Kerry: I never even discussed ‘anytime, anywhere’ inspections of Iran, Washington Free Beacon via You Tube, July 19, 2015
(Our “unique ability” to get the U.N. Security Council to force inspections and reinstate sanctions? Any such effort would almost certainly be vetoed by one or more Security Council members. — DM)
Iran’s supreme leader vows to continue anti-US policies, Ynet News, July 18, 2015
(Please see also, Back in Tehran… Khamenei adds red lines, Rouhani tries to resign, Jaafari hints at “fait accompli” soon. The linked July 12th DEBKAfile article claims that when Rouhani asked Khamenei to back off from some of his “red lines” and threatened to resign as president if he did not, Khamenei reminded him of the unpleasant fates of other presidents who had resigned. He and two other hard liners, Defense Minister Hosseim Dehqan and Revolutionary Guards chief Mohammad Ali Jaafari, told Rouhani
in the stiffest terms that Tehran must not on any account bow to international pressure for giving up its nuclear program or the development of ballistic missiles.
Although Iran got just about everything it wanted, and forfeited nothing of substance, it remains possible that Iran will reject the “deal” as soon as sanctions are lifted and can not “snap back.”
In addition, please see Into the fray: Iran- Reaping the storm that Barack sowed…, contending that Obama’s affinity for Islam has much to do with the “deal.”– DM)
“If any of our security officials or members of parliament approve or denounce the deal before fully scrutinizing it, they will regret it,” Revolutionary Guard commander and head of Iran’s Basij organization, Mohammad Reza Naghdi told the Fars news agency on Friday.
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Ayatollah Khamenei calls on country’s legislators to examine nuclear deal carefully before deciding whether to approve it, implying the accord has yet to win definitive backing in Tehran.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei withheld his verdict on Iran’s nuclear deal on Saturday but in a fiery address vowed enduring opposition to the United States and its Middle East policies, saying Washington sought Iran’s ‘surrender’.
In an speech at a Tehran mosque punctuated by chants of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel”, Khamenei said he wanted politicians to examine the agreement to ensure national interests were preserved, as Iran would not allow the disruption of its revolutionary principles or defensive abilities.
An arch conservative with the last word on high matters of state, Khamenei repeatedly used the phrase “whether this text is approved or not”, implying the accord has yet to win definitive backing from Iran’s factionalized political establishment.
Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei (Photo: AP)
“Whether the deal is approved or disapproved, we will never stop supporting our friends in the region and the people of Palestine, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain and Lebanon. Even after this deal our policy towards the arrogant US will not change,” he said.
Under the agreement reached on Tuesday, sanctions will be gradually removed in return for Iran accepting long-term curbs on a nuclear program that the West has suspected was aimed at creating a nuclear bomb. Iran denies it seeks a nuclear bomb.
Khamenei’s combative remarks about US policies in the Middle East may sit awkwardly with a diplomatic offensive Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif plans in coming days in the wake of the deal.
‘Insult’
Iran regards its nuclear program as an emblem of national dignity and dynamism in the face of what it sees as decades of hostility from Western countries that opposed its 1979 Islamic revolution.
Khamenei did not echo criticisms of the deal made on Friday by a top cleric, Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Movahedi Kermani, who said in an address broadcast on radio that it reflected excessive demands by world powers that were an “insult”.
But Khamenei’s remarks radiated a broad mistrust of US intentions, claiming that successive American presidents had sought Iran’s “surrender”, and declaring that if war broke out America would come off worst, nursing “a broken head”.
“The Americans say they stopped Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon,” Khamenei said.
“They know it’s not true. We had a fatwa (religious ruling), declaring nuclear weapons to be religiously forbidden under Islamic law. It had nothing to do with the nuclear talks.”
Anti-US and anti-Israel displays at al-Quds Day commemorations in Tehran (Photo: AFP)
Later on Saturday, the Supreme Leader praised Iranian negotiators who thrashed out the accord in marathon negotiations in Vienna.
“During the nuclear talks, we saw the Americans’ dishonesty over and over, but fortunately our officials fought back and in some cases showed revolutionary reactions,” Khamenei said during meetings with senior Iranian officials and ambassadors from several Muslim states, according to his official website.
But his remarks on Saturday did not shed light on Iran’s procedures for ratifying the accord, which are not known in any detail. Zarif will brief parliament on July 21, Iranian media have said, and the agreement will also be examined by the National Security Council, the country’s highest security body.
Zarif, who plans to visit several countries in the region, told fellow Muslim countries on Friday that Iran hoped the accord could pave the way for more cooperation in the Middle East and internationally.
In a message to Islamic and Arab countries on the Eid al-Fitr holiday at the end of Ramadan, Zarif said: “By solving the artificial crisis about its nuclear program diplomatically, a new opportunity for regional and international cooperation has emerged.”
‘Real terrorists’
Khamenei maintained that the Islamic Republic’s policies in the region would continue to defy the United States, and the nuclear deal was an exceptional instance of dialogue.
“We have repeatedly said we don’t negotiate with the US on regional or international affairs; not even on bilateral issues. There are some exceptions like the nuclear program that we negotiated with the Americans to serve our interests.”
He said US policies in the region were “180 degrees” opposed to Iran’s policies.
“The Americans dub the Lebanese resistance terrorists and regard Iran as a supporter of terrorism because of its support for the Lebanese Hezbollah, while the Americans themselves are the real terrorists who have created Islamic State and support the wicked Zionists,” Khamenei said.
Several Gulf Arab states have long accused Tehran of interference, alleging financial or armed support for political movements in several countries including Bahrain, Yemen and Lebanon. Shi’ite power Iran denies interference but vows undimmed support for the Syrian and Iraqi governments, who are both fighting insurgencies by a variety of Sunni armed groups.
Prominent conservatives have largely kept silent on the deal. Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior advisor to Khamenei, did not mention the agreement in his Eid al-Fitr message.
“If any of our security officials or members of parliament approve or denounce the deal before fully scrutinizing it, they will regret it,” Revolutionary Guard commander and head of Iran’s Basij organization, Mohammad Reza Naghdi told the Fars news agency on Friday.
Into the fray: Iran- Reaping the storm that Barack sowed…, Jerusalem Post, MARTIN SHERMAN,July 16, 2015
Map of Middle East. (photo credit:Courtesy)
It is through this Islamo-philic prism that the Obama administration’s attitude to, and execution of, its foreign policy must be evaluated – including its otherwise incomprehensible capitulation this week on Iran’s nuclear program.
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Obama is the first US president who genuinely conceives of Islam as not inherently opposed to American values or interests.
You’re absolutely right that John McCain has not talked about my Muslim faith – Barack Hussein Obama to ABC’s George Stephanopoulos, September 7, 2008
I also know that Islam has always been a part of America’s story – Barack Hussein Obama, Cairo, June 4, 2009
Islam has always been part of America – Barack Hussein Obama, the White House, August 11, 2010
Islam has been woven into the fabric of our country since its founding – Barack Hussein Obama, the White House, February 18, 2015
A question of cultural affinity?
It is through this Islamo-philic prism that the Obama administration’s attitude to, and execution of, its foreign policy must be evaluated – including its otherwise incomprehensible capitulation this week on Iran’s nuclear program.
Almost two years ago, I wrote a column titled, “Will the West withstand the Obama presidency?” (11/28/2013). In it I warned: “For anyone who understands that the US Constitution is not a Shari’a-compliant document…
it should be alarmingly apparent that the Obama incumbency is a dramatic and disturbing point of inflection in the history of America and its Western allies… whose political practices and societal norms are rooted in Judeo-Christian foundations in a cultural rather than in any religious sense.”
There is little alternative explanation to account for the metamorphosis that has taken place in how the US has approached resolving the impasse with Tehran, as starkly laid out by two former secretaries of state, Henry Kissinger and George Shultz.
In a Wall Street Journal opinion piece, “The Iran Deal and Its Consequences” (April 7), they note that the negotiation has been turned “on its head.” As they point out: “For 20 years, three presidents of both major parties proclaimed that an Iranian nuclear weapon was contrary to American and global interests – and that they were prepared to use force to prevent it. Yet negotiations that began 12 years ago as an international effort to prevent an Iranian capability to develop a nuclear arsenal are ending with an agreement that concedes this very capability.”
Risible inspection mechanism
Even before the specifics of the risible inspection mechanism, which one Israeli minister aptly described as “worse than worthless,” Kissinger and Shultz laid out the difficulties that would render any extended inspection endeavor ineffective: “In a large country with multiple facilities and ample experience in nuclear concealment, violations will be inherently difficult to detect.”
With considerable prescience, they warn: “Devising theoretical models of inspection is one thing. Enforcing compliance, week after week, despite competing international crises and domestic distractions, is another. Any report of a violation is likely to prompt debate over its significance – or even calls for new talks with Tehran to explore the issue.
Envisaging the problems likely to arise in enforcing any agreement, they caution: “Compounding the difficulty is the unlikelihood that breakout will be a clear-cut event.
More likely it will occur… via the gradual accumulation of ambiguous evasions. When inevitable disagreements arise over the scope and intrusiveness of inspections, on what criteria are we prepared to insist and up to what point? If evidence is imperfect, who bears the burden of proof? What process will be followed to resolve the matter swiftly?”
Reminiscent of taqiya?
But even without the daunting generic difficulties described by Kissinger and Shultz, the inspection mechanism provided for in the nascent deal make a mockery of Obama’s contention (July 14): “… this deal is not built on trust; it is built on verification,” and, “Because of this deal, inspectors will also be able to access any suspicious location… [They] will have access where necessary, when necessary.”
One can hardly imagine a more grossly misleading representation of the deal – so much so that it is difficult not to find it strongly reminiscent of the Muslim tactic of taqiya (the religiously sanctioned deception of non-Muslims).
Indeed, immediately following the announcement of the agreement, Ben Rhodes, Obama’s deputy national security adviser, made a stunning admission to CNN’s Erin Burnett. Starkly contradicting the president’s contention of “access where necessary, when necessary,” Rhodes conceded, “We never sought in this negotiation the capacity for so-called anytime, anywhere,” which is diametrically opposed to the impression he conveyed in April this year when queried on this issue.
You couldn’t make this stuff up
For as it turns out, it provides the Iranians with ample warning of impending inspections on any suspected violation, and ample ability to forestall the definition of any given suspicious event as a possible violation.
Thus in the case of a suspected infringement in any undisclosed (to the international community) site, the Iranians will have at least 24 days’ notice. Moreover, inspectors will not be able to conduct surprise visits but will be required to “provide Iran the basis for such concerns and request clarification.” No kidding!!! But wait, there’s more.
If Iran’s explanations do not adequately assuage international concerns, inspectors “may request access to such locations” to make sure no illicit activity has occurred. But first they need to “provide Iran the reasons for access in writing and will make available relevant information.” You can’t make this stuff up.
But here’s the kicker: Should the Iranians and the inspectors prove unable to “reach satisfactory arrangements,” Tehran will resolve any concerns “through necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA.” If there is still no agreement two weeks after the initial inquiry is filed, the crisis will be resolved by vote in the so-called Joint Commission – consisting of the six world powers, a representative of EU and – wait for it – Iran.
Like warning drug dealers of a bust
Astonishingly, nearly all the decisions of the Joint Commission, tasked with overseeing/ administering the implementation of the deal, are to be made by consensus – which in effect gives Iran veto power over them. In the case of inspection access, it is sufficient for two of its eight members (say China and Russia) to abstain for Iran to block any decision it dislikes.
It is thus difficult to dispute Benjamin Netanyahu’s characterization of the deal during his address in the Knesset when he likened it to giving drug dealers notice of an impending raid: “It’s like giving a criminal organization that deals drugs a 24-day warning before inspecting its drug lab.”
But worse – the deal requires the international inspectors to expose the sources of intelligence that lead to the detection of the possible infringement – thereby virtually ensuring the termination of their effectiveness.
As Netanyahu remarked: “The agreement also requires the world powers to… show Iran the very intelligence for which they want to conduct the inspections in the first place.”
It is possible that all this could be nothing more than mind-boggling incompetence and blatant lack of foresight? Or are these glaring loopholes the reflection of intent.
Devil not in details
After all, the more you think about the unenforceable, unverifiable agreement just concocted in Vienna, the more implausible it seems. As Alan Dershowitz points out in a Jerusalem Post opinion piece this week, “The devil is not so much in the details as in the broad outlines of this deal.”
Rather than the detailed minutiae of the deal, it is its deeply flawed overall structure that makes it so difficult to comprehend – unless the motives for its conclusion are reexamined.
For unless one is imbued with the child-like naiveté to believe that the tyrannical clergy who head the totalitarian theocracy in Tehran, on seeing their defiant intransigence vindicated and having vast additional resources placed at their disposal, will suddenly change their worldview, the picture of emerging realities is decidedly bleak and bewildering.
The spectacle unfolding before us is almost incomprehensible by any rational criterion.
Virtually the entire developed world, led by the only superpower on the planet, has for all intents and purposes conceded a legitimized path to weaponized nuclear status for a fanatical fundamentalist regime, ideologically bent on the destruction of America and its allies, and a major proliferator of terrorism, committed to attaining regional hegemony at the expense of relatively pro-Western governments.
Despite dwarfing Iran in terms of military might, economic wealth, physical size and population, Tehran’s interlocutors have provided it with vast resources to enormously enhance its nefarious pursuits across the region and beyond.
The New Middle East: Conflicts on steroids
The ominous consequences are not difficult to foresee.
As Ariel Ben Solomon, the Post’s Middle East correspondent, wrote in a recent report, “Iran deal to see Middle East conflicts go on steroids,” “A stronger Iran will translate into a more robust Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthi movement in Yemen, and Shi’ite forces in Iraq and Syria, and increasing sectarian strife fueled by Shi’ite minorities or Iranian agents throughout the Arab world.” (July 16) There is precious little reason for believing any other outcome is plausible.
In a July 15 interview, New Jersey Democrat Sen. Bob Menendez lamented another aspect of the deal, relating to easing restrictions on conventional weapons to Iran: “When you lift the arms embargo to a country that is the major sponsor of… terrorism in the world and is already destabilizing the region in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria [and] Iraq, to give them – after they are going to get $100 billion-150b. in economic relief – the opportunity to buy conventional weapons and improve their missile technology doesn’t seem to me to be in the national interest of the United States.”
The intriguing question is, of course, does this seem to President Obama to be in the national interest of the United States? And if so, why so? If so, how so?
‘No alternative’: A mindless mendacious mantra
The almost Pavlovian response of the apologists for the Iran deal is that its critics have not offered a feasible alternative. This is a claim – for want of a better word – so feeble that it barely merits a response.
As Sen. Menendez points out: “We never tested the proposition that dismantling elements of Iran’s illicit nuclear infrastructure was possible. It is pretty hard for me to believe that the world powers, sitting on one side of the table, the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany and the European Union looking at the Iranians… suffering under staggering sanctions… and falling oil prices couldn’t get a deal that eliminated some of that infrastructure.”
Rebutting John Kerry’s claim that such a goal was achievable only in “a world of fantasy,” Menendez retorted, “I don’t know that that is a ‘world of fantasy.’ Isn’t it possible with all the world on one side of the table, and Iran reeling with economic challenges, that you couldn’t have done better as relates to eliminating that nuclear infrastructure.”
Of course if the underlying assumption is that alternatives are only feasible if Iran deigns to accept them, then the apologists may be right. However, if the rationale were not to accommodate the ayatollahs, but to coerce them, the alternative is clear: Enhanced sanctions backed by the credible threat of military action aimed at destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities and their attendant infrastructure.
Arab arms race or Arab client states
But despite the overwhelming preponderance of power in their favor, the US and its Western allies seem to have forsworn the use of force, or even the credible specter thereof. As Kissinger and Shultz remark: “The threat of war now constrains the West more than Iran.”
This will clearly have a devastating impact on both friend and foe in the region.
It will destroy the confidence of US allies who will therefore be compelled to either acquire their own appropriate arsenals, as they can no longer rely on America for their security, or to become compliant client states of a hegemonic Iran.
For Iran it sends an equivocal message that it can violate the terms of the deal with impunity – for if what it encountered at Vienna is all the West can throw at it, what does it have to fear? There can be little doubt that what happened in Vienna this week has shredded America’s standing in the Middle East.
Some might even suspect that that was the purpose of the exercise.
Khamenei vs. Rouhani: Projecting Very Different Views on the Nuclear Deal, World Affairs Journal, Mehdi Khalaji, July 16, 2015
(If Khamenei reneges on the deal, it will likely be impossible to “snap back” the sanctions. With improved Russian rockets, an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities will be much more difficult.– DM)
In the United States, the same political body that was in charge of negotiating with Iran is also in charge of implementing the agreement. But in Iran, the president and his negotiators have little authority over foreign policy, the nuclear program, or military activities.
If [Khamenei] decides to stop implementing the deal in the next year or so, he would likely blame the West or the negotiating team for cutting such a deal, as he did in 2003 and 2004. His initial reaction to the new agreement has already sent discouraging signals about Iran’s willingness to comply with its commitments in the long term.
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The Supreme Leader’s initial reaction has sent discouraging signals about Iran’s willingness to comply with its commitments in the long term.
As expected, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s reaction to the nuclear deal was utterly different from that of President Hassan Rouhani. Right after the agreement was announced on July 14, Rouhani appeared on state television and praised the outcome. Yet when he and other officials visited Khamenei’s home a few hours later, the Supreme Leader did not say anything about the deal apart from a few lines thanking the negotiators. This reticence signaled to hardliners that they should increase their attacks on the agreement.
On July 15, in order to protect himself against these critics, Rouhani told the cabinet that Khamenei was “carefully following up” on the details of the final negotiations and “had meticulous supervision” over the process, to the point where the Supreme Leader “truly undertook much heavier responsibility in this regard” than any other official. But even this did not help him much. On July 14, Rouhani sent Khamenei a letter reporting on the deal’s results, but the Supreme Leader delayed his response by a day in order to show his lack of excitement about it. The letter thanked Khamenei for his “intelligent guidance and perpetual and explicit support to the negotiating team,” who “could successfully implement all policies determined by the Supreme Leader and respect redlines set” by him. Khamenei’s delayed answer — hardly a third as long as the president’s letter — avoided any wording that might indicate his total satisfaction with the accord, his direct role in the negotiations, or his responsibility for the deal. Instead he wrote, “The text needs to be studied carefully and go through the predicted legal process. Then, if it is approved, it needs to be protected against potential violations of the deal by the other party.”
Khamenei also failed to mention who should approve the deal. Rouhani’s team and the hardliners are currently in the midst of a hot dispute about whether that responsibility lies with the Majlis or the Supreme National Security Council. The hardliners insist on parliament, arguing that all international agreements should be adopted by the legislative branch of the government. Yet Rouhani’s team says that only the Supreme Council should review and endorse it. Not coincidentally, the president is the titular head of that council.
SHARP HARDLINER CRITICISM
On July 16, hardliner website Raja News published the third part of an article series titled “Some Aspects of the Deal Which Should Remain Unveiled,” by Ali Akbar Taheri. The article explains how the final deal reached by Rouhani’s negotiating team crosses six different redlines previously set by the Supreme Leader:
The article also downplays Rouhani’s claim about lifting sanctions related to weapons, noting that “these sanctions would be replaced by limits [imposed on Iran’s weapons trade]…[E]very missile that is able to carry a nuclear warhead would be limited, all Shahab missiles and satellite carriers and so on.” In addition, the article claims that Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said the following: “Russia and China wanted weapons sanctions to be lifted, but despite our support the Iranian team itself agreed to continuation of the sanctions for the next five years!”
On July 16, at an event called “The Beginning of the Math Class” (a sarcastic title indicating that the time of verification has begun), hardline analyst Fouad Izadi criticized the deal from a different angle: “If the U.S. Congress rejects the agreement, America would not be bound to implement it, but if Iran implements the agreement, it will lose all leverage.” Izadi, who is close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, went on to claim that in the case of disagreement between Iran and the P5+1, “the arbiter is the UN Security Council,” which means that the United States and other P5+1 members would essentially become the arbiters of their own dispute. “If Iran gets accused of violating the agreement, [these countries] can issue a resolution against it,” he said, but if the United States or another party is so accused, “the Security Council cannot issue a resolution because one of them could just veto it.” He also pointed out that the Majlis should approve the agreement, and that it should condition Iran’s implementation of the deal on U.S. congressional approval, explaining that “the U.S. president will not be in office in nineteen months, and after him the U.S. administration would not be bound by the agreement if Congress disapproves it.”
Also on July 16, the hardline newspaper Kayhan claimed that the largely insignificant financial reaction to the nuclear deal — i.e., no sharp changes in the stock market or exchange rate — shocked those who have been “overexcited” about the negotiations. “People expected the foreign currency rate to drop and the national currency value to go up,” said one article, “and now they ask why the opposite has happened.”
CONCLUSION
In the United States, the same political body that was in charge of negotiating with Iran is also in charge of implementing the agreement. But in Iran, the president and his negotiators have little authority over foreign policy, the nuclear program, or military activities. Instead, those sectors are under the purview of Supreme Leader Khamenei, who is usually reluctant to take any public responsibility for major decisions. Furthermore, he has repeatedly expressed his distrust toward Americans, the West, the UN, and the IAEA. And while he has more or less supported Iran’s negotiators in his public statements, he has clearly sought to distance himself from them as well. If he decides to stop implementing the deal in the next year or so, he would likely blame the West or the negotiating team for cutting such a deal, as he did in 2003 and 2004. His initial reaction to the new agreement has already sent discouraging signals about Iran’s willingness to comply with its commitments in the long term.
Key Nuclear Installations Missing from Iran Deal, Israel National News, Ari Yashar, July 15, 2015
Suspicious activity at Parchin (illustration)Reuters
As experts got a chance to examine the details of the 159-page Iran nuclear deal signed Tuesday, they warned that it ignores various key aspects of the Islamic regime’s nuclear program, and that the lifting of arms sanctions may pave Iran’s path to nuclear-capable missiles.
A glaring omission is seen in the absolute lack of any reference to the highly covert Parchin military base located southeast of Tehran, which is suspected of being the center of Iran’s secret nuclear weapons program, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Iran has admitted to testing exploding bridge wire nuclear detonators at the site, and reports tied the Parchin base to Iran’s nuclear program following a mysterious explosion at the site last October.
IAEA reports in November 2011 pointed to nuclear weapons development previously conducted at the site, and a 2012 IAEA report likewise confirmed explosives containment vessels were at the site and likely used to test nuclear detonations. Satellite photos have shown Iran has been modifying the site, possibly expanding the tests and covering up their existence.
Iran has repeatedly refused IAEA requests to inspect Parchin. IAEA chief Yukiya Amano announced on Tuesday that in addition to the nuclear deal, a “road map” agreement was sealed, by which Iran will disclose military aspects of its nuclear program by October 15.After this, Amano will write an assessment of Iran’s claimed disclosures by December 15 “with a view to closing the issue.”
Amano said the agreement would include a visit to Parchin, but it remains to be seen how much time Iran will have to prepare for such a visit and possibly hide evidence of nuclear tests; Iranian officials rejected last-minute reports that inspections would be allowed at all covert sites.
IAEA roadmap: putting the cart in front of the horse
Thomas Moore, an arms control specialist and staff member of the SenateForeign Relations Committee, told Washington Free Beacon that the IAEA “road map” should have taken place before the nuclear deal, and not after it.
“The IAEA’s resolution of the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program should precede the deal, not by months but by as much time as it takes to verify the absence of Iran’s (past military work), including the full historical picture of its program. And the deal does not do that,” said Moore.
Not only does the deal not directly address military aspects of Iran’s nuclear program, critics warn it contains several loopholes that will greatly limit its effectiveness in stopping Iran’s march to a nuclear weapon.
For one, the agreement calls for Iran’s “voluntary” compliance with the terms of the deal in several places, instead of implementing mandatory steps Iran must fulfill. It also outlines a convoluted bureaucratic process to confront Iranian violations, reports Washington Free Beacon.
What’s more, a section of the deal may allow Iran to avoid revealing its past nuclear weapons testing, stating that Iran “may propose to the IAEA alternative means of resolving the IAEA’s concerns that enable the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) at the location in question.”
The deal also includes removing a large number of sanctions, including those targeting Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI), which operates sites at the Parchin base and is thought to be highly involved in the covert nuclear weapons program.
“Iran can get its first bombs in weeks”
Aside from Parchin, experts were alarmed to see that the nuclear deal does not directly impose limits on or even reference the Russian-made Bushehr nuclear power plant, which they warn can produce enough plutonium for a large number of atomic weapons.
Henry Sokolski, director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, told Washington Free Beacon that Bushehr’s exclusion from the deal was a mistake.
“That reactor can produce enough plutonium for dozens of bombs per year,” warned Sokolski. “Iran could remove the fuel from the reactor and use a small, cheap reprocessing plant to extract plutonium, and get its first bombs in a matter of weeks.”
Regarding plutonium, after 15 years the deal stipulates that Iran will be able to “engage in producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their alloys,” and likewise conduct research and development “on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) metallurgy, or casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium metal.”
At the Natanz nuclear facility, a limitation on 5,060 centrifuges in 30 cascade units will cease in ten years, and after 15 years Iran will be able to enrich uranium over 3.67% – a 20% enrichment is needed to build nuclear weapons. In eight years, Iran can start producing up to 200 partial advanced centrifuges each year, and two years later it can construct complete advanced centrifuges.
Sokolski warned that “ultimately, this is a gamble on Iran not wanting to make bombs. If they really don’t, the deal will work. If they do, the fine print won’t stop them.”
Nuclear-capable missile sanctions lifted
In addition to the details on Iran’s nuclear program, experts warn there are pitfalls in how the deal approaches – or ignores – Iran’s nuclear-capable missile program. Notably the deal avoids addressing Iran’s ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) program.
It also removes sanctions against Iran’s Al Ghadir missile command based in Tehran, which has been leading the development of missiles capable of delivering a nuclear warhead, and is thought to hold operational control of Iran’s missiles.
A UN conventional arms embargo on Iran will end in five years due to the deal, and sanctions against selling ballistic missiles to Iran will likewise expire in eight years. However, it is possible that China and Russia will covertly sell arms to Iran before those dates, as they have done in the past.
Fred Fleitz, who has formerly served as a CIA analyst, State Department arms control official, and House Intelligence Committee staff member, told Washington Free Beacon that these facets of the deal will allow Iran to arm itself freely.
“Language on lifting conventional arms and missile embargoes is very weak,” stated Fleitz.
“The IAEA simply has to certify that Iran isn’t currently engaged in nuclear weapons work to lift these embargoes early. The IAEA will be hard pressed to find evidence of this and will probably issue a report allowing these embargoes to be lifted early,” he concluded.
How Iran describes the nuclear deal, Power Line,
Throughout the negotiation process, Iran’s government has been more forthright and more reliable in characterizing the parties’ interim agreements than the Obama administration. So it is worth noting what the Iranians say the deal entails. This is from FARS, Iran’s news agency:
Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani said his country has achieved all its four goals in the agreement that his foreign minister Zarif signed with the six world powers in Vienna on Tuesday.
President Rouhani said his nation started talks with the world powers in a bid to remove all sanctions while maintaining its nuclear program and nuclear progress as two main goals.
All sanctions, including the financial, banking, energy, insurance, transportation, precious metals and even arms and proliferation sanctions will be, not suspended, but terminated according to the Tuesday agreement as soon as the deal comes into force, he said, adding that Iran will only be placed under certain limited arms deal restrictions for five years.
Meantime, Iran will inject gas into its highly advanced IR8 centrifuge machines, continue its nuclear research and development, and keep its Arak Heavy Water Facility and Fordo and Natanz enrichment plants under the agreement, he said, elaborating on Iran’s gains.
Another goal, Rouhani said, was taking Iran off Chapter Seven of the UN Charter, “and we did it”.
More details on the deal:
The agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), will be presented to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which will adopt a resolution in seven to 10 days making the JCPOA an official document.
Based on the agreement, which has been concluded with due regard for Iran’s red lines, the world powers recognize Iran’s civilian nuclear program, including the country’s right to the complete nuclear cycle.
The UNSC sanctions against the Islamic Republic, including all economic and financial bans, will be lifted at once under a mutually agreed framework and through a new UN resolution.
None of the Iranian nuclear facilities will be dismantled or decomissioned.
Furthermore, nuclear research and development activities on all types of centrifuges, including advanced IR-6 and IR-8 machines, will continue.
The nuclear-related economic and financial restrictions imposed by the United States and the European Union (EU) targeting the Iranian banking, financial, oil, gas, petrochemical, trade, insurance and transport sectors will at once be annulled with the beginning of the implementation of the agreement.
The arms embargo imposed against the Islamic Republic will be annulled and replaced with certain restrictions, which themselves will be entirely removed after a period of five years.
Additionally, tens of billions of dollars in Iranian revenue frozen in foreign banks will be unblocked.
I have now read the agreement in its entirety–you, too, can read it here–and I think the Iranians’ description is accurate. I also agree with what Paul wrote earlier today.
Some aspects of the agreement are technical and can’t be well understood without knowledge of nuclear engineering or the history of various sanctions that have been imposed. But those details are immaterial. Loopholes could make the agreement slightly worse, but no technical interpretation can save it.
The mullahs may cheat on the agreement, or they may not. They may decide to walk away from the agreement at some point and openly develop nuclear weapons, or they may not. It makes very little difference. There are no undertakings in the agreement that go beyond 10 years (in most instances) or 15 years (in a few). The Ayatollah takes the long view: ten or fifteen years are nothing. In the meantime, what does Iran get?
First, and most important, it gets in excess of $100 billion in currently-frozen assets. This will happen in the near future, on or about the agreement’s Implementation Date. I think this prospect is what is making Iran’s leaders so jubilant. With that money, they can step up their support for allies in Syria, Yemen and Iraq, and their support for terrorism everywhere. (By way of perspective, the entire United States military budget for the current fiscal year is only $560 billion.) To the extent that they spend some of it at home, it will help cement their position domestically.
Second, the agreement grants Iran international legitimacy. Since the revolution of 1979 and the seizure of America’s embassy in Tehran, Iran has been treated as a rogue state. Under the agreement, that status comes to an end. Investment in Iran will be permitted and likely will flourish. Sanctions will be removed and Iran’s nuclear program will not only be tolerated, it will be explicitly recognized and to some degree supported by the international community. The agreement contemplates that upon implementation, “the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any other non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT [non-proliferation treaty].” It is hard to overstate how important this legitimacy is to the regime.
The third benefit to Iran’s rulers is perhaps the most important, and is closely linked to the first two. The agreement guarantees that, at least for the foreseeable future, the mullahs will remain in power. Realistically, the only way Iran could be denied a nuclear arsenal in the long term is through regime change. Early in the Obama administration, that seemed like a plausible scenario, but the administration declined to aid, or even encourage, anti-regime forces when such support might have made a difference. Now, with the mullahs both flush with cash and blessed with international legitimacy, their grip on power is probably stronger than ever. Nuclear weapons will follow, sooner or later, at a time of the regime’s choosing. And in the meantime, Iran’s ability to make mischief in the Middle East and around the world (e.g., through its newfound alliance with Venezuela) has been greatly enhanced.
King Barack, Sir John and a great nuke deal — for Iran | Part I, Dan Miller’s Blog, July 14, 2015
(The views expressed in this post are mine and do not necessarily reflect those of Warsclerotic or its other editors. — DM)
Oh what a tangled web we weave, when first we practice to deceive.
Obama has practiced deceit for a long time and His “deal” with Iran demonstrates His consummate mastery of the techniques. Earlier, He announced that the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action would eliminate Iran’s nuke weaponization and that there would be no deal otherwise. As I contended here in January of 2014, He lied. The November 2013 “joint plan of action” contemplated no inspection of any Iranian military or missile site. Quoting from my post linked immediately above,
The text of the English language version of the P5+1 “deal” is available here and the text of the January 16th White House summary of the recent agreement to go forward by reducing sanctions and beginning inspections of some (but not all) Iranian nuclear facilities is available here. I posted articles about the November 24th “deal” here and here and the White House summary here. The first two minutes and eleven seconds of the video embedded below provide a concise summary of what has been happening.
Obama, however, often told us that there would be anywhere, anytime inspections with which Iran could not interfere and which would prevent its development of nuclear weapons.
The “deal” with Iran was announced today, July 14, 2015. The 159 page text of the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” is available here. Here are excerpts from Attachment 1, dealing with IAEA inspections of Iran’s nuke sites:
In line with normal international safeguards practice, such requests will not be aimed at interfering with Iranian military or other national security activities, but will be exclusively for resolving concerns regarding fulfilment of the JCPOA commitments and Iran’s other non-proliferation and safeguards obligations. [Emphasis added.]
. . . .
If the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA cannot be verified after the implementation of the alternative arrangements agreed by Iran and the IAEA, or if the two sides are unable to reach satisfactory arrangements to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the specified locations within 14 days of the IAEA’s original request for access, Iran, in consultation with the members of the Joint Commission, would resolve the IAEA’s concerns through necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA. In the absence of an agreement, the members of the Joint Commission, by consensus or by a vote of 5 or more of its 8 members, would advise on the necessary means to resolve the IAEA’s concerns. The process of consultation with, and any action by, the members of the Joint Commission would not exceed 7 days, and Iran would implement the necessary means within 3 additional days. [Emphasis added.]
Hence, if Iran does not agree to permit inspections within fourteen days of an IAEA request, the dispute will be resolved by majority vote of an eight member committee, including Iran, Russia and China. Should those three vote against an IAEA inspection, as they likely would, it would take all of the other five members to grant the IAEA request. That process “would not exceed 7 days” and then, if a majority (five members) of the committee agreed with the IAEA, Iran would have three additional days to comply. In the unlikely event of a majority vote in favor of the IAEA, Iran would have had twenty-four days to prepare for an inspection. Three days, let alone twenty-four days, would give Iran ample time to eliminate evidence of whatever the IAEA sought. It all boils down to trusting Iran.
As observed here, that amounts to no time, nowhere supervision.
Any deal that scales back sanctions and allows Iran to keep operating its advanced nuclear development facilities even at a low level is a fatal bargain. So warned Simon Henderson of the Washington Institute and Olli Heinonen, a former deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as long as two years ago.
U.S. President Obama’s response to this was to promise that he would accept nothing less than a Western right to conduct “anywhere, anytime” international inspections of Iran’s most secret nuclear and military facilities. [Emphasis added.]
Indeed, veteran investigators have testified in front of Congress literally dozens of times that anywhere-anytime access is a minimum prerequisite to a verifiable deal.
Alas, Obama has now backed down from that. It’s an American collapse.
I have not dealt with other aspects of the “deal” here but plan to do so in Part II.
Joint comprehensive plan of action [PDF], July 14, 2015
(It’s about 150 pages in length, with frequent references to Annex I, dealing with IAEA inspections, which begins at page 21. The part of the annex dealing with IAEA inspections concerning “M. PAST AND PRESENT ISSUES OF CONCERN” starts at page 38; access begins at page 42. It’s complicated and dramatically delays and limits the nature and scope of the inspections, giving Iran ample time to hide its activities. Among other provisions, it includes:
In line with normal international safeguards practice, such requests will not be aimed at interfering with Iranian military or other national security activities, but will be exclusively for resolving concerns regarding fulfilment of the JCPOA commitments and Iran’s other non-proliferation and safeguards obligations.
. . . .
If the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA cannot be verified after the implementation of the alternative arrangements agreed by Iran and the IAEA, or if the two sides are unable to reach satisfactory arrangements to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the specified locations within 14 days of the IAEA’s original request for access, Iran, in consultation with the members of the Joint Commission, would resolve the IAEA’s concerns through necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA. In the absence of an agreement, the members of the Joint Commission, by consensus or by a vote of 5 or more of its 8 members, would advise on the necessary means to resolve the IAEA’s concerns. The process of consultation with, and any action by, the members of the Joint Commission would not exceed 7 days, and Iran would implement the necessary means within 3 additional days.
— DM
Addicted to self-deception, Israel Hayom, Dr. Reuven Berko, July 13, 2015
There is an Arab proverb that says, “What is written on the brow will inevitably be seen by the eye,” meaning that one will inevitably meet one’s destiny.
But the eyes of the West do not see the writing. The negotiators responsible for the talks between Iran and the world powers see the sights and hear the voices, but ignore reality and engage in the wishful thinking of those who sent them to Vienna.
Like failed psychologists, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and his team are managing the negotiations with the unquestionably stubborn Iranians as if they were therapy sessions. The Iranians, following the directives of a cynical ayatollah whispering to them from the wings, are deliberately displaying manic personality shifts, up and down, playing the West like a marionette between hope and despair.
The West watches eagerly as Iran continues to develop its missiles and its nuclear program, as the centrifuges constantly whirl throughout this period of intentional procrastination. World leaders hear the threats of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his band of clerics, who shun the deal and preach the destruction of Israel, while declaring that the Iranian nation’s struggle against the “boastful” United States will continue and that there will be no access to the sites where the bomb is being developed. If that is what the leader thinks, then the masses will follow. And indeed, the Iranian media, defense establishment, and the crowds in the streets of Tehran parade their zealous hatred and their anti-Western incitement as they demand that sanctions be lifted while American and Israeli flags go up in flames.
It appears the leaders in the talks are using “denial” and “repression” as psychological tricks to delude themselves, and not, God forbid, as negotiation tactics to achieve the desired deal from the enemy. These masters of self-deception respond to threatening declarations from Iran’s supreme leader that his country will never giver up its nuclear achievements by saying that it is his way of preparing the masses in Iran for the concessions to come. This is like saying that the harsh and radical comments repeatedly made are simply a way to “vent” the feelings of rage in the Iranian public and are a sign “from above” of the concession of the nuclear project.
Those who have eyes in their heads understand that things are not going well. Lifting the sanctions will swell Iran’s purse, which funds global terrorism, particularly in Syria, Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq, and seeks urgently to import Chinese and Russian weapons. Can the leaders of the negotiations admit that they were mistaken and were led astray by the masters of Iranian diplomacy? Will they be able to take a step back and admit that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was right to call the deal a disaster? Since we are dealing with deception, it appears that Kerry and his staff are trapped in cognitive dissonance of the same sort as a person who buys a beautiful car and then discovers that he has been deceived and the engine is burned out, yet still takes comfort in the fact that the horn works just fine.
From a psychological perspective, this is the line between the impulse for a collective Shiite suicide mission in the name of Allah and the megalomaniacal desire to control the world at the cost of the lives of everyone who opposes. However, in a Persian bazaar, what you see is what you buy. Iran is declaring, planning and working toward destroying every country in the Middle East — especially Israel — with its nuclear program, and no deal with Kerry will change that. Instead of the simple solution — the complete dismantling of the Iranian nuclear program — the West has become addicted to the process of self-deception and procrastination. At least therapy is discreet.
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