Archive for the ‘Assad’ category

Breaking: State Dept. Protests Obama Lethargy

June 17, 2016

Breaking: State Dept. Protests Obama Lethargy, Power LineSteven Hayward, June 16, 2016

There’s an old joke about how it would be nice if there was an American Interests desk at the State Department, since Foggy Bottom was usually more sympathetic to foreign nations than our own. The truth behind that joke is what makes so extraordinary the story the Wall Street Journal is reporting tonight about the 51 State Department employees who have signed a petition calling for a tougher military policy against the Assad regime in Syria:

BEIRUT—Dozens of State Department officials this week protested against U.S. policy in Syria, signing an internal document that calls for targeted military strikes against the Damascus government and urging regime change as the only way to defeat Islamic State.

The “dissent channel cable” was signed by 51 State Department officers involved with advising on Syria policy in various capacities, according to an official familiar with the document. The Wall Street Journal reviewed a copy of the cable, which repeatedly calls for “targeted military strikes” against the Syrian government in light of the near-collapse of the ceasefire brokered earlier this year.

The views expressed by the U.S. officials in the cable amount to a scalding internal critique of a longstanding U.S. policy against taking sides in the Syrian war, a policy that has survived even though the regime of President Bashar al-Assad has been repeatedly accused of violating ceasefire agreements and Russian-backed forces have attacked U.S.-trained rebels.

The Wall Street Journal doesn’t say so directly, but this represents massive internal disgust with the pusillanimity of Obama going on for several years now. That the State Departmentwould want stronger military action is simply extraordinary. Here and there the reality of the matter breaks through:

“It’s embarrassing for the administration to have so many rank-and-file members break on Syria,” said a former State Department official who worked on Middle East policy. . . The recent letter marked a move by the heart of the bureaucracy, which is largely apolitical, to break from the White House.

In other words, this is a no-confidence vote on Obama’s Middle East policy, from a government body that is otherwise endlessly accommodating to drift and indecision.

Syrian Opposition Official: West Responsible For Assad Remaining In Power; U.S. Enabled Russia To Become Main Player In Syria Crisis

May 19, 2016

Syrian Opposition Official: West Responsible For Assad Remaining In Power; U.S. Enabled Russia To Become Main Player In Syria Crisis, MEMRI, May 18, 2016

Khaled Khoja, who served as president of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces until March 2016, gave an interview to the London-based Saudi daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat on April 17, 2016, in which he harshly attacked the international community and particularly the U.S. Khoja argued that the U.S. never desired regime change in Syria and therefore did not take a decisive stand against Bashar Al-Assad despite his many crimes, and did not significantly support the Syrian opposition. According to him, the Americans showed apathy regarding the crisis, enabling Russia to fill the vacuum that they had created in a way that suited Russian interests. He added that the purpose of American military aid to the Kurds was to create a Kurdish canton, which would effectively lead to the splintering of Syria. Khoja stressed that the Syrian High Negotiations Committee remains insistent that the first step is to establish a transitional governing body, and only then can a new constitution, elections, and other topics be addressed.

It should be mentioned that the interview was given prior to the April 19 announcement by the head of the Syrian High Negotiations Committee, Riyad Hijab, that its delegation was suspending its participation in the Geneva talks.

Following are excerpts from the interview:[1]

28054Khaled Khoja (image: Zamanalwsl.net)

We Insist On A Serious Transition Of Power And All Authority

Khoja started by mentioning the Syrian High Negotiations Committee’s expectations from the current round of the Geneva talks: “We are here to focus on forming the governing body for the transitional phase. U.S. Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura is continuing his relentless efforts to begin discussing the political transitional phase, which will be based on establishing the ‘governing body,’ as stated in the Geneva announcement, UN Security Council Resolution 2218, and other resolutions. We have been empowered by opposition forces to discuss realizing these goals and we cannot deviate from them. Negotiations today should pick up where Geneva II left off [in February 2014] under the supervision of [former UN Special Envoy to Syria] Lakhdar Brahimi. We must start by forming this [governing] body and then proceeding to discuss the issues of the constitution, the elections, and other matters that fall under the governing body’s authority. Naturally, we have clear views on all these issues, which we will reveal at the appropriate time. I wish to say that we reject the verbal slips replacing the phrase ‘transitional governing body’ with ‘transitional regime’ or ‘transitional government’ and adhere to ‘transitional phase governing body’ and all it implies – meaning a serious transition of power and all authority.”

International And American Support For The Opposition Is Feeble

According to Khoja, “the position of international, and especially American, support for the Syrian opposition is feeble. The sad thing is that the true positions [of the U.S. and international community] regarding Assad is still feeble and vague despite all the evidence marking Bashar Al-Assad as a ‘war criminal,’ and despite the many official American statements that hold him responsible for ongoing killing and acts of slaughter. The lack of international political desire to push for the start of the transitional political phase in Syria has provided Assad and the parties supporting him, whether Iranians or Russians, with room to maneuver, enabling him [Assad] to continue heading the regime and to remain a chaos-creating factor in the region, [a factor] which exacerbates the refugee crisis and uses it as a card for pressuring neighboring countries and Europe, and which exports ISIS and terrorism…”

U.S. Apathy Is A Main Factor In Russia Becoming The Main Player In The Crisis

Khoja said further: “There is clearly American apathy regarding the Middle East, which opens the door for Russia to fill the vacuum left by the Americans… When we speak of the mass extermination of the Syrian people, their expulsion, the use of chemical weapons against them, the documentation of regime crimes in detention centers, forced disappearances, preplanned acts of murder, and red lines that have become green lights – all this causes observers to lose faith in the American position… Had the Americans not created this vacuum, we would not have been in the state we are in today, and Russia would not have become the main player in the crisis, holding the reins of initiative… Politically speaking, I believe the American position has not changed much since the onset of the Syrian revolution… [From the start] there was no real American support for change… The military aid we received [from the U.S.] is no match for the [American] military aid received by the Kurdish [Democratic] Union Party and the Kurdish People’s Defense Unit militias [YPG]. We believe that this aid for the Kurds was meant to create a new Kurdish ‘canton’ and to enforce a new reality as a foregone conclusion. American apathy has turned Syria into a series of ‘cantons’. The ‘Southern Canton,’ which is apart from the ‘Northern Canton,’ the ‘Kurdish Canton,’ and the ‘Alawi Canton.’ We cannot discount the possibility that as part of the political process, we will see a strengthening of [the phenomenon] of these cantons, but we will absolutely not agree to this…”

Syria Cannot Remain A Group Of Cantons In The Medium And Long Term

Khoja said that during the second round of negotiations there was talk of a federal solution that was “marketed by the Americans, the Russians, and UN Special Envoy de Mistura, who spoke openly and explicitly in one press conference on the topic of federation. Except that he did not discuss this issue with us, but rather only with other parties. The Russians did not hide their support for the federal solution and in my opinion, there is a serious attempt to create facts on the ground in Syria in order to strengthen the ‘canton’ situation.

“Any international solution, regardless of which parties promote it, cannot impose a situation that the Syrian people do not agree to. It is possible that the current situation will continue in the near future, but not in the medium and long term. The proof of this is that in the 1920s, the French tried to establish four statelets in Syria, but they only lasted a few years.”

 

Endnotes:

 

[1] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), April 17, 2016.

IRGC routed in Syria by new missile

May 16, 2016

IRGC routed in Syria by new missile, DEBKAfile, May 16, 2016

Khan_tuman_ambush_5.16

[N]either the Iranians nor Hizballah can win the war for Assad.

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The battle on May 6 in the village of Khan Touman, located southwest of Aleppo near Route 5, the main highway leading to Damascus, will go down in the annals of the Syrian war as the biggest defeat suffered by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hizballah, as well as the battle that changed the face of the war.

DEBKAfile’s military and intelligence sources report that an Iranian force consisting of IRGC troops and Hizballah was ambushed by fighters from the Jaysh al Fath organization, part of the Nusra Front.

Until this battle took place, Iranian and Hizballah commanders in Syria did not know that the rebels had received a shipment of MILAN antitank missiles provided by Turkey and funded by Saudi Arabia.

The encounter with the advanced weapon system brought the IRGC and Hizballah to rout.

The Iranians admitted that 17 of their fighters fell in the battle, including 13 from the IRGC’s “Karbala” Division that is usually based in Iran, and 22 were wounded. Among the dead were two Iranian brigadier generals. At least ten IRGC troops were taken prisoner by the rebels. Five or seven Iranian troops were executed immediately, and an unknown number were taken from the area to an undisclosed location.

Hizballah claimed that none of its troops were killed or taken prisoner. However, that statement was actually an attempt to hide that at least 15 of its fighters were killed. According to intelligence sources that monitored the battle, Hizballah’s death toll was even higher.

The defeat was a major shock to the Iranian and Hizballah hierarchies In Tehran and Beirut, and officials vowed that revenge would be coming soon.

The immediate result of the shock was the appointment of Gen. Mohsen Rezaei, commander of the IRGC 26 years ago in the 1980s, who retired years ago and was a candidate in several presidential elections.

DEBKAfile’s sources report that Rezaei is one of the only IRGC commanders to have visited many times in the West, mainly to participate in international conferences, and has spoken freely with Western military and intelligence officers on the situation in Iran and the Middle East.

It is hard to believe that he will succeed in turning the clock back for Iran and Hizballah in Syria. Rezaei’s appointment indicates confusion   or panic in the Iranian hierarchy that does not know how to respond to the defeat.

KhanTuman480

In addition, it is still not clear whether Rezaei will replace Gen. Qassem Soleimanias commander of Iran’s forces in Syria, or be subordinate to him.

DEBKAfile’s military sources point out that bringing Rezaei to Syria does not resolve Iran and Hizballah’s main military problem, as the battle in Khan Touman showed. If the rebels continue to receive advanced weapons like antitank and antiaircraft missiles, they will become superior to the three military forces fighting for Syrian President Bashar Assad, namely Iran’s standing army and IRGC troops, the Syrian army and Hizballah.

In other words, neither the Iranians nor Hizballah can win the war for Assad.

Seven days after the battle, the commander of Hizballah’s forces in Syria, Mustafa Bader Al-din, was killed by a ground-to-ground missile strike near the Damascus international airport. Later claims by various sources that he was killed in battle at Khan Touman were actually attempts to conceal the two biggest military blows suffered by the Iranians and Hizballah in Syria

Why Middle Eastern Leaders Are Talking to Putin, Not Obama

May 9, 2016

Why Middle Eastern Leaders Are Talking to Putin, Not Obama, Politico, Dennis Ross, May 8, 2016

John Hinderaker at Power Line writes,

Dennis Ross is a respected, if thoroughly conventional, expert on the Middle East. A Democrat, he has served in both Republican and Democratic administrations as an adviser and envoy. Ross served in the State Department as Hillary Clinton’s Special Advisor for the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. Subsequently, he joined President Obama’s National Security Council staff as a Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for the Central Region, which includes the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Pakistan and South Asia. So when Ross writes, in Politico, that Obama’s foreign policy weakness is hurting American interests, we should take notice.

— DM)

Putin and Middle Eastern leaders understand the logic of coercion. It is time for us to reapply it.

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The United States has significantly more military capability in the Middle East today than Russia—America has 35,000 troops and hundreds of aircraft; the Russians roughly 2,000 troops and, perhaps, 50 aircraft—and yet Middle Eastern leaders are making pilgrimages to Moscow to see Vladimir Putin these days, not rushing to Washington. Two weeks ago, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to see the Russian president, his second trip to Russia since last fall, and King Salman of Saudi Arabia is planning a trip soon. Egypt’s president and other Middle Eastern leaders have also made the trek to see Putin.

Why is this happening, and why on my trips to the region am I hearing that Arabs and Israelis have pretty much given up on President Barack Obama? Because perceptions matter more than mere power: The Russians are seen as willing to use power to affect the balance of power in the region, and we are not.

Putin’s decision to intervene militarily in Syria has secured President Bashar Assad’s position and dramatically reduced the isolation imposed on Russia after the seizure of Crimea and its continuing manipulation of the fighting in Ukraine. And Putin’s worldview is completely at odds with Obama’s. Obama believes in the use of force only in circumstances where our security and homeland might be directly threatened. His mindset justifies pre-emptive action against terrorists and doing more to fight the Islamic State. But it frames U.S. interests and the use of force to support them in very narrow terms. It reflects the president’s reading of the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, and helps to explain why he has been so reluctant to do more in Syria at a time when the war has produced a humanitarian catastrophe, a refugee crisis that threatens the underpinnings of the European Union, and helped to give rise to Islamic State. And, it also explains why he thinks that Putin cannot gain—and is losing—as a result of his military intervention in Syria.

But in the Middle East it is Putin’s views on the uses of coercion, including force to achieve political objectives, that appears to be the norm, not the exception—and that is true for our friends as well as adversaries. The Saudis acted in Yemen in no small part because they feared the United States would impose no limits on Iranian expansion in the area, and they felt the need to draw their own lines. In the aftermath of the nuclear deal, Iran’s behavior in the region has been more aggressive, not less so, with regular Iranian forces joining the Revolutionary Guard now deployed to Syria, wider use of Shiite militias, arms smuggling into Bahrain and the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, and ballistic missile tests.

Russia’s presence has not helped. The Russian military intervention turned the tide in Syria and, contrary to Obama’s view, has put the Russians in a stronger position without imposing any meaningful costs on them. Not only are they not being penalized for their Syrian intervention, but the president himself is now calling Vladimir Putin and seeking his help to pressure Assad—effectively recognizing who has leverage. Middle Eastern leaders recognize it as well and realize they need to be talking to the Russians if they are to safeguard their interests. No doubt, it would be better if the rest of the world defined the nature of power the way Obama does. It would be better if, internationally, Putin were seen to be losing. But he is not.

This does not mean that we are weak and Russia is strong. Objectively, Russia is declining economically and low oil prices spell increasing financial troubles—a fact that may explain, at least in part, Putin’s desire to play up Russia’s role on the world stage and his exercise of power in the Middle East. But Obama’s recent trip to Saudi Arabia did not alter the perception of American weakness and our reluctance to affect the balance of power in the region. The Arab Gulf states fear growing Iranian strength more than they fear the Islamic State—and they are convinced that the administration is ready to acquiesce in Iran’s pursuit of regional hegemony. Immediately after the president’s meeting at the Gulf Cooperation Council summit, Abdulrahman al-Rashed, a journalist very well connected to Saudi leaders, wrote: “Washington cannot open up doors to Iran allowing it to threaten regional countries … while asking the afflicted countries to settle silently.”

As I hear on my visits to the region, Arabs and Israelis alike are looking to the next administration. They know the Russians are not a force for stability; they count on the United States to play that role. Ironically, because Obama has conveyed a reluctance to exercise American power in the region, many of our traditional partners in the area realize they may have to do more themselves. That’s not necessarily a bad thing unless it drives them to act in ways that might be counterproductive. For example, had the Saudis been more confident about our readiness to counter the Iranian-backed threats in the region, would they have chosen to go to war in Yemen—a costly war that not surprisingly is very difficult to win and that has imposed a terrible price? Obama has been right to believe that the regional parties must play a larger role in fighting the Islamic State. He has, unfortunately, been wrong to believe they would do so if they thought we failed to see the bigger threat they saw and they doubted our credibility.

Indeed, so long as they question American reliability, there will be limits to how much they will expose themselves—whether in fighting the Islamic State, not responding to Russian entreaties, or even thinking about assuming a role of greater responsibility for Palestinian compromises on making peace with Israel. To take advantage of their recognition that they may need to run more risks and assume more responsibility in the region, they will want to know that America’s word is good and there will be no more “red lines” declared but unfulfilled; that we see the same threats they do; and that U.S. leaders understand that power affects the landscape in the region and will not hesitate to reassert it.

Several steps would help convey such an impression:

⧫ Toughen our declaratory policy toward Iran about the consequences of cheating on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to include blunt, explicit language on employing force, not sanctions, should the Iranians violate their commitment not to pursue or acquire a nuclear weapon;

⧫ Launch contingency planning with GCC states and Israel—who themselves are now talking—to generate specific options for countering Iran’s growing use of Shiite militias to undermine regimes in the region. (A readiness to host quiet three-way discussions with Arab and Israeli military planners would signal we recognize the shared threat perceptions, the new strategic realities, and the potentially new means to counter both radical Shiite and Sunni threats.)

⧫ Be prepared to arm the Sunni tribes in Iraq if Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi continues to be blocked from doing so by the Iranians and the leading militias;

⧫ In Syria, make clear that if the Russians continue to back Assad and do not force him to accept the Vienna principles (a cease-fire, opening humanitarian corridors, negotiations and a political transition), they will leave us no choice but to work with our partners to develop safe havens with no-fly zones.

Putin and Middle Eastern leaders understand the logic of coercion. It is time for us to reapply it.

 

US, Russia aim to ‘decapitate’ Syrian military

May 7, 2016

US, Russia aim to ‘decapitate’ Syrian military, DEBKAfile, May 7, 2016

Assad_dressed_in_military_uniform10.12

The US, Russia and the Syrian rebels started discussions this weekend over the composition of a list of Syrian generals who will be dishonorably discharged over war crimes they committed during the country’s civil war, DEBKAfile’s military and intelligence sources say in an exclusive report.

The generals will not face trial at an international tribunal over their war crimes. They will be able to leave Syria along with their families and their possessions, just like President Bashar Assad and his clan.

Our sources add that atop the list are the commanders of the Syrian air force who carried out the majority of the Assad regime’s attacks on the rebels over the past five years, including the atrocities of the past few days.

The sources say that the Americans and the Russians intend to “decapitate” the command but leave the military’s structure in its current form while integrating rebel fighters and commanders into its units. The rebel commanders are to receive ranks equivalent to their current ones in the new Syrian army.

DEBKAfile’s exclusive report on Wednesday, May 4, that Russia is ready to discuss the terms for Assad’s ouster surprised and stunned the political and military hierarchy in Tehran. In urgent consultations held the same day, it was decided to dispatch Iran’s deputy foreign minister for Arab and African affairs, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, to Moscow without delay in order to determine whether the report was accurate.

The senior Iranian diplomat arrived in the Russian capital the following day and met with Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, the chief strategist of Russia’s Middle East policy.

Immediately after the meeting, Amir-Abdollahian said Iran will continue supporting Assad and the Syrian people in fighting terrorism, and make efforts to achieve success at intra-Syrian talks, namely the negotiations in Geneva between the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition. The Iranian diplomat did not say a single word about Assad’s future.

However, Moscow was one step ahead of Tehran. Shortly before Amir-Abdollahian deplaned in the Russian capital, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made a bombshell statement, saying “Assad is not our ally, by the way. Yes, we support him in the fight against terrorism and in preserving the Syrian state. But he is not an ally like Turkey is the ally of the United States.”

Our sources said it was a put-down for both Washington and Ankara, whose relationship has deteriorated recently.

DEBKAfile’s military sources report that Assad has not failed to notice the latest developments, and he continues to use Syrian, Iranian and Hizballah forces to attack the rebels in the parts of Aleppo that they control. This comes despite the announcement on Saturday, May 7, by Moscow and the Russian military in Syria that the ceasefire in the northwestern city had been extended by 72 hours.

Assad is keeping the Syrian army in reserve to defend his region against the US-Russian plan to depose him.

Saudi Columnist Following Pulverizing Of Aleppo: Assad Is The No. 1 Terrorist; Is Putin Any Different From Al-Baghdadi? Is Khamenei More Humane Than Al-Zawahiri?

May 5, 2016

Saudi Columnist Following Pulverizing Of Aleppo: Assad Is The No. 1 Terrorist; Is Putin Any Different From Al-Baghdadi? Is Khamenei More Humane Than Al-Zawahiri? MEMRI, May 5, 2016

Following the massive attack on the city of Aleppo by the Syrian regime and its Russian ally, which included the destruction of a hospital, Saudi columnist Khalaf Al-Harbi penned an article in which he harshly attacked the Syrian regime as well as the leaders of Russia, Iran and Hizbullah. Writing in the government Saudi daily ‘Okaz, he accused these leaders of committing a “genocide” of the Syrian people, and the international community of silent complicity in this crime. He added that this crime was comparable to, if not worse than, the crimes of terrorist organizations such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda.

The following are excerpts from the article:[1]

27877Khalaf Al-Harbi (image: All4syria.info)

“In disaster-ridden Aleppo, a [Syrian air force] jet dropped barrel bombs on a hospital that was treating victims of previous airstrikes. The wounded [victims], the doctors and [other] patients were killed, and at the same time another jet bombed the rescue teams and civil defense [forces]. All this, of course, under the pretext of combatting terrorists!

“What action can terrorists carry out that is worse than the destruction of a hospital[?]

“Look at all the terrifying ISIS videos and the barbaric Al-Qaeda statements, and you will see the same [acts], possibly even less severe ones. If ISIS sends a suicide [bomber] to blow up a vegetable market, Bashar [Al-Assad] and Putin’s jets, together with Iran and Hizbullah, have already erased an entire city, and strove with all their might to exterminate its peaceful residents.

“What’s the difference between Putin and [ISIS leader] Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi? Is it possible that [Iranian Supreme Leader] Khamenei any more humane than [Al-Qaeda Leader] Al-Zawahiri? Did [Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader] Al-Zarqawi commit any crimes that [Hizbullah leader] Hassan Nasrallah has refused to commit? And as for Bashar Al-Assad – he cannot even be compared to the most satanic among people and demons, since he is the number one terrorist butcher, who receives the blessings of the international community, and in most cases has even conspired with it.

“Moreover, one could say that the case of Al-Baghdadi, Al-Zawahiri, and other terrorist leaders is simpler than that of Putin, Khamenei, Nasrallah, and Bashar, since these terrorist leaders are wanted all over the world, whereas the leaders of the barrel bombs are presidents of UN member-states. The silence regarding the crimes [of these leaders] provides certain legitimacy to the methodical extermination [they carry out in Syria], while we thought that such matters have long ago disappeared from the world.

“If the horrible crimes taking place in Aleppo today are classified as ‘combatting terrorism,’ then we say to the supporters of the barrel bombs – you will surely lose [this] campaign. This, because the child whose good family was destroyed in front of him will not become a peace activist or a human rights activist, but will seek an organization even more barbaric than ISIS to [join, in order to] avenge his family that was wiped off the face of the earth. Shame will continue to hound all those who, for political or sectarian reasons, supported [the dropping of] barrel bombs…”

 

Endnotes:

[1] ‘Okaz (Saudi Arabia), May 2, 2016.

Suddenly Russia consents to consider Assad’s ouster

May 4, 2016

Suddenly Russia consents to consider Assad’s ouster, DEBKAfile, May 4, 2016

Washington and Moscow have made dramatic progress over the last few days in marathon telephone talks between Secretary of State John Kerry and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on ending the war in Syria. Russia agreed for the first time to discuss the possibility that Syrian President Bashar Assad will step down, and the conditions under which such a process will take place, according to DEBKAfile’s intelligence sources.

The sources add that the Russians also agreed to begin to negotiate the future of senior Syrian military commanders who are carrying out the war against the rebels. The contacts that include the Saudis and the Jordanians have reached such an advanced stage that participants have started to prepare lists of Syrian commanders who will be removed or remain in their posts.

One of the clearest signs of the progress was the arrival of nearly all of the heads and commanders of the Syrian rebel organizations on Monday and Tuesday (May 2-3) for intensive talks at the US Central Command Forward-Jordan, a war room outside Amman staffed by officers from the US, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The gathering was arranged via a series of meetings held in Geneva over the last few days between the top diplomats of the US, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

Our sources report that US officials and senior officers in charge of the Obama administration’s strategy for the war in Syria presented the rebel leaders and commanders with a series of agreements already reached by Washington and Moscow on ways of ending the war. The main part of the agreement focused on the resignation of Assad and the departure of him and his family from the country-the Syrian opposition’s key demand for continuing the talks.

The rebel leaders were asked by the US officials and officers, who were accompanied by Saudi and Jordanian officials, to help facilitate implementation of the agreed measures and not to try to interfere with them, or in other words, to stop the fighting.

According to the information from our sources, the discussions in Jordan are continuing.

Washington’s current goal is achieve a ceasefire in all of Syria that will prevent an imminent attack by Russian, Iranian, Syrian and Hizballah forces on Aleppo, the country’s second-largest city.

Our military sources report that on Monday and Tuesday, by order of President Vladimir Putin, the Russian air force suddenly halted its airstrikes in the Aleppo area.

Thus, the Iranian, Syrian and Hizballah armies are preparing to launch their assault without the air support needed to capture the city. Even though the Syrian air force can operate in an uninhibited manner in the Aleppo area, it is not up to a large-scale and decisive attack.

No specific information is forthcoming for the Russian U-turn on Assad ousters in mid offensive for the recovery of Aleppo.

However Putin is prone to sudden zigzag in policies.

Iranian Daily ‘Kayhan’: Iran Asked Russia To Intervene In Syria; Moscow Must Not Reach Any Agreement On Syria With Washington At Assad’s And Iran’s Expense; Tehran Is Providing Assad With Strategic Weapons

April 27, 2016

Iranian Daily ‘Kayhan’: Iran Asked Russia To Intervene In Syria; Moscow Must Not Reach Any Agreement On Syria With Washington At Assad’s And Iran’s Expense; Tehran Is Providing Assad With Strategic Weapons, MEMRI, April 27, 2016

In its April 11, 2016 editorial, the Iranian daily Kayhan, the mouthpiece of Iran’s ideological camp which is led by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, discussed Russia’s interests in Syria and the Middle East, and Iran-Russia relations. The editorial warned Moscow not to reach a secret agreement with Washington at the expense of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad and Iran in exchange for Washington’s lifting its pressure on Russia over Ukraine and Crimea. It also underlined that such an agreement would in any case be doomed to failure, because it would not have Tehran’s knowledge or agreement, and stated that Tehran is opposed to Russia’s federal plan for Syria.

Noting that while it is important to Russia, Syria is not strategic to it as it is to Iran and Hizbullah. Russia’s might in the region stems solely from its protection of the Iran-Hizbullah-Syria resistance axis, it said, adding that if Moscow sells out Assad and Syria, it will become a minor player in the region, like France and the U.K.

The editorial revealed that the Russian military had entered Syria in October 2015 at Tehran’s request, and acknowledged that major parts of northern and southern Syria are directly controlled by Hizbullah and Iran. It added that Tehran has for some time been providing Assad with strategic weapons, and that Russia had withdrawn from Syria because its presence there was no longer needed.

The following are excerpts from the editorial:

“What Part Does Syria Play In Russian Foreign Policy?”

“…What part does Syria play in Russian foreign policy? Is it great or small? To what extent is Russia’s Syria policy based on cooperation with the West? Great or small? Is Russia’s security situation such that it would prefer to trade Syria for Ukraine – meaning that Russia will receive Ukraine and give Syria to the West? What weight does Russia have in Syria – meaning how much does Russia really influence the Syrian security issue? And on this matter, historically, in the past 50 years, was Syria, or was it not, part of the Eastern Bloc and [after the collapse of the Soviet Union] one of Russia’s satellite states?

“What is the extent of the military relations between Russia and Syria? How dependent is the Syrian army on Russian arms? What was Russia’s aim in becoming [physically] involved in Syria’s security situation this past October? What agreement was arrived at between the U.S. and Russia at the Geneva talks?

“Isn’t Russia’s becoming a main focal point at the Geneva talks, and isn’t its secret agreement with the U.S., aimed at weakening Iran’s role [in Syria] and placing the fate of Iran’s allies in the hands of Moscow-Washington agreements?

“According to this, and in light of the fact that it is clear what the outcome of the secret Kremlin-White House talks will be, what was the point of our five-year effort to protect the Syrian government, and our sacrifice of beloved martyrs? And, ultimately, in light of its past reputation, can Russia’s game be trusted?…”

“All Russia’s Might Lies In Its Preservation Of Iran, Hizbullah, And Syria; If It Does Not Do This, [Russia] Will Become A Minor Player, Like France And England”

“Syria plays a major part in Russia’s foreign policy… Syria and its Mediterranean coast is the only point in the Middle East and North Africa that has [physical] contact with the southern reaches of NATO territory. To some extent, these places are under Russian control, and any plan that impacts Russia’s ongoing presence in this sensitive region is certainly contrary to Russia’s interests and national security.”

“On the other hand, there is no way Russia can trust that any agreement with the West that rejects Assad will not also reject Russian influence. Therefore, we can say that in terms of geopolitics and strategic interests, there is no possibility that an agreement between Russia and the West about the current Syrian government would be achieved – unless the Russians make a mistake in the talks. But even if this happens, there is a possibility for rectification [of such a mistake by Russia], thanks to the good Iran-Russia relations. Additionally, in the past year or two, we have seen at least two such mistakes that were subsequently rectified.”

“Regarding Russian control over Eastern Ukraine and the Crimea, and Russian military control of the Black Sea: There is no reason for Russia to bring Syria in [to the equation] in order to obtain Ukraine. At this time, in the Ukrainian issue, the Westerners and the Western government in Kiev are apprehensive about Russia’s influence and about Russia’s military and security expansion in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Therefore, the statement that is brought up in Iran – i.e. that Russia wants to trade Syria for Ukraine, is not compatible with reality.

“What weight does Russia carry in Syria? Undoubtedly, Russia is one of the countries that influence the Syrian issue. Russia’s military presence in the ports of Latakia and Tartus, as well as the Russia-Syria military agreements, give Russia prominent status. But in comparison with the status of Iran and Hizbullah, [Russia’s] status is not considered strategic.

“In principle, in some strategic matters, there are strategic points of contention between Russia and Syria – but there are no such disputes between Damascus and Tehran… Russia’s influence in Syria is not so great that [Russia] can make decisions on behalf of the Syrian government and its allies in the region… that is, Russia has no strategic relations either with the Syrian government or with the main rebels such as Jabhat Al-Nusra and ISIS, which would allow it to establish a particular situation in Syria. All Russia’s might lies in its preservation of Iran, Hizbullah, and Syria. If it does not do this, [Russia] will become a minor player, like France and England.”

“Major Parts Of The Line Of Defense And The Operations Of North And South Syria Are Now Directly In Hizbullah’s And Iran’s Hands”

“Over the past 50 years, Syria was never recognized as part of the Eastern Bloc, and never expressed solidarity with it, despite its good relations with the Soviet Union and Russia. Perhaps the main reason there was no such alliance is Russia’s active relations with the Zionist regime. In any event, Syria was not defined as part of Russia’s [interests], and has, since the beginning of the victory of [Iran’s Islamic] Revolution, been part of the resistance front and an ally of Iran – and now too it owes its existence to Iran’s special and influential aid.

“In contrast to Russia, that has nothing in Syria that belongs to it, major parts of the line of defense and the operations of north and south Syria are now directly in Hizbullah’s and Iran’s hands. If Russia reaches an agreement with a third country that is unacceptable to Iran, such an agreement will surely fail – because in the past 30 years, every decision made for the resistance states and movements in which Iran had no part failed.

“Syria has no absolute dependence on Russian arms, and Iran has been providing Syria with strategic weapons for a long time. Therefore, in the [second Lebanon] war, the Assad government gave its Russian weapons to Hizbullah in Lebanon, without fearing that this would violate either the military protocols [that were in place] with Russia or the Russians’ conditions. Russia also did not succeed in expressing serious opposition [to this move]. Therefore, if Moscow was Syria’s only source of weapons, Assad would not have been able to unilaterally violate the agreement.”

“On The First Of October 2015, Russia [Physically] Entered The Syrian Security Issue, After Iran Officially Asked It To Do So”

“On the first of October 2015, Russia [physically] entered the Syrian security issue, after Iran officially asked it to do so. Two days after a visit [to Moscow] by a high-ranking Iranian delegation, Moscow sent its air forces and missile defense systems into the war against terrorist elements in Syria, and five and a half months later, it withdrew part of its military forces from Syria. This was because the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)   agreement with Putin was in force for five months at most. After the end of the [Russia-Iran] agreement, Russia withdrew only some of its forces from Syria.

“[It was at] Iran’s invitation that Russia entered Syria, when such a [military intervention] was necessary and worthwhile, and [Russia] withdrew part of its forces when even withdrawing them all would not have harmed the [Assad] government and the Syrian security apparatuses one bit. In this case, Iran’s conclusion was that the Russian forces should return [to Russia].

“The truth is that last summer, because of the advance of the terror elements in Idlib, Shaykh Maskin, Sakhaneh, and Tadmor, terror elements were enthused, and Syria needed a psychological shock; additionally, prior to Russia’s entrance, the sensitive region of Zabadani was taken by Hizbullah.

“This shock [i.e. Russia’s entrance into Syria] was implemented in early October, and it gave the [Syrian] army, and the forces connected to it, their second wind, and they carried out the Nasser 2 operation in the western part of the city of Aleppo and also determined the fate of the war in Syria. Therefore, when the Russians withdrew their forces [from Syria], there was no longer any need for their presence. So it is not at all correct to say that Iran and Syria were surprised when this happened.

“For Syria, there is a need for diplomatic talks, and Iran always stresses [the need for] this alongside military operations. Iran has had a useful presence in most [of these talks] particularly in the two recent rounds of talks held in Munich and Geneva. Here, Russia’s role was two-pronged: First, in the developments in the [war] arena; in this matter [Russia] is fully coordinating with Iran. Second is Russia’s special plan, the main point of which is [Syria’s] federalization. Iran has neither rejected nor approved [this plan], but it recognizes it as premature, and as not serving the interests of the participants in the diplomatic talks in Geneva.”

GCC leaders reject Obama’s Middle East policy

April 23, 2016

GCC leaders reject Obama’s Middle East policy, DEBKAfile, April 23, 2016

Big Bomber

 

DEBKAfile’s intelligence sources and its sources in the Gulf report exclusively that US President Barack Obama failed to convince the leaders of the six Gulf Cooperation Council member states, during their April 22 summit in Riyadh, to support his Middle East policy and cooperate with Washington.

Our sources also report that Saudi Arabia, with Turkey’s help, and the US carried out separate military operations several hours before the start of the summit that showed the extent of their differences.

The US on Thursday started to use its giant B-52 bombers against ISIS in an attempt to show Gulf leaders that it is determined to quash the terrorist organization’s threat to Gulf states. The bombers deployed at Qatar’s Al Udeid airbase attacked targets around Mosul in northern Iraq, but the targets were not identified.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which recently established a bloc along with Egypt and Jordan to oppose Obama’s Middle East policy, started to infiltrate a force of 3,500 rebels back into Syria.

The force has been trained and financed by the Saudis at special camps in Turkey and Jordan. Members of the force are now fighting alongside other rebels north of Aleppo, but they are being bombed heavily by the Russian and Syrian air forces.

Riyadh sent the rebels into Syria to demonstrate to Obama that the Saudi royal family opposes the policy of diplomatic and military cooperation between the US and Russia regarding Syria that enables President Bashar Assad to remain in power in Damascus.

Since the war in Syria began in 2011, Obama has promised countless times that Washington would train and arm Syrian rebel forces outside the country, and then deploy them in Syria in order to strengthen rebel forces.

However, it has not done so except for one instance in 2015. The US infiltrated a small force consisting of no more than several dozen fighters, but it was destroyed by the Nusra Front, an affiliate of Al Qaeda, shortly after it crossed the border. The terrorist group had apparently been tipped off about the arrival of the pro-American force.

All of Washington’s efforts to recruit and train Syrian fighters, which have cost close to $1 billion, have failed.

DEBKAfile’s sources report exclusively that the leaders of the six GCC member states put their previous differences aside and presented Obama with four requests aimed at building a new joint policy regarding the region. According to our sources, these requests were:

1. Action by Washington to strengthen the Sunni majority in Iraq and facilitate representation of the Sunnis in the central government in Baghdad. The Gulf rulers told Obama that his policy of trying to win the support of Iraqi Prime MinisterHaider al-Abadi is mistaken.

They also pointed out reports by their intelligence services that al-Abadi is likely to be deposed and be replaced by a pro-Iranian prIme minister in the near future.

Obama rejected the request and said he refuses to change his Iraq policy.

2. Imposition of new US sanctions on Iran over its continuing ballistic missile tests.

On April 19, several hours before Obama’s departure for Riyadh, Iran carried out its latest act of defiance by attempting to launch a satellite into orbit using one of its “Simorgh” intercontinental ballistic missiles. The missile failed to leave the Earth’s atmosphere, fell to earth and crashed along with the satellite.

Obama turned down the Gulf leaders on new sanctions as well.

3. Provision of US-made F-35 fighter-bombers to Saudi Arabia and the UAE so they can take action against the Iranian missile threat. The US president declined the request.

4. Abandonment of Washington’s cooperation with Russia and the UN for political solution in Syria, and instead cooperate with Gulf states and Turkey to end the war and depose President Bashar Assad. Obama refused.

In other words, the summit in Riyadh, Obama’s final meeting with GCC leaders before he leaves the White House next January, ended without a single agreement.

Arab Press Reports On U.S.-Russia Understandings Allowing Assad To Remain In Power In Syria During Transitional Phase

April 22, 2016

Arab Press Reports On U.S.-Russia Understandings Allowing Assad To Remain In Power In Syria During Transitional Phase, MEMRI, N. Mozes*, April 22, 2016

(The analysis does not mention the Arab press’ reaction to the Putin – Obama agreement to turn Golan over to Syria. — DM)

According to many reports in the Arab press in recent days, alongside the indirect talks in Geneva between the Syrian regime and opposition that are being mediated by UN Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura, the U.S. and Russia have been conducting separate secret talks to draw up understandings on resolving the crisis. The reports state that the U.S. is inclined to accept the position of the Syrian regime and its Russian ally, namely, that the idea of a transitional governing body should be abandoned in favor of a joint regime-opposition body, and that the Syrian regime should remain in the hands of President Bashar Al-Assad, at least in the transitional phase.

Concurrently, during his talks with the regime and opposition delegations, de Mistura presented an idea that he claims he did not initiate, which involves Assad remaining as a figurehead president and appointing deputies to whom he would delegate his political and military authority. It is hard to imagine that the U.S. and Russia were unaware of this proposal, which is in line with what has been reported on their own understandings regarding Assad’s remaining president during the transitional period. These reports, if true, show that the U.S. has backed down even further from its position vis-à-vis Assad and the Syrian opposition, and that it is disregarding the clause in the 2012 Geneva I communique calling for the establishment of a transitional body with full authority.

Arab press reports on these U.S.-Russia efforts increased greatly after Secretary of State John Kerry’s March 24, 2016 meetings with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and President Vladimir Putin. Following the meetings, Kerry said that both sides had agreed to step up their efforts to achieve a political transition in Syria and had agreed on a timetable and that a draft constitution would be submitted in August 2016.[1] On April 8, Kerry confirmed reports that the U.S. was further backing down from its previous position when he told the Saudi Al-Arabiya TV channel that while Assad can no longer lead his country in light of the many crimes he had committed, he would still be present at the start of the transitional phase. He added that if Assad would facilitate this phase, then a safe exit for him could be discussed.[2]

According to the Arab reports, the U.S.-Russia understandings would be imposed on the parties involved, as with the February 12, 2016 agreement on cessation of hostilities. In another similarity to that agreement, the Assad regime will be the main one to benefit.

This paper will review the reports on U.S.-Russia understandings on the Syrian crisis:

27751U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov (image: Orient-news.net, April 17, 2016)

Anti-Assad Media: American-Russian Deal Includes Assad Remaining In Power

On April 16, 2016, three days after the start of the third round of indirect talks in Geneva between the Syrian regime and opposition under the mediation of UN Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura, the London-based Saudi daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat reported that Western diplomats “are warning that there will be a U.S.-Russia deal on Syria before the summer.” According to the report, it is the Americans who are pressuring the Russians to arrive at understandings that are to be “very close to the Russia proposal regarding the nature of the transitional phase, the regime, the constitution, and the elections.” The diplomats cited in the report said that the U.S. is trusting Moscow to find a solution for the Syrian crisis while ignoring Western and regional elements.[3]

The following day, the newspaper reported that the U.S. and Russia were discussing not only “regime leader Bashar Al-Assad’s remaining in power during the transitional phase, but also the central role he would play in it, including in drafting a constitution and in the elections set for 18 months after the start of negotiations between the sides.”[4] In a later report, the paper cited Western sources who warned against recycling “the Yemen model” under which Yemen president ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Saleh had officially been removed but had in effect remained in control of the armed forces and in possession of many political cards.[5]

On April 17, the London-based Saudi daily Al-Hayat also reported on the U.S.-Russia talks. According to the daily, Robert Malley, the White House Coordinator for the Middle East and chief advisor to President Obama on Syria, and Putin’s Syria envoy Alexander Lavrentiev were holding intensive talks behind the scenes with the aim of drawing up “constitutional and political principles” based on a “political partnership” between the regime and the opposition, “in accordance with an improved Lebanese model.”[6] Under this proposal, the regime and opposition would share executive, military, security, legal, and constitutional authority. The newspaper also stated that Obama would present these understandings during his visit to the Gulf states on April 21, and that the Russians would present them to Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Qods Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who recently visited Moscow. The understandings would then be brought before Syrian regime representatives, and a “select list” of oppositionists who agree to a political solution.[7]

On April 18, 2016, the London-based daily Al-Arabi Al-Jadid reported that in light of the Geneva talks’ failure so far to bring the sides closer together, representatives of presidents Obama and Putin are working in Geneva to formulate an alternative plan in the event that the negotiations fail; this plan would be imposed on the sides via a UN Security Council resolution, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Two main proposals to resolve the crisis were presented at these U.S.-Russia Talks: The first is based on the principle of a “political partnership” among all elements of Syrian society, which would be more comprehensive than the 1989 Taif Agreement and would include leaving Assad in power, because he controls the main power base in Syria. The second proposal includes the establishment of a transitional council comprising eight technocrats; this council would lead the transitional phase.[8]

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov denied the reports about secret U.S.-Russia talks, stressing that they were “routine consultations.”[9] However, during the regime-opposition Geneva talks, de Mistura brought the delegations a proposal “from an expert” that also involved Assad’s remaining in power, at least temporarily. Under this proposal, he would continue to serve as president and would appoint three deputies to whom he would delegate his political and military authority and who would manage the country during the transitional phase.[10] It is hard to imagine that the U.S. and Russia, who sponsor the Geneva talks, were unaware of this proposal, which is in line with what has been reported on their own understandings regarding Assad’s remaining president during the transitional period.

As noted, these reports come in addition to similar reports in the Arab press following Kerry’s March 24 visit to Moscow that focused on a U.S.-Russia convergence on the issue of the Syrian crisis. Thus, the London-based Qatari daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi reported on March 29, 2016 that the U.S. and Russia had drawn up the general details of a three-point plan that includes general parliamentary elections under UN auspices, a new constitution, and creation of a presidential election mechanism allowing Assad to run “even though the U.S. would prefer that Russia persuade him not to do so.” The report also added that the president’s authority would be downgraded.[11]  Al-Hayat reported on March 31 that Kerry had informed Arab countries that the U.S. and Russia had arrived at understandings that included Assad’s exit to another country, but not a timetable for it.[12]

On April 11, 2016, a Syrian oppositionist website reported that Russia had prepared an alternative plan in case the Geneva talks failed; it dictated the establishment of a military council comprising both regime and opposition elements; this council would rule the country and prepare for parliamentary and presidential elections. Under this plan, there would be no transitional phase and no interim ruling body, as neither are compatible with the current Syrian constitution. Russia reportedly presented this plan to Kerry during the latter’s Moscow visit, and Kerry assured his hosts that the U.S. would not oppose it but that Russia would have to persuade the opposition to accept it.[13]

Kerry: Assad Should Remain For Start Of Transitional Phase

The American administration’s statements on resolving the Syrian crisis are rife with internal contradictions. For example, officials repeatedly state that Assad is illegitimate because of his crimes against his people, and that he cannot unite Syria, but at the same time Kerry said that Russia and the U.S. have agreed that he should remain for the start of the transitional phase. This effectively confirms reports that the American position is moving closer to the Russian one, and that the former no longer objects to Assad’s remaining in power during the transitional phase.

In an April 8, 2016 interview, Kerry told the Saudi Al-Arabiya TV: “During the transitional phase, Assad will remain in power in accordance with the Geneva [I] communique, since this communique required joint [regime and opposition] consensus regarding the phase. This means that both Assad and the opposition must join this consensus… The U.S. and Russia have reached an agreement that was reached also with many other countries, that is, there is no escaping a transitional phase followed by a united, secular, and non-sectarian Syria… Likewise, we agreed that Assad should be present at the start of the transitional phase…

“The Russians have made it clear that Assad has assured them that he will participate in the transitional phase and support the drafting of a new constitution and the holding of presidential elections. If he does not meet his commitments, I do not believe the Russians will continue to support him.”

In response to the question of whether Assad would be allowed safe passage out of Syria if he agreed to step down, Kerry responded: “… If Assad is willing to be a constructive factor in the efforts to make peace in Syria, this safe passage would receive significant attention, and the sides should seriously consider this effort and enable Assad to live safely, which is what I wish for him…”[14]

On April 16, a Syrian opposition website also reported that the U.S. had agreed to postpone the debate on Assad’s fate, and stated that Kerry, on his April 7 visit to Bahrain, had told the Gulf Cooperation Council foreign ministers that Assad’s withdrawal from power should not be discussed at this time.[15]

U.S.-Russia Military Coordination

Although U.S. administration officials reject the prospect of military coordination with Russia and the Syrian regime against the Islamic State (ISIS), there are indications of U.S.-Russia coordination regarding military activity in Syrian territory. Thus, the Syrian Democratic Forces – an umbrella organization of Kurdish and Sunni Arab forces fighting ISIS, Jabhat Al-Nusra, and Islamist opposition factions – received aerial support from both the U.S.-led international coalition and the Russian air force during its takeover of the city of Al-Shaddadi in southern Al-Hasakah in northwest Syria.[16] On March 24, the Pentagon reported that international coalition jets had bombed an ISIS post near Tadmur.[17]  A Syrian oppositionist website reported that this attack was carried out as regime forces, backed by the Russian air force, reached the outskirts of the city.[18]

The Syrian Opposition Fears That The U.S. Will Back Down Still More From Its Original Position

The Syrian opposition, represented by the High Negotiations Committee (HNC) that was established in Riyadh, expressed grave concern at the reports of an imminent U.S.-Russia deal enabling Assad to remain in power, and displeasure at the U.S. for not updating it on the details of such a deal. [19] On April 2, 2016, HNC general coordinator Riyad Hijab said: “It is clear that the U.S. has agreed with Russia on vague matters of whose nature we are not being informed… We do not fear rapprochement between the U.S and Russia, but rather the vagueness and opaqueness of these relations.”[20] Basma Qadmani, a member of the HNC delegation to the Geneva talks, stressed: “The American ambiguousness is disturbing to the Syrian opposition… We do not know what the U.S. discussed with Moscow. There are all sorts of rumors, and we are waiting for the U.S. to confirm that it still opposes leaving Assad in power.”[21]

In light of this ambiguity, HNC officials stressed that the purpose of the current Geneva talks was to establish a transitional governing body with full authority in accordance with the Geneva I communique, which they interpret as including Assad’s departure and a replacement of the existing regime.

* N. Mozes is a research fellow at MEMRI.

Endnotes:

[1] Nytimes.com, March 24, 2016.

[2] Alarabiya.net, April 8, 2016.

[3] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), April 16, 2016.

[4] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), April 17, 2016.

[5] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), April 18, 2016.

[6] A reference to the 1989 Taif Agreement that ended the Lebanese civil war and distributed political, civil, and military authority in the country along sectarian lines. Past reports indicated an intention to implement the Lebanese model in Syria as well.

[7] Al-Hayat (London), April 17, 2016.

[8] Al-Arabi Al-Jadid (London), April 18, 2016.

[9] Sputniknews.com, April 18, 2016.

[10] Webtv.un.org, April 18, 2016.

[11] Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), March 29, 2016.

[12] Al-Hayat (London), March 31, 2016.

[13] Orient-news.net, April 11, 2016.

[14] Alarabiya.net, April 8, 2016.

[15] Alsouria.net, April 16, 2016.

[16] Orient-news.net, February 19, February 20, 2016.

[17] Defense.gov, March 24, 2016.

[18] Zamanalwsl.net, March 24, 2016.

[19] See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 6280, Syrian Opposition On Eve Of Geneva Talks: U.S. Made ‘A Scary Retreat’ From Its Former Position, January 27, 2016.

[20] Etilaf.org, April 2, 2016.

[21] Orient-news.net, April 3, 2016.