Archive for January 2019

Syria’s UN envoy threatens retaliatory attack on Ben Gurion Airport

January 23, 2019

Source: Syria’s UN envoy threatens retaliatory attack on Ben Gurion Airport | The Times of Israel

Threats come after Israeli air force strikes on storehouses and radar systems at Damascus airport, which reportedly killed 21, including 12 Iranians

Syria's UN Ambassador Bashar Jaafari addresses the United Nations Security Council, at UN headquarters, Tuesday, Jan. 22, 2019. (AP Photo/Richard Drew)

Syria’s UN Ambassador Bashar Jaafari addresses the United Nations Security Council, at UN headquarters, Tuesday, Jan. 22, 2019. (AP Photo/Richard Drew)

Syria’s envoy to the United Nations warned Tuesday that if the world body did not halt Israeli strikes on his country, Syria would retaliate with an attack on Ben Gurion International Airport outside Tel Aviv.

Speaking at the UN Security Council after a series of IAF airstrikes on Sunday and Monday — most of them launched after an Iranian missile fired from Syria was intercepted over the Israeli Golan Heights on Sunday afternoon — Bashar Jaafari said Israel was only able to act freely in Syria because it had the backing of the US, UK and France in the Security Council.

Syrian state media Sana quoted Jaafari as saying that if the UN Security Council didn’t adopt measures stop Israel, “Syria would practice its legitimate right of self-defense and respond to the Israeli aggression on Damascus International Airport in the same way on Tel Aviv airport.”

“Isn’t it time now for the UN Security Council to stop the Israeli repeated aggressions on the Syrian Arab republic territories?” Jaafari said.

A view of Ben Gurion International Airport near Lod on May 8, 2018. (Tomer Neuberg/Flash90)

While Israel has repeatedly hit targets inside Syria in recent years to try to stop the transfer of arms to Hezbollah and the entrenchment of Iranian forces, Syria has rarely responded.

It’s unclear if Syria has the ability to strike at Ben Gurion Airport; any attempt to do so would be viewed by Israel as a major escalation.

On Sunday, Israel reportedly conducted a rare daylight missile attack on Iranian targets in Syria. In response, Iran fired a surface-to-surface missile at the northern Golan Heights, which was intercepted by the Iron Dome missile defense system over the Mount Hermon ski resort, according to the Israel Defense Forces.

Hours later, in the predawn hours of Monday morning, the Israel Air Force launched retaliatory strikes on Iranian targets near Damascus and on the Syrian air defense batteries that fired upon the attacking Israeli fighter jets, the army said.

Satellite images released by an Israeli firm on Tuesday appeared to show extensive damage at Damascus International Airport.

The photographs published by ImageSat indicated storehouses and radar systems at the Syrian airport were destroyed in the strikes.

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ImageSat Intl.@ImageSatIntl

Before, during and after: (SA-22) strike in , , 20 January 2018.

Twenty-one people were killed in the Israeli raids in Syria early on Monday, 12 of them Iranian fighters, a Britain-based Syrian war monitor said earlier on Tuesday.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights initially reported the death toll from the Israeli strikes to be 11. But on Tuesday, the war monitor said the number had risen to 21, making it one of the deadliest attacks by Israel in Syria.

According to SOHR, 12 of those killed were members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; six were Syrian military fighters; and the other three were other non-Syrian nationals.

A Syrian mobile anti-aircraft battery vehicle as seen through the targeting camera of an incoming Israeli missile, in footage released by the IDF of its early morning strikes in Syria on January 21, 2019. (IDF)

The IDF said Monday that Iranian troops in Syria launched their missile at the Golan in a “premeditated” attack aimed at deterring Israel from conducting airstrikes against the Islamic Republic’s troops and proxies in Syria.

Israeli troops on Monday were put on high alert in the north.

Military spokesperson Jonathan Conricus said the three response sorties destroyed a number of Iranian intelligence sites, training bases and weapons caches connected to the Quds Force, the expeditionary arm of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Satellite images purporting to show damage to Damascus International Airport in January 20 raids by Israel, released by ImageSat International, on January 22, 2019 (ImageSat International)

According to Conricus, one of the targets of the raids was “the main storage hub for Quds Force.”

On Monday morning, the IDF also released video footage of its airstrikes on Syrian air defenses, including on social media.

Embedded video

צבא ההגנה לישראל

@idfonline

תיעוד מתוך תקיפת חלק מסוללות ההגנה האווירית הסוריות לאחר שביצעו ירי הלילה:

According to Conricus, the Iranian retaliatory strike aimed at the northern Golan was “not a spur-of-the-moment” response, but had been planned months in advance, based on intelligence collected by the IDF.

“We understand that the Iranians are trying to change the context and deter us from our policy and our strategy of fighting Iranian troops in Syria,” Conricus said. “They thought they could change the rules of engagement. Our response was a rather clear one, with a message to Iran and Syria that our policies have not changed.”

 

Between exoatmospheric Arrow 3 and two perilous warfronts down below – DEBKAfile

January 23, 2019

Source: Between exoatmospheric Arrow 3 and two perilous warfronts down below – DEBKAfile

The Israeli-US Arrow 3’s successful interception of a mock ballistic missile flying outside the earth’s atmosphere coincided on Tuesday, Jan. 22, with a sniper bullet from Gaza denting an IDF’s officer’s helmet.

Tension shot up on Israel’s combustible southern border at the same moment as Dome anti-rocket batteries were being rushed north, the day after an Iranian Fatteh-110 missile was aimed from Syria at the Hermon ski slopes north of the Golan.

Nonetheless, the Arrow 3 test was the cause for celebration. Harel Locker, Chairman of Israel’s Aerospace Industries, commented: “We are capable of defending ourselves against many bad things that our enemies are throwing at the state of Israel and preparing our next ground-breaking, border-breaking and atmosphere-breaking products.” Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was more prosaic: “We have extremely powerful defensive and offensive capabilities, among the most advanced in the world, for reaching our enemies and settling accounts with them.”

That morning, in the south, gunfire from the northern Gaza Strip was directed at an IDF engineering truck. Israeli tanks shelled a Hamas position. In the afternoon, a Hamas sniper shot an IDF officer. He was injured but saved from worse by his helmet. The IDF spokesman, whose communiques are often less than accurate, claimed he was struck by a rock. Meanwhile, five Palestinians broke through the Gaza fence to infiltrate Israel, and, once again, the tanks went into action against another Hamas position in central Gaza.This time, the Palestinians suffered casualties, one dead and several injured.

This time, too, the prime minister reacted to Hamas’ violation of the ceasefire deal it undertook in return for Qatari funding, by holding back the third $15m installment of Qatari cash due in January. Information was received that the outbreak of Gaza violence was instigated this time by Hamas’ partner-in-error, Iran’s Palestinian pawn, the Islamic Jihad, on orders from Tehran that were relayed through Hizballah in Beirut.

Iran had put another of its proxies in play. Instead of directly retaliating for the massive Israeli air and cruise missile strikes against Al Qods targets in Syria early Monday morning Jan. 21, Tehran decided to use its pawn in Gaza to punish Israel.

This concatenation of events highlights the complexity of Israel’s military quandary. Iran has managed to pull a tight noose around Israel’s neck from three directions, Syria, Lebanon and Gaza and is building a fourth in Iraq. All of these fronts are bristling with ground-to-ground missiles, a small number of which are precision-guided, although most are not outfitted with exact targeting devices. By now, some of those precise missiles have reached the Gaza Strip, as well as Syria and Lebanon.

 Israel’s arsenal of air defense weapons is formidable. But they can’t seal Israel’s air space and territory hermetically or nullify the strategic advantage Iran has achieved by the power to inflame three of its borders.

On the one hand, Iran’s military capabilities in Syria are diluted by their distance from home base, but, on the other, they are near Israel, on its very doorstep. The missile aimed at the Golan on Monday laid bare the presence of mobile surface missiles manned by Iranian officers and teams and deployed south of Al-Kiswah, opposite the IDF’s Golan positions. It was indeed shot down in time by Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system. However, those Al Qods launchers are not positioned outside the atmosphere, but just 25km from the Israeli border.

 

Turkey and the Kurds in Syria – Jerusalem Studio 390 

January 23, 2019

 

 

True or False? – Netanyahu talks to the Iranian people

January 22, 2019

 

 

Why is the ISRAELI ARMY so POWERFUL? – VisualPolitik EN

January 22, 2019

Apropos of Kavan’s comment below:

Source: Defense site: Iran has a stronger military than Israel – Arab-Israeli Conflict – Jerusalem Post GlobalFirePower …

This ranking seems to be an oversimplification of a complicated subject that relies heavily on the statistics of military inventory and quantification, without thorough assessment of hidden factors. Those naval vessels and aircraft are merely numbers. The majority of the vessels are fast boats, and the remaining are ailing frigates. Aircraft belong to Vietnam war era. Moreover, training, effectiveness, operational readiness, people’s support for the military, unity of command, technological resources, type of government, national power, military alliance, and many other factors don’t seem to have been taken into account. Military is not a warehouse.
IDF is undoubtedly the strongest military in the region and one of the strongest in the world.

 

ניסוי מערכת “חץ” 3 – The test of the Arrow 3

January 22, 2019

 

 

INSS: Israel could face three-front war in 2019

January 22, 2019

Source: INSS: Israel could face three-front war in 2019

Institute for National Security Studies says the volatile situation along the northern border as well as in the Gaza Strip could lead Israel to war against Iran, Hezbollah and the Palestinians at the same time.

“The main three fronts are: Syria, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, and they are very volatile. Despite the continued mutual deterrence between the sides, there is a potential for a military escalation, which could eventually lead to an all-out three-front war … Israel is ought to be prepared for this scenario,” said the assessment, which was submitted to President Reuven Rivlin last week.

Prime Minister Netanyahu and IDF Chief of Staff Kochavi (Photo: Reuters)

Prime Minister Netanyahu and IDF Chief of Staff Kochavi (Photo: Reuters)

The First Northern War

One scenario for a three-front war involves the IDF facing all military forces along Israel’s northern border: Iran, Hezbollah, and the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad. The possible “northern border war” is the gravest threat Israel faces in the coming year, according to the INSS.

Israel has repeatedly taken vigorous military action against the Iranian arms depots in Syria. The Islamic Republic, however, has declared it doesn’t intend to leave the war-battered country in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, Israel’s freedom of operations in Syria has diminished since Russia began to arm the Syrian regime after Assad’s forces all but reclaimed all the territory occupied by the Islamic State and various rebel groups.

Hezbollah fighters on the Syria-Lebanon border (Photo: AP)

Hezbollah fighters on the Syria-Lebanon border (Photo: AP)

Due to Assad’s successes in Syria, Iran has decided to divert its attention to Iraq and Lebanon. Although Iranian support for its proxy Hezbollah has never ceased, recently more effort has been directed into assisting the terror group in converting its arsenal of unguided projectiles into precision-guided missiles, improving Hezbollah’s air defense capability and supplying the Shi’ite organization with long-range anti-ship missiles. Israel’s ability to thwart Iranian military projects in Lebanon is much more limited than in Syria, where a volatile political and security situation allowed the Israeli military to operate in a consequence-free environment.

The INSS researchers believe that to continue foiling Iran’s efforts to establish long-term military presence in Syria, as well as the Islamic Republic’s attempts to further enrich Hezbollah’s weapons arsenal, Israel would have to formulate a new course of action. The methods used by the IDF until now, which involve mostly aerial attacks on arms depots, no longer justify the risk of a possible military flare-up.

“Iran’s military projects in Lebanon and Iraq, as well as Russia’s restrictions on Israeli activity in Syria, will necessitate either an update to Israel’s modus operandi or formulating a new approach that would allow to Israel to eliminate the threat effectively while avoiding an all-out military confrontation,” said the assessment.

Conflict in the south

The potential for yet another Israel-Hamas flare-up is also extremely high in 2019. Although there are many factors that contribute to this assumption, the three main reasons are: the deteriorating socio-economic situation in the Strip; sanctions imposed on Hamas in Gaza by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas; and the erosion of Israel’s deterrence, which was achieved in the 2014 Operation Protective Edge.

Home in Ashkelon that suffered a direct hit from a rocket fired from Gaza (Photo: AFP)

Home in Ashkelon that suffered a direct hit from a rocket fired from Gaza (Photo: AFP)

Unless Israel is planning a preemptive strike on Hezbollah’s factories to produce precision-guided missiles, which would ensure a military confrontation, the IDF should divert all its efforts to rebuilding the deterrence against Hamas by inflicting significant blows on the terror group’s military wing. Although Gaza poses an immediate threat, it is less grave in scale than the northern front.

Deteriorating situation in the West Bank

The Trump administration is due to release its “deal of the century” peace plan to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The chances of the plan’s success, however, are slim. The Palestinian Authority has already rejected the proposal, and the best case scenario is that Israel would win the “blame game,” putting the onus of the failure of the latest American peace effort on the Palestinians.

Palestinians clashing with Israeli security forces in Ramallah (Photo: AFP)

Palestinians clashing with Israeli security forces in Ramallah (Photo: AFP)

But Israel would still have to bear the consequences of such a failure, which would undoubtedly lead to further instability and unrest in the West Bank. In the long term, there is the danger of a binational state forming in the absence of a two-state solution, which would threaten Israel’s identity as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

The Iran nuclear program

There are two low-probability extreme scenarios concerning the Iranian nuclear program that could come to pass in the coming year. The first is Iran acquiring an atomic bomb in the North Korean model in an effort to negotiate from a position of power. The second scenario is the toppling of the ayatollahs regime, which by all indications is stable and capable of suppressing any public unrest.

US-Israel relations

US support for Israel is stable, but Israel must prepare itself for unexpected decisions President Donald Trump might make. For instance, his announcement to withdraw the American forces from Syria does not significantly harm Israel’s security in the short term, but it strengthens its enemies and makes it easier for them to establish their long-term military presence in Syria.

Prime Minister Netanyahu meets with US President Trump (Photo: AFP)

Prime Minister Netanyahu meets with US President Trump (Photo: AFP)

INSS recommendations

According to the INSS, Israel should reach clear understandings with the United States regarding the Iranian nuclear program, which will include intelligence cooperation, defining a clear red line in case Iran violates the nuclear agreement and certainly in case Tehran tries to acquire a nuclear bomb, and preparing a joint political and military plan to stop Iran in case that red line is crossed.

In light of Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal signed between the Islamic Republic and world powers, and the possibility Iran might resume its nuclear activities, Israel should make the necessary preparations for a military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Israel should also make it clear to the Trump administration that if the nuclear deal is ever renegotiated, the US must ensure the compromises it would entail will not hurt Israel’s interests.

US President Trump (Photo: Reuters)

US President Trump (Photo: Reuters)

In the meantime, Israel can continue basing its campaign to prevent Iran from establishing military presence in Syria on intelligence superiority and varied and precise strike capabilities. While it’s preferable the campaign against Iran’s military entrenchment remains confined to Syrian territory, Israel must be prepared for the possibility it could expand to Lebanon or even directly to Iran.

The rehabilitation of the Syrian army has already begun, which might lead the Assad regime to becoming more assertive against IAF activity in the area. The IDF must make every effort to avoid a clash with the Russian forces stationed in Syria to prevent another international crisis, similar to the one that occurred following the downing of a Russian intelligence plane by Syrian aerial defense forces who were trying to stop an IAF attack.

Israel must continue systematically preventing the transfer of quality weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon, as long as the strategic conditions allow it. In addition, Israel must prepare to take action against Hezbollah’s accurate weapons facilities in Lebanon. Since such an attack would most certainly lead to a prolonged military confrontation with the Shiite terror group, Israel must also prepare the home front for a large-scale war in the north.

No political arrangement with Hamas

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been and continues to be a fundamental obstacle to Israel normalizing ties with its neighbors in the region. The Trump administration’s problematic relations with the Palestinians will make it difficult for any peace initiative to succeed. Nevertheless, the US and the pragmatic Sunni Arab world expect Israel to make the first move to convey its good intentions.

The Hamas government in Gaza is not a suitable partner for a diplomatic move, and so Israel must prepare for another war in the Strip. Any political arrangement with Hamas—a terrorist organization that doesn’t recognize Israel’s right to exist—weakens the moderate Palestinian camp and bolsters those who claim that Israel only understands force. However, it appears Hamas’s military options are limited, seeing as Israel has developed capabilities against its rockets arsenal and its border-crossing terror tunnels.

Relations with China and Russia

It’s important to maintain close ties, especially mutually beneficial economic ties, with Beijing and Moscow, but it shouldn’t be done at the expense of Israel’s only truly reliable ally: the United States. It is particularly important to strengthen risk management with regards to Chinese investment in essential infrastructures in Israel, while having open dialogue with the US, which is very sensitive to China acquiring the latest technology.

With Russia, Israel must reestablish the incident-prevention and coordination mechanisms in Syria, and urge the Russians to reduce their support for Iran.

Relationship with American Jewry

American Jewry is a key component when it comes to US contribution to Israel’s security. Israel needs to take proactive action to strengthen ties with various Jewish communities in the US, especially young Reform and Conservative Jews. There is also need for active dialogue with various sectors of American society who strongly oppose the Trump administration, but don’t hold anti-Israeli views, alongside renewed cooperation and dialogue with the Democratic Party. This can be done without compromising relations with the Trump administration and with the broad constituency of Republicans and Evangelical Christians who support Israel.

 

IDF comically responds to Iranian attack from Syria in Twitter post 

January 22, 2019

Source: IDF comically responds to Iranian attack from Syria in Twitter post – Arab-Israeli Conflict – Jerusalem Post

This is not the first time an official Israeli office has made a comic Twitter post.

BY TAMAR BEERI
 JANUARY 22, 2019 10:00
Netanyahu and Khamenei

The IDF posted a comic photo on their official Twitter page on Monday afternoon depicting a map of the Middle East, explaining “where Iran belongs” in contrast to where they are, referring to the Iranian settlement in Damascus from which a missile was fired at Israel earlier in the week.

The firing of the missile yesterday – a launch that could have killed civilians – was fired by Iranians out of Damascus within an area that we were promised that there would be no Iranians,” IDF spokesman Brig.-Gen. Ronen Manelis told reporters on Monday.

The IDF, in response, released a post on their Twitter page on Monday afternoon with a map pointing out in the playful font Comic Sans where Iran is in contrast to where it should be.

Israel Defense Forces

@IDF

This is not the first time official Israeli agencies have been trolls online.

In June 2018, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei wrote on Twitter that Israel “is a malignant cancerous tumor in the West Asian region that has to be removed and eradicated.”

The Israeli embassy in the US responded with a GIF image of the famous movie Mean Girls in which one character asks, “Why are you so obsessed with me?”

Khamenei.ir@khamenei_ir

Embassy of Israel

@IsraelinUSA

pic.twitter.com/1dRRE7Nv1s

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Anna Ahronheim contributed to this report.

 

Why hasn’t Syria used the S-300?

January 22, 2019

Source: Why hasn’t Syria used the S-300? – Arab-Israeli Conflict – Jerusalem Post

When the S-300 missile system was deployed it was portrayed as a game changer. But Reuters had reported in 2015 and again in October 2018 that Israel had trained against the S-300 system in Greece.

BY SETH J. FRANTZMAN
 JANUARY 21, 2019 19:57
The self-launching component of the S300 surface-to-air missile

Russian and Syrian media emphasized that Syrian air defense “repelled” the attack by Israel on Sunday. According to a spokesman for Russia’s national defense management center, the Syrians used the Pantsir and Buk air defense systems. Israel struck at a Pantsir defense system in retaliation on Monday. But why wasn’t the S-300, which Russia supplied to Syria in September, used by Damascus?

The continuing quiet among the S-300 gunners is a perplexing mystery that underpins the shadowy and deadly conflict unfolding in Syria’s skies. In late September, Russia announced it would give the Syrian regime the S-300 system in the wake of Syrian air defenses mistakenly shooting down a Russian Il-20. The Syrians had used an S-200 to hit the Russian plane, mistaking it for an Israeli warplane during an Israeli raid in Latakia.

On October 2, Russia announced they had completed the delivery of the S-300. 49 units of “equipment, including radars, control vehicles and four launchers,” were sent, according to Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.

New electronic warfare systems were also sent to Syria, including systems designed to control a “near zone” 50 km. from the system and a far zone “200 km.” away that would guard against Israeli attacks, according to a report at Janes.

Since the deployment of the S-300, there was a hiatus in attacks between October and late December. However, Syrian air defense was on alert, saying that its radars were jammed on November 30. This has led to speculation that Syrian air defense was tested several times between October and December.

An air strike on December 25 and then on January 12 were reported by Syrian media. Syria says it was able to shoot down Israeli missiles on January 12. Yet the three batteries of S-300s have apparently remained dormant. Part of the story with the S-300 can be realized from Russian media reports, which have emphasized that the system was not used or have pointed to other, older systems being used.

Is this because the Syrians are not trained on the system? All three battalions of S-300 PMU-2 systems were active by early November, Syrian media indicated. “Russian technical specialists completed the reconfiguration of the system to replace the Russian codes and letter frequencies to the letter codes and radars of Syrian ones,” a report noted.

OBSERVERS OF Syria note that the issue is not that the S-300 is ineffective. One expert who tweets under the name Tom Cat (@TomTheBasedCat) notes “the priority [of Syrian air defense] is to intercept the majority of the projectiles to minimize risk to civilians in the surrounding suburbs.” In this analysis, Syria’s goal isn’t to use air defense to strike at Israeli jets.

TØM CΛT@TomtheBasedCat

Too bad none of this even applies to Point Defense which is the main tasking of the air defense units in Damascus.

Might as well throw this whole amateur thread away because they fail to account for this and instead inflate the notion that the S-300 hundred ineffective.

TØM CΛT@TomtheBasedCat

Syria’s goal isn’t to shoot down an Israeli jet over Lebanese airspace, I don’t know why people think otherwise. The priority is to intercept the majority of the projectiles to minimize the risk to civilians in the surrounding suburbs.

However, in the past Syrian air defense projectiles have strayed toward Israel. In March 2017 an S-200 reportedly was fired and intercepted over the Jordan valley by an Arrow missile. An F-16 returning from an air strike was pursued by an S-200 missile in February and crashed in northern Israel. A Syrian missile heading for Israel was targeted by Israeli air defense on December 26.

With the S-300 now in Syria, the question is why it hasn’t been used. Tom Cat argues that “the S-300 is for Theater Defense against air-breathing targets like ballistic missiles and enemy planes, not for Point Defense like tonight [January 11] and the previous times.” In this analysis Syrian air defense doesn’t use the S-300 because it’s not the right system to stop the kind of threat involved. “The game will change when the S-300 is moved southwards because then they can actually track and target the jets,” the expert tweeted on January 13.

Others have speculated that the S-300 operators are not fully trained and that they will be ready by February of this year. This joins accusations online that the S-300 has not been effective or that it hasn’t been used because of fears that if it doesn’t work as planned then it will be an embarrassment for the Syrian regime and its Russian ally which has staked some of its pride on providing the system to help deter air strikes.

Another important aspect of the S-300 discussion is the public relations value of having the system work and also deterring air strikes.

AFTER THE December air strike, there was an apparent hiatus in such strikes. But then Israel took credit for the January 12 and January 20-21 air strikes. Former IDF chief of staff Gadi EIsenkot even said in an interview that “thousands of targets” had been hit and “in 2018 alone, the air force dropped a staggering 2,000 bombs” on Syria, according to The New York Times. This appears to raise serious concerns about Syrian air defense and its inability to deter the strikes, interdict them or use its more sophisticated new technology.

Syrian state media repeats claims again and again that it has intercepted Israel’s missiles. Russian media plays this up as well, with TASS claiming on January 20 that seven Israeli guided aircraft missiles were intercepted. The point here is to show that the Buk and Pantsir systems are doing their job, and the Pantsir S-1 is providing the point air defense it was designed for.

Nevertheless, the question mark about the S-300 remains. When it was deployed it was portrayed as a game changer. But Reuters had reported in 2015 and again in October 2018 that Israel had trained against the S-300system in Greece.

Regional countries are watching, as well as world powers, because the Syrian conflict is not just a conflict but a test of two different defense and combat systems, one in Israel that is linked to Israel’s advanced technology and defense industry and the West, and one supplied by Russia. Echoes of the Cold War – when Western-supplied technology rolled into battle with Israeli forces against the Syrian army in 1967, 1973 and 1982 – overshadow what comes next.

 

Turkey and U.S. can’t agree on what “safe zone” in Syria means 

January 22, 2019

Source: Turkey and U.S. can’t agree on what “safe zone” in Syria means – Middle East – Jerusalem Post

The latest dispute is part of tensions between Turkey and the US that have grown over the last several years.

BY SETH J. FRANTZMAN
 JANUARY 22, 2019 13:08
Kurdish fighters

“Turkey believes that safety starts not at its borders but from beyond its border,” Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said in a speech on Monday. “It is not possible to be safe without being powerful.” He was referring to a “safe zone” concept that has been proposed for northern Syria in an area the US hopes to withdraw from soon. But US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo says that the safe zone should make sure that US partners in eastern Syria are not attacked by Turkey, while also ensuring Turkey is not attacked by terrorists.

The latest dispute is part of tensions between Turkey and the US that have grown over the last several years. Turkey has claimed that the US is working with “terrorists” in eastern Syria because it accuses the People’s Protection Units (YPG) of being linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The US has been working with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to defeat ISIS while the YPG is part of the SDF. For Ankara the threat of ISIS and the YPG in Syria is seen as the same whereas US officials tend to argue that only parts of the YPG, particularly its political wing called the PYD, are linked to the PKK.

In mid-December Ankara asserted that ISIS was defeated and that Turkey would launch an operation in eastern Syria to secure the border against becoming a “terrorist corridor.” It wanted to build on operations Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch in other parts of northern Syria that had targeted ISIS and the YPG. After a phone call between US President Donald Trump and Erdogan, Trump decided to withdraw US forces from Syria. He announced the withdrawal on December 19th and indicated it would be coordinated with Turkey.

But US officials, such as anti-ISIS envoy Brett McGurk were surprised. They argued that Turkey had not played a consistent role in the Syrian conflict and had let extremists cross Turkey into Syria. They supported sticking by US partners in eastern Syria who had defeated ISIS. US Senator Lindsey Graham said the US must not abandon Kurdish allies in Syria. Pompeo suggested Turkey would “slaughter” the Kurds. Turkey was outraged, claiming that the YPG does not represent all Kurds and that Turkey has treated its Kurdish minority well and that it could do the same in eastern Syria. But Kurdish voices, many who oppose the YPG, tended to wonder if this was the case then why hadn’t Ankara included more Kurds in its role in Afrin after defeating the YPG there in March 2018. Instead Afrin has experienced lawlessness and many Kurds have fled while Syrian Arab rebel groups have moved to Afrin.

This has set up a new crises between Washington and Ankara. Pompeo called Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu on January 21st. They discussed US-Turkey “engagement” and the coordinated US withdrawal. “Pompeo reiterated the commitment of the US to addressing Turkish security concerns along the Turkish-Syria border.” However the US was also committed to protecting the “forces that worked with the US and Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS,” Pompeo said. The Cavusoglu-Pompeo discussions indicate Turkey and the US are not on the same page.

But it is not clear how much the US State Department, Pentagon and White House are on the same page either. Trump and Erdogan have also held two recent phone calls. Turkish media emphasizes that the US is changing its view of the YPG. “The US is clearly changing its position on supporting terrorist groups,” the Daily Sabah notes. Meanwhile Senator Graham, who has been outspoken about standing by the Kurds in eastern Syria, travelled to Turkey and blamed the Obama administration for creating a “nightmare” for the Turkish by arming Kurds in Syria and working with the YPG. This seemed to be a reversal of previous statements.

At issue now is a safe zone along the border and what “safe zone” means. Trump mentioned a “20 mile safe zone” in a January 14th tweet. Trump sees the relationship with Turkey as transactional and has discussed trade increases with Erdogan. Clearly Turkey can offer the US more trade than eastern Syria which Trump has characterized as “death and sand.” Sensing that Trump is closer to Ankara’s view than the State Department or Pentagon, Erdogan said that the safe zone along the border must not become “another swamp” against Turkey. The aim of the buffer zone would be to keep terrorists away. Turkey will discuss the concept in Russia this week with hopes Moscow might broker a deal as the US withdraws. This is what Moscow did in Idlib, brokering a deal which prevented a Syrian regime offensive.

Turkey says it wants to play a role in Manbij and other border areas along the border. The US policy still appears to be juggling several agendas in Syria and has not come to an understanding with Ankara about how the withdrawal will take place without sparking a new conflict between the YPG and Turkey over the border area. There are no real proposals in the works between Turkey and the US about a border force that might patrol this “safe zone.” Despite rumors that a mixed Arab “tribal” force or Kurdish Peshmerga forces connected to the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq might play a role, none of these are realistic proposals. None of them have strong backing from regional powers, the US or Turkey either. In addition rumors that the SDF is negotiating with the Syrian regime for autonomy and incorporating its forces into the Syrian regime to become a border force appear to be a plan only in its infancy and one that will be out-matched by major power politics such as the kind unfolding in Moscow. Washington’s interlocutors also appear to send mixed messages to Ankara and to Syrian partners in eastern Syria, setting the stage for yet more controversy.