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Iran’s supreme leader vows to continue anti-US policies

July 18, 2015

Iran’s supreme leader vows to continue anti-US policies, Ynet News, July 18, 2015

(Please see also, Back in Tehran… Khamenei adds red lines, Rouhani tries to resign, Jaafari hints at “fait accompli” soon. The linked July 12th DEBKAfile article claims that when Rouhani asked Khamenei to back off from some of his “red lines” and threatened to resign as president if he did not, Khamenei reminded him of the unpleasant fates of other presidents who had resigned. He and two other hard liners, Defense Minister Hosseim Dehqan and Revolutionary Guards chief Mohammad Ali Jaafari, told Rouhani 

in the stiffest terms that Tehran must not on any account bow to international pressure for giving up its nuclear program or the development of ballistic missiles.

Although Iran got just about everything it wanted, and forfeited nothing of substance, it remains possible that Iran will reject the “deal” as soon as sanctions are lifted and can not “snap back.”

In addition, please see Into the fray: Iran- Reaping the storm that Barack sowed…, contending that Obama’s affinity for Islam has much to do with the “deal.”– DM)

 

“If any of our security officials or members of parliament approve or denounce the deal before fully scrutinizing it, they will regret it,” Revolutionary Guard commander and head of Iran’s Basij organization, Mohammad Reza Naghdi told the Fars news agency on Friday.

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Ayatollah Khamenei calls on country’s legislators to examine nuclear deal carefully before deciding whether to approve it, implying the accord has yet to win definitive backing in Tehran.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei withheld his verdict on Iran’s nuclear deal on Saturday but in a fiery address vowed enduring opposition to the United States and its Middle East policies, saying Washington sought Iran’s ‘surrender’.

In an speech at a Tehran mosque punctuated by chants of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel”, Khamenei said he wanted politicians to examine the agreement to ensure national interests were preserved, as Iran would not allow the disruption of its revolutionary principles or defensive abilities.

An arch conservative with the last word on high matters of state, Khamenei repeatedly used the phrase “whether this text is approved or not”, implying the accord has yet to win definitive backing from Iran’s factionalized political establishment.

59219580100388640360noIran’s Ayatollah Khamenei (Photo: AP)

“Whether the deal is approved or disapproved, we will never stop supporting our friends in the region and the people of Palestine, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain and Lebanon. Even after this deal our policy towards the arrogant US will not change,” he said.

Under the agreement reached on Tuesday, sanctions will be gradually removed in return for Iran accepting long-term curbs on a nuclear program that the West has suspected was aimed at creating a nuclear bomb. Iran denies it seeks a nuclear bomb.

Khamenei’s combative remarks about US policies in the Middle East may sit awkwardly with a diplomatic offensive Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif plans in coming days in the wake of the deal.

‘Insult’

Iran regards its nuclear program as an emblem of national dignity and dynamism in the face of what it sees as decades of hostility from Western countries that opposed its 1979 Islamic revolution.

Khamenei did not echo criticisms of the deal made on Friday by a top cleric, Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Movahedi Kermani, who said in an address broadcast on radio that it reflected excessive demands by world powers that were an “insult”.

But Khamenei’s remarks radiated a broad mistrust of US intentions, claiming that successive American presidents had sought Iran’s “surrender”, and declaring that if war broke out America would come off worst, nursing “a broken head”.

“The Americans say they stopped Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon,” Khamenei said.

“They know it’s not true. We had a fatwa (religious ruling), declaring nuclear weapons to be religiously forbidden under Islamic law. It had nothing to do with the nuclear talks.”

61618310100492640360noAnti-US and anti-Israel displays at al-Quds Day commemorations in Tehran (Photo: AFP)

Later on Saturday, the Supreme Leader praised Iranian negotiators who thrashed out the accord in marathon negotiations in Vienna.

“During the nuclear talks, we saw the Americans’ dishonesty over and over, but fortunately our officials fought back and in some cases showed revolutionary reactions,” Khamenei said during meetings with senior Iranian officials and ambassadors from several Muslim states, according to his official website.

But his remarks on Saturday did not shed light on Iran’s procedures for ratifying the accord, which are not known in any detail. Zarif will brief parliament on July 21, Iranian media have said, and the agreement will also be examined by the National Security Council, the country’s highest security body.

Zarif, who plans to visit several countries in the region, told fellow Muslim countries on Friday that Iran hoped the accord could pave the way for more cooperation in the Middle East and internationally.

In a message to Islamic and Arab countries on the Eid al-Fitr holiday at the end of Ramadan, Zarif said: “By solving the artificial crisis about its nuclear program diplomatically, a new opportunity for regional and international cooperation has emerged.”

‘Real terrorists’

Khamenei maintained that the Islamic Republic’s policies in the region would continue to defy the United States, and the nuclear deal was an exceptional instance of dialogue.

“We have repeatedly said we don’t negotiate with the US on regional or international affairs; not even on bilateral issues. There are some exceptions like the nuclear program that we negotiated with the Americans to serve our interests.”

He said US policies in the region were “180 degrees” opposed to Iran’s policies.

“The Americans dub the Lebanese resistance terrorists and regard Iran as a supporter of terrorism because of its support for the Lebanese Hezbollah, while the Americans themselves are the real terrorists who have created Islamic State and support the wicked Zionists,” Khamenei said.

Several Gulf Arab states have long accused Tehran of interference, alleging financial or armed support for political movements in several countries including Bahrain, Yemen and Lebanon. Shi’ite power Iran denies interference but vows undimmed support for the Syrian and Iraqi governments, who are both fighting insurgencies by a variety of Sunni armed groups.

Prominent conservatives have largely kept silent on the deal. Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior advisor to Khamenei, did not mention the agreement in his Eid al-Fitr message.

“If any of our security officials or members of parliament approve or denounce the deal before fully scrutinizing it, they will regret it,” Revolutionary Guard commander and head of Iran’s Basij organization, Mohammad Reza Naghdi told the Fars news agency on Friday.

Categories: Diplomacy, Dishonor, Foreign policy, IAEA, Iran nuke inspections, Iran scam, Iranian military sites, Iranian missiles, Islamic supremacy, Israel, Khamenei, Middle East, Obama, Obama's affinity for Islam, Obama's America, P5+1, Rouhani, Sanctions
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Into the fray: Iran- Reaping the storm that Barack sowed…

July 18, 2015

Into the fray: Iran- Reaping the storm that Barack sowed…, Jerusalem Post, MARTIN SHERMAN,July 16, 2015

ShowImage (3)Map of Middle East. (photo credit:Courtesy)

It is through this Islamo-philic prism that the Obama administration’s attitude to, and execution of, its foreign policy must be evaluated – including its otherwise incomprehensible capitulation this week on Iran’s nuclear program.

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Obama is the first US president who genuinely conceives of Islam as not inherently opposed to American values or interests.

You’re absolutely right that John McCain has not talked about my Muslim faith – Barack Hussein Obama to ABC’s George Stephanopoulos, September 7, 2008

I also know that Islam has always been a part of America’s story – Barack Hussein Obama, Cairo, June 4, 2009

Islam has always been part of America – Barack Hussein Obama, the White House, August 11, 2010

Islam has been woven into the fabric of our country since its founding – Barack Hussein Obama, the White House, February 18, 2015

Barack Hussein Obama is the first US president who is explicitly and overtly unmoored, both cognitively and emotionally, from the moorings of America’s founding Judeo-Christian cultural heritage, and who genuinely conceives of Islam as not inherently opposed to American values or American interests.

A question of cultural affinity?

It is through this Islamo-philic prism that the Obama administration’s attitude to, and execution of, its foreign policy must be evaluated – including its otherwise incomprehensible capitulation this week on Iran’s nuclear program.

Almost two years ago, I wrote a column titled, “Will the West withstand the Obama presidency?” (11/28/2013). In it I warned: “For anyone who understands that the US Constitution is not a Shari’a-compliant document…

it should be alarmingly apparent that the Obama incumbency is a dramatic and disturbing point of inflection in the history of America and its Western allies… whose political practices and societal norms are rooted in Judeo-Christian foundations in a cultural rather than in any religious sense.”

There is little alternative explanation to account for the metamorphosis that has taken place in how the US has approached resolving the impasse with Tehran, as starkly laid out by two former secretaries of state, Henry Kissinger and George Shultz.

In a Wall Street Journal opinion piece, “The Iran Deal and Its Consequences” (April 7), they note that the negotiation has been turned “on its head.” As they point out: “For 20 years, three presidents of both major parties proclaimed that an Iranian nuclear weapon was contrary to American and global interests – and that they were prepared to use force to prevent it. Yet negotiations that began 12 years ago as an international effort to prevent an Iranian capability to develop a nuclear arsenal are ending with an agreement that concedes this very capability.”

Risible inspection mechanism

Even before the specifics of the risible inspection mechanism, which one Israeli minister aptly described as “worse than worthless,” Kissinger and Shultz laid out the difficulties that would render any extended inspection endeavor ineffective: “In a large country with multiple facilities and ample experience in nuclear concealment, violations will be inherently difficult to detect.”

With considerable prescience, they warn: “Devising theoretical models of inspection is one thing. Enforcing compliance, week after week, despite competing international crises and domestic distractions, is another. Any report of a violation is likely to prompt debate over its significance – or even calls for new talks with Tehran to explore the issue.

Envisaging the problems likely to arise in enforcing any agreement, they caution: “Compounding the difficulty is the unlikelihood that breakout will be a clear-cut event.

More likely it will occur… via the gradual accumulation of ambiguous evasions. When inevitable disagreements arise over the scope and intrusiveness of inspections, on what criteria are we prepared to insist and up to what point? If evidence is imperfect, who bears the burden of proof? What process will be followed to resolve the matter swiftly?”

Reminiscent of taqiya?

But even without the daunting generic difficulties described by Kissinger and Shultz, the inspection mechanism provided for in the nascent deal make a mockery of Obama’s contention (July 14): “… this deal is not built on trust; it is built on verification,” and, “Because of this deal, inspectors will also be able to access any suspicious location… [They] will have access where necessary, when necessary.”

One can hardly imagine a more grossly misleading representation of the deal – so much so that it is difficult not to find it strongly reminiscent of the Muslim tactic of taqiya (the religiously sanctioned deception of non-Muslims).

Indeed, immediately following the announcement of the agreement, Ben Rhodes, Obama’s deputy national security adviser, made a stunning admission to CNN’s Erin Burnett. Starkly contradicting the president’s contention of “access where necessary, when necessary,” Rhodes conceded, “We never sought in this negotiation the capacity for so-called anytime, anywhere,” which is diametrically opposed to the impression he conveyed in April this year when queried on this issue.

You couldn’t make this stuff up

For as it turns out, it provides the Iranians with ample warning of impending inspections on any suspected violation, and ample ability to forestall the definition of any given suspicious event as a possible violation.

Thus in the case of a suspected infringement in any undisclosed (to the international community) site, the Iranians will have at least 24 days’ notice. Moreover, inspectors will not be able to conduct surprise visits but will be required to “provide Iran the basis for such concerns and request clarification.” No kidding!!! But wait, there’s more.

If Iran’s explanations do not adequately assuage international concerns, inspectors “may request access to such locations” to make sure no illicit activity has occurred. But first they need to “provide Iran the reasons for access in writing and will make available relevant information.” You can’t make this stuff up.

But here’s the kicker: Should the Iranians and the inspectors prove unable to “reach satisfactory arrangements,” Tehran will resolve any concerns “through necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA.” If there is still no agreement two weeks after the initial inquiry is filed, the crisis will be resolved by vote in the so-called Joint Commission – consisting of the six world powers, a representative of EU and – wait for it – Iran.

Like warning drug dealers of a bust

Astonishingly, nearly all the decisions of the Joint Commission, tasked with overseeing/ administering the implementation of the deal, are to be made by consensus – which in effect gives Iran veto power over them. In the case of inspection access, it is sufficient for two of its eight members (say China and Russia) to abstain for Iran to block any decision it dislikes.

It is thus difficult to dispute Benjamin Netanyahu’s characterization of the deal during his address in the Knesset when he likened it to giving drug dealers notice of an impending raid: “It’s like giving a criminal organization that deals drugs a 24-day warning before inspecting its drug lab.”

But worse – the deal requires the international inspectors to expose the sources of intelligence that lead to the detection of the possible infringement – thereby virtually ensuring the termination of their effectiveness.

As Netanyahu remarked: “The agreement also requires the world powers to… show Iran the very intelligence for which they want to conduct the inspections in the first place.”

It is possible that all this could be nothing more than mind-boggling incompetence and blatant lack of foresight? Or are these glaring loopholes the reflection of intent.

Devil not in details

After all, the more you think about the unenforceable, unverifiable agreement just concocted in Vienna, the more implausible it seems. As Alan Dershowitz points out in a Jerusalem Post opinion piece this week, “The devil is not so much in the details as in the broad outlines of this deal.”

Rather than the detailed minutiae of the deal, it is its deeply flawed overall structure that makes it so difficult to comprehend – unless the motives for its conclusion are reexamined.

For unless one is imbued with the child-like naiveté to believe that the tyrannical clergy who head the totalitarian theocracy in Tehran, on seeing their defiant intransigence vindicated and having vast additional resources placed at their disposal, will suddenly change their worldview, the picture of emerging realities is decidedly bleak and bewildering.

The spectacle unfolding before us is almost incomprehensible by any rational criterion.

Virtually the entire developed world, led by the only superpower on the planet, has for all intents and purposes conceded a legitimized path to weaponized nuclear status for a fanatical fundamentalist regime, ideologically bent on the destruction of America and its allies, and a major proliferator of terrorism, committed to attaining regional hegemony at the expense of relatively pro-Western governments.

Despite dwarfing Iran in terms of military might, economic wealth, physical size and population, Tehran’s interlocutors have provided it with vast resources to enormously enhance its nefarious pursuits across the region and beyond.

The New Middle East: Conflicts on steroids

The ominous consequences are not difficult to foresee.

As Ariel Ben Solomon, the Post’s Middle East correspondent, wrote in a recent report, “Iran deal to see Middle East conflicts go on steroids,” “A stronger Iran will translate into a more robust Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthi movement in Yemen, and Shi’ite forces in Iraq and Syria, and increasing sectarian strife fueled by Shi’ite minorities or Iranian agents throughout the Arab world.” (July 16) There is precious little reason for believing any other outcome is plausible.

In a July 15 interview, New Jersey Democrat Sen. Bob Menendez lamented another aspect of the deal, relating to easing restrictions on conventional weapons to Iran: “When you lift the arms embargo to a country that is the major sponsor of… terrorism in the world and is already destabilizing the region in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria [and] Iraq, to give them – after they are going to get $100 billion-150b. in economic relief – the opportunity to buy conventional weapons and improve their missile technology doesn’t seem to me to be in the national interest of the United States.”

The intriguing question is, of course, does this seem to President Obama to be in the national interest of the United States? And if so, why so? If so, how so?

‘No alternative’: A mindless mendacious mantra

The almost Pavlovian response of the apologists for the Iran deal is that its critics have not offered a feasible alternative. This is a claim – for want of a better word – so feeble that it barely merits a response.

As Sen. Menendez points out: “We never tested the proposition that dismantling elements of Iran’s illicit nuclear infrastructure was possible. It is pretty hard for me to believe that the world powers, sitting on one side of the table, the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany and the European Union looking at the Iranians… suffering under staggering sanctions… and falling oil prices couldn’t get a deal that eliminated some of that infrastructure.”

Rebutting John Kerry’s claim that such a goal was achievable only in “a world of fantasy,” Menendez retorted, “I don’t know that that is a ‘world of fantasy.’ Isn’t it possible with all the world on one side of the table, and Iran reeling with economic challenges, that you couldn’t have done better as relates to eliminating that nuclear infrastructure.”

Of course if the underlying assumption is that alternatives are only feasible if Iran deigns to accept them, then the apologists may be right. However, if the rationale were not to accommodate the ayatollahs, but to coerce them, the alternative is clear: Enhanced sanctions backed by the credible threat of military action aimed at destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities and their attendant infrastructure.

Arab arms race or Arab client states

But despite the overwhelming preponderance of power in their favor, the US and its Western allies seem to have forsworn the use of force, or even the credible specter thereof. As Kissinger and Shultz remark: “The threat of war now constrains the West more than Iran.”

This will clearly have a devastating impact on both friend and foe in the region.

It will destroy the confidence of US allies who will therefore be compelled to either acquire their own appropriate arsenals, as they can no longer rely on America for their security, or to become compliant client states of a hegemonic Iran.

For Iran it sends an equivocal message that it can violate the terms of the deal with impunity – for if what it encountered at Vienna is all the West can throw at it, what does it have to fear? There can be little doubt that what happened in Vienna this week has shredded America’s standing in the Middle East.

Some might even suspect that that was the purpose of the exercise.

Categories: Arab nations, Diplomacy, Dishonor, Foreign policy, Free world, Gulf states, IAEA, Iran nuke inspections, Iran scam, Iran UN arms embargo, Iranian military sites, Iranian missiles, Iranian proxies, Iranian Threats, Islam, Islamic supremacy, Islamism, Israel, Kerry, Khamenei, Lies, Middle East, Netanyahu, Obama, Obama's affinity for Islam, Obama's America, P5+1, Rouhani, Russian missiles, Sanctions
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Khamenei vs. Rouhani: Projecting Very Different Views on the Nuclear Deal

July 18, 2015

Khamenei vs. Rouhani: Projecting Very Different Views on the Nuclear Deal, World Affairs Journal, Mehdi Khalaji, July 16, 2015

(If Khamenei reneges on the deal, it will likely be impossible to “snap back” the sanctions. With improved Russian rockets, an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities will be much more difficult.– DM)

In the United States, the same political body that was in charge of negotiating with Iran is also in charge of implementing the agreement. But in Iran, the president and his negotiators have little authority over foreign policy, the nuclear program, or military activities.

If [Khamenei] decides to stop implementing the deal in the next year or so, he would likely blame the West or the negotiating team for cutting such a deal, as he did in 2003 and 2004. His initial reaction to the new agreement has already sent discouraging signals about Iran’s willingness to comply with its commitments in the long term.

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The Supreme Leader’s initial reaction has sent discouraging signals about Iran’s willingness to comply with its commitments in the long term.

As expected, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s reaction to the nuclear deal was utterly different from that of President Hassan Rouhani. Right after the agreement was announced on July 14, Rouhani appeared on state television and praised the outcome. Yet when he and other officials visited Khamenei’s home a few hours later, the Supreme Leader did not say anything about the deal apart from a few lines thanking the negotiators. This reticence signaled to hardliners that they should increase their attacks on the agreement.

On July 15, in order to protect himself against these critics, Rouhani told the cabinet that Khamenei was “carefully following up” on the details of the final negotiations and “had meticulous supervision” over the process, to the point where the Supreme Leader “truly undertook much heavier responsibility in this regard” than any other official. But even this did not help him much. On July 14, Rouhani sent Khamenei a letter reporting on the deal’s results, but the Supreme Leader delayed his response by a day in order to show his lack of excitement about it. The letter thanked Khamenei for his “intelligent guidance and perpetual and explicit support to the negotiating team,” who “could successfully implement all policies determined by the Supreme Leader and respect redlines set” by him. Khamenei’s delayed answer — hardly a third as long as the president’s letter — avoided any wording that might indicate his total satisfaction with the accord, his direct role in the negotiations, or his responsibility for the deal. Instead he wrote, “The text needs to be studied carefully and go through the predicted legal process. Then, if it is approved, it needs to be protected against potential violations of the deal by the other party.”

Khamenei also failed to mention who should approve the deal. Rouhani’s team and the hardliners are currently in the midst of a hot dispute about whether that responsibility lies with the Majlis or the Supreme National Security Council. The hardliners insist on parliament, arguing that all international agreements should be adopted by the legislative branch of the government. Yet Rouhani’s team says that only the Supreme Council should review and endorse it. Not coincidentally, the president is the titular head of that council.

SHARP HARDLINER CRITICISM

On July 16, hardliner website Raja News published the third part of an article series titled “Some Aspects of the Deal Which Should Remain Unveiled,” by Ali Akbar Taheri. The article explains how the final deal reached by Rouhani’s negotiating team crosses six different redlines previously set by the Supreme Leader:

  1. Long-term limitations on the nuclear program. Khamenei has said that Iran should not agree to ten-year limitations because “ten years is a lifetime.” According to the article, however, the signed agreement contains at least fourteen Iranian commitments lasting ten or more years (e.g., a twenty-five-year limit on inspections and surveillance over enrichment of mined uranium; a fifteen-year ban on uranium enrichment at the Fordow facility).
  2. Unconventional inspections and access to military facilities. Khamenei has explicitly rejected such measures, but the final agreement allows the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct surveillance in all factories that enrich mined uranium, among other things. The agency can also ask to inspect military facilities such as Parchin if they deem it necessary.
  3. Limitations on enrichment at Fordow. Khamenei has opposed any such restrictions at the mountain facility, but the final agreement contains several.
  4. Delayed lifting of some sanctions. Khamenei previously insisted that all sanctions be rescinded as soon as the deal is signed, but the agreement indicates that some U.S. congressional sanctions and EU sanctions will not be lifted right away, if at all.
  5. IAEA conditionality. Khamenei has often expressed his distrust of the IAEA and declared that sanctions relief should not be conditioned on Iran’s implementation of the deal. Yet UN sanctions will not be lifted until the IAEA verifies that Tehran has complied with the agreement’s terms.
  6. Limits on centrifuge research. Khamenei has said that no restrictions should be placed on Iran’s nuclear research for the duration of the deal. Yet the agreement includes a ten-year limit on enrichment R&D related to the IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8 centrifuges, among other things.

The article also downplays Rouhani’s claim about lifting sanctions related to weapons, noting that “these sanctions would be replaced by limits [imposed on Iran’s weapons trade]…[E]very missile that is able to carry a nuclear warhead would be limited, all Shahab missiles and satellite carriers and so on.” In addition, the article claims that Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said the following: “Russia and China wanted weapons sanctions to be lifted, but despite our support the Iranian team itself agreed to continuation of the sanctions for the next five years!”

On July 16, at an event called “The Beginning of the Math Class” (a sarcastic title indicating that the time of verification has begun), hardline analyst Fouad Izadi criticized the deal from a different angle: “If the U.S. Congress rejects the agreement, America would not be bound to implement it, but if Iran implements the agreement, it will lose all leverage.” Izadi, who is close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, went on to claim that in the case of disagreement between Iran and the P5+1, “the arbiter is the UN Security Council,” which means that the United States and other P5+1 members would essentially become the arbiters of their own dispute. “If Iran gets accused of violating the agreement, [these countries] can issue a resolution against it,” he said, but if the United States or another party is so accused, “the Security Council cannot issue a resolution because one of them could just veto it.” He also pointed out that the Majlis should approve the agreement, and that it should condition Iran’s implementation of the deal on U.S. congressional approval, explaining that “the U.S. president will not be in office in nineteen months, and after him the U.S. administration would not be bound by the agreement if Congress disapproves it.”

Also on July 16, the hardline newspaper Kayhan claimed that the largely insignificant financial reaction to the nuclear deal — i.e., no sharp changes in the stock market or exchange rate — shocked those who have been “overexcited” about the negotiations. “People expected the foreign currency rate to drop and the national currency value to go up,” said one article, “and now they ask why the opposite has happened.”

CONCLUSION

In the United States, the same political body that was in charge of negotiating with Iran is also in charge of implementing the agreement. But in Iran, the president and his negotiators have little authority over foreign policy, the nuclear program, or military activities. Instead, those sectors are under the purview of Supreme Leader Khamenei, who is usually reluctant to take any public responsibility for major decisions. Furthermore, he has repeatedly expressed his distrust toward Americans, the West, the UN, and the IAEA. And while he has more or less supported Iran’s negotiators in his public statements, he has clearly sought to distance himself from them as well. If he decides to stop implementing the deal in the next year or so, he would likely blame the West or the negotiating team for cutting such a deal, as he did in 2003 and 2004. His initial reaction to the new agreement has already sent discouraging signals about Iran’s willingness to comply with its commitments in the long term.

Categories: Foreign policy, IAEA, Ideology, Iran scam, Iranian military sites, Iranian missiles, Iranian nukes, Khamenei, Obama, Obama's America, P5+1, Rouhani, Sanctions, Theocracy, U.S. Congress
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The irrelevance of Congress

July 17, 2015

The irrelevance of Congress, Power Line, Scott Johnson, July 17, 2015

The gambit undermines the Corker bill – to say nothing of American sovereignty – on multiple levels. On a policy level, the UNSCR on its own would compel American action even if Congress rejects the Iran deal. On a political level, the administration intends to take the UNSCR and go to lawmakers while they’re considering the deal and say ‘you can’t reject the agreement because it would put America in violation of international law.’

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Omri Ceren writes to elucidate the unfolding process in the Iran deal brought to us by President Obama. Omni’s message explores the issue I noted yesterday here. This is important. Omni writes:

Lead negotiator Wendy Sherman confirmed for journalists yesterday that the Obama administration will, over the next few days, pursue a binding United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) that will lift sanctions on Iran. The resolution was circulated yesterday by the U.S. and a leaked text is already online [1]. When asked how the move could be reconciled with the 60-day Congressional review period mandated by the Corker legislation, Sherman sarcastically responded that you can’t really say “well excuse me, the world, you should wait for the United States Congress” because there has to be some way for “the international community to speak.” [2]. She noted that at least the UNSCR would have a 90 day interim period before its mandatory obligations kick in.

The gambit undermines the Corker bill – to say nothing of American sovereignty – on multiple levels. On a policy level, the UNSCR on its own would compel American action even if Congress rejects the Iran deal. On a political level, the administration intends to take the UNSCR and go to lawmakers while they’re considering the deal and say ‘you can’t reject the agreement because it would put America in violation of international law.’

The pushback from the Hill yesterday was immediate and furious. Corker: “an affront to the American people… an affront to Congress and the House of Representatives” [3]. Cardin: “it would be better not to have action on the U.N. resolution” [4]. Cruz: “our Administration intended all along to circumvent this domestic review by moving the agreement to the UN Security Council before the mandatory 60-day review period ends” [5]. Kirk: “a breathtaking assault on American sovereignty and Congressional prerogative” [6]. McCarthy: “violates the spirit of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, which the President signed into law… inconceivable – yet sadly not surprising” [7].

The Washington Post article [by Karen DeYoung here covers some of those statements and has a bunch of background. The story will develop throughout the day and through the beginning of next week. It’s going to be particularly brutal given that the Corker legislation was created and passed to stop exactly this scenario.

Remember how we got here. The March 9 Cotton letter, signed by 47 Senators, declared that without Congressional buy-in any deal with Iran would not be binding on future presidents [8]. Iranian FM Zarif responded with a temper tantrum in which he revealed that the parties intended to fast-track an UNSCR that would make Congress irrelevant and tie the hands of future presidents: “I wish to enlighten the authors that if the next administration revokes any agreement with the stroke of a pen, as they boast, it will have simply committed a blatant violation of international law”[9]. That created a firestorm of criticism from the Hill [10]. Zarif doubled down from the stage at NYU: “within a few days after [an agreement] we will have a resolution in the security council … which will be mandatory for all member states, whether Senator Cotton likes it or not” [11].

And so Congress responded with the Corker legislation. 98 Senators and 400 Representatives passed the bill with the intention of preventing the Obama administration from immediately going to the U.N. after an agreement and making good on Zarif’s boast. President Obama signed the bill. Now the administration is doing exactly what the legislation was designed to prohibit.

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[1] http://www.scribd.com/doc/271711382/Iran-Deal-Draft-UNSC-Resolution-as-Uploaded-by-Inner-City-Press#scribd
[2] http://www.c-span.org/video/?327147-1/state-department-briefing
[3] http://www.cbsnews.com/news/biden-woos-hill-democrats-on-iran-nuclear-deal/
[4] http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/248228-senators-balk-at-un-action-on-iran
[5] http://www.cruz.senate.gov/files/documents/Letters/20150716_LettertoPOTUSonIranDeal.pdf
[6] http://www.kirk.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1474
[7] http://www.majorityleader.gov/2015/07/16/un-not-consider-iran-deal-congress/
[8] http://www.cotton.senate.gov/content/cotton-and-46-fellow-senators-send-open-letter-leaders-islamic-republic-iran
[9] http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/03/10/392067866/iran-calls-gop-letter-propaganda-ploy-offers-to-enlighten-authors
[10] http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/03/12/gop-goes-ballistic-over-plan-to-take-the-iran-nuke-deal-to-the-u-n.html
[11] http://freebeacon.com/national-security/zarif-a-few-days-after-deal-un-will-drop-all-sanctions-whether-sen-cotton-likes-it-or-not/

NOTE: Noah Rothman has more here.

Categories: Diplomacy, Dishonor, Foreign policy, Iran scam, Obama, Obama's America, P5+1, Sanctions, U.S. Congress, United Nations
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The Deal Wasn’t About Iran’s Nukes

July 16, 2015

The Deal Wasn’t About Iran’s Nukes, Commentary Magazine, , July 15, 2015

If you think the United States just struck a poor nuclear deal with Iran, you’re right; but if that’s your key takeaway, you’re missing the point. Iran’s nuclear program was last on the list of the Obama administration’s priorities in talking to Tehran. The administration readily caved on Iran’s nukes because it viewed the matter only as a timely pretense for achieving other cherished aims. These were: (1) preventing an Israeli attack on Iran; (2) transforming the United States into a more forgiving, less imposing power; (3) establishing diplomacy as a great American good in itself; (4) making Iran into a great regional power; and (5), ensuring the legacies of the president and secretary of state as men of vision and peace.

The administration has always viewed Israel as an intractable troublemaker and the main catalyst for the region’s woes. An Israeli strike on Iran, especially if supported by the United States, would have been yet another display of destabilizing Israeli aggression that put Middle East peace further out of reach. Barack Obama, therefore, repeatedly warned Israel against attacking Iran. Benjamin Netanyahu complied, and for his compliance White House officials taunted him in 2014 as a “chickenshit” whose window of opportunity had closed. That window is now barred. The Iran deal states that the U.S. will train Iranians to counter any sabotage attempts on its nuclear facilities and systems. This is aimed at frustrating Israeli action.

Obama came to office promising to limit American action as well. In his standard progressive view, the United States has been too eager to throw its weight around and impose its norms on other countries without giving sufficient thought to the resentment it might sow. He ended the war in Iraq and sought to remake the United States as a humble power. “Too often the United States starts by dictating,” he told a Saudi news outlet soon after being elected. He, by contrast, would do a lot of “listening.” The Iran negotiations became Obama’s magnum opus on the theme of listening. Americans listened to Iranians dictate terms, shoot down offers, insult the United States, and threaten allies. America has been humbled indeed.

But such humility is necessary if diplomacy is to be made into a nation-defining ethos. And if we could successfully negotiate with theocratic Iran, then surely Americans would see that diplomacy could conquer all. So, for the sake of proving this abstract principle, Obama foreclosed any non-diplomatic approach to Iran before a deal was reached. As he told Tom Friedman in April, “there is no formula, there is no option, to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon that will be more effective than the diplomatic initiative and framework that we put forward — and that’s demonstrable.” So declared, so demonstrated.

Like the preeminence of diplomacy, the notion of Iran’s potential as a levelheaded regional power was a treasured abstract principle Obama hoped to substantiate through the nuclear talks. Once again, first came the declaration. Last December Obama speculated on the outcome of a completed nuclear deal: “There’s incredible talent and resources and sophistication inside of Iran, and it would be a very successful regional power that was also abiding by international norms and international rules, and that would be good for everybody.”

If Iran’s fanatical anti-Semitism called this sanguine view into question, that too could be explained. “Well the fact that you are anti-Semitic, or racist, doesn’t preclude you from being interested in survival,” he told the Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg. “It doesn’t preclude you from being rational about the need to keep your economy afloat; it doesn’t preclude you from making strategic decisions about how you stay in power; and so the fact that the supreme leader is anti-Semitic doesn’t mean that this overrides all of his other considerations.” That the United States and Iran have now come to an agreement—whatever the details—is supposed to demonstrate the soundness of that principle.

As far as legacy, what politician doesn’t want one? For Obama, a nominal nuclear deal may make him feel as if he’s earned the Nobel Prize once furnished him as election swag. John Kerry’s own efforts to earn a Nobel by brokering Middle East peace became another footnote in the story of Palestinian obstinacy. He too had something to prove.

From the administration’s standpoint, the deal was a grand slam. If it left Iran as an official nuclear power on the perpetual verge of a breakout, well, that was always the bargaining chip to get everything else. And with the United States having shown extraordinary cooperation and forgiveness, the thinking goes, even a nuclear Iran will become a less bellicose and more collegial member of the community of nations. What good the deal has already done, the administration believes, will continue to pay dividends. As is his wont, Obama is now declaring as much. But by the time his vision is upended by facts, he’ll be out of office, and we won’t have the luxury of fighting reality with abstractions.

Categories: Diplomacy, Dishonor, Foreign policy, Ideology, Iran scam, Iranian missiles, Iranian nukes, Israel, Kerry, Middle East, Obama, Obama's America, P5+1, Sanctions
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The Iran Deal: Making War More Likely?

July 16, 2015

The Iran Deal: Making War More Likely? American Thinker, Stephen Bryen and Shoshana Bryen, July 16, 2015

The deal is done. Iran has sort-of promised it won’t build nuclear weapons, but even the promise has serious caveats: Iran can continue to build weapons platforms to deliver the non-existent weapons; it can cooperate with friendly countries to acquire enhancements to weapons delivery technology; and it can prevent entry to requested facilities by international inspectors for 24 days per request; it need not account for prior military activity. And Iran will be vastly richer.

Based on the world’s experience with the efficacy of multinational inspection regimes and with Iran specifically, it would be wise to assume that the Islamic Republic will move (continue?) covertly to build nuclear warheads, perhaps just leaving out the nuclear fuel. Iran will likely begin testing rockets so that they will be able to release a future nuclear weapon securely at the right moment to get the right blast effect.

The rocket is as important as the nuclear weapon it carries.

Nuclear weapons don’t go off if they plow into the ground, because as they disintegrate they can’t achieve the necessary chain reaction; they must explode above ground at a fixed altitude

Allowing Iran to openly acquire ballistic missile technology can shorten the time from weapons acquisition to weapons use, increasing the relative nervousness of the neighbors — not a recipe for stability. Israel will have to try to interdict and disrupt Iranian ballistic missile testing on an active and overt basis. Because Israeli is not a signatory to the Iran deal, it can expect to be censured by its allies and everyone else. But Israel will have no choice.

If a nuclear weapon were to be fired at Israel, in the few minutes from launch to impact Israel could, in theory, launch its own nuclear weapons from diverse platforms including land-based intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), from F-4’s and F-15’s, and from the newer Israeli submarines. Iran would face annihilation. It potentially could mean the same for Israel, although Israel’s anti-missile system may be sufficient to block the Iranian strike. A lot will depend on how good the Iranian technology is, how well tested it is, and what Israel’s countermeasures are.

The above scenario suggests this might be the time for Israel to place whatever nuclear cards it holds on the table. Israel has long been a presumed nuclear power, including by the CIA since the 1970s, and Secretary Robert Gates said so explicitly in his confirmation hearings. But Israel’s official posture remains “nuclear ambiguity” and a vague statement that Israel would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in the region, hinting that the program was designed as a deterrent. But given that Iran is likely on its way to being a nuclear power as well, and has threatened Israel specifically and directly with annihilation, Israel’s deterrence may well be enhanced by a less ambiguous posture.

While the first of the deal’s unintended consequences is that it forces Israel to officially become a nuclear power, there are others.

The deal increases the chances of direct conventional warfare between Israel and an emboldened and wealthier Iran. It may come as a consequence of Israel’s “interdict and defeat” effort in Syria; too many Iranian missiles in the hands of Hizb’allah; the deployment of Iranian troops in Syria threatening Israel; a firefight in the Golan or southern Lebanon; or conflict on the high seas. The list is a long one.

And Israel is not the only country that views Iran with alarm. Egypt and Saudi Arabia will urgently step up their search for nuclear capability. Egypt has gone down this road before and the Saudis have been leaning on Pakistan for a bomb.  Neither Egypt nor Saudi Arabia is inherently stable, and instability runs different scenarios. Saudi Arabia has IRBM delivery systems and F-15s that can be used to deliver a nuclear weapon. Egypt does not presently have the rockets, but it has a good nuclear science base that it gained in cooperation with different international partners. How viable its nuclear science pool is today is unclear; but in the 1980s Egypt was working with Iraq on the creation of plutonium fuel for weapons (at the Osirak reactor, among other locales) and was partnered with Argentina and perhaps others in building a version of the American Pershing II mobile nuclear missile. It is not unreasonable to think these programs or variants of them will in some way be revived.

The U.S. administration may think the Sunni Arab states have nowhere to turn for technology, but that would be wrong. Russia, for example, and China are more than capable under the right circumstances of cynically supporting both sides in the region — greatly enhancing the chances of war.

In the short term, the Saudis and Egyptians will need to rely on under-the-table relationships with Israel to resist pressure from Iran, which will grow apace thanks to the Washington-led deal; whether this can be concretized and turned into a workable and useful collective security pact is an important consideration. At a minimum, given the substantial barriers to overt cooperation, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States will be heavily exposed and at risk for some time.

The security consequences do not only accrue to the regional countries, but to the United States and our European allies as well.

The U.S.-led deal leaves the Islamic Republic on the road to nuclear weapons capability, now or in five years or in ten — we don’t actually know because the administration gave up its demand for information on Iran’s previous military activities. The cost of this, which we already are seeing, is further diminution of American power and influence in the Middle East as neither our Arab allies nor Israel believe we can protect them. This fuels Russian as well as Iranian ambitions. Europe, which needs oil from the Middle East, can consequently be expected to back away from NATO, encouraging Russian nibbling on the margins of Europe — Estonia is already panicked. The Atlantic Alliance system andPax Americana that emerged from the ashes of WWII will collapse.

In the face of that possibility, the U.S. — whether in this administration or the next — will find that it cannot stand aside. In some manner, however halting, the United States will have to agree to do what Israel by circumstance is being forced to do, namely move militarily to truncate Iran’s nuclear program.

That being the case, it would be wise for the U.S. to pick up the leadership gauntlet earlier rather than later, and to do so in the company of as many friends and allies as it can muster.

Categories: Diplomacy, Dishonor, Foreign policy, Funding terrorism, Gulf states, Hezbollah, IAEA, Ideology, Iran - Syria war, Iran nuke inspections, Iran scam, Iran UN arms embargo, Iranian missiles, Iranian nukes, Iranian proxies, Israel, Middle East, Obama, Obama's America, P5+1, Sanctions, War
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Kerry: Iranian Access to Billions Won’t Affect World Terror

July 16, 2015

Kerry: Iranian Access to Billions Won’t Affect World Terror, Clarion Project, July 16, 2015

Iran-Kerry-Zarif-IPU.S. Secretary of State John Kerry (L) speaks to Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (R) while (Photo: © Reuters) before the announcement of the nuclear deal in Vienna. Hossein Fereydoun (C), the brother of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani listens.

In its most recent report, the State Department wrote, “Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Lebanese Hezbollah in Lebanon and has trained thousands of its fighters at camps in Iran.”

In 2010 alone, State reported “Iran provides roughly $100-$200 million per year in funding to support Hezbollah.”

*********************

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry dismissed concerns that Iran will use its newly found billions of dollars in sanctions relief to ramp up its support for international terrorism.

Speaking to the BBC after the nuclear agreement between Iran and six world powers was reached, Kerry said that the more than $100 billion that Iran is set to receive “is going to make all the difference in the world is just – it’s not true.”

Acknowledging Iran is an international player in wreaking terror across the globe, Kerry said, “What Iran has done for years with Hezbollah does not depend on money.” He similarly stated Iran’s support of the Houthi rebels against the government in Yemen has not “depended on money.”

“Sure, something may go additionally somewhere,” Kerry added. “But if President [Hasan] Rouhani and his administration do not [use the money to] take care of the people of Iran, they will have an enormous problem.”

Earlier this year, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest admitted the U.S. would have no control over Iran’s use of monies freed by sanctions relief. However, he said it was “common sense” Iran would use the money to pump up its economy that was devastated by the international sanctions and not put the money into terrorism.

Still, Earnest said, “I’m not going to make any predictions about what they are going to do, and I’m certainly not going to be in a position to prescribe what they should do,” he said. “This is a sovereign country that will make their own decisions.”

Kerry contended it was the opinion of the U.S. intelligence community that Iranian money “that finds its way somewhere, is not the difference in what is happening in the Middle East.”

However, many contend that Kerry’s prognosis is not rooted in fact. Up until the 9/11 attack on the U.S. by Al Qaeda, the State Department reported Hezbollah was “responsible for more American deaths than any other terrorist group.”

In its most recent report, the State Department wrote, “Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Lebanese Hezbollah in Lebanon and has trained thousands of its fighters at camps in Iran.”

In 2010 alone, State reported “Iran provides roughly $100-$200 million per year in funding to support Hezbollah.”

Efforts by Republicans in Congress to make the current deal contingent on Iran removing its support for terrorism failed earlier this year when U.S. President Barack Obama said he would veto any such legislation.

Meanwhile, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the former head of the Saudi Arabian intelligence services and the kingdom’s ambassador to the U.S. in Washington, said the current deal will result in Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon and “wreak havoc in the region.”

He also contended America’s traditional allies in the Arab world are now distrustful of the U.S. and looking elsewhere to make alliances. Writing in The Daily Star, a Lebanese newspaper, bin Sultan commented, “People in my region now are relying on God’s will and consolidating their local capabilities and analysis with everybody else except our oldest and most powerful ally.”

Currently, Hezbollah is backing troops loyal to beleaguered Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad who have been trying to recapture the city of Zabadani, located in a hilly region in southwestern Syria.

Categories: Diplomacy, Dishonor, Foreign policy, Hezbollah, Ideology, Iran scam, Iranian proxies, Kerry, Middle East, Obama, Obama's America, P5+1, Sanctions
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Beware the Hyde-and-Jekyll Defense of the Iran Nuclear Agreement

July 16, 2015

Beware the Hyde-and-Jekyll Defense of the Iran Nuclear Agreement, Middle East Forum, Gary C. Gambill, July, 2015

1500Obama administration officials believe that a nuclear threshold détente will transform Iran into the kind of state one might trust to linger near the finish line of producing a bomb.

After two years of negotiations with Iran over the fate of its nuclear program, the Obama administration has unveiled an agreement abandoning the pursuit of a decisive reduction in the Islamic Republic’s breakout capacity – the ability to quickly and successfully produce a bomb – and lifting the economic sanctions that have hobbled its economy. The agreement not only sanctifies Teheran’s retention of sufficient enrichment infrastructure to produce a bomb in a year or less, but also drops or dilutes a range of other longstanding demands, from closing a once-secret, heavily fortified underground enrichment facility to providing inspectors with a full accounting of its bomb-making research and development.

As the Obama administration and its supporters seek to rally domestic and international support for this historic compromise, listen for what can best be described as a Hyde-and-Jekyll defense.

When discussing what will happen if the P5+1 world powers maintain their long-standing refusal to accept Iran’s retention of proliferation-prone nuclear infrastructure, the administration has often depicted the Islamic Republic as a menacing force hell-bent on continuing its march toward the brink, whatever the consequences. Secretary of State John Kerry has suggested that Iran might “rush towards a nuclear weapon” if the talks collapse. Obama has characterized the alternative as “letting them rush towards a bomb.” Outside of the administration, supporters of the pending nuclear agreement have typically offered more measured warnings that the Iranians could “take the lid off their program” and “rapidly ramp up their uranium enrichment.” Most believe that war will be likely, if not unavoidable, if there is no agreement.

However, when speaking about what will happen if the P5+1 recognizes and validates Tehran’s nuclear threshold status, the administration and its supporters have depicted the Islamic Republic as an eminently rational actor likely to abide by the letter and spirit of a prospective agreement. Obamasees the P5+1 as offering the Iranians the prospect of being “a very successful regional power” in return for accepting monitored limits on their nuclear program. “Without in any way being under an illusion about Iranian intentions … [or] the nature of that regime, they are self-interested,” according to Obama. “It is possible for them to make a strategic calculation that, at minimum, pushes much further to the right whatever potential breakout capacity they may have.”

Put simply, if we continue refusing to lift sanctions until Iran fully unclenches its nuclear fist (dramatically downsizes its enrichment infrastructure, acknowledges past weaponization work, gives inspectors wide latitude, etc.), we will get Mr. Hyde. But we will get the friendly Dr. Jekyll if we give in and accept the agreement Obama has put before us. And this is only if we give in – proponents of the agreement are quite certain that the good doctor won’t pop up if the international community stands firm (i.e. that the Iranians won’t, upon further reflection, make more concessions on the nuclear issue, or otherwise try harder to win international confidence).

983 (1)
983 (1)Obama administration officials warn that Iran could “rush” for a bomb if the international community demands a more decisive reduction in its nuclear infrastructure.

Oddly enough, the Hyde portraiture isn’t one of Iran reverting to its nuclear posture before direct talks with the Obama administration began in early 2013. Back then, the mullahs weren’t “rapidly” ramping up enrichment capacity (let alone “rushing” for a bomb), but increasing it slowly enough not to cross certain thresholds deemed likely to trigger Israeli and/or American military action (e.g., accumulating enough near-20% enriched uranium to produce through further enrichment sufficient weapons grade uranium for a bomb). The Iran they suggest will emerge from our failure to compromise is far more unhinged and oblivious to its people’s welfare than the one they sat down with two years ago. And dumber, too – an attempt by Iran to “rush” for a bomb or significantly narrow its nuclear breakout time by ramping up enrichment capacity would be supremely stupid when international resolve is at a peak.

While some proponents of the agreement are simply cherry-picking diametrically opposed characterizations of Iran to fit mismatched legs of a bad argument, many appear to genuinely believe that a nuclear threshold détente will somehow transform Iran into the kind of partner one might trust to linger near the finish line of producing a bomb, and that lack of one will put it on a path to war.

There are three overlapping strands of reasoning in this argument. All have an elegant logic with a weak empirical track record outside of Iran and little applicability to the particulars of the case at hand.

“More to lose”

The first holds that lifting sanctions will accelerate Iran’s integration into the world economy, creating disincentives to misbehave. “If in fact they’re engaged in international business, and there are foreign investors, and their economy becomes more integrated with the world economy, then in many ways it makes it harder for them to engage in behaviors that are contrary to international norms,” explained Obama in April.

Although there is much to be said for free markets and trade, economic integration hasn’t reliably inhibited the aggression of states. The European continent was more economically integrated on the eve of World War I than at any time prior and for many decades after.

In any case, lifting sanctions isn’t likely to result in Iran’s headlong integration into the world economy. This isn’t a situation where a bankrupt dictatorship opens up to the world out of desperation and falls prey to socio-economic forces beyond its control. The Iranian regime is getting a direct financial windfall out of this (access to frozen Iranian assets worth as much as $150 billion, ability to sell oil, etc.), which it can simply pocket while forgoing the kind of increased trade and foreign investment that might constrain its freedom of action later.

“More like us”

The second line of reasoning holds that drawing Iran into closer economic and socio-cultural contact with the rest of the world will cause religious extremism, xenophobia, and other unsavory attitudes among the public at large to give way to materialist and individualist concerns that will constrain government decision-making. Obama “believes the more people interact with open societies, the more they will want to be part of an open society,” says Ivo Daalder, Obama’s former NATO ambassador and head of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

But this presumes that the Iranian public has influence over its government’s aggressive regional and international policies. As was made clear in the deadly aftermath of the rigged 2009 elections and at many other times, the Iranian government can and does ignore public opinion.

In any case, there’s little evidence that Iranian public opinion supports the regime’s nuclear brinksmanship. While most Iranians do express support for a civilian energy program, few attach a high priority to it. Despite a steady diet of government propaganda heralding the nuclear program as the sacred right of the Iranian people, only 6% of respondents in a September 2013 Zogby poll said that continuing Iran’s enrichment program was one of their top two policy priorities. Iranian leaders threaten world peace because of ideological and strategic reasons, not public opinion.

“Empower moderates”

1501Obama has argued that the pending nuclear agreement could “strengthen the hands” of President Hassan Rouhani and other “moderates.”

Finally, Obama has argued that an agreement “could strengthen the hands of more moderate leaders in Iran.” President Hassan Rouhani and other “moderates” will gain clout in Iran’s government if there is a deal on his watch, while “hardliners” will gain influence if there isn’t one.

But this is a misreading of what causes the strength of moderates in government to fluctuate. This variable is in large part a function of how aggressively radical mullahs vet who can run in elections. So-called “moderates” are allowed to ascend the ranks of power when the system is under threat and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei needs them to safely channel public dissent and/or soften international hostility to Iran, but they lose clout when they are no longer needed to deflect such challenges.

Might not the exorbitant financial payoff to the Iranian state of having sanctions lifted boost the legitimacy of the system and thereby weaken moderates? Alan J. Kuperman, head of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project at the University of Texas at Austin, is concerned that such a windfall “would entrench the ruling mullahs, who could claim credit for Iran’s economic resurgence.”

Moreover, Kuperman adds, the Iranian regime will acquire “extra resources” to “amplify the havoc it is fostering in neighboring countries like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen.” And once a nuclear deal is signed, fear of provoking Tehran to violate it will surely discourage the international community from punishing it for its terrorism sponsorship and bloody proxy interventions in the region.

Rouhani may get a personal boost from getting sanctions lifted on his watch, but it’s a mistake to translate that into broad advancement of “moderates.” The Iranian president may be a soft-liner on some domestic issues, but he is no less committed to realizing Iran’s nuclear ambitions than so-called hardliners.

Indeed, he is arguably more so. Many hardliners are more interested in using the nuclear program to throw a wrench into Iran’s relations with the West and keep it on a “rogue” footing than in the delicate task of preventing the international community from stopping its eventual construction of a bomb. Not surprisingly, the above-mentioned Zogby poll showed that Iranians who believe Iran should have nuclear weapons are more likely to self-identify as Rouhani supporters than those who don’t.

Conclusion

The reality is that we don’t know what will happen inside Iran in the years to come. But it’s a good bet the nature and temperament of the regime won’t change dramatically for better or worse as a result of whether or not the international community sanctifies Iran’s nuclear threshold status.

Although Obama administration officials are quick to insist that their proposed nuclear agreement with Iran is a good idea regardless of the nature and intentions of the Iranian regime, no one really believes this. If Iran is completely unchanged by its opening to the world, then the best case scenario is that we’ll be exactly where we are today when modest restrictions on its enrichment capacity expire in 10 years, only Iran will have recovered economically from the impact of sanctions, shattered the global coalition arrayed against it, and obtained the internationally sanctioned right to ramp up enrichment.

The worst-case scenario is, well, a lot worse.

Categories: Diplomacy, Dishonor, Foreign policy, Ideology, Iran scam, Iranian missiles, Iranian nukes, Iranian proxies, Obama, Obama's America, P5+1, Sanctions
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Key Nuclear Installations Missing from Iran Deal

July 15, 2015

Key Nuclear Installations Missing from Iran Deal, Israel National News, Ari Yashar, July 15, 2015

Parchin site(1)Suspicious activity at Parchin (illustration)Reuters

As experts got a chance to examine the details of the 159-page Iran nuclear deal signed Tuesday, they warned that it ignores various key aspects of the Islamic regime’s nuclear program, and that the lifting of arms sanctions may pave Iran’s path to nuclear-capable missiles.

A glaring omission is seen in the absolute lack of any reference to the highly covert Parchin military base located southeast of Tehran, which is suspected of being the center of Iran’s secret nuclear weapons program, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Iran has admitted to testing exploding bridge wire nuclear detonators at the site, and reports tied the Parchin base to Iran’s nuclear program following a mysterious explosion at the site last October.

IAEA reports in November 2011 pointed to nuclear weapons development previously conducted at the site, and a 2012 IAEA report likewise confirmed explosives containment vessels were at the site and likely used to test nuclear detonations. Satellite photos have shown Iran has been modifying the site, possibly expanding the tests and covering up their existence.

Iran has repeatedly refused IAEA requests to inspect Parchin. IAEA chief Yukiya Amano announced on Tuesday that in addition to the nuclear deal, a “road map” agreement was sealed, by which Iran will disclose military aspects of its nuclear program by October 15.After this, Amano will write an assessment of Iran’s claimed disclosures by December 15 “with a view to closing the issue.”

Amano said the agreement would include a visit to Parchin, but it remains to be seen how much time Iran will have to prepare for such a visit and possibly hide evidence of nuclear tests; Iranian officials rejected last-minute reports that inspections would be allowed at all covert sites.

IAEA roadmap: putting the cart in front of the horse

Thomas Moore, an arms control specialist and staff member of the SenateForeign Relations Committee, told Washington Free Beacon that the IAEA “road map” should have taken place before the nuclear deal, and not after it.

“The IAEA’s resolution of the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program should precede the deal, not by months but by as much time as it takes to verify the absence of Iran’s (past military work), including the full historical picture of its program. And the deal does not do that,” said Moore.

Not only does the deal not directly address military aspects of Iran’s nuclear program, critics warn it contains several loopholes that will greatly limit its effectiveness in stopping Iran’s march to a nuclear weapon.

For one, the agreement calls for Iran’s “voluntary” compliance with the terms of the deal in several places, instead of implementing mandatory steps Iran must fulfill. It also outlines a convoluted bureaucratic process to confront Iranian violations, reports Washington Free Beacon.

What’s more, a section of the deal may allow Iran to avoid revealing its past nuclear weapons testing, stating that Iran “may propose to the IAEA alternative means of resolving the IAEA’s concerns that enable the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) at the location in question.”

The deal also includes removing a large number of sanctions, including those targeting Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI), which operates sites at the Parchin base and is thought to be highly involved in the covert nuclear weapons program.

“Iran can get its first bombs in weeks”

Aside from Parchin, experts were alarmed to see that the nuclear deal does not directly impose limits on or even reference the Russian-made Bushehr nuclear power plant, which they warn can produce enough plutonium for a large number of atomic weapons.

Henry Sokolski, director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, told Washington Free Beacon that Bushehr’s exclusion from the deal was a mistake.

“That reactor can produce enough plutonium for dozens of bombs per year,” warned Sokolski. “Iran could remove the fuel from the reactor and use a small, cheap reprocessing plant to extract plutonium, and get its first bombs in a matter of weeks.”

Regarding plutonium, after 15 years the deal stipulates that Iran will be able to “engage in producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their alloys,” and likewise conduct research and development “on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) metallurgy, or casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium metal.”

At the Natanz nuclear facility, a limitation on 5,060 centrifuges in 30 cascade units will cease in ten years, and after 15 years Iran will be able to enrich uranium over 3.67% – a 20% enrichment is needed to build nuclear weapons. In eight years, Iran can start producing up to 200 partial advanced centrifuges each year, and two years later it can construct complete advanced centrifuges.

Sokolski warned that “ultimately, this is a gamble on Iran not wanting to make bombs. If they really don’t, the deal will work. If they do, the fine print won’t stop them.”

Nuclear-capable missile sanctions lifted

In addition to the details on Iran’s nuclear program, experts warn there are pitfalls in how the deal approaches – or ignores – Iran’s nuclear-capable missile program. Notably the deal avoids addressing Iran’s ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) program.

It also removes sanctions against Iran’s Al Ghadir missile command based in Tehran, which has been leading the development of missiles capable of delivering a nuclear warhead, and is thought to hold operational control of Iran’s missiles.

A UN conventional arms embargo on Iran will end in five years due to the deal, and sanctions against selling ballistic missiles to Iran will likewise expire in eight years. However, it is possible that China and Russia will covertly sell arms to Iran before those dates, as they have done in the past.

Fred Fleitz, who has formerly served as a CIA analyst, State Department arms control official, and House Intelligence Committee staff member, told Washington Free Beacon that these facets of the deal will allow Iran to arm itself freely.

“Language on lifting conventional arms and missile embargoes is very weak,” stated Fleitz.

“The IAEA simply has to certify that Iran isn’t currently engaged in nuclear weapons work to lift these embargoes early. The IAEA will be hard pressed to find evidence of this and will probably issue a report allowing these embargoes to be lifted early,” he concluded.

Categories: Diplomacy, Dishonor, Foreign policy, IAEA, Iran nuke inspections, Iran scam, Iranian military sites, Iranian nukes, Obama, Obama's America, P5+1, Parchin, Sanctions
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How Iran describes the nuclear deal

July 15, 2015

How Iran describes the nuclear deal, Power Line, John Hinderaker, July 14, 2015

Throughout the negotiation process, Iran’s government has been more forthright and more reliable in characterizing the parties’ interim agreements than the Obama administration. So it is worth noting what the Iranians say the deal entails. This is from FARS, Iran’s news agency:

Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani said his country has achieved all its four goals in the agreement that his foreign minister Zarif signed with the six world powers in Vienna on Tuesday.

President Rouhani said his nation started talks with the world powers in a bid to remove all sanctions while maintaining its nuclear program and nuclear progress as two main goals.

All sanctions, including the financial, banking, energy, insurance, transportation, precious metals and even arms and proliferation sanctions will be, not suspended, but terminated according to the Tuesday agreement as soon as the deal comes into force, he said, adding that Iran will only be placed under certain limited arms deal restrictions for five years.

Meantime, Iran will inject gas into its highly advanced IR8 centrifuge machines, continue its nuclear research and development, and keep its Arak Heavy Water Facility and Fordo and Natanz enrichment plants under the agreement, he said, elaborating on Iran’s gains.

Another goal, Rouhani said, was taking Iran off Chapter Seven of the UN Charter, “and we did it”.

More details on the deal:

The agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), will be presented to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which will adopt a resolution in seven to 10 days making the JCPOA an official document.

Based on the agreement, which has been concluded with due regard for Iran’s red lines, the world powers recognize Iran’s civilian nuclear program, including the country’s right to the complete nuclear cycle.

The UNSC sanctions against the Islamic Republic, including all economic and financial bans, will be lifted at once under a mutually agreed framework and through a new UN resolution.

None of the Iranian nuclear facilities will be dismantled or decomissioned.

Furthermore, nuclear research and development activities on all types of centrifuges, including advanced IR-6 and IR-8 machines, will continue.

The nuclear-related economic and financial restrictions imposed by the United States and the European Union (EU) targeting the Iranian banking, financial, oil, gas, petrochemical, trade, insurance and transport sectors will at once be annulled with the beginning of the implementation of the agreement.

The arms embargo imposed against the Islamic Republic will be annulled and replaced with certain restrictions, which themselves will be entirely removed after a period of five years.

Additionally, tens of billions of dollars in Iranian revenue frozen in foreign banks will be unblocked.

I have now read the agreement in its entirety–you, too, can read it here–and I think the Iranians’ description is accurate. I also agree with what Paul wrote earlier today.

Some aspects of the agreement are technical and can’t be well understood without knowledge of nuclear engineering or the history of various sanctions that have been imposed. But those details are immaterial. Loopholes could make the agreement slightly worse, but no technical interpretation can save it.

The mullahs may cheat on the agreement, or they may not. They may decide to walk away from the agreement at some point and openly develop nuclear weapons, or they may not. It makes very little difference. There are no undertakings in the agreement that go beyond 10 years (in most instances) or 15 years (in a few). The Ayatollah takes the long view: ten or fifteen years are nothing. In the meantime, what does Iran get?

First, and most important, it gets in excess of $100 billion in currently-frozen assets. This will happen in the near future, on or about the agreement’s Implementation Date. I think this prospect is what is making Iran’s leaders so jubilant. With that money, they can step up their support for allies in Syria, Yemen and Iraq, and their support for terrorism everywhere. (By way of perspective, the entire United States military budget for the current fiscal year is only $560 billion.) To the extent that they spend some of it at home, it will help cement their position domestically.

Second, the agreement grants Iran international legitimacy. Since the revolution of 1979 and the seizure of America’s embassy in Tehran, Iran has been treated as a rogue state. Under the agreement, that status comes to an end. Investment in Iran will be permitted and likely will flourish. Sanctions will be removed and Iran’s nuclear program will not only be tolerated, it will be explicitly recognized and to some degree supported by the international community. The agreement contemplates that upon implementation, “the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any other non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT [non-proliferation treaty].” It is hard to overstate how important this legitimacy is to the regime.

The third benefit to Iran’s rulers is perhaps the most important, and is closely linked to the first two. The agreement guarantees that, at least for the foreseeable future, the mullahs will remain in power. Realistically, the only way Iran could be denied a nuclear arsenal in the long term is through regime change. Early in the Obama administration, that seemed like a plausible scenario, but the administration declined to aid, or even encourage, anti-regime forces when such support might have made a difference. Now, with the mullahs both flush with cash and blessed with international legitimacy, their grip on power is probably stronger than ever. Nuclear weapons will follow, sooner or later, at a time of the regime’s choosing. And in the meantime, Iran’s ability to make mischief in the Middle East and around the world (e.g., through its newfound alliance with Venezuela) has been greatly enhanced.

Categories: Diplomacy, Dishonor, Foreign policy, IAEA, Ideology, Imperialism, Iran nuke inspections, Iran scam, Iranian military sites, Iranian nukes, Iranian proxies, Israel, Middle East, Obama, Obama's America, P5+1, Rouhani, Sanctions
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