Posted tagged ‘North Korean nukes’

« WarSclerotic home page
Newer Entries »

An EMP attack on America seems likely

April 19, 2015

An EMP attack on America seems likely, Dan Miller’s Blog, April 19, 2015

(The views expressed in this article are mine and do not necessarily reflect those of Warsclerotic or any of its other editors. — DM)

Some consider North Korea to be the rogue nation most likely to use an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) to attack America; Iran is also seen as quite likely to do it. It matters little which succeeds.

Here is a lengthy 2013 video about an EMP attack, what would happen and why:

The possibilities and consequences of an EMP attack on America are too horrific to contemplate; the “legitimate news media” generally ignore them. We therefore tend to relegate them to the realm of remote “tin foil hat conspiracy theories” and to focus instead on more congenial stuff — the latest sex scandal, Hillary Clinton’s campaign van parking in a disabled-only space and other matters unlikely to impact America to an extent even approaching that of an EMP attack. Meanwhile, most of “our” Congress Critters, who should know better, focus on opinion polls, filling their campaign coffers and getting richer personally while neglecting our atrophying missile defense systems and other potential means of avoiding or recovering from an EMP attack.

Here is a 2013 video about the likelihood of an Iranian EMP attack on America that would paralyze the country for a very long time.

North Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran have long cooperated in the development of nukes and means to deliver them. I wrote about their cooperation here, here, here and elsewhere. It now appears that Iran intends to use them for an EMP attack on America.

The issue of a nuclear EMP attack was raised in the final hours of this week’s elections in Israel when U.S. authority Peter Vincent Pry penned a column for Arutz Sheva warning of Iran’s threat to free nations.

“Iranian military documents describe such a scenario — including a recently translated Iranian military textbook that endorses nuclear EMP attack against the United States,” he wrote. [Emphasis added.]

Here is a March 7, 2015 video about the impact of the P5+1 “negotiations” on Iran getting (or keeping) nukes and the likelihood of an Iranian EMP attack on America:

In April of this year, John Bolton had this to say about the Iran – North Korea connection, how much we don’t know and the ongoing P5+1 “negotiations.”

Perhaps Israel can take out Iran’s nuke capabilities.

Here is a February 2015 video about what’s (not) being done to harden our domestic power grid:

As of February of this year, Govtrack US opined that the chances of passage of the SHIELD act were zero percent. Be that as it may, simply hardening the power grid would not solve communications or transport problems — most modern communications devices, as well as vehicles built after 1987, depend on computer chips and, when the chips are fried, will not function. Even if food and water could be processed, getting them to consumers in sufficient quantities to keep them alive would be an enormous if not impossible task.

Problems of a human nature would also arise and remaining alive would be difficult. If one’s family were about to starve, how many would try to steal food and water from those who still have even enough for a few days? How many roving gangs of armed criminals, quite willing to kill, would do the same? The police would likely have no communications ability and might well be otherwise occupied, tending to their own families. Military forces not confined to base would likely have the same problems and be doing the same.

That suggests another problem in restoring infrastructure seriously damaged or destroyed by the EMP attack. It would not only require the availability of transport, communications and undamaged equipment. It would also require the availability of personnel, not otherwise occupied in scrounging for food, water, medical supplies and other resources to care for their own families, while protecting them from those lacking such resources, as well as from armed gangs.

Now, the U.S. military is taking steps to protect itself by reopening a cold war bunker at Cheyenne Mountain, abandoned in 2006.

Cheyene Mt. Complex

Cheyene Mt. Complex

The Pentagon last week [early April 2015] announced a $700 million contract with Raytheon Corporation to oversee the work for North American Aerospace Command (NORAD) and US Northern Command.

Admiral William Gortney, head of NORAD and Northern Command, said that ‘because of the very nature of the way that Cheyenne Mountain’s built, it’s EMP-hardened.’

. . . .

‘And so, there’s a lot of movement to put capability into Cheyenne Mountain and to be able to communicate in there,’ Gortney told reporters.

‘My primary concern was… are we going to have the space inside the mountain for everybody who wants to move in there, and I’m not at liberty to discuss who’s moving in there,‘ he said.  [Emphasis added.]

The Cheyenne mountain bunker is a half-acre cavern carved into a mountain in the 1960s that was designed to withstand a Soviet nuclear attack. From inside the massive complex, airmen were poised to send warnings that could trigger the launch of nuclear missiles.

But in 2006, officials decided to move the headquarters of NORAD and US Northern Command from Cheyenne to Petersen Air Force base in Colorado Springs. The Cheyenne bunker was designated as an alternative command center if needed.

Now the Pentagon is looking at shifting communications gear to the Cheyenne bunker, officials said.

‘A lot of the back office communications is being moved there,’ said one defense official.

Officials said the military’s dependence on computer networks and digital communications makes it much more vulnerable to an electromagnetic pulse, which can occur naturally or result from a high-altitude nuclear explosion.

Under the 10-year contract, Raytheon is supposed to deliver ‘sustainment’ services to help the military perform ‘accurate, timely and unambiguous warning and attack assessment of air, missile and space threats’ at the Cheyenne and Petersen bases.

Raytheon’s contract also involves unspecified work at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska.

When will the site be fully operational, for what and who will be allowed to go there?

Some other military bases are probably being hardened, at least to an extent that might (or might not) preserve their electrical grids. If it works, they may serve as refugee centers for adjacent civilian populations. However, the military installations would likely run out of food and potable water before very long and, with food and water processing centers no longer operational, there would be substantial difficulties in getting — as well as transporting — large quantities of food and water. Were the processing centers to become operational, transportaion difficulties would remain. Communications between the military installations and the outside world? Likely zilch, at least initially, because radios, telephones and other modern communications devices (as most now are) depend on computer chips and would be fried by an EMP attack. Some might eventually be restored at some military bases, but that is not likely to be the case with those not on those bases.

Conclusions

What would you do in the event of an EMP attack? In a major metropolitan area, you would probably be SOL very quickly. In a small town? Marginally but not much better off. An isolated small farm, close to a mountain spring and adequately stocked with food, medical supplies, firearms and ammunition, could provide reason to hope that you might eventually be able to grow or slaughter sufficient food and have access to enough potable water to survive; at least until roving armed gangs arrive and overpower you.

This video is about a massive world-wide pandemic. In the event of a pandemic, electricity, automobiles and communications would still function, at least for a while. Following an EMP attack, the consequences would likely be substantially worse and last far longer.

Here is a link to a novel about one family in a small city and its efforts to survive an EMP attack on America. It does a reasonable job of summarizing the potential consequences.

Categories: Congressional Critters, Department of Defense, Diplomacy, Domestic policy, EMP attack, Foreign policy, IAEA, Iran, Iran scam, Iranian EMPs, Iranian missiles, Iranian nukes, Israel, North Korean missiles, North Korean nukes, Obama, P5+1, Rogue nations, U.S. Congress, U.S. Military, Urban areas
Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Comments: 25 Comments

US Admits N. Korea, Maybe Iran, Can Now Target it with EMP-Nukes

April 12, 2015

US Admits N. Korea, Maybe Iran, Can Now Target it with EMP-Nukes, Israel National News,Mark Langfan April 12, 2015

(Please see also, Why IS the US military moving back into ‘Stargate’ base deep under the Rocky Mountains a decade after it was abandoned? — DM)

Adm. Gortney revealed that America’s anti-missile missile shield is not only configured to repulse a North Korean missile, but an Iranian ICBM as well. The Admiral explained that the current assessment is that the threat of an ICBM EMP strike comes from North Korea and not from Iran, but that the system could handle both scenarios. “Our system is designed for North Korea, and if we get our assessment wrong, for Iran. Its [the US homeland missile shield] is designed to defend the nation [the homeland] against both those particular threats today,” he said.

US President Barack Obama is currently negotiating a deal with Iran that he himself has admitted would enable it to manufacture its own nuclear weapons, 12-13 years after it is signed.

*********************

In a blockbuster admission, Admiral Bill Gortney, Commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) disclosed that the Pentagon now believes North Korea has mastered the ability to miniaturize its nuclear bombs so they can be fitted onto their latest mobile KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which are capable of reaching the continental United States.

At the news conference, Adm. Gortney flatly stated, Pyongyang has “the ability to put a nuclear weapon on a KN-08 and shoot it at the homeland [the continental United States].” He expressed confidence that the US could knock down such a missile if launched by North Korea or its ally, Iran.

He also admitted, however, that it is “very difficult” for the US to counter the threat, because its intelligence is unable to follow the mobile ICBMs and give an efficient warning before they are launched.

 

The admission was accompanied by the announcement that NORAD is reopening its nuclear-EMP-proof Cheyenne Mountain bunker,

The KN-08 is a road-capable, highly mobile ICBM, which can be hidden anywhere throughout the North Korea and could be fired on a short-countdown virtually undetectable by American intelligence. As Adm. Gortney further explained about the North’s KN-08 ICBM, “It’s the relocatable [highly-mobile, can go anywhere – ML] target set that really impedes our ability to find, fix, and finish the [KN-08] threat. And as the [KN-08] targets move around and if we don’t have a persistent stare [i.e., the ability to monitor its location at all times – ML] and persistent [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] that we do not have over North Korea at this time, that relocatable nature makes it very difficult for us to be able to counter it.”

Despite Adm. Gortney’s concerns, he still believes that if a KN-08 was fired at the US homeland, in the Admiral’s words – “Should one get airborne and come at us [the US homeland], I’m confident we would be able to knock it down.”

Even if this is true, it is not clear if the US ballistic defense could knock down an incoming North Korean ICBM in time, if the nuke is intended as an EMP weapon, which explodes soon after re-entering the atmosphere.

System can defend against Iran strike, too 

In another dramatic revelation, Adm. Gortney revealed that America’s anti-missile missile shield is not only configured to repulse a North Korean missile, but an Iranian ICBM as well. The Admiral explained that the current assessment is that the threat of an ICBM EMP strike comes from North Korea and not from Iran, but that the system could handle both scenarios. “Our system is designed for North Korea, and if we get our assessment wrong, for Iran. Its [the US homeland missile shield] is designed to defend the nation [the homeland] against both those particular threats today,” he said.

Experts have estimated that the KN-08 has a range of 5,600 miles and would be capable of hitting the US’s west coast if launched from North Korea. Experts also believe the missile is not accurate.

However, Adm. Gortney’s statement about North Korea’s nuke-capable KN-08 ICBM must be taken in the context of his simultaneous announcement of the Pentagon’s concern about an EMP-missile strikeon the United States homeland.

South Korean intelligence has long believed that North Korea has been developing an EMP-nuclear device. As early as June 2009, Kim Myong Chol, who was an “unofficial” spokesperson of the then-Supreme Leader Kim Jong-il, openly threatened use of a “high-altitude detonation of hydrogen bombs that would create a powerful electromagnetic pulse” bomb.” And, in November of 2013, South Korea’s intelligence service (NIS) issued a report to the South Korean parliament that North Korea had “purchased Russian electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weaponry to develop its own version” of a nuclear EMP device.

EMP strike on South Korea?

In 2005, then-USAF Major Colin Miller posited, in a public-domain US Air Force University thesis, that the North Koreans could tactically use a nuclear-EMP weapon on the Korean Peninsula to “level-the playing field” against the electronic dependent forces of the United States and South Korea.

The tactical North Korean EMP “decapitation” attack would likely bag as POWs the 40,000 living US marines now guarding South Koreabecause an EMP doesn’t kill human beings, only electronics.

A tactical nuclear-EMP aimed at South Korea would not need an ICBM to reach the 30-50 km level above the earth to explode. Rather, it would only need a much smaller short-range missile to achieve its suitable EMP-location above the Korean peninsula for an effective EMP detonation.

Given the degree of cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and North Korea, it is highly likely that any nuclear-EMP-technology mastered by North Korea has already been shared with Iran. Therefore, the EMP-proliferation danger from North Korea to Iran is a catastrophic danger.

North Korea has been threatening a pre-emptive nuclear strike on the US for two years, as explained in this ABC News report from 2013. At the time of the report, North Korea was said to be “years away” from a developing a missile that could hit the US: These “years” have apparently passed.

And yet, inexplicably, US President Barack Obama is currently negotiating a deal with Iran that he himself has admitted would enable it to manufacture its own nuclear weapons, 12-13 years after it is signed.

 

 

 

 

Categories: EMP attack, Foreign policy, Iran, Iran scam, Iranian EMPs, Iranian nukes, Iranian proxies, North Korea, North Korean nukes, Obama, P5+1, Rogue nations
Tags: , , , , , , , ,

Comments: 3 Comments

Iran, North Korea, nukes and Obama

March 30, 2015

Iran, North Korea, nukes and Obama, Dan Miller’s Blog, March 30, 2015

(The views expressed in this article are mine and do not necessarily reflect those of Warsclerotic or its other editors. — DM)

North Korea has ample nukes and wants money. Iran wants (and may already have) nukes, has money and will have more as sanctions are ended. The two rogue nations have long had a symbiotic relationship and it has not diminished. Yet “our” P5+1 negotiators, under the leadership of Obama’s minions, ignore that inconvenient problem as well as Iran’s missile development, “possible” nuclear weaponization and increasing regional hegemony.

I wrote about the Iran – North Korea connection back in 2013 in articles titled China, Iran and North Korea — a radioactive stew,  Iran, North Korea and Nuke Negotiations and elsewhere. As I noted in the radioactive stew article,

The main thing that puzzles me is why we continue to focus on Iran’s uranium enrichment. Is Iran (again) playing us for suckers? North Korea is fully capable of enriching uranium for Iran (or for anyone else) and would doubtless be happy to enrich as much as may be desired in exchange for the hard currency freely available to Iran if it were only to cease its own enrichment. North Korea needs the money and is not likely very particular about its sources. Just as our sanctions have not impacted Iran’s enrichment capabilities significantly, neither have they impacted those of North Korea. Perhaps we may awaken before it’s too late and notice Iran playing its Korean hole card in our high-stakes poker game.

We have not awakened and the problem has worsened since 2013.

Soure: American in North Korea

Soure: American in North Korea

In 2014, I summarized several earlier articles in one titled The Iran scam continues. There, I pointed out that the English language version of the interim P5+1 deal and the White House summary generally ignore “undisclosed” — but known — Iranian sites for missile and warhead development and the work done there– despite warnings from the International Atomic Energy Agency. I also noted the Iran – North Korea nexus. Again, the situation has become worse since then. As the magic date of March  31, 2015 arrives, Iran is still demanding – and likely will get — more and more concessions.

“The Iranians are again outplaying the Americans,” said one source in Europe familiar with the negotiations. “They know they’ll have to give up certain things eventually. So they’re digging in their heels on issues that mean everything and preparing to give ground on relatively minor issues—but not yet, and not until they see how much more the Americans are willing to give.” [Emphasis added.]

. . . .

“Iran has successfully dragged the administration toward their positions to attain massive concessions, and, sensing that kind of weakness, they are seeking to press their advantage to gain further ground on critical points,” according to the source, who added that on the sanctions relief front, Iran is seeking a rollback “without dismantling anything.” [Emphasis added.]

a1 Obama and Kahameni -building a toaster

What might Iran be willing to give up in order to get additional important concessions? How about stuff that North Korea will be pleased to do in exchange for a share of the extra funds Iran will have as sanctions are eliminated?

Occasionally but not often, news media raise the Iran – North Korea connection. For example, a March 29th article at the Washington Post by Ali Alfoneh and Reuel Marc Gerecht is titled What else is Iran hiding? Another article at the Daily Beast by Gordon G. Chang is titled Does Iran Have Secret Nukes in North Korea?

As noted in the Washington Post article,

The unfinished North Korean-designed reactor that was destroyed by Israeli planes on Sept. 6, 2007, at Deir al-Zour in Syria was in all likelihood an Iranian project, perhaps one meant to serve as a backup site for Iran’s own nuclear plants. We draw this conclusion because of the timing and the close connection between the two regimes: Deir al-Zour was started around the time Iran’s nuclear facilities were disclosed by an Iranian opposition group in 2002, and the relationship between Shiite-ruled Syria and Shiite Iran has been exceptionally tight since Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000. We also know — because Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former Iranian president and majordomo of the political clergy, proudly tells us in his multivolume autobiography — that sensitive Iranian-North Korean military cooperation began in 1989. Rafsanjani’s commentary leaves little doubt that the Iranian-North Korean nexus revolved around two items: ballistic missiles and nuclear-weapons technology. [Emphasis added.]

. . . .

The Iranian-North Korean contacts intensify in 1992, the year that Rafsanjani, with Rouhani at his side, launches a policy of commercial engagement with the Europeans. On Jan. 30, Rafsanjani receives intelligence minister Ali Fallahian and Mostafa Pourmohammadi, the ministry’s director of foreign espionage, to discuss “procurement channels for sensitive commodities.” On Feb. 8, Rafsanjani writes, “The North Koreans want oil, but have nothing to give in return but the special commodity. We, too, are inclined to solve their problem.” Rafsanjani orders defense minister Akbar Torkan to organize a task force to analyze the risks and benefits of receiving the “special commodity.” This task force recommends that the president accept the “risk of procuring the commodities in question.” Rafsanjani adds that “I discussed [this] with the Leader [Ayatollah Ali Khamenei] in more general terms and it was decided to take action based on the [task force’s] review.” [Emphasis added.]

It’s most unlikely that the “special commodity” and the technical know-how surrounding it have anything to do with ballistic missiles; Rafsanjani expresses anxiety that the “special commodity” could be intercepted by the United States, but doesn’t share this worry about missile procurement. In a March 9, 1992, journal entry, the cleric gloats about the U.S. Navy having tracked a North Korean ship bound for Syria but not two ships destined for Iran. Two days later, when the “special commodity” is unloaded, he writes: “The Americans were really embarrassed.” [Emphasis added.]

. . . .

Odds are good that North Korea helped to jump-start Iran’s nuclear-weapons program. If so, how long did this nefarious partnership continue?

Rouhani was Rafsanjani’s alter ego. He’s undoubtedly the right man to answer all of the PMD questions that the IAEA keeps asking and the Obama administration keeps avoiding. [Emphasis added.]

As noted at the Daily Beast article,

In October 2012, Iran began stationing personnel at a military base in North Korea, in a mountainous area close to the Chinese border. The Iranians, from the Ministry of Defense and associated firms, reportedly are working on both missiles and nuclear weapons. Ahmed Vahidi, Tehran’s minister of defense at the time, denied sending people to the North, but the unconfirmed dispatches make sense in light of the two states announcing a technical cooperation pact the preceding month.

. . . .

[N]o inspections of Iranian sites will solve a fundamental issue: As can be seen from the North Korean base housing Tehran’s weapons specialists, Iran is only one part of a nuclear weapons effort spanning the Asian continent. North Korea, now the world’s proliferation superstar, is a participant. China, once the mastermind, may still be a co-conspirator. Inspections inside the borders of Iran, therefore, will not give the international community the assurance it needs.

The cross-border nuclear trade is substantial enough to be called a “program.” Larry Niksch of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., estimates that the North’s proceeds from this trade with Iran are “between $1.5 billion and $2.0 billion annually.” A portion of this amount is related to missiles and miscellaneous items, the rest derived from building Tehran’s nuclear capabilities. [Emphasis added.]

Iran has bought a lot with its money. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, thought to be Tehran’s chief nuclear scientist, was almost certainly in North Korea at Punggye-ri in February 2013 to witness Pyongyang’s third atomic test. Reports put Iranian technicians on hand at the site for the first two detonations as well.

The North Koreans have also sold Iran material for bomb cores, perhaps even weapons-grade uranium. The Telegraph reported that in 2002 a barrel of North Korean uranium cracked open and contaminated the tarmac of the new Tehran airport.

. . . .

Even if Iran today were to agree to adhere to the Additional Protocol, it could still continue developing its bomb in North Korea, conducting research there or buying North Korean technology and plans. And as North Korean centrifuges spin in both known and hidden locations, the Kim regime will have a bigger stock of uranium to sell to the Iranians for their warheads. With the removal of sanctions, as the P5+1 is contemplating, Iran will have the cash to accelerate the building of its nuclear arsenal.

So while the international community inspects Iranian facilities pursuant to a framework deal, the Iranians could be busy assembling the components for a bomb elsewhere. In other words, they will be one day away from a bomb—the flight time from Pyongyang to Tehran—not one year as American and other policymakers hope. [Emphasis added.]

Why does the Obama administration persistently avoid raising the Iran – North Korea nexus? Perhaps doing so would scuttle the “negotiations” and thereby Obama’s dreams about His legacy. Perhaps Obama is keen for Iran to have, and be in a position to use, nukes to enhance its hegemony over the Middle East and to displace Israel as well as regional Arab allies in the Gulf states. Since Israel is unwilling to commit suicide in present circumstances by agreeing to a two state solution with Palestinians — intent upon and capable of causing her destruction — that may well be His only way to bring to fruition His desire for Middle east “peace” through submission and “social justice.”

to follow the Constitution. It's to old and too slow.

to transform the Middle East with social justice

Conclusions

The Iran – North Korea nexus, regardless of its importance, was not considered (or was considered but deemed too intractable to approach) when the framework for the P5+1 negotiations was decided and it will not be considered now. That’s bad and dangerous. If a deal with Iran evolves from the current mess, Obama will gloat about His legacy and the Mad Mullahs will gloat about having put one over on the weak and declining free world. That’s frustrating but otherwise of little consequence.

Because of the Iran – North Korea nexus, Iran would need little time to repair any damage Israel and/or her Arab allies might do to Iran’s existing or future nuclear infrastructure. What can and should be done? I wish I knew. Perhaps Iran’s borders could be sealed adequately to keep North Korean stuff out, but that would require an expensive long term commitment. Perhaps others will think of something better. I hope so.

Categories: Diplomacy, Foreign policy, Gulf states, International Community, Iran, Iran scam, Iranian missiles, Iranian nukes, Islamism, Israel, Kerry, Khamenei, Mad Mullahs, Middle East, North Korea, North Korean nukes, Obama, P5+1, Palestinians, Sanctions, Supreme Leader, Two state solution
Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Comments: Be the first to comment

Iran Nuclear Talks and North Korean Flashbacks

November 7, 2014

Iran Nuclear Talks and North Korean Flashbacks, Forbes, Claudia Rosett, November 7, 2014

(During Clinton’s efforts to achieve detente with North Korea, Wendy Sherman found hope for change — for the better —  in every hostile utterance from NK leaders. Now she is Obama’s boot on the ground in the P5+1 negotiations with Iran. What can possibly go right wrong? — DM)

Now, in the Obama administration’s increasingly desperate quest for an Iran deal, comes news that President Obama is proposing to Iran’s Khamenei, ruler of the world’s leading terror-sponsoring state, that Iran and the U.S. cooperate to fight the terrorists of ISIS. This has a familiar ring. Back in 2000, the visit of North Korea’s Vice Marshal Jo to the White House was preceded, shortly beforehand, by a “Joint U.S.-D.P.R.K. Statement on International Terrorism,” in which both the U.S. and North Korea agreed that “international terrorism poses an unacceptable threat to global peace and security.” Apparently this was all part of the negotiating process of finding common ground. What could go wrong? Not that anyone should pin all this on Wendy Sherman, who is just one particularly active cog in the Washington negotiating machine. But there’s a familiar script playing out here. It does not end well.

*****************

With the Iran nuclear talks nearing a Nov. 24 deadline for a deal, U.S. chief negotiator Wendy Sherman is under pressure to bring almost a year of bargaining to fruition. While U.S. policy rests ultimately with President Obama, and the most prominent American face in these talks is now that of Secretary of State John Kerry, the hands-on haggling has been the domain of Sherman. On the ground, she has been chief choreographer of the U.S. negotiating team. The President has been pleased enough with her performance to promote her last week from Under Secretary to Acting Deputy Secretary of State.

The talks themselves have been doing far less well, marked by Iranian demands and U.S. concessions. This summer the U.S. and its negotiating partners agreed to extend the original July deadline until November. Tehran’s regime, while enjoying substantial relief from sanctions, is refusing to give up its ballistic missile program and insisting on what Tehran’s officials have called their country’s “inalienable right” to enrich uranium.

The Obama administration badly wants a deal. This week The Wall Street Journal reported that last month Obama wrote a secret letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, which “appeared aimed both at buttressing the campaign against Islamic State and nudging Iran’s religious leader closer to a nuclear deal.” Speaking to reporters in Paris this week about the Iran nuclear negotiations, Kerry said “We believe it is imperative for a lot of different reasons to get this done.”

So, now that crunch time has arrived, what might we expect? If precedent is any guide, it’s worth revisiting Sherman’s record from her previous bout as a lead negotiator, toward the end of the second term of the Clinton administration. Back then, Sherman was trying to clinch an anti-proliferation missile deal with another rogue despotism, North Korea.

That attempt failed, but only after then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, together with Sherman, had dignified North Korean tyrant Kim Jong Il with a visit to Pyongyang in late October, 2000. These American top diplomats brought Kim the gift of a basketball signed by one of his favorite players, Michael Jordan. Kim entertained them with a stadium display in which tens of thousands of North Koreans used flip cards to depict the launch of a long-range missile.

Less well remembered was the encounter shortly before Albright’s trip to Pyongyang, in which the State Department hosted a visit to Washington, Oct. 9-12 of 2000, by one of the highest ranking military officials in North Korea, Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok. The centerpiece of Jo’s trip was a 45-minute face-to-face meeting at the White House, in the Oval Office, with President Clinton. It was historic, it was the first time an American president had met with an official of North Korea’s totalitarian state.

And it was a deft piece of extortion by North Korea, which had parlayed its missile program — including its missile trafficking to the Middle East, and its 1998 test-launch of a missile over Japan — into this lofty encounter in which the U.S. superpower was pulling out all the stops in hope of cutting a deal before Clinton’s second term expired in Jan., 2001. By 2000 (or, by some accounts, earlier) the Clinton administration was also seeing signs that North Korea was cheating on a 1994 denuclearization arrangement known as the Agreed Framework. Eight months before Jo arrived in Washington, Clinton had been unable to confirm to Congress that North Korea had abandoned its pursuit of a nuclear weapons program. Nonetheless, Jo’s visit rolled ahead, with Sherman enthusing in advance to the press that “Chairman Kim Jong Il has clearly made a decision — personally — to send a special Envoy to the United States to improve relations with us.”

Officially, Jo was hosted in Washington by Albright. But it was Sherman, then the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for North Korea Policy, who orchestrated the events, squired Jo around Washington and briefed the press. It was Sherman who had helped prepare the way while accompanying her predecessor, the previous North Korea policy coordinator and former defense secretary, William Perry, on a trip to North Korea in 1999.

Jo arrived in Washington on Oct. 9, staying at the venerable Mayflower Hotel, where Sherman went to greet him. The next morning Jo and his delegation began their rounds with a courtesy call on Albright at the State Department. Then, before heading to the White House, Jo engaged in a symbolically freighted act. According to an account published some years later in the Washington Post by the senior State Department Korean language interpreter, Tong Kim, who was present for the occasion: “The marshal arrived in Washington in a well-tailored suit, but before going to the White House, he asked for a room at the State Department, where he changed into his mustard-colored military uniform, with lines of heavy medals hanging on the jacket, and donned an impressive military hat with a thick gold band.” Perhaps it did not occur to anyone at the State Department that North Korea was still a hostile power, a brutal rogue state fielding one of the world’s largest standing armies, and that this donning of the uniform on State premises was not just a convenience, but an implied threat. Or perhaps the zealous hospitality of the occasion just over-rode any thought at all. In any event, it was in his uniform that Jo went from the State Department to the White House.

Following those meetings, Sherman briefed the press. She made a point of mentioning that Jo had worn a business suit to the State Department. but changed into full military uniform for his meeting with the President of the United States. Sherman chose to interpret Jo’s wardrobe change as happy evidence of North Korean diversity under Dear Leader Kim: “We think this is very important for American citizens to know that all segments of North Korea society, obviously led by Chairman Kim Chong-Il in sending this Special Envoy, are working to improve the relationship between the United States and North Korea and this is obviously an important message to the citizens of North Korea as well.”

Actually, there were substantial segments of North Korean society whose chief preoccupation was finding enough food to stay alive, toward the end of a 1990s famine in which an estimated one million or so had died — forbidden by Kim’s totalitarian state to enjoy even a hint of the freedom that had by then allowed their brethren in South Korea to join the developed world. This was known at the time, but did not figure in Sherman’s public remarks.

On the second evening of Jo’s Washington visit, Albright hosted a banquet for him and his delegation at the State Department. She welcomed the “distinguished group” to the “historic meeting,” and invited everyone to relax and get better acquainted. There was laughter and applause. Jo made a toast — a disturbing toast — in which he said there could be “friendship and cooperation and goodwill, if and when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and our leadership is assured, is given the strong and concrete security assurances from the United States for the state sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”

If the State Department’s chief North Korea policy coordinator, Wendy Sherman, noticed a problem with that toast, and its mention of territorial integrity, it seems she did nothing to alert the assembled American dignitaries. The crowd clapped and raised a toast to North Korea’s envoy. It was left to outside observers, such as American Enterprise Institute scholar and North Korea expert Nicholas Eberstadt, to point out, as Eberstadt stressed at an AEI forum in 2008, that North Korea lays claim to the entire Korean peninsula, including South Korea. “Take a look at the maps; take a look at the preamble to the Workers’ Party charter,” said Eberstadt; the real message is, “We can be friends with North Korea if we are willing to subsidize North Korean government behavior and throw South Korea into the bargain too, but that is a pretty high opening bid.”

Jo’s visit ended with a U.S.-D.P.R.K Joint Communique, full of talk about peace, security, transparency and access. There was no missile deal. Kim Jong Il wanted Clinton, leader of the free world, to come parley over missiles in totalitarian, nuclear-cheating Pyongyang. Clinton demurred. In late October, Albright and Sherman went instead. As the clock ticked down on the final weeks of the Clinton administration, Sherman reportedly traveled to Africa with a bag of cold-weather clothes, to be ready in the event of a last-minute summons to North Korea.

In 2001, President Bush was inaugurated. Sherman left the State Department, and soon afterward she wrote an Op-ed for The New York Times, headlined “Talking to the North Koreans.” Sherman noted that “Some are understandably concerned that a summit with President Bush would only legitimize the North Korean leader” — nonetheless, she urged Bush to try it. Bush tried confrontation in 2002 over North Korea’s nuclear cheating, followed by years of Sherman-style Six-Party Talks, including two agreements, in 2005 and 2007, which North Korea punctuated in 2006 with its first nuclear test, and has followed during Obama’s presidency with two more nuclear tests, in 2009 and 2013.

Vice-Marshal Jo died in 2010. Kim Jong Il died in 2011, and was succeeded by his son, current North Korean tyrant Kim Jong Un, whose regime carried out the 2013 nuclear test, and threatened earlier this year to conduct another. Wendy Sherman rejoined the State Department under Obama, and has moved on from wooing North Korea to the bigger and potentially far deadlier project of negotiating a nuclear deal with Iran. Considerable secrecy has surrounded many specifics of these talks, while Americans have been asked to trust that this is all for their own good. In a talk last month at Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies, Sherman said: “As Madeleine Albright once observed — a wonderful Secretary of State, a dear friend, and a business partner to boot at one point in my life — negotiations are like mushrooms, and often they do best in the dark.”

Now, in the Obama administration’s increasingly desperate quest for an Iran deal, comes news that President Obama is proposing to Iran’s Khamenei, ruler of the world’s leading terror-sponsoring state, that Iran and the U.S. cooperate to fight the terrorists of ISIS. This has a familiar ring. Back in 2000, the visit of North Korea’s Vice Marshal Jo to the White House was preceded, shortly beforehand, by a “Joint U.S.-D.P.R.K. Statement on International Terrorism,” in which both the U.S. and North Korea agreed that “international terrorism poses an unacceptable threat to global peace and security.” Apparently this was all part of the negotiating process of finding common ground. What could go wrong? Not that anyone should pin all this on Wendy Sherman, who is just one particularly active cog in the Washington negotiating machine. But there’s a familiar script playing out here. It does not end well.

Categories: Iran, Iranian nukes, Islamic State, Kerry, Nukes, Obama, P5+1, Rouhani, Supreme Leader, Terrorism, Wendy Sherman
Tags: , , , , , ,

Comments: Be the first to comment

Newer Entries »