H/t Joopklepzeiker
H/t Joopklepzeiker
Kerry: I never even discussed ‘anytime, anywhere’ inspections of Iran, Washington Free Beacon via You Tube, July 19, 2015
(Our “unique ability” to get the U.N. Security Council to force inspections and reinstate sanctions? Any such effort would almost certainly be vetoed by one or more Security Council members. — DM)
Deep meaning of the Iran deal, Power Line,
This deal does the opposite of rolling back Iran’s nuclear program. It funds, protects, and perfects the nuclear program.
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Omni Ceren sent out several email messages yesterday updating his readers on the Iran agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or “JCPOA”). I would like to bring the following excerpt from one of the messages to your attention. Omri writes:
The agreement commits the international community to actively helping Iran perfect its nuclear program over the life of the deal (!) On a policy level, it means Iran’s breakout time will be constantly shrinking. On a political level, it means that the deal will be seen as accomplishing the exact opposite of what the Obama administration promised Congress: instead of rolling back Iran’s nuclear program, it will commit the U.S. and its allies to funding and boosting it.
The commitments are sprinkled across the JCPOA and obligate a range of global powers:
– Russian sponsorship/cooperation on nuclear research at Fordow — The Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) will be converted into a nuclear, physics, and technology centre and international collaboration will be encouraged in agreed areas of research. The Joint Commission will be informed in advance of the specific projects that will be undertaken at Fordow…The transition to stable isotope production of these cascades at FFEP will be conducted in joint partnership between the Russian Federation and Iran on the basis of arrangements to be mutually agreed upon.
– European sponsorship of nuclear security, including training against sabotage— E3/EU+3 parties, and possibly other states, as appropriate, are prepared to cooperate with Iran on the implementation of nuclear security guidelines and best practices…Co-operation through training and workshops to strengthen Iran’s ability to protect against, and respond to nuclear security threats, including sabotage.
– International sponsorship/cooperation of Iranian fuel fabrication, which will help Iran complete its mastery of fuel cycle, making Iran’s program harder more opaque and difficult to regulate — The Joint Commission will establish a Technical Working Group with the goal of enabling fuel to be fabricated in Iran while adhering to the agreed stockpile parameters… This Technical Working Group will also, within one year, work to develop objective technical criteria for assessing whether fabricated fuel and its intermediate products can be readily converted to UF6.
This deal does the opposite of rolling back Iran’s nuclear program. It funds, protects, and perfects the nuclear program.
Iran’s supreme leader vows to continue anti-US policies, Ynet News, July 18, 2015
(Please see also, Back in Tehran… Khamenei adds red lines, Rouhani tries to resign, Jaafari hints at “fait accompli” soon. The linked July 12th DEBKAfile article claims that when Rouhani asked Khamenei to back off from some of his “red lines” and threatened to resign as president if he did not, Khamenei reminded him of the unpleasant fates of other presidents who had resigned. He and two other hard liners, Defense Minister Hosseim Dehqan and Revolutionary Guards chief Mohammad Ali Jaafari, told Rouhani
in the stiffest terms that Tehran must not on any account bow to international pressure for giving up its nuclear program or the development of ballistic missiles.
Although Iran got just about everything it wanted, and forfeited nothing of substance, it remains possible that Iran will reject the “deal” as soon as sanctions are lifted and can not “snap back.”
In addition, please see Into the fray: Iran- Reaping the storm that Barack sowed…, contending that Obama’s affinity for Islam has much to do with the “deal.”– DM)
“If any of our security officials or members of parliament approve or denounce the deal before fully scrutinizing it, they will regret it,” Revolutionary Guard commander and head of Iran’s Basij organization, Mohammad Reza Naghdi told the Fars news agency on Friday.
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Ayatollah Khamenei calls on country’s legislators to examine nuclear deal carefully before deciding whether to approve it, implying the accord has yet to win definitive backing in Tehran.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei withheld his verdict on Iran’s nuclear deal on Saturday but in a fiery address vowed enduring opposition to the United States and its Middle East policies, saying Washington sought Iran’s ‘surrender’.
In an speech at a Tehran mosque punctuated by chants of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel”, Khamenei said he wanted politicians to examine the agreement to ensure national interests were preserved, as Iran would not allow the disruption of its revolutionary principles or defensive abilities.
An arch conservative with the last word on high matters of state, Khamenei repeatedly used the phrase “whether this text is approved or not”, implying the accord has yet to win definitive backing from Iran’s factionalized political establishment.
Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei (Photo: AP)
“Whether the deal is approved or disapproved, we will never stop supporting our friends in the region and the people of Palestine, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain and Lebanon. Even after this deal our policy towards the arrogant US will not change,” he said.
Under the agreement reached on Tuesday, sanctions will be gradually removed in return for Iran accepting long-term curbs on a nuclear program that the West has suspected was aimed at creating a nuclear bomb. Iran denies it seeks a nuclear bomb.
Khamenei’s combative remarks about US policies in the Middle East may sit awkwardly with a diplomatic offensive Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif plans in coming days in the wake of the deal.
‘Insult’
Iran regards its nuclear program as an emblem of national dignity and dynamism in the face of what it sees as decades of hostility from Western countries that opposed its 1979 Islamic revolution.
Khamenei did not echo criticisms of the deal made on Friday by a top cleric, Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Movahedi Kermani, who said in an address broadcast on radio that it reflected excessive demands by world powers that were an “insult”.
But Khamenei’s remarks radiated a broad mistrust of US intentions, claiming that successive American presidents had sought Iran’s “surrender”, and declaring that if war broke out America would come off worst, nursing “a broken head”.
“The Americans say they stopped Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon,” Khamenei said.
“They know it’s not true. We had a fatwa (religious ruling), declaring nuclear weapons to be religiously forbidden under Islamic law. It had nothing to do with the nuclear talks.”
Anti-US and anti-Israel displays at al-Quds Day commemorations in Tehran (Photo: AFP)
Later on Saturday, the Supreme Leader praised Iranian negotiators who thrashed out the accord in marathon negotiations in Vienna.
“During the nuclear talks, we saw the Americans’ dishonesty over and over, but fortunately our officials fought back and in some cases showed revolutionary reactions,” Khamenei said during meetings with senior Iranian officials and ambassadors from several Muslim states, according to his official website.
But his remarks on Saturday did not shed light on Iran’s procedures for ratifying the accord, which are not known in any detail. Zarif will brief parliament on July 21, Iranian media have said, and the agreement will also be examined by the National Security Council, the country’s highest security body.
Zarif, who plans to visit several countries in the region, told fellow Muslim countries on Friday that Iran hoped the accord could pave the way for more cooperation in the Middle East and internationally.
In a message to Islamic and Arab countries on the Eid al-Fitr holiday at the end of Ramadan, Zarif said: “By solving the artificial crisis about its nuclear program diplomatically, a new opportunity for regional and international cooperation has emerged.”
‘Real terrorists’
Khamenei maintained that the Islamic Republic’s policies in the region would continue to defy the United States, and the nuclear deal was an exceptional instance of dialogue.
“We have repeatedly said we don’t negotiate with the US on regional or international affairs; not even on bilateral issues. There are some exceptions like the nuclear program that we negotiated with the Americans to serve our interests.”
He said US policies in the region were “180 degrees” opposed to Iran’s policies.
“The Americans dub the Lebanese resistance terrorists and regard Iran as a supporter of terrorism because of its support for the Lebanese Hezbollah, while the Americans themselves are the real terrorists who have created Islamic State and support the wicked Zionists,” Khamenei said.
Several Gulf Arab states have long accused Tehran of interference, alleging financial or armed support for political movements in several countries including Bahrain, Yemen and Lebanon. Shi’ite power Iran denies interference but vows undimmed support for the Syrian and Iraqi governments, who are both fighting insurgencies by a variety of Sunni armed groups.
Prominent conservatives have largely kept silent on the deal. Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior advisor to Khamenei, did not mention the agreement in his Eid al-Fitr message.
“If any of our security officials or members of parliament approve or denounce the deal before fully scrutinizing it, they will regret it,” Revolutionary Guard commander and head of Iran’s Basij organization, Mohammad Reza Naghdi told the Fars news agency on Friday.
Khamenei vs. Rouhani: Projecting Very Different Views on the Nuclear Deal, World Affairs Journal, Mehdi Khalaji, July 16, 2015
(If Khamenei reneges on the deal, it will likely be impossible to “snap back” the sanctions. With improved Russian rockets, an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities will be much more difficult.– DM)
In the United States, the same political body that was in charge of negotiating with Iran is also in charge of implementing the agreement. But in Iran, the president and his negotiators have little authority over foreign policy, the nuclear program, or military activities.
If [Khamenei] decides to stop implementing the deal in the next year or so, he would likely blame the West or the negotiating team for cutting such a deal, as he did in 2003 and 2004. His initial reaction to the new agreement has already sent discouraging signals about Iran’s willingness to comply with its commitments in the long term.
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The Supreme Leader’s initial reaction has sent discouraging signals about Iran’s willingness to comply with its commitments in the long term.
As expected, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s reaction to the nuclear deal was utterly different from that of President Hassan Rouhani. Right after the agreement was announced on July 14, Rouhani appeared on state television and praised the outcome. Yet when he and other officials visited Khamenei’s home a few hours later, the Supreme Leader did not say anything about the deal apart from a few lines thanking the negotiators. This reticence signaled to hardliners that they should increase their attacks on the agreement.
On July 15, in order to protect himself against these critics, Rouhani told the cabinet that Khamenei was “carefully following up” on the details of the final negotiations and “had meticulous supervision” over the process, to the point where the Supreme Leader “truly undertook much heavier responsibility in this regard” than any other official. But even this did not help him much. On July 14, Rouhani sent Khamenei a letter reporting on the deal’s results, but the Supreme Leader delayed his response by a day in order to show his lack of excitement about it. The letter thanked Khamenei for his “intelligent guidance and perpetual and explicit support to the negotiating team,” who “could successfully implement all policies determined by the Supreme Leader and respect redlines set” by him. Khamenei’s delayed answer — hardly a third as long as the president’s letter — avoided any wording that might indicate his total satisfaction with the accord, his direct role in the negotiations, or his responsibility for the deal. Instead he wrote, “The text needs to be studied carefully and go through the predicted legal process. Then, if it is approved, it needs to be protected against potential violations of the deal by the other party.”
Khamenei also failed to mention who should approve the deal. Rouhani’s team and the hardliners are currently in the midst of a hot dispute about whether that responsibility lies with the Majlis or the Supreme National Security Council. The hardliners insist on parliament, arguing that all international agreements should be adopted by the legislative branch of the government. Yet Rouhani’s team says that only the Supreme Council should review and endorse it. Not coincidentally, the president is the titular head of that council.
SHARP HARDLINER CRITICISM
On July 16, hardliner website Raja News published the third part of an article series titled “Some Aspects of the Deal Which Should Remain Unveiled,” by Ali Akbar Taheri. The article explains how the final deal reached by Rouhani’s negotiating team crosses six different redlines previously set by the Supreme Leader:
The article also downplays Rouhani’s claim about lifting sanctions related to weapons, noting that “these sanctions would be replaced by limits [imposed on Iran’s weapons trade]…[E]very missile that is able to carry a nuclear warhead would be limited, all Shahab missiles and satellite carriers and so on.” In addition, the article claims that Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said the following: “Russia and China wanted weapons sanctions to be lifted, but despite our support the Iranian team itself agreed to continuation of the sanctions for the next five years!”
On July 16, at an event called “The Beginning of the Math Class” (a sarcastic title indicating that the time of verification has begun), hardline analyst Fouad Izadi criticized the deal from a different angle: “If the U.S. Congress rejects the agreement, America would not be bound to implement it, but if Iran implements the agreement, it will lose all leverage.” Izadi, who is close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, went on to claim that in the case of disagreement between Iran and the P5+1, “the arbiter is the UN Security Council,” which means that the United States and other P5+1 members would essentially become the arbiters of their own dispute. “If Iran gets accused of violating the agreement, [these countries] can issue a resolution against it,” he said, but if the United States or another party is so accused, “the Security Council cannot issue a resolution because one of them could just veto it.” He also pointed out that the Majlis should approve the agreement, and that it should condition Iran’s implementation of the deal on U.S. congressional approval, explaining that “the U.S. president will not be in office in nineteen months, and after him the U.S. administration would not be bound by the agreement if Congress disapproves it.”
Also on July 16, the hardline newspaper Kayhan claimed that the largely insignificant financial reaction to the nuclear deal — i.e., no sharp changes in the stock market or exchange rate — shocked those who have been “overexcited” about the negotiations. “People expected the foreign currency rate to drop and the national currency value to go up,” said one article, “and now they ask why the opposite has happened.”
CONCLUSION
In the United States, the same political body that was in charge of negotiating with Iran is also in charge of implementing the agreement. But in Iran, the president and his negotiators have little authority over foreign policy, the nuclear program, or military activities. Instead, those sectors are under the purview of Supreme Leader Khamenei, who is usually reluctant to take any public responsibility for major decisions. Furthermore, he has repeatedly expressed his distrust toward Americans, the West, the UN, and the IAEA. And while he has more or less supported Iran’s negotiators in his public statements, he has clearly sought to distance himself from them as well. If he decides to stop implementing the deal in the next year or so, he would likely blame the West or the negotiating team for cutting such a deal, as he did in 2003 and 2004. His initial reaction to the new agreement has already sent discouraging signals about Iran’s willingness to comply with its commitments in the long term.
How Israel Might Destroy Iran’s Nuclear Program, National Review Online, Daniel Pipes, via Middle East Forum, July 16, 2015
Israeli alternatives in dealing with the Iranian nuclear threat
The Vienna deal has been signed and likely will soon be ratified, which raises the question: Will any government intervene militarily to stop the nearly inevitable Iranian nuclear buildup?
Obviously it will not be the American or Russian governments or any of the other four signatories. Practically speaking, the question comes down to Israel, where a consensus holds that the Vienna deal makes an Israeli attack more likely. But no one outside the Israeli security apparatus, including myself, knows its intentions. That ignorance leaves me free to speculate as follows.
Three scenarios of attack seem possible:
Airplanes. Airplanes crossed international boundaries and dropped bombs in the 1981 Israeli attack on an Iraqi nuclear installation and in the 2007 attack on a Syrian one, making this the default assumption for Iran. Studies show this to be difficult but attainable.
Special ops. These are already underway: computer virus attacks on Iranian systems unconnected to the Internet that should be immune, assassinations of top-ranking Iranian nuclear scientists, and explosions at nuclear installations.
Presumably, Israelis had a hand in at least some of these attacks and, presumably, they could increase their size and scope, possibly disrupting the entire nuclear program. Unlike the dispatch of planes across several countries, special operations have the advantage of reaching places like Fordow, far from Israel, and of leaving little or no signature.
Nuclear weapons. This doomsday weapon, which tends to be little discussed, would probably be launched from submarines. It hugely raises the stakes and so would only be resorted to, in the spirit of “Never Again,” if the Israelis were desperate.
Of these alternatives, I predict the Netanyahu government will most likely opt for the second, which is also the most challenging to pull off (especially now that the great powers promised to help the Iranians protect their nuclear infrastructure). Were this unsuccessful, it will turn to planes, with nuclear weapons as a last resort.
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