H/t The Jewish Press
Posted tagged ‘Iran Scam’
Cartoon of the day
June 16, 2015The Iran scam grows even worse – Part I, Nuke site inspections
June 15, 2015Dan Miller’s Blog, May 15, 2015
(The views expressed in this article are mine and do not necessarily reflect those of Warsclerotic or its other editors. — DM
It is likely that the P5+1 nuke deal with Iran will be approved soon. Military and other nuke sites which Iran has not “disclosed” will not be inspected. Nor will Iran’s nuke ties with North Korea — which P5+1 member China seems to be helping, Iran’s massive support for terrorism and abysmal human rights record be considered because they are also deemed unnecessary for deal approval. Sanctions against Iran are moribund and will not be revived regardless of whether there is a “deal.” However, a bronze bust of Obama may soon be displayed prominently in Supreme Leader Khamenei’s office and one of Khamenei may soon be displayed proudly in Dear Leader Obama’s office.
Part I — Nuke site inspections
According to a June 11, 2015 article by the Middle East Research Institute (MEMRI), Iran’s Supreme Leader has said there will not even be “token” IAEA inspections.
This past week, members of Iran’s nuclear negotiating team revealed details about the Iran-U.S. nuclear negotiations. The negotiations were dealt a blow when Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected an agreement reached by the two sides concerning a token inspection of military facilities and questioning of several nuclear scientists and “military personnel”; these were to be the response to the IAEA’s open dossier on possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program to which Iran has so far refused to respond.
Iranian reports on these developments show that in order to arrive at a comprehensive agreement, the U.S. is willing to forgo actual inspection of Iranian military facilities and to settle for inspection of declared nuclear facilities only, as set forth under the Additional Protocol, while the ongoing monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program will be left to intelligence elements. [Emphasis added.]
Also on June 11th, it was reported that
CIA Director John Brennan likely came to Israel last week to tell Israeli officials that a final nuclear deal with Iran does not have to include a commitment by Tehran to provide access to military bases, or Iranian consent to interview its scientists, a new report by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) said. [Emphasis added.]
On June 12th, Iranian President Rouhani reiterated that
the country will never allow its secrets to be exposed under the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or any other treaty.
“Certainly, Iran will not allow its secrets to be obtained by others under the pretext of implementing the (Additional) Protocol or any other treaty,” President Rouhani said at a press conference in Tehran.
He reaffirmed that foreigners will be denied access not only to Iran’s military secrets but also to secret information in other technological fields.
Here’s a video with comments by Former DIA Director Lt. General Michael Flynn and Ambassador Robert Joseph on Iran’s ballistic missile program and other aspects of the “deal:”
Here’s the Obama administration’s most recent waffle on inspections of Iran’s nuclear sites and sanctions relief:
Although the State Department spokesman waffled, his comments were, unfortunately, at least generally consistent with the January 14, 2014 White House Summary of the framework for subsequent P5+1 negotiations. As I noted here in January of 2014, that summary failed even to mention such military sites as Parchin — even though the IAEA “had reason to think that there had been implosion testing in 2011 but was refused access to inspect” it, Iran’s development and testing of rocketry capable of delivering nuclear warheads and its development and testing of nuclear warheads.
It had been reported on November 27, 2013 that
Despite Tehran’s protestations that it has no intention of ever creating a nuclear weapon, Iran, in fact, has been developing a warhead for some 15 years. That design is now near perfect. [Emphasis added.]
It had been reported on November 28, 2013 that
A top Iranian military leader announced late Tuesday that Iran has developed “indigenous” ballistic missile technology, which could eventually allow it to fire a nuclear payload over great distances. [Emphasis added.]
Why does the White House Summary fail to mention such things? Probably because they are not within the parameters of the November 24, 2013 Joint Plan of Action.
The Joint Plan of Action, — on which the White House Summary seems to have been based — states, in a superficially comforting preamble,
The goal for these negotiations is to reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons. This comprehensive solution would build on these initial measures and result in a final step for a period to be agreed upon and the resolution of concerns. This comprehensive solution would enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the NPT in conformity with its obligations therein. This comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment programme with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the programme. This comprehensive solution would constitute an integrated whole where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. This comprehensive solution would involve a reciprocal, step-bystep process, and would produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions, as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme. [Emphasis added.]
There would be additional steps in between the initial measures and the final step, including, among other things, addressing the UN Security Council resolutions, with a view toward bringing to a satisfactory conclusion the UN Security Council’s consideration of this matter. The E3+3 and Iran will be responsible for conclusion and implementation of mutual near-term measures and the comprehensive solution in good faith. A Joint Commission of E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of the near-term measures and address issues that may arise, with the IAEA responsible for verification of nuclear-related measures. The Joint Commission will work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concern.
However, while the Joint Plan of Action calls for “enhanced monitoring” of Iran’s facilities, its focus is on nuclear enrichment, not Iran’s militarization of nukes.
Enhanced monitoring:
Provision of specified information to the IAEA, including information on Iran’s plans for nuclear facilities, a description of each building on each nuclear site, a description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in specified nuclear activities, information on uranium mines and mills, and information on source material. This information would be provided within three months of the adoption of these measures.
Submission of an updated DIQ for the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40, to the IAEA. Steps to agree with the IAEA on conclusion of the Safeguards Approach for the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40.
Daily IAEA inspector access when inspectors are not present for the purpose of Design Information Verification, Interim Inventory Verification, Physical Inventory Verification, and unannounced inspections, for the purpose of access to offline surveillance records, at Fordow and Natanz.
IAEA inspector managed access to: centrifuge assembly workshops; centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities; and, uranium mines and mills.
Despite Obama’s claims, Iran appears to have increased, not rolled-back, its nuclear enrichment program. According to the New York Times on June 1st,
With only one month left before a deadline to complete a nuclear deal with Iran, international inspectors have reported that Tehran’s stockpile of nuclear fuel increased about 20 percent over the last 18 months of negotiations, partially undercutting the Obama administration’s contention that the Iranian program had been “frozen” during that period.
But Western officials and experts cannot quite figure out why. One possibility is that Iran has run into technical problems that have kept it from converting some of its enriched uranium into fuel rods for reactors, which would make the material essentially unusable for weapons. Another is that it is increasing its stockpile to give it an edge if the negotiations fail.
Here’s an “explanation” by Marie Harf, the “the Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry at the U.S. State Department. . . .”
Iran will not budge on inspection of its military and other sites it has not disclosed and which are claimed by the IAEA to be places where Iran’s weaponization of nukes is likely. The Obama Administration will not budge on permitting Iran to get away with it.
Although Israel has been the only free and democratic nation consistently to oppose the P5+1 “negotiations” and the framework on which they are based from the beginning, France has sometimes opposed Obama’s pursuit of a bad “deal.” Recently, France even demanded the inspection of Iran’s sites as sought by the IAEA and stated that it would not consent to a P5+1 “deal” without them.
However, “the French position creates a problem for President Obama because the deal has to be agreed on by the P5+1, not the ‘P4+1-with-one-vote-in-opposition’.” Of the P5+1 members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus Germany), France appeared to stand alone on this point. However, the linked article suggests that Obama may be trying to use France’s support for a Palestinian state within Israel to convince her to agree that such inspections are unnecessary.
The first story is about France, a member of the P5+1 negotiating a deal with Iran on nuclear capabilities. The French government has expressed increasing concern that the emerging deal is flawed — perhaps fatally.
The other story is that Obama’s
expressed skepticism about the achievability of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement appears to have given way to the French notion that “all other ways have been explored,” and that it is time to let the UN determine parameters for a “big overarching deal.” And, as it happens, the French draft corresponds with the President Obama’s own — strongly held — belief that Israel has to ascribe to the President’s view, despite having just elected a Prime Minister who disagrees.
. . . .
Smash the two stories together, you get an American president supporting France in its efforts to be a major player in the Middle East in exchange for French support of the P5+1 deal with Iran.
In both cases, guess who pays the price: Israel.
The rest of the “free world,” such as it has become, will also pay a hefty price for such a “deal” with Iran.
On a similar note, it was reported on June 9th that
A senior Western diplomat told Ma’ariv in a report published Tuesday that “a diplomatic attack against Israel is expected soon that will surprise even the pessimists in Jerusalem.” [Emphasis added.]
“In the (UN) Security Council, in western capitals and at EU headquarters, they are just waiting for the Iran deal to be signed and for it to be approved by the American Congress,” warned the diplomatic source.
It appears that the waiting period will likely expire in September, at which time a UN General Assembly will open in tandem with the first shots of the diplomatic barrage against Israel.
Diplomatic sources familiar with Western European positions vis-a-vis Israel said the EU already has a list ready, itemizing sanctions against Israel in the fields of trade, agriculture, science and culture. [Emphasis added.]
That list is to be translated into an economic assault – unless Israel presents a new set of concessions it is willing to make for a new round of peace talks, after the last set of talks was torpedoed by the PA signing a unity deal with the Hamas terrorist organization.
“Senior officials in Jerusalem are aware of the existence of sanctions documents at EU headquarters, some of which have even fallen into their hands,” one diplomatic source revealed to Ma’ariv.
Were Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to have agreed with Obama on the Iran nuke “negotiations,” Israel’s punishment by imposing economic sanctions on her as those on Iran cease would now be unlikely.
Obama seems to be happy with any “deal” that Iran is willing to sign, despite Iran’s ongoing nuke militarization, the Iran-North Korea-China connection, Iran’s continued massive support for terrorism and its abysmal human rights record. With such a “deal,” Iran will be able to pursue such goals essentially unimpeded, at least until a different administration takes over in Washington.
(H/t Freedom is just another word.)
Parts II through ?? of this series will be posted over the next several days.
Iran Backs Taliban With Cash and Arms
June 12, 2015Iran Backs Taliban With Cash and Arms, Wall Street Journal, Margherita Stancati, June 11, 2015
The White House-supported international nuclear talks with Iran that are scheduled to finish this month face world-wide criticism for potentially setting up a new regional dynamic in which Tehran, unfettered by punitive economic sanctions and flush with new resources, would be able to pursue an activist agenda through its proxies in and around the Middle East. Tehran’s growing ties to the Taliban is another sign of that, these critics say.
U.S. officials declined to comment specifically about closer Iran-Taliban ties, but have said that its diplomacy with Iran doesn’t alter its concerns about Iran’s destabilizing influence in the region. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said in a recent letter to lawmakers that Iran was the “foremost state sponsor of terrorism.”
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“Iran supplies us with whatever we need,” he said.
Afghan and Western officials say Tehran has quietly increased its supply of weapons, ammunition and funding to the Taliban, and is now recruiting and training their fighters, posing a new threat to Afghanistan’s fragile security.
Iran’s strategy in backing the Taliban is twofold, these officials say: countering U.S. influence in the region and providing a counterweight to Islamic State’s move into the Taliban’s territory in Afghanistan.
The Taliban’s aggressive military push and the new momentum toward peace negotiations between them and Kabul also raises the possibility that some of their members could eventually return to power.
“Iran is betting on the re-emergence of the Taliban,” said a Western diplomat. “They are uncertain about where Afghanistan is heading right now, so they are hedging their bets.”
Iranian officials didn’t respond to requests for comment, but Tehran has repeatedly denied providing financial or military aid to the Taliban in conversations with Afghan and Western officials. “Whenever we discussed it, they would deny it,” a former senior Afghan official said.
The developing Iran-Taliban alliance represents a new complication in Mr. Obama’s plans for both the Middle East and the future of Afghanistan, where the U.S. has been working to curb the Taliban’s role ahead of a planned withdrawal of all but 1,000 U.S. troops at the end of his presidency in 2016. At its peak in 2011 there were 100,000 U.S. troops.
The White House-supported international nuclear talks with Iran that are scheduled to finish this month face world-wide criticism for potentially setting up a new regional dynamic in which Tehran, unfettered by punitive economic sanctions and flush with new resources, would be able to pursue an activist agenda through its proxies in and around the Middle East. Tehran’s growing ties to the Taliban is another sign of that, these critics say.
Rep. Ed Royce (R., Calif.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said Iran’s support to the Taliban could increase if a nuclear deal is signed and Iran wins sanction relief.
“Across the region, Iran is stepping up its support for militants and rebel groups,” Mr. Royce said. “With billions in sanctions relief coming, that support goes into overdrive.”
Sen. John McCain (R., Ariz), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, said Iran’s increased support to the Taliban is a continuation of its aggressive behavior in Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. “This is further evidence of the administration’s continued willful disregard for the facts on the ground in light of Iranian aggression in the region,” he said.
U.S. officials declined to comment specifically about closer Iran-Taliban ties, but have said that its diplomacy with Iran doesn’t alter its concerns about Iran’s destabilizing influence in the region. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said in a recent letter to lawmakers that Iran was the “foremost state sponsor of terrorism.”
The Taliban have long used Pakistani territory as their main recruiting base and headquarters. But Afghan and Western officials say Iran, through its elite Revolutionary Guard Corps, has emerged as an important ally for the Taliban.
What’s more, they say, Tehran is turning to Afghan immigrants within its borders—a tactic it has also used to find new recruits to fight in support of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria.
Mr. Abdullah is one of those Iranian-backed Taliban fighters. After being detained for working as an illegal laborer in the Iranian port city of Bandar Abbas, Mr. Abdullah said he was approached by an Iranian intelligence officer.
“He asked me how much money I made, and that he would double my salary if I went to work for them in Afghanistan,” he said.
Mr. Abdullah said smugglers hired by Iran ferry supplies across the lawless borderlands where Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan meet and deliver them to Taliban units in Afghan territory. He said his fighters receive weapons that include 82mm mortars, light machine guns, AK-47 rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and materials for making roadside bombs.
Military and intelligence officials see Iran’s support to the Taliban as an alliance of convenience. Historically, relations between Iran, a Shiite theocracy, and the hard-line Sunni Taliban have been fraught. Iran nearly went to war against the Taliban regime in 1998 after 10 of its diplomats were killed when their consulate in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif was overrun.
Iran didn’t oppose the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, and it has since maintained friendly relations with the Western-backed government in Kabul.
But Iran has long been uneasy with the U.S. military presence on its doorstep, and the Revolutionary Guard Corps have been delivering weapons to the Taliban since at least 2007, according to an October 2014 report by the U.S. Department of Defense.
Iran’s alliance with the Taliban took a new turn in June 2013 when Tehran formally invited a Taliban delegation to participate in a conference on Islam and to meet senior Iranian officials.
By the fall of that year, Afghan security officials said they had clear evidence that Iran was training Taliban fighters within its borders. Tehran now operates at least four Taliban training camps, according to Afghan officials and Mr. Abdullah, the Taliban commander. They are in the Iranian cities of Tehran, Mashhad and Zahedan and in the province of Kerman.
“At the beginning Iran was supporting Taliban financially,” said a senior Afghan official. “But now they are training and equipping them, too.”
The drawdown of U.S. and allied troops has made it easier for Taliban fighters and smugglers to cross the porous border undetected. “In the past, the U.S. had significant surveillance capabilities,” said Sayed Wahid Qattali, an influential politician from the western city Herat, where Iran has long had influence. “But now that the Americans have left, Iran is a lot freer.”
Iran formalized its alliance with the Taliban by allowing the group to open an office in Mashhad, maintaining a presence there since at least the beginning of 2014, a foreign official said. The office has gained so much clout that some foreign officials are now referring to it as the “Mashhad Shura,” a term used to describe the Taliban’s leadership councils.
One of the main points of contact between Tehran and the insurgency is head of the Taliban’s Qatar-based political office, Tayeb Agha, Afghan and foreign officials said. His most recent trip to Iran was in mid-May, the insurgent group said. The Taliban deny they receive support from Iran or any other foreign country, but say they want good relations with Afghanistan’s neighbors.
Iran’s backing of the Taliban has a strategic rationale. Tehran is already battling Islamic State, also known as Daesh, in Syria and Iraq, and it is wary of a new front line emerging close to its eastern border, Afghan officials say.
“Iran seeks to counter Daesh with the Taliban,” said an Afghan security official.
For the Taliban, Islamic State militants represent a threat of a different kind: they are competitors. Since an offshoot of Islamic State announced plans to expand in Afghanistan and Pakistan earlier this year, the new group has been actively recruiting fighters, many of whom are disaffected Taliban, say residents and Afghan officials.
This has pitted the two rival jihadist groups against each other, with clashes erupting between them in provinces including Helmand in the south, Nangarhar in the east and specifically involving Iran-backed Taliban in Farah, near Iran’s border, Afghan officials say.
Iranian funding gives more options to the militant group, support that is beginning to have an impact on the battlefield.
“If it wasn’t for Iran, I don’t think they would’ve been able to push an offensive like they are doing now,” said Antonio Giustozzi, a Taliban expert who has tracked Iran’s involvement in Afghanistan.
In recent months, security in Afghanistan’s west and north deteriorated sharply compared to last year, as Taliban fighters amassed in large numbers, testing the ability of Afghan troops to hold their ground.
It’s unclear, however, how far Iran will go to promote the Taliban.
“They wouldn’t want the Taliban to become too strong,” said a second foreign official. “They just want to make sure that they have some levers in their hands, because if the Taliban would win, God forbid, then they would lose all their leverage.”
Saudi air chief killed in Yemeni rebel Scud attack on Khamis Mushayt air base
June 12, 2015Saudi air chief killed in Yemeni rebel Scud attack on Khamis Mushayt air base, DEBKAfile, June 12, 2015
Saudi Air Force Commander Lt. Gen. Muhammad bin Ahmed Al-Shaalan slain by Yemeni Scud
The Saudi Air Force Commander Lt. Gen. Muhammad bin Ahmed Al-Shaalan was killed in a Scud missile cross-border attack by Yemeni Houthi rebels on the big King Khalid Air Base at Khamis Mushayt in the southwestern Asir region of Saudi Arabia, DEBKAfile reports. The attack took place on June 6, but his death was concealed under a blanket of secrecy until Wednesday, June 10.
The largest Saudi air base, it is from there that the kingdom has for last two and a half months waged its air campaign to end the Yemeni insurgency. Saudi and coalition air strikes, directed against the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels, their allies from the Yemeni army and from local tribes, have killed an estimated 2,000 people, some of them civilians, including women and children.
DEBKAfile’s military sources in the Gulf remarked that even the tardy official disclosure of Gen. Al-Shaalan’s death Wednesday left more questions than answers. The terse three-line announcement said: “The Commander of Saudi Royal Air Forces Lieutenant General Mohammed bin Ahmed Al-Shaalan died Wednesday during a working trip outside the kingdom from a heart attack.”
No information was provided about the nature of his putative “working trip,” its destination and purpose – or even the date of his funeral.
Our military sources report that the Houthis’ Scud attack caught the Saudis unawares. The only reaction from the air base came from the American teams operating Patriot counter-missile batteries. They tried to shoot down the incoming missiles and managed to intercept only two or three out of a barrage of 15.
The US has deployed Patriots at Khamis Mushayt to shield the special operations units and drones fighting Al Qaeda in Arabia (AQIP). But since the start of the Yemen civil war, American drones have been feeding the Saudi Air Force with intelligence about Houthi targets and movements.
The Yemen assault on the Saudi air base represented a major escalation in the Yemeni war, with effect on the complex US relationship with Iran in the context of the Yemen conflict.
DEBKAfile’s military sources assert that the Houthi Scud crews undoubtedly received precise data from Iranian intelligence about the whereabouts of Gen. Al-Shalaan and his top staff on the day of their attack. With this information, they were able to time their attack for 3 am before dawn and target the base’s living quarters and aircraft hangars.
Tehran most likely put the Houthis up to the Scud attack, both to damage the base from which air strikes are launched against them and as payback for the intelligence US drones are providing for those strikes.
Riyadh concealed the circumstances of the air chief’s death to avoid affecting the morale of Saudi combatants taking part in the Yemen war. The Obama administration also had in interest in drawing a discreet veil over the incident so as not to jeopardize the nuclear negotiations with Iran as they enter the final lap before the June 30 deadline.
Islamic State at Israel’s Gate
June 12, 2015Islamic State at Israel’s Gate, Front Page Magazine,
(According to Israel National News,
Late on Thursday night “color red” rocket sirens were sounded in the southern coastal city of Ashkelon, as well as throughout the Ashkelon Coast regional council.
At least one rocket was identified as having been fired from Gaza, but IDF officials said it is believed the rocket exploded inside Gaza. No rockets were found in Israeli territory.
— DM)
All this is happening while the Obama administration, by the president’s own admission, has no clear strategy to defeat ISIS. At the same time, President Obama’s “strategy” to deal with Iran is to make concession after concession in order to secure any nuclear deal he can, including the possibility of providing Iran with relief from sanctions that were imposed for non-nuclear related reasons such as Iran’s support for terrorist activities
In short, Israel is facing Iran-backed Hamas from the south, Iran-backed Hezbollah from the north, and an expanding Islamic State presence north and south of Israel and within Israel itself. And that is before Iran gets its hands on a nuclear bomb and the Islamic State has enough radioactive material to build its own weapons of mass destruction.
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Jihadists affiliated with the Islamic State (also known as ISIS or ISIL) are carrying on the rocket war against Israeli civilians from where Hamas left off. Following several rocket attacks in the last several weeks for which the Islamic State has taken credit, rockets launched from Gaza Thursday night exploded in the Ashkelon area.
Israel is still holding Hamas responsible for the attacks as the governing authority in Gaza.
“The IDF understands that Hamas wants quiet and is making an effort to prevent the shooting, but the State of Israel still sees Hamas as responsible for what happens in Gaza,” said Sami Turgeman, head of IDF’s Southern Command.
The Israeli military responded with measured attacks on Hamas facilities, while at the same time trying to avoid setting off a wider war at this time. But Israel’s hand is being forced by the Islamic State, which is evidently working assiduously to supplant Hamas as the authoritative Islamic power in Gaza. The Gaza branch calls itself the Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade. It is cooperating with another ISIS-affiliated group operating in the Sinai Peninsula, which calls itself Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis.
According to a June 8th report by Debkafile, “Islamic State operatives in the Gaza Strip have been helping themselves to Hamas rockets in recent weeks after furtively penetrating the factory teams operating the group’s production and assembly lines… The jihadis then secretly passed the stolen rockets to their squads for launching against Israel.”
On June 7th Debkafile noted in more general terms Hamas’s loss of control in Gaza in the face of Islamic State infiltration: “The terror infrastructure Hamas built over many years in Sinai has been taken over by ISIS, and its control of the Gaza Strip is slipping, as yet more radical and violent organizations eat away at its authority and seize control of the rocket offensive against Israel.”
Thus, even as Hamas remains committed to the destruction of Israel and is trying to re-build its arms stockpiles with Iran’s help, it is engaged simultaneously in its own battles with the Islamic State. Hamas has arrested some ISIS supporters and bulldozed a Sunni mosque believed to have been used by ISIS affiliated jihadists, while Hamas’s own facilities have come under attack by ISIS affiliated jihadists. Hamas also claimed in a message to Israeli authorities, routed through an Egyptian intermediary, that jihadists affiliated with the Islamic State were deliberately trying to spark a renewed war between Israel and Hamas.
The Islamic State is also trying to position itself to challenge Israel from the north. Israeli TV Channel 2 reported last week that the Islamic State is moving forces in the direction of the Golan Heights and the Israeli border.
Moreover, ISIS is developing an increasing presence within Israel itself. Recruits, influenced by ISIS’s slick social media promotions, are attracted to ISIS’s self-declared purer Islamic ideology. Hamas is apparently too “moderate” for these jihadists’ tastes.
“Dozens of Israeli Arabs and Palestinians have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join insurgent groups.” Israel’s Shin Bet domestic intelligence agency said in a statement released last January 4th. Israel had announced that it managed to crack one Islamic State cell on its soil and arrested its alleged members. An Israeli security official described the cell as “just the tip of the iceberg.”
Last July, the Islamic State previewed its intentions in a statement that it issued regarding jihad against Israel:
As for the massacres taking place in Gaza against the Muslim men, women and children, then the Islamic State will do everything within its means to continue striking down every apostate who stands as an obstacle on its paths towards Palestine. It is only [a] matter of time and patience before it (Islamic State) reaches Palestine to fight the barbaric Jews and kill those of them hiding behind the gharqad trees – the trees of the Jews.
Arutz Sheva reported that a spokesperson for the Islamic State, Nidal Nuseiri, urged patience as the Islamic State wanted first to consolidate its control over Arab Muslim lands, but “reaffirmed that conquering ‘Bayt el-Maqdis’ (Jerusalem) and destroying the State of Israel is central to the group’s jihad.” Thanks to President Obama’s dithering, the Islamic State is well on its way to achieving such consolidation in Iraq and Syria, while spreading to Libya.
At least three questions arise from the emergence of ISIS as a direct threat to Israel. Will Israeli military and security forces, either on their own or in concert with Jordan and Egypt, take on ISIS directly, including going after ISIS’s command and control centers with far more firepower than the Obama administration has used thus far?
To what extent will Israel be willing to outsource military operations against ISIS affiliates in Gaza to Hamas, much as it has outsourced some security operations to the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank? Major-General Turgeman tried to cast Hamas as the lesser of two evils, since, he claimed, “Israel and Hamas have shared interests, including in the current situation, which is quiet and calm and growth and prosperity.” Hamas “does not want global jihad,” he added. This is a truly incredible assertion coming from an Israeli military leader about a group willing to put its own citizens and their homes in harm’s way in order to launch their own thousands of rockets against Israel. What happened to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s concise description of Hamas and the Islamic State as “branches of the same poisonous tree?” This just further demonstrates how completely insane the Middle East has become.
Finally, how successful will Iran be in exploiting the chaotic situation in Gaza, positioning itself as it has in Iraq as an enemy of ISIS, while further bolstering Hamas to Israel’s detriment?
All this is happening while the Obama administration, by the president’s own admission, has no clear strategy to defeat ISIS. At the same time, President Obama’s “strategy” to deal with Iran is to make concession after concession in order to secure any nuclear deal he can, including the possibility of providing Iran with relief from sanctions that were imposed for non-nuclear related reasons such as Iran’s support for terrorist activities.
In short, Israel is facing Iran-backed Hamas from the south, Iran-backed Hezbollah from the north, and an expanding Islamic State presence north and south of Israel and within Israel itself. And that is before Iran gets its hands on a nuclear bomb and the Islamic State has enough radioactive material to build its own weapons of mass destruction.
Today in appeasement
June 11, 2015Today in appeasement, Power Line,
So on one side the US is strengthening Lebanese institutions that insulate Hezbollah from the consequences of its Syria warfighting. On the other side – this is the WSJ scoop – the US is kneecapping organizations inside Lebanon that are trying to wrest control of those very institutions away from Hezbollah. The combination can’t help but feed regional fears that Washington is realigning with Tehran, and that the US’s traditional Arab allies have to go it alone.
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Omri Ceren writes to draw attention to Jay Solomon’s Wall Street Journal article “U.S. Strategy in Lebanon Stirs Fears.” Omri writes:
Hayya Bina is a Beirut-based civil society NGO that – among other things – works to craft and promote an alternative Shiite identity in in opposition to Hezbollah. The WSJ reported yesterday that the State Department has just cut some of its funding. Not all of its funding, which would make sense if the organization was inefficient or corrupt.
The administration only cut the funding for programs – and this is a direct quote from a State Department letter viewed by the WSJ – “intended [to] foster an independent moderate Shiite voice.” Regional actors and folks in town are drawing the straightforward conclusion:
[T]he U.S. move feeds into an increasingly alarmed narrative held by many Arab leaders who say that U.S. and Iranian interests appear increasingly aligned—at their expense. Both Washington and Tehran are fighting Islamic State forces in Iraq and Syria, with U.S. conducting airstrikes against the militants, but notably not against Mr. Assad’s Iran-backed regime… Some pro-democracy activists in Washington also voiced concern that cutting Hayya Bina’s funding will send a message that the U.S. is tacitly accepting Hezbollah in an effort to appease Iran. “At best, the decision shows poor political judgment,” said Firas Maksad, director of Global Policy Advisors, a Washington-based consulting firm focused on the Middle East. “Coming on the heels of an expected deal with Iran, it is bound to generate much speculation about possible ulterior motives.”… the Obama administration has also cooperated with Lebanese institutions—including the armed forces and an intelligence agency—that are considered close to Hezbollah and combating Islamic State and Nusra Front, an al Qaeda-affiliated militia in Syria.
That last part of the excerpt – about the Obama administration’s cooperation with Lebanese institutions controlled by Hezbollah – has separately been getting a lot of play lately. Last week the Pentagon quietly posted a news release announcing “the State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to Lebanon for AGM-114 Hellfire II missiles” (I haven’t seen this one reported out, incidentally [1]). Yesterday State Department Press Office Director Jeff Rathke confirmed that the US will be delivering TOW missiles to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and is contemplating the delivery of six A29 aircraft [2].
That’s just since June began. The problem is that the LAF’s operations are objectively oriented toward shoring up Hezbollah’s position in Lebanon, more or less serving as a rear guard while Hezbollah fights in Syria. Hezbollah and the LAF have been fighting alongside one another on the Lebanese-Syrian border for months [3]. Inside Lebanon top politicians have long accused Hezbollah of using Lebanese security institutions to prevent blowback from Syria [4].
Tony Badran from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies already published a kind of canonical piece on how the LAF has become a domestic tool for Hezbollah last year in English-language Lebanese media [5]. The punchline on the new A29 delivery is that the administration says it’s aimed in part at helping the LAF “enforce United Nation’s security council resolutions 1559 and 1701″ [6]. Those resolutions call on the LAF to act against Hezbollah. Except the LAF doesn’t so much disrupt Hezbollah these days as de facto back its play in Syria.
So on one side the US is strengthening Lebanese institutions that insulate Hezbollah from the consequences of its Syria warfighting. On the other side – this is the WSJ scoop – the US is kneecapping organizations inside Lebanon that are trying to wrest control of those very institutions away from Hezbollah. The combination can’t help but feed regional fears that Washington is realigning with Tehran, and that the US’s traditional Arab allies have to go it alone. Remember that in a little over two weeks the Arab countries will be making those calculations with an Iran deal in the background that puts the Iranians on a 10 year glide path to a nuclear weapon.
________________
[1] http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/lebanon-agm-114-hellfire-ii-missiles
[2] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/06/243337.htm#LEBANON
[3] http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Feb-03/286269-hezbollah-army-pound-militant-hideouts-along-syria-border.ashx
[4] http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Jan-26/285359-hezbollah-exploiting-armys-anti-jihad-campaign-rifi.ashx
[5] https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentary/540966-the-sum-of-its-parts
[6] http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/us-approves-possible-462m-a-29-super-tucano-sale-to-413350/
General Michael Flynn and Ambassador Robert Joseph on Iran’s Missile Program and a Nuclear Deal
June 11, 2015General Michael Flynn and Ambassador Robert Joseph on Iran’s Missile Program and a Nuclear Deal, Secure Freedom.Org. via You Tube, June 11, 2015
Former DIA Director Lt. General Michael Flynn and Ambassador Robert Joseph discuss their concerns about the exclusion of Iran’s ballistic missile program from the nuclear agreement currently being negotiated with Tehran and their belief that this deal will not stop or slow Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear Negotiations At An Impasse
June 11, 2015Nuclear Negotiations At An Impasse, MEMRI, A. Savyon and Y. Carmon, June 11, 2015
Leader Khamenei Rejects Agreement Reached On Token Inspection Of Military Sites And Questioning Of Scientists; U.S. Willing To Close IAEA Dossier On Iranian PMD, To Settle For Inspecting Declared Nuclear Sites Only, And To Rely On Intelligence; EU Objects.
Introduction
This past week, members of Iran’s nuclear negotiating team revealed details about the Iran-U.S. nuclear negotiations. The negotiations were dealt a blow when Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected an agreement reached by the two sides concerning a token inspection of military facilities and questioning of several nuclear scientists and “military personnel”; these were to be the response to the IAEA’s open dossier on possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program to which Iran has so far refused to respond.
Iranian reports on these developments show that in order to arrive at a comprehensive agreement, the U.S. is willing to forgo actual inspection of Iranian military facilities and to settle for inspection of declared nuclear facilities only, as set forth under the Additional Protocol, while the ongoing monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program will be left to intelligence elements.[1]
Thus, at this stage, there is a deadlock: Iran is refusing both to respond to the IAEA dossier on its PMD, and to allow actual inspection of facilities that are not declared nuclear facilities.
Furthermore, the EU has announced its objections to a comprehensive agreement with Iran in the absence of satisfactory answers from it regarding the IAEA dossier on its PMD. It said that the IAEA investigation of the PMD “will be essential” to a nuclear deal.[2] IAEA Director-General Yukio Amano has also linked the investigation of Iranian PMD to the attainment of such an agreement.
The Issue: Inspection Of Iranian Military Sites, Questioning Of Iranian Scientists
On May 25, 2015, in an Iranian television interview, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister and head negotiator Abbas Araghchi disclosed that this issue had been agreed upon, but that when the Iranian team returned to Tehran for Khamenei’s approval, Khamenei had rejected this agreed solution out of hand (see MEMRI TV Clip No. 4928, Top Iranian Nuclear Negotiator Abbas Aragchi: We Reached Solution with P5+1 on Site Inspection, But Khamenei Rejected It, May 25, 2015 and Appendix I).[3]
It was evident also from Aragchi’s statements that after Khamenei rejected the agreed solution, Iran even reneged from what had been agreed as part of the Additional Protocol, and is now insisting that limitations and restrictions that are part of the Protocol be implemented in a way that will make future inspections difficult. As part of Iran’s backpedaling, Araghchi repeatedly emphasized that “so far, nothing has been concluded” regarding the issue of the inspections.[4]
U.S. Willingness To Disregard IAEA PMD Dossier
Statements by negotiating team member Hamid Baidinejad show that in return for willingness on Iran’s part to sign a comprehensive agreement, the U.S. was willing to forgo actual investigation of the IAEA’s open PMD dossier on Iran and instead to conduct a token inspection of military sites and questioning of Iranian nuclear scientists and military personnel. The U.S. asked Iran to carry out a number of specific steps, thereby paving the way to a comprehensive solution for this issue. These steps included inspections at several points in Iran, including two military facilities, and questioning several senior military officials and scientists (see Appendix II).
Iranian Negotiators’ Two Versions Of Events
An analysis of these statements by the Iranian negotiators shows that there are two different versions of what took place in the negotiations. According to Araghchi, the Iranian team agreed to the U.S.’s demand for a token inspection, but when the team returned to Tehran, Khamenei completely rejected this token inspection. Aragchi’s disclosure that the Iranian negotiators had arrived at an agreement with the Americans that was subsequently rejected by Khamenei caused an uproar in the Iranian political system, triggering harsh criticism against both the negotiators and the leaders of the pragmatic camp, and even leading to a public confrontation between Khamenei and pragmatic camp leader Hashemi Rafsanjani.[5]
The second version of events emerged after the uproar sparked by Aragchi’s revelations. Another negotiator, Baidinejad, in an attempt to correct Araghchi’s claim, stated that the Iranian negotiators had rejected the U.S. demands, even the demand for token inspection, but that the Americans had pressed them to present the demand to Khamenei anyway; when they did so, at the Americans’ urging, Khamenei rejected it outright.
Conclusion
Iran’s reneging on its consent to the U.S. demand for token inspections of its military facilities and questioning of some of its scientists and military personnel in exchange for the closing of the IAEA’s PMD dossier on it places President Obama in a difficult situation, and brings the negotiations to an impasse. This is because along with Khamenei’s rejection, the EU and the IAEA director-general both oppose closing Iran’s dossier in order to arrive at a comprehensive agreement.
It was apparently under these circumstances that CIA director John Brennan was secretly dispatched in early June to Israel, in order to persuade Israel, and, via Israel, the EU, that intelligence monitoring of any Iranian PMD was a satisfactory solution and that actual investigation of the PMD, which Khamenei rejected, could be waived. To this end, Brennan also underlined,on May 31, 2015 on CBS’s Face the Nation, the close U.S.-Israel security cooperation.[6]
In light of this situation, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said on May 31, 2015 that with regard to inspection, “other solutions must be discussed.”[7]
Appendix I: Aragchi’s Version Of Events
In an interview that aired May 25, 2015 on Iran’s Channel 2 TV,Araqchi said [8]: “[Our] red lines may change under certain circumstances. This is another issue. We may change some of our red lines for a certain period of time. This is not a problem. The [leader] will give us new instructions, and the team will act accordingly. We have acted within this framework, and we will do so in the future. We will not let ourselves go beyond this framework…
“The Additional Protocol, which is the internationally accepted [control] regime, was not a red line for us. As I said before, our [negotiating] team does not determine those red lines. From the very beginning – and given that the Additional Protocol is [internationally] accepted – we were given permission to accept it during the negotiations. So far, it has not been accepted – we do not have an agreement yet – but it is one of the issues that the negotiating team has been given instructions to accept. As I said, the red lines may or may not be changed in due course, and the Additional Protocol may or may not be accepted at some point, but so far, this has not happened, and our instructions have not changed…
“If the military officials, the relevant officials, the Iranian parliament or the council appointed by Khamenei reach the conclusion that the access provided for in the Additional Protocol comes under the same category as the inspections that Khamenei banned, we will obey and will categorically not allow ‘managed access…’
“The ‘Possible Military Dimension’ [PMD] has always been a strong pretext for the [West]. We have to take this pretext away from them. We have created conditions that will enable us, within the framework of reaching the final nuclear agreement, to resolve the issue of PMD. This is possible now. In the negotiations, we discussed and reached several possible solutions, but these were not accepted in Tehran. These include [allowing the IAEA] to interview several [nuclear scientists], and allowing access to several facilities. They gave us a list and said: ‘If you let us have access to these people and these facilities, we will end the issue of PMD.’ This, however, was not accepted by Tehran, and Khamenei decisively and courageously rejected it..”
Appendix II: Baidinejad’s Version Of Events
In June 1, 2015 statements on his Instagram account that were quoted by the Iranian news agency Fars, negotiating team member Hamid Baidinejad said:[9] “One of the first principles agreed upon, already at the start of the Iran-P5+1 negotiations, was that in a future nuclear agreement, Iran would implement the Additional Protocol on a temporary and voluntary basis until the Majlis decides whether to ratify it and takes into account the other side’s implementation of its obligations…
“It is natural that after a comprehensive nuclear agreement is signed, Iran would be expected to revert to its previous decision – that is, temporarily and voluntarily implementing the Additional Protocol… Without the implementation of the Additional Protocol, even if it is on a temporary basis, the IAEA will not be able to confirm that Iran’s nuclear program is civilian, and that would mean that the process for resolving the nuclear issue will have failed…
“In no way does the Additional Protocol include a clause regarding an obligation on the part of the member states to agree to inspection of their military facilities or investigation of their nuclear scientists. The only thing that the Additional Protocol does make possible is controlled access to non-nuclear facilities, for taking [soil] samples for proving that there is no nuclear activity at facilities that are not declared [to be nuclear sites]…
“Should there be evidence of nuclear material at undeclared sites, whether they are military or civilian, the IAEA will be able to demand controlled access to them [but] only by means of a specific procedure already set out, so that an [Additional Protocol] member state will agree to the sampling in order to prove that it is not conducting nuclear activity in undeclared facilities…
“The Additional Protocol is not a special agreement between the international community and Iran; it is an important international document. Over 120 states are currently members of this protocol, and some have signed it and implemented it temporarily. Therefore, the attempt to interpret it in a way that will include an obligation on the part of [member]states to undergo inspection at [their] military facilities or to allow investigation of [their] nuclear scientists is completely mistaken…
“The discussion on the issue of [Iran’s] PMD, [that is,] Western countries’ claim that Iran has a military nuclear program for producing nuclear weapons, is historically rooted in the years prior to 2003. In recent years, U.S. and Western intelligence services have said that before 2003, Iran’s military wing – commanded by specific commanders in the country – engaged in an extensive clandestine project for producing nuclear weapons. To prove their mistaken claim, [the West] presented intelligence based on their intelligence agencies; however, Iran considers all this intelligence [data] to be faked… There is no doubt that these false accusations against Iran can only be resolved with a political agreement. Discussion of this issue, no matter how lengthy, will not remove these accusations…
“[That is why] the Iranian negotiating team proposed during the talks that Iran and the P5+1 resolve this issue, because they [i.e. the P5+1] would like, along with reaching an agreement, that the issue of the accusations [that Iran] attempted to obtain nuclear weapons will be resolved. They proposed that Iran take several specific steps and thus pave the way to a comprehensive solution to the issue… Iran announced that it considers this dossier faked… But an agreement on it depends on what steps Iran will be asked to take [in order to close the dossier]. They announced that they will discuss the issue on level of the P5+1 [alone] because of its special sensitivity, and will submit their final opinion to Iran at the appropriate time.
“In the round [of talks] that preceded the [April 2015] press release in Lausanne, the P5+1 countries presented Iran with a program that includes inspection at a few points, including two military facilities, and questioning of several senior military officials and nuclear experts whose names were noted in the IAEA reports both directly and indirectly. They claimed that [if they] were allowed access to these sites, and the IAEA was permitted to question these people, that would be the end of the matter of the [PMD] accusations against Iran. As soon as this insulting proposal was raised, Iran rejected it unequivocally… At the same time, the P5+1 asked the Iranian representatives to present the P5+1’s opinion to officials in Iran, despite their express opposition, [for the officials’ approval].
“Leader [Khamenei’s] harsh response rejecting the demand by these countries to inspect military facilities and question nuclear scientists was a completely correct and accurate response. The nuclear negotiations team is proud of having expressed the exact same position [as Khamenei] three months ago, thanks to its complete grasp of the position of the regime and of the leader… Unfortunately, there were some in Iran who were not updated on the details of this issue… and instead of praising the Iranian negotiating team, took the opportunity, while being unaware of the process by which the issue was brought up for discussion – which was reported in full to top regime officials – to launch extremely harsh attacks on the Iranian negotiating team, to plan protests, and to demand a halt to the negotiations…
“These objections and accusations will not last long, but airing these concerns to public opinion can cast doubt on the regime’s main institutions. Everyone is expected to understand Iran’s critical circumstances, and, in this Year of Empathy Between the Government and the People they must join hands in defending Iran’s basic principles and rights and must unite with senior officials in order to efficiently promote the sensitive stage of the nuclear negotiations under the guidance of top senior officials in the regime of the Islamic Republic – and especially by Leader [Khamenei] who is very closely overseeing the negotiations. This way, if an agreement is reached, it will guarantee the preservation of the great Iranian nation’s basic principles.”
Endnotes:
[1] Under the Additional Protocol, the clarification of PMDs at facilities that are not declared nuclear facilities is subject to the consent of the member state under investigation; thus, such sites in fact cannot be inspected.
[2] AP, June 8 2015.
[3] In the interview, Aragchi said that the NPT’s Additional Protocol was not a red line for the Iranian team, and that the team had in fact beeninstructed to accept it. He explained that Iran could always harden its position on these issues. See MEMRI TV Clip No. 4928, “Top Iranian Nuclear Negotiator Abbas Araqchi: We Reached Solution with P5+1 on Site Inspection, But Khamenei Rejected It,” May 25, 2015. It should be mentioned that under former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, IAEA questioning of Iranian scientists was permitted, and two visits to theParchin military facility were allowed. The Iranian team’s acceptance of this demand by the international community was presumably based on this precedent.
[4] Irib (Iran), June 4, 2014.
[5] Senior figures in Iran’s ideological camp hastened to obscure Araghchi’s statements, and to correct them. Majlis speaker for national security affairs Alaa Al-Boroujerdi stated that Aragchi’s words were untrue, and added: “Aragchi only discussed the major issues, and did not say that Iran had consented to inspection of military facilities… Khamenei announced that we will not allow any talks with Iranian scientists, after he noticed that we were under threat by terrorists. The arrest of several who murdered our nuclear scientists revealed that these [perpetrators] were linked to the Mossad. We have red lines, and we will implement them. ISNA, Iran, May 25, 2015. The Javandaily, which is affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), also denied Aragchi’s statements regarding the red lines: “In a television interview, top Iranian negotiation [Aragchi] referred to a particular point, and this issue should be addressed. He said: ‘…Perhaps under certain conditions our red lines will change, and the work [of the negotiations] will proceed according to instructions.’ This declaration regarding the possibility of changes to the red lines under certain circumstances is mistaken, for several reasons… As is evident from their names, the red lines are borders that define the basic framework of the negotiations, and without them the negotiations will reach undesirable and unexpected results.” Javanalso warned the Iranian negotiating team about deviating from the red lines: “The Iranian nation supports its negotiating team as long as it operates to realize its rights in the framework of the national interests and preserves national honor. Any withdrawal from this basis, and acceptance of being forced into humiliation by the enemy side, will be met with a popular response from the nation, and will undoubtedly go down in history as a dark and negative point.” Javan, Iran, May 26, 2015. A new website affiliated with the extremist ideological camp called on May 26, 2015 on Khamenei to fire Foreign Minister Zarif and his negotiating team for their “American tendencies.” Amanpress.ir, May 26, 2015.
[6] Haaretz (Israel), June 9, 2015.
[7] Mehr (Iran), May 31, 2015.
[8] See MEMRI TV Clip No. 4928, Top Iranian Nuclear Negotiator Abbas Aragchi: We Reached Solution with P5+1 on Site Inspection, But Khamenei Rejected It, May 25, 2015.
[9] Fars (Iran), June 1, 2015.
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