WarSclerotic

The F-35 is a U.S.-manufactured fifth-generation combat platform with stealth capabilities, probably the best fighter jet in the world. (Israel just received its first F-35 jets, and has used them operationally over Syria.)

Turkey is planning to acquire at least 100 F-35 fighter jets, the first of which is scheduled to be delivered in 2019. Delivering such a war machine to Turkey – an authoritarian, Islamist-leaning state that undermines Western interests in the region – would be a big mistake.

Under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey has long stopped behaving as a reliable Western ally, even though it is still a formal member of the NATO alliance.  Instead, Turkey has succumbed to Ottoman and Islamist impulses, and it seems to have imperial ambitions.

Turkey is spending large amounts on arms procurement and on building a domestic military industry intended to bolster its ability to project power beyond its border. It is intervening militarily in Iraq and in Syria. It has used military force against Kurds in Syria (an important American partner in the war against ISIS). Turkish-sponsored militias may yet confront American forces in Syria.

Ankara is also very hostile to American allies in the region. Turkish fighters regularly violate Greek airspace, underscoring Turkey’s desire for a revision in the international border. It bullies Cyprus (a third of which is occupied by Turkey) by sending its navy to intervene with gas explorations in Cypriot continental shelf waters. Turkey is also challenging the legitimacy of President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi in Egypt (who deposed the Muslim Brotherhood former President Mohammed Morsi). Ankara opposes the Saudi attempt to isolate Qatar (a country that supports the Muslim Brotherhood and that is cozy with Iran). Similarly, Turkey’s relations with Israel have been strained. And at the same time, Turkey is nurturing good relations with Russia, China and Iran.

The Barack Obama and Donald Trump administrations have failed to significantly signal their displeasure with Ankara, allowing Turkey to pursue policies that are inimical to the American interest. It is time to change that. It makes no sense to strengthen Turkish military capabilities, and therefore the sale of F-35 jets to Turkey should be halted.

Telegraphically, here are 10 reasons why the F-35 sale to Turkey should be tanked:

1. The sale by America of F-35 fighter jets abroad is meant to be a booster for the capabilities of U.S. allies. Turkey hardly qualifies any longer for this title.
2. Delivering the F-35 to Turkey would indicate American support for Erdogan’s Turkey. Yet, Turkey is an increasingly authoritarian Islamist regime. Under Erdogan, infringements on human rights have gradually increased resulting in a “Putinization” of the Turkish political system. The military, once the defender of the Kemalist secular tradition, has been successfully subordinated by the Islamists.
3. Supplying F-35s will significantly strengthen the capabilities of the Turkish military to make mischief in the region. Erdogan may decide to use the upgraded air force to establish himself as arbiter of developments in the eastern Mediterranean and other parts of the Middle East, or to interfere with Israel’s air supremacy, or even to attack Israel.
4. The planned delivery of the Russian-made S-400 air defense system to Turkey, a procurement that has antagonized NATO members, makes the F-35 deal very problematic. If Turkey integrates the American-made F-35 and the Russian-produced S-400, details about the airplane operating systems might leak to the Russians. Thus, F-35 security could be compromised in other arenas where the jet is deployed.
5. Turkey might facilitate Russian access to data about American weapon systems on the F-35.
6. Leakage of sensitive information and technical details of U.S. weapons systems to Tehran is also a distinct possibility since Turkey is developing warmer relations with Iran.
7. Eskisehir, in Turkey, has been chosen as an industrial hub for the production of F-35 engines and as a maintenance hub for all European operators of the F-35. This too is a mistake. It could create a problematic logistical dependency upon a country whose political direction is uncertain.
8. This could result in the transfer of state-of-the-art technology to Turkey and increase the capabilities of the Turkish domestic arms industry. This would reduce Turkey’s dependence upon foreign suppliers, enhancing its freedom of action.
9. The economic benefits of the F-35 deal for Turkey are evaluated at over $12 billion, thus aiding the fortunes of an Islamist regime. It is unwise to confer such advantages on a country whose behavior is not helpful to the U.S.
10. Arms sales should be subordinated to paramount political and strategic considerations. American economic fears of losing the Turkish arms market should not supersede the negative strategic ramifications of the transaction.

In sum, the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Turkey must be stopped.

The most recent clash between Iran and Israel, on May 10, ended badly for Iran: All of the missiles it fired at Israeli military positions were intercepted or landed outside of Israeli territory. In response, Israel struck some 50 Iranians targets in Syria.

The results should come as no surprise because Israel is considerably stronger than Iran in the Syrian arena and Tehran’s use of its own forces and Shiite militias is predicated on a mistaken conception.

Originally, these forces were sent to Syria to help save the Assad regime and topple Islamic State, and they were aided by Russian air support. Iran, however, had other ideas: to build a long-term presence in Syria that would pose a significant threat to Israel. The Russian warplanes, though, were deployed to help Assad and to safeguard Russian interests in Syria. Thus far, Russia has not helped Iran in its fight against Israel, and it appears it has no intention of doing so. The Iranian and Shiite forces, therefore, were left without adequate air defenses, while the Iranian air force cannot contend with its Israeli counterpart. The Israeli airstrikes, which destroyed Syrian and Iranian air-defense systems, rendered the Iranian and Shiite fighters exposed. This situation isn’t likely to change in any substantial manner in the future. After their resounding failure in early May, the Iranians must know they cannot continue on the same path as before, and that Israel has forced it to plot a new course.

Iran now has two main courses of action to choose from – both problematic. The first option is using its most effective card for deterring Israel from further airstrikes: triggering Hezbollah’s massive rocket and missile arsenal; and, less likely, helping it by firing missiles at Israel from Iran. If Iran decides to utilize this capability on a significant scale, it’s reasonable to assume Hezbollah will follow orders.

This option, however, comes with two severe risks. First, Israel has repeatedly clarified that missile barrages from Hezbollah will lead to a particularly harsh Israeli response – not just against Hezbollah but all of Lebanon. The second risk is even more profound: Even if Hezbollah fires missiles, Israel will still hold Iran responsible. Israel can retaliate with a concentrated campaign to dislodge the Iranian foothold in Syria and Lebanon, which if successful would ultimately remove Iran from those countries. Even if the Iranians restrict their barrage to military targets, the most recent clash should inform them that even limited rocket fire can provoke a massive Israeli response, and moreover – that activating Hezbollah’s missile arsenal on any significant scale means war with Israel. Iran has no interest in getting dragged into a wide-scale conflict because its involvement in Syria places it at a disadvantage. A war with Israel would hamper Iran’s attempts to solidify its influence in Syria as well as Iraq and Lebanon. Above all, Israel could see an Iranian provocation as justification for an attack on Iran’s nuclear sites.

Iran’s other option is to switch into a lower gear when it comes to Israel. Iran won’t forgo its intent to raise a flag in Syria, which is its top strategic priority. But in light of the threat that the Iranian foothold in Syria presents to Israel, even though Iran does not have the capability of going to war with Israel on that particular state, Iran might prefer not to make the situation worse. What’s more, the Trump administration now comprises an unprecedented threat to Iran, under which Iran can use other methods to bolster its status in Syria, such as economic investment, tighter political ties, and helping build up the Shiite militias in Syria. This does not mean that Iran will give up on military action, just that it will leave out the elements that will pose a challenge to Israel before it has a proper response.

It’s hard to know which route Iran will opt for. There could be a debate between the radical arm of the regime and the moderates, which is reflected in President Hassan Rouhani’s remarks that Iran does not want more tension and in the calls by the protesters who flooded the streets at the end of 2017 for Iran to stop its costly intervention in Syria.