Posted tagged ‘Obama’s legacy’

Op-Ed: Chaos and 2nd Cold War, Part II: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy

October 11, 2015

Op-Ed: Chaos and 2nd Cold War, Part II: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy, Israel National News, Prof. Louis René Beres, October 11, 2015

(Part I is available here. — DM)

Israel should now be calculating the exact extent or subtlety with which it should consider communicating key portions of its nuclear posture and positions. Naturally, Israel should never reveal any too-specific information about its nuclear strategy, its nuclear hardening, or even its nuclear yield-related capabilities. Still, sometimes, the duty of finely-honed intelligence services should not be to maximize strategic secrecy, but rather, to carefully “share” certain bits of pertinent information.

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How will Russia respond to any ramped up American uses of force in the Middle East, and, more plausibly, vice-versa?  One must assume that Jerusalem is already asking these key questions, and even wondering whether, in part, greater mutualities of interest could sometime exist with Moscow than with Washington.

To wit, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin in September 2015. Among other things, the Israeli leader must  be calculating: 1)Will the Obama Administration’s incoherent retreat from most of the Middle East point toward a more permanent United States detachment from the region; and 2) If it does, what other major powers are apt to fill the resultant vacuum? Just as importantly, and as an obvious corollary to (2), above, the prime minister should be inquiring: “How will the still-emerging Cold War II axis of conflict impact America’s pertinent foreign policy decisions?”

There are some additional ironies yet to be noted. Almost certainly, ISIS, unless it is first crushed by U.S. and/or Russian-assisted counter-measures, will plan to march westward across Jordan, ultimately winding up at the borders of West Bank (Judea/Samaria). There, ISIS Jihadists could likely make fast work of any still-posted Hamas and Fatah forces, in effect, taking over what might once have become “Palestine.” In this now fully imaginable scenario, the most serious impediment to Palestinian statehood is not Israel, but rather a murderous band of Sunni Arab terrorists.[16]

What about the larger picture of “Cold War II?” Israeli defense planners will need to factor into their suitably nuanced calculations the dramatically changing relationship between Washington and Moscow. During “Cold War I,” much of America’s support for the Jewish State had its most fundamental origins in a perceived need to compete successfully in the Middle East with the then Soviet Union. In the progressive development of “Cold War II,” Jerusalem will need to carefully re-calculate whether a similar “bipolar” dynamic is once again underway, and whether the Russian Federation might, this time around, identify certain strategic benefits to favoring Israel in regional geo-politics.

In all such strategic matters, once Israel had systematically sorted through the probable impact of emerging “superpower” involvements in the Middle East, Jerusalem would need to reassess its historic “bomb in the basement.” Conventional wisdom, of course, has routinely pointed in a fundamentally different policy direction. Still, this “wisdom” assumes that credible nuclear deterrence is simply an automatic result of  physically holding nuclear weapons. By the logic of this too-simplistic argument, removing Israel’s nuclear bomb from the “basement” would only elicit new waves of global condemnation, and would likely do so without returning any commensurate security benefits to Jerusalem.

Scholars know, for good reason, that the conventional wisdom is often unwise. Looking ahead, the strategic issues facing Israel are not at all uncomplicated or straightforward.  Moreover, in the immutably arcane world of Israeli nuclear deterrence, it can never really be adequate that enemy states merely acknowledge the Jewish State’s nuclear status. Rather, it is also important that these states should be able to believe that Israel holds usable nuclear weapons, and that Jerusalem/Tel-Aviv would be willing to employ these usable weapons in certain clear, and situationally recognizable, circumstances.

Current instabilities in the Middle East will underscore several good reasons to doubt that Israel could ever benefit from any stubborn continuance of deliberate nuclear ambiguity. It would seem, too, from certain apparent developments already taking place within Mr. Netanyahu’s “inner cabinet,” that portions of Israel’s delegated leadership must now more fully understand the bases of any such informed skepticism.

In essence, Israel is imperiled by compounding and inter-related existential threats that justify its fundamental nuclear posture, and that require a correspondingly purposeful strategic doctrine. This basic need exists well beyond any reasonable doubt. Without such weapons and doctrine, Israel could not expectedly survive over time, especially if certain neighboring regimes, amid expanding chaos,  should soon become more adversarial, more Jihadist, and/or less risk-averse.

Incontestably, a purposeful nuclear doctrine could prove increasingly vital to coping with various more-or-less predictable strategic scenarios for Israel, that is, those believable narratives requiring preemptive action, and/or an appropriate retaliation.

Typically, military doctrine carefully describes how national forces should fight in various combat operations. The literal definition of “doctrine” derives from Middle English, from the Latin doctrina, meaning teaching, learning, andinstruction. Though generally unrecognized, the full importance of doctrine lies not only in the several ways that it can animate and unify military forces, but also in the uniquely particular fashion that it can transmit certain desired “messages.”

In other words, doctrine can serve an increasingly imperiled  state as a critical form of communication, one directed to its friends, and also to its foes.

Israel can benefit from just such broadened understandings of doctrine. The principal security risks now facing Israel are really more specific than general or generic. This is because Israel’s extant adversaries in the region will likely be joined, at some point, by: (1) a new Arab state of “Palestine;” and/or by (2) a newly-nuclear Iran. It is also because of the evidently rekindled global spark of “bipolar” or “superpower” adversity, and the somewhat corollary insertion of additional American military forces to combat certain new configurations of Jihadi terror.

For Israel, merely having nuclear weapons, even when fully recognized in broad outline by enemy states, can never automatically ensure successful deterrence. In this connection, although starkly counter-intuitive, an appropriately selective and thoughtful end to deliberate ambiguity could improve the overall credibility of Israel’s nuclear deterrent.  With this point in mind, the potential of assorted enemy attack prospects in the future could be reduced by making available certain selected information concerning the safety of  Israel’s nuclear weapon response capabilities.

This crucial information, carefully limited, yet more helpfully explicit, would center on the distinctly major and inter-penetrating issues of Israeli nuclear capability and decisional willingness.

Skeptics, no doubt, will disagree. It is, after all, seemingly sensible to assert that nuclear ambiguity has “worked” thus farWhile Israel’s current nuclear policy has done little to deter multiple conventional terrorist attacks, it has succeeded in keeping the country’s enemies, singly or in collaboration, from mounting any authentically existential aggressions. This conclusion is not readily subject to any reasonable disagreement.

But, as the nineteenth-century Prussian strategic theorist, Karl von Clausewitz, observed, in his classic essay, On War, there may come a military tipping point when “mass counts.” Israel is already coming very close to this foreseeable point of no return. Israel is very small.  Its enemies have always had an  undeniable advantage in “mass.”

More than any other imperiled state on earth, Israel needs to steer clear of such a tipping point.

This, too, is not subject to any reasonable disagreement.

Excluding non-Arab Pakistan, which is itself increasingly coup-vulnerable, none of Israel’s extant Jihadi foes has “The Bomb.”  However, acting together, and in a determined collaboration, they could still carry out potentially lethal assaults upon the Jewish State. Until now, this capability had not been possible, largely because of insistent and  persistently overriding fragmentations within the Islamic world. Looking ahead, however, these same fragmentations could sometime become a source of special danger to Israel, rather than remain a continuing source of  national safety and reassurance.

An integral part of Israel’s multi-layered security system lies in the country’s ballistic missile defenses, primarily, the Arrow or “Hetz.” Yet, even the well-regarded and successfully-tested Arrow, now augmented by the newer and shorter-range iterations of “Iron Dome,” could never achieve a sufficiently high probability of intercept to meaningfully protect Israeli civilians.[17] No system of missile defense can ever be “leak proof,” and even a single incoming nuclear missile that somehow managed to penetrate Arrow or corollary defenses could conceivably kill tens or perhaps hundreds of thousands of Israelis.[18]

In principle, at least, this fearsome reality could be rendered less prospectively catastrophic if Israel’s traditional reliance on deliberate ambiguity were suitably altered.

Why alter? The current Israeli policy of an undeclared nuclear capacity is unlikely to work indefinitely. Leaving aside a Jihadi takeover of already-nuclear Pakistan, the most obviously unacceptable “leakage” threat would come from a nuclear Iran. To be effectively deterred, a newly-nuclear Iran would require convincing assurance that Israel’s atomic weapons were both (1) invulnerable, and (2) penetration-capable.

Any Iranian judgments about Israel’s capability and willingness to retaliate with nuclear weapons would then depend largely upon some prior Iranian knowledge of these weapons, including their expected degree of protection from surprise attack, as well as Israel’s expected capacity to “punch-through” all pertinent Iranian active and passive defenses.

Jurisprudentially, at least, following JCPOA in Vienna, a  nuclear weapons-capable Iran is a fait accompli. For whatever reasons, neither the “international community” in general, nor Israel in particular, had ever managed to create sufficient credibility concerning a once-timely preemptive action. Such a critical defensive action would have required very complex operational capabilities, and could have generated Iranian/Hezbollah counter actions that might have a  very significant impact on the entire Middle East. Nevertheless, from a purely legal standpoint, such preemptive postures could still have been justified, under the authoritative criteria of anticipatory self-defense, as permitted under customary international law.

It is likely that Israel has undertaken some very impressive and original steps in cyber-defense and cyber-war, but even the most remarkable efforts in this direction will not be enough to stop Iran altogether. Earlier, the “sanctions” sequentially leveled at Tehran – although certainly better than nothing – could have had no tangible impact on effectively halting Iranian nuclearization.

Strategic assessments can sometimes borrow from a Buddhist mantra. What is, is. Ultimately, a nuclear Iran could decide to share some of its nuclear components and materials with Hezbollah, or with another kindred terrorist group. Ultimately, amid growing regional chaos, such injurious assets could find their way to such specifically U.S- targeted groups as ISIS.

Where relevant, Israeli nuclear ambiguity could be loosened by releasing certain very general information regarding the availability and survivability of appropriately destructive  nuclear weapons.

Israel should now be calculating the exact extent or subtlety with which it should consider communicating key portions of its nuclear posture and positions. Naturally, Israel should never reveal any too-specific information about its nuclear strategy, its nuclear hardening, or even its nuclear yield-related capabilities. Still, sometimes, the duty of finely-honed intelligence services should not be to maximize strategic secrecy, but rather, to carefully “share” certain bits of pertinent information.

What about irrational enemies? An Israeli move from ambiguity to disclosure would not likely help in the case of an irrational nuclear enemy. It is even possible, in this regard, that particular elements of Iranian leadership might meaningfully subscribe to certain end-times visions of a Shiite apocalypse. By definition, any such enemy would not necessarily value its own continued national survival more highly than any other national preference, or combination of preferences. By definition, any such enemy would present a genuinely unprecedented strategic challenge.

Were its leaders to become authentically irrational, or to turn in expressly non-rational directions, Iran could then effectively become a nuclear suicide-bomber in macrocosm.  Such a profoundly destabilizing strategic prospect is improbable, but it is also not inconceivable. A similarly serious prospect exists in already-nuclear Pakistan.

To protect itself against military strikes from irrational enemies, especially those attacks that could carry existential costs, Israel will need to reconsider virtually every aspect and function of its nuclear arsenal and doctrine. This is a strategic reconsideration that must be based upon a number of bewilderingly complex intellectual calculations, and not merely on ad hoc, and more-or-less presumptively expedient political judgments.

Removing the bomb from Israel’s basement could enhance Israel’s strategic deterrence to the extent that it would heighten enemy perceptions of the severe and likely risks involved. This would also bring to mind the so-called Samson Option, which, if suitably acknowledged, could allow various enemy decision-makers to note and underscore a core assumption. This is that Israel is prepared to do whatever is needed to survive. Interestingly, such preparation could be entirely permissible under governing international law, including the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice.[19]

Irrespective of  its preferred level of ambiguity, Israel’s nuclear strategy must always remain oriented toward deterrence, not to actual war-fighting.[20] The Samson Option refers to a policy that would be based in part upon a more-or-less implicit threat of massive nuclear retaliation for certain anticipated enemy aggressions.  Israel’s small size means, inter alia, that any nuclear attack would threaten Israel’s very existence, and could not be tolerated. Israel’s small size also suggests a compelling need for sea-basing (submarines) at least a recognizably critical portion of its core nuclear assets,

From a credibility standpoint, a Samson Option could make sense only in “last-resort,” or “near last-resort,” circumstances. If the Samson Option is to be part of a convincing deterrent, as it should, an incremental end to Israel’s deliberate ambiguity is essential. The really tough part of this transformational process will lie in determining the proper timing for such action vis-a-vis Israel’s security requirements, and in calculating authoritative expectations (reasonable or unreasonable) of the “international community.”

The Samson Option should never be confused with Israel’s overriding security objective: To seek stable deterrence at the lowest possible levels of military conflict. As a last resort, it basically states the following warning to all potential nuclear attackers:  “We (Israel) may have to `die,` but (this time) we won’t die alone.”

There is a related observation. In our often counter-intuitive strategic world, it can sometimes be rational to pretend irrationality. The nuclear deterrence benefits of any such pretended irrationality would depend, at least in part, upon an enemy state’s awareness of Israel’s intention to apply counter-value targeting when responding to a nuclear attack. But, once again, Israeli decision-makers would need to be aptly wary of ever releasing too-great a level of specific operational information.

In the end, there are specific and valuable critical security benefits that would likely accrue to Israel as the result of a purposefully selective and incremental end to its historic policy of deliberate nuclear ambiguity.   The right time to begin such an “end”  has not yet arrived. But, at the precise moment that Iran verifiably crosses the nuclear threshold, or arguably just before this portentous moment, Israel should  promptly remove The Bomb from its “basement.”

When this critical moment arrives, Israel should already have configured (1) its presumptively optimal allocation of nuclear assets; and (2) the extent to which this preferred configuration should now be disclosed. Such strategic preparation could then enhance the credibility of Israel’s indispensable nuclear deterrence posture.

When it is time for Israel to selectively ease its nuclear ambiguity, a second-strike nuclear force should be revealed in broad outline. This robust strategic force – hardened, multiplied, and dispersed – would need to be fashioned so as to recognizably inflict a decisive retaliatory blow against major enemy cities. Iran, it follows, so long as it is led by rational decision-makers, should be made to understand that the actual costs of  any planned aggressions against Israel would always exceed any expected gains.

In the final analysis, whether or not a shift from deliberate ambiguity to some selected level of nuclear disclosure would actually succeed in enhancing Israeli nuclear deterrence would depend upon several complex and intersecting factors. These include, inter alia, the specific types of nuclear weapons involved; reciprocal assessments and calculations of pertinent enemy leaders; effects on rational decision-making processes by these enemy leaders; and effects on both Israeli and adversarial command/control/communications operations. If  bringing Israel’s bomb out of the “basement” were to result in certain new enemy pre-delegations of nuclear launch authority, and/or in new and simultaneously less stable launch-on-warning procedures, the likelihood of unauthorized and/or accidental nuclear war could then be substantially increased.

Not all adversaries may be entirely rational. To comprehensively protect itself against potentially irrational nuclear adversaries, Israel has no logical alternative to developing an always problematic conventional preemption option, and to fashion this together with a suitable plan for subsequent “escalation dominance.” Operationally, especially at this very late date, there could be no reasonable assurances of success against many multiple hardened and dispersed targets. Regarding deterrence, however, it is noteworthy that “irrational” is not the same as “crazy,” or “mad,” and that even an expectedly irrational Iranian leadership could still maintain susceptible preference orderings that are both consistent and transitive.

Even an irrational Iranian leadership could be subject to threats of deterrence that credibly threaten certain deeply held religious as well as civic values. The relevant difficulty here for Israel is to ascertain the precise nature of these core enemy values. Should it be determined that an Iranian leadership were genuinely “crazy” or “mad,” that is, without any decipherable or predictable ordering of preferences, all deterrence bets could then have to give way to preemption, and possibly even to certain plainly unwanted forms of war fighting.

Such determinations, of course, are broadly strategic, not narrowly jurisprudential. From the discrete standpoint of international law, especially in view of Iran’s expressly genocidal threats against Israel, a preemption option could still represent a permissible expression of anticipatory self-defense. Again, however, this purely legal judgment would be entirely separate from any parallel or coincident assessments of operational success. There would be no point for Israel to champion any strategy of preemption on solely legal grounds if that same strategy were not also expected to succeed in specifically military terms.

Growing chaotic instability in the Middle East plainly heightens the potential for expansive and unpredictable conflicts.[21] While lacking any obviously direct connection to Middle East chaos, Israel’s nuclear strategy must now be purposefully adapted to this perilous potential. Moreover, in making this adaptation, Jerusalem could also have to pay special attention not only to the aforementioned revival of  major “bipolar” animosities, but also, more specifically and particularly, to Russia’s own now-expanding nuclear forces.

This cautionary warning arises not because augmented and modernized Russian nuclear forces would necessarily pose any enlarged military threat to Israel directly, but rather because these strategic forces could determine much of the way in which “Cold-War II” actually evolves and takes shape. Vladimir Putin has already warned Washington of assorted “nuclear countermeasures,” and recently test launched an intercontinental nuclear missile.[22] One such exercise involved a new submarine-launched Bulava missile, a weapon that could deliver a nuclear strike with up to 100 times the force of the 1945 Hiroshima blast.

Current adversarial Russian nuclear posturing vis-à-vis the United States remains oriented toward the Ukraine, not the Middle East.[23] Nevertheless, whatever happens to U.S.-Russian relations in any one part of the world could carry over to certain other parts, either incrementally, or as distinctly sudden interventions or escalations. For Jerusalem, this means, among other things, an unceasing obligation to fashion its own developing nuclear strategy and posture with an informed view to fully worldwide power problems and configurations.

Whether looking toward Gaza, West Bank (Judea/Samaria), Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, or Syria, Israel will need to systematically prioritize existential threats, and, thereafter, stay carefully focused on critically intersecting and overriding factors of global and regional security. In all such meticulously careful considerations, both chaos and Cold War II should be entitled to occupy a conspicuous pride of place.

Sources:

[16] A further irony here concerns Palestinian “demilitarization,” a pre-independence condition of statehood called for by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Should Palestinian forces (PA plus Hamas) ever actually choose to abide by any such formal legal expectation, it could makes these forces less capable of withstanding any foreseeable ISIS attacks. Realistically, however, any such antecedent compliance would be highly improbable. See, for earlier legal assessments of Palestinian demilitarization, Louis René Beres and (Ambassador) Zalman Shoval, “Why a Demilitarized Palestinian State Would Not Remain Demilitarized: A View Under International Law,” Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, Winter 1998, pp. 347-363; and Louis René Beres and Zalman Shoval, “On Demilitarizing a Palestinian `Entity’ and the Golan Heights: An International Law Perspective,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 28, No. 5, November 1995, pp. 959-972.

[17] There is another notable and more generic (pre-nuclear age) risk of placing too-great a reliance on defense. This is the risk that a corollary of any such reliance will be a prospectively lethal tendency to avoid taking otherwise advantageous offensive actions. Recall, in this connection, Carol von Clausewitz On War:  “Defensive warfare…does not consist of waiting idly for things to happen. We must wait only if it brings us visible and decisive advantages. That calm before the storm, when the aggressor is gathering new forces for a great blow, is most dangerous for the defender.” See: Carl von Clausewitz, Principles of War, Hans W. Gatzke, tr., New York: Dover Publications, 2003, p. 54.

[18] For early authoritative accounts, by the author, of expected consequences of a nuclear attack, see: Louis René Beres, Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Louis René Beres, Mimicking Sisyphus: America’s Countervailing Nuclear Strategy (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1983); Louis René Beres, Reason and Realpolitik: U.S. Foreign Policy and World Order (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1984); and Louis René Beres, Security or Armageddon: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1986).

[19] See: “Summary of the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Advisory Opinion, 1996, I.C.J., 226 (Opinion of 8 July 1996). The key conclusion of this Opinion is as follows: “…in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.”

[20] This advice was a central recommendation of the Project Daniel Group’s final report,  Israel’s Strategic Future (ACPR, Israel, May 2004: “The overriding priority of Israel’s nuclear deterrent force must always be that it preserves the country’s security without ever having to be fired against any target. The primary point of Israel’s nuclear forces must always be deterrence ex ante, not revenge ex post.” (p. 11). Conceptually, the core argument of optimizing military force by not resorting to any actual use pre-dates the nuclear age. To wit, Sun-Tzu, in his ancient classic, The Art of War, counseled: “Supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.”

[21] Once again, Prussian military thinker, Carl von Clausewitz, had already highlighted the generic (pre-nuclear age) dangers of unpredictability, summarizing these core hazards as matters of “friction.”

[22] ICBM test launches are legal and permissible under the terms of New START, It does appear, however,  that Russia has already developed and tested a nuclear-capable cruise missile with a range of 500-5500 KM, which would be in express violation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). At the same time, current research into the U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike Program seeks to circle around INF Treaty limitations, by employing a delivery vehicle trajectory that is technically neither ballistic nor cruise.

[23] Russia, of course, is operating much more openly and substantially in Syria, but here, in the Middle East theatre, at least, Moscow’s public tone toward Washington is somewhat less confrontational or adversarial.

 

Check Out What Obama’s Former Pastor Says About Jesus During Million Man March Speech

October 11, 2015

Check Out What Obama’s Former Pastor Says About Jesus During Million Man March Speech, The Blaze, October 10, 2015

(Obama was a member of the Reverend Mr. Wright’s church for some twenty years. However, he never heard a single word that he said.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QtYnCmw2CWE

Please see also, Jeremiah Wright: Jesus was a Palestinian! at Power Line and Jeremiah Wright claims ‘Jesus was a Palestinian’ at American Thinker. The latter begins,

The man who married Barack and Michelle Obama, baptized their daughters, gave him the title of one of his books, and was the only beneficiary of his charity dollars before Obama’s presidential run, has made a remarkably ignorant antisemitic claim.

— DM)

The Rev. Jeremiah Wright, former pastor of President Barack Obama, offered the traditional Muslim greeting — “salaam alaikum” — at the beginning of his speech at the 20th anniversary of the Million Man March in Washington on Saturday.

Then the pastor emeritus of Chicago’s Trinity United Church of Christ launched into an appeal for “Palestinian justice” and for blacks to stand with them.

rev-jeremiah-wright-e1444529619382Image source: C-SPAN

Not mentioning Israelis, he called Palestinians the “original people” — and then offered the crowd a reminder.

“Please remember, Jesus was a Palestinian,” Wright said.

He added that Palestinians are fighting against those who say “their god told them they could have somebody else’s country,” calling it “one of the most egregious injustices in the 20th and 21st centuries.”

Wright also said that youths in Ferguson, Missouri, and youths “in Palestine” have “united” and that blacks should join them.

Wright made headlines in 2008 after his sermons were examined and Barack Obama — then campaigning for the presidency — was forced to renounce his former pastor‘s controversial statements (e.g., “No, no, no, not God bless America! God damn America — that’s in the Bible — for killing innocent people.”)

After Obama’s election, Wright commented in 2009 that “them Jews” were keeping him from the new president. ”Them Jews ain’t going to let him talk to me,” Wright told the Daily Press of Newport News, Virginia. “I told my baby daughter that he’ll talk to me in five years when he’s a lame duck, or in eight years when he’s out of office.”

Here’s the clip from Wright’s Saturday speech:

 

Op-Ed: Chaos and 2nd Cold War, Part I: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy

October 11, 2015

Op-Ed: Chaos and 2nd Cold War, Part I: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy, Israel National News,Prof. Louis René Beres, October 9, 2015

To fashion a functional nuclear strategy would be difficult for any state in world politics, but it could be especially challenging for one that keeps its bomb more-or-less securely “in the basement.” Now, as the Middle East descends into an ever more palpable chaos,[1] Israel will have to make certain far-reaching decisions on this very complex task.

Among other nuanced and widely intersecting concerns, Jerusalem’s decisions will need to account for a steadily hardening polarity between Russia and the United States.

Here, almost by definition, there will be no readily available guidebook to help lead the way. For the most part, Israel will need to be directed by an unprecedented fusion of historical and intellectual considerations. In the end, any resultant nuclear strategy will have to represent the prospective triumph of mind over mind, not merely of mind over matter.[2]

Conceivably, at least for the Jewish State that is smaller than America’s Lake Michigan, an emergent “Cold War II” could prove to be as determinative in shaping its national nuclear posture as coinciding regional disintegration. Still, a new Cold War need not necessarily prove disastrous or disadvantageous for Israel. It is also possible, perhaps even plausible, that Jerusalem could sometime discern an even greater commonality of strategic interest with Moscow, than with Washington.

To be sure, any such stark shift of allegiance in Israeli geo-political loyalties ought not to be intentionally sought, or in any way cultivated for its own sake. Moreover, on its face, it would currently be hard to imagine in Jerusalem that a superpower mentor of both Syria and Iran could somehow also find strategic common ground with Israel. Yet, in these relentlessly tumultuous times, any normally counter-intuitive judgments could, at least on rare occasions, prove surprisingly correct.

Credo quia absurdum. “I believe because it is absurd.” In these tumultuous times, certain once preposterous counter-intuitive judgments should no longer be dismissed out of hand. Moreover, in seeking to best understand the Israel-relevant dynamics of any renewed Washington-Moscow bipolar axis of conflict, Jerusalem will need to consider the prospects for a conceivably “looser” form of enmity.

In other words, looking ahead, it would seem realistic that a now “restored” superpower axis might nonetheless reveal greater opportunities for cooperation between the dominant “players.” Understood in the traditional language of international relations theory, this points toward a relationship that could become substantially less “zero-sum.”[3]

By definition, regarding zero-sum relationships in world politics, any one state’s gain is necessarily another state’s loss. But in Cold War II, it is reasonable to expect that the still-emerging axis of conflict will be “softer.” Here, for both major players, choosing a cooperative strategy could sometimes turn out to be judged optimal.[4]

Recognizing this core difference in superpower incentives from the original Cold War, and to accomplish such recognition in a timely fashion,  could prove vitally important for Israel. In essence, it could become a key factor in figuring out what should or should not be done by Jerusalem about any expected further increments of regional nuclear proliferation, and about Iran.

Iranian nuclearization remains the single most potentially daunting peril for Jerusalem. In this regard, virtually nothing has changed because of the recent Iran Nuclear Agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Vienna, 14 July, 2015).[5] To the contrary, in a situation fraught with considerable irony, Iran’s overall strategic latitude will actually have been expanded and improved by the terms of this concessionary pact.[6] Most plainly, these Iranian enhancements are the permissible result of a now no-holds-barred opportunity for transfer of multiple high-technology weapons systems, from Moscow to Tehran.

For the foreseeable future, the nuclear threat from Iran will continue to dwarf all other recognizable security threats.[7] At the same time, this enlarging peril could be impacted by certain multi-sided and hard to measure developments on the terrorism front.  In more precisely military terminology, these intersecting terror threats could function “synergistically,” or as so-called “force multipliers.”

The “whole” of the strategic danger now facing Israel is substantially greater than the simple arithmetic sum of its parts.[8] This true combination could include a persistently shifting regional “correlation of forces,”[9] one that would continue to oscillate menacingly, and also to the  observable benefit of Israel’s mortal enemies, both state and sub-state.

In Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv, serious derivative questions should now be addressed. What does this changing set of adversarial developments mean for Israel in very specifically operational and policy terms? Above all, this configuration of enmity should warn that a steady refinement and improvement of Israel’s nuclear strategy must be brought front and center. For Israel, there can be no other reasonable conclusion, not only because of ominous developments in Iran, but also because of the growing prospect of additional nuclear weapon states in the region, including perhaps Egypt, and/or Saudi Arabia.

Despite U.S. President Barack Obama’s continuing support for a “world free of nuclear weapons,” all of the world’s existing nuclear weapon states are already expanding and modernizing their nuclear arsenals. As of the end of September 2015, the world’s total inventory of nuclear warheads was reliably estimated as 17,000.[10] What Israel must also bear in mind is that this American president’s notion that nuclear weapons are intrinsically destabilizing, or even evil, makes no defensible intellectual sense.

It is plausible, rather, that only the perceived presence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of both original superpowers prevented World War III. Equally convincing, Israel, without its atomic arsenal – whether ambiguous, or declared – could never survive, especially in a region that may soon combine further nuclear spread with steadily undiminished chaos.

Israel will have to decide, in prompt and sometimes inter-related increments, upon the precise extent to which the nation needs to optimize its composite national security policies on preemption, targeting, deterrence, war fighting, and active defense. A corollary imperative here must be to deal more purposefully with the complicated and politically stubborn issues of “deliberate ambiguity.” Going forward, it will not serve Israel’s best interests to remain ambiguous about ambiguity.

To date, at least, it seems that this longstanding policy of “opacity” (as it is also sometimes called) has made perfectly good sense. After all, one can clearly assume that both friends and enemies of Israel already acknowledge that the Jewish State holds persuasive military nuclear capabilities that are (1) survivable; and (2) capable of penetrating any determined enemy’s active defenses. Concerning projections of nuclear weapon survivability, Israel has made plain, too, its steady and possibly expanding deployment of advanced sea-basing (submarines).

Thus far, “radio silence” on this particular “triad” component has likely not been injurious to Israel. This could change, however, and rather quickly. Here, again, there is no room for error. Already, in delivering his famousFuneral Speech, with its conspicuously high praise of Athenian military power, Pericles had warned: “What I fear more than the strategies of our enemies, is our own mistakes.”[11]

Thus far, there have been no expressed indications that Israel’s slowly growing force of Dolphin-class diesel submarines has anything at all to do with reducing the vulnerability of its second-strike nuclear forces, but any such policy extrapolations about Israeli nuclear retaliatory forces would also be problematic to dismiss.[12]

Also significant for Israel’s overall security considerations is the refractory issue  of “Palestine.” A Palestinian state, any Palestinian state, could pose a serious survival threat to Israel, in part, as a major base of operations for launching increasingly lethal terrorist attacks against Israeli citizens. A possibly more important “Palestine” security issue for Israel lies in an even larger generalized potential for creating a steadily deteriorating correlation of regional forces. More specifically, any such deterioration could include various destabilizing “synergies,” that is, tangible interactive effects resulting from instabilities already evident  in Iraq and Syria, and from a manifestly concomitant Iranian nuclearization.

Leaving aside the various possibilities of any direct nuclear transfer to terrorists, a Palestinian state would  itself remain  non-nuclear. But, when viewed together with Israel’s other regional foes, this new and 23rd Arab state could still have the stunningly consequential effect of becoming a “force multiplier,” thereby impairing Israel’s already-minimal strategic depth, and  further rendering the Jewish State vulnerable to a thoroughly diverse panoply of both conventional and unconventional attacks. Here, for a variety of easily determinable reasons, a “merely” non-nuclear adversary could still heighten the chances of involving Israel in assorted nuclear weapons engagements,[13] including, in the future, a genuine nuclear war.[14]

What, then, should Israel do next about its core nuclear posture, and about its associated “order of  battle?”  How, exactly, should its traditionally ambiguous nuclear stance be adapted to the increasingly convergent and inter-penetrating threats of Middle Eastern chaos, Iranian nuclearization, and “Palestine?” In answering these difficult questions, Jerusalem will have to probe very carefully into the alleged American commitment to “degrade” and “destroy” ISIS(IS).  However well-intentioned, this pledge, especially if actually carried out effectively, could simultaneously aid both Syria’s President Assad, and the surrogate Shiite militia, Hezbollah.[15]

___________________________

[1] Although composed in the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes’Leviathan still offers an illuminating and enduring vision of chaos in world politics. Says the English philosopher in Chapter XIII, “Of the Naturall Condition of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity, and Misery:”  during chaos, a condition which Hobbes identifies as a “time of Warre,”  it is a time “…where every man is Enemy to every man… and where the life of man is solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.” At the time of writing, Hobbes believed that the condition of “nature” in world politics was less chaotic than that same condition existing among individual human beings -because of what he called the “dreadful equality” of individual men in nature being able to kill others – but this once-relevant differentiation has effectively disappeared with the global spread of nuclear weapons.

[2] The core importance of literally thoughtful military doctrine – of attention to the complex intellectual antecedents of any actual battle – had already been recognized by early Greek and Macedonian armies. See, on this still-vital recognition, F.E. Adcock, The Greek and Macedonian Art of War (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1962), especially Chapter IV.

[3] For much earlier, but still useful, scholarly assessments of polarity in world politics, by this author, See: Louis René Beres, “Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Reliability of Alliance Commitments,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4, December 1972, pp. 702-710; Louis René Beres, “Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Tragedy of the Commons,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4, December 1973, pp. 649-658; and Louis René Beres, “Guerillas, Terrorists, and Polarity: New Structural Models of World Politics,”Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 27, No.4., December 1974, pp. 624-636.

[4] Of course, in the context of any non-zero-sum game, ensuring enforceable agreements between the players (here, the United States and Russia) could still prove more-or-less decisively problematic.

[5]  See Louis René Beres, “After the Vienna Agreement: Could Israel and a Nuclear Iran Coexist?”  IPS Publications, IDC Herzliya, Institute for Policy and Strategy, Israel, September 2015.

[6] Significantly, this agreement also violates two major treaties, the 1968Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the 1948 Genocide Convention. The first violation has to do with subverting the NPT expectation that all non-nuclear state signatories must remain non-nuclear for a period of “indefinite duration.” The second violation centers on codified U.S. indifference to Genocide Convention obligations concerning responsibility to enforce the prohibition against “incitement to genocide.” In both cases, moreover, per article 6 of theU.S. Constitution – the “Supremacy Clause” – these violations are ipso factoalso violations of U.S. domestic law.

[7] See Louis René Beres, “Like Two Scorpions in a Bottle: Could Israel and a Nuclear Iran Coexist in the Middle East?” The Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 8., No. 1., 2014, pp. 23-32. See, also: Louis René Beres and (General/USAF/ret.) John T. Chain, “Living With Iran: Israel’s Strategic Imperative,” BESA Perspectives Paper No. 249, May 28, 2014, BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Israel. General Chain was Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Air Command.

[8] See Louis René Beres, “Core Synergies in Israel’s Strategic Planning: When the Adversarial Whole is Greater than the Sum of its Parts,” Harvard National Security Journal, Harvard Law School, June 2, 2015.

[9] See Louis René Beres, “Understanding the Correlation of Forces in the Middle East: Israel’s Urgent Strategic Imperative,” The Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, Vol. IV, No. 1 (2010). Russia’s Putin, of course, is accustomed to thinking in such strategic terms; in the Soviet days, “correlation of forces” was already a tested yardstick for measuring Moscow’s presumptive military obligations.

[10] Se: Hans M. Kristensen, “Nuclear Weapons Modernization: A Threat to the NPT?”  Arms Control Today, Arms Control Association, September 2015, 11 pp.

[11] From the Funeral Speech of 431 BCE, near the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, when Sparta first invaded Attica. For greater detail, see:Thucydides, The Speeches of Pericles, H.G. Edinger, tr., New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1979), 68 pp.

[12] On nuclear sea-basing by Israel (submarines) see: Louis René Beres and (Admiral/USN/ret.) Leon “Bud” Edney, “Israel’s Nuclear Strategy: A Larger Role for Submarine Basing,” The Jerusalem Post, August 17, 2014; and Professor Beres and Admiral Edney, “A Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent for Israel,” Washington Times, September 5, 2014. Admiral Edney was NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

[13] Such engagements could include assorted enemy attacks on Israel’sDimona nuclear reactor. Already, in both 1991 and 2014, this small reactor came under combined missile and rocket attack from Iraq and Hamas aggressions, respectively. For fully authoritative assessments of these attacks, and related risks, see: Bennett Ramberg, “Should Israel Close Dimona? The Radiological Consequences of a Military Strike on Israel’s Plutonium-Production Reactor,” Arms Control Today, Arms Control Association, May 2008, pp. 6-13.

[14] Naturally, the risks of a nuclear war would be expected to increase together with any further regional spread of nuclear weapons. In this connection, returning to the prophetic insights of Thomas Hobbes, back in the seventeenth century (see Note #1, above), Leviathan makes clear that the chaotic condition of nature is substantially worse among individual human beings, than among states. This is because, opines Hobbes, also in Chapter XIII, within this particular variant of chaos, “…the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest….” Now, however, with the spread of nuclear weapons, the “dreadful equality” of Hobbesian man could be replicated, more or less, in the much larger and more consequential arena of world politics.

[15] “Everything is very simple in war,” advises Clausewitz, “but the simplest thing is also very difficult.” See: Carl von Clausewitz, On War.

The cipher in the White House

October 11, 2015

The cipher in the White House, Washington TimesWesley Pruden, October 8, 2015

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Mr. Obama, humiliated by Vladimir Putin’s seizure of the initiative in the Middle East, seems not to understand what has happened to him. No one fears him or respects him. He has become a harmless cipher in an empty suit in the affairs of serious men. The nation pays the price.

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ANALYSIS/OPINION:

Perhaps it’s not fair to blame Barack Obama for the mess he’s making. The Middle East is where chaos was invented, after all, and perhaps not even the collection of incompetents and boobs the president has installed in the White House could make things this bad. Maybe it’s someone else’s fault. He blames the Jews.

When Mr. Obama promised the United Nations General Assembly earlier this month “a different type of leadership,” he prescribed “a leadership strong enough to recognize that nations share common interests and people share a common humanity.” That’s all very nice, and Mr. Obama should buy the world a Coke (or at least a Perrier in a glass bottle). He may have a profitable post-White House career waiting for him writing treacle for greeting cards.

Well-meaning he may be (or not), but he doesn’t have a clue about how such leadership would deal with people who do not share the common humanity. Some people have no humanity, but are the bastard progeny of an alien species of an evil planet in a cosmos, far, far away from our own.

Israel, which has seen pain and death in every guise, was stunned this week by a round of stabbings and shootings, including the murder of an American and his Israeli wife, seated in their car on the road near Nablus, by Palestinian gunmen who required their four children — aged 9, 7, 4 and 4 months — watch while their mother and father bled out their lives. The brutes fled, leaving the terrified children to deal with the terror and the gruesome aftermath of unspeakable cruelty.

The Palestinians celebrated the slaying with what Palestinian newspapers described as “joy” over the “heroics” of the gunmen. They put up photographs of their grim work on Twitter and Facebook. In Washington, the government of the “leader from behind” said it was “monitoring” the violence with a “growing sense of alarm.” The leader from behind hoped the perpetrators would be “swiftly brought to justice.”

Senior officials at the White House viewed with alarm, and pointed with pride at the moral equivalence served at the State Department. “We are deeply concerned about recent violence and escalating tensions in the West Bank and Jerusalem, and we condemn in the strongest terms violence against Israeli and Palestinian civilians.”

And then, with its reserves of decency spent, comes the “but” that everyone knew was on the way. “We call upon all parties to take affirmative steps to restore calm, and refrain from actions and rhetoric that would further escalate tensions.” Memo to Israel: “This means you.” Those parents with their four children should have known their presence on the road was a provocation. Why else assess the not-so-subtle blame for both killer and prey? The super-sleuths in Foggy Bottom are still trying to figure out whether the slaying of the couple on the road, with their four children watching, was an “act of terror.” Why not ask the 9-year-old?

President Obama and his friends dismiss as canard the logical conclusion of a reasonable man that this president just doesn’t like Jews very much, and scorns Israelis in particular.

Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu demonstrated with devastating effect his dilemma in getting a fair hearing for Israel at the U.N. When he observed that only 70 years after the Holocaust, Iran, guaranteed by Mr. Obama’s deal to get a nuclear bomb, threatens anew to annihilate the Jewish state. There was no response from the General Assembly audience — not a cheer, not even a rumble of applause, nothing but the silence of frightened churls. Mr. Netanyahu did not disturb the silence while 44 seconds ticked off the clock. The only movement in the hall was the squirming in the ranks of the West by the occasional delegate with still a remnant of shame.

The same audience had wildly cheered President Obama the day before as he took a victory lap for his deal with the mullahs, and for making sure a docile Congress took nothing away. The delegates now sat again in stony silence when Mr. Netanyahu observed that Iran continues to spread fear and terror, opposing every interest of America and the democracies, and works without rest toward establishing dominion over the region. Worst of all, there was no silence more profound and more frightening than in the ranks of the American delegates.

Mr. Obama, humiliated by Vladimir Putin’s seizure of the initiative in the Middle East, seems not to understand what has happened to him. No one fears him or respects him. He has become a harmless cipher in an empty suit in the affairs of serious men. The nation pays the price.

Fast-roping toward war in the Middle East

October 10, 2015

Fast-roping toward war in the Middle East, Washington Times, Ken Allard, October 8, 2015

(Oh well,

 

Not on our side

— DM)

 

Home to the Arab world’s largest population and the region’s geopolitical crossroads, Egypt had been a key American strategic ally ever since Anwar Sadat. But Mr. Obama backed the Islamist dictatorship of Mohammed Morsi, even after 30 million Egyptians took to the streets in July, 2013 to force his overthrow. When Mr. Obama cut off military ties with the new Egyptian regime of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the Russians swiftly stepped in to reverse a generation of American statecraft. Unlike the amateurs in the West Wing, Russian strategists and diplomats have no difficulty connecting dots or reading maps.

Neither do our few remaining allies in the Middle East, who can be forgiven for drawing their own conclusions, given the Egyptian reversal, those Syrian red-lines, the recent Iranian arms control deal and the steady expansion of Iranian influence throughout the region.

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The Russians are rapidly reinforcing their bridgehead in Syria, adding ground troops to their air, marine and naval forces. It is a classic air, land and sea intervention by a military establishment that understands how combined arms build synergies and broaden capabilities. As Jed Babbin pointed out in these pages on Wednesday, the broad-shouldered Russian intervention is the direct counterpoint to the “inaction, indecision and dithering” that have long characterized President Barack Obama’s foreign policy.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has called Mr. Obama’s bluff. He has also deployed a Russian expeditionary force bristling with robust anti-aircraft and ground-attack weapons, even firing cruise missiles from warships in the Caspian Sea. Such a deployment is precisely what Mr. Putin believes necessary to insure that Russian jets and helicopters dominate the skies over Syria. Fox News reports that Russian jets have already shadowed U.S. Predator drones on three occasions, a quiet but unsubtle message that the unmanned aircraft are flying only because of Russian forbearance.

Depending solely on Mr. Putin’s strategic objectives, that prevailing restraint can vanish in an instant. Union and Confederate commanders, for example, routinely practiced counter-reconnaissance throughout the Shenandoah Valley campaign of 1864. When planning a surprise attack or defending a vulnerable position, their first objective was to prevent enemy cavalry from having an unobstructed view of one’s own dispositions. What cavalry did back then, air forces and satellites do today.

Updating an ancient principle for the digital age, Norman Schwarzkopf destroyed Saddam Hussein’s radars, reconnaissance systems and intelligence assets before American airpower launched the opening salvos of Operation Desert Storm. Today’s Russian generals grew up practicing the basic principles of Soviet electronic warfare: Intercept the enemy’s communications, jam him or destroy him. Above all: Use the electromagnetic spectrum and state-of-the-art Russian air defenses to offset hi-tech American airpower. In Syria, that campaign has already begun.

Pandering to an American public that is militarily and strategically illiterate, some presidential candidates have reflexively called for “no-fly zones” to be set up in Syria. Predictably, Donald Trump has even expressed enthusiasm for Mr. Putin’s alleged intent to combat ISIS. But seriously, folks, why would Vladimir Putin go to the considerable trouble of staging the largest foreign deployment of Russian forces since the Cold War only to cater to western conceits about no-fly zones? Even if he did, who would set up and enforce them? Having made a power play to control Syria (and therefore a major chunk of the Middle East) why on earth would Mr. Putin content himself solely with attacking ISIS? (If you are having trouble following this logic, then you probably are a member of the White House staff “perplexed” by Russian objectives.

As a highly trained KGB apparatchik, Syria is not Mr. Putin’s first rodeo. While it has become obligatory in Washington policy salons to deplore Crimea and eastern Ukraine, Egypt’s recent history offers a better clue to Russia’s long-range goals.

Home to the Arab world’s largest population and the region’s geopolitical crossroads, Egypt had been a key American strategic ally ever since Anwar Sadat. But Mr. Obama backed the Islamist dictatorship of Mohammed Morsi, even after 30 million Egyptians took to the streets in July, 2013 to force his overthrow. When Mr. Obama cut off military ties with the new Egyptian regime of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the Russians swiftly stepped in to reverse a generation of American statecraft. Unlike the amateurs in the West Wing, Russian strategists and diplomats have no difficulty connecting dots or reading maps.

Neither do our few remaining allies in the Middle East, who can be forgiven for drawing their own conclusions, given the Egyptian reversal, those Syrian red-lines, the recent Iranian arms control deal and the steady expansion of Iranian influence throughout the region. Because it is a tough and unforgiving neighborhood, where would you place your bets if you lived there? Do you ally yourself with the rising regional power or the one seemingly intent only on defeat and retreat? As a friend points out, “Obama only attacks oilmen, Wall Street, the police, pro-lifers, the NRA, Christians, conservative Republicans, and traditional U.S. allies. Remember when they were the good guys?”

In this confusing world, it is important to remember that things can get worse, particularly given the fog of war with lots of heavily armed aircraft moving at high speeds over surprisingly small operating areas. War is justly famed for confounding the best intentions, for proving that the only assumption which holds true is the one you were certain could never happen.

How ironic that the place where three of the world’s great religions were born might yet spark a global confrontation where no holds are barred.

What could a “harsh” Iranian reaction to Riyadh constitute?

October 10, 2015

What could a “harsh” Iranian reaction to Riyadh constitute? Al-MonitorAli Omidi, October 9, 2015

[A]s history has shown, a country’s desire to start a military campaign is not always logical. Iran might decide that no matter what, it must launch a military campaign against Riyadh in order to punish Saudi Arabia.

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TEHRAN, Iran — Hundreds of Iranian pilgrims were killed in the Sept. 24 stampede in Mina, near Mecca. The incident was followed by Saudi negligence in reporting the situation on time, and failure to collaborate with Iranian authorities. This prompted Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to call on Saudi Arabia to apologize to the “Muslim world” and Iran. Ayatollah Khamenei also accused Riyadh of not fulfilling its obligations in returning the bodies of the Iranian pilgrims, and behaving “maliciously.” He further warned, “The slightest disrespect to tens of thousands of Iranian pilgrims in Mecca and Medina as well as the Saudi government’s refusal to fulfill its duties with regard to the transfer of the pure corpses [of those killed during the hajj] will elicit a harsh and tough reaction from Iran.”

Meanwhile, upon the Oct. 3 return of the bodies of 104 Iranian pilgrims, President Hassan Rouhani issued an additional warning. He said, “So far, our language has been one of brotherhood. When necessary, we have used the language of diplomacy; however, if needed, the language of authority will be used as well.”

Indeed, on the very same day, Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), said, “The IRGC has prepared all its possible potentials in order to fulfill the will of the great leader of the Islamic Revolution and make the Saudi dynasty answer for the crimes it committed in Mina and restore the rights of the victims. We are ready and are awaiting orders.” Jafari added, “The Muslim World is tired of the Saudis’ betrayals and ignorance, which reminds us of Abu Lahab, including the massacre of the people of Yemen, displacement of the poor people of Syria, repression of the people of Bahrain, ethnic massacres in Iraq, creation of ethnic tension and support of terrorism. The Saudis shall melt in the anger of the Muslims.”

Lastly, former IRGC Cmdr. Mohsen Rezaei, who is also adviser to Ayatollah Khamenei, warned Riyadh, “Don’t play with fire, because the fire will burn you … don’t follow the example of Saddam [Hussein], who in the middle of the Iraq-Iran War had no way out.”

In response, Saudi Arabia has accused Iran of playing politics with the stampede. “I think the Iranians should think of more productive activities than to play politics with a tragedy that has befallen those people who were performing their most sacred religious duty,” Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir told the UN General Assembly. Mindful of the increasingly hostile rhetoric, the question arises of what the “harsh and tough reaction” that Iran has warned of could potentially constitute.

In general, harsh reaction translates into military action. Iran has just finished its negotiations with the six world powers over its nuclear program, and thus considers itself to be in a stronger position. Separately, Iran also assesses that Saudi Arabia is in a desperate situation in Yemen. Therefore, in the case of a possible military confrontation with Saudi Arabia, there are several scenarios that Tehran could consider:

    • A ground campaign. For this kind of campaign to be possible, Iran would need to cross both Iraq and Kuwait. Neither of these countries will allow Iran to enter their territory in order to attack Saudi Arabia. Therefore, this option is not on the table. In addition, such a military campaign requires a large and well-equipped army as well as logistical, financial and economic abilities enjoyed by a superpower. Iran is only considered a mid-level power in the region. There is also the historical example of the US reaction to Iraq’s 1991 invasion of Kuwait for Iran to consider.

 

    • A naval campaign. This would mean that Iran has to travel a distance of 200 miles to reach the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia. Such a campaign is impossible considering the Iranian armed forces’ lack of strategic depth vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia, as the latter has the advantage of controlling the sea from land.

 

    • Supporting allies in proxy wars. This would mean that Iran will, more determinedly than ever, support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in his fight against opposition forces. Tehran would also support Hezbollah against pro-Saudi elements of the Lebanese government, as well as in Israel, and the Houthis in Yemen. Of course, while supporting Hezbollah and Assad is possible and easy, it is more difficult to give military support to the Houthis since Yemen is under naval blockade. Moreover, UN Resolution 2216 forbids provision of military support to the Houthis. Iran can, however, achieve this goal via smugglers and private contractors.

 

    • Restricting Saudi access to the Strait of Hormuz. Considering Iran’s familiarity with the Strait of Hormuz and the military advantages that it enjoys in this regard, this option is possible. The problem, however, is that this scenario can lead to a battle of tankers, as it did toward the end of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. Indeed, Saudi ships could be prompted to raise a third party flag. In addition, this scenario will give an excuse to world powers to increase their military presence in the Persian Gulf, which runs counter to Iran’s objectives.

 

    • Destroying the bridge that connects Saudi Arabia to Bahrain. The King Fahd Causeway, which is 25 kilometer (15.5 miles) long, was used for the first time in December 1986. If the bridge is destroyed by high-explosives missiles from the air, the Saudi military support for Bahrain is likely to decrease, which will in turn weaken the Bahraini regime. If such an attack is carried out, and Iran at the same time manages to provide opposition groups in Bahrain with logistic and military support, the Bahraini regime is likely to collapse. However, considering that the United States maintains a military presence in Bahrain, it is not possible for Iran to conduct a direct military campaign against Bahrain.

 

    • Supporting the Shiite population of Qatif, in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, with the condition that in case of receiving military and logistic support, the Shiites of Saudi Arabia will rebel with the aim of toppling the Saudi government. Considering that Saudi Arabia has built a very long wall on its border with Iraq, and also considering the distance between the Shiite-inhabited region of Saudi Arabia and Iran, this is hardly a probable option. In addition, there are doubts about whether Saudi Shiites will in fact rebel against their government if provided with such support.

 

  • Firing missiles at Saudi Arabia. As Iran is equipped with multiple types of missiles, it can hit a variety of targets inside Saudi Arabia. Since Saudi Arabia does not have the necessary infrastructure for an effective air defense, such as an Iron Dome, an Iranian missile attack will be effective. The problem, however, is that in such a scenario, Saudi Arabia and its allies will destroy Iran’s oil infrastructure in retaliation.

Considering the options above, and existing limitations, any “harsh” response on the part of Iran will likely be limited to options three through six above. Of course, in case of any kind of confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, all the Arab states of the Persian Gulf — minus Oman — and more than likely the United States and Israel, will offer their complete support to Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, as history has shown, a country’s desire to start a military campaign is not always logical. Iran might decide that no matter what, it must launch a military campaign against Riyadh in order to punish Saudi Arabia. It is therefore more beneficial, for both Iran and Saudi Arabia, to solve their problems via diplomatic means. However, the current exchange of harsh words between Saudi and Iranian officials shows that the situation will either get critical, or the current cold war will continue.

 

A word from their Supreme Leader

October 10, 2015

A word from their Supreme Leader, Power LineScott Johnson, October 10, 2015

We have yet to see the fatuous fatwa allegedly promulgated by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khameni denouncing the development of nuclear weapons. Yet it has repeatedly been cited by President Obama and others in support of the deadly arrangement into which we have entered with Iran regarding its nuclear program. See, e.g., MEMRI’s reports here and here. The foreboding John Fogerty/Creedence Clearwater Revival song could be put to good use: “I want to know, have you ever seen the fatwa?”

Obama seems to have premised the agreement on hopes for an opening to Iran. Perhaps he doesn’t understand the nature of the Iranian regime. He has an unending train of excuses to mitigate the meaning of their terrorist ventures and ceaseless hostility to the United States. To the extent that Obama can distinguish America’s friends from America’s enemies, he weakens our friends and props up our enemies.

This week Reuters highlighted words actually spoken by their Supreme Leader that tend to belie Obama’s train of thought. In the translation provided in the video Reuters posts with the story, Khamenei states that “negotiation with the U.S. is forbidden[.]” It sounds something like a fatwa of the nonmythical variety. Reuters reports:

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on Wednesday banned any further negotiations between Iran and the United States, putting the brakes on moderates [sic] hoping to end Iran’s isolation after reaching a nuclear deal with world powers in July.

Khamenei, the highest authority in the Islamic Republic, already said last month there would be no more talks with the United States after the nuclear deal, but has not previously declared an outright ban.

His statements directly contradict those of moderate Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, who says his government is ready to hold talks with the United States on how to resolve the conflict in Syria, where the two countries back opposing sides.

“Negotiations with the United States open gates to their economic, cultural, political and security influence. Even during the nuclear negotiations they tried to harm our national interests.,” Khamenei was quoted as saying on his website.

Khamenei asserts that in the negotiations leading to the arrangement “the Americans took advantage of a few chances.” I’m thinking those “chances” are of the same nature as the fatuous fatwa, i.e., mythical.

Khamenei’s remarks came in an address Revolutionary Guards Navy commanders. Obama hasn’t been asked about them yet. When asked, he will undoubtedly dismiss them as offered for domestic political consumption, as he has done with the Supreme Leader’s “Death to America” routine. Taking Obama’s interpretation at face value, we have Obama presenting a pure case of projection if there ever was one.

What’s Obama’s Next Move on Israel?

October 9, 2015

What’s Obama’s Next Move on Israel? Commentary Magazine, October 9, 2015

(On the other hand, Obama may concentrate on global smarming and bypassing Congress on gun control. — DM)

new-obama

The reasoning behind America’s supine reaction to Russian intervention in Syria is no mystery. It is a clear reflection of President Obama’s longstanding desire to withdraw from the Middle East, as well as his commitment to détente with Iran. Since the Iranians are hoping the Russian forces can do what Hezbollah and Iranian volunteers failed to accomplish in the last few years — destroy Bashar Assad’s opposition — it is hardly surprising that the U.S. would decide to shrug at this nightmarish reversal of fortune for American interests. But that doesn’t mean the president likes being upstaged by Russian President Vladimir Putin. The question for the White House now is how to seize back the initiative on the world stage in a manner better suited to President Obama’s sensibilities. The recent surge of Palestinian terror attacks on Israelis may provide the answer. Though the administration has its hands full with foreign crises right now, it may be that Obama’s answer to Russian adventurism will be a return to the dead in the water peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. Instead of stronger efforts to make good on his promise to destroy ISIS, he may prefer another go at hammering Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.

As late as only a couple of weeks ago, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians didn’t seem to be on the White House’s front burner. To judge by his recent speech at the United Nations General Assembly, President Obama was done with the Israel-Palestinian peace process. For the first time since he became president, Obama didn’t mention the topic once in his annual UN address. With Russia waging war in Syria, the U.S. is unable to do much about ISIS and the region in chaos. The notion that the carnage and suffering that had spread across the Middle East has anything to with Israel or the Palestinians is ludicrous. So it was little surprise that the president preferred to use his address to boast of the dubious virtues of his nuclear deal with Iran than to spout his standard lines about Israel needing to take risks for the sake of a peace process that wasn’t going anywhere.

Indeed, the scheduled meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu next month was seen as an opportunity to repair the alliance that was damaged by the debate over Iran rather than another chance for Obama to renew his longstanding feud with the Israeli leader. Though Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas’s farcical declaration at the UN that the Oslo Accords no longer bound him fell flat, the outbreak of a wave of Palestinian terror directed at Israelis has put that issue back in the news. The administration’s studious neutrality about the recent violence in spite of the incitement from the Palestinian Authority that has stoked the bloodshed has helped to further isolate Israel. The intractable nature of the conflict and the Palestinians’ obvious lack of interest in peace would deter a wiser man than Obama. But the need to do something to assert American influence, or at least get some attention, could prompt the president to use what may be the start of a third intifada to unleash Secretary of State John Kerry and begin a new round of pointless negotiations.

Why would the administration expend what is left of its diminishing political capital for another round of Netanyahu-bashing that would almost certainly do nothing to advance the cause of peace?

The first thing to remember about this president is never to underestimate either the strength of his obsessions or his willingness to hold onto grudges.

President Obama is a man who has learned nothing in his seven years in office. He arrived at the White House determined to foster engagement with Iran and create more daylight between the U.S. and Israel, and convinced that Netanyahu’s Likud was not to his taste. Nothing that has happened in the intervening years has altered his opinion about any of this.

Part of it is rooted in a genuine belief that the only way to solve the Israel-Palestinian conflict is to put sufficient pressure on the Israelis to make concessions. That fits in nicely with his equally sincere conviction that the United States must concentrate its efforts on reaching out to the Muslim and Arab worlds rather than reinforcing the alliance with Israel, which he and advisors like Susan Rice see as an impediment to U.S. interests.

The failure of every previous attempt to foster peace has not influenced the president’s opinion. No matter how many times the Palestinian leadership says no to Israeli offers of peace or incites their people to religious-based violence — as Abbas is currently doing — Obama still thinks that the key to success will be more Israel-bashing.

However, just as important as his faith in pressure on Israel is his animus for Netanyahu. The president’s defining characteristic in office is his arrogant belief in his own superior intellect and Netanyahu’s stubborn refusal to bow to Obama’s demands irritates him in a way that can only be described as disproportionate. As State Department veteran and former Obama staffer Dennis Ross describes in his new book that was excerpted yesterday in Politico, Obama and Susan Rice were so offended by possible Israeli opposition to the Iran deal that they kept Netanyahu in the dark about the talks with Tehran and then spread canards about his dissent being rooted in racism.

It would make political sense for Obama and the Democratic Party for the president to forget about his feud with Netanyahu,  but that isn’t likely to happen. That’s especially true since the prime minister used his own UN speech to reiterate his criticisms of the Iran deal, something that was likely to drive Obama straight up the White House walls even though that’s a fight he’s already won.

Lastly, a new peace process push would let Obama preen on the international stage in a way that he likes. The president disdains and even mocks Putin’s muscular approach to international affairs, even though Russia’s advances come at America’s expense. But he really thinks that moves like appeasing Iran or putting Israel in its place enhance his prestige. That this is dangerous nonsense that only undermines American credibility seems never to occur to him.

The ultimate outcome of any new push for peace with the Palestinians is a foreordained conclusion. Neither Abbas nor his Hamas rivals are willing to recognize the legitimacy of a Jewish state, no matter where its borders might be drawn. Moreover, the violence that Abbas has incited in order to compete with Hamas may not be so easily kept in check. American neutrality about Abbas’ double game in which he stokes hatred with one hand and seeks to restrain it with the other may serve to only make the situation even more dangerous. Instead of allowing the president to claim that the U.S. is a force for peace, more pressure on Israel will just add to the toll of suffering in Iraq and Syria, that Obama’s misguided policies have created.

 

Why hasn’t Sisi visited Washington yet?

October 9, 2015

Why hasn’t Sisi visited Washington yet? Al-MonitorMohamed Saied, October 8, 2014

(Obama thinks highly of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood and rejects President Sisi because he supported the Egyptian masses who sought the overthrow of an increasingly dictatorial President Morsi. Obama’s rejection of Sisi’s Egypt pushed it into an alliance with Russia. Now Obama, et al, claim that alliance as a basis for the continuing hostility toward Sisi. Perhaps it is. Obama, et al, have also complained about Egyptian human rights violations in repressing the Muslim Brotherhood; few similar complaints have been made about far greater Saudi and Iranian human rights violations. Sisi is the only president of a Muslim nation who seeks to promote a more secular and hence moderate Islam, to which the Muslim Brotherhood is hostile. Please see also, Egypt’s secular culture minister ruffles Salafi feathers. — DM)

One of the most important issues that may hinder the return of US-Egyptian relations to their previous state is the strong relationship between Cairo and Moscow; Sisi has met his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin four times so far, and Egypt is currently considered the most important ally of Moscow in the Middle East.

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CAIRO — Ever since Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi took office on June 8, 2014, US-Egyptian relations have been deteriorating. This has been further confirmed by the fact that Sisi has not visited Washington yet despite the shuttle visits he has made abroad.

Differences and conflicts plagued the US-Egyptian relationship during the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. These conflicts culminated in the 1967 Six-Day War, when diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed because of the economic and military support by the United States to Israel.

However, these relations started to take a positive turn based on the strengthening of the strategic interests shared between the two countries in the wake of the signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel — the US’ permanent ally — on Sept. 17, 1978, between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, as per the State Information Service affiliated with the Presidency of the Republic.

Only one meeting was held between Presidents Sisi and Barack Obama on the sidelines of the 69th Session of the UN General Assembly in September 2014 in New York, but other than this the two presidents have been settling for phone calls to discuss the latest developments in the region.

According to The Washington Times, Obama refused to meet with Sisi on the sidelines of the 70th session of the UN General Assembly. Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry attributed this in a press statement on Sept. 24 to the mismatching agendas and schedules of the two presidents, which prevented them from holding individual talks.

According to the US Embassy in Egypt’s reports on the situation in the country following the revolution of June 30, 2013, Washington started a “comprehensive review” of its relations with Egypt on the background of the ouster of former Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi.

On Aug. 15, 2013, following the killing of hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood demonstrators in Al-Nahda Square and Rabia al-Adawiya Square, Obama announced the cancellation of the Bright Star maneuvers, which were launched in 1980 following the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and consisted of a joint military exercise between the two countries.

By October 2013, the review of relations put a halt to the deal consisting of delivering arms to Egypt. Also in October 2013, the US administration suspended $260 million that was going to be directly transferred to the Egyptian government along with another $300 million in US loan guarantees.

However, in a telephone call on March 13, Obama told Sisi that the military aid amounting to $1.3 billion would continue.

Meanwhile, Dina Badawi, spokeswoman for the US State Department for the Middle East, expressed concerns in a live interview on the ONtv channel April 2 over the state of rights and freedoms in Egypt, and pointed out that aid is aimed at continuing the democratic track and the political reforms in the country.

Abdel Moneim Said, director of the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, and Shai Feldman, the Judith and Sidney Swartz director at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies, said in a research paper titled “Resetting US-Egyptian relations,” which was published in March 2014 on the center’s website, that at the root of the downturn in the US-Egyptian relations is the huge gap between the two sides’ narratives regarding the events of June 30, 2013.

One of the most important issues that may hinder the return of US-Egyptian relations to their previous state is the strong relationship between Cairo and Moscow; Sisi has met his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin four times so far, and Egypt is currently considered the most important ally of Moscow in the Middle East.

The dispute between Russia and the United States is in regard to several issues. Chief among these is the Syrian issue; Moscow launched airstrikes on Sept. 30, sparking criticism on the part of Obama during a press conference Oct. 2. Obama said that Moscow is acting “not out of strength, but out of weakness” in support of the losing party. The president was referring to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and he pointed out that Russia should help in reaching a political settlement.

Meanwhile, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry did not issue any statements condemning or supporting such strikes.

In January, spokeswoman for the US State Department Jennifer Psaki said during the daily press brief that a meeting she described as “routine” was held with a delegation of members of the former Egyptian parliament from the dissolved Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party, on the sidelines of their visit to Washington, which was organized and financed by Georgetown University in Washington.

This meeting raised the ire of the Egyptian political leadership, as well-informed sources told Reuters in June that the Egyptian government summoned the US ambassador in Cairo to express displeasure over visits to Washington by figures of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is banned in Egypt.

Concerning the fact that Egypt did not extend an official invitation to Obama to meet with Sisi, or vice versa, Atef el-Ghomri, former director of the office of the Egyptian Al-Ahram newspaper in Washington and a member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, said, “There is an ongoing split within the US decision-making circles over the revolution of June 30, 2013, and the toppling of former President Mohammed Morsi, who belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood.”

Ghomri told Al-Monitor that over the past years, Egypt’s relations have been confined to its foreign relations with Washington as it only took into account its regional and international interests. This deprived Egypt of any international initiatives or insights about various issues. Also, Egypt had to give up its pivotal role in the Middle East as far as the African and Arab countries are concerned. This negatively affected Egypt over time.

“The Egyptian leadership is trying to diversify its foreign relations. It resorted to the Eastern bloc led by Russia, as well as East Asia represented by China and Singapore.” Ghomri added.

Washington is concerned about several files managed by the Egyptian leadership, mainly the human rights and political reforms issues. The United States has been expressing those concerns since the June 30 Revolution, when the Muslim Brotherhood was toppled and replaced by a military president.

Under such circumstances, Cairo had to resort to other countries, while the US-Egyptian relations are expected to witness further tension, especially with the differences in views concerning several international issues, namely Syria, Iran and Libya.

 

Obama Admin’s Iran Point Man Promotes Anti-Israel Conspiracy Theories

October 8, 2015

Obama Admin’s Iran Point Man Promotes Anti-Israel Conspiracy Theories, Washington Free Beacon, October 8, 2015

(Surprising? Nope. — DM)

eyrestate__2_Alan Eyre / Twitter

A State Department official closely involved in the Obama administration’s Iran push has been promoting publications from anti-Semitic conspiracy sites and other radical websites that demonize American Jewish groups and Israel, according to sources and documents obtained by the Washington Free Beacon.

Alan Eyre, the State Department’s Persian-language spokesman and a member of the negotiating delegation that struck a nuclear deal with Iran earlier this year, has in recent months disseminated articles that linked American-Jewish skeptics of the deal to shadowy financial networks, sought to soften the image of Iranian terrorists with American blood on their hands, and linked deal criticism to a vast “neoconservative worldview.”

Eyre described the one article, penned by the anti-Israel conspiracy theorist Stephen Walt, as having an “interesting thesis.”

Insiders who spoke to the Free Beacon about Eyre’s private postings pointed to a pattern of partisanship and called it a sign that key officials at the State Department are biased against the state of Israel. Such criticism has dogged the team Obama since the early days of the administration.

Eyre regularly briefed U.S. officials at the negotiating table and was responsible for proofreading draft texts of the recent Iranian nuclear agreement.

While Eyre has a public Facebook page officially sponsored by the State Department, screenshots taken from his private personal account obtained by the Free Beacon include content that insiders described as concerning.

In one Feb. 13 posting, when Iran talks were at a critical stage, Eyre disseminated a link to an article praising Iranian Quds Force Chief Ghassem Suleimani, who is directly responsible for the deaths of Americans abroad.

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Suleimani, who is listed as a terrorist by the U.S. State Department, will have international sanctions against him waived under the parameters of the nuclear accord.

In another posting from Feb. 5, Eyre links to the website LobeBlog, which is viewed by critics as anti-Israel and regularly attacks neoconservative pundits.”

The article Eyre links to, “Who Are the Billionaires Attacking Obama’s Iran Diplomacy,” attacks opponents of the Iranian deal and insinuates that wealthy Jewish donors are behind this push.

The article puts particular emphasis on the Israel Project (TIP), a non-profit advocacy organization run by Josh Block, a longtime Democrat, and claimed that wealthy Jewish individuals were behind a stealth campaign to kill the deal. TIP is portrayed as playing a crucial role in discrediting the deal and convincing lawmakers to take a stance against it.

The article was penned by a former ThinkProgress blogger, Eli Clifton, who was forced out of the Center for American Progress-backed blog following a scandal in which several writers accused Iran deal critics of being “Israel firsters.”

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In another posting, Eyre links to an article by Stephen Walt, co-author of the book The Israel Lobby, which has been branded by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) as an “anti-Jewish screed.”

Walt lashes out in the piece at neoconservative critics of the Iran deal, writing that “no one should listen to their advice today.”

Eyre linked to the piece with the comment, “interesting thesis.” He then quoted Walt at length, according to a screenshot:

The real problem is that the neoconservative worldview — one that still informs the thinking of many of the groups and individuals who are most vocal in opposing the Iran deal — is fundamentally flawed. Getting Iraq wrong wasn’t just an unfortunate miscalculation, it happened because their theories of world politics were dubious and their understanding of how the world works was goofy.

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Eyre also appeared to express disappointment online in March, when Sen. Tom Cotton and 46 other Republican lawmakers penned an open letter to Iran opposing the nuclear talks.

Eyre links to a March 9 Washington Post article by Paul Pillar, an Israel critic who backs boycotts of the Jewish state, titled ‘The misguided, condescending letter from Republican senators to Iran.’ He then opined in the post, “Seriously. Can someone write them a letter telling them that the most fundamental duty of Congress is to pass a budget?”

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At least one of Eyre’s Facebook friends has quibbled with his postings.

When Eyre linked to a Talking Points Memo article claiming that “49 percent of Republicans don’t believe in evolution,” one critic commented: “This post is total crap. Some 300 people were polled, and the polling criteria were, of course, not specified. This outfit has a deserved reputation as a left-leaning, professionally anti-Republican Flak Tank.”

Eyre dismissed that criticism, responding, “If you are going to fact check every incendiary posting I put up, it is going to detract from the sum total of my facebook-derived frivolity.”

In addition to his postings, Eyre has appeared as a keynote speaker at the National Iranian American Council’s Washington, D.C., conference.

The council, which has been accused as serving as a pro-Tehran lobbying shop, has helped the Obama administration disseminate pro-Iran talking points and champion the deal in the public sphere. Its top officials also have insinuatedthat Jewish lawmakers who oppose the deal have more loyalty to Israel than America.

One senior official at a Washington, D.C., pro-Israel organization expressed disappointment but not surprise at Eyre’s posting.

“The easiest way to explain the State Department’s behavior toward the Middle East is to assume that they don’t like the Israelis very much and they have this romantic fascination with Iran,” the source said. “That’s what you’re seeing here.”

“Of course they can’t admit that out loud, because the American people believe exactly the opposite, so they do it through passive-aggressive Facebook posts and occasional slips of the tongue about how moderate and sophisticated the Iranians are,” the source added.

A State Department spokesman declined to comment on Eyre’s personal postings when contacted by the Free Beacon.

“Alan Eyre is the Department’s Persian Language Spokesperson,” the official said. “In that capacity, he maintains his official page on Facebook here,” the spokesman continued, providing a link to the page.

The Facebook page in question, however, is separate from Eyre’s public-facing personal page referenced by the State Department, which said it had no knowledge of the second page.

“We’re not aware of any such content that you refer to posted on that account,” the official said.

The official did not respond to follow-up requests asking for comment from Eyre on the postings.