Posted tagged ‘Iranian elections’

Iran: The Deep State Endures

March 9, 2016

Iran: The Deep State Endures, Gatestone InstituteLawrence A. Franklin, March 9, 2016

♦ Western governments need to accept the harsh reality that the Islamic Republic of Iran remains a revolutionary regime. The IRGC has responsibility over all ballistic missile programs and research and development. The West also needs to internalize that all decisions over ballistic missiles and associated delivery systems, the pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, export of the revolution, aggressive support of the Shi’a ascendancy in the Gulf and militant acts of inhumanity towards their own people are made by the deep state.

♦ In short, the Iranian regime is much more Islamic than a Republic. The regime’s most reviled and inveterate enemies remain Israel and the United States.

♦ Those Iranians opposed to the existing order have been broken physically and psychologically by a combination of regime cruelty and lack of support from the world’s democracies.

Despite the voluminous and biased reporting about the conclusions that should be drawn from Iran’s recent Majles (Consultative Assembly) elections, the results signify next to nothing.[1] Hundreds of candidates are disqualified from running by the Council of Guardians (COG) if they are judged to be opposed to the current Islamic regime, or on grounds of “moral turpitude” and other reasons that would be irrelevant in a true democracy. When given the limited choice from a thoroughly vetted set of pro-regime candidates, all of whom favor Islamic rule, the people will always vote for the more “liberal” of the alternatives. This is hardly surprising in a country where the existing martial, theocratic order remains highly unpopular.

Whatever the balance in the Majles between hardliners and those members who may be a bit more flexible on some economic and social issues, it matters little. There will always be a significant number of deputies who are former IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) men, and who will hector a President’s cabinet members and political allies about decisions which run afoul of “deep state” institutions.[2]

20101112fireIran’s Majles (Consultative Assembly). Image source: Mahdi Sigari/Wikimedia Commons

The political superstructure of Iran’s government is much like that of the former Soviet Union. The office of the President, the Majles, and the Civil/Criminal Court System have little real decision-making power in the Islamic Republic. They are more for show, for the people to let off steam, and for foreign observers who might imagine that from there, the seeds of democracy might take root.

Similar to all of the illusions and wishful thinking of the past, the Rouhani era will not usher in an Iran which will conduct itself like a conventional member of the nation-state system. The aforementioned superstructure institutions will remain superficial. Indeed, they serve as screen for the deep state institutions, which will not evolve. The unelected leaders of Iran’s deep state institutions are even more powerful today. No election has resulted in diminution of their power. These substructure institutions — the Council of Guardians, the Assembly of Experts, the Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS), the IRGC’s Intelligence Bureau, the Special Courts, and the Office of the Supreme Leader — remain largely insulated from external pressure and domestic transitory moods.

Western governments need to accept the harsh reality that the Islamic Republic of Iran remains a revolutionary regime. The IRGC has responsibility over all ballistic missile programs and research and development. The West also needs to internalize that all decisions over ballistic missiles[3] and associated delivery systems, the pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, export of the revolution,[4] aggressive support of the Shi’a ascendancy in the Gulf [5] and militant acts of inhumanity towards their own people are made by the deep state.

In short, the regime remains much more Islamic than a Republic. The regime’s most reviled and inveterate enemies remain Israel and the United States.

Moreover, those Iranians opposed to the existing order have been broken physically and psychologically by a combination of regime cruelty and lack of support from the world’s democracies.[6] The people, though sullen, appear resigned to their fate. The dispirited state of the populace has proven advantageous for the ruling clique of the regime’s Praetorian Guard, the IRGC, the politically reactionary mullahs, and the economy’s kleptocrat-bureaucrats to rule with virtual impunity.

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[1] A Majles in Islamic governments is more of a consultative assembly rather than a legislative body. It is more of a sounding board for various political constituencies. In fact, the original meaning of the term referred to a Council of Tribes. “The Oxford Dictionary of Islam” by John Esposito, 2003, p. 187. In Iran, it is the Council of Guardians which (Shuraya-e-Negahban) decides whether any bill passed by the Majles is theologically compatible with the Koran and Islam. See “Who Rules Iran” by Wilfried Buchta, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2000, p. 59.A slightly different version of this institution is the Loya Jirga in Afghanistan.

[2] “Who Rules Iran: The structure of Power in the Islamic Republic” by Wilfried Buchta. See Chapter III: “The Internal Political Struggle (1997-2000). All of Iran’s previous six Presidents before Hassan Rouhani were victims of tense vocal challenges to Presidential and/or Cabinet level decisions. This was particularly true during President Khatami’s two terms (1997-2005).

[3] See Michael Eisenstadt’s Chapter on “Iran’s Military Dimension” in “Iran Under Khatami,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998.

[4] “Islam and Revolution” by Imam Khomeini. Mizan Press: Berkeley, California, 1981. Imam Khomeini outlined in detail in his speeches and writings the Islamic Republic’s worldwide mission to establish Allah’s Kingdom on earth.

[5] Iran has dispatched thousands of troops, military advisers, militia warriors and spies to assist Shi’a causes in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Bahrain.

[6] See the HBO Film “For Neda” which focuses on the millions of protesters challenging the presidential election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to a second term in 2009. The film quotes the regime as claiming that the President had received 63% of the vote. During the student led protests in 1999 and the widespread national demonstrations after the fraudulent re-election of Ahmadinejad in 2009, the world’s democracies amounted to muted vocal support.

No new dawn in Iran

March 1, 2016

No new dawn in Iran, Israel Hayom, Ruthie Blum, March 1, 2016

For the past three years, the West has been tricking itself into seeing the Islamic Republic of Iran as a country undergoing a gradual process of reform. The outcome of Friday’s two elections — one for the Majlis (parliament) and the other for the Assembly of Experts — is serving as the latest mirage in the delusion.

In 2013, when Hassan Rouhani replaced Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president of Iran, the United States and Europe took it as a sign of a new dawn. Even Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the chief mullah controlling Iran’s “elected” leader, came to understand that Rouhani was preferable to the volatile and fanatic Ahmadinejad, whose repeated pronouncements about wiping Israel off the map before attending to America were not serving Tehran in good stead.

Rouhani’s appearance on the international stage provided particular fantasy-fodder for supporters of a diplomatic solution to the problem of Iran’s race to obtain nuclear weapons and to guarantee its regional, and eventually global, hegemony.

Those people today feel vindicated for two reasons. The first is that world powers finally did reach a nuclear deal with Iran. The second is that Rouhani’s “pro-deal” camp emerged victorious in the latest parliamentary election, and two of the most hard-line ayatollahs were voted out of the Assembly of Experts, the body charged with appointing the supreme leader. And considering Khamenei’s advancing age and questionable health, this clerical assembly, which sits for eight years, is likely to end up selecting his successor.

To understand why the above is no cause for celebration, two crucial things need to be kept in mind: the only thing the nuclear deal accomplished was to enable Iran to step up its nuclear program, but with lots more money at its disposal; and Rouhani is no moderate.

Indeed, Iran continues to assert its right to nuclear power, while flexing its military muscles nearly daily by testing missiles and threatening the West not to intervene. In addition, celebrations less than three weeks ago marking the anniversary of the 1979 revolution that turned Iran into an Islamic state included chants of “death to America,” “death to Israel” and a reenactment of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy’s humiliation of U.S. sailors who had strayed into Tehran’s territorial waters.

A review of Rouhani’s record also leaves little room for optimism. Though the Shiite cleric was not Khamenei’s preferred choice, he would never have been approved as a candidate in the first place if his revolutionary credentials had not been impeccable. And they certainly were.

Rouhani was a long-time Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini loyalist, who has always backed and spearheaded the quelling of any popular protests, employing any bloody means to nip them in the bud. The only real difference between him and his predecessor is in his strategic understanding of how to accomplish Iran’s goals by presenting himself as more palatable to the West.

In 1992, his eldest son committed suicide, leaving a note to this very effect, saying, “I hate your government, your lies, your corruption, your religion, your double-dealing and your hypocrisy. I am ashamed to live in an environment in which I am forced to lie to my friends every day and tell them that my father is not part of all this — to tell them that my father loves the nation and to know that the reality is far from this. I get nauseated when I see you, father, kissing Khamenei’s hand.”

But it was his resume that made Rouhani such an appropriate nuclear negotiator, a role he fulfilled for years. Addressing Iran’s Supreme Cultural Revolution Council in September 2005, he explained the purpose of being a wolf in sheep’s clothing: “While we were talking with the Europeans in Tehran, we were installing equipment in parts of the Isfahan facility,” he said. “By creating a calm environment, we were able to complete the work.”

It is this tactic that puts Rouhani in the “pragmatist” camp.

In July, after the completion of the nuclear deal was first announced — and then disputed as to its contents, perceived differently in Washington and Tehran — Rouhani made a speech to the Iranian public.

“Peace and blessings upon the pure souls of the prophets and the holy men, the great Prophet of Islam [Muhammad], the imams, the imam of the martyrs [Khomeini], and the exalted martyrs, especially the nuclear [scientists], and peace and blessings upon the Hidden Imam,” he began.

“We aspired to achieve four goals: The first was to continue the nuclear capabilities, the nuclear technology, and even the nuclear activity. The second was to remove the mistaken, oppressive, and inhuman sanctions. The third was to remove the Security Council resolutions that we see as illegitimate. The fourth was to remove the nuclear dossier from Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and the Security Council in general. All four goals have been achieved today.”

He later referred to Israel’s warnings about the deal. “The people in Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and Lebanon are happy, too, because the hollow efforts of the oppressive Zionist regime to thwart the negotiations during the past 23 months have failed,” he said, ending with a message to the Arab countries of the region.

“Do not be misled by the propaganda of the Zionist regime and the evil-mongers of this [Iranian] nation,” he cautioned. “Iran and its might are always your might. We see the security of the region as our security, and the stability of the region as our stability.”

Let us not kid ourselves. Rouhani’s showing in the elections does not signify a new era of freedom for the Iranian people. Nor does it indicate a shift away from the regime’s sponsorship of global terrorism. On the contrary, if anything, it could provide American voters with a false sense of national — and international — security that is utterly unwarranted.

Fundamentalists and Revolutionary Guards steal Iran’s elections

February 26, 2016

Fundamentalists and Revolutionary Guards steal Iran’s elections, DEBKAfile, February 26, 2016

Rafsanjani_RouhaniOpposition leaders to Khamenei Hashemi Rafsanjani (l.) and President Hassan Rouhani

US President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Kerry fondly hoped that the nuclear agreement signed with Iran would bring to the surface a new type of leader – more liberal and less liable to restart the nuclear program – in the twin elections taking place in the Islamic Republic Friday, Feb. 26.

They are in for a disappointment, say DEBKAfile’s Iran analysts.

But one change is almost certain. The Iranian voter will be choosing for the first time on one day a new parliament (Majlis) and the Assembly of Experts, the only body competent to choose the republic’s next supreme leader. The incumbent, 75-year-old Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is not expected to outlast the four-year term of the next Assembly of Experts. He has been struggling with prostate cancer for more than five years. Treatment and surgery have failed to halt its spread to other parts of his body. And strong medication is necessary to keep him looking alert and vigorous in his public appearances.

Speculation is already rife in Tehran about who the next Assembly of Experts will choose as his successor.

Seen from the perspective of Iran’s Islamic regime, the supreme leader’s overarching duty is to continue the legacy of its revolutionary founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his successor, Ali Khamenei.

Rather than meeting the expectations of the US president, his main job is to continue strengthening Iran on its path of religious extremism, ideological subversion, export of the Shiite revolution (by terror) and the continuation of the nuclear program.

The biggest political bombshell of the election campaign was a proposal by former President Hashemi Rafsanjani to establish a national leadership council now, instead of choosing a new leader later. This was intended to replace the single dictatorial rule of the supreme leader by a collective leadership.

Iran’s fundamentalists, especially the powerful Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), were in uproar about a proposal they viewed as so dangerous for the regime that they threatened to confiscate the Rafsanjani clan’s extensive property and put him on trial for corruption and fraud.

His beloved son Mahdi has already been in jail for months on those charges.

But Rafsanjani is not easily cowed. He knew that if he backed down, the extremists would crack down on him still harder.

So this week, he announced that he had pulled the strings which gave Hassan Rouhani victory in the last presidential election. And, in the campaign leading up to the Assembly of Experts vote, he threw his support behind a moderate cleric, Hassan Khomeini, who happens to be the grandson of the Islamic regime’s iconic founder.

The IRGC and radical mullahs thereupon launched an offensive to thwart what they believed to be Rafsanjani’s dangerous plan to establish a triumvirate with Rouhani and Khomeini Junior to head a future government.

Senior radical clerics, such as ayatollahs Ahama Alam-Alhoda, Mohammad Mesbah-Yazdi, Ahmad Jannati, and Mohammad Yazi, slandered him and fought to remove his candidates for the twin slates.

They branded the former president and members of a “reformist” list as British agents, a particularly malicious charge because the UK is still seen in Iran as a symbol of colonialism and meddler in foreign politics.

Ayatollah Khamenei himself harshly denounced “foreign agents” as “addicted to foreign influence,” who should be barred from the Assembly of Experts.

Young Khomenei saw the light and withdrew his candidacy for its membership. But Rafsanjani stood out to the last as a central figure in the two campaigns, even after a majority of the candidates condemned as “moderates and reformists” were barred from the elections.

In the end, the two slates were left with no more than 30 moderate candidates out of a total of 3,000 vying for the 375 seats in the two bodies.

Their defeat as a group was predestined, and the two elections leave Iran more politically and religiously radicalized than before.

A key figure expected to take center stage in the new parliament is Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, whose daughter is married to Khamenei’s mover-and-shaker son. Another is Haddad-Adel, one of Khamenei’s top advisers, who heads a faction of religious fundamentalists and IRGC officers. He is the frontrunner to succeed Ali Larijani as Speaker of the next Majlis.

They are all expected to gang up to prevent President Rouhani from running for a second term when it runs out in two years – contrary to the Obama administration’s hopes. They will also do their best to make him a lame duck and whipping boy for all the country’s economic ills for the remainder of his presidency.

He will find the new parliament less cooperative than the outgoing House under Larijani when he tries to introduce liberal policies.

Unofficial results of the two elections are expected to be released Friday night. The extremists and hardliners have engineered them so that they will win big and set Iran on a course that it is even more radical than before on such key issues as its nuclear weapons program and intervention in Syria and other Middle East conflicts. They will keep the feud with Saudi Arabia alive and pursue every possible means of venting their bottomless hatred of Israel and seeking its destruction.