial North Korean attack look like? Unlike in 1950, when Soviet, Chinese and North Korean planners had a realistic prospect of conquering South Korea in a war, an attack today has only a small chance of victory within a narrow time window. In 1950, DPRK forces enjoyed large initial advantages in numbers, troop quality, and all classes of equipment including tanks and aircraft. Today all of those initial advantages except artillery and numbers are on our side, and even the numbers are more balanced. DPRK planners recognize their inferiority in technology and, after ROK mobilization, even in numbers. They understand that ROK/US forces will have air superiority initially, and (unless China intervenes) air supremacy within days. They therefore plan to win by striking quickly, by surprise, while ROK forces are still mobilizing, US reinforcements are not yet in theatre, and while our airpower is largely committed to overcoming the DPRK integrated air defense system and targeting WMD storage sites, launchers, and command, control, and communications (C3) networks.

Recognizing that ROK forces will be on some degree of heightened readiness during a crisis, the regime will use its formidable intelligence and special operations capability to obscure preparations for an attack and slow ROK responses. Its own past history of symbolic attacks, placing its forces on alert, and angry promises to destroy its enemies will actually work in its favor in this case: ROK/US intelligence agencies will expect some kind of posturing from the North and may therefore misidentify attack preparations as lesser actions. DPRK agents will also count on the psychological reluctance of the South Korean population and government to believe that war is imminent. They will actively seek to influence the ROK democratic decision-making process to get inside our decision cycle. In particular, ROK mobilization will require a political decision and every hour of delay imposed through threats, deception, information and cyber attacks, or direct action will have consequences. In the end, even if ROK/US commanders do recognize the signs of an attack before it begins, it will still take time to react. In that time, DPRK commanders hope to win.

There will be no need for detailed orders. Just as ROK forces know and rehearse their war plan, DPRK forces are largely in place, in numbers sufficient to achieve some local breakthroughs on the major routes towards Seoul—their first operational objective. North Korea will hope to begin mobilization before South Korea does, and thereby turn their currently modest advantage in numbers into a temporarily significant one. DPRK forces will rely, Soviet-style, on the use of overwhelming artillery and rocket fires to break through ROK prepared positions along the DMZ, while using deep fires to attack C3 nodes, routes forward, and mobilization centers. Strikes against targets in Seoul and the surrounding urban areas will have the additional useful effect of causing fear and choking routes with a panicked populace.

On the subject of routes it is worth considering the limited space for mechanized maneuver in central Korea: The eastern half of the peninsula is largely mountainous with roads running along valley floors. The grain of the country will tend to push DPRK forces southwest (towards Seoul). The western half of the peninsula around Seoul and the Han River system is slightly flatter, but at least south of the DMZ the land is now so built up that once major routes come under fire it will be slow going for both sides. It’s not good country for heavy forces, and until recently both sides planned to use mostly lighter infantry to fight on the line. Recent announced changes to ROK force structure see a much greater emphasis on heavy forces—perhaps to get more combat power out of a smaller overall force—but the terrain suggests that such forces will likely be difficult to maneuver. Furthermore, DPRK tactics emphasize the use of infiltration to achieve local penetrations and attack deeper, tactical targets. Their line formations include elite sub-elements specially trained for these tasks, and the terrain—whether urban or forested mountain—is ideal for it. Road-bound heavy forces will be especially susceptible to such tactics.

The final element in the DPRK plan is an extensive deep battle across the entire South Korean depth using some one hundred thousand special operations forces (SOF). An interesting feature of this war is that since both sides look and speak more or less alike, covert insertion and operation is easier for each side—but especially so for North Korean agents who may move freely within South Korea’s open society.

Some DPRK SOF will have been pre-positioned. More will be inserted by sea, air, and ground infiltration shortly before the main attack, exploiting—little-green-men-style—any public uncertainty or national command paralysis for temporary deniability. One of the main tasks for DPRK SOF in this preliminary phase will be to support the deception plan by encouraging and magnifying whatever confusion and chaos may accompany a crisis, and especially to foster political uncertainty and indecision in the critical hours before the main attack. Deniable attacks against political leadership, false-flag provocations, staged anti-war protests, terrorist attacks aimed at causing panic, and limited attacks against key C3 nodes will begin in this stage. This phase could last for days or even weeks, but hours are more likely.

Once DPRK main forces attack across the DMZ, the remaining DPRK SOF will surge south by sea and air towards targets in Seoul and in depth. Many will be destroyed en route by defending ROK forces, and more will be defeated at their objectives, but DPRK planners hope to overwhelm ROK defenses by sheer numbers of SOF and inflict temporary but serious damage while they still have operational surprise. SOF targets in this phase will be national C3 nodes, including political leadership, mobilization centres, airfields, ports and naval bases, and choke points on major routes. As with artillery strikes, fighting by SOF on objectives in Seoul will be aimed at heightening panic and demoralizing political leadership, and will be exploited by DPRK information warfare agencies to give the impression that the front has already reached the ROK capital.

With luck, DPRK planners hope to have main forces entering Seoul within the first week, from which position they can either transition to defense and negotiate from strength or, if conditions permit, push on to decisively defeat ROK forces.

But this plan is very optimistic. ROK planners understand it well and are prepared to counter it. Forces defending along the DMZ are in strong, prepared positions supported by obstacles. ROK C3 is hardened and redundant. Rear-area security forces are substantial and their plans are kept current and rehearsed. Even given some disruption by DPRK SOF, mobilization is expected to generate millions of men within days.

The Unknowns

There are three main variables which might affect this estimate: First, the combat performance of either side cannot be known for certain. My own guess is that ROK forces would fight very well—especially on defense. But there are ways in which North Korea may attempt to undermine ROK morale: Both sides consider the other to be cousins awaiting liberation and this could be used as part of a skillful information operations campaign—particularly if ROK forces seek to advance into the North. The possible combat performance of DPRK forces is even less predictable. On the one hand, the DPRK population has been brainwashed from birth. On the other hand, North Korea’s people fear their own leadership and are often on the brink of starvation. It is possible that they might fight fanatically, but also that, given a chance, they would turn on their leaders. We simply don’t know.

The second main variable is the potential DPRK use of WMD. Finding and killing these will be a high priority for ROK/US commanders, but it is possible that some will survive, especially in the first few days. The North’s leaders may decide to use chemical weapons for battlefield advantage or, if they fail to enter Seoul, may seek to blackmail the ROK government with the possibility of chemical or even nuclear attack against it. Of course the use, or even threatened use, of WMD might invite US retaliation in kind, but a desperate or simply risk-taking Kim regime could gamble that our side would blink first.

The third and related variable is what the DPRK regime would do in defeat. Facing defeat, it is possible that army commanders, or even their troops, would turn on the leadership and depose the regime. On the other hand, if Kim retains enough control over his forces but believes that he is on the brink of being deposed, it is possible that he could—with nothing left to lose—simply unleash whatever WMD he still possesses.

The Takeaway: DPRK Will Make it Ugly

Recognizing that in war nothing ever goes entirely as expected, and that there are some major unknowns, this is based on what we do know about North Korea’s force structure, its comparative strengths, and terrain and other considerations—along with my own assessment of how Korean War II would initially unfold. But regardless of how it played out, one thing is near certain: It would entail horrific destruction and suffering. Tens or hundreds of thousands could become casualties. In defeat, North Korea would become a 25-million strong humanitarian catastrophe. And that is just with conventional weapons: The possible consequences of attacking Seoul with WMD are almost too awful to contemplate. There is a role for force here—a strong ROK/US posture has certainly constrained North Korean aggression for decades—and in no way should DPRK threats be simply acceded to. But under current conditions, and given the scale of likely destruction, planners should strongly question whether each DPRK provocation—even the imminent development of a ICBM—justifies risking such a war.

Karim Cheurfi: From the Cauldron of Prison to the Streets of Paris

Posted April 25, 2017 by danmillerinpanama
Categories: Countering Islamic Extremism, Countering violent extremism, Islamic radicalization

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Karim Cheurfi: From the Cauldron of Prison to the Streets of Paris, Investigative Project on Terrorism, Patrick Dunleavy, April 24, 2017

Despite an acknowledged problem with insufficient training, groups like the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) seek to censor any mention of Islamic radicalization from American law enforcement and military training.

In 2004, the FBI’s official definition of radicalization was “the process of attracting and possibly converting inmates to radical Islam.” They since have been pressured to change the term to “violent extremism.”

Removing warning labels from canisters containing caustic material does not render the substance inside harmless. It only increases the risk of a deadly incident. Toxic waste spills are often the result of carelessness.

Here in the United States, it is imperative that the Justice Department and the FBI revise the Correctional Intelligence Initiative Program to include the proper vetting of clergy and a post release component to track people who were radicalized or previously incarcerated for terrorist crimes. The initiative started in 2003 with a mission to “detect, deter, and disrupt efforts by terrorist and extremist groups to radicalize or recruit within all federal, state, territorial, tribal and local prison populations.”

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The initial reports regarding Islamic terrorist Karim Cheurfi, the man responsible for the latest attack that killed French police officer Xavier Jugele and wounded several others, contained the all-too-familiar phrase – “known to authorities.”

What actually was known? Cheurfi had a predisposition for violence, animosity toward authority – he had tried to kill police officers twice before – and a sense of alienation. They also knew that he had spent a significant period of his life in a place that some authorities called a radicalizing cauldron, the French prison system. Inside those prisons, a small group of Islamic terrorists was effectively radicalizing other inmates who came in as petty criminals with no religious leanings, said Pascal Mailhos, past director of France’s domestic intelligence agency.

Mailhos’ warning proved prophetic as French prisons spawned terrorists like Mohammed Merah, who in 2012 murdered police officers and Jewish school children in Toulouse, and Amedy Coulibaly, who killed a police trainee before storming the Hyper Cacher kosher supermarket and killing four hostages. Charlie Hebdo attacker Said Kouachi, like Karim Cheurfi, came out of the joint radicalized and ready to kill law enforcement, military personnel and innocent civilians in the name of Allah.

This problem is not unique to France. Former inmates who turned to the violent path of jihad plotted or carried out terrorist attacks in the United States, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom.

For some, particularly for those who have spent time in prison, the radicalization process from conversion to violence is more accelerated. “Some individuals, particularly those who convert in prison, may be attracted directly to jihadi violence…for this group, jihad represents a convenient outlet for (their) aggressive behavior,” the Central Intelligence Agency said in a report, “Homegrown Jihad – Pathway to Terrorism.”

When you combine the ingredients of violent aggressive behavior, animosity toward authority, incarceration, and radical Islamic ideology, you will almost certainly produce a deadly toxin. French prosecutor Francois Molins insisted that Cheurfi showed no signs of radicalization prior to the attack. Missing the signs could be the result of bad eyesight or, a lack of training. “We don’t have anyone trained for anti-radicalization,” said David Dulondel, the head of the union representing officers at France’s Fleury-Merogis maximum security prison. “We can’t say whether someone is in the process of radicalizing or not.”

Despite an acknowledged problem with insufficient training, groups like the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) seek to censor any mention of Islamic radicalization from American law enforcement and military training.

In 2004, the FBI’s official definition of radicalization was “the process of attracting and possibly converting inmates to radical Islam.” They since have been pressured to change the term to “violent extremism.”

Removing warning labels from canisters containing caustic material does not render the substance inside harmless. It only increases the risk of a deadly incident. Toxic waste spills are often the result of carelessness.

Prison radicalization should not be treated this way. We must put the tools in place to monitor and control this threat. Others have done it. Following last month’s Westminster Bridge attack by Khalid Masood, British authorities announced the formation of a task force that will combine intelligence, law enforcement, corrections and probation personnel to look at literature, clergy, and other influences available in prisons. The task force will also closely monitor recently released inmates for changes in behavior or association with known radical mosques or people. France, which has suffered its share of jihadi violence carried out by ex-inmates, had to admit that its program to address prison radicalization had been an utter failure. Yet it has not made any significant changes.

Here in the United States, it is imperative that the Justice Department and the FBI revise the Correctional Intelligence Initiative Program to include the proper vetting of clergy and a post release component to track people who were radicalized or previously incarcerated for terrorist crimes. The initiative started in 2003 with a mission to “detect, deter, and disrupt efforts by terrorist and extremist groups to radicalize or recruit within all federal, state, territorial, tribal and local prison populations.”

Failure to effectively address the ongoing threat is not an acceptable option. At some point there will be a price to pay.

Video: Pamela Geller Discussing Islamization of San Diego Schools on One America News

Posted April 25, 2017 by danmillerinpanama
Categories: Academia and Islamists, Academia and the left, CAIR, California public schools, Islamic indoctrination of children, Islamisation

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Video: Pamela Geller Discussing Islamization of San Diego Schools on One America News, Geller Report, April 24, 2017

(Please see also, The U.S. Department of Education has been promoting Islam for years and San Diego School District Pushes CAIR-Assisted ‘Anti-Islamophobia’ Plan. DM)

I appeared on One America News network’s The Daily Ledger to discuss the islamization and madrassing of the San Diego public schools.

The islamization of public schools has been proceeding for many years.

Jewish students are the most bullied, but there are no safe places or Judaism lessons in public school. Or for Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, etc. This is part of the escalation of the islamization of the workplace.

 

 It is telling that the public school district is working with a designated terrorist group, CAIR.

This is nothing short of surrender to a brutal, invading ideology.

Textbook companies have their material on Islam vetted by Islamic groups that turn them into dawah presentations, proselytizing for Islam.

Innumerable textbooks and other material used in public schools today presents a rosy and whitewashed picture of Islam, while being harshly critical of Judaism and Christianity.

Our children are being taught to despise and be ashamed of their own heritage and culture, and to think that any negative word about Islam, even in connection with jihad terror attacks, is racist and Islamophobic. This is a recipe for surrender and subjugation.