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Is Russia Plotting To Bring Down OPEC?

October 11, 2015

Is Russia Plotting To Bring Down OPEC?

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Posted on Sun, 04 October 2015 00:00

Source: Is Russia Plotting To Bring Down OPEC? | OilPrice.com

President Putin’s recent moves in the Middle East—to shore up Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria through deployment of combat aircraft, equipment, and manpower and build-out of air-, naval-, and ground-force bases, and the agreement in the last week with Iran, Iraq, and Syria on intelligence and security cooperation—could contribute to Russian efforts to combat the myriad negative pressures on Russia’s vital energy industry.

Live by Energy…

Energy is the foundation of Russia, its economy, its government, and its political system. Putin has highlighted on various occasions the contribution Russia’s mineral wealth, in particular oil and natural gas, must make for Russia to be able to sustain economic growth, promote industrial development, catch up with the developed economies, and modernize Russia’s military and military industry.

Even a casual glance at the IMF’s World Economic Outlook statistics for Russia shows the tight correlation since 1992 between GDP growth on the one hand and oil and gas output, exports, and prices on the other (economic series available here). According to the IMF’s 2015 Article Iv Consultation-Press Release and Staff Report, published August 3, oil and natural gas exports comprised 65 percent of exports, 52 percent of the Federal government budget, and 14.5 percent of GDP in 2014. Including their domestic contribution, hydrocarbons represent ~30 percent of GDP.

While oil and natural gas are crucial to Russia, Russia’s crude and natural gas are crucial to its neighbors on the Eurasian landmass. Russia supplied about 30 percent (146.6 bcm) of Europe’s natural gas in 2014, and about 25 percent of its crude (3.5 mmbbl/day) in 2013. Russia’s oil and natural gas are also important to its Asian and Central Asian neighbors.

It is not only the commodities that make Russia crucial, but its massive land-based infrastructure for their distribution throughout the Eurasian landmass. As Tatiana Mitrova, head of the oil and gas department, Energy Research Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences, pointed out regarding natural gas in The Geopolitics of Russian Natural Gas:

“Russia has a unique transcontinental infrastructure in the heart of Eurasia (150,000 km of trunk pipelines), which also makes it a backbone of the evolving, huge Eurasian gas market (which could include Europe, North Africa, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Caspian Sea region, and Northeast Asia). Control over the transportation assets in this region together with vast gas reserves make Russia the key element of this new market.”

The land-based oil distribution network is smaller, but also important. The 4,000 km Druzhba pipeline delivers about 1 mmbbl/day of crude to Europe—about 30 percent of total shipments to Europe. In the Far East, Rosneft shipped 22.6 million tons of crude to China in 2014 through the East Siberian Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline.

The Russian government continues to seek to extend and expand the natural gas distribution infrastructure—into Europe, with various proposed pipeline projects (Nord Stream 2, Turkish Stream 2, 3, and 4, South European Pipeline), and into China, with two large pipeline projects, Power of Siberia Pipeline (to supply China from East Siberia), and the proposed Altai pipeline (to supply China from West Siberia).

…Death by Energy

In the last few years, the threats to Russia’s energy industry have multiplied and intensified. They pose an existential threat to the industry and therefore to the Russian economy:

– The revenues Russia can earn from its crude and natural gas exports face intense pressure. The Saudi decision to let the market set prices and to pursue market share, has led to steep declines in crude and petroleum product prices. The decision also has impacted natural gas export prices negatively, since, for Russia’s long-term supply agreements, they wholly or partially are indexed to oil prices. The transition in Europe to hybrid natural gas pricing models (which take European spot hub prices into account) also has pressured natural gas pricing. (Natural gas data from Gazprom).

Adding to the revenue pain, natural gas export volumes have been falling, according to Gazprom (which has a monopoly on pipeline exports), as have domestic volumes within Russia:

It is therefore not surprising that the aforementioned IMF Article Iv Consultation-Press Release and Staff Report projected sharp declines in 2015 and 2016 from 2014 levels for oil export revenues ($109.8 billion and $96 billion respectively) and natural gas export revenues ($12 billion and $14.3 billion respectively).

– The U.S. and European Union’s decisions to impose—and maintain—sanctions on Russia after its invasion and annexation of Crimea and invasion and informal annexation eastern Ukraine will pile more pressure on the Russian energy industry. They include bans on financing for and the supply of critical equipment and technology to important Russian energy projects. Novatek and its partners Total and Chinese National Petroleum Company still lack $15 billion of the $27 billion needed to finance the Yamal LNG plant. Denis Khramov, Russia’s deputy Minister of Natural Resources, said September 28 at a conference in Russia’s Far East that Rosneft and Gazprom are delaying some offshore drilling by two to three years because of sanctions and low oil prices. The sanctions are also impeding Gazprom’s ability to develop the Chayandinskoye and Kovyktinskoye fields in eastern Siberia, from which it plans to supply natural gas to China under the bilateral $400 billion, thirty year deal signed in 2014.

– Following the Russian invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, The European Union is now even more determined to reduce its dependence on Russia for natural gas and to force Gazprom submit to EU competition rules. Europe has sought and continues to seek alternatives Russian natural gas (among them, U.S. LNG and Iranian pipeline and/or LNG). The European Commission, the European Union’s executive body, has refused to bless Gazprom’s proposed 55 bcm/year Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline project, citing existing surplus Gazprom pipeline capacity into Europe and insufficient future demand for Russian natural gas. Also, the EU Commission in April charged Gazprom with violating the EU’s anti-trust laws for anti-competitive practices and unfair pricing in Central and Eastern Europe. If found guilty, Gazprom could face substantial fines of around $1 billion. Even if Gazprom avoids fines and manages to reach a settlement with the EU, as it hopes to do, its European market share and pricing will remain under pressure into the future.

– The emergence of the U.S., along with Canada, as powerful crude, NGL, and natural gas producers is also a major concern for the Russian economy. This has transformed the U.S. from a market for Russian crude and natural gas (via LNG) to a global competitor. If, as seems increasingly likely, the ban on crude exports is lifted, U.S. crude will compete with Russian crude in several key markets. It would also force foreign suppliers to seek other markets for all or part of the exports they previously sent to the U.S. This in turn would intensify competition among these crude exporting countries for share in those markets. In regard to natural gas, its explosive output growth in the U.S. undercut Gazprom’s rationale for its Baltic LNG project (10 mtpa), turned the U.S. into a major (potential) LNG competitor in global LNG import markets, and, via the U.S. toll- and Henry Hub- pricing model, weakened Gazprom’s ability to insist on oil-indexed, long-term contracts.

Saving Russian Energy (and Russia) through the Middle East?

Putin’s moves in the Middle East could help Russia address the impact of these threats to the Russian energy industry. They potentially enhance the attractiveness of Russian crude and natural gas supplies compared to those from Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Arab allies.

In the selection of crude and natural gas suppliers, security is a key consideration for importers. Wary of U.S. naval power, the Chinese, for example, prefer pipeline natural gas supplies over seaborne LNG supplies. Importers therefore must take into consideration the potential threats to transport. In this critical area, Russia enjoys a decided advantage over Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab producers, which depend on sea transport through the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea to ship their oil and LNG.

Each of the three routes from these two bodies of water passes through a “choke point” (from the Red Sea, through the Suez Canal to Europe and through the Mandeb Strait to Asia, from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz). By adding an airbase to their military presence in Syria, the Russians—coordinating with Iran, Syrian President Assad, and eventually possibly Iraq—would have the capability to disrupt shipments from Persian Gulf and Red Sea terminals.

Russia’s export channels are less susceptible to disruption. With the exception of LNG exports to Asia from Sakhalin, Russia sends natural gas to its customers via pipeline. About 70 percent of Russia’s seaborne oil exports are susceptible to choke points (shipments from two ports on the Gulf of Finland through the Baltic Sea to the Atlantic and one port on the Black Sea through the Turkish Strait/Bosporus to the Mediterranean), while 30 percent are not (pipeline shipments to Europe and ESPO pipeline shipments to the port of Primorsk near Vladivostok).

Putin’s moves also are strengthening Russia’s influence with OPEC. Russia already has extensive and close ties with Iran and Venezuela, and is now laying the basis for such ties with Iraq. Putin has aligned Russia with OPEC’s have nots–the members lacking financial resources to withstand low crude prices for an extended period and that have objected to Saudi policies (Iran, Iraq, Angola, Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Ecuador, and Venezuela)—against the haves (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar). He has continually supported Venezuelan President Maduro’s calls for an emergency OPEC meeting on prices and his efforts to persuade Saudi Arabia to reverse its policy. Most recently, in the beginning of September, Putin told Maduro that the two countries “must team up to shore up oil prices”.

In addition, Russia’s deputy prime minister in charge of energy policy, Arkady Dvorkovich, in the beginning of September made comments that, in tone and substance, mocked Saudi policy, saying that “OPEC producers are suffering the ricochet effects of their attempt to flush out rivals by flooding the world with excess output,” expressing doubt that OPEC members “really want to live with low oil prices for a long time,” and implying that Saudi policy is irrational.

Indeed, Russia can be seen as maneuvering to split OPEC into two blocs, with Russia, although not a member, persuading the “Russian bloc” to isolate Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab OPEC members within OPEC. This might persuade the Saudis to seek a compromise with the have nots.

A strategic alliance with Iran and Iraq offers Putin two more potential avenues to pressure the Saudis. They can test Saudi determination to defend their market share at any price and its wherewithal financially to do so. Iran claims it can raise crude output by one million barrels within six or so months of the lifting of sanctions. The Saudis may be calculating that Iran must first rehabilitate its oil fields and that Iran, cash poor, cannot do so quickly. If this is the case, Russia could step in, offer Iran financing, and force the Saudis to contemplate prices staying lower longer than they anticipated and therefore continuing pressure on their economy.

Russia also could cooperate with Iran and Iraq to take market share from Saudi Arabia in the vital Chinese market. As a recent Bloomberg article pointed out, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia, Iraq and other countries are vying intensely for sales to China, the second largest import market and the major source of demand growth in coming years. Coordinating their pricing and consistently offering the Chinese prices below the Saudi price, they could seek to win market share. Such a price war would pressure the competitors’ currencies.

Since the Russians allow the Ruble to float, Iran maintains an informal and unofficial peg for its Rial to the US$, and Iraq has indicated it is willing to adjust its peg if necessary, while the Saudis are committed to the Riyal’s peg to the US$, Russia, Iran, and Iraq would have any advantage over Saudi Arabia. To the extent that Iran and Iraq allowed their currencies to adjust, Russian, Iranian, and Iraqi revenues in local currency terms would not decline as much as Saudi revenues fixed in US$ (and might even increase) as their currencies depreciated.

Results

Each of these opportunities offers the possibility to address the pressures on the Russian energy industry. However, Putin will have to play his cards carefully. Played heavy-handedly, he could intensify fears in Europe of excessive dependence on Russian energy supplies and awaken such fears in China. This could lead the Europeans and Chinese to search for other suppliers. In addition, mismanaged confrontation with the U.S. and Europe in and over Syria could lead to broadening and strengthening of economic and financial sanctions. Moreover, neither Iran nor Iraq will want to become overly dependent on Russia, which lacks the resources they need develop their energy industries.

Finally, the opportunities assume Putin’s gambits in Syria and with Syria, Iran, and Iraq in intelligence and security cooperation will succeed. And this, given the Soviet experience in Afghanistan and Putin’s experience in eastern Ukraine, is far from certain.

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Op-Ed: Chaos and 2nd Cold War, Part I: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy

October 11, 2015

Op-Ed: Chaos and 2nd Cold War, Part I: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy, Israel National News,Prof. Louis René Beres, October 9, 2015

To fashion a functional nuclear strategy would be difficult for any state in world politics, but it could be especially challenging for one that keeps its bomb more-or-less securely “in the basement.” Now, as the Middle East descends into an ever more palpable chaos,[1] Israel will have to make certain far-reaching decisions on this very complex task.

Among other nuanced and widely intersecting concerns, Jerusalem’s decisions will need to account for a steadily hardening polarity between Russia and the United States.

Here, almost by definition, there will be no readily available guidebook to help lead the way. For the most part, Israel will need to be directed by an unprecedented fusion of historical and intellectual considerations. In the end, any resultant nuclear strategy will have to represent the prospective triumph of mind over mind, not merely of mind over matter.[2]

Conceivably, at least for the Jewish State that is smaller than America’s Lake Michigan, an emergent “Cold War II” could prove to be as determinative in shaping its national nuclear posture as coinciding regional disintegration. Still, a new Cold War need not necessarily prove disastrous or disadvantageous for Israel. It is also possible, perhaps even plausible, that Jerusalem could sometime discern an even greater commonality of strategic interest with Moscow, than with Washington.

To be sure, any such stark shift of allegiance in Israeli geo-political loyalties ought not to be intentionally sought, or in any way cultivated for its own sake. Moreover, on its face, it would currently be hard to imagine in Jerusalem that a superpower mentor of both Syria and Iran could somehow also find strategic common ground with Israel. Yet, in these relentlessly tumultuous times, any normally counter-intuitive judgments could, at least on rare occasions, prove surprisingly correct.

Credo quia absurdum. “I believe because it is absurd.” In these tumultuous times, certain once preposterous counter-intuitive judgments should no longer be dismissed out of hand. Moreover, in seeking to best understand the Israel-relevant dynamics of any renewed Washington-Moscow bipolar axis of conflict, Jerusalem will need to consider the prospects for a conceivably “looser” form of enmity.

In other words, looking ahead, it would seem realistic that a now “restored” superpower axis might nonetheless reveal greater opportunities for cooperation between the dominant “players.” Understood in the traditional language of international relations theory, this points toward a relationship that could become substantially less “zero-sum.”[3]

By definition, regarding zero-sum relationships in world politics, any one state’s gain is necessarily another state’s loss. But in Cold War II, it is reasonable to expect that the still-emerging axis of conflict will be “softer.” Here, for both major players, choosing a cooperative strategy could sometimes turn out to be judged optimal.[4]

Recognizing this core difference in superpower incentives from the original Cold War, and to accomplish such recognition in a timely fashion,  could prove vitally important for Israel. In essence, it could become a key factor in figuring out what should or should not be done by Jerusalem about any expected further increments of regional nuclear proliferation, and about Iran.

Iranian nuclearization remains the single most potentially daunting peril for Jerusalem. In this regard, virtually nothing has changed because of the recent Iran Nuclear Agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Vienna, 14 July, 2015).[5] To the contrary, in a situation fraught with considerable irony, Iran’s overall strategic latitude will actually have been expanded and improved by the terms of this concessionary pact.[6] Most plainly, these Iranian enhancements are the permissible result of a now no-holds-barred opportunity for transfer of multiple high-technology weapons systems, from Moscow to Tehran.

For the foreseeable future, the nuclear threat from Iran will continue to dwarf all other recognizable security threats.[7] At the same time, this enlarging peril could be impacted by certain multi-sided and hard to measure developments on the terrorism front.  In more precisely military terminology, these intersecting terror threats could function “synergistically,” or as so-called “force multipliers.”

The “whole” of the strategic danger now facing Israel is substantially greater than the simple arithmetic sum of its parts.[8] This true combination could include a persistently shifting regional “correlation of forces,”[9] one that would continue to oscillate menacingly, and also to the  observable benefit of Israel’s mortal enemies, both state and sub-state.

In Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv, serious derivative questions should now be addressed. What does this changing set of adversarial developments mean for Israel in very specifically operational and policy terms? Above all, this configuration of enmity should warn that a steady refinement and improvement of Israel’s nuclear strategy must be brought front and center. For Israel, there can be no other reasonable conclusion, not only because of ominous developments in Iran, but also because of the growing prospect of additional nuclear weapon states in the region, including perhaps Egypt, and/or Saudi Arabia.

Despite U.S. President Barack Obama’s continuing support for a “world free of nuclear weapons,” all of the world’s existing nuclear weapon states are already expanding and modernizing their nuclear arsenals. As of the end of September 2015, the world’s total inventory of nuclear warheads was reliably estimated as 17,000.[10] What Israel must also bear in mind is that this American president’s notion that nuclear weapons are intrinsically destabilizing, or even evil, makes no defensible intellectual sense.

It is plausible, rather, that only the perceived presence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of both original superpowers prevented World War III. Equally convincing, Israel, without its atomic arsenal – whether ambiguous, or declared – could never survive, especially in a region that may soon combine further nuclear spread with steadily undiminished chaos.

Israel will have to decide, in prompt and sometimes inter-related increments, upon the precise extent to which the nation needs to optimize its composite national security policies on preemption, targeting, deterrence, war fighting, and active defense. A corollary imperative here must be to deal more purposefully with the complicated and politically stubborn issues of “deliberate ambiguity.” Going forward, it will not serve Israel’s best interests to remain ambiguous about ambiguity.

To date, at least, it seems that this longstanding policy of “opacity” (as it is also sometimes called) has made perfectly good sense. After all, one can clearly assume that both friends and enemies of Israel already acknowledge that the Jewish State holds persuasive military nuclear capabilities that are (1) survivable; and (2) capable of penetrating any determined enemy’s active defenses. Concerning projections of nuclear weapon survivability, Israel has made plain, too, its steady and possibly expanding deployment of advanced sea-basing (submarines).

Thus far, “radio silence” on this particular “triad” component has likely not been injurious to Israel. This could change, however, and rather quickly. Here, again, there is no room for error. Already, in delivering his famousFuneral Speech, with its conspicuously high praise of Athenian military power, Pericles had warned: “What I fear more than the strategies of our enemies, is our own mistakes.”[11]

Thus far, there have been no expressed indications that Israel’s slowly growing force of Dolphin-class diesel submarines has anything at all to do with reducing the vulnerability of its second-strike nuclear forces, but any such policy extrapolations about Israeli nuclear retaliatory forces would also be problematic to dismiss.[12]

Also significant for Israel’s overall security considerations is the refractory issue  of “Palestine.” A Palestinian state, any Palestinian state, could pose a serious survival threat to Israel, in part, as a major base of operations for launching increasingly lethal terrorist attacks against Israeli citizens. A possibly more important “Palestine” security issue for Israel lies in an even larger generalized potential for creating a steadily deteriorating correlation of regional forces. More specifically, any such deterioration could include various destabilizing “synergies,” that is, tangible interactive effects resulting from instabilities already evident  in Iraq and Syria, and from a manifestly concomitant Iranian nuclearization.

Leaving aside the various possibilities of any direct nuclear transfer to terrorists, a Palestinian state would  itself remain  non-nuclear. But, when viewed together with Israel’s other regional foes, this new and 23rd Arab state could still have the stunningly consequential effect of becoming a “force multiplier,” thereby impairing Israel’s already-minimal strategic depth, and  further rendering the Jewish State vulnerable to a thoroughly diverse panoply of both conventional and unconventional attacks. Here, for a variety of easily determinable reasons, a “merely” non-nuclear adversary could still heighten the chances of involving Israel in assorted nuclear weapons engagements,[13] including, in the future, a genuine nuclear war.[14]

What, then, should Israel do next about its core nuclear posture, and about its associated “order of  battle?”  How, exactly, should its traditionally ambiguous nuclear stance be adapted to the increasingly convergent and inter-penetrating threats of Middle Eastern chaos, Iranian nuclearization, and “Palestine?” In answering these difficult questions, Jerusalem will have to probe very carefully into the alleged American commitment to “degrade” and “destroy” ISIS(IS).  However well-intentioned, this pledge, especially if actually carried out effectively, could simultaneously aid both Syria’s President Assad, and the surrogate Shiite militia, Hezbollah.[15]

___________________________

[1] Although composed in the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes’Leviathan still offers an illuminating and enduring vision of chaos in world politics. Says the English philosopher in Chapter XIII, “Of the Naturall Condition of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity, and Misery:”  during chaos, a condition which Hobbes identifies as a “time of Warre,”  it is a time “…where every man is Enemy to every man… and where the life of man is solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.” At the time of writing, Hobbes believed that the condition of “nature” in world politics was less chaotic than that same condition existing among individual human beings -because of what he called the “dreadful equality” of individual men in nature being able to kill others – but this once-relevant differentiation has effectively disappeared with the global spread of nuclear weapons.

[2] The core importance of literally thoughtful military doctrine – of attention to the complex intellectual antecedents of any actual battle – had already been recognized by early Greek and Macedonian armies. See, on this still-vital recognition, F.E. Adcock, The Greek and Macedonian Art of War (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1962), especially Chapter IV.

[3] For much earlier, but still useful, scholarly assessments of polarity in world politics, by this author, See: Louis René Beres, “Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Reliability of Alliance Commitments,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4, December 1972, pp. 702-710; Louis René Beres, “Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Tragedy of the Commons,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4, December 1973, pp. 649-658; and Louis René Beres, “Guerillas, Terrorists, and Polarity: New Structural Models of World Politics,”Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 27, No.4., December 1974, pp. 624-636.

[4] Of course, in the context of any non-zero-sum game, ensuring enforceable agreements between the players (here, the United States and Russia) could still prove more-or-less decisively problematic.

[5]  See Louis René Beres, “After the Vienna Agreement: Could Israel and a Nuclear Iran Coexist?”  IPS Publications, IDC Herzliya, Institute for Policy and Strategy, Israel, September 2015.

[6] Significantly, this agreement also violates two major treaties, the 1968Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the 1948 Genocide Convention. The first violation has to do with subverting the NPT expectation that all non-nuclear state signatories must remain non-nuclear for a period of “indefinite duration.” The second violation centers on codified U.S. indifference to Genocide Convention obligations concerning responsibility to enforce the prohibition against “incitement to genocide.” In both cases, moreover, per article 6 of theU.S. Constitution – the “Supremacy Clause” – these violations are ipso factoalso violations of U.S. domestic law.

[7] See Louis René Beres, “Like Two Scorpions in a Bottle: Could Israel and a Nuclear Iran Coexist in the Middle East?” The Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 8., No. 1., 2014, pp. 23-32. See, also: Louis René Beres and (General/USAF/ret.) John T. Chain, “Living With Iran: Israel’s Strategic Imperative,” BESA Perspectives Paper No. 249, May 28, 2014, BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Israel. General Chain was Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Air Command.

[8] See Louis René Beres, “Core Synergies in Israel’s Strategic Planning: When the Adversarial Whole is Greater than the Sum of its Parts,” Harvard National Security Journal, Harvard Law School, June 2, 2015.

[9] See Louis René Beres, “Understanding the Correlation of Forces in the Middle East: Israel’s Urgent Strategic Imperative,” The Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, Vol. IV, No. 1 (2010). Russia’s Putin, of course, is accustomed to thinking in such strategic terms; in the Soviet days, “correlation of forces” was already a tested yardstick for measuring Moscow’s presumptive military obligations.

[10] Se: Hans M. Kristensen, “Nuclear Weapons Modernization: A Threat to the NPT?”  Arms Control Today, Arms Control Association, September 2015, 11 pp.

[11] From the Funeral Speech of 431 BCE, near the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, when Sparta first invaded Attica. For greater detail, see:Thucydides, The Speeches of Pericles, H.G. Edinger, tr., New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1979), 68 pp.

[12] On nuclear sea-basing by Israel (submarines) see: Louis René Beres and (Admiral/USN/ret.) Leon “Bud” Edney, “Israel’s Nuclear Strategy: A Larger Role for Submarine Basing,” The Jerusalem Post, August 17, 2014; and Professor Beres and Admiral Edney, “A Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent for Israel,” Washington Times, September 5, 2014. Admiral Edney was NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

[13] Such engagements could include assorted enemy attacks on Israel’sDimona nuclear reactor. Already, in both 1991 and 2014, this small reactor came under combined missile and rocket attack from Iraq and Hamas aggressions, respectively. For fully authoritative assessments of these attacks, and related risks, see: Bennett Ramberg, “Should Israel Close Dimona? The Radiological Consequences of a Military Strike on Israel’s Plutonium-Production Reactor,” Arms Control Today, Arms Control Association, May 2008, pp. 6-13.

[14] Naturally, the risks of a nuclear war would be expected to increase together with any further regional spread of nuclear weapons. In this connection, returning to the prophetic insights of Thomas Hobbes, back in the seventeenth century (see Note #1, above), Leviathan makes clear that the chaotic condition of nature is substantially worse among individual human beings, than among states. This is because, opines Hobbes, also in Chapter XIII, within this particular variant of chaos, “…the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest….” Now, however, with the spread of nuclear weapons, the “dreadful equality” of Hobbesian man could be replicated, more or less, in the much larger and more consequential arena of world politics.

[15] “Everything is very simple in war,” advises Clausewitz, “but the simplest thing is also very difficult.” See: Carl von Clausewitz, On War.

Categories: Arab nations, Cold war, Defense of Israel, Foreign policy, Free world, Iran scam, Iranian nukes, Iranian proxies, Iranian Threats, Islamic State, Islamic supremacy, Islamic terrorism, Islamism, Israel, Israeli nukes, Middle East, Netanyahu, Nucler war, Obama - Middle East, Obama - rogue president, Obama and Israel, Obama's America, Obama's foreign failures, Obama's legacy, Palestinian Authority, Palestinian heroes, Palestinians, Russia - Middle East, Russia - Syrian war, Russian nukes
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The cipher in the White House

October 11, 2015

The cipher in the White House, Washington Times, Wesley Pruden, October 8, 2015

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Mr. Obama, humiliated by Vladimir Putin’s seizure of the initiative in the Middle East, seems not to understand what has happened to him. No one fears him or respects him. He has become a harmless cipher in an empty suit in the affairs of serious men. The nation pays the price.

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ANALYSIS/OPINION:

Perhaps it’s not fair to blame Barack Obama for the mess he’s making. The Middle East is where chaos was invented, after all, and perhaps not even the collection of incompetents and boobs the president has installed in the White House could make things this bad. Maybe it’s someone else’s fault. He blames the Jews.

When Mr. Obama promised the United Nations General Assembly earlier this month “a different type of leadership,” he prescribed “a leadership strong enough to recognize that nations share common interests and people share a common humanity.” That’s all very nice, and Mr. Obama should buy the world a Coke (or at least a Perrier in a glass bottle). He may have a profitable post-White House career waiting for him writing treacle for greeting cards.

Well-meaning he may be (or not), but he doesn’t have a clue about how such leadership would deal with people who do not share the common humanity. Some people have no humanity, but are the bastard progeny of an alien species of an evil planet in a cosmos, far, far away from our own.

Israel, which has seen pain and death in every guise, was stunned this week by a round of stabbings and shootings, including the murder of an American and his Israeli wife, seated in their car on the road near Nablus, by Palestinian gunmen who required their four children — aged 9, 7, 4 and 4 months — watch while their mother and father bled out their lives. The brutes fled, leaving the terrified children to deal with the terror and the gruesome aftermath of unspeakable cruelty.

The Palestinians celebrated the slaying with what Palestinian newspapers described as “joy” over the “heroics” of the gunmen. They put up photographs of their grim work on Twitter and Facebook. In Washington, the government of the “leader from behind” said it was “monitoring” the violence with a “growing sense of alarm.” The leader from behind hoped the perpetrators would be “swiftly brought to justice.”

Senior officials at the White House viewed with alarm, and pointed with pride at the moral equivalence served at the State Department. “We are deeply concerned about recent violence and escalating tensions in the West Bank and Jerusalem, and we condemn in the strongest terms violence against Israeli and Palestinian civilians.”

And then, with its reserves of decency spent, comes the “but” that everyone knew was on the way. “We call upon all parties to take affirmative steps to restore calm, and refrain from actions and rhetoric that would further escalate tensions.” Memo to Israel: “This means you.” Those parents with their four children should have known their presence on the road was a provocation. Why else assess the not-so-subtle blame for both killer and prey? The super-sleuths in Foggy Bottom are still trying to figure out whether the slaying of the couple on the road, with their four children watching, was an “act of terror.” Why not ask the 9-year-old?

President Obama and his friends dismiss as canard the logical conclusion of a reasonable man that this president just doesn’t like Jews very much, and scorns Israelis in particular.

Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu demonstrated with devastating effect his dilemma in getting a fair hearing for Israel at the U.N. When he observed that only 70 years after the Holocaust, Iran, guaranteed by Mr. Obama’s deal to get a nuclear bomb, threatens anew to annihilate the Jewish state. There was no response from the General Assembly audience — not a cheer, not even a rumble of applause, nothing but the silence of frightened churls. Mr. Netanyahu did not disturb the silence while 44 seconds ticked off the clock. The only movement in the hall was the squirming in the ranks of the West by the occasional delegate with still a remnant of shame.

The same audience had wildly cheered President Obama the day before as he took a victory lap for his deal with the mullahs, and for making sure a docile Congress took nothing away. The delegates now sat again in stony silence when Mr. Netanyahu observed that Iran continues to spread fear and terror, opposing every interest of America and the democracies, and works without rest toward establishing dominion over the region. Worst of all, there was no silence more profound and more frightening than in the ranks of the American delegates.

Mr. Obama, humiliated by Vladimir Putin’s seizure of the initiative in the Middle East, seems not to understand what has happened to him. No one fears him or respects him. He has become a harmless cipher in an empty suit in the affairs of serious men. The nation pays the price.

Categories: Death to Israel, Dishonor, Foreign policy, International Community, Iran scam, Islam's war on Jews, Islamic supremacy, Islamic terrorism, Islamism, Israel, Jews, Middle East, Netanyahu, Obama - Middle East, Obama - rogue president, Obama and Israel, Obama's affinity for Iran, Obama's anti-semitism, Obama's foreign failures, Obama's legacy, Palestinian heroes, Palestinians, Russia - Middle East, United Nations
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Moscow:UK Should Explain Report of Permission to Hit Russian Jets Over Iraq

October 11, 2015

Moscow:UK Should Explain Report of Permission to Hit Russian Jets Over Iraq

14:50 11.10.2015

(updated 16:07 11.10.2015)

Source: Moscow:UK Should Explain Report of Permission to Hit Russian Jets Over Iraq

The Russian Embassy in London has requested the UK Foreign Office’s clarifications on media reports of the alleged British leadership’s decision to enable UK pilots participating in anti-ISIL coalition’s airstrikes to shoot down Russian planes over Iraq.

Fighters from the al-Qaida linked Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) during a parade in Raqqa, Syria
© AP Photo/ Raqqa Media Center
Russia Still Awaits UK Response on ISIL Targets in Syria

Earlier, a UK defense source told the Daily Star Sunday tabloid that British and NATO pilots reportedly had been given a clearance to shoot down Russian jets over Iraq.UK defense sources stressed that RAF pilots have been told to avoid contact with Russian jets “at all costs,” but warned the pilots must be prepared to attack Russian jets “if their lives depend on it.”

“We are concerned by media reports as far as they refer to senior members of the Cabinet. We urgently requested UK Foreign Office’s clarifications. At the same time, the hypothesis itself of a potential conflict between British and Russian aircraft in the skies over Iraq is incomprehensible. As it is known, the Russian jets are not involved in attacks on ISIL targets on its [Iraqi] territory”, Russian Ambassador in the UK Alexander Yakovenko told RIA Novosti.

A man amidt damage in the al-Katerji district in Aleppo September 20, 2015
© REUTERS/ Abdalrhman Ismail
Syrian Strikes: Why Iraq Leaning Toward Russia, Turning Away From US

Russia launched precision airstrikes against Islamic State targets in Syria last week at the request of Syrian President Bashar Assad. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Moscow had not received any requests from Baghdad to carry out airstrikes against ISIL targets in Iraq.The Royal Air Force’s (RAF) Tornado combat aircraft are said to be equipped with up to four Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missiles (ASRAAM) to shoot down a Russian jet they encounter. The 2,300-miles-per-hour missiles with warheads filled with 22 pounds of high explosive lock onto targets using an infrared heat-seeker.

A screen of the system for unmanned drones.
© AP Photo/ Lefteris Pitarakis
UK Prime Minister Promises to Buy New Drones to Fight ISIL in Iraq, Syria

British Defense Secretary Michael Fallon said earlier he was seeking to extend RAF’s anti-ISIL efforts in Iraq to Syria.A US-led coalition of 60 nations has been conducting anti-ISIL airstrikes in Iraq and Syria for over a year, bypassing the UN Security Council’s and Assad’s approval.

Yakovenko also said that British aircraft were not involved in the coalition strikes against ISIL in Syria.

“As for the joint struggle against the Islamic State, we have not received an official response to our request concerning information the British side has on ISIL’s infrastructure targets, which could be used by the Russian Air Force,” the ambassador added.

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Iraqi air force: We hit convoy of ISIS leader Baghdadi

October 11, 2015

Iraqi air force: We hit convoy of ISIS leader Baghdadi

By REUTERS \

10/11/2015 15:39

Source: Iraqi air force: We hit convoy of ISIS leader Baghdadi – Middle East – Jerusalem Post



ISIL, led by Baghdadi, last year proclaimed a caliphate straddling Iraqi and Syria [AP]

The fate of the terrorist leader is still unknown.

BAGHDAD  – The Iraqi air force struck a convoy of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in western Anbar province close to the Syrian border on Sunday, a military statement said.

The fate of the terrorist leader, who has declared himself the leader of a caliphate in areas Islamic State controls in Iraq and Syria, is still unknown, the statement said.

“Iraqi air forces have bombed the convoy of the terrorist Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi while he was heading to Karabla to attend a meeting with Daesh commanders”, the statement read, using the Arabic acronym for Islamic State.

Sunday’s report is not the first time Baghdadi is said to have been wounded by his enemies. The Islamic State leader was reportedly wounded in a March attack launched by the US-led coalition in the al-Baaja district of Nineveh, close to the Syrian border.

In November, Iraqi Defense Minister Khaled al-Abadi claimed that Baghdadi was wounded by a US air strike near Mosul. According to the post, Baghdadi’s deputy was killed in the attack.

Last week, a recording of al-Qaida leader Ayman Zawihri documenting his disapproval of Baghdadi was released.

“You spill blood and attack the Muslim people in order to rule,” Zawihri said. “Baghdadi’s caliphate is a caliphate of explosions, damage and destruction.”

Yasser Okbi and JPost.com staff contributed to this report.

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Officials: CIA-backed Syrian rebels under Russian blitz

October 11, 2015

Officials: CIA-backed Syrian rebels under Russian blitz

By KEN DILANIAN Oct. 10, 2015 11:13 AM EDT

Source: Officials: CIA-backed Syrian rebels under Russian blitz

 

WASHINGTON (AP) — CIA-backed rebels in Syria, who had begun to put serious pressure on President Bashar Assad’s forces, are now under Russian bombardment with little prospect of rescue by their American patrons, U.S. officials say.

Over the past week, Russia has directed parts of its air campaign against U.S.-funded groups and other moderate opposition in a concerted effort to weaken them, the officials say. The Obama administration has few options to defend those it had secretly armed and trained.

The Russians “know their targets, and they have a sophisticated capacity to understand the battlefield situation,” said Rep. Mike Pompeo, R-Kan., who serves on the House Intelligence Committee and was careful not to confirm a classified program. “They are bombing in locations that are not connected to the Islamic State” group.

Other U.S. officials interviewed spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the matter publicly.

The CIA began a covert operation in 2013 to arm, fund and train a moderate opposition to Assad. Over that time, the CIA has trained an estimated 10,000 fighters, although the number still fighting with so-called moderate forces is unclear.

The effort was separate from the one run by the military, which trained militants willing to promise to take on IS exclusively. That program was widely considered a failure, and on Friday, the Defense Department announced it was abandoning the goal of a U.S.-trained Syrian force, instead opting to equip established groups to fight IS.

For years, the CIA effort had foundered — so much so that over the summer, some in Congress proposed cutting its budget. Some CIA-supported rebels had been captured; others had defected to extremist groups. The secret CIA program is the only way the U.S. is taking on Assad militarily. In public, the United States has focused its efforts on fighting IS and urging Assad to leave office voluntarily.

“Probably 60 to 80 percent of the arms that America shoveled in have gone to al-Qaida and its affiliates,” said Joshua Landis, a Syria expert at the University of Oklahoma.

But in recent months, CIA-backed groups, fighting alongside more extremist factions, began to make progress in Syria’s south and northwest, American officials say. In July and August, U.S.-supported rebels seized territory on the al-Ghab plain, in northwest Syria’s Idlib and Hama governorates. The plain is a natural barrier between areas controlled by Sunni Muslims and the Alawite sect to which Assad and his loyalists belong. The capture of the al-Ghab plain was seen as a breakthrough toward weakening the Alawites.

Those and other gains put Damascus, the capital, at risk, officials say.

But in recent days, Russian airstrikes have hit groups in the area, according to the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington think tank that closely tracks the situation. Russian bombs and missiles have hit specific buildings associated with the moderate Syrian opposition, according to a U.S. official briefed on the intelligence.

Russian officials have insisted they are bombing Islamic State militants and other terrorists.

U.S. intelligence officials see many factors motivating Russia’s intervention: Moscow’s reasserting its primacy as a great power, propping up Assad and wanting to deal a blow to the United States, which has insisted that Assad must go to end Syria’s civil war.

Russia is also interested in containing IS, an organization that includes thousands of Chechen fighters who may pose a threat to Russia, officials say.

But in the short term, “my conclusion is that the timing of their intervention was driven by Assad really going critical,” said Rep. Jim Himes, D-Conn., also a House Intelligence Committee member.

The administration is scrambling to come up with a response to Russia’s moves, but few believe the U.S. can protect its secret rebel allies. The administration has all but ruled out providing CIA-backed groups with surface-to-air missiles that can down aircraft, fearing such weapons would end up in the wrong hands, officials say.

Rep. Adam Schiff, the top Democrat on the committee, says the U.S. should consider establishing a no-fly zone that allows rebels a safe place from which to operate, and shooting down Syrian helicopters that are bombing civilians. He said the U.S. also should provide arms to the Ukrainian government fighting Russian-backed separatists.

A no-fly zone would require the U.S. military to be ready to engage in air battles with the Syrian government, something it is not prepared to do.

The administration “is debating the merits of taking further action or whether they are better off letting Putin hang himself,” he said, referring to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

“Our options are much narrower than they were two weeks ago,” said Sen. Angus King, I-Maine, who serves on the Intelligence and Armed Services committees. “I don’t think there is any simple answer. … Further air involvement has become very problematic because of the Russian engagement.”

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63 ISIS targets hit in 64 Russian sorties over Syria – combat report

October 11, 2015

63 ISIS targets hit in 64 Russian sorties over Syria – combat report

Published time: 11 Oct, 2015 10:12

Edited time: 11 Oct, 2015 11:25

Source: 63 ISIS targets hit in 64 Russian sorties over Syria – combat report — RT News

© Russian Defence Ministry
© Russian Defence Ministry / RIA Novosti
Russian Aerospace Forces have extended the range of their airstrikes on Islamic State positions in Syria to four provinces, focusing primarily on demolishing fortified installations and eliminating supply bases and the terrorists’ infrastructure.

Over the last 24 hours Russian aircraft have attacked terrorist positions in the Hama, Idlib, Latakia and Raqqa provinces of Syria. In total, 64 sorties targeted 63 Islamic State installations, among them 53 fortified zones, 7 arms depots, 4 training camps and a command post.

The airstrikes were carried out by Sukhoi Su24M and Su-34 bombers and Su-25SM assault aircraft, with Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jets ensuring air escort for the assault groups.

“Having accomplished combat assignments, all aircraft of the task force operating in Syria successfully returned to the Khmeimim airbase,” said the spokesperson for the Russian Defense Ministry, Igor Konashenkov.

In the vicinity of the city of Saraqib in northwest Syria, an artillery position known for inflicting strikes on the nearby residential areas has been exposed and eliminated.

A group of Sukhoi Su-24M bombers attacked a terrorist field headquarters near the village of Salma in northwest Syria. This command post has been coordinating operations of the militants in whole of the Latakia province.

“A direct hit of a guided KAB-500 air bomb completely destroyed a building with militant commanders inside,” the Defense Ministry’s spokesperson reported. “The airstrike also eliminated five SUVs with ZU-23 double-barreled 23mm anti-aircraft guns mounted on them that were parked nearby.”

A Sukhoi Su-24M bomber attacked a thoroughly concealed position of SUVs with mortar launchers mounted on them near the village of Kafer-Delba. As a result of the attack, a mobile sub-artillery battery consisting of four vehicles was eliminated.

Aerial reconnaissance discovered a stronghold of terrorists near the village of Achan. A pinpoint airstrike carried out by Su-24M aircraft eliminated the installation, along with an ammunition and logistics depot.

The Russian Defense Ministry’s spokesman, Igor Konashenkov, also said that the Russian and American armed forces have held a second video conference regarding the operation in Syria. The two sides discussed in detail proposals voiced at the first such event and focused on issues of air security to be ensured by both sides, since both US and Russian aircraft are currently operating in Syria’s airspace.

The date for the next consultation is to be arranged later.

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Fast-roping toward war in the Middle East

October 10, 2015

Fast-roping toward war in the Middle East, Washington Times, Ken Allard, October 8, 2015

(Oh well,

 

Not on our side

— DM)

 

Home to the Arab world’s largest population and the region’s geopolitical crossroads, Egypt had been a key American strategic ally ever since Anwar Sadat. But Mr. Obama backed the Islamist dictatorship of Mohammed Morsi, even after 30 million Egyptians took to the streets in July, 2013 to force his overthrow. When Mr. Obama cut off military ties with the new Egyptian regime of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the Russians swiftly stepped in to reverse a generation of American statecraft. Unlike the amateurs in the West Wing, Russian strategists and diplomats have no difficulty connecting dots or reading maps.

Neither do our few remaining allies in the Middle East, who can be forgiven for drawing their own conclusions, given the Egyptian reversal, those Syrian red-lines, the recent Iranian arms control deal and the steady expansion of Iranian influence throughout the region.

*****************************

The Russians are rapidly reinforcing their bridgehead in Syria, adding ground troops to their air, marine and naval forces. It is a classic air, land and sea intervention by a military establishment that understands how combined arms build synergies and broaden capabilities. As Jed Babbin pointed out in these pages on Wednesday, the broad-shouldered Russian intervention is the direct counterpoint to the “inaction, indecision and dithering” that have long characterized President Barack Obama’s foreign policy.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has called Mr. Obama’s bluff. He has also deployed a Russian expeditionary force bristling with robust anti-aircraft and ground-attack weapons, even firing cruise missiles from warships in the Caspian Sea. Such a deployment is precisely what Mr. Putin believes necessary to insure that Russian jets and helicopters dominate the skies over Syria. Fox News reports that Russian jets have already shadowed U.S. Predator drones on three occasions, a quiet but unsubtle message that the unmanned aircraft are flying only because of Russian forbearance.

Depending solely on Mr. Putin’s strategic objectives, that prevailing restraint can vanish in an instant. Union and Confederate commanders, for example, routinely practiced counter-reconnaissance throughout the Shenandoah Valley campaign of 1864. When planning a surprise attack or defending a vulnerable position, their first objective was to prevent enemy cavalry from having an unobstructed view of one’s own dispositions. What cavalry did back then, air forces and satellites do today.

Updating an ancient principle for the digital age, Norman Schwarzkopf destroyed Saddam Hussein’s radars, reconnaissance systems and intelligence assets before American airpower launched the opening salvos of Operation Desert Storm. Today’s Russian generals grew up practicing the basic principles of Soviet electronic warfare: Intercept the enemy’s communications, jam him or destroy him. Above all: Use the electromagnetic spectrum and state-of-the-art Russian air defenses to offset hi-tech American airpower. In Syria, that campaign has already begun.

Pandering to an American public that is militarily and strategically illiterate, some presidential candidates have reflexively called for “no-fly zones” to be set up in Syria. Predictably, Donald Trump has even expressed enthusiasm for Mr. Putin’s alleged intent to combat ISIS. But seriously, folks, why would Vladimir Putin go to the considerable trouble of staging the largest foreign deployment of Russian forces since the Cold War only to cater to western conceits about no-fly zones? Even if he did, who would set up and enforce them? Having made a power play to control Syria (and therefore a major chunk of the Middle East) why on earth would Mr. Putin content himself solely with attacking ISIS? (If you are having trouble following this logic, then you probably are a member of the White House staff “perplexed” by Russian objectives.

As a highly trained KGB apparatchik, Syria is not Mr. Putin’s first rodeo. While it has become obligatory in Washington policy salons to deplore Crimea and eastern Ukraine, Egypt’s recent history offers a better clue to Russia’s long-range goals.

Home to the Arab world’s largest population and the region’s geopolitical crossroads, Egypt had been a key American strategic ally ever since Anwar Sadat. But Mr. Obama backed the Islamist dictatorship of Mohammed Morsi, even after 30 million Egyptians took to the streets in July, 2013 to force his overthrow. When Mr. Obama cut off military ties with the new Egyptian regime of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the Russians swiftly stepped in to reverse a generation of American statecraft. Unlike the amateurs in the West Wing, Russian strategists and diplomats have no difficulty connecting dots or reading maps.

Neither do our few remaining allies in the Middle East, who can be forgiven for drawing their own conclusions, given the Egyptian reversal, those Syrian red-lines, the recent Iranian arms control deal and the steady expansion of Iranian influence throughout the region. Because it is a tough and unforgiving neighborhood, where would you place your bets if you lived there? Do you ally yourself with the rising regional power or the one seemingly intent only on defeat and retreat? As a friend points out, “Obama only attacks oilmen, Wall Street, the police, pro-lifers, the NRA, Christians, conservative Republicans, and traditional U.S. allies. Remember when they were the good guys?”

In this confusing world, it is important to remember that things can get worse, particularly given the fog of war with lots of heavily armed aircraft moving at high speeds over surprisingly small operating areas. War is justly famed for confounding the best intentions, for proving that the only assumption which holds true is the one you were certain could never happen.

How ironic that the place where three of the world’s great religions were born might yet spark a global confrontation where no holds are barred.

Categories: Assad, Egypt, Foreign policy, Iran scam, Morsi, Muslim Brotherhood, Obama - Middle East, Obama's foreign failures, Obama's legacy, Putin, Reform Islam, Russia - Middle East, Syria war
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What could a “harsh” Iranian reaction to Riyadh constitute?

October 10, 2015

What could a “harsh” Iranian reaction to Riyadh constitute? Al-Monitor, Ali Omidi, October 9, 2015

[A]s history has shown, a country’s desire to start a military campaign is not always logical. Iran might decide that no matter what, it must launch a military campaign against Riyadh in order to punish Saudi Arabia.

**********************

TEHRAN, Iran — Hundreds of Iranian pilgrims were killed in the Sept. 24 stampede in Mina, near Mecca. The incident was followed by Saudi negligence in reporting the situation on time, and failure to collaborate with Iranian authorities. This prompted Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to call on Saudi Arabia to apologize to the “Muslim world” and Iran. Ayatollah Khamenei also accused Riyadh of not fulfilling its obligations in returning the bodies of the Iranian pilgrims, and behaving “maliciously.” He further warned, “The slightest disrespect to tens of thousands of Iranian pilgrims in Mecca and Medina as well as the Saudi government’s refusal to fulfill its duties with regard to the transfer of the pure corpses [of those killed during the hajj] will elicit a harsh and tough reaction from Iran.”

Meanwhile, upon the Oct. 3 return of the bodies of 104 Iranian pilgrims, President Hassan Rouhani issued an additional warning. He said, “So far, our language has been one of brotherhood. When necessary, we have used the language of diplomacy; however, if needed, the language of authority will be used as well.”

Indeed, on the very same day, Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), said, “The IRGC has prepared all its possible potentials in order to fulfill the will of the great leader of the Islamic Revolution and make the Saudi dynasty answer for the crimes it committed in Mina and restore the rights of the victims. We are ready and are awaiting orders.” Jafari added, “The Muslim World is tired of the Saudis’ betrayals and ignorance, which reminds us of Abu Lahab, including the massacre of the people of Yemen, displacement of the poor people of Syria, repression of the people of Bahrain, ethnic massacres in Iraq, creation of ethnic tension and support of terrorism. The Saudis shall melt in the anger of the Muslims.”

Lastly, former IRGC Cmdr. Mohsen Rezaei, who is also adviser to Ayatollah Khamenei, warned Riyadh, “Don’t play with fire, because the fire will burn you … don’t follow the example of Saddam [Hussein], who in the middle of the Iraq-Iran War had no way out.”

In response, Saudi Arabia has accused Iran of playing politics with the stampede. “I think the Iranians should think of more productive activities than to play politics with a tragedy that has befallen those people who were performing their most sacred religious duty,” Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir told the UN General Assembly. Mindful of the increasingly hostile rhetoric, the question arises of what the “harsh and tough reaction” that Iran has warned of could potentially constitute.

In general, harsh reaction translates into military action. Iran has just finished its negotiations with the six world powers over its nuclear program, and thus considers itself to be in a stronger position. Separately, Iran also assesses that Saudi Arabia is in a desperate situation in Yemen. Therefore, in the case of a possible military confrontation with Saudi Arabia, there are several scenarios that Tehran could consider:

    • A ground campaign. For this kind of campaign to be possible, Iran would need to cross both Iraq and Kuwait. Neither of these countries will allow Iran to enter their territory in order to attack Saudi Arabia. Therefore, this option is not on the table. In addition, such a military campaign requires a large and well-equipped army as well as logistical, financial and economic abilities enjoyed by a superpower. Iran is only considered a mid-level power in the region. There is also the historical example of the US reaction to Iraq’s 1991 invasion of Kuwait for Iran to consider.

 

    • A naval campaign. This would mean that Iran has to travel a distance of 200 miles to reach the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia. Such a campaign is impossible considering the Iranian armed forces’ lack of strategic depth vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia, as the latter has the advantage of controlling the sea from land.

 

    • Supporting allies in proxy wars. This would mean that Iran will, more determinedly than ever, support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in his fight against opposition forces. Tehran would also support Hezbollah against pro-Saudi elements of the Lebanese government, as well as in Israel, and the Houthis in Yemen. Of course, while supporting Hezbollah and Assad is possible and easy, it is more difficult to give military support to the Houthis since Yemen is under naval blockade. Moreover, UN Resolution 2216 forbids provision of military support to the Houthis. Iran can, however, achieve this goal via smugglers and private contractors.

 

    • Restricting Saudi access to the Strait of Hormuz. Considering Iran’s familiarity with the Strait of Hormuz and the military advantages that it enjoys in this regard, this option is possible. The problem, however, is that this scenario can lead to a battle of tankers, as it did toward the end of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. Indeed, Saudi ships could be prompted to raise a third party flag. In addition, this scenario will give an excuse to world powers to increase their military presence in the Persian Gulf, which runs counter to Iran’s objectives.

 

    • Destroying the bridge that connects Saudi Arabia to Bahrain. The King Fahd Causeway, which is 25 kilometer (15.5 miles) long, was used for the first time in December 1986. If the bridge is destroyed by high-explosives missiles from the air, the Saudi military support for Bahrain is likely to decrease, which will in turn weaken the Bahraini regime. If such an attack is carried out, and Iran at the same time manages to provide opposition groups in Bahrain with logistic and military support, the Bahraini regime is likely to collapse. However, considering that the United States maintains a military presence in Bahrain, it is not possible for Iran to conduct a direct military campaign against Bahrain.

 

    • Supporting the Shiite population of Qatif, in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, with the condition that in case of receiving military and logistic support, the Shiites of Saudi Arabia will rebel with the aim of toppling the Saudi government. Considering that Saudi Arabia has built a very long wall on its border with Iraq, and also considering the distance between the Shiite-inhabited region of Saudi Arabia and Iran, this is hardly a probable option. In addition, there are doubts about whether Saudi Shiites will in fact rebel against their government if provided with such support.

 

  • Firing missiles at Saudi Arabia. As Iran is equipped with multiple types of missiles, it can hit a variety of targets inside Saudi Arabia. Since Saudi Arabia does not have the necessary infrastructure for an effective air defense, such as an Iron Dome, an Iranian missile attack will be effective. The problem, however, is that in such a scenario, Saudi Arabia and its allies will destroy Iran’s oil infrastructure in retaliation.

Considering the options above, and existing limitations, any “harsh” response on the part of Iran will likely be limited to options three through six above. Of course, in case of any kind of confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, all the Arab states of the Persian Gulf — minus Oman — and more than likely the United States and Israel, will offer their complete support to Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, as history has shown, a country’s desire to start a military campaign is not always logical. Iran might decide that no matter what, it must launch a military campaign against Riyadh in order to punish Saudi Arabia. It is therefore more beneficial, for both Iran and Saudi Arabia, to solve their problems via diplomatic means. However, the current exchange of harsh words between Saudi and Iranian officials shows that the situation will either get critical, or the current cold war will continue.

 

Categories: Foreign policy, Iran, Iran - Middle East, Iran military, Iran scam, Israel, Khamenei, Middle East, Obama - Middle East, Obama's affinity for Iran, Obama's America, Obama's legacy, Russia - Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Saudi military, Saudi royal family
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What’s Obama’s Next Move on Israel?

October 9, 2015

What’s Obama’s Next Move on Israel? Commentary Magazine, , October 9, 2015

(On the other hand, Obama may concentrate on global smarming and bypassing Congress on gun control. — DM)

new-obama

The reasoning behind America’s supine reaction to Russian intervention in Syria is no mystery. It is a clear reflection of President Obama’s longstanding desire to withdraw from the Middle East, as well as his commitment to détente with Iran. Since the Iranians are hoping the Russian forces can do what Hezbollah and Iranian volunteers failed to accomplish in the last few years — destroy Bashar Assad’s opposition — it is hardly surprising that the U.S. would decide to shrug at this nightmarish reversal of fortune for American interests. But that doesn’t mean the president likes being upstaged by Russian President Vladimir Putin. The question for the White House now is how to seize back the initiative on the world stage in a manner better suited to President Obama’s sensibilities. The recent surge of Palestinian terror attacks on Israelis may provide the answer. Though the administration has its hands full with foreign crises right now, it may be that Obama’s answer to Russian adventurism will be a return to the dead in the water peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. Instead of stronger efforts to make good on his promise to destroy ISIS, he may prefer another go at hammering Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.

As late as only a couple of weeks ago, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians didn’t seem to be on the White House’s front burner. To judge by his recent speech at the United Nations General Assembly, President Obama was done with the Israel-Palestinian peace process. For the first time since he became president, Obama didn’t mention the topic once in his annual UN address. With Russia waging war in Syria, the U.S. is unable to do much about ISIS and the region in chaos. The notion that the carnage and suffering that had spread across the Middle East has anything to with Israel or the Palestinians is ludicrous. So it was little surprise that the president preferred to use his address to boast of the dubious virtues of his nuclear deal with Iran than to spout his standard lines about Israel needing to take risks for the sake of a peace process that wasn’t going anywhere.

Indeed, the scheduled meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu next month was seen as an opportunity to repair the alliance that was damaged by the debate over Iran rather than another chance for Obama to renew his longstanding feud with the Israeli leader. Though Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas’s farcical declaration at the UN that the Oslo Accords no longer bound him fell flat, the outbreak of a wave of Palestinian terror directed at Israelis has put that issue back in the news. The administration’s studious neutrality about the recent violence in spite of the incitement from the Palestinian Authority that has stoked the bloodshed has helped to further isolate Israel. The intractable nature of the conflict and the Palestinians’ obvious lack of interest in peace would deter a wiser man than Obama. But the need to do something to assert American influence, or at least get some attention, could prompt the president to use what may be the start of a third intifada to unleash Secretary of State John Kerry and begin a new round of pointless negotiations.

Why would the administration expend what is left of its diminishing political capital for another round of Netanyahu-bashing that would almost certainly do nothing to advance the cause of peace?

The first thing to remember about this president is never to underestimate either the strength of his obsessions or his willingness to hold onto grudges.

President Obama is a man who has learned nothing in his seven years in office. He arrived at the White House determined to foster engagement with Iran and create more daylight between the U.S. and Israel, and convinced that Netanyahu’s Likud was not to his taste. Nothing that has happened in the intervening years has altered his opinion about any of this.

Part of it is rooted in a genuine belief that the only way to solve the Israel-Palestinian conflict is to put sufficient pressure on the Israelis to make concessions. That fits in nicely with his equally sincere conviction that the United States must concentrate its efforts on reaching out to the Muslim and Arab worlds rather than reinforcing the alliance with Israel, which he and advisors like Susan Rice see as an impediment to U.S. interests.

The failure of every previous attempt to foster peace has not influenced the president’s opinion. No matter how many times the Palestinian leadership says no to Israeli offers of peace or incites their people to religious-based violence — as Abbas is currently doing — Obama still thinks that the key to success will be more Israel-bashing.

However, just as important as his faith in pressure on Israel is his animus for Netanyahu. The president’s defining characteristic in office is his arrogant belief in his own superior intellect and Netanyahu’s stubborn refusal to bow to Obama’s demands irritates him in a way that can only be described as disproportionate. As State Department veteran and former Obama staffer Dennis Ross describes in his new book that was excerpted yesterday in Politico, Obama and Susan Rice were so offended by possible Israeli opposition to the Iran deal that they kept Netanyahu in the dark about the talks with Tehran and then spread canards about his dissent being rooted in racism.

It would make political sense for Obama and the Democratic Party for the president to forget about his feud with Netanyahu,  but that isn’t likely to happen. That’s especially true since the prime minister used his own UN speech to reiterate his criticisms of the Iran deal, something that was likely to drive Obama straight up the White House walls even though that’s a fight he’s already won.

Lastly, a new peace process push would let Obama preen on the international stage in a way that he likes. The president disdains and even mocks Putin’s muscular approach to international affairs, even though Russia’s advances come at America’s expense. But he really thinks that moves like appeasing Iran or putting Israel in its place enhance his prestige. That this is dangerous nonsense that only undermines American credibility seems never to occur to him.

The ultimate outcome of any new push for peace with the Palestinians is a foreordained conclusion. Neither Abbas nor his Hamas rivals are willing to recognize the legitimacy of a Jewish state, no matter where its borders might be drawn. Moreover, the violence that Abbas has incited in order to compete with Hamas may not be so easily kept in check. American neutrality about Abbas’ double game in which he stokes hatred with one hand and seeks to restrain it with the other may serve to only make the situation even more dangerous. Instead of allowing the president to claim that the U.S. is a force for peace, more pressure on Israel will just add to the toll of suffering in Iraq and Syria, that Obama’s misguided policies have created.

 

Categories: Abbas, Foreign policy, Iran scam, Israel, Middle East, Netanyahu, Obama - Middle East, Obama and Israel, Obama's affinity for Iran, Obama's affinity for Islam, Obama's America, Obama's foreign failures, Obama's legacy, Palestinian Authority, Palestinian heroes, Palestinians, Putin, Russia - Middle East, Two state solution
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