Archive for the ‘IAEA’ category

Speaking of the Iran deal (4)

July 21, 2015

Speaking of the Iran deal (4), Power LineScott Johnson, July 21, 2015

Omri Ceren writes to draw attention to Bill Gertz’s Free Beacon article on the ludicrous inspections regime established under the deal with Iran. Omni writes:

Last April – in the immediate days after the Lausanne framework was announced – Obama administration officials assured reporters that it was a good deal because the verification regime would include anytime/anywhere inspections [a][b][c]. Then there was a range of hearings and forums held in early June – which was the lead-up to Vienna – at which IAEA veterans, nuclear experts, and top US intelligence officials confirmed that indeed anytime/anywhere access to suspicious sites was a minimum prerequisite to verifying a deal with Iran [d][e][f][g]).

Then the Vienna talks began and it became clear that the administration would cave to Iranian intransigence on verification. White House validators started trying to convince reporters that technology could be a substitute for robust access [h][i].

Then the talks ended and it was confirmed that Iran will be allowed to block IAEA inspectors for 24 days at a time. The administration is doubling down on the technology talking point and making it mostly about “environmental sampling.” White House communications staffers have begun using the phrase as their two-word answer to any questions about the collapse on inspections. Energy Secretary Moniz repeated it over and over again on last weekend’s Sunday talk shows [j]. White House validators got the hint and have begun invoking it as well yesterday [k]. The argument is that the IAEA’s technology is so good that – even though they have almost a month to destroy evidence – the Iranians could never “sanitize” a site so well that the IAEA couldn’t detect nuclear activity.

There are a couple of reasons why that argument doesn’t hold up.

(1) Diplomatic – Even if the IAEA could detect that *some* kind of nuclear activity had occurred in a sanitized site, the Iranians will have destroyed enough evidence to prevent the agency from determining *what* kind of activity occurred. The goal of verification is not just detection but detection to a sufficient degree that a diplomatic response can be justified. No country is going to be confident enough to blow up the deal without the IAEA being certain that significant cheating had occurred, and being able to explain what it was.

(2) Scientific – It’s just not true. The IAEA’s technology is not good enough. A month isn’t enough time for the Iranians to dismantle a big site like Natanz, but that’s not where they’ll cheat. They’ll cheat in smaller facilities that can be easily dismantled and scrubbed in a couple of weeks. Olli Heinonen – who is the former Deputy Director General of the IAEA, and who worked at the agency for 27 years, and who sat atop its verification shop as head of the Department of Safeguards – explained to reporters today that the Iranians could assemble all the parts they needed for a nuclear bomb in a building that’s just 239 square yards [full article linked above]. And unlike a facility like Natanz, small buildings can in fact be sanitized in 24 days:

Much of this equipment is very easy to move… So you can take it out over the night… and then there is this dispute settlement time which is 24 days – you will use that to sanitize the place, make new floors, new tiles on the wall, paint the ceiling and take out the ventilation… This [nuclear] equipment can be taken out in one or two nights. How long will it take for you to renovate your home? It doesn’t take three weeks… Secretary Kerry has said if there is big installation, 24 days is enough… But there are certain activities where unfortunately in my view, it’s not enough.

This isn’t a theoretical debate. In 2003 the Iranians delayed access to the Kalaye Electric Company for two weeks and completely scrubbed it. They pulled the same trick with the Lashkar Abad laser uranium enrichment plant.

It’s just not true that they can’t dismantle a covert facility in 24 days, and even if it was true they could still dismantle enough to ensure that no country would be confident enough to call them out for cheating.

[a] https://youtu.be/ObV5motay7E?t=1m18s
[b] http://www.timesofisrael.com/top-obama-adviser-dismisses-idea-that-better-iran-deal-is-possible/
[c] http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-04-20/inspectors-need-full-access-in-any-iran-nuclear-deal-moniz-says
[d] http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/062515_Albright_Testimony.pdf
[e] http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/062515_Albright_Testimony.pdf
[f] http://taskforceoniran.org/transcripts/Looming_Deadline_Event.pdf
[g] http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20150610/103582/HHRG-114-FA13-Wstate-FlynnM-20150610.pdf
[h] http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/07/world/middleeast/nuclear-inspectors-await-chance-to-use-modern-tools-in-iran.html
[i] http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/06/the-spy-tech-that-will-keep-iran-in-line.html
[j] http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2015/07/speaking-of-the-iran-deal-2.php
[k] http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/qa-hans-blix-iran-deal-remarkably-far-reaching

Islam, Imam Obama, Sir John of Kerry and a great deal for Iran | Part II

July 20, 2015

(The views expressed in this post are mine, and do not necessarily reflect those of Warsclerotic or its other editors. — DM)
Oh what a tangled web we weave, when first we practice to deceive.

Dealing from the Bottom

The current “deal” is based on a long-standing scam

Part I of this series, published on July 14, 2015, pointed out what should be a glaring consistency in the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” first made available on that date, and the November 24, 2013 Joint Plan of Actionneither provides for any “anytime -anywhere” inspections of Iran’s nuclear weaponization or missile sites. That consistency has been little remarked upon elsewhere.

Secretary Kerry now acknowledges that he never sought such inspections.

Leaving aside the twenty-four day lag between an IAEA request to inspect suspect facilities — which Kerry says is just fine — he claims that we now have a “unique ability” to get the U.N. Security Council to force inspections and reinstate sanctions. However, any effort to do so would almost certainly be vetoed by one or more Security Council members. The permanent members are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States — five of the members of P5+1 which approved the “deal.”

On July 16th, US Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman said,

“I think this is one of those circumstances where we have all been rhetorical from time to time,” Sherman said in a conference call with Israeli diplomatic reporters. “That phrase, anytime, anywhere, is something that became popular rhetoric, but I think people understood that if the IAEA felt it had to have access, and had a justification for that access, that it would be guaranteed, and that is what happened.” [Emphasis added.]

Kerry also claimed that the massive financial boost for Iran resulting from the lifting of sanctions will not enhance Iran’s support for terrorism.

Speaking to the BBC after the nuclear agreement between Iran and six world powers was reached, Kerry said that the more than $100 billion that Iran is set to receive “is going to make all the difference in the world is just – it’s not true.”

Acknowledging Iran is an international player in wreaking terror across the globe, Kerry said, “What Iran has done for years with Hezbollah does not depend on money.” He similarly stated Iran’s support of the Houthi rebels against the government in Yemen has not “depended on money.” [Emphasis added.]

. . . .

In its most recent report, the State Department wrote, “Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Lebanese Hezbollah in Lebanon and has trained thousands of its fighters at camps in Iran.”

In 2010 alone, State reported “Iran provides roughly $100-$200 million per year in funding to support Hezbollah.”

Secretary Kerry is almost certainly wrong, on that as on other aspects of the “deal.”.

Here’s Megan Kelly’s wrap up.

 

Iran may reject the “deal.”

There are at least glimmers of hope that Iran may reject the “deal,” unanimously endorsed by the UN Security council today.

A UN Security Council resolution endorsing Iran’s nuclear deal that passed on Monday is unacceptable, the country’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps commander Mohammed Ali Jafari was quoted as saying by the semi-official Tasnim News Agency.

“Some parts of the draft have clearly crossed the Islamic republic’s red lines, especially in Iran’s military capabilities. We will never accept it,” he was quoted as saying shortly before the resolution was passed in New York. [Emphasis added.]

The Iranian Parliament also has problems with the “deal.”

On Saturday, the Fars News Agency reported that the Majlis threatened to reject the agreement’s provision on ballistic missiles, which call for an international embargo on missile technology to be extended for eight years–a significant, last-minute concession by the U.S.

Iran wants unrestricted ballsitic missile development and access to conventional arms dealers abroad.

“The parliament will reject any limitations on the country’s access to conventional weapons, specially ballistic missiles,” said Tehran MP Seyed Mehdi Hashemi.

. . . .

In addition, the nuclear deal says that the Majlis will ratify the Additional Protocol (AP) to the Non-Proliferation Treaty–but it does not say when.

The AP is the key to long-term monitoring of Iranian nuclear research and development by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Without approval of the AP, Iran may hide key information about its nuclear activity, and may accelerate advanced centrifuge research immediately when the nuclear deal expires, among other hazards. (Even then, its commitments under the AP will be somewhat voluntary.) [Emphasis added.]

. . . .

[W]hile the interim agreement of Nov. 2013 provided that Iran would ratify the AP within one year, there is no such deadline in the final Iran deal. The AP is merely to be applied “provisionally,” while the Majlis decides whether to accept it or not.

Meanwhile, if the Obama administration has its way, the U.S. Congress will have no opportunity to amend the deal–and will have to accept the lifting of international sanctions regardless of whether legislators accept or reject the agreement. [Emphasis added.]

Iranian leadership’s opposition to the “deal” appears to have come from Iran’s Supreme leader and the Iranian Parliament has the authority to reject the “deal.”

As expected, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s reaction to the nuclear deal was utterly different from that of President Hassan Rouhani. Right after the agreement was announced on July 14, Rouhani appeared on state television and praised the outcome. Yet when he and other officials visited Khamenei’s home a few hours later, the Supreme Leader did not say anything about the deal apart from a few lines thanking the negotiators. This reticence signaled to hardliners that they should increase their attacks on the agreement. [Emphasis added.]

America’s Supreme Leader, on the other hand, has been pushing vigorously to force the U.S. Congress to approve it, with no way to change it.

 

The “deal,” and Obama’s foreign policy in general, are rooted in His affinity for Islam

Obama may or may not be a Muslim. However, He thinks very highly of Islam and deems it the “religion of peace.” It would be ironic were Obama’s Iran “deal” to be rejected by Iran.

As observed in a Jerusalem Post article, with the thrust of which I agree, His affinity for Islam is at the root of His “deal.”

Obama is the first US president who genuinely conceives of Islam as not inherently opposed to American values or interests.

. . . .

It is through this Islamo-philic prism that the Obama administration’s attitude to, and execution of, its foreign policy must be evaluated – including its otherwise incomprehensible capitulation this week on Iran’s nuclear program. [Emphasis added.]

. . . .

The inspection mechanism provided for in the nascent deal make a mockery of Obama’s contention (July 14): “… this deal is not built on trust; it is built on verification,” and, “Because of this deal, inspectors will also be able to access any suspicious location… [They] will have access where necessary, when necessary.”

One can hardly imagine a more grossly misleading representation of the deal – so much so that it is difficult not to find it strongly reminiscent of the Muslim tactic of taqiya (the religiously sanctioned deception of non-Muslims). [Emphasis added.]

Indeed, immediately following the announcement of the agreement, Ben Rhodes, Obama’s deputy national security adviser, made a stunning admission to CNN’s Erin Burnett. Starkly contradicting the president’s contention of “access where necessary, when necessary,” Rhodes conceded, “We never sought in this negotiation the capacity for so-called anytime, anywhere,” which is diametrically opposed to the impression he conveyed in April this year when queried on this issue. [Emphasis added.]

In His capacity as America’s Imam in Chief, Obama has consistently claimed that the “religion of peace” has nothing to do with the Islamic State or with Islamic terrorism (of which he claims there is none) — such as the recent murder of four members of the U.S. Marines and one member of the U.S. Navy — committed in the name of Allah. The Daily Beast has posted some of the terrorist’s writings. They include these statements:

“I would imagine that any sane person would devote their time to mastering the information on the study guide and stay patient with their studies, only giving time for the other things around to keep themselves focused on passing the exam,” Abdulazeez wrote. “They would do this because they know and have been told that they will be rewarded with pleasures that they have never seen.”

This life is that test, he wrote, “designed to separate the inhabitants of Paradise from the inhabitants of Hellfire.”

. . . .

“We ask Allah to make us follow their path,” Abdulazeez wrote. “To give us a complete understanding of the message of Islam, and the strength the live by this knowledge, and to know what role we need to play to establish Islam in the world.” [Emphasis added.]

Obama apparently considers the Islamic Republic of Iran to be Islamic — and therefore peaceful — despite its widespread support for its terrorist proxies. That may explain the credence He gives to Supreme Leader Khamenei’s alleged fatwa preventing Iran from obtaining nukes. Obama and Khamenei have frequently referred to it in support of that proposition, although no text been produced. According to a Washington Post article dated November 27, 2013,

Oddly, the Iranian Web site does not provide the text of the original fatwa — and then mostly cites Western news reports as evidence that Khamenei has reiterated it on several occasions. The fatwa does not appear to be written, but in the Shiite tradition equal weight is given to oral and written opinions.

. . . .

Just about every Alfred Hitchcock thriller had what he called a “MacGuffin” — a plot device that gets the action going but is unimportant to the overall story. The Iranian fatwa thus appears to be a diplomatic MacGuffin — something that gives the Americans a reason to begin to trust the Iranians and the Iranians a reason to make a deal. No one knows how this story will end, but just as in the movies, the fatwa likely will not be critical to the outcome. [Emphasis added.]

Even if one believes the fatwa exists — and will not later be reversed — it clearly appears to have evolved over time. U.S. officials should be careful about saying the fatwa prohibits the development of nuclear weapons, as that is not especially clear anymore. The administration’s statements at this point do not quite rise to the level of  earning Pinocchios, but we will keep an eye on this issue. [Emphasis added.]

An April 6, 2015 article at the Middle East Media Research Institute provides additional information.

In March of this year Obama presented a Nowruz message to the people of Iran citing Khamenei’s alleged fatwa. Here’s a video from the White House.

Here are a few interesting excerpts:

“Our negotiations have made progress, but gaps remain,” he said. “And there are people, in both our countries and beyond, who oppose a diplomatic resolution. My message to you—the people of Iran—is that, together, we have to speak up for the future we seek. [Emphasis added.]

“As I have said many times before, I believe that our countries should be able to resolve this issue peacefully, with diplomacy,” Obama said. “Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has issued a fatwa against the development of nuclear weapons, and President Rouhani has said that Iran would never develop a nuclear weapon. [Emphasis added.]

Isn’t that special! Why, in light of the alleged fatwa, does Iranian television broadcast simulations of nuclear attacks on Israel?

A short animated film being aired across Iran, shows the nuclear destruction of Israel and opens with the word ‘Holocaust’ appearing on the screen, underneath which a Star of David is shown, Israel’s Channel 2 reported on Tuesday.

Khamenei’s Death to America rants are considered an excellent reason to have a “deal.”

Similarly, the Reverend Jeremiah Wright was fond of saying “God Damn America.”

Obama apparently understood Khamenei’s words, but perhaps He didn’t understand Jeremiah’s words.

 

Conclusions

Elected on a platform of Hope and Change, Obama has brought us many changes; very few, if any, of those changes provide a basis for hope, at least until He has left office. Some will be difficult, if not impossible, even then to ameliorate. During His remaining time in office, He will continue to do His worst to eliminate any vestigial hope we may have. The “deal” with Iran is only one of the many changes for the worse that He has wrought.

Kerry: I never even discussed ‘anytime, anywhere’ inspections of Iran

July 19, 2015

Kerry: I never even discussed ‘anytime, anywhere’ inspections of Iran, Washington Free Beacon via You Tube, July 19, 2015

(Our “unique ability” to get the U.N. Security Council to force inspections and reinstate sanctions? Any such effort would almost certainly be vetoed by one or more Security Council members. — DM)

 

Iran’s supreme leader vows to continue anti-US policies

July 18, 2015

Iran’s supreme leader vows to continue anti-US policies, Ynet News, July 18, 2015

(Please see also, Back in Tehran… Khamenei adds red lines, Rouhani tries to resign, Jaafari hints at “fait accompli” soon. The linked July 12th DEBKAfile article claims that when Rouhani asked Khamenei to back off from some of his “red lines” and threatened to resign as president if he did not, Khamenei reminded him of the unpleasant fates of other presidents who had resigned. He and two other hard liners, Defense Minister Hosseim Dehqan and Revolutionary Guards chief Mohammad Ali Jaafari, told Rouhani 

in the stiffest terms that Tehran must not on any account bow to international pressure for giving up its nuclear program or the development of ballistic missiles.

Although Iran got just about everything it wanted, and forfeited nothing of substance, it remains possible that Iran will reject the “deal” as soon as sanctions are lifted and can not “snap back.”

In addition, please see Into the fray: Iran- Reaping the storm that Barack sowed…, contending that Obama’s affinity for Islam has much to do with the “deal.”– DM)

 

“If any of our security officials or members of parliament approve or denounce the deal before fully scrutinizing it, they will regret it,” Revolutionary Guard commander and head of Iran’s Basij organization, Mohammad Reza Naghdi told the Fars news agency on Friday.

*****************

Ayatollah Khamenei calls on country’s legislators to examine nuclear deal carefully before deciding whether to approve it, implying the accord has yet to win definitive backing in Tehran.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei withheld his verdict on Iran’s nuclear deal on Saturday but in a fiery address vowed enduring opposition to the United States and its Middle East policies, saying Washington sought Iran’s ‘surrender’.

In an speech at a Tehran mosque punctuated by chants of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel”, Khamenei said he wanted politicians to examine the agreement to ensure national interests were preserved, as Iran would not allow the disruption of its revolutionary principles or defensive abilities.

An arch conservative with the last word on high matters of state, Khamenei repeatedly used the phrase “whether this text is approved or not”, implying the accord has yet to win definitive backing from Iran’s factionalized political establishment.

59219580100388640360noIran’s Ayatollah Khamenei (Photo: AP)

“Whether the deal is approved or disapproved, we will never stop supporting our friends in the region and the people of Palestine, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain and Lebanon. Even after this deal our policy towards the arrogant US will not change,” he said.

Under the agreement reached on Tuesday, sanctions will be gradually removed in return for Iran accepting long-term curbs on a nuclear program that the West has suspected was aimed at creating a nuclear bomb. Iran denies it seeks a nuclear bomb.

Khamenei’s combative remarks about US policies in the Middle East may sit awkwardly with a diplomatic offensive Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif plans in coming days in the wake of the deal.

‘Insult’

Iran regards its nuclear program as an emblem of national dignity and dynamism in the face of what it sees as decades of hostility from Western countries that opposed its 1979 Islamic revolution.

Khamenei did not echo criticisms of the deal made on Friday by a top cleric, Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Movahedi Kermani, who said in an address broadcast on radio that it reflected excessive demands by world powers that were an “insult”.

But Khamenei’s remarks radiated a broad mistrust of US intentions, claiming that successive American presidents had sought Iran’s “surrender”, and declaring that if war broke out America would come off worst, nursing “a broken head”.

“The Americans say they stopped Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon,” Khamenei said.

“They know it’s not true. We had a fatwa (religious ruling), declaring nuclear weapons to be religiously forbidden under Islamic law. It had nothing to do with the nuclear talks.”

61618310100492640360noAnti-US and anti-Israel displays at al-Quds Day commemorations in Tehran (Photo: AFP)

Later on Saturday, the Supreme Leader praised Iranian negotiators who thrashed out the accord in marathon negotiations in Vienna.

“During the nuclear talks, we saw the Americans’ dishonesty over and over, but fortunately our officials fought back and in some cases showed revolutionary reactions,” Khamenei said during meetings with senior Iranian officials and ambassadors from several Muslim states, according to his official website.

But his remarks on Saturday did not shed light on Iran’s procedures for ratifying the accord, which are not known in any detail. Zarif will brief parliament on July 21, Iranian media have said, and the agreement will also be examined by the National Security Council, the country’s highest security body.

Zarif, who plans to visit several countries in the region, told fellow Muslim countries on Friday that Iran hoped the accord could pave the way for more cooperation in the Middle East and internationally.

In a message to Islamic and Arab countries on the Eid al-Fitr holiday at the end of Ramadan, Zarif said: “By solving the artificial crisis about its nuclear program diplomatically, a new opportunity for regional and international cooperation has emerged.”

‘Real terrorists’

Khamenei maintained that the Islamic Republic’s policies in the region would continue to defy the United States, and the nuclear deal was an exceptional instance of dialogue.

“We have repeatedly said we don’t negotiate with the US on regional or international affairs; not even on bilateral issues. There are some exceptions like the nuclear program that we negotiated with the Americans to serve our interests.”

He said US policies in the region were “180 degrees” opposed to Iran’s policies.

“The Americans dub the Lebanese resistance terrorists and regard Iran as a supporter of terrorism because of its support for the Lebanese Hezbollah, while the Americans themselves are the real terrorists who have created Islamic State and support the wicked Zionists,” Khamenei said.

Several Gulf Arab states have long accused Tehran of interference, alleging financial or armed support for political movements in several countries including Bahrain, Yemen and Lebanon. Shi’ite power Iran denies interference but vows undimmed support for the Syrian and Iraqi governments, who are both fighting insurgencies by a variety of Sunni armed groups.

Prominent conservatives have largely kept silent on the deal. Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior advisor to Khamenei, did not mention the agreement in his Eid al-Fitr message.

“If any of our security officials or members of parliament approve or denounce the deal before fully scrutinizing it, they will regret it,” Revolutionary Guard commander and head of Iran’s Basij organization, Mohammad Reza Naghdi told the Fars news agency on Friday.

Into the fray: Iran- Reaping the storm that Barack sowed…

July 18, 2015

Into the fray: Iran- Reaping the storm that Barack sowed…, Jerusalem PostMARTIN SHERMAN,July 16, 2015

ShowImage (3)Map of Middle East. (photo credit:Courtesy)

It is through this Islamo-philic prism that the Obama administration’s attitude to, and execution of, its foreign policy must be evaluated – including its otherwise incomprehensible capitulation this week on Iran’s nuclear program.

********************

Obama is the first US president who genuinely conceives of Islam as not inherently opposed to American values or interests.

You’re absolutely right that John McCain has not talked about my Muslim faith – Barack Hussein Obama to ABC’s George Stephanopoulos, September 7, 2008

I also know that Islam has always been a part of America’s story Barack Hussein Obama, Cairo, June 4, 2009

Islam has always been part of AmericaBarack Hussein Obama, the White House, August 11, 2010

Islam has been woven into the fabric of our country since its founding Barack Hussein Obama, the White House, February 18, 2015

Barack Hussein Obama is the first US president who is explicitly and overtly unmoored, both cognitively and emotionally, from the moorings of America’s founding Judeo-Christian cultural heritage, and who genuinely conceives of Islam as not inherently opposed to American values or American interests.

A question of cultural affinity?

It is through this Islamo-philic prism that the Obama administration’s attitude to, and execution of, its foreign policy must be evaluated – including its otherwise incomprehensible capitulation this week on Iran’s nuclear program.

Almost two years ago, I wrote a column titled, “Will the West withstand the Obama presidency?” (11/28/2013). In it I warned: “For anyone who understands that the US Constitution is not a Shari’a-compliant document…

it should be alarmingly apparent that the Obama incumbency is a dramatic and disturbing point of inflection in the history of America and its Western allies… whose political practices and societal norms are rooted in Judeo-Christian foundations in a cultural rather than in any religious sense.”

There is little alternative explanation to account for the metamorphosis that has taken place in how the US has approached resolving the impasse with Tehran, as starkly laid out by two former secretaries of state, Henry Kissinger and George Shultz.

In a Wall Street Journal opinion piece, “The Iran Deal and Its Consequences” (April 7), they note that the negotiation has been turned “on its head.” As they point out: “For 20 years, three presidents of both major parties proclaimed that an Iranian nuclear weapon was contrary to American and global interests – and that they were prepared to use force to prevent it. Yet negotiations that began 12 years ago as an international effort to prevent an Iranian capability to develop a nuclear arsenal are ending with an agreement that concedes this very capability.”

Risible inspection mechanism

Even before the specifics of the risible inspection mechanism, which one Israeli minister aptly described as “worse than worthless,” Kissinger and Shultz laid out the difficulties that would render any extended inspection endeavor ineffective: “In a large country with multiple facilities and ample experience in nuclear concealment, violations will be inherently difficult to detect.”

With considerable prescience, they warn: “Devising theoretical models of inspection is one thing. Enforcing compliance, week after week, despite competing international crises and domestic distractions, is another. Any report of a violation is likely to prompt debate over its significance – or even calls for new talks with Tehran to explore the issue.

Envisaging the problems likely to arise in enforcing any agreement, they caution: “Compounding the difficulty is the unlikelihood that breakout will be a clear-cut event.

More likely it will occur… via the gradual accumulation of ambiguous evasions. When inevitable disagreements arise over the scope and intrusiveness of inspections, on what criteria are we prepared to insist and up to what point? If evidence is imperfect, who bears the burden of proof? What process will be followed to resolve the matter swiftly?”

Reminiscent of taqiya?

But even without the daunting generic difficulties described by Kissinger and Shultz, the inspection mechanism provided for in the nascent deal make a mockery of Obama’s contention (July 14): “… this deal is not built on trust; it is built on verification,” and, “Because of this deal, inspectors will also be able to access any suspicious location… [They] will have access where necessary, when necessary.”

One can hardly imagine a more grossly misleading representation of the deal – so much so that it is difficult not to find it strongly reminiscent of the Muslim tactic of taqiya (the religiously sanctioned deception of non-Muslims).

Indeed, immediately following the announcement of the agreement, Ben Rhodes, Obama’s deputy national security adviser, made a stunning admission to CNN’s Erin Burnett. Starkly contradicting the president’s contention of “access where necessary, when necessary,” Rhodes conceded, “We never sought in this negotiation the capacity for so-called anytime, anywhere,” which is diametrically opposed to the impression he conveyed in April this year when queried on this issue.

You couldn’t make this stuff up

For as it turns out, it provides the Iranians with ample warning of impending inspections on any suspected violation, and ample ability to forestall the definition of any given suspicious event as a possible violation.

Thus in the case of a suspected infringement in any undisclosed (to the international community) site, the Iranians will have at least 24 days’ notice. Moreover, inspectors will not be able to conduct surprise visits but will be required to “provide Iran the basis for such concerns and request clarification.” No kidding!!! But wait, there’s more.

If Iran’s explanations do not adequately assuage international concerns, inspectors “may request access to such locations” to make sure no illicit activity has occurred. But first they need to “provide Iran the reasons for access in writing and will make available relevant information.” You can’t make this stuff up.

But here’s the kicker: Should the Iranians and the inspectors prove unable to “reach satisfactory arrangements,” Tehran will resolve any concerns “through necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA.” If there is still no agreement two weeks after the initial inquiry is filed, the crisis will be resolved by vote in the so-called Joint Commission – consisting of the six world powers, a representative of EU and – wait for it – Iran.

Like warning drug dealers of a bust

Astonishingly, nearly all the decisions of the Joint Commission, tasked with overseeing/ administering the implementation of the deal, are to be made by consensus – which in effect gives Iran veto power over them. In the case of inspection access, it is sufficient for two of its eight members (say China and Russia) to abstain for Iran to block any decision it dislikes.

It is thus difficult to dispute Benjamin Netanyahu’s characterization of the deal during his address in the Knesset when he likened it to giving drug dealers notice of an impending raid: “It’s like giving a criminal organization that deals drugs a 24-day warning before inspecting its drug lab.”

But worse – the deal requires the international inspectors to expose the sources of intelligence that lead to the detection of the possible infringement – thereby virtually ensuring the termination of their effectiveness.

As Netanyahu remarked: “The agreement also requires the world powers to… show Iran the very intelligence for which they want to conduct the inspections in the first place.”

It is possible that all this could be nothing more than mind-boggling incompetence and blatant lack of foresight? Or are these glaring loopholes the reflection of intent.

Devil not in details

After all, the more you think about the unenforceable, unverifiable agreement just concocted in Vienna, the more implausible it seems. As Alan Dershowitz points out in a Jerusalem Post opinion piece this week, “The devil is not so much in the details as in the broad outlines of this deal.”

Rather than the detailed minutiae of the deal, it is its deeply flawed overall structure that makes it so difficult to comprehend – unless the motives for its conclusion are reexamined.

For unless one is imbued with the child-like naiveté to believe that the tyrannical clergy who head the totalitarian theocracy in Tehran, on seeing their defiant intransigence vindicated and having vast additional resources placed at their disposal, will suddenly change their worldview, the picture of emerging realities is decidedly bleak and bewildering.

The spectacle unfolding before us is almost incomprehensible by any rational criterion.

Virtually the entire developed world, led by the only superpower on the planet, has for all intents and purposes conceded a legitimized path to weaponized nuclear status for a fanatical fundamentalist regime, ideologically bent on the destruction of America and its allies, and a major proliferator of terrorism, committed to attaining regional hegemony at the expense of relatively pro-Western governments.

Despite dwarfing Iran in terms of military might, economic wealth, physical size and population, Tehran’s interlocutors have provided it with vast resources to enormously enhance its nefarious pursuits across the region and beyond.

The New Middle East: Conflicts on steroids

The ominous consequences are not difficult to foresee.

As Ariel Ben Solomon, the Post’s Middle East correspondent, wrote in a recent report, “Iran deal to see Middle East conflicts go on steroids,” “A stronger Iran will translate into a more robust Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthi movement in Yemen, and Shi’ite forces in Iraq and Syria, and increasing sectarian strife fueled by Shi’ite minorities or Iranian agents throughout the Arab world.” (July 16) There is precious little reason for believing any other outcome is plausible.

In a July 15 interview, New Jersey Democrat Sen. Bob Menendez lamented another aspect of the deal, relating to easing restrictions on conventional weapons to Iran: “When you lift the arms embargo to a country that is the major sponsor of… terrorism in the world and is already destabilizing the region in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria [and] Iraq, to give them – after they are going to get $100 billion-150b. in economic relief – the opportunity to buy conventional weapons and improve their missile technology doesn’t seem to me to be in the national interest of the United States.”

The intriguing question is, of course, does this seem to President Obama to be in the national interest of the United States? And if so, why so? If so, how so?

‘No alternative’: A mindless mendacious mantra

The almost Pavlovian response of the apologists for the Iran deal is that its critics have not offered a feasible alternative. This is a claim – for want of a better word – so feeble that it barely merits a response.

As Sen. Menendez points out: “We never tested the proposition that dismantling elements of Iran’s illicit nuclear infrastructure was possible. It is pretty hard for me to believe that the world powers, sitting on one side of the table, the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany and the European Union looking at the Iranians… suffering under staggering sanctions… and falling oil prices couldn’t get a deal that eliminated some of that infrastructure.”

Rebutting John Kerry’s claim that such a goal was achievable only in “a world of fantasy,” Menendez retorted, “I don’t know that that is a ‘world of fantasy.’ Isn’t it possible with all the world on one side of the table, and Iran reeling with economic challenges, that you couldn’t have done better as relates to eliminating that nuclear infrastructure.”

Of course if the underlying assumption is that alternatives are only feasible if Iran deigns to accept them, then the apologists may be right. However, if the rationale were not to accommodate the ayatollahs, but to coerce them, the alternative is clear: Enhanced sanctions backed by the credible threat of military action aimed at destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities and their attendant infrastructure.

Arab arms race or Arab client states

But despite the overwhelming preponderance of power in their favor, the US and its Western allies seem to have forsworn the use of force, or even the credible specter thereof. As Kissinger and Shultz remark: “The threat of war now constrains the West more than Iran.”

This will clearly have a devastating impact on both friend and foe in the region.

It will destroy the confidence of US allies who will therefore be compelled to either acquire their own appropriate arsenals, as they can no longer rely on America for their security, or to become compliant client states of a hegemonic Iran.

For Iran it sends an equivocal message that it can violate the terms of the deal with impunity – for if what it encountered at Vienna is all the West can throw at it, what does it have to fear? There can be little doubt that what happened in Vienna this week has shredded America’s standing in the Middle East.

Some might even suspect that that was the purpose of the exercise.

Khamenei vs. Rouhani: Projecting Very Different Views on the Nuclear Deal

July 18, 2015

Khamenei vs. Rouhani: Projecting Very Different Views on the Nuclear Deal, World Affairs JournalMehdi Khalaji, July 16, 2015

(If Khamenei reneges on the deal, it will likely be impossible to “snap back” the sanctions. With improved Russian rockets, an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities will be much more difficult.– DM)

In the United States, the same political body that was in charge of negotiating with Iran is also in charge of implementing the agreement. But in Iran, the president and his negotiators have little authority over foreign policy, the nuclear program, or military activities.

If [Khamenei] decides to stop implementing the deal in the next year or so, he would likely blame the West or the negotiating team for cutting such a deal, as he did in 2003 and 2004. His initial reaction to the new agreement has already sent discouraging signals about Iran’s willingness to comply with its commitments in the long term.

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The Supreme Leader’s initial reaction has sent discouraging signals about Iran’s willingness to comply with its commitments in the long term.

As expected, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s reaction to the nuclear deal was utterly different from that of President Hassan Rouhani. Right after the agreement was announced on July 14, Rouhani appeared on state television and praised the outcome. Yet when he and other officials visited Khamenei’s home a few hours later, the Supreme Leader did not say anything about the deal apart from a few lines thanking the negotiators. This reticence signaled to hardliners that they should increase their attacks on the agreement.

On July 15, in order to protect himself against these critics, Rouhani told the cabinet that Khamenei was “carefully following up” on the details of the final negotiations and “had meticulous supervision” over the process, to the point where the Supreme Leader “truly undertook much heavier responsibility in this regard” than any other official. But even this did not help him much. On July 14, Rouhani sent Khamenei a letter reporting on the deal’s results, but the Supreme Leader delayed his response by a day in order to show his lack of excitement about it. The letter thanked Khamenei for his “intelligent guidance and perpetual and explicit support to the negotiating team,” who “could successfully implement all policies determined by the Supreme Leader and respect redlines set” by him. Khamenei’s delayed answer — hardly a third as long as the president’s letter — avoided any wording that might indicate his total satisfaction with the accord, his direct role in the negotiations, or his responsibility for the deal. Instead he wrote, “The text needs to be studied carefully and go through the predicted legal process. Then, if it is approved, it needs to be protected against potential violations of the deal by the other party.”

Khamenei also failed to mention who should approve the deal. Rouhani’s team and the hardliners are currently in the midst of a hot dispute about whether that responsibility lies with the Majlis or the Supreme National Security Council. The hardliners insist on parliament, arguing that all international agreements should be adopted by the legislative branch of the government. Yet Rouhani’s team says that only the Supreme Council should review and endorse it. Not coincidentally, the president is the titular head of that council.

SHARP HARDLINER CRITICISM

On July 16, hardliner website Raja News published the third part of an article series titled “Some Aspects of the Deal Which Should Remain Unveiled,” by Ali Akbar Taheri. The article explains how the final deal reached by Rouhani’s negotiating team crosses six different redlines previously set by the Supreme Leader:

  1. Long-term limitations on the nuclear program. Khamenei has said that Iran should not agree to ten-year limitations because “ten years is a lifetime.” According to the article, however, the signed agreement contains at least fourteen Iranian commitments lasting ten or more years (e.g., a twenty-five-year limit on inspections and surveillance over enrichment of mined uranium; a fifteen-year ban on uranium enrichment at the Fordow facility).
  2. Unconventional inspections and access to military facilities. Khamenei has explicitly rejected such measures, but the final agreement allows the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct surveillance in all factories that enrich mined uranium, among other things. The agency can also ask to inspect military facilities such as Parchin if they deem it necessary.
  3. Limitations on enrichment at Fordow. Khamenei has opposed any such restrictions at the mountain facility, but the final agreement contains several.
  4. Delayed lifting of some sanctions. Khamenei previously insisted that all sanctions be rescinded as soon as the deal is signed, but the agreement indicates that some U.S. congressional sanctions and EU sanctions will not be lifted right away, if at all.
  5. IAEA conditionality. Khamenei has often expressed his distrust of the IAEA and declared that sanctions relief should not be conditioned on Iran’s implementation of the deal. Yet UN sanctions will not be lifted until the IAEA verifies that Tehran has complied with the agreement’s terms.
  6. Limits on centrifuge research. Khamenei has said that no restrictions should be placed on Iran’s nuclear research for the duration of the deal. Yet the agreement includes a ten-year limit on enrichment R&D related to the IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8 centrifuges, among other things.

The article also downplays Rouhani’s claim about lifting sanctions related to weapons, noting that “these sanctions would be replaced by limits [imposed on Iran’s weapons trade]…[E]very missile that is able to carry a nuclear warhead would be limited, all Shahab missiles and satellite carriers and so on.” In addition, the article claims that Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said the following: “Russia and China wanted weapons sanctions to be lifted, but despite our support the Iranian team itself agreed to continuation of the sanctions for the next five years!”

On July 16, at an event called “The Beginning of the Math Class” (a sarcastic title indicating that the time of verification has begun), hardline analyst Fouad Izadi criticized the deal from a different angle: “If the U.S. Congress rejects the agreement, America would not be bound to implement it, but if Iran implements the agreement, it will lose all leverage.” Izadi, who is close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, went on to claim that in the case of disagreement between Iran and the P5+1, “the arbiter is the UN Security Council,” which means that the United States and other P5+1 members would essentially become the arbiters of their own dispute. “If Iran gets accused of violating the agreement, [these countries] can issue a resolution against it,” he said, but if the United States or another party is so accused, “the Security Council cannot issue a resolution because one of them could just veto it.” He also pointed out that the Majlis should approve the agreement, and that it should condition Iran’s implementation of the deal on U.S. congressional approval, explaining that “the U.S. president will not be in office in nineteen months, and after him the U.S. administration would not be bound by the agreement if Congress disapproves it.”

Also on July 16, the hardline newspaper Kayhan claimed that the largely insignificant financial reaction to the nuclear deal — i.e., no sharp changes in the stock market or exchange rate — shocked those who have been “overexcited” about the negotiations. “People expected the foreign currency rate to drop and the national currency value to go up,” said one article, “and now they ask why the opposite has happened.”

CONCLUSION

In the United States, the same political body that was in charge of negotiating with Iran is also in charge of implementing the agreement. But in Iran, the president and his negotiators have little authority over foreign policy, the nuclear program, or military activities. Instead, those sectors are under the purview of Supreme Leader Khamenei, who is usually reluctant to take any public responsibility for major decisions. Furthermore, he has repeatedly expressed his distrust toward Americans, the West, the UN, and the IAEA. And while he has more or less supported Iran’s negotiators in his public statements, he has clearly sought to distance himself from them as well. If he decides to stop implementing the deal in the next year or so, he would likely blame the West or the negotiating team for cutting such a deal, as he did in 2003 and 2004. His initial reaction to the new agreement has already sent discouraging signals about Iran’s willingness to comply with its commitments in the long term.

The President Holds a Press Conference on the Nuclear Deal with Iran

July 16, 2015

The President Holds a Press Conference on the Nuclear Deal with Iran, The White House, July 15, 2015

(Iran’s centrifuges continue to spin and so does Obama. — DM)

 

The Iran Deal: Making War More Likely?

July 16, 2015

The Iran Deal: Making War More Likely? American ThinkerStephen Bryen and Shoshana Bryen, July 16, 2015

The deal is done. Iran has sort-of promised it won’t build nuclear weapons, but even the promise has serious caveats: Iran can continue to build weapons platforms to deliver the non-existent weapons; it can cooperate with friendly countries to acquire enhancements to weapons delivery technology; and it can prevent entry to requested facilities by international inspectors for 24 days per request; it need not account for prior military activity. And Iran will be vastly richer.

Based on the world’s experience with the efficacy of multinational inspection regimes and with Iran specifically, it would be wise to assume that the Islamic Republic will move (continue?) covertly to build nuclear warheads, perhaps just leaving out the nuclear fuel. Iran will likely begin testing rockets so that they will be able to release a future nuclear weapon securely at the right moment to get the right blast effect.

The rocket is as important as the nuclear weapon it carries.

Nuclear weapons don’t go off if they plow into the ground, because as they disintegrate they can’t achieve the necessary chain reaction; they must explode above ground at a fixed altitude

Allowing Iran to openly acquire ballistic missile technology can shorten the time from weapons acquisition to weapons use, increasing the relative nervousness of the neighbors — not a recipe for stability. Israel will have to try to interdict and disrupt Iranian ballistic missile testing on an active and overt basis. Because Israeli is not a signatory to the Iran deal, it can expect to be censured by its allies and everyone else. But Israel will have no choice.

If a nuclear weapon were to be fired at Israel, in the few minutes from launch to impact Israel could, in theory, launch its own nuclear weapons from diverse platforms including land-based intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), from F-4’s and F-15’s, and from the newer Israeli submarines. Iran would face annihilation. It potentially could mean the same for Israel, although Israel’s anti-missile system may be sufficient to block the Iranian strike. A lot will depend on how good the Iranian technology is, how well tested it is, and what Israel’s countermeasures are.

The above scenario suggests this might be the time for Israel to place whatever nuclear cards it holds on the table. Israel has long been a presumed nuclear power, including by the CIA since the 1970s, and Secretary Robert Gates said so explicitly in his confirmation hearings. But Israel’s official posture remains “nuclear ambiguity” and a vague statement that Israel would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in the region, hinting that the program was designed as a deterrent. But given that Iran is likely on its way to being a nuclear power as well, and has threatened Israel specifically and directly with annihilation, Israel’s deterrence may well be enhanced by a less ambiguous posture.

While the first of the deal’s unintended consequences is that it forces Israel to officially become a nuclear power, there are others.

The deal increases the chances of direct conventional warfare between Israel and an emboldened and wealthier Iran. It may come as a consequence of Israel’s “interdict and defeat” effort in Syria; too many Iranian missiles in the hands of Hizb’allah; the deployment of Iranian troops in Syria threatening Israel; a firefight in the Golan or southern Lebanon; or conflict on the high seas. The list is a long one.

And Israel is not the only country that views Iran with alarm. Egypt and Saudi Arabia will urgently step up their search for nuclear capability. Egypt has gone down this road before and the Saudis have been leaning on Pakistan for a bomb.  Neither Egypt nor Saudi Arabia is inherently stable, and instability runs different scenarios. Saudi Arabia has IRBM delivery systems and F-15s that can be used to deliver a nuclear weapon. Egypt does not presently have the rockets, but it has a good nuclear science base that it gained in cooperation with different international partners. How viable its nuclear science pool is today is unclear; but in the 1980s Egypt was working with Iraq on the creation of plutonium fuel for weapons (at the Osirak reactor, among other locales) and was partnered with Argentina and perhaps others in building a version of the American Pershing II mobile nuclear missile. It is not unreasonable to think these programs or variants of them will in some way be revived.

The U.S. administration may think the Sunni Arab states have nowhere to turn for technology, but that would be wrong. Russia, for example, and China are more than capable under the right circumstances of cynically supporting both sides in the region — greatly enhancing the chances of war.

In the short term, the Saudis and Egyptians will need to rely on under-the-table relationships with Israel to resist pressure from Iran, which will grow apace thanks to the Washington-led deal; whether this can be concretized and turned into a workable and useful collective security pact is an important consideration. At a minimum, given the substantial barriers to overt cooperation, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States will be heavily exposed and at risk for some time.

The security consequences do not only accrue to the regional countries, but to the United States and our European allies as well.

The U.S.-led deal leaves the Islamic Republic on the road to nuclear weapons capability, now or in five years or in ten — we don’t actually know because the administration gave up its demand for information on Iran’s previous military activities. The cost of this, which we already are seeing, is further diminution of American power and influence in the Middle East as neither our Arab allies nor Israel believe we can protect them. This fuels Russian as well as Iranian ambitions. Europe, which needs oil from the Middle East, can consequently be expected to back away from NATO, encouraging Russian nibbling on the margins of Europe — Estonia is already panicked. The Atlantic Alliance system andPax Americana that emerged from the ashes of WWII will collapse.

In the face of that possibility, the U.S. — whether in this administration or the next — will find that it cannot stand aside. In some manner, however halting, the United States will have to agree to do what Israel by circumstance is being forced to do, namely move militarily to truncate Iran’s nuclear program.

That being the case, it would be wise for the U.S. to pick up the leadership gauntlet earlier rather than later, and to do so in the company of as many friends and allies as it can muster.

Key Nuclear Installations Missing from Iran Deal

July 15, 2015

Key Nuclear Installations Missing from Iran Deal, Israel National News, Ari Yashar, July 15, 2015

Parchin site(1)Suspicious activity at Parchin (illustration)Reuters

As experts got a chance to examine the details of the 159-page Iran nuclear deal signed Tuesday, they warned that it ignores various key aspects of the Islamic regime’s nuclear program, and that the lifting of arms sanctions may pave Iran’s path to nuclear-capable missiles.

A glaring omission is seen in the absolute lack of any reference to the highly covert Parchin military base located southeast of Tehran, which is suspected of being the center of Iran’s secret nuclear weapons program, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Iran has admitted to testing exploding bridge wire nuclear detonators at the site, and reports tied the Parchin base to Iran’s nuclear program following a mysterious explosion at the site last October.

IAEA reports in November 2011 pointed to nuclear weapons development previously conducted at the site, and a 2012 IAEA report likewise confirmed explosives containment vessels were at the site and likely used to test nuclear detonations. Satellite photos have shown Iran has been modifying the site, possibly expanding the tests and covering up their existence.

Iran has repeatedly refused IAEA requests to inspect Parchin. IAEA chief Yukiya Amano announced on Tuesday that in addition to the nuclear deal, a “road map” agreement was sealed, by which Iran will disclose military aspects of its nuclear program by October 15.After this, Amano will write an assessment of Iran’s claimed disclosures by December 15 “with a view to closing the issue.”

Amano said the agreement would include a visit to Parchin, but it remains to be seen how much time Iran will have to prepare for such a visit and possibly hide evidence of nuclear tests; Iranian officials rejected last-minute reports that inspections would be allowed at all covert sites.

IAEA roadmap: putting the cart in front of the horse

Thomas Moore, an arms control specialist and staff member of the SenateForeign Relations Committee, told Washington Free Beacon that the IAEA “road map” should have taken place before the nuclear deal, and not after it.

“The IAEA’s resolution of the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program should precede the deal, not by months but by as much time as it takes to verify the absence of Iran’s (past military work), including the full historical picture of its program. And the deal does not do that,” said Moore.

Not only does the deal not directly address military aspects of Iran’s nuclear program, critics warn it contains several loopholes that will greatly limit its effectiveness in stopping Iran’s march to a nuclear weapon.

For one, the agreement calls for Iran’s “voluntary” compliance with the terms of the deal in several places, instead of implementing mandatory steps Iran must fulfill. It also outlines a convoluted bureaucratic process to confront Iranian violations, reports Washington Free Beacon.

What’s more, a section of the deal may allow Iran to avoid revealing its past nuclear weapons testing, stating that Iran “may propose to the IAEA alternative means of resolving the IAEA’s concerns that enable the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) at the location in question.”

The deal also includes removing a large number of sanctions, including those targeting Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI), which operates sites at the Parchin base and is thought to be highly involved in the covert nuclear weapons program.

“Iran can get its first bombs in weeks”

Aside from Parchin, experts were alarmed to see that the nuclear deal does not directly impose limits on or even reference the Russian-made Bushehr nuclear power plant, which they warn can produce enough plutonium for a large number of atomic weapons.

Henry Sokolski, director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, told Washington Free Beacon that Bushehr’s exclusion from the deal was a mistake.

“That reactor can produce enough plutonium for dozens of bombs per year,” warned Sokolski. “Iran could remove the fuel from the reactor and use a small, cheap reprocessing plant to extract plutonium, and get its first bombs in a matter of weeks.”

Regarding plutonium, after 15 years the deal stipulates that Iran will be able to “engage in producing or acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their alloys,” and likewise conduct research and development “on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) metallurgy, or casting, forming, or machining plutonium or uranium metal.”

At the Natanz nuclear facility, a limitation on 5,060 centrifuges in 30 cascade units will cease in ten years, and after 15 years Iran will be able to enrich uranium over 3.67% – a 20% enrichment is needed to build nuclear weapons. In eight years, Iran can start producing up to 200 partial advanced centrifuges each year, and two years later it can construct complete advanced centrifuges.

Sokolski warned that “ultimately, this is a gamble on Iran not wanting to make bombs. If they really don’t, the deal will work. If they do, the fine print won’t stop them.”

Nuclear-capable missile sanctions lifted

In addition to the details on Iran’s nuclear program, experts warn there are pitfalls in how the deal approaches – or ignores – Iran’s nuclear-capable missile program. Notably the deal avoids addressing Iran’s ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) program.

It also removes sanctions against Iran’s Al Ghadir missile command based in Tehran, which has been leading the development of missiles capable of delivering a nuclear warhead, and is thought to hold operational control of Iran’s missiles.

A UN conventional arms embargo on Iran will end in five years due to the deal, and sanctions against selling ballistic missiles to Iran will likewise expire in eight years. However, it is possible that China and Russia will covertly sell arms to Iran before those dates, as they have done in the past.

Fred Fleitz, who has formerly served as a CIA analyst, State Department arms control official, and House Intelligence Committee staff member, told Washington Free Beacon that these facets of the deal will allow Iran to arm itself freely.

“Language on lifting conventional arms and missile embargoes is very weak,” stated Fleitz.

“The IAEA simply has to certify that Iran isn’t currently engaged in nuclear weapons work to lift these embargoes early. The IAEA will be hard pressed to find evidence of this and will probably issue a report allowing these embargoes to be lifted early,” he concluded.

Maybe They Just . . . Forgot To?

July 15, 2015

Maybe They Just . . . Forgot To? National Review, Patrick Brennan, July 14, 2015

(Here’s a video of  Mr. Rhodes explaining that we never sought anywhere, anytime inspections:

 

Unfortunately, as I observed here, the November “Joint plan of action” did not contemplate investigation of Iran’s military sites,  possible military uses or development of nukes, other than by limiting uranium enrichment. — DM)

 

In April:

Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz on Iran nuke inspections: “We expect to have anywhere, anytime access.” April 20 ’15 http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-04-20/inspectors-need-full-access-in-any-iran-nuclear-deal-moniz-says 

Ben @rhodes44 told the Israeli people today on TV that framework agreement w/ Iran has snap inspections. “Anywhere, any time”. Quite a claim