Archive for October 23, 2015

Spy vs. Spy: Inside the Fraying U.S.-Israel Ties – WSJ

October 23, 2015

Source: Spy vs. Spy: Inside the Fraying U.S.-Israel Ties – WSJ

Distrust set allies to snoop on each other after split over Iran nuclear deal; each kept secrets

President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appeared at a news conference at the White House on Sept. 10, 2010, a time when both countries began to split over the best means to keep Iran from an atomic bomb.
President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appeared at a news conference at the White House on Sept. 10, 2010, a time when both countries began to split over the best means to keep Iran from an atomic bomb. PHOTO: JASON REED/REUTERS

The U.S. closely monitored Israel’s military bases and eavesdropped on secret communications in 2012, fearing its longtime ally might try to carry out a strike on Fordow, Iran’s most heavily fortified nuclear facility.

Nerves frayed at the White House after senior officials learned Israeli aircraft had flown in and out of Iran in what some believed was a dry run for a commando raid on the site. Worried that Israel might ignite a regional war, the White House sent a second aircraft carrier to the region and readied attack aircraft, a senior U.S. official said, “in case all hell broke loose.”

The two countries, nursing a mutual distrust, each had something to hide. U.S. officials hoped to restrain Israel long enough to advance negotiations on a nuclear deal with Iran that the U.S. had launched in secret. U.S. officials saw Israel’s strike preparations as an attempt to usurp American foreign policy.

Instead of talking to each other, the allies kept their intentions secret. To figure out what they weren’t being told, they turned to their spy agencies to fill gaps. They employed deception, not only against Iran, but against each other. After working in concert for nearly a decade to keep Iran from an atomic bomb, the U.S. and Israel split over the best means: diplomacy, covert action or military strikes.

Personal strains between President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu erupted at their first Oval Office meeting in 2009, and an accumulation of grievances in the years since plunged relations between the two countries into crisis.

This Wall Street Journal account of the souring of U.S.-Israel relations over Iran is based on interviews with nearly two dozen current and former senior U.S. and Israeli officials.

U.S. and Israeli officials say they want to rebuild trust but acknowledge it won’t be easy. Mr. Netanyahu reserves the right to continue covert action against Iran’s nuclear program, said current and former Israeli officials, which could put the spy services of the U.S. and Israel on a collision course.

A shaky start

Messrs. Obama and Netanyahu shared common ground on Iran when they first met in 2007. Mr. Netanyahu, then the leader of Israel’s opposition party, the right-wing Likud, discussed with Mr. Obama, a Democratic senator, how to discourage international investment in Iran’s energy sector. Afterward, Mr. Obama introduced legislation to that end.

Suspicions grew during the 2008 presidential race after Mr. Netanyahu spoke with some congressional Republicans who described Mr. Obama as pro-Arab, Israeli officials said. The content of the conversations later found its way back to the White House, senior Obama administration officials said.

Soon after taking office in January 2009, Mr. Obama took steps to allay Israeli concerns, including instructing the Pentagon to develop military options against Iran’s Fordow facility, which was built into a mountain. The president also embraced an existing campaign of covert action against Iran, expanding cooperation between the Central Intelligence Agency and Mossad, the Israeli spy agency.

Mossad leaders compared the covert campaign to a 10-floor building: The higher the floor, they said, the more invasive the operation. CIA and Mossad worked together on operations on the lower floors. But the Americans made clear they had no interest in moving higher—Israeli proposals to bring down Iran’s financial system, for example, or even its regime.

Some covert operations were run unilaterally by Mossad, such as theassassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, according to U.S. officials.

The first Oval Office meeting between Messrs. Obama and Netanyahu, in May 2009—weeks after Mr. Netanyahu became prime minister—was difficult for both sides. After the meeting, Mr. Obama’s aides called Ron Dermer, Mr. Netanyahu’s adviser, to coordinate their statements. Mr. Dermer told them it was too late; Mr. Netanyahu was already briefing reporters. “We kind of looked at each other and said, ‘I guess we’re not coordinating our messages,’ ” said Tommy Vietor, a former administration official who was there.

In 2010, the risk of covert action became clear. A computer virus dubbed Stuxnet, deployed jointly by the U.S. and Israel to destroy Iranian centrifuges used to process uranium, had inadvertently spread across the Internet. The Israelis wanted to launch cyberattacks against a range of Iranian institutions, according to U.S. officials. But the breach made Mr. Obama more cautious, officials said, for fear of triggering Iranian retaliation, or damaging the global economy if a virus spread uncontrollably.

Israel questioned whether its covert operations were enough, said aides to Mr. Netanyahu. Stuxnet had only temporarily slowed Tehran’s progress. “Cyber and other covert operations had their inherent limitations,” a senior Israeli official said, “and we reached those limitations.”

Mr. Netanyahu pivoted toward a military strike, raising anxiety levels in the White House.

The U.S. Air Force analyzed the arms and aircraft needed to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities and concluded Israel didn’t have the right equipment. The U.S. shared the findings, in part, to steer the Israelis from a military strike.

The Israelis weren’t persuaded and briefed the U.S. on an attack plan: Cargo planes would land in Iran with Israeli commandos on board who would “blow the doors, and go in through the porch entrance” of Fordow, a senior U.S. official said. The Israelis planned to sabotage the nuclear facility from inside.

Pentagon officials thought it was a suicide mission. They pressed the Israelis to give the U.S. advance warning. The Israelis were noncommittal.

Iranian students in a November 2013 demonstration defending their country's nuclear program outside the Fordow Uranium Conversion facility in Iran.ENLARGE
Iranian students in a November 2013 demonstration defending their country’s nuclear program outside the Fordow Uranium Conversion facility in Iran. PHOTO:CHAVOSH HOMAVANDI/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

“Whether this was all an effort to try to pressure Obama, or whether Israel was really getting close to a decision, I don’t know,” said Michéle Flournoy, who at the time was undersecretary of defense for policy.

Mr. Obama, meanwhile, was moving toward diplomacy. In December 2011, the White House secretly used then-Sen. John Kerry to sound out Omani leaders about opening a back channel to the Iranians.

At the same time, the White House pressed the Israelis to scale back their assassination campaign and turned down their requests for more aggressive covert measures, U.S. officials said.

The president spoke publicly about his willingness to use force as a last resort to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon—“I don’t bluff,” Mr. Obama said in March 2012—but some of Mr. Netanyahu’s advisers weren’t convinced.

In early 2012, U.S. spy agencies told the White House about a flurry of meetings that Mr. Netanyahu convened with top security advisers. The meetings covered everything from mission logistics to the political implications of a military strike, Israeli officials said.

Warning signs

U.S. spy agencies stepped up satellite surveillance of Israeli aircraft movements. They detected when Israeli pilots were put on alert and identified moonless nights, which would give the Israelis better cover for an attack. They watched the Israelis practice strike missions and learned they were probing Iran’s air defenses, looking for ways to fly in undetected, U.S. officials said.

New intelligence poured in every day, much of it fragmentary or so highly classified that few U.S. officials had a complete picture. Officials now say many jumped to the mistaken conclusion that the Israelis had made a dry run.

At the time, concern and confusion over Israel’s intentions added to the sense of urgency inside the White House for a diplomatic solution.

The White House decided to keep Mr. Netanyahu in the dark about the secret Iran talks, believing he would leak word to sabotage them. There was little goodwill for Mr. Netanyahu among Mr. Obama’s aides who perceived the prime minister as supportive of Republican challenger Mitt Romney in the 2012 campaign.

Mr. Netanyahu would get briefed on the talks, White House officials concluded, only if it looked like a deal could be reached.

The first secret meeting between U.S. and Iranian negotiators, held in July 2012, was a bust. But “nobody was willing to throw it overboard by greenlighting Israeli strikes just when the process was getting started,” a former senior Obama administration official said.

Israeli officials approached their U.S. counterparts over the summer about obtaining military hardware useful for a strike, U.S. officials said.

At the top of the list were V-22 Ospreys, aircraft that take off and land like helicopters but fly like fixed-wing planes. Ospreys don’t need runways, making them ideal for dropping commandos behind enemy lines.

The Israelis also sounded out officials about obtaining the Massive Ordnance Penetrator, the U.S. military’s 30,000-pound bunker-busting bomb, which was designed to destroy Fordow.

Mr. Netanyahu wanted “somebody in the administration to show acquiescence, if not approval” for a military strike, said Gary Samore, who served for four years as Mr. Obama’s White House coordinator for arms control and weapons of mass destruction. “The message from the Obama administration was: ‘We think this is a big mistake.’ ”

White House officials decided not to provide the equipment.

Messrs. Obama and Netanyahu spoke in September 2012, and Mr. Obama emerged convinced Israel wouldn’t strike on the eve of the U.S. presidential election.

By the following spring, senior U.S. officials concluded the Israelis weren’t serious about a commando raid on Fordow and may have been bluffing. When the U.S. offered to sell the Ospreys, Israel said it didn’t have the money.

Former Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who championed a strike, said Mr. Netanyahu had come close to approving a military operation against Iran. But Israel’s military chiefs and cabinet members were reluctant, according to Israeli officials.

While keeping the Omani talks secret, U.S. officials briefed the Israelis on the parallel international negotiations between Iran and major world powers under way in early 2013. Those talks, which made little headway, were led on the U.S. side by State Department diplomat Wendy Sherman.

Robert Einhorn, at the time an arms control adviser at the State Department, said that during the briefings, Mr. Netanyahu’s advisers wouldn’t say what concessions they could live with. “It made us feel like nothing was going to be good enough for them,” Mr. Einhorn said.

U.S. spy agencies were monitoring Israeli communications to see if the Israelis had caught wind of the secret talks. In September 2013, the U.S. learned the answer.

Yaakov Amidror, Mr. Netanyahu’s national security adviser at the time, had come to Washington in advance of a Sept. 30 meeting between Messrs. Netanyahu and Obama.

On Sept. 27, Mr. Amidror huddled with White House national security adviser Susan Rice in her office when she told him that Mr. Obama was on the phone in a groundbreaking call with Iran’s president, Hassan Rouhani.

Mr. Amidror had his own surprise. During a separate meeting in the Roosevelt Room, he told several of Mr. Obama’s top advisers that Israel had identified the tail numbers of the unmarked U.S. government planes that ferried negotiators to Muscat, Oman, the site of the secret talks, U.S. officials said.

Mr. Amidror, who declined to comment on the White House discussions, said that it was insulting for Obama administration officials to think “they could go to Oman without taking our intelligence capabilities into account.” He called the decision to hide the Iran talks from Israel a big mistake.

U.S. officials said they were getting ready to tell the Israelis about the talks, which advanced only after Mr. Rouhani came to office. During the Sept. 30 meeting with Mr. Netanyahu, the president acknowledged the secret negotiations. The secrecy cemented Israel’s distrust of Mr. Obama’s intentions, Israeli officials said.

Mr. Samore, the former White House official, said he believed it was a mistake to keep Israel in the dark for so long. Mr. Einhorn said: “The lack of early transparency reinforced Israel’s suspicions and had an outsize negative impact on Israeli thinking about the talks.”

Israel pushed for the U.S. to be more open about the Iran negotiations. Ms. Rice, however, pulled back on consultations with her new Israeli counterpart, Yossi Cohen, who took over as Mr. Netanyahu’s national security adviser, according to U.S. and Israeli officials.

Secretary of State John Kerry, left, huddled with Iranian officials, including Hossein Fereydoun, center, the brother of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, right, before addressing a news conference about a nuclear agreement reached in Vienna in July.ENLARGE
Secretary of State John Kerry, left, huddled with Iranian officials, including Hossein Fereydoun, center, the brother of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, right, before addressing a news conference about a nuclear agreement reached in Vienna in July. PHOTO: US STATE DEPARTMENT/REUTERS

In exchanges with the White House, U.S. officials said, Mr. Cohen wouldn’t budge from demanding Iran give up its centrifuges and uranium-enrichment program. Israeli officials said they feared any deviation would be taken by the U.S. as a green light for more concessions.

In one meeting, Mr. Cohen indicated Mr. Netanyahu could accept a deal allowing Iran to keep thousands of centrifuges, U.S. officials said. Soon after, Mr. Cohen called to say he had misspoken. Neither side was prepared to divulge their bottom line.

In November 2013, when the interim agreement was announced, Mr. Samore was in Israel, where, he said, the Israelis “felt blindsided” by the terms. U.S. officials said the details came together so quickly that Ms. Sherman and her team didn’t have enough time to convey them all. Israeli officials said the Americans intentionally withheld information to prevent them from influencing the outcome.

Listening in

As talks began in 2014 on a final accord, U.S. intelligence agencies alerted White House officials that Israelis were spying on the negotiations. Israel denied any espionage against the U.S. Israeli officials said they could learn details, in part, by spying on Iran, an explanation U.S. officials didn’t believe.

Earlier this year, U.S. officials clamped down on what they shared with Israel about the talks after, they allege, Mr. Netanyahu’s aides leaked confidential information about the emerging deal.

When U.S. officials confronted the Israelis over the matter in a meeting, Israel’s then-minister of intelligence said he didn’t disclose anything from Washington’s briefings. The information, the minister said, came from “other means,” according to meeting participants.

Ms. Sherman told Mr. Cohen, Israel’s national security adviser: “You’re putting us in a very difficult position. We understand that you will find out what you can find out by your own means. But how can we tell you every single last thing when we know you’re going to use it against us?” according to U.S. officials who were there.

Mr. Netanyahu turned to congressional Republicans, one of his remaining allies with the power to affect the deal, Israeli officials said, but he couldn’t muster enough votes to block it.

U.S. officials now pledge to work closely with their Israeli counterparts to monitor Iran’s compliance with the international agreement.

But it is unclear how the White House will respond to any covert Israeli actions against Iran’s nuclear program, which current and former Israeli officials said were imperative to safeguard their country.

One clause in the agreement says the major powers will help the Iranians secure their facilities against sabotage. State Department officials said the clause wouldn’t protect Iranian nuclear sites from Israel.

Michael Hayden, a former director of the CIA, said the U.S. and Israel could nonetheless end up at odds.

“If we become aware of any Israeli efforts, do we have a duty to warn Iran?” Mr. Hayden said. “Given the intimacy of the U.S.-Israeli relationship, it’s going to be more complicated than ever.”

Write to Adam Entous at adam.entous@wsj.com

Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei’s Letter Of Guidelines To President Rohani On JCPOA Sets Nine Conditions Nullifying Original Agreement Announced July 14, 2015

October 23, 2015

Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei’s Letter Of Guidelines To President Rohani On JCPOA Sets Nine Conditions Nullifying Original Agreement Announced July 14, 2015, Middle East Media Research Foundation, Y. Carmon and A. Savyon, October 22, 2015

(Please pay particular attention to Conditions 1 – 6 and their implications as noted by MEMRI. The conditions appear to be quite substantial. Additional material, including Twitter and Facebook messages, is also provided in appendices at the end of the article. I have not reproduced that material here.– DM)

On October 21, 2015, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei published a letter of guidelines to Iranian President Hassan Rohani on the execution of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The letter’s publication coincides with the days of the Ashura that are of vital religious and national significance in Iran and symbolize steadfastness against the forces of evil. Intended as an historical document aimed at assuring Iran’s future, the letter was posted on Khamenei’s website in Persian and tweeted from his Twitter account and posted on his Facebook page in English (see Appendices), and published in English by the official Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting authority IRIB (see below). The letter is now a founding document in all things concerning theJCPOA and the conditions under which Iran will be willing to execute it.

The letter, defined by Khamenei on his website as “conditional approval” of the JCPOA, sets several new conditions for Iran’s execution of the agreement. These conditions constitute late and unilateral additions to the agreement concluded three months previously that fundamentally change it. Khamenei stresses that the agreement awaits his opinion following what he calls “precise and responsible examination” in the Majlis and “clearance of this agreement through legal channels” in Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.  

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It should be further noted that in his introduction to the new conditions, Khamenei attacks the U.S. and President Obama with great hostility, and calls for Obama to be prosecuted by international judiciary institutions. He states that Obama had sent him two letters declaring that he has no intention of subverting the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but adds that the U.S.’s support for fitna in Iran (i.e. the popular post-election unrest in 2009), its monetary aid to opponents of the Republic, and its explicit threats to attack Iran have proven the opposite and have exposed the real intent of America’s leaders, whose enmity towards Iran will not end. He wrote that the Americans’ behavior in the nuclear talks is another link in the chain of its enmity towards Iran, that America entered into the talks with the aim of “deception,” and that therefore Iran must remain alert in light of America’s hostile intentions.

The set of conditions laid out by Khamenei creates a situation in which not only does the Iranian side refrain from approving the JCPOA,[1] but, with nearly every point, creates a separate obstacle, such that executing the agreement is not possible.

The following are Khamenei’s nine conditions, and their implications:

Khamenei’s Conditions For Iranian Execution Of The JCPOA

First condition: Khamenei demands that the U.S. and Europe lift the sanctions, not suspend them, and in addition demands “solid and sufficient” guarantees in advance that this will be done, before Iran takes its own steps and meets its own obligations under the agreement. These guarantees, insists Khamenei, must include, inter alia, an official letter from the U.S. president and from the EU undertaking to fully lift the sanctions. Furthermore, he demands that this letter will state that any declaration by the West that the “structure of the sanctions will remain in force” (i.e. allowing snapback) will be considered “non-compliance with the JCPOA” on the part of the West.

Implications: These conditions constitute a total change of the JCPOA. Khamenei is not allowing any execution of the JCPOA by Iran until this is accepted in writing by the other side, and thus he is nullifying the JCPOA as agreed upon on July 14, 2015.

Second condition: Any sanctions against Iran “at every level and on every pretext,” including terrorism and human rights violations, by any one of the countries participating in the negotiations will “constitute a violation of the JCPOA,” and a reason for Iran to stop executing the agreement.

Implications: This demand, that links the JCPOA to other issues and prohibits any punishment of Iran on any issue and for any reason, serves as an excuse for Iran to cancel the agreement.

Third condition: Under the JCPOA, Iran is obligated, following the JCPOA’s Adoption Day, to carry out its obligations concerning changing the function of the nuclear reactor at Arak and shipping out most of its stockpile of enriched uranium. Contrary to this, Khamenei is changing the timetable of the JCPOA, stating that Iran will not carry out these actions until after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declares that it is closing its dossier on Iran’s “past and future issues (including the so-called Possible Military Dimensions or PMD of Iran’s nuclear program).”

Implications: This demand to change the timetable creates a situation in which Iran will not take action as stipulated in the JCPOA, and will not meet its obligations, before the sanctions are eased, also according to the JCPOA, but instead dictates that the sanctions must first be lifted completely and states that only then will Iran meet its obligations. Khamenei here is creating a situation in which the IAEA will not be able to report on Iran’s meeting of its obligations regarding the Arak reactor and regarding the shipping out of its enriched uranium by the target date of December 15, 2015, because Iran is not going to do so by then – thus the execution of the agreement is thwarted from the beginning.

Fourth condition: Iran will meet its obligations to “renovate” and change the purpose of the Arak reactor only after there is a signed agreement on an “alternative plan” for changes to the reactor, and after there is “sufficient guarantee” that this alternative plan will be implemented.

Implications: Iran’s fulfillment of its obligations regarding the Arak reactor, as stipulated by the JCPOA, will be postponed until some unknown future date.

Fifth condition: Iran will carry out its obligation to ship out its enriched uranium to another country in exchange for yellowcake “on a gradual basis and on numerous occasions,” and only after “a secure agreement has been clinched to that effect, along with sufficient guarantees” that this exchange will be implemented.

Implications: The date for Iran to ship out its enriched uranium as stipulated by the JCPOA is postponed until some unknown future date. Khamenei is demanding that Iran receive in exchange for the enriched uranium not raw uranium as per the JCPOA, but instead uranium that has been enriched, albeit to a lower level than the uranium it ships out. This is yet another change to the JCPOA as concluded on July 14, 2015.

Sixth condition: Khamenei instructs President Rohani to begin, along with reducing Iran’s ability to enrich uranium under the JCPOA, immediately to expand Iran’s ability to enrich uranium with a 15-year long-term plan for 190,000 centrifuge SWU (Separative Work Units). “This plan,” he says, “must allay any concern stemming from some points entailed in the JCPOA appendices.”

Implications: This article nullifies the declared goal of the JCPOA, which is to reduce Iran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities.

Seventh condition: The Iranian Atomic Energy Organization must ensure continued nuclear research and development, in its various dimensions, such that in eight years’ time, Iran will not be lacking in enrichment technology. This, he says, is all in accordance with the JCPOA.

Eighth condition: In the event of doubt or ambiguity regarding the content of the JCPOA, the source of authority for removing this doubt or ambiguity will be the content of the talks – i.e. it will also include the statements by the Iranian side, not just the “interpretation provided by the opposite party,” that is, the P5+1.

Implications: Any doubt or ambiguity regarding the content of the JCPOA will become the source of unending dispute and will paralyze any possibility of executing the agreement.

Ninth condition: Due to apprehensions that the other side, particularly the U.S., will break its promises or cheat, President Rohani must establish a “well-informed and smart panel” to monitor the execution of the agreement.

Implications: Khamenei is creating an administrative framework for perpetual delays in the execution of the agreement.

Khamenei adds also a 10th condition, directed at Iran, not the P5+1, demanding that Rohani take seriously his instructions in the matter of the “resistance economy,” the main thrust of which is self-reliance instead of basing Iran’s economy on external sources. He also demands that after the sanctions are lifted, there will be no “unbridled imports,” and no imports whatsoever from the U.S.

Political Ramifications In Iran

In February 2016, elections for the Majlis and the Assembly of Experts are set to take place in Iran. The pragmatic camp, headed by Hashemi Rafsanjani and President Rohani, had hoped that a quick execution of the agreement would allow the sanctions to be eased and funds to be released immediately, which in turn would allow the pragmatic camp to present these achievements and triumph in the elections. By setting these conditions, however, Khamenei has thwarted any speedy execution of the agreement, and thus has thwarted the pragmatic camp’s hope for electoral success.

IRIB Translation

The following is the official English translation of Khamenei’s letter, as published by IRIB.[2] This translation was tweeted by Khamenei and also posted on his Facebook page (see Appendix I and II).

“Wednesday, 21 October 2015 17:41
“Ayatollah Khamenei sends a letter to President Hassan Rouhani about the JCPOA

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“Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, in a letter to President Hassan Rouhani, who also heads the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), referred to the precise and responsible examination of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in the Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament) and also the SNSC, and the clearance of this agreement through legal channels, and issued important instructions regarding the observation of and safeguarding the country’s national interests. Enumerating nine-point requirements for the implementation of the JCPOA, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei endorsed SNSC Resolution 634, dated August 10, 2015, provided that the following provisions and requirements are observed.

“The full text of Ayatollah Khamenei’s letter follows on:

In the Name of Allah, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

“Your Excellency,  Mr Rouhani,
“President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Head of the Supreme National Security Council
“May God bestow success upon you.
“Greetings to You

“The agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has already been cleared through legal channels following precise and responsible examinations in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, [parliamentary] ad hoc committees and other committees as well as the Supreme National Security Council. Since the agreement is waiting for my view, I deem it necessary to remind several points so that Your Excellency and other officials directly or indirectly involved in the issue would have enough time to comply with and safeguard national interests and the country’s best interests.

“1. Before anything else, I deem it necessary to extend my gratitude to all those involved in this challenging procedure throughout all its periods, including the recent nuclear negotiating team whose members tried their best in explaining the positive points and incorporating all those points [into the agreement], critics who reminded all of us of weak points through their appreciable meticulousness, and particularly the chairman and members of the Majlis ad hoc committee [set up to review the JCPOA] as well as the senior members of the SNSC who covered some voids by including their important considerations, and finally the Speaker of Majlis and Members of Parliament who adopted a cautious bill to show the right way of implementation [of the agreement] to the administration, and also national media and the country’s journalists who despite all their differences of view presented a complete image of this agreement to public opinion. This voluminous collection of activity and endeavors and thoughts [spent] on an issue which is thought to be among the unforgettable and instructive issues of the Islamic Republic, deserves appreciation and is a source of satisfaction. Therefore, one can say with certainty that the divine reward for these responsible contributions will, God willing, include assistance and mercy and guidance by Almighty God because the divine promises of assistance in exchange for assisting His religion are unbreakable.

“2. Enjoying decades-long background of presence in the very details of the affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, you must have naturally realized that the government of the United States of America, neither in the nuclear issue nor in any other issue, had been pursuing no other approach but hostility and disturbance, and is unlikely to do otherwise in the future either. The remarks by the US President [Barack Obama] in two letters addressed to me on the point that [Washington] has no intention of subverting the Islamic Republic of Iran turned out to be unreal and his open threats of military and even nuclear strike, which can result in a lengthy indictment against him in international courts, laid bare the real intentions of US leaders. Political pundits and public opinion of many nations clearly understand that the case of his never-ending hostility is the nature and identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is born out of the Islamic Revolution. Insistence on rightful Islamic stances and opposition to the hegemonic and arrogant system, perseverance against excessive demands and encroachment upon oppressed nations, revelations on the US support for medieval dictators and suppression of independent nations, incessant defense for the Palestinian nation and patriotic resistance groups, rational and globally popular yelling at the usurping Zionist regime constitute the main items which make the US regime’s enmity against the Islamic Republic inevitable, and this enmity will continue as long as the Islamic Republic [continues to] disappoint them with its internal and sustainable strength.

“The behavior and words of the US government in the nuclear issue and its prolonged and boring negotiations showed that this (nuclear issue) was also another link in their chain of hostile enmity with the Islamic Republic. Their deception through flip-flopping between their initial remarks that came after Iran accepted to hold direct talks with them and their constant non-compliance with their pledges throughout two-year-long negotiations and their alignment with the demands of the Zionist regime and their bullying diplomacy regarding relations with European governments and bodies involved in the negotiations are all indicative of the fact that the US’s deceitful involvement in the nuclear negotiations has been done not with the intention of a fair settlement [of the case], but with the ill intention of pushing ahead with its hostile objectives about the Islamic Republic.

“Doubtlessly, vigilance vis-à-vis the hostile intentions of the US government and instances of resistance on the part of the officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran throughout the negotiations managed, in numerous cases, to prevent heavy damage from being inflicted [upon Iran].

“However, the outcome of the negotiations, which is enshrined in the JCPOA, has numerous ambiguities and structural weaknesses that could inflict big damage on the present and the future of the country in the absence of meticulous and constant monitoring.

“3. The nine-point provisions entailed in the recent bill adopted by the Majlis and the 10-point instructions outlined in the resolution of the Supreme National Security Council carry helpful and effective points which must be taken into consideration. Meantime, there are some other necessary points which are announced here while some of the points mentioned in the two documents are highlighted.

“First, since Iran has accepted to negotiate basically for the objective of removal of unjust economic and financial sanctions and its enforcement (the lifting of sanctions) is tied to Iran’s future actions under the JCPOA, it is necessary that solid and sufficient guarantees be arranged to avoid any infraction by the opposite parties. Written declaration by the US president and the European Union for the lifting of the sanctions is among them. In the statements of the EU and the US president, it must be reiterated that these sanctions will be fully lifted. Any declaration that the structure of the sanctions will remain in force shall imply non-compliance with the JCPOA.

“Second, throughout the eight-year period, any imposition of sanctions at any level and under any pretext (including repetitive and fabricated pretexts of terrorism and human rights) on the part of any of the countries involved in the negotiations will constitute a violation of the JCPOA and the [Iranian] government would be obligated to take the necessary action as per Clause 3 of the Majlis bill and stop its activities committed under the JCPOA .

“Third, the measures related to what is mentioned in the next two clauses will start only after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announces [the conclusion of] the past and future issues (including the so-called Possible Military Dimensions or PMD of Iran’s nuclear program).

“Fourth, measures to renovate the Arak plant by preserving its heavy [water] nature will start only after a firm and secure agreement has been signed on an alternative plan, along with sufficient guarantees for its implementation.

“Fifth, the deal with a foreign government for swapping enriched uranium with yellow cake will start only after a secure agreement has been clinched to that effect, along with sufficient guarantees [for its implementation]. The aforesaid deal and exchange must be done on a gradual basis and on numerous occasions.

“Sixth, by virtue of the Majlis bill, the plan and the necessary preparations for mid-term development of the atomic energy industry, which includes the method of advancement in different periods of time for 15 years for the final objective of 190,000 SWU, must be drawn up and carefully reviewed by the Supreme National Security Council. This plan must allay any concern stemming from some points entailed in the JCPOA appendices.

“Seventh, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran must organize research and development in different aspects such that after the end of the eight-year period, there would be no shortage of technology for the level of [uranium] enrichment entailed in the JCPOA.

“Eighth, it must be noted that on the ambiguous points in the JCPOA document, the interpretation provided by the opposite party is not acceptable and the reference would be the text of the negotiations.

“Ninth, the existence of complications and ambiguities in the text of the JCPOA and the suspicion of breach of promise, infractions and deception by the opposite party, particularly the US, require that a well-informed and smart panel be established to monitor the progress of affairs and [gauge] the opposite party’s commitment and realization of what was mentioned above. The composition and the tasks of this would-be panel should be determined and approved by the Supreme National Security Council.

“In witness whereof, Resolution 634, dated August 10, 2015, of the Supreme National Security Council, is endorsed pending the observation of the aforementioned points.

“In conclusion, as it has been notified in numerous meetings to you and other government officials and also to our dear people in public gatherings, although the lifting of sanctions is a necessary job in order to remove injustice [imposed on people] and regain the rights of the Iranian nation, economic overture and better livelihood and surmounting the current challenges will not be easy unless the Economy of Resistance is taken seriously and followed up on entirely. It is hoped that this objective will be pursued with full seriousness and special attention would be paid to enhancing national production. You should also watch out so that unbridled imports would not follow the lifting of sanctions, and particularly importing any consumer materials from the US must be seriously avoided.

“I pray to Almighty God for your and other contributors’ success.
“Source: www. leader. ir”

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Endnotes:

[2] English.irib.ir/news/leader/item/217470-ayatollah-khamenei-sends-a-letter-to-president-hassan-rouhani-about-the-jcpoa, October 21, 2015.

[3] Twitter.com/khamenei_ir, October 21, 2015.

[4] Facebook.com/www.Khamenei.ir/posts/943612332378368:0, posted October 21, 2015.