Rosen: Obama Administration Extensively Deceived Public, Media to Sell Iran Nuclear Deal, Fox News via YouTube, May 9, 2016
(The video is about the secret bilateral negotiations between the Obama administration and Iranian officials. Please see also, Obama, the Iran Scam, Ben Rhodes and Public Credulity. — DM)
Why Middle Eastern Leaders Are Talking to Putin, Not Obama, Politico, Dennis Ross, May 8, 2016
John Hinderaker at Power Line writes,
Dennis Ross is a respected, if thoroughly conventional, expert on the Middle East. A Democrat, he has served in both Republican and Democratic administrations as an adviser and envoy. Ross served in the State Department as Hillary Clinton’s Special Advisor for the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. Subsequently, he joined President Obama’s National Security Council staff as a Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for the Central Region, which includes the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Pakistan and South Asia. So when Ross writes, in Politico, that Obama’s foreign policy weakness is hurting American interests, we should take notice.
— DM)
Putin and Middle Eastern leaders understand the logic of coercion. It is time for us to reapply it.
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The United States has significantly more military capability in the Middle East today than Russia—America has 35,000 troops and hundreds of aircraft; the Russians roughly 2,000 troops and, perhaps, 50 aircraft—and yet Middle Eastern leaders are making pilgrimages to Moscow to see Vladimir Putin these days, not rushing to Washington. Two weeks ago, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to see the Russian president, his second trip to Russia since last fall, and King Salman of Saudi Arabia is planning a trip soon. Egypt’s president and other Middle Eastern leaders have also made the trek to see Putin.
Why is this happening, and why on my trips to the region am I hearing that Arabs and Israelis have pretty much given up on President Barack Obama? Because perceptions matter more than mere power: The Russians are seen as willing to use power to affect the balance of power in the region, and we are not.
Putin’s decision to intervene militarily in Syria has secured President Bashar Assad’s position and dramatically reduced the isolation imposed on Russia after the seizure of Crimea and its continuing manipulation of the fighting in Ukraine. And Putin’s worldview is completely at odds with Obama’s. Obama believes in the use of force only in circumstances where our security and homeland might be directly threatened. His mindset justifies pre-emptive action against terrorists and doing more to fight the Islamic State. But it frames U.S. interests and the use of force to support them in very narrow terms. It reflects the president’s reading of the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, and helps to explain why he has been so reluctant to do more in Syria at a time when the war has produced a humanitarian catastrophe, a refugee crisis that threatens the underpinnings of the European Union, and helped to give rise to Islamic State. And, it also explains why he thinks that Putin cannot gain—and is losing—as a result of his military intervention in Syria.
But in the Middle East it is Putin’s views on the uses of coercion, including force to achieve political objectives, that appears to be the norm, not the exception—and that is true for our friends as well as adversaries. The Saudis acted in Yemen in no small part because they feared the United States would impose no limits on Iranian expansion in the area, and they felt the need to draw their own lines. In the aftermath of the nuclear deal, Iran’s behavior in the region has been more aggressive, not less so, with regular Iranian forces joining the Revolutionary Guard now deployed to Syria, wider use of Shiite militias, arms smuggling into Bahrain and the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, and ballistic missile tests.
Russia’s presence has not helped. The Russian military intervention turned the tide in Syria and, contrary to Obama’s view, has put the Russians in a stronger position without imposing any meaningful costs on them. Not only are they not being penalized for their Syrian intervention, but the president himself is now calling Vladimir Putin and seeking his help to pressure Assad—effectively recognizing who has leverage. Middle Eastern leaders recognize it as well and realize they need to be talking to the Russians if they are to safeguard their interests. No doubt, it would be better if the rest of the world defined the nature of power the way Obama does. It would be better if, internationally, Putin were seen to be losing. But he is not.
This does not mean that we are weak and Russia is strong. Objectively, Russia is declining economically and low oil prices spell increasing financial troubles—a fact that may explain, at least in part, Putin’s desire to play up Russia’s role on the world stage and his exercise of power in the Middle East. But Obama’s recent trip to Saudi Arabia did not alter the perception of American weakness and our reluctance to affect the balance of power in the region. The Arab Gulf states fear growing Iranian strength more than they fear the Islamic State—and they are convinced that the administration is ready to acquiesce in Iran’s pursuit of regional hegemony. Immediately after the president’s meeting at the Gulf Cooperation Council summit, Abdulrahman al-Rashed, a journalist very well connected to Saudi leaders, wrote: “Washington cannot open up doors to Iran allowing it to threaten regional countries … while asking the afflicted countries to settle silently.”
As I hear on my visits to the region, Arabs and Israelis alike are looking to the next administration. They know the Russians are not a force for stability; they count on the United States to play that role. Ironically, because Obama has conveyed a reluctance to exercise American power in the region, many of our traditional partners in the area realize they may have to do more themselves. That’s not necessarily a bad thing unless it drives them to act in ways that might be counterproductive. For example, had the Saudis been more confident about our readiness to counter the Iranian-backed threats in the region, would they have chosen to go to war in Yemen—a costly war that not surprisingly is very difficult to win and that has imposed a terrible price? Obama has been right to believe that the regional parties must play a larger role in fighting the Islamic State. He has, unfortunately, been wrong to believe they would do so if they thought we failed to see the bigger threat they saw and they doubted our credibility.
Indeed, so long as they question American reliability, there will be limits to how much they will expose themselves—whether in fighting the Islamic State, not responding to Russian entreaties, or even thinking about assuming a role of greater responsibility for Palestinian compromises on making peace with Israel. To take advantage of their recognition that they may need to run more risks and assume more responsibility in the region, they will want to know that America’s word is good and there will be no more “red lines” declared but unfulfilled; that we see the same threats they do; and that U.S. leaders understand that power affects the landscape in the region and will not hesitate to reassert it.
Several steps would help convey such an impression:
⧫ Toughen our declaratory policy toward Iran about the consequences of cheating on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to include blunt, explicit language on employing force, not sanctions, should the Iranians violate their commitment not to pursue or acquire a nuclear weapon;
⧫ Launch contingency planning with GCC states and Israel—who themselves are now talking—to generate specific options for countering Iran’s growing use of Shiite militias to undermine regimes in the region. (A readiness to host quiet three-way discussions with Arab and Israeli military planners would signal we recognize the shared threat perceptions, the new strategic realities, and the potentially new means to counter both radical Shiite and Sunni threats.)
⧫ Be prepared to arm the Sunni tribes in Iraq if Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi continues to be blocked from doing so by the Iranians and the leading militias;
⧫ In Syria, make clear that if the Russians continue to back Assad and do not force him to accept the Vienna principles (a cease-fire, opening humanitarian corridors, negotiations and a political transition), they will leave us no choice but to work with our partners to develop safe havens with no-fly zones.
Putin and Middle Eastern leaders understand the logic of coercion. It is time for us to reapply it.
Iran’s Plans to Control a Palestinian State, Gatestone Institute, Khaled Abu Toameh, May 9, 2016
(Please see also, Op-Ed: Trump’s “peace through strength” for USA also applies to Israel. — DM)
♦ The Iran nuclear deal, marking its first anniversary, does not appear to have had a calming effect on the Middle East.
♦ Iran funnels money to Hamas and Islamic Jihad because they share its desire to eliminate Israel and replace it with an Islamic empire. The Iranian leaders want to see Hamas killing Jews every day, with no break. Ironically, Hamas has become too “moderate” for the Iranian leadership because it is not doing enough to drive Jews out of the region.
♦ More Palestinian terror group leaders may soon perform the “pilgrimage” to their masters in Tehran. If this keeps up, the Iranians themselves will puppeteer any Palestinian state that is created in the region.
The Iran nuclear deal, marking its first anniversary, does not appear to have had a calming effect on the Middle East. The Iranians seem to be deepening their intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general and in internal Palestinian affairs in particular.
This intervention is an extension of Iran’s ongoing efforts to expand its influence in Arab and Islamic countries, including Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Lebanon and some Gulf states. The nuclear deal between Tehran and the world powers has not stopped the Iranians from proceeding with their global plan to export their “Islamic Revolution.” On the contrary, the general sense among Arabs and Muslims is that in the wake of the nuclear deal, Iran has accelerated its efforts to spread its influence.
Iran’s direct and indirect presence in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon has garnered some international attention, yet its actions in the Palestinian arena are still ignored by the world.
That Iran provides financial and military aid to Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad has never been a secret. In fact, both the Iranians and the Palestinian radical groups have been boasting about their relations.
Iran funnels money to these groups because they share its desire to eliminate Israel and replace it with an Islamic empire. Like Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas and Islamic Jihad agreed to play the role of Tehran’s proxies and enablers in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Iran used to funnel money to Hamas and Islamic Jihad because they share its desire to eliminate Israel and replace it with an Islamic empire. Relations between Iran and Hamas foundered a few years back, when Hamas leaders refused to support the Iranian-backed Syrian dictator, Bashar Assad. Pictured above: Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal (left) confers with Iranian “Supreme Leader” Ali Khamenei, in 2010. (Image source: Office of the Supreme Leader)
But puppets must remain puppets. Iran gets nasty when its dummies do not play according to its rules. This is precisely what happened with Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
Relations between Iran and Hamas foundered a few years back over the crisis in Syria. Defying their masters in Tehran, Hamas leaders refused to declare support for the Iranian-backed Syrian dictator, Bashar Assad. Things between Iran and Hamas have been pretty bad ever since.
First, the Assad government closed down Hamas offices in Damascus. Second, Assad expelled the Hamas leadership from Syria. Third, Iran suspended financial and military aid to Hamas, further aggravating the financial crisis that the Gaza-based Islamist movement had already been facing.
Islamic Jihad got it next. Iranian mullahs woke up one morning to realize that Islamic Jihad leaders have been a bit unfaithful. Some of the Islamic Jihad leaders were caught flirting with Iran’s Sunni rivals in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. Even worse, the Iranians discovered that Islamic Jihad was still working closely with their erstwhile allies in the Gaza Strip, Hamas.
Iran had had high hopes for Islamic Jihad replacing Hamas as Tehran’s darling, and major proxy in the Palestinian arena. But here were Islamic Jihad leaders and activists working with their cohorts in Hamas, in apparent disregard of Papa Iran.
The mullahs did not lose much time. Outraged by Islamic Jihad’s apparent disloyalty, Iran launched its own terror group inside the Gaza Strip: Al-Sabireen (The Patient Ones). This group, which currently consists of several hundred disgruntled ex-Hamas and ex-Islamic Jihad members, was meant to replace Islamic Jihad the same way Islamic Jihad was supposed to replace Hamas in the Gaza Strip — in accordance with Iran’s scheme.
Lo and behold: it is hard to get things right with Iran. Al-Sabireen has also failed to please its masters in Tehran and is not “delivering.” Palestinian sources in the Gaza Strip say that Iran has realized that the investment in Al-Sabireen has not been worthwhile because the group has not been able to do anything “dramatic” in the past two years. By “dramatic,” the sources mean that Al-Sabireen has neither emerged as a serious challenger to Islamic Jihad or Hamas, and has not succeeded in killing enough Israelis.
So Iran has gone running back to its former bedfellow, Islamic Jihad.
For now, Iran is not prepared fully to bring Hamas back under its wings. Hamas, for the Iranians, is a “treacherous” movement, thanks to its periodic temporary ceasefires with Israel. The Iranian leaders want to see Hamas killing Jews every day, with no break. Ironically, Hamas has become too “moderate” for the Iranian leadership because it is not doing enough to drive Jews out of the region.
That leaves Iran with the Islamic Jihad.
In a surprise move, the Iranians this week hosted Islamic Jihad leader Ramadan Shalah and senior officials from his organization, in a renewed bid to revive Islamic Jihad’s role as the major puppet of Tehran in the Gaza Strip. Islamic Jihad officials said that the visit has resulted in the resumption of Iranian financial aid to their cash-strapped organization. As a result of the rift between Islamic Jihad and Iran, the Iranians are said to have cut off nearly 90% of their financial aid to the Palestinian terror organization.
Some Palestinians, such as political analyst Hamadeh Fara’neh, see the rapprochement between Iran and Islamic Jihad as a response to the warming of relations between Hamas and Turkey. The Iranians, he argues, are unhappy with recent reports that suggested that Turkey was acting as a mediator between Hamas and Israel.
Other Palestinians believe that Iran’s real goal is to unite Islamic Jihad and Al-Sabireen so that they would become a real and realistic alternative to Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
Whatever Iran’s intentions may be, one thing is clear: The Iranians are taking advantage of the nuclear deal to move forward with their efforts to increase their influence over some Arab and Islamic countries. Iran is also showing that it remains very keen on playing a role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict — one that emboldens radical groups that are bent on the destruction of Israel and that share the same values as the Islamic State terror group.
Iran’s latest courtship of Islamic Jihad is yet another attempt by the mullahs to deepen their infiltration of the Palestinian arena by supporting and arming any terror group that strives to smash Israel. For now, it seems that Hamas’s scheme is working, largely thanks to the apathy of the international community, where many believe that Iran has been declawed by the nuclear deal.
But more Palestinian terror group leaders may soon perform the “pilgrimage” to their masters in Tehran. If this keeps up, the Iranians themselves will puppeteer any Palestinian state that is created in the region. Their ultimate task, after all, is to use this state as a launching pad to destroy Israel. And the Iranians are prepared to fund and arm any Palestinian group that is willing to help achieve this goal.
Khamenei’s Anti-Americanism, Gatestone Institute, Majid Rafizadeh, May 8, 2016
(Please see also, Dangerous illusions about Iran. — DM)
♦ Khamenei is sending a strong signal to Washington that Iran’s reintegration in global financial system does not mean that the Iranian regime will change its hostility towards the U.S. and Israel.
♦ “The Persian Gulf is the Iranian nation’s home and the Persian Gulf and a large section of the Sea of Oman belong to this powerful nation. Therefore, we be present in the region, hold war games and display our power.” – Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei
♦ In addition, Khamenei is sending a message to the Iranian people that the current process of implementing the nuclear agreement, lifting sanctions, and partial economic liberalization does not mean that Iran is going to liberalize its politics and allow freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and more political participation.
Some politicians and policy analysts argue that Iran’s sanctions relief and the continuing implementation of its nuclear program would push Iran towards moderation in dealing with the United States and Israel, as well as scaling down Iran’s expansionist and hegemonic ambitions. The realities on the ground suggest otherwise.
As Tehran’s revenues are rising, anti-American and anti-Semitic rhetoric by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, are escalating.
The Iranian regime continues to view the U.S. and Israel as their top geopolitical, strategic and ideological enemies. According to Iran’s Mehr News Agency, on May 1, Khamenei welcomed the Secretary General of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Ramadan Abdullah Shalah, and his accompanying delegation in Tehran:
“Ayatollah Khamenei reaffirmed that with this perspective in regional issues, Iran sees the United States as the main enemy with the Zionist regime standing behind it. He pointed to extensive, unprecedented sanctions of the U.S. and its followers against the Islamic establishment in recent years and dubbed the objective of them as discouraging Iran from continuing its path; ‘but they failed to achieve their goals and will fail in future as well.’ “
Khamenei is sending a strong signal to Washington that Iran’s reintegration in the global financial system does not mean that the Iranian regime will change its hostility towards the U.S. and Israel.
In addition, Khamenei is sending a message to the Iranian people that the current process of implementing the nuclear agreement, lifting sanctions, and partial economic liberalization does not mean that Iran is going to liberalize its politics and allow freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and more political participation.
Khamenei is also making it clear that Iran is not going to fundamentally change its foreign policy objectives in the region.
Regarding Iran’s role in the Gulf, Iran’s Supreme Leader pointed out on May 2 that
“The Persian Gulf is the Iranian nation’s home and the Persian Gulf and a large section of the Sea of Oman belong to this powerful nation. Therefore, we should be present in the region, hold war games and display our power.”
When it comes to Syria, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has become more emboldened and empowered in supporting the Syrian regime financially, militarily, and in intelligence and advisory capacities. Even during the current peace talks, Iran is ramping up its presence in Syria to increase Bashar Assad’s leverage in the negotiations.
In Iraq, Iran’s sectarian agenda and support for Shiite militias continues to cause political instability. This week, hundreds of followers of the Iraqi Shia leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, stormed into the Iraqi parliament building, demanding its speaker halt the session. Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi warned that these protests could lead to the Iraqi state’s failure. After the protests, al-Sadr — who spent several years studying in Qom (Iran’s center of Islamic studies) — travelled to Iran.
Currently, some of the powerful Iraqi Shiite militias with which Iran has close connections, and in which it is investing its resources, are: Sadr’s Promised Day Brigade, the successor to the Mahdi Army; the Badr Organization, Asa’ib Ahl al Haqq (League of the Righteous) and Kata’ib Hezbollah (Battalions of Hezbollah).
In Yemen and Bahrain, Iran’s support for the Houthi rebels and Shiite groups continues to fuel the sectarian conflicts there.
Khamenei has also unleashed a series of anti-U.S. and anti-Israel tweets, including:
“Lebanon’s Hezbollah is strong enough not to be hurt by some pressures; today, no doubt Zionist regime is scared of Hezbollah more than past.” (1 May 2016)
“Shia-Sunni clash is colonialist, US plot. Top issue is to realize 2 sides of the extensive war & one’s stance to avoid being against Islam.” (1 May 2016)
Iran’s foreign policy is anchored in three areas: ideological principles (anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism), national interests (mainly economic gains), and nationalism.
Although Khamenei needed to emphasize Iran’s national and economic interests, there is no evidence that he is giving up on the revolutionary ideological norms. Khamenei is relying on the so-called moderates — President Hassan Rouhani and his U.S.-educated foreign minister, Javad Zarif — to continue the process of implementing the nuclear deal in order to benefit Iran economically and ensure the regime’s hold on power.
Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei (left), is not giving up on the revolutionary ideological norms. He is relying on the so-called moderates, such as President Hassan Rouhani (right), to continue the process of implementing the nuclear deal in order to benefit Iran economically and ensure the regime’s hold on power.
Nevertheless, at the end of day, the key decision makers in Iran’s political establishments are Khamenei and the senior cadre of the IRGC, who prioritize Iran’s ideological and revolutionary principles. It is from them that Khamenei draws his legitimacy.
As long as the Supreme Leader is alive, one should not expect that Iran’s reintegration into the global economy to move the country to the moderate end of the spectrum, or that its anti-American, anti-Semitic sentiments and fundamentals of Tehran’s foreign policies will change.
(The views expressed in this article are mine and do not necessarily reflect those of Warsclerotic or any of its other editors. — DM)
A recent article by David Samuels at the New York Times Magazine, based on an interview with Obama’s foreign policy guru Ben Rhodes, purported to explain how, and about what, the Obama administration lied to get public support for the Iran Scam. According to the article, the principal Obama lie involved who was the Iranian president when the negotiations with Iran began. It’s much deeper and worse than that. As Paul Harvey would say, “Here’s “the rest of the story.”
Iranian President Rouhani was elected on June 15, 2013 and assumed office on August 3d. According to Rhodes,
negotiations started when the ostensibly moderate Hassan Rouhani was elected president, providing an opening for the administration to reach out in friendship. In reality, as Samuels gets administration officials to admit, negotiations began when “hardliner” Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was still president. [Emphasis added.]
There is no necessary inconsistency — about a month and a half elapsed between Rouhani’s election and becoming the Iranian president. However, that is of little if any consequences.
Mr. Rosen, interviewed in the above video, touches, very briefly, on other problems with the Iran scam. Back in the world of reality, “we” had been negotiating with Iran during Ahmadinejad’s presidency for a couple of years, during which “we” gave Iran everything it requested. This article is intended to provide substantially more information and analysis of what happened and why during “our” secret bilateral negotiations with Iran.
The Negotiations
According to interviews with Iranian vice president and Atomic Energy Organization head Ali Akbar Salehi, translated and published by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) on August 17, 2015, secret bilateral negotiations between the Obama and Iranian regimes had begun much earlier and included Obama’s Assistant Secretary of State, William Burns. During those negotiations, the U.S. conceded that Iran’s right to Uranium enrichment would be respected, that Iran’s missile programs would be left out of any deal and that its efforts to develop nuclear warheads and other devices would be ignored. Obama had essentially caved in to Iran’s demands even before the existence of negotiations was acknowledged.
In an interview published in the daily Iran on August 4, 2015 under the title “The Black Box of the Secret Negotiations between Iran and America,” Iranian vice president and Atomic Energy Organization head Ali Akbar Salehi, who is a senior member of Iran’s negotiation team and was foreign minister under president Ahmadinejad, revealed new details on the secret bilateral talks between Iran and the U.S. that started during Ahmadinejad’s second presidential term. According to Salehi, U.S. Secretary of Energy Dr. Ernest Moniz, whom Salehi knew from his period as a doctoral student at MIT, was appointed to the American negotiation team at Salehi’s request, a request which the Americans met within hours. [Emphasis added.]
Salehi added that Khamenei agreed to open a direct channel of negotiations between Iran and the U.S. on the condition that the talks would yield results from the start and would not deal with any other issue, especially not with U.S.-Iran relations. Following this, Salehi demanded, via the Omani mediator Sultan Qaboos, that the U.S. recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium, and received a letter from Qaboos expressing such American recognition, which he relayed to Ahmadinejad. [Emphasis added.]
The secret bilateral Iran-US negotiations had begun with a letter for Iran delivered to an Omani official. Salehi told an Omani intermediary.
‘I am not sure how serious the Americans are, but I will give you a note. Tell them that these are our demands. Deliver it on your next visit to Oman.’ I wrote down four clear issues, one of which was official recognition of rights to [uranium] enrichment. I figured that if the Americans were sincere in their offer, then they must agree to these four demands. Mr. Suri gave this short letter to the mediator, and stressed that these were Iran’s demands. [He added that]if the Americans wished to solve this issue, they were welcome to, otherwise dealing with White House proposals would be useless and unwarranted…
“All the demands in the letter were related to the nuclear challenge. These were issues we have always come against, such as closing the nuclear dossier [in the Security Council], official recognition of [Iran’s] right to enrich [uranium], and resolving the issue of Iran’s actions under the PMD [Possible Military Dimensions]. After receiving the letter, the Americans said: ‘We are certainly willing and able to easily solve the issues Iran has brought up.’ [Emphasis added.]
The first meeting between the Iranian and American negotiating teams began following eight months of coordination. Iran
sent a team to Oman that included the deputy foreign minister for European and American affairs, Mr. [Ali Asghar] Khaji, as well as several CEOs. The Americans were surprised in the first meeting and said, ‘We cannot believe this is happening. We thought Oman was joking. We aren’t even prepared for these talks with you.’
“Q: What was the level of the team that the Americans dispatched?
“A: It included Assistant Secretary of State William Burns. They said: ‘We only came to see if Iran was truly willing to negotiate.’ Our representative gave them the required response and eventually there were talks on this issue. The initial result was achieved and the ground was prepared for further coordination. [Emphasis added.]
“Q: How were the Americans convinced that the Iranian diplomats who were dispatched had the necessary authority?
“A: [Until] that phase, Iran and America had not been allowed to sit opposite each other at the negotiating table. The fact that Iran had sent a deputy foreign minister to the talks indicated its seriousness. The Americans also noticed how seriously [Iran was taking] the issue. At that meeting, Khaji pressed the Americans to set up a roadmap for the negotiations, and eventually the talks of a roadmap were postponed to the second meeting. At the second meeting, Khaji warned the Americans: ‘We did not come here for lengthy negotiations. If you are serious, you must officially recognize enrichment, otherwise we cannot enter into bilateral talks. But if you officially recognize enrichment, then we too are serious and willing to meet your concerns on the nuclear matter as part of international regulations.‘
International regulations were later agreed upon by the P5+1 negotiators, in the form of the Iran – IAEA secret deals concerning nuke inspections and a UN resolution dealing with Iranian missiles. Neither was included in the Joint Cooperative Plan of Action.
“Of course, at that time we were [still] exchanging various information with the Americans via the [Omani] mediation, and this is documented at the Foreign Ministry. We did not do it in the form of official letters, but rather unofficially and not on paper. The Omani mediator later came to Iran, held talks with us, and then later spoke to the Americans and told them our positions, so that the ties were not severed. But there was no possibility for direct talks.
“Thus, a real opportunity was squandered because, at the time, the Americans were genuinely prepared to make real concessions to Iran. Perhaps it was God’s will that the process progressed like that and the results were [eventually] in our favor. In any case, several months passed and Obama was reelected in America [in November 2012]. I thought that, unlike the first time, we must not waste time in coordinating [within regime bodies], so with the leader’s backing and according to my personal decision, I dispatched our representatives to negotiate with the Americans in Oman. [Emphasis added.]
“Q: Didn’t you have another meeting with the leader about the process and content of the talks?
“A: No. Obviously during the process I wrote a letter to the leader detailing the problems. He said ‘try to solve them.’ He was always supportive but told me to ‘act in a manner that includes necessary coordination [within the regime]. In this situation, I dispatched Khaji to the second meeting in Oman (around March 2013) and it was a positive meeting. Both sides stayed in Oman for two or three days and the result was that the Omani ruler sent a letter to Ahmadinejad saying that the American representative had announced official recognition of Iran’s enrichment rights. Sultan Qaboos sent the same letter to the American president. When Ahmadinejad received the letter, several friends said that this move would be fruitless and that the Americans do not keep [their] commitments. [But] we had advanced to this stage. [Emphasis added.]
. . . . We [then ] prepared ourselves for the third meeting with the Americans in order to set up the roadmap and detail the mutual commitments. All this happened while Iran was nearing the presidential elections [in June 2013]. At that time, the leader’s office told me that I had to cease negotiations and let the next government handle the talks after the results of the elections were known.
. . . .
“Q: What was the Americans’ position in the first meetings between Iran and the P5+1 held during the Rohani government [era]?
“A:After the Rohani government began to operate – along with the second term of President Obama – the new negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 were started. By then, Kerry was no longer an American senator but had been appointed secretary of state. As a senator, Kerry had been appointed by Obama to be in charge of handling the nuclear dossier, and then [in December 2012] he was appointed secretary of state. [Emphasis added.]
“Before that, the Omani mediator, who had close relations with Kerry, told us that Kerry would soon be appointed [U.S.] secretary of state. During the period when the secret negotiations with the Americans were underway in Oman, there was a situation in which it was easier to obtain concessions from the Americans. After the Rohani government and the American administration [of Obama’s second term] took power, and Kerry become secretary of state, the Americans spoke from a more assertive position. They no longer showed the same degree of eagerness to advance the negotiations. Their position became harder, and the threshold of their demands rose. At the same time, on the Iranian side, the situation [also] changed, and a most professional negotiating team took responsibility for negotiating with the P5+1. [Emphasis added.]
As to the reluctance of the American side to make concessions after Kerry had replaced Clinton as the Secretary of State, it must be remembered that “we” had already made all or most of the concessions Iran sought.
Another positive point was that [President] Rohani oversaw the dossier, knew its limits, and as a result succeeded in producing a good strategy to advance the nuclear dossier. At the same time, Rohani took responsibility for everything. Many may have reservations and ask why we were putting ourselves in danger, but Rohani’s willingness to take responsibility was very high. There are those who say, from a political standpoint, that he was willing to take a very great risk, because, had the negotiations not achieved certain results, and had the best results not been achieved, he would have faced waves of criticism. But he took upon himself the risk of [such] criticism. In any event, he agreed to take this responsibility, and, God be praised, even God helped him, and he emerged [from the negotiations] with his head held high.” [Emphasis added.]
At some point, the negotiations broke down over “technical issues.” Salehi, a technical expert as well as a diplomat, found a way to resolve those issues.
A . . . condition was that American experts would come to Iran and talk to me. I said that as vice president I would not enter into a discussion with their experts, because as far as the protocol was concerned, this would create a bad situation and they would say that Iran would capitulate in any situation. This was not good for Iran, but I was willing to quit and to come to the talks not as vice president but as the foreign minister’s scientific advisor. Larijani said ‘he’s right.’ The next day, Fereydoun asked me to come to his office and asked me who my [American] counterpart was. I said, the [U.S.] Department of Energy. Fereydoun called Araghchi and said, ‘Tell [U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs] Ms. [Wendy] Sherman that Salehi is joining the negotiations provided that the American secretary of energy also joins the negotiators.‘ Araghchi and Sherman were the liaison between Iran and America. Araghchi said in this conversation with Fereydoun that on such short notice it was unlikely that they [i.e. the Americans] would send their secretary of energy. I heard [Fereydoun’s conversation with Araghchi]. In short, Fereydoun asked and Araghchi contacted Sherman and a few hours later a report that they welcomed Iran’s proposal arrived. [Emphasis added.]
“Q: How many hours did it take before they [the Americans] said yes?
“A: It didn’t take long. I went to see Fereydoun in the evening and the next day they responded. This was because of the time difference [between Tehran and Washington].
“Q: The general perception was that because Moniz was brought into the negotiating team, you were brought into the Iranian team?
“A: [On the contrary,] Moniz came because of me. In any case, in February [2015] I joined [the negotiations], and praise God, matters moved forward with Moniz.
“Q: Did you and Moniz study together?
“A: Moniz knew me more than I knew him. I saw him at the annual IAEA meeting. When I was a doctoral student at MIT, he had just been accepted as a staff member. He is five years older than me.
“Q: Did you take one of his classes?
“A: No. He knew me because my doctoral studies advisor was his close friend and right hand man in scientific fields. Even now he is an advisor on many of Moniz’s scientific programs. Many of my fellow students are now experts for Moniz. One of them was Mujid Kazimi, who is of Palestinian origin. He recently died. He was two years older than me but we were friends in college. After graduating, he became the head of the MIT Department of Nuclear Science and was a prominent figure who carried out many programs with Moniz.
“Q: How did Moniz treat you initially?
“A: In light of our prior acquaintance, he was excited. We’ve known each other for years and he treated [me] very well. Our first meeting was in public.
“Q: How did you feel when you heard Moniz was coming [to the talks]?
“A: I was very happy. I was assured. I said that the prestige of the Islamic Republic remained intact [because] an Iranian official would not speak to an American expert but rather would negotiate with a high-ranking American official. This was very important. Second, as I said before, he could make a decision [while] an expert could not. We had a very interesting group meeting. The American experts were same ones who had dealt with disarmament vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.
“I said [to Moniz]: ‘I cannot accept your offer for various reasons.’ One American expert said, ‘We do not accept the basic assumption of your calculations.’ I said, ‘Tell us what is the basic assumption of [your] calculations so we can work from there.’ He said ‘we can’t do that.’ I said to them, ‘If you don’t accept our estimation, then tell us [yours]. You say that you cannot because this [exposes] your process. If we show [our] calculation, you will know our working secrets.’ So then I said ‘ok, what do we do now?’ The meeting stagnated.
“Later I thought about it… and said ‘Mr. Moniz, I am here with full authority from my country. Anything I sign will be acceptable to my country. Do you have full authority as well, or does any result achieved here need to be asked and clarified with officials from other countries?’ He said ‘no, I have full authority.’
“Q: Did you have full authority?
“A: Yes. In the scientific discussions, I knew the level of [Iran’s] demands. I said, ‘Mr. Moniz, you made an offer to Iran, and Iran rejects it. I want to ask you a question. If you can answer it [then] I will have no problem with your offer.’ I continued and said: ‘Show me one place on earth where enrichment is taking place using the method you are demanding of us. If you can give me even a single example then I will sign on the spot and we will become the second country to enrich in this method.’ He looked [at me] and then announced that the meeting was over, and we spoke. We had the first private meeting that lasted two or three hours. He said: ‘Mr. Salehi, when I was called [out of the negotiating room, it was because] Obama wanted to speak to me. Now I am free [to continue]. What you said is acceptable [but] there are practical problems with your offer.’ I said, ‘Do you agree? Then I relinquish that proposal.’ Eventually. we reached mutual understandings on this issue. I said ‘let’s start from the top.’ This diplomatic challenge should be published in a memoir so that everyone can understand how we reached 6,000 centrifuges. It is a very nice story… [Emphasis added.]
The Aftermath
Ultimately, Iran’s right to enrich Uranium was fully recognized in the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) and in the subsequent Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA). As to the missile aspects of the “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program, neither document dealt with Iranian missiles. That was left up to the United Nations Security Council to deal with in its resolution approving the nuke “deal.” In light of Russia’s warm relations with Iran, Russia would most likely veto any proposed Security Council resolution finding Iran in violation of its missile provisions.
The “verification” mechanism was included only in separate and secret “side deal(s)” solely between Iran and the IAEA which members of the U.S. Congress were not permitted to see during the pseudo-approval process. According to Kerry, he was not permitted to see them either, but the details were “fully explained” to him.
Here’s a video of Secretary Kerry under questioning about the side deals:
Questions might have been better directed to this Kerry clone; more candid answers might have been provided.
As I wrote earlier, the Iranian nuke inspections are a sick joke.
Any pretense that the IAEA will have “any time, anywhere” access to Iran’s military sites was mere rhetoric, as acknowledged by US Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman on July 16th
“I think this is one of those circumstances where we have all been rhetorical from time to time,” Sherman said in a conference call with Israeli diplomatic reporters. “That phrase, anytime, anywhere, is something that became popular rhetoric, but I think people understood that if the IAEA felt it had to have access, and had a justification for that access, that it would be guaranteed, and that is what happened.” [Emphasis added.]
Ms. Sherman was right about the rhetorical nature of administration assertions, but wrong about IAEA access, of which there will apparently be little or none pursuant to the secret deals between Iran and the IAEA.
As I observed on August 4, 2015,
In an interview on Al Jazeera TV last week Ali Akbar Velayati, Security Adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader, stated that
United Nations nuclear inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency would not be given access to Tehran’s sensitive military nuclear sites.
. . . .
“First, allow me to emphasize that the issue of the missiles and of Iran’s defensive capabilities were not part of the negotiations to begin with,” Velayati said. [Emphasis added.]
“No matter what pressure is exerted, Iran never has negotiated and never will negotiate with others – America, Europe, or any other country – about the nature and quality of missiles it should manufacture or possess, or about the defensive military equipment that it needs. This is out of the question.” [Emphasis added.]
. . . .
Reza Najafi, Iran’s ambassador and permanent envoy to the IAEA, stated over the weekend that “no country is permitted to know the details of future inspections conducted by the IAEA.” [Emphasis added.]
Najafi’s statement could mean (a) that no details about inspection methodology will be disclosed, (b) that no details about inspection results will be disclosed or (c) both. If inspection methodologies — who did the inspections as well as when, where and how, are not disclosed, what useful purpose will they serve, other than for Iran? If details of the results of inspections are not disclosed, that will also be the case. How, in either or both cases, will the members of the P5+1 negotiating teams have sufficient information to decide whether to “snap back” sanctions — if doing so is now even possible — or anything else? [Emphasis added.]
Conclusions
One can only hope that our next president will dispose of the Iranian “deal” as a treaty which Obama refused to submit to the Congress as the Constitution requires or at least ostentatiously ignore it and grant no more concessions.
Otherwise, be not afraid; Obama the Great One — the smartest person in any room and the best President ever — has made us safe. How can one possibly be safer alive than dead?
Rhodes is just the messenger, Israel Hayom, Boaz Bismuth, May 8, 2016
This is the story of one young man — Ben Rhodes is his name — who aspired to become a novelist. He realized that dream, in a manner of sorts, by becoming a storyteller, and he would tell those stories at the White House, as the president’s deputy national security advisor for strategic communications.
Storyteller is too elegant a title, perhaps, for the person who sold us the tale known as the Iran nuclear deal. A profile piece on Rhodes, one of President Barack Obama’s closest advisers, by the New York Times Magazine reveals facts that we already knew, facts that led to the outrageous nuclear deal between Iran and world powers on July 14, last year:
1. The story of the elections in Iran and the victory of the “moderate” camp was a well-planned spin — an invention — to sell the nuclear deal to the American public (which opposed it) and to the world.
2. Obama desired a nuclear deal with Iran as early as 2009. He wanted it even more than the Iranians did, and was even prepared to sign such a deal with extremist President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
3. Obama upgraded Iran’s international and regional standing in order to shirk his commitments toward U.S. allies in the region, among them Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey.
4. The Obama administration exploited journalists who are “27 years old … and know literally know nothing” (in the words of Rhodes himself), having them sing the administration’s tune to the world.
Even more experienced reporters like Jeffrey Goldberg (The Atlantic) and Laura Rozen (Al-Monitor) were relegated, at least on the Iranian issue, to “mouthpieces” for the administration.
5. Even had Iran failed to fulfill its obligations or concealed figures pertaining to its nuclear project, Obama would not have followed through on his threat to order a pre-emptive strike against it. This is according to former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, whose job, according to the New York Times article, was to make sure that Israel wouldn’t attack Iran.
The giant scam, revealed by the person tasked with executing these deceitful manipulations (the same Rhodes), is nothing short of scandalous. It is testimony to how in July 2012, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s close aide Jake Sullivan was dispatched to Muscat in Oman to coordinate the details of the interim and permanent nuclear deal with the Iranians.
The New York Times story also reveals that three months before “moderate” Iranian President Hassan Rouhani was elected to office in the summer of 2013, Sullivan and then-Deputy Secretary of State William Burns had already met at the White House to approve the interim deal, which served as the basis for the permanent deal.
The Rhodes profile piece sheds light on things we already knew, or at the very least suspected, to have transpired during these manipulative negotiations. We witnessed the charade at Laussane from up close, in November 2013. Looking back, those talks were supposedly on the verge of collapsing, but in actuality the sides had already planned out the signing ceremony.
Rhodes is not waiting for Obama’s term in office to end to explain the roots of his boss’ worldview: the boy who grew up in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia, whose revulsion against a certain kind of global power politics was influenced by the interactions with power he had there.
As a young man, Obama, according to Rhodes, was revolted by the notion of a superpower. Thus, Rhodes explains, if someone tries tracing the origins of the idea of “leading from behind,” which Obama implemented in Libya, the answers can be found in the president’s childhood.
While the New York Times article focuses on Rhodes, he is only the executioner of policy. The person responsible for the scam is Obama. He is not the first to manipulate the media; many have done so before him. In 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson “sold” Congress on the idea that the U.S. had met the challenges it faced in Vietnam, which was not the case. Other presidents, as well, such as Nixon and even George W. Bush in regard to Iraq, cynically used the media. But here we are talking about Obama — “Mr. Clean” — the man who is allegedly without flaw.
A storyteller’s festival
The New York Times piece illustrates yet again the extent to which the president is living in a virtual reality. Remember how just two weeks ago he called this the most peaceful era of human history? Now we understand that his comments have no place in the real world. Perhaps they are more befitting a storyteller’s festival.
Throughout the nuclear talks with Iran, Rhodes also gave interviews to Israeli news outlets. The New York Times article about him went online Thursday; did anyone over the weekend hear those Israeli news outlets mention even one word of what Rhodes himself has just revealed?
Of course not. After all, it’s one thing to hurt Israel — but to hurt Obama’s narrative? Heaven forbid.
(The Bomb? What bomb?
–DM)
Panetta isn’t Gates. He’s a career Democrat and a Clinton guy. He’s a conformist. He goes along. And yet he’s still making the admission.
As secretary of defense, he tells me, one of his most important jobs was keeping Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and his defense minister, Ehud Barak, from launching a pre-emptive attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. “They were both interested in the answer to the question, ‘Is the president serious?’ ” Panetta recalls. “And you know my view, talking with the president, was: If brought to the point where we had evidence that they’re developing an atomic weapon, I think the president is serious that he is not going to allow that to happen.”
Panetta stops.
“But would you make that same assessment now?” I ask him.
“Would I make that same assessment now?” he asks. “Probably not.”
Not news to anyone with any common sense. But probably a big admission within the echo chamber.
Obama’s Foreign Policy Guru Boasts of How the Administration Lied to Sell the Iran Deal, Weekly Standard, Lee Smith, May 5, 2016
It’s hardly any wonder that Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes has a “mind meld” with his boss, the president. According to a David Samuels New York Times Magazine article to be published Sunday and already posted to the website, Rhodes, like Barack Obama, is contemptuous of “the American foreign-policy establishment.” What Obama calls the “Washington playbook” dictating the sorts of responses available to American policymakers, Rhodes calls the “Blob.”
The Blob includes “editors and reporters at The New York Times, The Washington Post, The New Yorker,” etc. It also encompasses, according to Rhodes, Obama’s former secretary of state Hillary Clinton, and the administration’s first defense secretary Robert Gates. Presumably Leon Panetta, former Pentagon chief and CIA director, who goes on the record to criticize Rhodes and the president, is also part of the Blob, alongside “other Iraq-war promoters from both parties who now whine incessantly about the collapse of the American security order in Europe and the Middle East.” In other words, the emotion driving the administration’s foreign policy is contempt—contempt for allies, colleagues, and the generations of American policymakers who built the post-WWII international order, ensuring relative global stability, and peace and prosperity at home.
Samuels’s profile is an amazing piece of writing about the Holden Caulfield of American foreign policy. He’s a sentimental adolescent with literary talent (Rhodes published one short story before his mother’s connections won him a job in the world of foreign policy), and high self regard, who thinks that everyone else is a phony. Those readers who found Jeffrey Goldberg’s picture of Obama in his March Atlantic profile refreshing for the president’s willingness to insult American allies publicly will be similarly cheered here by Rhodes’s boast of deceiving American citizens, lawmakers, and allies over the Iran deal. Conversely, those who believe Obama risked American interests to take a cheap shot at allies from the pedestal of the Oval Office will be appalled to see Rhodes dancing in the end zone to celebrate the well-packaged misdirections and even lies—what Rhodes and others call a “narrative”—that won Obama his signature foreign policy initiative.
Rhodes is a storyteller who uses a writer’s tools to advance an agenda that is packaged as politics but is often quite personal. He is adept at constructing overarching plotlines with heroes and villains, their conflicts and motivations supported by flurries of carefully chosen adjectives, quotations and leaks from named and unnamed senior officials. He is the master shaper and retailer of Obama’s foreign-policy narratives, at a time when the killer wave of social media has washed away the sand castles of the traditional press.
As Rhodes admits, it’s not that hard to shape the narrative. “All these newspapers used to have foreign bureaus,” Rhodes said. “Now they don’t. They call us to explain to them what’s happening in Moscow and Cairo. Most of the outlets are reporting on world events from Washington. The average reporter we talk to is 27 years old, and their only reporting experience consists of being around political campaigns. That’s a sea change. They literally know nothing.”
In Rhodes’s “narrative” about the Iran deal, negotiations started when the ostensibly moderate Hassan Rouhani was elected president, providing an opening for the administration to reach out in friendship. In reality, as Samuels gets administration officials to admit, negotiations began when “hardliner” Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was still president. It was Rhodes who framed the Iran deal as a choice between peace and war, and it was Rhodes who set up a messaging unit to sell the deal that created an “echo chamber” in the press. “[Al Monitor reporter] Laura Rozen was my RSS feed,” says Tanya Somanader, the 31-year-old who managed @TheIranDeal twitter feed. “She would just find everything and retweet it.”
“In the spring of last year,” Samuels writes:
legions of arms-control experts began popping up at think tanks and on social media, and then became key sources for hundreds of often-clueless reporters. “We created an echo chamber,” [Rhodes] admitted, when I asked him to explain the onslaught of freshly minted experts cheerleading for the deal. “They were saying things that validated what we had given them to say.”
When I suggested that all this dark metafictional play seemed a bit removed from rational debate over America’s future role in the world, Rhodes nodded. “In the absence of rational discourse, we are going to discourse the [expletive] out of this,” he said. “We had test drives to know who was going to be able to carry our message effectively, and how to use outside groups like Ploughshares, the Iran Project and whomever else. So we knew the tactics that worked.” He is proud of the way he sold the Iran deal. “We drove them crazy,” he said of the deal’s opponents.
It’s not clear whether or not Panetta supported the deal, but he admits he was wrong about Obama’s willingness to take all measures to stop Iran from getting a bomb.
As secretary of defense, he tells me, one of his most important jobs was keeping Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and his defense minister, Ehud Barak, from launching a pre-emptive attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. “They were both interested in the answer to the question, ‘Is the president serious?’ ” Panetta recalls. “And you know my view, talking with the president, was: If brought to the point where we had evidence that they’re developing an atomic weapon, I think the president is serious that he is not going to allow that to happen.”
Panetta stops.
“But would you make that same assessment now?” I ask him.
“Would I make that same assessment now?” he asks. “Probably not.”
Rhodes tells Samuels that Don DeLillo is his favorite novelist. “That’s the only person I can think of who has confronted these questions of, you know, the individual who finds himself negotiating both vast currents of history and a very specific kind of power dynamics,” he tells Samuels. “And that’s what it’s like to work in the U.S. foreign-policy apparatus in 2016.”
So that’s it. For the last seven years the American public has been living through a postmodern narrative crafted by an extremely gifted and unspeakably cynical political operative whose job is to wage digital information campaigns designed to dismantle a several-decade old security architecture while lying about the nature of the Iranian regime. No wonder Americans feel less safe—they are.
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