Archive for September 2015

Petraeus: Fight Against Islamic State ‘Inadequate’

September 22, 2015

Petraeus: Fight Against Islamic State ‘Inadequate’

BY:
September 22, 2015 2:37 pm

Source: Petraeus: Fight Against Islamic State ‘Inadequate’

Retired Gen. and ex-CIA Director David Petraeus testified Tuesday that U.S. progress against the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS) terrorist group has been “inadequate.”

“It has been more than a year since the U.S. commenced military action against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria,” Petraeus said to the Senate Armed Services Committee. “While there have been significant accomplishments, the progress achieved thus far has been inadequate.

The U.S. has carried out thousands of air strikes against IS as part of Operation Inherent Resolve, but the terrorist group shows no signs of retreating.

“In Iraq we have halted and reversed ISIS’s momentum in some areas, but we have seen gains by ISIS in others such as Ramadi,” Petraeus said.

Petraeus said that “some elements of the right strategy” to defeat IS are being utilized by the U.S., but that “several are under-resourced while others are missing.”

Petraeus recommended ramping up U.S. military support for its allies in the area, notably the Iraqi Security Forces and Kurdish Peshmerga. He also recommended embedding U.S. advisors behind the front lines in Iraqi brigades, coordinating airstrikes more closely with Iraqi coalition partners, and broadening the rules of engagement to carry out airstrikes against IS targets.

Petraeus stopped short of recommending the deployment of U.S. troops for combat roles before a “viable” force of Iraqi partners was available to hold onto the areas taken back from IS.

Petraeus’s testimony can be added to a litany of bad news about U.S. progress against IS, although the White House had until recently characterized the fight as successful.

Retired Marine Gen. John Allen, who created the anti-IS coalition, will step down in November after struggling with the White House for control of the war, Bloomberg reported Tuesday.

Last week, Gen. Lloyd Austin, the U.S.’s top commander of Middle East operations, admitted the failure of a program to train and equip moderate rebels to fight IS in Syria.

Hanging over these revelations are serious allegations that senior U.S. officials manipulated intelligence on IS to hide its strength, lending credence to the White House’s narrative that Inherent Resolve was working.

Disclosure: Brookings Takes Millions from Foreign Governments

September 22, 2015

Disclosure: Brookings Takes Millions from Foreign Governments Documents reveal contributions from Qatar, UAE

BY:
September 22, 2015 3:05 pm

Source: Disclosure: Brookings Takes Millions from Foreign Governments – Washington Free Beacon

The Brookings Institution, one of the country’s top left-leaning think tanks, has for the first time admitted to Congress that it receives millions of dollars every year from foreign governments, including Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, according to official disclosure forms obtained by the Washington Free Beacon.

The disclosure of these figures comes as a result of a recently implemented federal law mandating that those who testify before Congress reveal any potential conflicts created as a result of funding by foreign entities.

Brookings has come under intense scrutiny by reporters and others for not fully disclosing the large amounts of cash it receives from Middle Eastern governments.

The practice has led some to accuse Brookings and its most prominent scholars of pushing biased analyses aimed at making these foreign governments look good. The think tank’s relationship with Qatar has received particular attention due to the Middle Eastern country’s close relationship with the terrorist group Hamas and its ongoing funding of various terrorist entities.

The disclosure form, which is presented to Congress before an individual testifies, reveals that Brookings received nearly $15 million from the Embassy of Qatar between 2013 and 2015. Brookings also maintains a facility in the Qatari capital of Doha, where Hamas is known to operate freely.

The think tank received another $1,920,000 from the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates between those same years.

Several million dollars also have been donated over those years by the Norwegian and Swedish governments. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) also donated more than $250,000 to Brookings.

These disclosures came as a result of a Sept. 17 congressional hearing at which Suzanne Maloney, a Brookings senior fellow, offered testimony on Iran’s relationship with the terrorist group Hezbollah.

The forms further reveal that, in addition to the millions in foreign donations, Brookings has received federal grants.

Both the foreign donations and federal grants “were for independent research and analysis related to an number of subject matters,” according to Maloney. A “portion” of these funds may have been “related to the hearing,” which discussed the ways in which Hezbollah stands to profit from Iran in the wake of the recent nuclear deal.

When questioned about the foreign donations by the New York Times last year, Martin Indyk, a Brookings scholar who has also worked with the Obama administration, defended the practice and maintained that it does not bias his views.

“Our business is to influence policy with scholarly, independent research, based on objective criteria, and to be policy-relevant, we need to engage policy makers,” said Indyk, who reportedly received a $14.8 million check from Qatar.

Many experts have refuted Indyk’s claim and accused Brookings and Indyk of ignoring a clear conflict of interest.

“When an American think tank like Brookings accepts money from Middle Eastern regimes that sharply restrict free speech, it is saying it doesn’t care that its scholarship on the Middle East might at least appear to be compromised,” said Lee Smith, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute who has reported on Brookings’ funding. “It is saying it doesn’t care that there is at least the appearance if not the reality of a very obvious conflict of interest.”

This appearance of a conflict became acute when Indyk was selected by the Obama administration to mediate peace between Israel and the Palestinians, Smith said.

“The problem was further compounded when the Obama White House named Martin Indyk to serve as envoy to a peace process between two actors, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, that are both at war with Hamas—a terrorist organization that, like Brookings, is funded by Qatar,” Smith said. “That neither Indyk nor Brookings nor the White House ever saw this as a conflict of interest is evidence of an arrogance beyond compare.”

Josh Block, CEO of the Israel Project, said the new disclosure rules are necessary for transparency.

“The reason we supported this rule change is because the American people deserve to know what foreign governments are paying to influence U.S. policy by funding these ‘independent experts’ to the tune of millions of dollars—especially countries like Russia or Qatar with  long, sordid records of mischief or supporting terrorism against Americans and our allies and of rank hostility toward Israel,” Block said.

“Until now, the potential foreign financial conflicts of interests and the motives of those funding the experts testifying was totally hidden from view,” Block said. “This kind of transparency is good governance. We applaud those in Congress who adopted this rule for matters of foreign affairs and national security and would like to see its expanded use in other committees in both the House and Senate.”

Brookings did not respond to a request for comment on its foreign funding.

2,000 Russian Troops Head To Syria For “First Phase” Of Mission To Support Assad

September 22, 2015

2,000 Russian Troops Head To Syria For “First Phase” Of Mission To Support Assad Tyler Durden’s picture

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 09/22/2015 09:32 -0400

Source: 2,000 Russian Troops Head To Syria For “First Phase” Of Mission To Support Assad | Zero Hedge

With each passing day, The Kremlin seems less and less interested in observing any niceties with regard to how it describes Russia’s military involvement in Syria.

Initially, it seemed likely that Moscow would go the Ukraine route by providing logistical support and lurking behind the scenes while officially denying – or at least downplaying – its role in the conflict. Over the course of the last two weeks, it’s become increasingly clear that Russia now intends to make no secret of its intention not only to stabilize the Assad regime but in fact to turn the tide completely with the provision of advanced weapons and equipment including combat aircraft, tanks, and drones.

The only remaining question was how long it would be before Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moualem made an official request for ground troops, allowing Moscow to abandon all pretense that Russia isn’t officially at war and while we may not have reached that point yet, you can’t very well build a forward operating base and not staff it which is why now, according to FT, Moscow is set to send 2,000 troops to Latakia as part of the mission’s “first phase”. Here’s more:

Russia is to deploy 2,000 military personnel to its new air base near the Syrian port city of Latakia, signalling the scale of Moscow’s involvement in the war-torn country.

 

The deployment “forms the first phase of the mission there”, according to an adviser on Syria policy in Moscow.

 

The force will include fighter aircraft crews, engineers and troops to secure the facility, said another person briefed on the matter.

 

Three western defence officials agreed that the Russian deployment tallied with the numbers needed to establish a forward air base similar to those built by western militaries in Afghanistan.

Here’s more, from The New York Times, on the buildup at Latakia:

The deployment of some of Russia’s most advanced ground attack planes and fighter jets as well as multiple air defense systems at the base near the ancestral home of President Bashar al-Assad appears to leave little doubt about Moscow’s goal to establish a military outpost in the Middle East. The planes are protected by at least two or possibly three SA-22 surface-to-air, antiaircraft systems, and unarmed Predator-like surveillance drones are being used to fly reconnaissance missions.

 

Russia has military presences near Latakia and in Tartus.Russian Moves in Syria Widen Role in MideastSEPT. 14, 2015

 

“With competent pilots and with an effective command and control process, the addition of these aircraft could prove very effective depending on the desired objectives for their use,” said David A. Deptula, a retired three-star Air Force general who planned the American air campaigns in 2001 in Afghanistan and in the 1991 Persian Gulf war.

 

In addition, a total of 15 Russian Hip transport and Hind attack helicopters are also now stationed at the base, doubling the number of those aircraft from last week, the American official said. For use in possible ground attacks, the Russians now also have nine T-90 tanks and more than 500 marines, up from more than 200 last week.

 

“The equipment and personnel just keep flowing in,” said the American official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss confidential intelligence reports. “They were very busy over the weekend.”

On Monday, the Russian embassy in Damascus came under mortar fire. That attack, Moscow says, did not emanate from ISIS but rather from other anti-Assad forces backed by “external sponsors”:

The Russian foreign ministry said a shell, which landed near its embassy on Sunday but caused no casualties, came from Jobar, which is held by anti-Assad fighters who were not allied with Isis and had “external sponsors”.

 

“We expect a clear position with regard to this terrorist act from all members of the international community, including regional players,” the ministry said. “This requires not just words but concrete action.”

 

It added that the fighters’ “foreign sponsors” were responsible for using their influence on “illegal armed formations”.

Clearly, “foreign sponsors” is a reference to Assad’s US-backed regional enemies including the Saudis, Qatar, and Turkey among others and this certainly seems to indicate that the Russians will not be prepared to tolerate attacks on their assets by groups who enjoy the support of the US-backed coalition. Of course quite a few of the groups battling for control of Syria are supported either directly or indirectly by the US and its regional allies which means that even if Russia manages to avoid direct confrontation with the handful of troops the US overtly backs, avoiding confrontations with the troops covertly supported by the US and other state actors will be impossible by definition, as they, just as much as ISIS, are angling for the ouster of Assad.

Meanwhile, the French took the absurdity to a whole new level on Monday when Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius claimed that the country’s plans to begin bombing Syria were born out of concerns for “self defense”. Here’s the quote:

“We received specific intelligence indicating that the resent terrorist attacks against France and other European nations were organized by Daesh [Arabic derogatory term for IS] in Syria. Due to this threat we decided to start reconnaissance flights to have the option for airstrikes, if that would be necessary. This is self-defense.

And so, as the violence escalates and Syria looks set to become the stage for a not-so-cold war pitting Russia and its regional proxies against the US and its regional proxies, we close with the following graphic which (partially) quantifies the human cost of geopolitical wrangling gone horribly awry:

Iran wants to renegotiate parts of the nuke “deal.” That may be good.

September 22, 2015

Iran wants to renegotiate parts of the nuke “deal.” That may be good. Dan Miller’s Blog, September 22, 2015

(The views expressed in this article are mine and do not necessarily reflect those of Warsclerotic or those of its other editors. — DM)

 

Iran wants sanctions relief to be lifted, immediately, and not merely suspended. Iran should not get that. If it doesn’t, it may well terminate the “deal” unilaterally. If Iran gets what it wants, the Senate should review the “deal” as a treaty and reject it. Either outcome would be a substantial improvement over the current “deal” and the morass in which it is embedded.

This post is based on a September 21st article at Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) titled “Expected September 28 NY Meeting Between P5+1 Foreign Ministers And Iran Could Signify Reopening Of Nuclear Negotiations To Address Khamenei’s September 3 Threat That If Sanctions Are Not Lifted, But Merely Suspended, There Will Be No Agreement.”

The MEMRI article cites statements by Supreme Leader Khamenei and one of his senior advisers, Ali Akbar Velayat. The latter said, on September 19th,  “the nuclear negotiations are not over yet.” Khamenei has said much the same thing.

Khamenei said, in a September 3, 2015 speech to the Assembly of Experts, that he did not accept the terms of the agreement and demanded that the sanctions be immediately lifted rather than merely suspended; otherwise, he said, there would either be no agreement, or Iran too would merely suspend its execution of its obligations under the JCPOA.

. . . .

“Freezing or suspension [of the sanctions] is unacceptable to me… If they suspend [the sanctions], we too will suspend [what is incumbent upon us]. If we are to implement what [is required of us], the sanctions must be [actually] cancelled.

Iran has thus made clear that it will not abide by the nuke “deal” as written; unless it gets the changes it now demands, it will either terminate the deal or violate it. If, as seems likely for the reasons cited in the MEMRI article, the September 28th meeting involves discussion of the deal, it will either be renegotiated or it won’t be.

If the “deal” is not renegotiated, or is renegotiated and Iran does not get what it demands, it may very well terminate the deal. Iran has already received substantial sanctions relief, is already open for business and is already doing lots of it with many more nations than previously. Termination would be a rebuff to the “Great Satan,” would not damage Iran much economically and it could proceed with its “peaceful” nuke program without even farcical nuke self-inspections.

If The Obama administration and others cave and Iran gets what it demands or enough to satisfy it, the “deal” will be very different from what was previously presented to the Congress under the Corker legislation. That legislation purported to eliminate the constitutional requirement of approval of the “deal” by a two-thirds Senate majority before going into effect and permitted it to go into effect unless rejected by half of the membership of both houses; Obama promised to veto such a rejection and put the “deal” into effect. The House has disapproved the “deal” but the Senate has not acted because of Democrat fillibusters, urged by the White House. Under the new “deal,” the ability of the United States to “snap back” sanctions would be vitiated; a possible but very difficult if not impossible to accomplish, “snap back” had been among the reasons cited by many of those who favored the “deal” (often despite its many other flaws) for supporting it.

If a deal eliminating the “snap back” is struck, Obama, et al, may well claim that it’s none of the business of the Congress since, by virtue of the Corker legislation, it has already eliminated its constitutional authority to deal with the JCPOA as a treaty, regardless of any “minor” change.

I hope, but am less than confident, that both houses of the Congress will reject this contention vigorously and repeal the Corker legislation. Whatever benefits or other legitimacy the Corker legislation may once have been thought to have it no longer has. Repeal will probably require use of the “nuclear option” to invoke cloture to end a Democrat filibuster in the Senate. If — as seems likely — Obama vetoes the rejection, the Congress should state that it no longer considers itself bound by the Corker legislation. Next, the Senate should treat the renegotiated “deal” as a treaty, regardless of whether Obama agrees to send it to the Senate, and reject it. It should do so even if, as also seems likely, that requires use of the “nuclear option” to invoke cloture.

Obama has precipitated what may well become a constitutional crisis. If the Congress does its job, Obama will be the loser and America will be the winner — even if it becomes necessary to take out Iran’s nukes militarily.

Iran appears to wants changes in the JCPOA

September 22, 2015

Expected September 28 NY Meeting Between P5+1 Foreign Ministers And Iran Could Signify Reopening Of Nuclear Negotiations To Address Khamenei’s September 3 Threat That If Sanctions Are Not Lifted, But Merely Suspended, There Will Be No Agreement, MEMRI, September 21, 2015

(If the JCPOA is renegotiated, in any respect, will Congress get another opportunity to challenge it? If so, will a way be found to deal with it as a treaty? The answer to both questions should be yes. — DM)

The expected meeting between the P5+1 foreign ministers and Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif may be evidence of a shift in the White House position and also evidence that it intends to discuss the Iranian demand for further concessions from the superpowers.

****************

Recent reports indicate that the foreign ministers of the P5+1 are set to meet with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in New York on September 28, 2015, on the margins of the UN General Assembly, to “examine the recent developments of the JCPOA.”[1]

On September 20, 2015, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said, at a joint press conference in Berlin with his German counterpart Frank-Walter Steinmeier, that he would meet Zarif in New York to discuss “Iran and other matters.”[2]

Additionally, Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the head of Iran’s Center for Strategic Research, said on September 19, 2015 that “the nuclear negotiations are not over yet.”[3]

As will be recalled, Khamenei said, in a September 3, 2015 speech to the Assembly of Experts, that he did not accept the terms of the agreement and demanded that the sanctions be immediately lifted rather than merely suspended; otherwise, he said, there would either be no agreement, or Iran too would merely suspend its execution of its obligations under the JCPOA. He said: “We negotiated [with the Americans] in order to have the sanctions lifted, and the sanctions will be lifted. Now, if we are supposed to uphold this framework… this completely contradicts the reason for Iran’s participation in the talks to begin with. Otherwise, what was the point of our participation in the talks? We would have continued to do what we were doing [prior to the talks]… The fact that we sat down and held talks and made concessions on certain issues was mainly in order to have the sanctions lifted. If the sanctions are not going to be lifted, there will be no agreement… [Our] officials [i.e. Rohani’s government and his Ministry of Foreign Affairs] should make this clear…

“Freezing or suspension [of the sanctions] is unacceptable to me… If they suspend [the sanctions], we too will suspend [what is incumbent upon us]. If we are to implement what [is required of us], the sanctions must be [actually] cancelled. True, the other side says that some of the sanctions are not [up to them entirely] to be lifted. We say in response that [with regard to those sanctions] we will use our legal rights to freeze them. But regarding [the sanctions that are] in the hands of the American and European governments – those must be totally lifted.”[4]

The apparent meaning of all the above is that the nuclear negotiations, which Iran considers unfinished, will be reopened, with the aim of achieving the complete lifting of sanctions – instead of a mere suspension of them as was agreed in the JCPOA and adopted in UN Security Council Resolution 2231.

It will also be recalled that following Khamenei’s September 3 demands, on September 4 the White House responded; spokesman Josh Earnest said that Iran was charged with meeting its obligations under the JCPOA: “What we have indicated all along is that once an agreement was reached, as it was back in mid-July, that we would be focused on Iran’s actions and not their words, and that we will be able to tell if Iran follows through on the commitments that they made in the context of these negotiations. And that is what will determine our path forward here.

“We’ve been crystal clear about the fact that Iran will have to take a variety of serious steps to significantly roll back their nuclear program before any sanctions relief is offered – and this is everything from reducing their nuclear uranium stockpile by 98 percent, disconnecting thousands of centrifuges, essentially gutting the core of their heavy-water reactor at Arak, giving the IAEA the information and access they need in order to complete their report about the potential military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. And then we need to see Iran begin to comply with the inspections regime that the IAEA will put in place to verify their compliance with the agreement.

“And only after those steps and several others have been effectively completed, will Iran begin to receive sanctions relief.  The good news is all of this is codified in the agreement that was reached between Iran and the rest of the international community. And that’s what we will be focused on, is their compliance with the agreement.”[5]

The expected meeting between the P5+1 foreign ministers and Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif may be evidence of a shift in the White House position and also evidence that it intends to discuss the Iranian demand for further concessions from the superpowers.

It should be clarified that agreement on the part of the U.S. to lifting the sanctions would constitute a fundamental change to the JCPOA. This is because lifting the sanctions, rather than suspending them, will render impossible a snapback in case of Iranian violations, and the guarantee of a snapback is one of the central justifications for the JCPOA, according to President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry.

Endnotes:

[1] Fars (Iran), September 21, 2015.

[2] State.gov, September 20, 2015.

[3] Fars (Iran), September 19, 2015. It should be mentioned that Majlis member Hamid Rasaei said that the language of the agreement signed by Abbas Araghchi that was delivered to Majlis committees was “a partial document with many translating errors and omissions.” He added that the government must present the agreement to the Majlis in the form of a draft law and that a Majlis committee is currently “examining a version that is neither a proposal nor a draft law.” Tasnim (Iran), September 20, 2015.

[5] Whitehouse.gov, September 4, 2015.

Chinese Jet in Second Near-Collision with U.S. Spy Plane

September 22, 2015

Chinese Jet in Second Near-Collision with U.S. Spy Plane PLA jet flies close to nose of RC-135 over East China Sea

BY:
September 22, 2015 5:00 am

Source: Chinese Jet in Second Near-Collision with U.S. Spy Plane – Washington Free Beacon

A Chinese interceptor jet conducted a second dangerous pass near a U.S. surveillance aircraft over Asian waters—weeks before a state visit to the United States by Chinese leader Xi Jinping that begins Tuesday.

The latest incident took place over the East China Sea near Japan’s Senkaku Islands when a Chinese interceptor flew in front of an RC-135 electronic intelligence-gathering jet, nearly colliding with the aircraft.

It was the second time a Chinese aircraft nearly collided with a U.S. surveillance jet. The last incident took place in August 2014 over the nearby South China Sea.

Pentagon and U.S. Pacific Command spokesmen declined to provide details of the latest encounter but did not dispute that it took place.

“I have nothing for you regarding the incident you mention,” said Cmdr. Bill Urban, a Pentagon spokesman.

The latest U.S.-China aerial confrontation was mentioned indirectly by Adm. Harry Harris, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, during Senate Armed Services Committee testimony last week.

Harris called the 2014 incident “a very dangerous event,” referring to the barrel roll conducted by a Chinese jet over the top of a P-8 maritime surveillance aircraft as “a dangerous maneuver in acrobatic circles, let along in an intercept regime in an open ocean.”

“And we most recently have seen that again, but I’ll give the system credit for that intervening period of time, we’ve seen very few dangerous activities by the Chinese following that August 2014 incident,” Harris said.

Harris, without mentioning the RC-135 incident, said the decline in dangerous aerial encounters until the latest incident was due to military and political relationships worked out with the Chinese.

Asked about a second recent dangerous aerial encounter mentioned by the admiral, a Pacific Command spokesman at first said “there is no new P-8 incident.”

Questioned later about the RC-135 incident, the spokesman, Capt. Darryn James, refused to provide details and referred questions to the Pentagon.

Two Pentagon officials, speaking on background, described the East China Sea encounter as a dangerous and unprofessional aerial intercept that was similar to the 2014 near collision between a Chinese J-11 interceptor and Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft in the nearby South China Sea.

The J-11 came within 50 feet of the P-8 as it was conducting surveillance, in an attempt to coerce the surveillance aircraft to depart.

In the recent East China Sea incident, the Chinese interceptor crossed very close to the nose of the RC-135 near the Senkaku Islands—the location of a major dispute over ownership of the islands located south of Japan’s Okinawa and north of Taiwan.

Disclosure of the dangerous Chinese jet encounter comes a day before Xi begins an official state visit to the United States. The incident is likely to embarrass the Communist Party secretary who arrives in Seattle on Tuesday. He is scheduled to meet President Obama later this week.

Xi’s visit is also expected to raise two contentious issues: large-scale Chinese hacking of U.S. government and private-sector databases and the theft of data on tens of millions of Americans. China also has raised tensions as a result of disputes over maritime claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea.

Xi is also contending with a wavering Chinese economy that has caused stock markets around the world to drop sharply in recent weeks.

The Chinese leader, who recently was seen in a major military parade riding in the back of a limousine as he reviewed thousands of Chinese troops, tanks, missiles, and aircraft, will be hosted at a White House state dinner, an honor normally reserved for U.S. allies.

The dangerous aerial encounter is a setback for the Pentagon’s aggressive military diplomacy with China, which President Obama has made a centerpiece of Pentagon policy.

Critics in Congress, including Sen. John McCain (R., Ariz.), the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Rep. Randy Forbes (R., Va.), chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on sea power, have called on the Obama administration to cut back on military exchanges that are not producing results.

The Pentagon recently concluded an agreement outlining what it calls rules of the road for encounters at sea that are designed to prevent further dangerous ship-to-ship incidents like the 2013 near-collision in the South China Sea.

On Dec. 5, 2013, a Chinese amphibious ship sailed directly in front of the guided missile cruiser USS Cowpens and stopped, forcing the Cowpens to sharply alter course to avoid hitting the Chinese vessel.

The Obama administration announced at the November 2014 summit between Obama and Xi that the Pentagon and Chinese military had concluded a memorandum of understanding on “rules of behavior” for the safety of air and sea encounters.

Pentagon officials have said the rules for maritime encounters are clearer than those for aerial intercepts.

Talks in Beijing on the aerial rules have been bogged down in Chinese demands that the United States halt all aerial surveillance near China’s coasts, something the Pentagon so far has refused to accept.

Harris, the Pacom commander, said last week that he has ordered his component commanders to continue to conduct operations when challenged by Chinese jets or naval forces.

“What I’ve told the component commanders of the Pacific fleet and Pacific air forces to tell their pilots and crews to do is to continue to insist on our right to operate in international airspace and maritime space,” Harris said.

“When challenged by Chinese fighter aircraft, our aircraft ought to maintain a professional flight profiles, predictable flight profiles, and we have the means to record that activity and then we’ll see what happens.”

The area where the incident occurred has been the focus of a major dispute between Beijing and Tokyo over the ownership of the Senkakus.

Senior U.S. officials, while claiming neutrality in Asian maritime disputes, have invoked the U.S.-Japan defense treaty several times in recent years, stating that U.S. forces would defend Japan if the islands are attacked.

Further heightening tensions, China in November 2013 unilaterally imposed an air defense identification zone over the East China Sea, claiming control over a security zone covering the Senkakus and several South Korean islands.

China is claiming ownership of the Senkakus, which it calls the “Diaoyu Islands,” though they have been under Japanese authority for decades. The waters around the islands are believed to contain large reserves of undersea gas and oil coveted by both countries.

The Chinese have demanded that all aircraft entering the zone seek permission and submit flight plans. China has threatened to use military forces to enforce the zone, but so far has not done so.

The United States, Japan, and South Korea have said they do not recognize the air defense zone.

Officials said the most recent aerial encounter between the United States and China was less dangerous than the 2014 encounter between the J-11 and the P-8.

The Pentagon called the 2014 intercept “aggressive” and “dangerous” and threatened to cut off military relations with the People’s Liberation Army unless the maneuvers were halted.

Defense officials have said that aerial intercepts remain an unresolved issue between the two countries. National Security Adviser Susan Rice, during a visit to Beijing last fall, was told by Chinese officials that China is demanding that the United States halt all surveillance flights along Chinese coasts.

Urban, the Pentagon spokesman, while not providing details of the East China Sea incident, defended the Pentagon’s efforts to seek to lower the risk of dangerous encounters.

“The department has made tremendous progress with respect to reducing risk between our operational forces and those of the People’s Republic of China (PRC),” Urban said.

“Over the past year, we have seen improvements in PRC behavior, specifically the safety and professionalism with which they intercept our aircraft.”

Additionally, the Pentagon has “robust, existing mechanisms to deal with incidents between our operating forces, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement,” he said.

Rick Fisher, a China military analyst with the International Assessment and Strategy Center, said the latest aerial encounter should not go unchallenged.

“Threatening intercepts over the East and South China seas require a very firm U.S. response,” Fisher said.

“The first step should be increased flights. But there must also be a deliberate program of expanding air defense cooperation with Japan and the Philippines.”

Fisher urged states in the region to conduct joint aircraft deployments to Japanese air fields in the Sakishima Islands and said that the United States should offer the Philippines air defense systems and training to bolster its defenses.

US to bring in new advanced nuclear bombs to Germany

September 22, 2015

US to bring in new advanced nuclear bombs to Germany

report Published time: 22 Sep, 2015 12:01

Source: US to bring in new advanced nuclear bombs to Germany – report — RT News
A German Air Force Panavia Tornado IDS jet fighter © Fabrizio Bensch

A German Air Force Panavia Tornado IDS jet fighter © Fabrizio Bensch / Reuters

Starting third quarter 2015, the US Air Force is starting preparations to bring in new B61 nuclear bombs to Luftwaffe’s Büchel Air Base, according to ZDF TV channel. German parliament previously called for American nukes to be removed.

The base in Rhineland-Palatinate in western Germany hosts German Panavia Tornado multipurpose aircraft that are capable to deploy the USAF nuclear bombs stored there under a nuclear sharing deal. The base is the only location in Germany that has nuclear weapons since 2007 and has 20 of them, according to the Royal United Services Institute.

The US is currently working on a new variant of the B61, Mod 12, which would be more accurate and have smaller yield than modifications 3 and 4 currently deployed in Europe.

READ MORE: US B61-12 nuclear bomb test may be drilling use in Europe – Moscow

ZDF cites budget documents indicating that in third quarter this year the base would receive funding for the future storage and deployment of the new B61-12s. That includes the upgrade of the Tornado aircraft.

The report notes that nuclear disarmament was part of the 2009 coalition parliament between Chancellor Angela Merkel’s CDU party and Free Democrats. In 2010, the German parliament called on the government to have the American nuclear weapons removed from its soil, citing public support for such a decision.


US accuses Russia of missile violations to cover Europe deployment plans – Moscow

Berlin also intended to retire its fleet of Tornados by 2015, with no plans to have a replacement capable of deploying the American nuclear bombs. The F-35 is capable of dropping B61, but Germany doesn’t intend to buy the expensive aircraft and chose Eurofighter Typhoon to be Tornado’s successor.

In 2012, Berliner Zeitung reported thay Berlin had quietly decided to keep at least some of the Tornados operational until as far as 2024.

The B61-12 would be more precise and less destructive than its predecessor, which proponents say would be a major benefit. Critics say the weapon would be on the borderline between strategic and tactical and decision makers would be more tempted to use them, which could have unforeseen and grave consequence for the global security.

Former parliamentary state secretary in Germany’s Defense Ministry, Willy Wimmer, told ZDF that the move to upgrade Büchel Air Base nuclear arsenal gave NATO “new attack options against Russia” a constituted “a conscious provocation of our Russian neighbors.”

Moscow keeps the presence of American nukes in Europe in mind when shaping its own military policies as reflected in Russia’s newest military doctrine published last year, spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry Maria Zakharova told German television.

“The comprehensive analysis of the situation points to the threat posed by the increasing military capability of NATO and its endowment with global functions, which it performs in violation of the international law, as well as the encroachment of the military infrastructure of NATO members on the borders of the Russian Federation,” she commented.

Moscow has been critical of the entire nuclear sharing program between the US and European countries, saying it breached the spirit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which forbids the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. Washington insists the NPT does not forbid it to keep nuclear weapons in Europe as long as they remain under control of the US troops.

Russia’s concern about the nukes partially comes from the fact that the US trains troops of European nations, including those not hosting American nuclear weapons at all, to deploy them, which, Moscow says, harms the regional stability and threatens Russia’s national security.

The German defense ministry would not immediately comment on the ZDF report.


US & Russia ‘playing nuclear chicken with each other’ (Op-Edge by Dr Helen Caldicott) http://on.rt.com/129q8m

Yom Kippur

September 22, 2015

Why Israel prefers a hot line to a military coordination center with Russia

September 22, 2015

Source: Why Israel prefers a hot line to a military coordination center with Russia

DEBKAfile Exclusive Analysis September 22, 2015, 12:43 PM (IDT)
IDF chief Eisenkott and Russian army chief Grasimov

IDF chief Eisenkott and Russian army chief Grasimov

There is a big difference between the latest headlines saying that the IDF and the Russian military will coordinate their operations, and the statement by Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu that he and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed Monday, Sept. 21, to establish a mechanism to prevent misunderstandings and clashes between the two militaries. Neither the Russian military force in Syria, which is growing every day, nor the IDF have any plans for a body that will allow each side to inform the other of ground, air or naval operations about to be carried out in the Syrian theater.

Russia does not want the IDF to find out anything about its military moves or intentions, and the IDF does not want the Russians to have advance notice of any operations it is about to conduct in Syria, or of Israeli Air Force surveillance missions overhead.

DEBKAfile’s military and intelligence sources report that this is the reason why Putin and Netanyahu, and afterwards the Israeli chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Gady Eisenkot, and his Russian counterpart, Gen. Valery Gerasimov, agreed on the establishment of a hotline between the Russian and Israeli general staffs.

This communications channel will connect the offices of Gerasimov’s deputy, Gen. Nikolay Bogdanovsky, in Moscow and of Eisenkot’s deputy, Gen. Yair Golan, in Tel Aviv.

The hotline will enable the two sides to ask to clarify events, without offering their reasons for doing so. In other words, the hotline will be used at a time when Russian or Israeli military operations in Syria are underway, and senior officers are acting to avert a probable clash between the two military forces – or after the event.

In the first instance, it will be important to cut the clashes short without delay to avert an escalation of hostilities.

Besides the technical arrangements for operating the hotline, the two deputy chiefs of staff will need to meet, get to know each other, and agree on a framework of military topics for discussion. This process could take several weeks.

In other words, the issue at hand is not coordination of military operations, but rather a mechanism that goes into action fast to assess collisions after the event and determine how to prevent them in the future.

In any case, Israel is constrained from full military coordination with the Russian military, especially in the Syrian theater, by the IDF’s commitment to joint operations with the US and Jordanian army via US Central Command Forward-Jordan. The IDF moreover maintains mechanisms for coordinating its air, naval and missile operations with the US military.

Russia, for its part, coordinates its military operations in Syria with its close ally, Iran, which is also Israel’s sworn enemy.

DEBKAfile‘s military sources note that the Russian chief of staff was not in uniform when he received Gen. Eisenkot. This was a demonstration of the Russian intention to downgrade the military aspect of the Israeli-Russian talks.

Before flying out of Moscow, Netanyahu announced that he had briefed Washington fully on its talks with Putin, thus ascertaining that those talks in no way impaired any aspect of Israeli-US military cooperation.

Like It or Not, America and Russia Need to Cooperate in Syria

September 22, 2015

Like It or Not, America and Russia Need to Cooperate in Syria

September 17, 2015

 

Source: Like It or Not, America and Russia Need to Cooperate in Syria | The National Interest

Image: Flickr/Official U.S. Air Force

Many outside observers view the Russian military buildup in Syria as a way for President Putin to force his way through to the negotiating table with Barack Obama ahead of the UN General Assembly meeting in New York. There is some truth to that. To be effective, diplomacy should be backed by facts on the ground, and Moscow is busy creating them—in the face of mounting U.S. concerns. However, coercive diplomacy is just another form of diplomacy.

The current spike in Russia’s involvement in Syria, however, does not need to be linked solely to UNGA. Even without it, Moscow would now be sending more weapons and more instructors to Syria. As the Islamic State has expanded its control over more territory in Syria, it has posed more of a threat to the survival of the Russian-backed regime in Damascus. Thus, Moscow’s Plan A now is to help Bashar al-Assad keep his remaining strongholds; its Plan B is to help him secure the Alawite enclave around Latakia.

The Kremlin’s upping the ante in Syria is explained by its vision of IS as a threat to Russia itself, and Putin’s view of Assad as one who stands up to that threat and refuses to give up. Fighting the enemy abroad, by bolstering an ally is preferable, of course, to having to fight in the Caucasus or Central Asia. It is also important not to appear weak under pressure: in Putin’s memorable phrase, “the weak get beaten.”

The expansion of Russia’s military role in Syria has real risks. Both Russian political and military leaders and the Russian people still remember Afghanistan. The Kremlin, however, is probably calculating that the risks in Syria are manageable. Russia is sending advisers and technicians, crews to operate weapons systems, some support personnel and it may send pilots, but not combat troops: the pro-Assad fighters on the battlefield will continue to be Syrians, Iranians or Hezbollah.

Another risk is a potential collision with the United States and its allies, who have long been striking IS targets in Syria and who can also bomb Assad’s forces and potentially hit their Russian advisers. Russian weapons—and warplanes, if it comes to that—can in turn hit Western-backed Syrian opposition. Finally, Israel may not tolerate advanced weapons in the Syrian arsenal that can endanger the Jewish state’s security.

Diplomatically, the collision has already occurred: Washington is angry with Moscow’s policies. The Kremlin, for its part, likely believes that its firm stance would make the White House accept Russia as a player and negotiate with it on the following: de-conflicting of their parallel engagements or even on a division of labor as both countries execute their strategies in Syria; a broad anti-IS coalition, which Putin has proposed; and eventually the future of postwar Syria.

Moscow certainly hopes that cooperation with the United States and the West on Syria would blunt their confrontation over Ukraine, the Kremlin’s overriding concern. It is probably not a mere coincidence that since September 1, shelling in Donbass has died down, the leadership in Donetsk has been purged of recalcitrant figures and progress is expected on the issue of local elections next month. Right after UNGA, Vladimir Putin will be meeting in Paris with Chancellor Merkel, President Hollande and Ukraine’s Petro Poroshenko.

So far, Western reactions to the Russian activism in Syria has been largely negative. Emotionally, this is understandable. Moscow’s actions are clearly at odds with Washington’s policies on an issue very sensitive to the Obama administration. Russia is not asking for permission when it moves troops and borders in Ukraine, or when it ramps up military support for a regime that the United States has said needs to go. Moscow is visibly upgrading its politico-military presence in the key region of the Middle East. While doing so, Russian officials miss few opportunities to sneer at U.S. policies in Iraq, Libya, Yemen—and Syria.

Yet, in a deeper sense, Russian, U.S., European, Iranian, Saudi, Chinese and Indian interests are on the same side against an enemy that threatens all of them. Everyone agrees that IS must be defeated, even though they disagree on how to do it. The Obama administration is unlikely to fall for the Putin plan of a grand coalition with Moscow, Tehran and Damascus to accomplish that, but a degree of coordination is advisable. Alas, Syria as the world has known it for the past seventy years probably cannot be restored. It will have to be put together again in a wholly new way. This can only result from negotiations among the various Syrian players (minus IS), with the assistance of the international community, including the West and Russia.

Dmitri Trenin is Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center.