Archive for the ‘Iranian nukes’ category

Khamenei vs. Rouhani: Projecting Very Different Views on the Nuclear Deal

July 18, 2015

Khamenei vs. Rouhani: Projecting Very Different Views on the Nuclear Deal, World Affairs JournalMehdi Khalaji, July 16, 2015

(If Khamenei reneges on the deal, it will likely be impossible to “snap back” the sanctions. With improved Russian rockets, an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities will be much more difficult.– DM)

In the United States, the same political body that was in charge of negotiating with Iran is also in charge of implementing the agreement. But in Iran, the president and his negotiators have little authority over foreign policy, the nuclear program, or military activities.

If [Khamenei] decides to stop implementing the deal in the next year or so, he would likely blame the West or the negotiating team for cutting such a deal, as he did in 2003 and 2004. His initial reaction to the new agreement has already sent discouraging signals about Iran’s willingness to comply with its commitments in the long term.

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The Supreme Leader’s initial reaction has sent discouraging signals about Iran’s willingness to comply with its commitments in the long term.

As expected, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s reaction to the nuclear deal was utterly different from that of President Hassan Rouhani. Right after the agreement was announced on July 14, Rouhani appeared on state television and praised the outcome. Yet when he and other officials visited Khamenei’s home a few hours later, the Supreme Leader did not say anything about the deal apart from a few lines thanking the negotiators. This reticence signaled to hardliners that they should increase their attacks on the agreement.

On July 15, in order to protect himself against these critics, Rouhani told the cabinet that Khamenei was “carefully following up” on the details of the final negotiations and “had meticulous supervision” over the process, to the point where the Supreme Leader “truly undertook much heavier responsibility in this regard” than any other official. But even this did not help him much. On July 14, Rouhani sent Khamenei a letter reporting on the deal’s results, but the Supreme Leader delayed his response by a day in order to show his lack of excitement about it. The letter thanked Khamenei for his “intelligent guidance and perpetual and explicit support to the negotiating team,” who “could successfully implement all policies determined by the Supreme Leader and respect redlines set” by him. Khamenei’s delayed answer — hardly a third as long as the president’s letter — avoided any wording that might indicate his total satisfaction with the accord, his direct role in the negotiations, or his responsibility for the deal. Instead he wrote, “The text needs to be studied carefully and go through the predicted legal process. Then, if it is approved, it needs to be protected against potential violations of the deal by the other party.”

Khamenei also failed to mention who should approve the deal. Rouhani’s team and the hardliners are currently in the midst of a hot dispute about whether that responsibility lies with the Majlis or the Supreme National Security Council. The hardliners insist on parliament, arguing that all international agreements should be adopted by the legislative branch of the government. Yet Rouhani’s team says that only the Supreme Council should review and endorse it. Not coincidentally, the president is the titular head of that council.

SHARP HARDLINER CRITICISM

On July 16, hardliner website Raja News published the third part of an article series titled “Some Aspects of the Deal Which Should Remain Unveiled,” by Ali Akbar Taheri. The article explains how the final deal reached by Rouhani’s negotiating team crosses six different redlines previously set by the Supreme Leader:

  1. Long-term limitations on the nuclear program. Khamenei has said that Iran should not agree to ten-year limitations because “ten years is a lifetime.” According to the article, however, the signed agreement contains at least fourteen Iranian commitments lasting ten or more years (e.g., a twenty-five-year limit on inspections and surveillance over enrichment of mined uranium; a fifteen-year ban on uranium enrichment at the Fordow facility).
  2. Unconventional inspections and access to military facilities. Khamenei has explicitly rejected such measures, but the final agreement allows the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct surveillance in all factories that enrich mined uranium, among other things. The agency can also ask to inspect military facilities such as Parchin if they deem it necessary.
  3. Limitations on enrichment at Fordow. Khamenei has opposed any such restrictions at the mountain facility, but the final agreement contains several.
  4. Delayed lifting of some sanctions. Khamenei previously insisted that all sanctions be rescinded as soon as the deal is signed, but the agreement indicates that some U.S. congressional sanctions and EU sanctions will not be lifted right away, if at all.
  5. IAEA conditionality. Khamenei has often expressed his distrust of the IAEA and declared that sanctions relief should not be conditioned on Iran’s implementation of the deal. Yet UN sanctions will not be lifted until the IAEA verifies that Tehran has complied with the agreement’s terms.
  6. Limits on centrifuge research. Khamenei has said that no restrictions should be placed on Iran’s nuclear research for the duration of the deal. Yet the agreement includes a ten-year limit on enrichment R&D related to the IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8 centrifuges, among other things.

The article also downplays Rouhani’s claim about lifting sanctions related to weapons, noting that “these sanctions would be replaced by limits [imposed on Iran’s weapons trade]…[E]very missile that is able to carry a nuclear warhead would be limited, all Shahab missiles and satellite carriers and so on.” In addition, the article claims that Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said the following: “Russia and China wanted weapons sanctions to be lifted, but despite our support the Iranian team itself agreed to continuation of the sanctions for the next five years!”

On July 16, at an event called “The Beginning of the Math Class” (a sarcastic title indicating that the time of verification has begun), hardline analyst Fouad Izadi criticized the deal from a different angle: “If the U.S. Congress rejects the agreement, America would not be bound to implement it, but if Iran implements the agreement, it will lose all leverage.” Izadi, who is close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, went on to claim that in the case of disagreement between Iran and the P5+1, “the arbiter is the UN Security Council,” which means that the United States and other P5+1 members would essentially become the arbiters of their own dispute. “If Iran gets accused of violating the agreement, [these countries] can issue a resolution against it,” he said, but if the United States or another party is so accused, “the Security Council cannot issue a resolution because one of them could just veto it.” He also pointed out that the Majlis should approve the agreement, and that it should condition Iran’s implementation of the deal on U.S. congressional approval, explaining that “the U.S. president will not be in office in nineteen months, and after him the U.S. administration would not be bound by the agreement if Congress disapproves it.”

Also on July 16, the hardline newspaper Kayhan claimed that the largely insignificant financial reaction to the nuclear deal — i.e., no sharp changes in the stock market or exchange rate — shocked those who have been “overexcited” about the negotiations. “People expected the foreign currency rate to drop and the national currency value to go up,” said one article, “and now they ask why the opposite has happened.”

CONCLUSION

In the United States, the same political body that was in charge of negotiating with Iran is also in charge of implementing the agreement. But in Iran, the president and his negotiators have little authority over foreign policy, the nuclear program, or military activities. Instead, those sectors are under the purview of Supreme Leader Khamenei, who is usually reluctant to take any public responsibility for major decisions. Furthermore, he has repeatedly expressed his distrust toward Americans, the West, the UN, and the IAEA. And while he has more or less supported Iran’s negotiators in his public statements, he has clearly sought to distance himself from them as well. If he decides to stop implementing the deal in the next year or so, he would likely blame the West or the negotiating team for cutting such a deal, as he did in 2003 and 2004. His initial reaction to the new agreement has already sent discouraging signals about Iran’s willingness to comply with its commitments in the long term.

How Israel Might Destroy Iran’s Nuclear Program

July 17, 2015

How Israel Might Destroy Iran’s Nuclear Program, National Review Online, Daniel Pipes, via Middle East Forum, July 16, 2015

1505Israeli alternatives in dealing with the Iranian nuclear threat

The Vienna deal has been signed and likely will soon be ratified, which raises the question: Will any government intervene militarily to stop the nearly inevitable Iranian nuclear buildup?

Obviously it will not be the American or Russian governments or any of the other four signatories. Practically speaking, the question comes down to Israel, where a consensus holds that the Vienna deal makes an Israeli attack more likely. But no one outside the Israeli security apparatus, including myself, knows its intentions. That ignorance leaves me free to speculate as follows.

Three scenarios of attack seem possible:

Airplanes. Airplanes crossed international boundaries and dropped bombs in the 1981 Israeli attack on an Iraqi nuclear installation and in the 2007 attack on a Syrian one, making this the default assumption for Iran. Studies show this to be difficult but attainable.

Special ops. These are already underway: computer virus attacks on Iranian systems unconnected to the Internet that should be immune, assassinations of top-ranking Iranian nuclear scientists, and explosions at nuclear installations.

Presumably, Israelis had a hand in at least some of these attacks and, presumably, they could increase their size and scope, possibly disrupting the entire nuclear program. Unlike the dispatch of planes across several countries, special operations have the advantage of reaching places like Fordow, far from Israel, and of leaving little or no signature.

Nuclear weapons. This doomsday weapon, which tends to be little discussed, would probably be launched from submarines. It hugely raises the stakes and so would only be resorted to, in the spirit of “Never Again,” if the Israelis were desperate.

Of these alternatives, I predict the Netanyahu government will most likely opt for the second, which is also the most challenging to pull off (especially now that the great powers promised to help the Iranians protect their nuclear infrastructure). Were this unsuccessful, it will turn to planes, with nuclear weapons as a last resort.

Cartoon of the day

July 17, 2015

H/t Joopklepzeiker

 

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Column One: Obama’s age of nuclear chaos

July 16, 2015

Column One: Obama’s age of nuclear chaos, Jerusalem Post, Caroline Glick, July 16, 2015

ShowImage (2)Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif gestures as he talks with journalist from a balcony of the Palais Coburg hotel where the Iran nuclear talks meetings are being held in Vienna, Austria. (photo credit:REUTERS)

Not only will the US and its allies remove the sanctions imposed on Iran over the past decade and so start the flow of some $150 billion to the ayatollahs’ treasury. They will help Iran develop advanced centrifuges.

They even committed themselves to protecting Iran’s nuclear facilities from attack and sabotage.

Israel still may have the ability to attack Iran’s nuclear sites. If it does, then it should attack them as quickly and effectively as possible.

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On Tuesday, we moved into a new nuclear age.

In the old nuclear age, the US-led West had a system for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It had three components: sanctions, deterrence and military force. In recent years we have witnessed the successful deployment of all three.

In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, the UN Security Council imposed a harsh sanctions regime on Iraq. One of its purposes was to prevent Iraq from developing nuclear weapons. After the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, we learned that the sanctions had been successful. Saddam largely abandoned his nuclear program due to sanctions pressure.

The US-led invasion of Iraq terrified several rogue regimes in the region. In the two to three years immediately following the invasion, America’s deterrent strength soared to unprecedented heights.

As for military force, the nuclear installation that Syrian dictator Bashar Assad built in Deir a-Zour with Iranian money and North Korean technicians wasn’t destroyed through sanctions or deterrence. According to foreign media reports, in September 2007, Israel concluded that these paths to preventing nuclear proliferation to Syria would be unsuccessful.

So then-prime minister Ehud Olmert ordered the IDF to destroy it. The outbreak of the Syrian civil war three years later has prevented Assad and his Iranian bosses from reinstating the program, to date.

The old nuclear nonproliferation regime was highly flawed.

Pakistan and North Korea exploited the post-Cold War weaknesses of its sanctions and deterrence components to develop and proliferate nuclear weapons and technologies.

Due to American weakness, neither paid a serious price for its actions.

Yet, for all its flaws and leaks, the damage caused to the nonproliferation system by American weakness toward Pakistan and North Korea is small potatoes in comparison to the destruction that Tuesday’s deal with Iran has wrought.

That deal doesn’t merely show that the US is unwilling to exact a price from states that illicitly develop nuclear weapons. The US and its allies just concluded a deal that requires them to facilitate Iran’s nuclear efforts.

Not only will the US and its allies remove the sanctions imposed on Iran over the past decade and so start the flow of some $150 billion to the ayatollahs’ treasury. They will help Iran develop advanced centrifuges.

They even committed themselves to protecting Iran’s nuclear facilities from attack and sabotage.

Under the deal, in five years, Iran will have unlimited access to the international conventional arms market. In eight years, Iran will be able to purchase and develop whatever missile systems it desires.

And in 10 years, most of the limitations on its nuclear program will be removed.

Because the deal permits Iran to develop advanced centrifuges, when the agreement ends in 10 years, Iran will be positioned to develop nuclear weapons immediately.

In other words, if Iran abides by the agreement, or isn’t punished for cheating on it, in 10 years, the greatest state sponsor of terrorism in the world will be rich, in possession of a modernized military, a ballistic missile arsenal capable of carrying nuclear warheads to any spot on earth, and the nuclear warheads themselves.

Facing this new nuclear reality, the states of the region, including Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and perhaps the emirates, will likely begin to develop nuclear arsenals. ISIS will likely use the remnants of the Iraqi and Syrian programs to build its own nuclear program.

Right now, chances are small that Congress will torpedo Barack Obama’s deal. Obama and his backers plan to spend huge sums to block Republican efforts to convince 13 Democratic senators and 43 Democratic congressmen to vote against the deal and so achieve the requisite two-thirds majority to cancel American participation in the deal.

Despite the slim chances, opponents of the deal, including Israel, must do everything they can to convince the Democrats to vote against it in September. If Congress votes down the deal, the nuclear chaos Obama unleashed on Tuesday can be more easily reduced by his successor in the White House.

If Congress rejects the deal, then US sanctions against Iran will remain in force. Although most of the money that will flow to Iran as a result of the deal is now frozen due to multilateral sanctions, and so will be transferred to Iran regardless of congressional action, retaining US sanctions will make it easier politically and bureaucratically for Obama’s replacement to take the necessary steps to dismantle the deal.

Just as the money will flow to Iran regardless of Congress’s vote, so Iran’s path to the bomb is paved regardless of what Congress does.

Under one scenario, if Congress rejects the deal, Iran will walk away from it and intensify its nuclear activities in order to become a nuclear threshold state as quickly as possible. Since the deal has destroyed any potential international coalition against Iran’s illegal program, no one will bat a lash.

Obama will be deeply bitter if Congress rejects his “historic achievement.” He can be expected to do as little as possible to enforce the US sanctions regime against his Iranian comrades. Certainly he will take no military action against Iran’s nuclear program.

As a consequence, regardless of congressional action, Iran knows that it has a free hand to develop nuclear weapons at least until the next president is inaugurated on January 20, 2017.

The other possible outcome of a congressional rejection of the deal is that Iran will stay in the deal and the US will be the odd man out.

In a bid to tie the hands of her boss’s successor and render Congress powerless to curb his actions, the day before the deal was concluded, Obama’s UN Ambassador Samantha Power circulated a binding draft resolution to Security Council members that would prohibit member nations from taking action to harm the agreement.

If the resolution passes – and it is impossible to imagine it failing to pass – then Iran can stay in the deal, develop the bomb with international support and the US will be found in breach of a binding UN Security Council resolution.

Given that under all scenarios, Tuesday’s deal ensures that Iran will become a threshold nuclear power, it must be assumed that Iran’s neighbors will now seek their own nuclear options.

Moreover, in light of Obama’s end-run around the Congress, it is clear that regardless of congressional action, the deal has already ruined the 70-year old nonproliferation system that prevented nuclear chaos and war.

After all, now that the US has capitulated to Iran, its avowed foe and the greatest state sponsor of terrorism, who will take future American calls for sanctions against nuclear proliferators seriously? Who will be deterred by American threats that “all options are on the table” when the US has agreed to protect Iran’s nuclear installations and develop advanced centrifuges for the same ayatollahs who daily chant, “Death to America”? For Israel, the destruction of the West’s nonproliferation regime means that from here on out, we will be living in a region buzzing with nuclear activity. Until Tuesday, Israel relied on the West to deter most of its neighbors from developing nuclear weapons. And when the West failed, Israel dealt with the situation by sending in the air force. Now, on the one hand Israel has no West to rely on for sanctions or deterrence, and on the other hand, it has limited or no military options of its own against many of the actors that will now seek to develop nuclear arsenals.

Consider Israel’s situation. How could Israel take action against an Egyptian or Jordanian nuclear reactor, for instance? Both neighboring states are working with Israel to defeat jihadist forces threatening them all. And that cooperation extends to other common threats. Given these close and constructive ties, it’s hard to see how Israel could contemplate attacking them.

But on the other hand, the regimes in Amman and Cairo are under unprecedented threat.

In theory they can be toppled at any moment by jihadist forces, from the Muslim Brotherhood to ISIS. It’s already happened once in Egypt.

The same considerations apply to Saudi Arabia.

As for Turkey, its NATO membership means that if Israel were to attack Turkish nuclear sites, it would run the risk of placing itself at war not only with Turkey, but with NATO.

Given Israel’s limited military options, we will soon find ourselves living under constant nuclear threat. Under these new circumstances, Israel must invest every possible effort in developing and deploying active nuclear defenses.

One key aspect to this is missile defense systems, which Israel is already developing.

But nuclear bombs can be launched in any number of ways.

Old fashioned bombs dropped from airplanes are one option.

Artillery is another. Even suicide trucks are good for the job.

Israel needs to develop the means to defend itself against all of these delivery mechanisms. At the same time, we will need to operate in hostile countries such as Lebanon, Syria and elsewhere to destroy deliveries of nuclear materiel whether transferred by air, sea or land.

Here is the place to mention that Israel still may have the ability to attack Iran’s nuclear sites. If it does, then it should attack them as quickly and effectively as possible.

No, a successful Israeli attack cannot turn back the clock. Israel cannot replace the US as a regional superpower, dictating policy to our neighbors. But a successful attack on Iran’s nuclear program along with the adoption of a vigilantly upheld strategy of active nuclear defense can form the basis of a successful Israeli nuclear defense system.

And no, Israel shouldn’t be overly concerned with how Obama will respond to such actions.

Just as Obama’s nuclear capitulation to Iran has destroyed his influence among our Arab neighbors, so his ability to force Israel to sit on the sidelines as he gives Iran a nuclear arsenal is severely constrained.

How will he punish Israel for defying him? By signing a nuclear deal with Iran that destroys 70 years of US nonproliferation strategy, allows the Iranian regime to grow rich on sanctions relief, become a regional hegemon while expanding its support for terrorism and develop nuclear weapons? Years from now, perhaps historians will point out the irony that Obama, who loudly proclaims his goal of making the world free of nuclear weapons, has ushered in an era of mass nuclear proliferation and chaos.

Israel can ill afford the luxury of pondering irony.

One day the nuclear Furies Obama has unleashed may find their way to New York City.

But their path to America runs through Israel. We need to ready ourselves to destroy them before they cross our border.

The President Holds a Press Conference on the Nuclear Deal with Iran

July 16, 2015

The President Holds a Press Conference on the Nuclear Deal with Iran, The White House, July 15, 2015

(Iran’s centrifuges continue to spin and so does Obama. — DM)

 

The Deal Wasn’t About Iran’s Nukes

July 16, 2015

The Deal Wasn’t About Iran’s Nukes, Commentary Magazine, July 15, 2015

If you think the United States just struck a poor nuclear deal with Iran, you’re right; but if that’s your key takeaway, you’re missing the point. Iran’s nuclear program was last on the list of the Obama administration’s priorities in talking to Tehran. The administration readily caved on Iran’s nukes because it viewed the matter only as a timely pretense for achieving other cherished aims. These were: (1) preventing an Israeli attack on Iran; (2) transforming the United States into a more forgiving, less imposing power; (3) establishing diplomacy as a great American good in itself; (4) making Iran into a great regional power; and (5), ensuring the legacies of the president and secretary of state as men of vision and peace.

The administration has always viewed Israel as an intractable troublemaker and the main catalyst for the region’s woes. An Israeli strike on Iran, especially if supported by the United States, would have been yet another display of destabilizing Israeli aggression that put Middle East peace further out of reach. Barack Obama, therefore, repeatedly warned Israel against attacking Iran. Benjamin Netanyahu complied, and for his compliance White House officials taunted him in 2014 as a “chickenshit” whose window of opportunity had closed. That window is now barred. The Iran deal states that the U.S. will train Iranians to counter any sabotage attempts on its nuclear facilities and systems. This is aimed at frustrating Israeli action.

Obama came to office promising to limit American action as well. In his standard progressive view, the United States has been too eager to throw its weight around and impose its norms on other countries without giving sufficient thought to the resentment it might sow. He ended the war in Iraq and sought to remake the United States as a humble power. “Too often the United States starts by dictating,” he told a Saudi news outlet soon after being elected. He, by contrast, would do a lot of “listening.” The Iran negotiations became Obama’s magnum opus on the theme of listening. Americans listened to Iranians dictate terms, shoot down offers, insult the United States, and threaten allies. America has been humbled indeed.

But such humility is necessary if diplomacy is to be made into a nation-defining ethos. And if we could successfully negotiate with theocratic Iran, then surely Americans would see that diplomacy could conquer all. So, for the sake of proving this abstract principle, Obama foreclosed any non-diplomatic approach to Iran before a deal was reached. As he told Tom Friedman in April, “there is no formula, there is no option, to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon that will be more effective than the diplomatic initiative and framework that we put forward — and that’s demonstrable.” So declared, so demonstrated.

Like the preeminence of diplomacy, the notion of Iran’s potential as a levelheaded regional power was a treasured abstract principle Obama hoped to substantiate through the nuclear talks. Once again, first came the declaration. Last December Obama speculated on the outcome of a completed nuclear deal: “There’s incredible talent and resources and sophistication inside of Iran, and it would be a very successful regional power that was also abiding by international norms and international rules, and that would be good for everybody.”

If Iran’s fanatical anti-Semitism called this sanguine view into question, that too could be explained. “Well the fact that you are anti-Semitic, or racist, doesn’t preclude you from being interested in survival,” he told the Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg. “It doesn’t preclude you from being rational about the need to keep your economy afloat; it doesn’t preclude you from making strategic decisions about how you stay in power; and so the fact that the supreme leader is anti-Semitic doesn’t mean that this overrides all of his other considerations.” That the United States and Iran have now come to an agreement—whatever the details—is supposed to demonstrate the soundness of that principle.

As far as legacy, what politician doesn’t want one? For Obama, a nominal nuclear deal may make him feel as if he’s earned the Nobel Prize once furnished him as election swag. John Kerry’s own efforts to earn a Nobel by brokering Middle East peace became another footnote in the story of Palestinian obstinacy. He too had something to prove.

From the administration’s standpoint, the deal was a grand slam. If it left Iran as an official nuclear power on the perpetual verge of a breakout, well, that was always the bargaining chip to get everything else. And with the United States having shown extraordinary cooperation and forgiveness, the thinking goes, even a nuclear Iran will become a less bellicose and more collegial member of the community of nations. What good the deal has already done, the administration believes, will continue to pay dividends. As is his wont, Obama is now declaring as much. But by the time his vision is upended by facts, he’ll be out of office, and we won’t have the luxury of fighting reality with abstractions.

The Iran Deal: Making War More Likely?

July 16, 2015

The Iran Deal: Making War More Likely? American ThinkerStephen Bryen and Shoshana Bryen, July 16, 2015

The deal is done. Iran has sort-of promised it won’t build nuclear weapons, but even the promise has serious caveats: Iran can continue to build weapons platforms to deliver the non-existent weapons; it can cooperate with friendly countries to acquire enhancements to weapons delivery technology; and it can prevent entry to requested facilities by international inspectors for 24 days per request; it need not account for prior military activity. And Iran will be vastly richer.

Based on the world’s experience with the efficacy of multinational inspection regimes and with Iran specifically, it would be wise to assume that the Islamic Republic will move (continue?) covertly to build nuclear warheads, perhaps just leaving out the nuclear fuel. Iran will likely begin testing rockets so that they will be able to release a future nuclear weapon securely at the right moment to get the right blast effect.

The rocket is as important as the nuclear weapon it carries.

Nuclear weapons don’t go off if they plow into the ground, because as they disintegrate they can’t achieve the necessary chain reaction; they must explode above ground at a fixed altitude

Allowing Iran to openly acquire ballistic missile technology can shorten the time from weapons acquisition to weapons use, increasing the relative nervousness of the neighbors — not a recipe for stability. Israel will have to try to interdict and disrupt Iranian ballistic missile testing on an active and overt basis. Because Israeli is not a signatory to the Iran deal, it can expect to be censured by its allies and everyone else. But Israel will have no choice.

If a nuclear weapon were to be fired at Israel, in the few minutes from launch to impact Israel could, in theory, launch its own nuclear weapons from diverse platforms including land-based intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), from F-4’s and F-15’s, and from the newer Israeli submarines. Iran would face annihilation. It potentially could mean the same for Israel, although Israel’s anti-missile system may be sufficient to block the Iranian strike. A lot will depend on how good the Iranian technology is, how well tested it is, and what Israel’s countermeasures are.

The above scenario suggests this might be the time for Israel to place whatever nuclear cards it holds on the table. Israel has long been a presumed nuclear power, including by the CIA since the 1970s, and Secretary Robert Gates said so explicitly in his confirmation hearings. But Israel’s official posture remains “nuclear ambiguity” and a vague statement that Israel would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in the region, hinting that the program was designed as a deterrent. But given that Iran is likely on its way to being a nuclear power as well, and has threatened Israel specifically and directly with annihilation, Israel’s deterrence may well be enhanced by a less ambiguous posture.

While the first of the deal’s unintended consequences is that it forces Israel to officially become a nuclear power, there are others.

The deal increases the chances of direct conventional warfare between Israel and an emboldened and wealthier Iran. It may come as a consequence of Israel’s “interdict and defeat” effort in Syria; too many Iranian missiles in the hands of Hizb’allah; the deployment of Iranian troops in Syria threatening Israel; a firefight in the Golan or southern Lebanon; or conflict on the high seas. The list is a long one.

And Israel is not the only country that views Iran with alarm. Egypt and Saudi Arabia will urgently step up their search for nuclear capability. Egypt has gone down this road before and the Saudis have been leaning on Pakistan for a bomb.  Neither Egypt nor Saudi Arabia is inherently stable, and instability runs different scenarios. Saudi Arabia has IRBM delivery systems and F-15s that can be used to deliver a nuclear weapon. Egypt does not presently have the rockets, but it has a good nuclear science base that it gained in cooperation with different international partners. How viable its nuclear science pool is today is unclear; but in the 1980s Egypt was working with Iraq on the creation of plutonium fuel for weapons (at the Osirak reactor, among other locales) and was partnered with Argentina and perhaps others in building a version of the American Pershing II mobile nuclear missile. It is not unreasonable to think these programs or variants of them will in some way be revived.

The U.S. administration may think the Sunni Arab states have nowhere to turn for technology, but that would be wrong. Russia, for example, and China are more than capable under the right circumstances of cynically supporting both sides in the region — greatly enhancing the chances of war.

In the short term, the Saudis and Egyptians will need to rely on under-the-table relationships with Israel to resist pressure from Iran, which will grow apace thanks to the Washington-led deal; whether this can be concretized and turned into a workable and useful collective security pact is an important consideration. At a minimum, given the substantial barriers to overt cooperation, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States will be heavily exposed and at risk for some time.

The security consequences do not only accrue to the regional countries, but to the United States and our European allies as well.

The U.S.-led deal leaves the Islamic Republic on the road to nuclear weapons capability, now or in five years or in ten — we don’t actually know because the administration gave up its demand for information on Iran’s previous military activities. The cost of this, which we already are seeing, is further diminution of American power and influence in the Middle East as neither our Arab allies nor Israel believe we can protect them. This fuels Russian as well as Iranian ambitions. Europe, which needs oil from the Middle East, can consequently be expected to back away from NATO, encouraging Russian nibbling on the margins of Europe — Estonia is already panicked. The Atlantic Alliance system andPax Americana that emerged from the ashes of WWII will collapse.

In the face of that possibility, the U.S. — whether in this administration or the next — will find that it cannot stand aside. In some manner, however halting, the United States will have to agree to do what Israel by circumstance is being forced to do, namely move militarily to truncate Iran’s nuclear program.

That being the case, it would be wise for the U.S. to pick up the leadership gauntlet earlier rather than later, and to do so in the company of as many friends and allies as it can muster.

Ignoring the Nuclear Gorilla in the Room?

July 16, 2015

‘All evidence suggests Iran already has nuclear warheads’

By Garth Kant, April 2, 2015 Via World Net Daily (Note: published four months ago!)


The Three Stooges…or are they? [Source: Unknown]

(Does Iran have the bomb? Seems pretty important given all that’s transpired lately. It they do, that would be a real game changer and everyone’s credibility would be on the line. Regardless, even the source of this article could come under question. Still, it makes a lot of sense. Why wouldn’t they have the bomb at this point? – LS)

Analyst: Obama administration almost certainly knows and is ‘fine’ with it

WASHINGTON – On a day when Iran and Western powers announced they had reached a framework of a deal, a highly informed and keen-eyed analyst believes the Obama administration wasn’t actually trying to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.

In fact, just the opposite.

“If Iran wanted to be nuclear, that was fine with this administration. I really think that’s their policy,” said Middle East specialist Clare Lopez of the Center for Security Policy.

Lopez described the talks with Iran talks as a diplomatic kabuki dance intended to cover up the awful truth: Iran already has what it wants.

“All the evidence suggests Iran already has nuclear warheads,” she told WND.

Worse yet, she said the Obama administration almost certainly knows that.

“IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) reporting over recent years indicates at a minimum they strongly suspect that Iran already has built nuclear warheads. It’s certainly known that Iran has long range ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles.)”

“The only thing I don’t think we know for sure is whether the Iranians have been able to marry the nuclear warheads to missiles, which is a technically difficult thing to do,” said the woman whose analytical acumen was honed by 20 years as a CIA field operative.

The New York Times described the framework deal announced Thursday as a “surprisingly specific and comprehensive general understanding about the next steps in limiting Tehran’s nuclear program.”

But it doesn’t appear the parties agree upon what they agreed to, because after the announcement, Iran immediately accused the U.S. of lying about what was in the agreement.

Chief Iranian negotiator Mohammad Javad Zarif told reporters the agreement would allow Iran to keep operating its nuclear program.

“We will continue enriching; we will continue research and development,” and not close any facilities, Zarif said.

He also crowed that essentially all economic sanctions against Iran will be removed after the deal is signed, by the deadline of June 30.

The proposed deal would also allow Iran to keep operating 6,000 centrifuges capable of producing enriched uranium, a fuel for nuclear weapons. After 15 years, Iran would be free to produce as much fuel as it wishes.

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Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had a stark assessment of the agreement, tweeting, “A deal based on this framework would threaten the survival of Israel.”

Nonetheless, President Obama claimed the deal “cuts off every pathway” for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. And, he insisted, “If Iran cheats, the world will know it.”

But from what Lopez surmises, whatever is in the deal is largely irrelevant, because Iran basically already has what it wants.

WND asked Lopez, if Iran already has warheads, did it buy or build them?

“I think they built them,” she said. “I don’t see how not, after this many years of working closely with other countries’ programs.”

So, if the objective wasn’t to prevent Iran from getting the bomb, why was the Obama administration so desperate to get a deal?

“To sort of rack up a political win,” said Lopez. “It’s for appearances. A political notch in the gun belt. But it’s not real. I mean, they know it’s not real.”

The administration’s eagerness for a deal was expressed as far back as January 2013, when national security council staffer Ben Rhodes told liberal activists it was as important to the president as Obamacare, saying, “This is probably the biggest thing President Obama will do in his second term on foreign policy. This is health care for us, just to put it in context.”

That zeal for a deal has made the rest of the world wary.

“What bothers me is it looks like the administration is so hungry for a deal just to have a deal so they can say they have a deal,” House Speaker John Boehner said Thursday, before the deal was announced and upon returning from a trip to Israel and five other countries in the Middle East. “The rest of the world wants something real out of this.”

“And we’re in these talks with the people who describe us as Satan, like we’re going to come to some agreement with the Iranians, while they’re spreading terror all over the Middle East,” he added.

Lopez told WND, “I’m not sure if architects of this policy agenda, including the president, actually understand the history of Islamic jihad and what it’s done in, and to, the world – especially the non-Muslim world, much of which was forcibly subjugated to Islamic rule over the centuries. Or else, how could they possibly follow such a policy?”

She also warned that the administration may not fully recognize Iran is so dangerous because it is not seeking peaceful coexistence; ultimately, it is seeking world domination and has not shied from expressing that openly.

“According to its own constitution, it is dedicated to jihad and a global Islamic government under Shariah. Its ideology says it can accelerate the return of the 12th Imam by instigating Armageddon: a frightening thought about a regime driving for a nuclear bomb.”

Lopez noted a distinct peculiarity to keep in mind when negotiating with Iran: “Islamic law obligates Muslims to lie to non-Muslims. Why on earth would anyone expect Iran, a jihad and Shariah state, to negotiate with Westerners in good faith?”

Lopez does see “a tremendous naivete about what jihad and Shariah really mean” on the part of the Obama administration.

She detects “an apparent trust that if the U.S. adopts a more accommodating attitude, well, then so will the Iranians. I’m not sure how Ivy League graduates could be so ignorant of world history. I cannot imagine they’d want to inflict the legacy of Islamic jihad on anyone if they knew what it has meant historically.”

The Washington Post reported another possible motivation for Obama to strike a deal, almost any deal, with Iran: personal pride.

“The negotiations are also personal for the president. Obama was dismissed as dangerously naive in 2007 by then-candidate Hillary Rodham Clinton for suggesting that he would engage in ‘aggressive personal diplomacy’ with Iran,” reported the paper Wednesday.

“There’s a determination to prove the Republicans wrong, and to prove the world wrong,” Julianne Smith, a former deputy national security adviser to Vice President Biden, told the Post.

Lopez enumerated four more reasons why she believed the president pushed so hard for a deal:
•Obama has decided to remove U.S. power and influence from the Middle East and North Africa.
•He has a worldview that sees America as influence for ill in the world; therefore, he must diminish that influence wherever and however possible.
•He has a worldview that sees Islam as suppressed and oppressed by Western (colonial) powers and the U.S. as the inheritor of that oppressive role.
•He has a desire to “rectify” what is viewed as “injustice” suffered by Islam at the hands of the West and has decided that best way to do that is for the U.S. to withdraw and allow and empower Islam to rise back up again to what is seen as its “rightful” place in the world.

Why does Lopez believe the evidence suggests Iran already has built nuclear warheads? Because so much of that evidence has been publicly available for so long.

In 2004, the AP reported an Iranian opposition group revealed that the regime had bought blueprints for a nuclear bomb from the same black-market network that provided Libya such diagrams, and that it was continuing to enrich uranium despite a commitment to suspend that effort.

The National Council of Resistance of Iran, or NCRI, said the diagram was provided by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani head of the network linked to nuclear programs in both Iran and Libya.

The NCRI has a long record of providing accurate information on Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

On Aug. 15, 2002, the exiled group revealed that Iran was building two secret nuclear sites: a uranium enrichment plant at Natanz and a heavy water production plant in Arak.

In 2005, the New York Times reported senior U.S. intelligence officials provided the IEAE with the contents of “stolen Iranian laptop containing more than a thousand pages of Iranian computer simulations and accounts of experiments – studies for crucial features of a nuclear warhead.”

NPR reported that in 2006 nuclear bomb blueprints were discovered “on computers belonging to three Swiss businessmen under investigation for their ties to the smuggling ring directed by Khan,” according to former U.N. weapons inspector David Albright.

The information was made public in 2008, by which time Khan was under “house arrest for having sold nuclear secrets to Libya and other countries.”

The Guardian reported in 2006 the U.S. had evidence that Iran was designing “a crude nuclear bomb, like the one dropped on Nagasaki in 1945.”

The U.S. said bomb blueprints were “found on a laptop belonging to an Iranian nuclear engineer, and obtained by the CIA in 2004.”

Lopez said if “you read between the lines” of its report back in November 2011, it was clear that even the IAEA believed Iran had been working on a nuclear warhead as well as the explosive triggers for initiating the implosion sequence.

“So, yes, they’ve had the information how to build a warhead for a long time. They’ve had expert assistance from, at a minimum, North Korea and Pakistan,” she said. “They’re documented by the IAEA as having engaged in activities related to warhead development. There are satellite images from Parchin of what are believed to be ‘containers’ in which warhead triggers were tested. And Iranian officials have been reported present in North Korea during nuclear tests.”

Parchin is one of the sites where Iran does not permit IAEA inspectors to go.

Secretary of State John Kerry said Thursday that, under the deal, Iran would allow the IEAE to inspect anywhere it wants.

But, before the deal was announced, Lopez warned, “The whole inspection thing is kind of voluntary. The IEAE submits a request to tell the Iranians where they want to go and they can comply or not.”

Lopez described the Iranians’ transparency and honesty about its program as nonexistent. And, she noted, Iran has always avoided compliance with the international obligations it has already agreed to.

“Every single facility that we know about, publicly, in their nuclear weapons program was revealed by someone other than Iran. As a signatory to the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) they are responsible for reporting to the IEAE all of their facilities and opening them up to inspection. They have never, ever volunteered admission of a single one. It all came from satellite photos, intelligence services or the Iranian opposition.”

Since satellite photography showed the structures at Parchin were designed for the testing of the explosive charges used to detonate nuclear warheads, Lopez said it begged the question: “On what do you test these explosive triggers, if you don’t have a warhead?”

Lopez said the Iranians were conducting research and development on nuclear warheads at Lavizan, the existence of which was revealed by the NCRI in 2002.

“Once it was exposed, the Iranians razed it to the ground. Leveled all the buildings, every tree, bush, and blade of grass and carted it off to I-don’t-I-know-where, and then they turned the place into a city park with picnic benches and tennis courts. This is how they act.”

Lopez said the key threshold for the Iranians is perfecting a delivery system for a warhead.

“I don’t know if they’ve married it to a missile. Until it’s on top of a missile it’s not deliverable, at least, in the usual way.”

She described Iran’s missiles as an enormous problem the West is ignoring at its own peril.

“Iran’s ICBMs are not even on the table for discussion. They are explicitly excluded from these talks.”

Furthermore, “The Pentagon has open-source reporting available now for at least two-to-three years that Iran’s ICBMs would be able to reach the continental U.S. this year, 2015. It has the range to hit the US, I don’t know about accuracy. They’ve got solid rocket-propellant fuel, all the things that help a missile increase its range.”

So, it all boils down to whether they can marry the warhead to the rocket?

“Yes.”

When they accomplish that, can they both attack Israel and launch an EMP attack over the United States?

“Yes. All they need is one missile to attack America. It wouldn’t even have to be an inter-continental missile. It could be a ‘Scud in a bucket.’ They could put a shorter range missile on a fishing trawler, park it outside the international water boundary, and send it over Kansas.”

Former CIA Director James Woolsey wrote in the Wall Street Journal in August of a study that concluded an electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, attack, which could knock out America’s electrical grid with a single nuclear explosion over the nation’s heartland, would kill up to 90 percent of the U.S. population within a year, due to starvation, disease and societal breakdown.

In other words, a single nuclear bomb would give Iran the ability to inflict an apocalypse upon the United States, and effectively destroy it, with merely the flip of a switch.

“There’s an open-source report about an Iranian military document that showed their military doctrine explicitly calls for the use of an EMP weapon against the United States. That doesn’t mean they have the capability already but they are thinking about it,” warned Lopez.

“We’re dealing with a regime that not only was responsible, in part, for collaboration in the 9/11 attacks, which has attacked, killed and tortured our people for 36 years, but is also a regime with an ideology that has a messianic and apocalyptic theology that envisions an Armageddon to bring on the end times according to their beliefs. It is also an eschatology that is absolutely imbued with Jew hatred. So, why on earth, should we negotiate with a regime like that? Knowing that, ever since the beginning, they have never negotiated in good faith. Ever.”

She clarified how different this was than negotiating with the Soviets during the Cold War because they were just as concerned about their own survival as were Americans, unlike the mullahs in Tehran.

The Cold War doctrine of deterrence relied upon the belief that neither side would launch an attack if it was assured the other side would launch an equally devastating counter-attack.

The theory was that “mutually assured destruction,” or MAD, guaranteed neither side would launch an attack because it would also be committing suicide.

However, that theory does not necessarily apply to Iran.

Lopez recalled the words of Mideast scholar Bernard Lewis that, when it comes to the apocalypse-seeking mullahs of Iran, “Mutually assured destruction is not a deterrent factor, but rather an inducement.

“And that’s how they think,” lamented Lopez. “They think they’re going to bring back the 12th imam to launch the end times, by bringing Armageddon on Earth.”

The analyst also described a number of other problems with the administration’s negotiations with Iran.

First, the U.N. Security Council has passed six resolutions demanding that Iran halt all nuclear enrichment, period.

Before the plan was announced, she observed, “All we know about the talks is what’s leaked; we don’t have an official version, but we are given to understand that our side is ready to concede that Iran may continue enriching.”

That proved to be true when it was reported the deal will allow Iran to keep running 6,000 centrifuges, and, after 15 years, as many as it wishes.

She noted the Joint Plan of Action agreed to by world powers and Iran in 2013 said very explicitly it’s envisioned that Iran will continue to enrich.

“Right there, they’ve flouted six U.N. resolutions,” she said. “Iran has 19,000 centrifuges for enriching uranium that they’ve admitted to. Only about 10,000 are hooked up and operating. The others are not attached yet. The deal will reportedly let Iran run 6,000 centrifuges, and the remainder do not have to be destroyed. All they have to do is say they unhooked them. So they don’t have to destroy any centrifuges. They don’t have to remove any centrifuges. They just have to say they unplugged them.”

Another major problem, Lopez pointed out, is that Iran already has quite a stockpile of enriched uranium, a key ingredient to a nuclear weapon.

“They diluted some of it into a less-readily accessible form, but they kept it all,” she said. “It only takes a week or two to reverse that process and get back up to enriched uranium.”

WND mentioned that Israeli Prime Minister has pointed out that any Iranian enrichment capability was an unacceptable danger. And WND recently reported that former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton was amazed the U.S. had moved from an original position, 15 years ago, of insisting Iran have no enrichment capabilities, to negotiating over how much enrichment capability the terrorist state could have.

“How do you, in negotiations, all of a sudden decide you’re going to overturn six U.N. Security Council resolutions?” asked Lopez, both rhetorically and incredulously. “What authority do they have to do that?”

And one more major problem cited by Lopez: “The Iranians reportedly are permitted to continue working on more advanced generations of centrifuges. They are developing newer centrifuges that can make more enriched uranium, faster.”

WND then pointed to yet another problem: reports that Iran is outsourcing much of its nuclear program, so that any deal struck with the West wouldn’t even cover much of the mullahs’ effort to become a nuclear power.

On Sunday, Gordon Chang wrote in the Daily Beast a description of the vast breadth of Iranian outsourcing.

North Korea and Iran announced a technical cooperation pact in September of 2012, and one month later, “Iran began stationing personnel at a military base in North Korea, in a mountainous area close to the Chinese border. The Iranians, from the Ministry of Defense and associated firms, reportedly are working on both missiles and nuclear weapons.”

“Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, thought to be Tehran’s chief nuclear scientist, was almost certainly in North Korea at Punggye-ri in February 2013 to witness Pyongyang’s third atomic test. Reports put Iranian technicians on hand at the site for the first two detonations as well.”

Chang also reported the North Koreans have also sold Iran material for bomb cores, “perhaps even weapons-grade uranium.”

Additionally, “Hundreds of North Koreans have worked at about 10 nuclear and missile facilities in Iran.”

Indications are China is cooperating with the two countries.

“There have been continual reports of transfers by Chinese enterprises to Iran in violation of international treaties and U.N. rules. Chinese entities have been implicated in shipments of maraging steel, ring-shaped magnets, and valves and vacuum gauges, all apparently headed to Iran’s atom facilities. In March 2011, police in Port Klang seized two containers from a ship bound to Iran from China.”

Chang’s conclusion about Iranian outsourcing was alarming: “[T]hey will be one day away from a bomb – the flight time from Pyongyang to Tehran – not one year as American and other policymakers hope.”

Lopez told WND, “I would say the Daily Beast story is accurate. That is my understanding of how things have been for many, many years. A working relationship between Iran and North Korea makes sense to them.”

Why?

“Iran has the world breathing down its neck. North Korea has taken itself out of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, but Iran is still a signatory. The Iranians and North Koreans have been working together for many, many years on warheads and on missiles.”

If this information is so publicly known, why would State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf dismiss as “bizarre” reports from top analysts that Iran was likely hiding key nuclear-related assets in North Korea, and that the two regimes were transferring enriched uranium and ballistic missile technology back and forth?

“I think it is known inside the State Department, and certainly inside the INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research), their research branch, a small division within the department that’s part of the intelligence community. They for sure know about this. Whether Marie Harf knows, maybe not.”

So, then Secretary of State John Kerry and the other negotiators know about the vast Iranian outsourcing, too?

“Of course he does! At his level, he would have to know.”

So, if the administration is not disclosing so much information about what Iran is doing behind the scenes, WND asked Lopez, would Obama would ever utilize the military option to destroy the country’s nuclear program?

“No.”

Does Israel have a viable military option?

“Yes.”

She referred to multiple reports in February that Saudi Arabia had leaked word it would let Israel fly over its airspace to attack Iran if necessary.

But does Israel have the ability to take out Iran’s radar and air defenses and reach Iranian facilities located deep underground without U.S. bunker-buster bombs?

Lopez referred to the book “A Time to Attack” by Georgetown professor and former Pentagon strategist Matthew Kroenig, which, she said, described how “Israel by itself cannot knock out Iran’s entire program or bring down the regime, the only sure way to stop the program. But if the Israelis took out four key facilities they could buy time, at least one or two years.”

As for reaching buried sites, Lopez said bunker-buster bombs might not be needed if Israel were to drop “multiple bombs down the same hole.”

Besides, they don’t need to destroy the facilities: merely collapsing the entrance of a site “would turn it into a sarcophagus.”

That, she said, would cripple Iran’s program for a while.

Would that be worth the risk of massive Iranian retaliation and a full-scale regional war?

“I think it depends on the Israeli assessment of how close they are to deliverable nuclear weapons capability. Everything depends on that assessment. If Israel thinks Iran is close, they have to go,” concluded the analyst.

“They can’t wait.”

Cartoons of the day

July 16, 2015

H/t Hope and Change Cartoons

Dealing from the Bottom

 

H/t Freedom is just another word

finished

 

H/t The Jewish Press

24-Day-drug-bust

Beware the Hyde-and-Jekyll Defense of the Iran Nuclear Agreement

July 16, 2015

Beware the Hyde-and-Jekyll Defense of the Iran Nuclear Agreement, Middle East Forum, Gary C. Gambill, July, 2015

1500Obama administration officials believe that a nuclear threshold détente will transform Iran into the kind of state one might trust to linger near the finish line of producing a bomb.

After two years of negotiations with Iran over the fate of its nuclear program, the Obama administration has unveiled an agreement abandoning the pursuit of a decisive reduction in the Islamic Republic’s breakout capacity – the ability to quickly and successfully produce a bomb – and lifting the economic sanctions that have hobbled its economy. The agreement not only sanctifies Teheran’s retention of sufficient enrichment infrastructure to produce a bomb in a year or less, but also drops or dilutes a range of other longstanding demands, from closing a once-secret, heavily fortified underground enrichment facility to providing inspectors with a full accounting of its bomb-making research and development.

As the Obama administration and its supporters seek to rally domestic and international support for this historic compromise, listen for what can best be described as a Hyde-and-Jekyll defense.

When discussing what will happen if the P5+1 world powers maintain their long-standing refusal to accept Iran’s retention of proliferation-prone nuclear infrastructure, the administration has often depicted the Islamic Republic as a menacing force hell-bent on continuing its march toward the brink, whatever the consequences. Secretary of State John Kerry has suggested that Iran might “rush towards a nuclear weapon” if the talks collapse. Obama has characterized the alternative as “letting them rush towards a bomb.” Outside of the administration, supporters of the pending nuclear agreement have typically offered more measured warnings that the Iranians could “take the lid off their program” and “rapidly ramp up their uranium enrichment.” Most believe that war will be likely, if not unavoidable, if there is no agreement.

However, when speaking about what will happen if the P5+1 recognizes and validates Tehran’s nuclear threshold status, the administration and its supporters have depicted the Islamic Republic as an eminently rational actor likely to abide by the letter and spirit of a prospective agreement. Obamasees the P5+1 as offering the Iranians the prospect of being “a very successful regional power” in return for accepting monitored limits on their nuclear program. “Without in any way being under an illusion about Iranian intentions … [or] the nature of that regime, they are self-interested,” according to Obama. “It is possible for them to make a strategic calculation that, at minimum, pushes much further to the right whatever potential breakout capacity they may have.”

Put simply, if we continue refusing to lift sanctions until Iran fully unclenches its nuclear fist (dramatically downsizes its enrichment infrastructure, acknowledges past weaponization work, gives inspectors wide latitude, etc.), we will get Mr. Hyde. But we will get the friendly Dr. Jekyll if we give in and accept the agreement Obama has put before us. And this is only if we give in – proponents of the agreement are quite certain that the good doctor won’t pop up if the international community stands firm (i.e. that the Iranians won’t, upon further reflection, make more concessions on the nuclear issue, or otherwise try harder to win international confidence).

983 (1)
983 (1)Obama administration officials warn that Iran could “rush” for a bomb if the international community demands a more decisive reduction in its nuclear infrastructure.

Oddly enough, the Hyde portraiture isn’t one of Iran reverting to its nuclear posture before direct talks with the Obama administration began in early 2013. Back then, the mullahs weren’t “rapidly” ramping up enrichment capacity (let alone “rushing” for a bomb), but increasing it slowly enough not to cross certain thresholds deemed likely to trigger Israeli and/or American military action (e.g., accumulating enough near-20% enriched uranium to produce through further enrichment sufficient weapons grade uranium for a bomb). The Iran they suggest will emerge from our failure to compromise is far more unhinged and oblivious to its people’s welfare than the one they sat down with two years ago. And dumber, too – an attempt by Iran to “rush” for a bomb or significantly narrow its nuclear breakout time by ramping up enrichment capacity would be supremely stupid when international resolve is at a peak.

While some proponents of the agreement are simply cherry-picking diametrically opposed characterizations of Iran to fit mismatched legs of a bad argument, many appear to genuinely believe that a nuclear threshold détente will somehow transform Iran into the kind of partner one might trust to linger near the finish line of producing a bomb, and that lack of one will put it on a path to war.

There are three overlapping strands of reasoning in this argument. All have an elegant logic with a weak empirical track record outside of Iran and little applicability to the particulars of the case at hand.

“More to lose”

The first holds that lifting sanctions will accelerate Iran’s integration into the world economy, creating disincentives to misbehave. “If in fact they’re engaged in international business, and there are foreign investors, and their economy becomes more integrated with the world economy, then in many ways it makes it harder for them to engage in behaviors that are contrary to international norms,” explained Obama in April.

Although there is much to be said for free markets and trade, economic integration hasn’t reliably inhibited the aggression of states. The European continent was more economically integrated on the eve of World War I than at any time prior and for many decades after.

In any case, lifting sanctions isn’t likely to result in Iran’s headlong integration into the world economy. This isn’t a situation where a bankrupt dictatorship opens up to the world out of desperation and falls prey to socio-economic forces beyond its control. The Iranian regime is getting a direct financial windfall out of this (access to frozen Iranian assets worth as much as $150 billion, ability to sell oil, etc.), which it can simply pocket while forgoing the kind of increased trade and foreign investment that might constrain its freedom of action later.

“More like us”

The second line of reasoning holds that drawing Iran into closer economic and socio-cultural contact with the rest of the world will cause religious extremism, xenophobia, and other unsavory attitudes among the public at large to give way to materialist and individualist concerns that will constrain government decision-making. Obama “believes the more people interact with open societies, the more they will want to be part of an open society,” says Ivo Daalder, Obama’s former NATO ambassador and head of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

But this presumes that the Iranian public has influence over its government’s aggressive regional and international policies. As was made clear in the deadly aftermath of the rigged 2009 elections and at many other times, the Iranian government can and does ignore public opinion.

In any case, there’s little evidence that Iranian public opinion supports the regime’s nuclear brinksmanship. While most Iranians do express support for a civilian energy program, few attach a high priority to it. Despite a steady diet of government propaganda heralding the nuclear program as the sacred right of the Iranian people, only 6% of respondents in a September 2013 Zogby poll said that continuing Iran’s enrichment program was one of their top two policy priorities. Iranian leaders threaten world peace because of ideological and strategic reasons, not public opinion.

“Empower moderates”

1501Obama has argued that the pending nuclear agreement could “strengthen the hands” of President Hassan Rouhani and other “moderates.”

Finally, Obama has argued that an agreement “could strengthen the hands of more moderate leaders in Iran.” President Hassan Rouhani and other “moderates” will gain clout in Iran’s government if there is a deal on his watch, while “hardliners” will gain influence if there isn’t one.

But this is a misreading of what causes the strength of moderates in government to fluctuate. This variable is in large part a function of how aggressively radical mullahs vet who can run in elections. So-called “moderates” are allowed to ascend the ranks of power when the system is under threat and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei needs them to safely channel public dissent and/or soften international hostility to Iran, but they lose clout when they are no longer needed to deflect such challenges.

Might not the exorbitant financial payoff to the Iranian state of having sanctions lifted boost the legitimacy of the system and thereby weaken moderates? Alan J. Kuperman, head of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project at the University of Texas at Austin, is concerned that such a windfall “would entrench the ruling mullahs, who could claim credit for Iran’s economic resurgence.”

Moreover, Kuperman adds, the Iranian regime will acquire “extra resources” to “amplify the havoc it is fostering in neighboring countries like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen.” And once a nuclear deal is signed, fear of provoking Tehran to violate it will surely discourage the international community from punishing it for its terrorism sponsorship and bloody proxy interventions in the region.

Rouhani may get a personal boost from getting sanctions lifted on his watch, but it’s a mistake to translate that into broad advancement of “moderates.” The Iranian president may be a soft-liner on some domestic issues, but he is no less committed to realizing Iran’s nuclear ambitions than so-called hardliners.

Indeed, he is arguably more so. Many hardliners are more interested in using the nuclear program to throw a wrench into Iran’s relations with the West and keep it on a “rogue” footing than in the delicate task of preventing the international community from stopping its eventual construction of a bomb. Not surprisingly, the above-mentioned Zogby poll showed that Iranians who believe Iran should have nuclear weapons are more likely to self-identify as Rouhani supporters than those who don’t.

Conclusion

The reality is that we don’t know what will happen inside Iran in the years to come. But it’s a good bet the nature and temperament of the regime won’t change dramatically for better or worse as a result of whether or not the international community sanctifies Iran’s nuclear threshold status.

Although Obama administration officials are quick to insist that their proposed nuclear agreement with Iran is a good idea regardless of the nature and intentions of the Iranian regime, no one really believes this. If Iran is completely unchanged by its opening to the world, then the best case scenario is that we’ll be exactly where we are today when modest restrictions on its enrichment capacity expire in 10 years, only Iran will have recovered economically from the impact of sanctions, shattered the global coalition arrayed against it, and obtained the internationally sanctioned right to ramp up enrichment.

The worst-case scenario is, well, a lot worse.