Archive for the ‘Nuclear option’ category

The Iran Deal’s Disastrous Legacy Has Nothing to Do with Nukes

May 10, 2018


AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi

Noah Rothman / May 9, 2018 Commentary Magazine

Source: The Iran Deal’s Disastrous Legacy Has Nothing to Do with Nukes

{In other words, things are a whole lot worse. – LS}

In March, State Department veteran and former adviser to Barack Obama, Frederic Hof, bid farewell to public life with a stunning admission. Amid a confession regarding his failure to prevent the expansion of the Syrian civil war into a regional crisis, Hof laid the blame for that all-consuming conflict (as well as a notable uptick in Russian aggression) at the feet of Barack Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran.

“[T]he administration sacrificed Syrian civilians and American credibility for the mistaken notion that Iran required appeasement in Syria as the price for a nuclear agreement,” Hof wrote. Today, with 500,000 dead, millions displaced, and the norm prohibiting chemical-weapons use shattered, we can confirm that the price of appeasement is as high as ever.

Indeed, the Iran nuclear deal was supposed to have a variety of positive knock-on effects entirely unrelated to the development of nuclear weapons, but they never materialized. As New York Times reporters David Sanger and David Kirkpatrick observe, Obama “regarded Iran as potentially a more natural ally” of the United States than America’s Sunni allies in Cairo, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh. Iran is urbane, young, educated, and chafing under its theological government. The opening up of the Iranian economy in a post-deal world, so the thinking went, would facilitate—even necessitate—domestic liberalization. Purely out of self-interest, the Mullahs would soon agree to pare back their support for destabilizing activities in the region and cooperate with the West to “defeat the Islamic State.”

All these ambitious objectives went unrealized in the years that passed since the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA) adoption. That is not to say that the JCPOA failed to induce some tectonic shifts in the region. The Obama administration’s effort to empower Iran and its Shiite proxies in the region compelled the Middle East’s Sunni states to rethink their alliances. The regularization of contacts between Washington and Tehran for the first time in nearly 40 years forced longtime foes, Israel and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, into a de facto pact. And just like that, the region’s all-consuming Palestinian question faded into the background. The remarkable diminution of the central issue of what we used to call the Middle East Peace Process underscores how stabilizing America’s forward posture can be, for good or for ill. It also demonstrates how American withdrawal can scramble regional dynamics with unforeseeable consequences.

Ultimately, the most welcome revelation the Iran nuclear deal has wrought is one to which only the accord’s most prideful defenders remain resistant. There can be no permanent accommodation with the regime in Tehran. The Islamic Republic can only be contained and weakened, with the eventual—if unstated—aim of nudging it toward radical democratic reform and, ultimately, dissolution.

Since Donald Trump announced his decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, the deal’s defenders and its detractors have largely argued over one another’s heads. The deal’s champions insist that everyone from IAEA inspectors to the Trump administration’s defense secretary and former secretary of state has certified that Iran is abiding by the arrangement. This is a red herring. Most of the deal’s opponents do not dispute that Iran is nominally in compliance with the terms of the deal. That’s the problem.

Iran can unilaterally deny international observers access to military sites, and it can shield an extensive trove of technical knowledge related to its nuclear program from inspectors. It can import tons of low-enriched uranium, manufacture nuclear fuel, test nuclear-capable delivery vehicles, and restart its centrifuges and develop a stockpile of fissionable material within weeks rather than a year. None of this is a violation of the terms of the JCPOA and its annexes. This experience has led even some of the deal’s defenders to confess that the regime in Tehran will never be a stabilizing and responsible force. Even Iran-deal proponents like Democratic Connecticut Senator Chris Murphy have confessed as much. “We have to continue to send signals to the Iranian people that, ultimately, what will secure the United States and our friends in Israel, in the long run, is for the Iranian people to demand that moderate, internationalist leadership ultimately prevail in the power struggles that are happening inside that country,” he said.

Bad news, Senator Murphy: This is what “moderate, internationalist leadership” in the Islamic Republic of Iran looks like. Iranian president Hassan Rouhani’s supposedly moderate credentials led Barack Obama to attempt to elevate and legitimize him through direct personal contacts, but there is nothing moderate about any element of the Iranian regime. A half a million deaths later and with no end in sight, this moderate Iranian president continues to back up the blood-soaked Assad regime. It has used the unfrozen assets and access to new markets attributable to the Iran deal to increase its defense spending by 30 percent and augment its support for rogue elements in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen even as consumer-goods prices skyrocket and the public takes to the streets. This is the moderate regime that holds American sailors hostage and parades them on television in violation of the Geneva Conventions. This regime persecutes and jails journalists, disenfranchises Christians, and executes homosexuals. These acts, Rouhani said in 2014, are “God’s commandments.”

If Murphy’s admission that the current Iranian regime will not be able to guarantee American security or regional peace is a cognitive breakthrough, it is one of many that the Iran deal has wrought. The Saudi awakening, the disillusionment of Obama officials like Hof, and the realignment of the Middle East follow in the wake of the Iran deal, as do bloody conflicts in Yemen, Syria, and Ukraine that resulted from great powers testing their boundaries in a new post-JCPOA environment.

When a full accounting of the Iran deal is done, it will be hard to avoid the conclusion that nuclear weapons were the least of our concerns.

 

Iran wants to renegotiate parts of the nuke “deal.” That may be good.

September 22, 2015

Iran wants to renegotiate parts of the nuke “deal.” That may be good. Dan Miller’s Blog, September 22, 2015

(The views expressed in this article are mine and do not necessarily reflect those of Warsclerotic or those of its other editors. — DM)

 

Iran wants sanctions relief to be lifted, immediately, and not merely suspended. Iran should not get that. If it doesn’t, it may well terminate the “deal” unilaterally. If Iran gets what it wants, the Senate should review the “deal” as a treaty and reject it. Either outcome would be a substantial improvement over the current “deal” and the morass in which it is embedded.

This post is based on a September 21st article at Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) titled “Expected September 28 NY Meeting Between P5+1 Foreign Ministers And Iran Could Signify Reopening Of Nuclear Negotiations To Address Khamenei’s September 3 Threat That If Sanctions Are Not Lifted, But Merely Suspended, There Will Be No Agreement.”

The MEMRI article cites statements by Supreme Leader Khamenei and one of his senior advisers, Ali Akbar Velayat. The latter said, on September 19th,  “the nuclear negotiations are not over yet.” Khamenei has said much the same thing.

Khamenei said, in a September 3, 2015 speech to the Assembly of Experts, that he did not accept the terms of the agreement and demanded that the sanctions be immediately lifted rather than merely suspended; otherwise, he said, there would either be no agreement, or Iran too would merely suspend its execution of its obligations under the JCPOA.

. . . .

“Freezing or suspension [of the sanctions] is unacceptable to me… If they suspend [the sanctions], we too will suspend [what is incumbent upon us]. If we are to implement what [is required of us], the sanctions must be [actually] cancelled.

Iran has thus made clear that it will not abide by the nuke “deal” as written; unless it gets the changes it now demands, it will either terminate the deal or violate it. If, as seems likely for the reasons cited in the MEMRI article, the September 28th meeting involves discussion of the deal, it will either be renegotiated or it won’t be.

If the “deal” is not renegotiated, or is renegotiated and Iran does not get what it demands, it may very well terminate the deal. Iran has already received substantial sanctions relief, is already open for business and is already doing lots of it with many more nations than previously. Termination would be a rebuff to the “Great Satan,” would not damage Iran much economically and it could proceed with its “peaceful” nuke program without even farcical nuke self-inspections.

If The Obama administration and others cave and Iran gets what it demands or enough to satisfy it, the “deal” will be very different from what was previously presented to the Congress under the Corker legislation. That legislation purported to eliminate the constitutional requirement of approval of the “deal” by a two-thirds Senate majority before going into effect and permitted it to go into effect unless rejected by half of the membership of both houses; Obama promised to veto such a rejection and put the “deal” into effect. The House has disapproved the “deal” but the Senate has not acted because of Democrat fillibusters, urged by the White House. Under the new “deal,” the ability of the United States to “snap back” sanctions would be vitiated; a possible but very difficult if not impossible to accomplish, “snap back” had been among the reasons cited by many of those who favored the “deal” (often despite its many other flaws) for supporting it.

If a deal eliminating the “snap back” is struck, Obama, et al, may well claim that it’s none of the business of the Congress since, by virtue of the Corker legislation, it has already eliminated its constitutional authority to deal with the JCPOA as a treaty, regardless of any “minor” change.

I hope, but am less than confident, that both houses of the Congress will reject this contention vigorously and repeal the Corker legislation. Whatever benefits or other legitimacy the Corker legislation may once have been thought to have it no longer has. Repeal will probably require use of the “nuclear option” to invoke cloture to end a Democrat filibuster in the Senate. If — as seems likely — Obama vetoes the rejection, the Congress should state that it no longer considers itself bound by the Corker legislation. Next, the Senate should treat the renegotiated “deal” as a treaty, regardless of whether Obama agrees to send it to the Senate, and reject it. It should do so even if, as also seems likely, that requires use of the “nuclear option” to invoke cloture.

Obama has precipitated what may well become a constitutional crisis. If the Congress does its job, Obama will be the loser and America will be the winner — even if it becomes necessary to take out Iran’s nukes militarily.

The nuclear option to stop the nuclear Iran?

September 16, 2015

The nuclear option to stop the nuclear Iran? Power LineSteven Hayward, September 16, 2015

No, I’m not talking about using nuclear weapons to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons, though I have several times over the last few years heard from very knowledgeable and well-placed people in the defense and foreign policy community that if it comes down to Israel having to defend itself alone against the imminent deployment of Iranian nukes they might have to resort to using their nuclear capacities to stop it, because they lack our conventional capacity to penetrate Iran’s hardened nuclear facilities. It would be an awful moment for the world as well as Israel itself, but it serves as a prompt to ponder the consequences of Obama’s obvious decision to take U.S. military action off the table.

Rather, I’m speaking of using the so-called “nuclear option” in the Senate to abolish the filibuster for a vote on the disapproval of this terrible agreement, which right now Senate Democrats will block with a filibuster so they don’t have to go on record with a vote, and so Obama won’t have to cast an unpopular veto. With polls showing that public support for the Iran agreement is as low as 21 percent, Senate Republicans can quote Harry Reid’s arguments for invoking the “nuclear option” for confirming judges last session: surely having the Senate cast a vote on this treaty is way more important than confirming judges? Make Obama veto the bill disapproving the deal, and make Senate Democrats vote against overriding the veto.

If the Senate GOP took this step, it would go a long way toward showing the conservative grassroots that they can indeed stand up to Obama and the Democrats on the Hill. Plus they’d be reasserting their constitutional duty to render “advice and consent” on treaties, even if Obama has evaded this constitutional requirement by calling it an “executive agreement.”