Archive for April 17, 2014

Column one: The disappearance of US will

April 17, 2014

Column one: The disappearance of US will, Jerusalem Post,  Caroline B. Glick, April 17, 2014

(A good summary of the foreign policy “successes” of the United States of Obama. — DM)

In Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East and beyond, the America’s most dangerous foes are engaging in aggression and brinkmanship unseen in decades.

Obama on PassoverObama on Passover Photo: REUTERS

The most terrifying aspect of the collapse of US power worldwide is the US’s indifferent response to it.

In Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East and beyond, the America’s most dangerous foes are engaging in aggression and brinkmanship unseen in decades.

As Gordon Chang noted at a symposium in Los Angeles last month hosted by the David Horowitz Freedom Center, since President Barack Obama entered office in 2009, the Chinese have responded to his overtures of goodwill and appeasement with intensified aggression against the US’s Asian allies and against US warships.

In 2012, China seized the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines. Washington shrugged its shoulders despite its mutual defense treaty with the Philippines. And so Beijing is striking again, threatening the Second Thomas Shoal, another Philippine possession.

In a similar fashion, Beijing is challenging Japan’s control over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea and even making territorial claims on Okinawa.

As Chang explained, China’s recent application of its Air-Defense Identification Zone to include Japanese and South Korean airspace is a hostile act not only against those countries but also against the principle of freedom of maritime navigation, which, Chang noted, “Americans have been defending for more than two centuries.”

The US has responded to Chinese aggression with ever-escalating attempts to placate Beijing.

And China has responded to these US overtures by demonstrating contempt for US power.

Last week, the Chinese humiliated Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel during his visit to China’s National Defense University. He was harangued by a student questioner for the US’s support for the Philippines and Japan, and for opposition to Chinese unilateral seizure of island chains and assertions of rights over other states’ airspace and international waterways.

As he stood next to Hagel in a joint press conference, China’s Defense Chief Chang Wanquan demanded that the US restrain Japan and the Philippines.

In addition to its flaccid responses to Chinese aggression against its allies and its own naval craft, in 2012 the US averred from publicly criticizing China for its sale to North Korea of mobile missile launchers capable of serving Pyongyang’s KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missiles. With these easily concealed launchers, North Korea significantly upgraded its ability to attack the US with nuclear weapons.

As for Europe, the Obama administration’s responses to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and to its acts of aggression against Ukraine bespeak a lack of seriousness and dangerous indifference to the fate of the US alliance structure in Eastern Europe.

Rather than send NATO forces to the NATO member Baltic states, and arm Ukrainian forces with defensive weapons, as Russian forces began penetrating Ukraine, the US sent food to Ukraine and an unarmed warship to the Black Sea.

Clearly not impressed by the US moves, the Russians overflew and shadowed the US naval ship. As Charles Krauthammer noted on Fox News on Monday, the Russian action was not a provocation. It was “a show of contempt.”

As Krauthammer explained, it could have only been viewed as a provocation if Russia had believed the US was likely to respond to its shadowing of the warship. Since Moscow correctly assessed that the US would not respond to its aggression, by buzzing and following the warship, the Russians demonstrated to Ukraine and other US allies that they cannot trust the US to protect them from Russia.

In the Middle East, it is not only the US’s obsessive approach to the Palestinian conflict with Israel that lies in shambles. The entire US alliance system and the Obama administration’s other signature initiatives have also collapsed.

After entering office, Obama implemented an aggressive policy in Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere of killing al-Qaida operatives with unmanned drones. The strategy was based on the notion that such a campaign, that involves no US boots on the ground, can bring about a rout of the terrorist force at minimal cost human cost to the US and at minimal political cost to President Barack Obama.

The strategy has brought about the demise of a significant number of al-Qaida terrorists over the years. And due to the support Obama enjoys from the US media, the Obama administration paid very little in terms of political capital for implementing it.

But despite the program’s relative success, according to The Washington Post, the administration suspended drone attacks in December 2013 after it endured modest criticism when one in Yemen inadvertently hit a wedding party.

No doubt al-Qaida noticed the program’s suspension. And now the terror group is flaunting its immunity from US attack.

This week, jihadist websites featured an al-Qaida video showing hundreds of al-Qaida terrorists in Yemen meeting openly with the group’s second in command, Nasir al-Wuhayshi.

In the video, Wuhayshi threatened the US directly saying, “We must eliminate the cross,” and explaining that “the bearer of the cross is America.”

Then there is Iran.

The administration has staked its reputation on its radical policy of engaging Iran on its nuclear weapons program. The administration claims that by permitting Iran to undertake some nuclear activities it can convince the mullahs to shelve their plan to develop nuclear weapons.

This week brought further evidence of the policy’s complete failure. It also brought further proof that the administration is unperturbed by evidence of failure.

In a televised interview Sunday, Iran’s nuclear chief Ali Akhbar Salehi insisted that Iran has the right to enrich uranium to 90 percent. In other words, he said that Iran is building nuclear bombs.

And thanks to the US and its interim nuclear deal with Iran, the Iranian economy is on the mend.

The interim nuclear deal the Obama administration signed with Iran last November was supposed to limit its oil exports to a million barrels a day. But according to the International Energy Agency, in February, Iran’s daily oil exports rose to 1.65 million barrels a day, the highest level since June 2012.

Rather than accept that its efforts have failed, the Obama administration is redefining what success means.

As Strategic Affairs Minister Yuval Steinitz noted, in recent months US officials claimed the goal of the nuclear talks was to ensure that Iran would remain years away from acquiring nuclear weapons. In recent remarks, Secretary of State John Kerry said that the US would suffice with a situation in which Iran is but six months away from acquiring nuclear weapons.

In other words, the US has now defined failure as success.

Then there is Syria.

Last September, the US claimed it made history when, together with Russia it convinced dictator Bashar Assad to surrender his chemical weapons arsenal. Six months later, not only is Syria well behind schedule for abiding by the agreement, it is reportedly continuing to use chemical weapons against opposition forces and civilians. The most recent attack reportedly occurred on April 12 when residents of Kafr Zita were attacked with chlorine gas.

The growing worldwide contempt for US power and authority would be bad enough in and of itself. The newfound confidence of aggressors imperils international security and threatens the lives of hundreds of millions of people.

What makes the situation worse is the US response to what is happening. The Obama administration is responding to the ever-multiplying crises by pretending that there is nothing to worry about and insisting that failures are successes.

And the problem is not limited to Obama and his advisers or even to the political Left. Their delusional view that the US will suffer no consequences for its consistent record of failure and defeat is shared by a growing chorus of conservatives.

Some, like the anti-Semitic conservative pundit Patrick Buchanan, laud Putin as a cultural hero. Others, like Sen. Rand Paul, who is increasingly presenting himself as the man to beat in the 2016 Republican presidential primaries, indicate that the US has no business interfering with Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

Iran as well is a country the US should be less concerned about, in Paul’s opinion.

Leaders like Sen. Ted Cruz who call for a US policy based on standing by allies and opposing foes in order to ensure US leadership and US national security are being drowned out in a chorus of “Who cares?” Six years into Obama’s presidency, the US public as a whole is largely opposed to taking any action on behalf of Ukraine or the Baltic states, regardless of what inaction, or worse, feckless action means for the US’s ability to protect its interests and national security.

And the generation coming of age today is similarly uninterested in US global leadership.

During the Cold War and in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the predominant view among American university students studying international affairs was that US world leadership is essential to ensure global stability and US national interests and values.

Today this is no longer the case.

Much of the Obama administration’s shuttle diplomacy in recent years has involved sending senior officials, including Obama, on overseas trips with the goal of reassuring jittery allies that they can continue to trust US security guarantees.

These protestations convince fewer and fewer people today.

It is because of this that US allies like Japan, South Korea and Saudi Arabia, that lack nuclear weapons, are considering their options on the nuclear front.

It is because of this that Israeli officials are openly stating for the first time that the US cannot be depended on to either secure Israel’s eastern frontier in the event that an accord is reached with the Palestinians, or to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

It is because of this that the world is more likely than it has been since 1939 to experience a world war of catastrophic proportions.

There is a direct correlation between the US elite’s preoccupation with social issues running the narrow and solipsistic gamut from gay marriage to transgender bathrooms to a phony war against women, and America’s inability to recognize the growing threats to the global order or understand why Americans should care about the world at all.

And there is a similarly direct correlation between the growing aggression of US foes and Obama’s decision to slash defense spending while allowing the US nuclear arsenal to become all but obsolete.

America’s spurned allies will take the actions they need to take to protect themselves. Some will persevere, others will likely be overrun.

But with Americans across the ideological spectrum pretending that failure is success and defeat is victory, while turning their backs on the growing storm, how will America protect itself? 

 

Kerry : Ukranian Anti-Semitism Allegations ‘Grotesque’ – YouTube

April 17, 2014

Kerry : Ukranian Anti-Semitism Allegations ‘Grotesque’ – YouTube.

Secretary of State John Kerry calls allegations that Jews were required to register by pro-Russian forces “grotesque,” as he also condemned threats against the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine.

Off Topic: Making a case for space

April 17, 2014

Making a case for space | JPost | Israel News.

By REUVEN BEN-SHALOM

04/17/2014 15:51

Israel must lead in space exploration for maintaining its qualitative military edge, for national prestige, for promoting technological innovation and for leading humanity in pushing the boundaries of the next frontier.

The Final Frontier

The Final Frontier Photo: AMIT BAR-YOSEF

Last week, Israel successfully launched the Ofek 10 satellite, adding another essential intelligence asset and reinforcing Israel’s place in the prestigious club of space exploration leaders. Besides military applications, Israel is also involved in many space exploration initiatives with commercial and scientific goals.

Space exploration is a highly debatable issue. Here are some questions, addressing the matter from an international, as well as Israeli perspective.

Why invest in space? Aren’t there enough problems here on earth requiring our tax money?

Space is important for defense applications, such as reconnaissance and communication satellites. Missile defense requires operating in space in order to detect and shoot down threats even before they reenter the atmosphere. In the future, we may have other space-based capabilities, such as the ability to strike targets, either by laser or by dispensing precision guided munitions.

As for civilian uses, without satellites there would be no cell phones, no internet, no weather forecasting and no navigational data for WAZE. The need for cutting-edge technology aboard spacecrafts has stimulated progress and innovation, making life on earth easier and better, through a multitude of technologies adapted from spaceflight to everyday use.

It is difficult to predict what other implementations or spin-offs space exploration may someday produce. We may eventually master the ability not only to forecast, but to alter weather systems. We may solve the earth’s energy deficits by harvesting sustainable energy in space. We might need to protect earth from an existential threat such as an inbound asteroid or sun flare. Maybe we will dispose of our waste in some remote planet. And of course, we may simply want to take a vacation on Mars.

The pursuit of pure science and abstract knowledge also motivates us. We need to satisfy our curiosity, and deepen our understanding of the universe, our planet and ourselves. We are inspired by space exploration. Steven Hawking said it best: “To confine our attention to terrestrial matters would be to limit the human spirit.”

So operating in space is important. But why risk the lives of astronauts, when robots could do it safer, better, and cheaper?
Life support systems built to withstand the harsh and unforgiving environment in space make spaceships bigger and much more expensive. Unmanned platforms would give us much more science for the same money.

In his book Breakout Into Space, George Henry Elias presents a detailed argument on why the human race, led by the United States, must develop and settle space as the next frontier. Our species may someday need to leave earth and find a new habitat, due to overpopulation, natural catastrophes such as an asteroid impact, or if we render the planet inhabitable by nuclear or environmental disasters.

His case may sound somewhat apocalyptic, but in my opinion it is sadly very realistic.

Since we are a generation that has grown into relative stability, it’s hard for us to grasp this, but reviewing global trends, and even looking across the border at our neighbors, teaches us how vulnerable our world really is.

In order to enable this human migration, we had better work on acquiring the means and methods for establishing a self-sufficient interplanetary civilization.

Data accumulated by scientists from the biomedical aspects of extended human presence in microgravity at the International Space Station (ISS) will someday enable long duration trips, such as to Mars and beyond.

Some prosperous and popular areas in the world were uninhabited and dangerous not too long ago, but people moved there, seeking a new life. We humans must always push the boundaries and boldly go where no man (or woman) has gone before. It’s who we are, it’s what we’re about, and history has taught us that this explorative attitude ultimately pays off.

But even before we leave earth, human spaceflight is essential for promoting life on earth. It is a fact that human space flight has significantly contributed to aviation safety. NASA has had an enormous influence on world aviation, introducing safety methodologies and technological improvements which were developed for space flight but found their way to passenger planes.

Seeing spaceflight and aviation as two separate entities is a mistake. There is no doubt that suborbital flight will eventually replace current methods for flying long distances, facilitating a trip from Israel to Australia in about one hour.

Why should Israel invest in space? Shouldn’t we leave this for countries with more resources?
First and foremost, it is crucial for our defense. A country as challenged as Israel must utilize and dominate space in order to keep its qualitative military edge, as we do on land, at sea and in the air.

Israel is a world leader in technological innovation, and it is only natural that we lead humanity in pushing the boundaries of the next frontier. The world needs our spirit and skills and we have a responsibility to contribute to making the world a better place. We know how to invent stuff. We believe in breaking ground and breaking the rules. We think outside of the box. We are explorers, inventors, entrepreneurs, pioneers and settlers.

Recent development of private space initiatives also opens up enormous markets and business opportunities.

Leading in space is also a matter of geopolitical leverage and national prestige. Prime Minister Netanyahu recently announced that Israel would send another astronaut to the ISS within a few years. Some commentators mentioned as-a-matter-of fact that it would be another Air Force pilot.

Colonel Ilan Ramon, the first Israeli astronaut, tragically perished along with his crewmembers aboard the Space Shuttle Colombia. He proved to be a wonderful ambassador for Israel, demonstrating not only remarkable professionalism, but a captivating personality.

The Mercury astronauts selected by NASA in 1959 were all military test pilots. The idea was to select people who had already proven their ability to withstand extreme physical and mental challenges.

In the novel Space, James Michener described the selection process of his imaginary “solid six” astronauts, where great emphasis was put on their public image.

PR was, and still is, an essential tool in garnering public support for the promotion of space exploration.

However, I believe that the next Israeli astronaut should be a scientist, not a pilot.

The advantages of an aviator’s skills are vastly outweighed by the need to choose someone who can promote scientific objectives. Moreover, this would be a wonderful opportunity for showing a side of Israel that is detached from defense aspects. If it were up to me, I would choose a woman scientist.

There is another aspect of space exploration which I find most appealing. It can serve as a collective human endeavor, characterized by neutrality, harmony and peace. The ISS is an incredible international collaboration, serving not only as a scientific lab, but as an experiment in multicultural coexistence and partnership.

It is fascinating to hear astronauts describe their feelings as they gaze down at earth.

Ilan Ramon wrote: “We are working this mission for the benefit of all mankind, and from space our world looks as one unity with no borders. So let me call from up here in space – let’s work our way for peace and better life for everyone on Earth.”

The writer is a former pilot in the IAF, founder of Cross-Cultural Strategies Ltd. and International Project Manager at CockpitRM.

www.CCSt.co.il

Former Iran atomic agency head tells about sabotaged material, deceiving IAEA

April 17, 2014

Former Iran atomic agency head tells about sabotaged material, deceiving IAEA | JPost | Israel News.

By HERB KEINON

04/17/2014 20:45

Israeli official says comments “should serve as a wake-up call to anyone who has any doubt about the duplicity of the Iranian regime.

Fereydoon Abbasi-Davani

Former head of Iran Atomic Energy Organization Fereydoon Abbasi-Davani Photo: REUTERS

The former head of Iran’s anomic energy organization admitted in a recent interview to an Iranian paper that Tehran lied to the International Atomic Energy Agency, and also described the ways the west subverted the country’s nuclear program by selling sabotaged parts.

Fereydoon Abbasi, who headed the Iranian agency under former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, told the Khorasan newspaper that at one point Iran stopped submitting the Design Information Questionnaire that the IAEA routinely requested to chart the planning and progress of Iran’s nuclear facilities.

This decision was taken, he said, because of Iran’s concern that the information of what parts Iran was seeking was transferred to western intelligence agencies which would then ensure that faulty or sabotaged parts were supplied.

“The IAEA inspector would honestly report, for instance, that a certain part or a certain pump had yet to arrive [in Iran], or to be installed,” he said, according to a translation of the interview by MEMRI, the Middle East Media Research Institute.

“As a result, the intelligence agency receives this information [from the IAEA and then] searches the globe for companies that make the pump, and pressures them. They would pressure that country or company not to transfer the parts or equipment to Iran, or would allow them to do so [only] after sabotaging [the parts]… For instance, if it was an electronic system, they would infect it with a virus, or plant explosives in it, or even alter the type of components, in order to paralyze [Iran’s] system.”

Abbasi said that this was the way in which western intelligence agencies infected Iranian computers with the Stuxnet worm, which set back the country’s nuclear program for months.  He said that western intelligence agencies closed Iran’s purchasing channels so that “no one [besides them] could sell us anything. [At the same time, they] opened the channels that they [personally] control, in order to provide Iran with equipment that would also benefit them. This, for example, [is how]… they got the Stuxnet virus [into Iran]. They planted it in equipment that Iran purchased.”

Abbasi said that on the basis of the information that Iran provided the IAEA, “they knew how many centrifuges we intend to install, and what parts we need, and therefore they prevented this equipment [from getting to Iran] – for instance, a hollow pump that was supposed to be purchased from AEG. The company itself is [probably] not at fault – these intelligence agencies carry out the sabotage and then transfer the equipment to Iran via that [company].”

This was the reason, he said, why Iran stopped providing information to the IAEA. “[We] would give the DIQ [to the IAEA] but only after the fact [in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA regulations],” he said. “When we wanted to move the Arak reactor’s main warehouse, we concealed it, so that [IAEA inspectors] would not notice which workshop [the activity was being conducted in], since they might have carried out assassinations or sabotage there. [So] for several years we concealed warehouse, so that that company could do its work…”

With negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program continuing, one Israeli government official said that Abbasi’s comments “should serve as a wake-up call to anyone who has any doubt about the duplicity and mendacity of the Iranian regime, and their desire to hoodwink the international community.”

Off Topic: The Ukrainian exodus, let it be so

April 17, 2014

Israel Hayom | The Ukrainian exodus, let it be so.

Dan Margalit

Where is the right balance between Israel’s conflicting interests as they pertain to the events in Ukraine? It has no claim or stake in the future of Crimea, which has been essentially annexed unilaterally by Russia. It also has no vested interests in the actions of the separatists, who are acting on Russia’s behalf to tear the eastern part of the country from the capital Kiev. Is it a hostile takeover? Is it a domestic uprising? As it was said long ago, “It’s their problem.”

Not exactly though; while Israel has no preference on the outcome of the Ukrainian crisis, no one can ignore the fact that the United States expects Israel to support it, and when the U.S. is disappointed in this regard, it comes at a certain diplomatic price. For example, that Washington would not come to Jerusalem’s aid in the United Nations, on the Palestinian front, were Jerusalem to remain neutral on the Ukrainian issue.

But one can say that Israel’s interest lies in the other direction. Russian President Vladimir Putin is proving himself a dynamic leader, practical, able to create new facts on the ground. This is the situation as it currently appears, unless the pendulum swings against him somehow. A direct clash with Moscow, while it is notching victories (again, for the time being) no less, seems like an unnecessary headache.

In more sensitive talks, veteran diplomats have called into memory U.N. Resolution 242 issued in November 1967, which since then has been the basis for all Israeli-Arab negotiations, successful and unsuccessful alike. The starting point, according to its creators, and which has always been used to agitate Israel, includes the key sentence that has been ingrained into the mind of every Israeli diplomat since: “Inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.”

The annexation of territories as a result of war is impermissible? The situations are not similar. Israel conquered Judea and Samaria in what was clearly a war of self-defense.

Even Israel’s harshest critic, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, accepted this. In contrast, Ukraine never provoked Russia, which justified its “price-tag” gangs taking to the city streets to undermine the government in Kiev.

They acted when Ukraine was holding tense debates over whether to democratically join the West, if at all, and Putin, with guile, moved to block the move while declaring he would enter a war of defense to protect the Russian-speaking population in the neighboring country. A government fell and rose in Kiev as a consequence. Nevertheless, Israel has been inclined to stay out of the matter, which provides an inherent bitter reminder of its own diplomatic issues.

Under these circumstances it is wise to take a modest approach. It is wise not to stick out; Israel needs to explain to Washington and Moscow that it wants no part in what is happening.

There is just one decidedly Israeli interest, which it gave up on years ago already and ceased properly fighting for: The welcomed increase — two and a half or three times the norm — of Jewish immigration to Israel from Ukraine.

Unfortunately, the land of Israel has always done a poor job attracting Jews. They came here mainly because they were rejected and pushed here by the Diaspora. Like the hooligans in one Ukrainian city who hung a poster that the time has come to expel the Jews. These are not ideal circumstances, but our arms are open regardless. Let them come en masse and let the Rabbinate refrain from raising difficulties. The Ukrainian exodus, 2014, this is what needs to interest Israel. Let it be so.

 

Off Topic: Jordanian air strike destroyed Al Qaeda raider force heading for US military base

April 17, 2014

Jordanian air strike destroyed Al Qaeda raider force heading for US military base.

DEBKAfile Exclusive Report April 17, 2014, 12:20 PM (IDT)

Jordanian air strike destroyed combat veihicles

Jordanian air strike destroyed combat veihicles

The Royal Jordanian Air force strike Wednesday, April 16, against a combat vehicle convoy from Syria destroyed an Al Qaeda raider force on its way to attack US military targets in the kingdom, debkafile’s military sources reveal.

Jordan’s first assault on a target outside the country took place on the Syrian side of the border opposite the eastern town of Ruwaished.

This episode brought to the fore how dramatically the threat al Qaeda-Iraq poses to Jordan, the US forces based their and Israel has escalated.

Amman has not disclosed where the air strike took place, who rode in the destroyed armored vehicles and where they came from.

According to debkafile’s counterterrorism sources, they were driven by Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) fighters, coming from the western Iraqi province of Anbar. To avoid running into Jordanian military formations around Ruwaished, the group moved through Syria in the Abu Kemal region and, after refueling and collecting extra fighters and arms, turned south and aimed for the Jordanian border, where their expedition was abruptly brought to a close.

Our intelligence sources report that their target was a secret US-Jordanian training facility situated west of Ruwaished, where Iraqi army troops are being instructed in advanced counter terror combat tactics. At the end of these courses, the graduates return to their units, better able to put up a fight against the al Qaeda forces continuing to overrun large swathes of their country, and posing a real danger to Baghdad.

This episode broke new ground in more than one area.

It was the first ISIS operation directed against the American military presence in Jordan, and also the first time the jihadists used stealth to creep through a crack between the Jordanian, Iraqi and Syrian borders.

ISIS planners were well aware of the two full divisions the Jordanian army had strung out along its borders with Syria and Iraq, to seal the kingdom off from Islamist terrorist incursions. Those planners were crafty enough to find away around this barrier.

However, many Jordanians have joined up with the Al Qaeda branches of Iraq and Syria. It is thought to be only a matter of time before they return to home ground fired up with the jihadist doctrine of terror.

The Jordanians don’t say how they knew the ISIS vehicle convoy was heading their way. It stands to reason that US or Jordanian surveillance aircraft detected the vehicles on the move. Since there was no time to drop Jordanian commandos to apprehend the terrorists in Syria before they crossed the border, it was decided in a hurried conference between Amman and Washington to send the Jordanian air force into action. The commanders likely used the US Command and Control Headquarters established near Amman a year ago to maintain close US-Jordanian military coordination.

Jews Ordered to ‘Register’ in Donetsk, Ukraine

April 17, 2014

The Jewish Press » » Jews Ordered to ‘Register’ in Donetsk, Ukraine.

Flyers with instructions to “register” were handed to Jews as they left synagogue following holiday prayers.

By: Hana Levi Julian

Text of anti-Semitic flyer distributed to Jews in Donetsk, Ukraine on Passover 2014.
Text of anti-Semitic flyer distributed to Jews in Donetsk, Ukraine on Passover 2014.
Photo Credit: Courtesy, Israel Matzav blog 

It is said that those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.  For some Jews in Donetsk, Ukraine on this Passover holiday of “freedom,” concern and even fear is lurking in their thoughts, making them wonder about the lessons of the past.

On the first day of Passover this week, three armed men in the eastern Ukrainian province of Donetsk distributed flyers warning Jews to “register” themselves and their assets with the new pro-Russian government, according to the novosti.dn.ua website.

The flyers were handed out next to a synagogue as people were leaving following holiday prayers. They read as follows:

“Dear Ukraine citizens of Jewish nationality,

Due to the fact that the leaders of the Jewish community of Ukraine supported (Stepan) Bendery Junta, and oppose the pro-Slavic People’s Republic of Donetsk, [the interim government] has decided that all citizens of Jewish descent age 16 and older, residing within the territory of the republic, are required to report to the Commissioner for Nationalities in the Donetsk Regional Administration building and register by May 3.

(Ed. Note: Stepan Bander was a Ukrainian nationalist leader in Kiev who fought with Nazi Germany in the 1940s against Soviet troops before switching sides and taking up arms against the German occupation.)

“ID and passport are required to register your Jewish religion, religious documents of family members, as well as documents establishing the rights to all real estate property that belongs to you, including vehicles. Evasion of registration will result in citizenship revocation and you will be forced outside the country with a confiscation of property. A registration fee of $50 is required.”

Pro-Russian separatists are occupying the building where the Jews were told the register.

The flyer was written in the Russian language and bore the symbol of Mother Russia at the top of the page and that of the Donetsk People’s Republic at the bottom. It was allegedly signed by Denis Pushilin, chairman of the Donetsk interim government but no ink signature is seen on the paper.

Donetsk was recently declared an independent “people’s republic” by pro-Russian activists. In response to a query by a Ukrainian Jewish website, Pushilin confirmed the flyers were indeed distributed by his organization. However, he was quoted by the tvrain.ru news site on Wednesday as denying any connection to the content, and called the flyers a ‘provocation.’

Nevertheless, Jewish Agency Chairman Natan Sharansky told Voice of Israel government radio on Wednesday that aliyah from the Ukraine is likely to double by the end of 2014.

The flyer – authentic or not – constitutes the 17th anti-Semitic incident to have taken place in Ukraine since the beginning of 2014. Most were violent attacks. Several were aimed at Chabad-Lubavitch emissaries and a few were life-threatening. Five took place in Kiev alone, according to statistics gleaned from the Coordination Forum for Countering Antisemitism (CFCA) website.

A reader on the Israel Matzav blog warned in a number of posts that the situation in Ukraine is becoming extremely dangerous for Jews.

Wisely, a Jewish resident of Donetsk told Ynet that she does not intend to register, although she said that she had never encountered any form of anti-Semitism until she saw the flyer. “Though I take it very seriously, I am uncertain of its authenticity,” she said.

Plutonium in the Islamic Republic: Make-or-break issue or simply a decoy?

April 17, 2014

Plutonium in the Islamic Republic: Make-or-break issue or simply a decoy? | JPost | Israel News.

By YONAH JEREMY BOB

04/17/2014 02:43

Iran will sway West to allow it permanent near nuclear break-out capability, if it exchanges reduced plutonium production capacity, dilution of medium-level enriched uranium for enrichment capabilities of low-level uranium.

A general view of the Arak heavy-water project, 190 km (120 miles) southwest of Tehran

A general view of the Arak heavy-water project, 190 km (120 miles) southwest of Tehran Photo: REUTERS

The latest reports from the negotiations between the P5+1 powers and Iran over the latter’s nuclear program indicate that the Islamic Republic might be ready to make a key concession on slowing its path toward producing a nuclear weapon using plutonium.

The specific issue is what will happen with Iran’s Arak nuclear facility. If it is completed and operates as it is currently designed, it could produce enough plutonium for a nuclear weapon within eight months, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

There are many other issues that could mean a longer waiting period, but Arak is considered a serious enough issue to be a deal-breaker for the US, and was the issue that almost torpedoed the interim deal.

Iran’s decision to halt construction – at least internally – of the plutonium facility as part of the interim deal, and its recent announcement that it might be willing to redesign it to greatly decrease the speed at which it produces plutonium, indeed mark a potential negotiating victory for the West and a deal-breaker in a final agreement.

The latest issue of Arms Control Today, a publication of the Arms Control Association, features some of these compromise solutions. But has Iran used the matter of Arak as a decoy to distract the West from negotiating hard on the primary issue of uranium enrichment? With all the highly complex nuclear issues to negotiate regarding the country’s multiple nuclear capabilities, the interim and final deals in many ways will come down to old-fashioned bargaining.

While there are certain issues that are deal-breakers, the West’s negotiating position has shifted much closer toward that of Iran in recent years.

This is mostly a function of Iran successfully breaching past red lines without having faced consequences.

The shift is so prominent that some of those red lines might now be less important to the West than the goals of avoiding an overt Iranian weapons capability and being able to claim victory by at least extracting some high-profile concessions from Tehran.

For example, only a short time ago the West’s demands were for no more uranium enrichment by Iran at any level, the shipment abroad of much of the country’s enriched uranium stockpile, the dismantling of its long-secret underground Fordow facility, and the dismantling of the Arak facility – in a nutshell, eliminating both the present and future paths to a bomb.

Now it appears that the red lines amount to keeping Iran at least 6-12 months away from “break-out capacity” – where it could produce a bomb – and under heavy monitoring while at least reducing the threat presented by the Arak facility (without touching the Fordow facility).

This is where the Arak concession comes into play.

It is absolutely a serious concession and a deal-breaker on its own. But if Iran successfully trades a reduction of its plutonium production capacity and the dilution of its medium-level enriched uranium for being able to permanently continue enriching low-level uranium, it will have succeeded in having the West agree to it maintaining a permanent near-break-out capability (6-12 months, maybe less if clandestinely).

At the same time, the West will be able to truthfully claim it halted Iran’s path to a plutonium bomb and froze its path to using uranium, with the plutonium halt being the biggest proof it “won” and got the Islamic Republic to back down.

Many say that had the West not raised the stakes, Iran would have undoubtedly gone down both paths. But another, more likely possibility – since several basic aspects of the plutonium path to a weapon still do not exist, and most of what does exist is half-baked – is that the plutonium path is nothing more than a decoy.

Iran may have planned from the start that it would “concede” its plutonium path to prove its intentions were not weapons-related, while using it to at least keep its uranium option open, something that a few years ago the West would not have agreed to. If this is true, any future public dispute between Iran and the US over whether to reduce the Arak facility’s plutonium production, fully convert it to a light-water reactor (not usable for weapons-grade material) or totally dismantle it could be seen from this vantage point as being somewhat staged.

Regardless of whether or not it was a grand strategy from the start, even if the final deal stops Iran’s path to a plutonium weapon but preserves both a “modest” (a term used by US President Barack Obama) Iranian “right” to uranium enrichment and lets Iran keep some of its stockpile, the outcome would likely be a permanent near break-out capacity – which Secretary of State John Kerry essentially has confirmed to Congress.

Surprise Attack on Iran: Can Israel Do It?

April 17, 2014

Surprise Attack on Iran: Can Israel Do It?.

April 16, 2014

According to a report [3] in March by the Israeli daily Haaretz, Israel continues to prepare for a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Quoting anonymous members of the Knesset who were present during hearings on the military budget, officials in the Israel Defense Force (IDF) have allegedly received instructions to continue preparing for a strike and a special budget has been allocating for that purpose. However, conducting a military operation against Iran’s key nuclear facilities would be a challenging task for the Israeli military. The distance from Israel to the Iranian nuclear sites is such that any strike using the air force would be challenging on its fuel capacity. Allocating tanker planes to the mission could alleviate part of this concern. Nonetheless, Israeli jets can’t spend too much time in Iranian airspace before the mission itself is in jeopardy. Engaging Iran’s air force in dogfights must be avoided. Therefore, surprise will be a necessary element in a successful Israeli mission.

A successful surprise attack is not easy to achieve. It rests on the ability to deceive the adversary. In general, a deception strategy might involve several elements, related to the timing of the operation, the military platforms involved, the targets, the routes chosen to the targets, the munitions used, and so on. There are several potential obstacles. First, preparations for conducting a military operation must be made without revealing the main elements of the surprise. Second, the political decision must be made covertly, that is, without revealing the timing of the operation. Could Israel pull it off?

Israel’s History of Surprise

Israel has in the past utilized both of these elements in order to succeed with conducting military operations. Both the Entebbe operation in 1976 and the attack on the Iraqi reactor in 1981 came as complete surprises to the targets due to their lack of knowledge about Israel’s military capabilities and understanding of its decision-making process and willingness to accept risk.

An example of the latter factor as an element of surprise was the 1967 attack on Egyptian airfields. At the time, Israel possessed about two hundred operational jets. 188 were used against the airfields. The costs of this strategy were obvious: only twelve planes were left to defend Israel’s territory. Egypt failed to understand the Israeli willingness to accept risk, which in part led to the mission’s success.

Another example of deception came before the 1982 invasion of south Lebanon. Prior to the formal Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights in late 1981, Israel amassed military forces in the north to deter a Syrian response. Instead of scaling back after tension had subdued, Israel kept the forces there in order to utilize them in the forthcoming Lebanese campaign. Getting used to the increased Israeli military presence in the north, the PLO and Syria failed to consider the possibility that these might be stationed there for a forthcoming invasion. Israel was itself the victim of this strategy in 1973. Egypt conducted several large training drills prior to its surprise crossing of the Suez Canal. This made it hard for the Israelis to assess whether the Egyptian actions were part of another drill or preparation for an actual attack. The Israeli failure to acknowledge this potential Egyptian deception strategy is also an example of how a state fails in incorporating the lessons of the past. Just five years earlier the Russian army had invaded Czechoslovakia in a move that begun as a training exercise and continued as a surprise attack. The head of Israeli military intelligence at the time, Aaron Yariv, issued a directive that every major training exercise by an adversary was to be regarded as a potential attack, but this directive was forgotten by the Israeli military and political leadership after Yariv quit his position in 1972.

There was an additional element to the 1973 Egyptian deception strategy. In 1968, Egyptian generals concluded that they did not have the capabilities to challenge the Israeli military. Still, the decision was to train as if it had the military capability to go through with the attack. After focusing all of its effort on covertly acquiring the necessary equipment and manpower—thereby making previous exercises more relevant—its capabilities came as a surprise to the Israelis who still assessed that the Egyptian military was in no shape to undertake the crossing. Israel learned the lesson of that experience and then utilized it in the 1981 attack on the Iraqi reactor. After having trained for months on fuel-saving maneuvers, and after just having absorbed their new U.S.-supplied F-16 fighters, the Israeli air force had acquired the necessary capabilities for the mission. It was Iraq’s turn to fail in accurately updating its assessment of Israel’s capabilities.

Surprise and Decision-Making

An element of deception must also be included in the decision-making process. The meeting of the Syrian-Egyptian Armed Forces Supreme Council in August 1973 serves as a precedent. In order to keep the meeting secret, all participants resorted to civilian means of transport and false passports. An important topic was on the agenda at that meeting—a decision on the two options for D-Day (only to be awaiting the final approval of presidents Sadat and Assad). It was deemed crucial that the Israelis did not learn of the meeting.

In Israel, it is the government as a whole—not the prime minister—that is the commander-in-chief of the military. The green light for a decision to attack Iran’s nuclear sites must thus be obtained from the cabinet ministers. Upholding secrecy after a vote in the full ministerial cabinet is a challenge. The cabinet meets every Sunday morning. However, according to the procedure requirements, the agenda items must be finalized by the preceding Wednesday. Listing the item “military attack against Iran” is not an option since the time frame from Wednesday to Sunday is a long period to keep a secret. There are three options: assure an unscheduled meeting (which may well ring some alarms), vote in advance (that is, further outsource the decision on timing to a smaller forum, but this would still risk the leak of valuable information), or announce a general or fake topic. The Begin government chose the second option prior to the attack on the Iraqi reactor in 1981. Then the ministerial cabinet approved the operation in principle and allowed the final decision to be made in the smaller security cabinet (consisting of key ministers). Former premier Ehud Olmert preferred a combination of the first and third option. The press release announcing an unscheduled cabinet meeting the day before the attack on the Syrian reactor in September 2007 said that the security cabinet was to convene to discuss “Israel’s response to Kassem rocket fire from the Gaza Strip”. Another example of Olmert’s masking of the decision-making process leading up to the attack on the reactor was related to a meeting with the U.S. administration in June 2007. The official reason given for the meeting between Olmert and George W. Bush on June 19 was Iran’s nuclear program and the peace process. However, in that meeting Olmert urged the U.S. to attack the reactor.

The Defensive Preparations Dilemma

Since the Iranians are expecting an operation, it would be impossible for Israel to achieve strategic surprise like they did with the attack on the Iraqi reactor in 1981. However, operational and tactical surprise may be achieved with regards to how the operation will be conducted and the specific date and time of the operation. One of the major problems will be how to achieve operational surprise when preparations will need to be undertaken to counter the threat of missiles from Iran, Hezbollah, and Palestinian groups in Gaza. One solution to this defensive preparations dilemma is to conduct exercises and distribute personal protective gear continuously for a long time, so as to make it impossible for Iran to determine when an attack will be launched. This has indeed been done. In recent years, Israel has conducted numerous large home-front exercises (in part also as a result of the Syrian civil war and potential fallout). It has also distributed gas masks to a large portion of the population (although it has recently been scaled back).

Mobilization of the reserves is a complex issue in Israel that also touches on the decision-making process. The mobilization would risk being delayed if it takes place under a massive missile attack from Iran and Hezbollah. A recent report from Israel’s state comptroller questioned the reserves’ ability to mobilize under fire. As such, the order needs to be given prior to the initial Israeli attack. However, mobilizing the reserves would be a signal to Iran that an attack is impending. It is possible that the Israeli leadership’s preferences for operational secrecy induce it to delay the mobilization until the day of the attack (to the risk of higher casualty numbers). According to Israeli law, mobilization of the reserves requires the approval of the Knesset Committee on Defense. Time could be saved with obtaining the committee’s approval in the months preceding the attack. Begin obtained an approval for the operation against the Iraqi reactor in the full ministerial cabinet in October 1980, which then outsourced the timing decision to the security cabinet. To protect secrecy after a series of domestic leaks, the security cabinet later decided to leave the decision on the date of the operation to Begin, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, and Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan. A similar procedure could be implemented with regards to the decision to mobilize the reserves.

Offensive Preparations

Complex military operations require lengthy preparations that cannot be concealed. However, although an adversary might know about the intention to attack, the timing and conduct of the operation are more difficult to dissect. In recent years, the Israeli military has conducted numerous offensive exercises to prepare for a potential green light from the political leadership. Two recent exercises demonstrating the capabilities of the Israeli air force took place in December 2013 and January 2014. Such exercises do not only prepare the pilots for a potential mission, it may also serve as part of a deception strategy. For several years prior to the Six Day War in 1967, Israeli aircraft could routinely be seen in the mornings hovering over the Mediterranean. As the Egyptians became familiar with the flight pattern, its air force did not pay much attention when Israeli planes followed the same route on the morning of June 5, 1967. The Israelis then launched a surprise attack. The trick used was to manipulate the adversary’s perceptions and expectations. Although Iran is not neighboring Israel and does not have significant satellite surveillance assets, it does have some intelligence capabilities that it uses to monitor Israel. For example, an Iranian radar is stationed in Syria. Iran is also known to be studying Israel’s military conduct in past campaigns. The head of the Iranian Civil Defense Organization Gholam Reza Jalali recently stated that it had sent a team to Lebanon after the 2006 war to study the effect of Israeli munitions on destroyed buildings. Apparently, Iran is also monitoring Israeli intentions and decision making. On January 26, 2013—four days prior to an Israeli attack on a convoy carrying missiles from Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon—Supreme Leader Khamenei’s close advisor Ali Akbar Velayati stated that Iran would perceive an attack on Syria as an attack on Iran itself. Velayati might have known about the transport in advance and attempted to increase its chance of reaching its destination by creating a deterrent against an Israeli attack. This suggests that the Iranian regime have some understanding of Israeli intentions and redlines. Two Israeli signals are typical of an impending attack: deployment of Iron Dome batteries in areas of likely fallout and unscheduled meetings in the security cabinet. However, since the Israelis know there are under surveillance, they can also use it for deception. As long as the Syrian civil war continues, it would be difficult for Iran to know whether Israeli preparations are intended for the Syrian or Iranian arena. If Iran gets used to the Israeli behavioral pattern, then a surprise attack would be easier to achieve.

Operational Surprise

The need for surprise requires that Israel is the one choosing the date of the operation. This may sound as an unnecessary consideration since by definition a preemptive attack is triggered by a decision in the leadership of the attacking country. However, with regards to the timing of an attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities, there are some limits that constrain the time frame available to an attacker. Iran’s nuclear program offers two potential routes to a nuclear weapon—enrichment of uranium in centrifuge facilities or the production of plutonium in a yet-to-be-operational heavy-water reactor. Both of these routes must be considered when deciding on the date of an attack. The problem with linking the attack date to developments of the program is that Iran would have some control over the time frame available for an attack, thereby decreasing Israel’s ability to achieve surprise. Since an operational nuclear reactor is a politically difficult target and as such is off limits, the date when the Arak reactor will go “hot” serves as the outer boundary of the available time frame. Iran would have an incentive to get it operational in order to reduce the utility of an Israeli operation against the other facilities (it makes less sense to attack the enrichment facilities when Iran could subsequently move to produce plutonium using the surviving reactor). On the other hand, its operational status constitute an Israeli redline, so Israel will have a strong incentive to launch an attack before it goes “hot.” From the Iranian perspective, there is a dilemma between halting the work on the reactor—thereby reducing tension with Israel—and continuing with the work to dictate Israel’s available time frame.

The element of surprise is also related to the choice of flight route to targets in Iran. Early detection by neighboring states situated along the Israeli route is not necessarily an operational threat as long as the Israeli planes are not targeted by Arab antiaircraft systems and early warning is not passed on to the Iranian government. Given Israel’s dependence on achieving the element of surprise with regards to the operation’s timing, coordinating the operation with an external actor might be problematic and would involve considerable risk. Over the years, several such alleged partnerships have been suggested. In April 2012, a rumor emerged that Israel had been granted access to Azeri bases. Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia have been named for this purpose as well. In June 2010 news reports surfaced in Western media saying that the Saudi military had conducted a test of its antiaircraft systems and radars to ensure that it did not attack Israeli jets en route to targets in Iran. And again, in November 2013, The Sunday Times reported that Riyadh had given its consent to Israel’s use of its airspace. However, coordinating a leak-sensitive operation with another state involves huge risks. Israel recently learned the price of regional cooperation with regards to sensitive operations. According to a October 2013 report by The Washington Post columnist David Ignatius, Turkey-Israel intelligence relations experienced a severe setback after Turkish espionage chief Hakan Fidan provided Iran with a list of Iranians who had met Mossad case officers in Turkey. There is thus an inherent dilemma between coordinating with an external actor—thereby easing the operational obstacles represented by the length of the route, the number of planes necessary for destroying the targets, and the requirements for conducting rescue operations—and minimizing the risk of leaks.

In order to avoid early detection, Israel would need to reduce the external signals of the strike force. This can be done is several ways. One way is to jam or blind radars located along the route to the nuclear sites. Another option is to avoid the radars’ detection range. On June 7, 1981, Israeli jets on their way to the Iraqi reactor were flying low above the desert to avoid detection by radars. Similar low-profile flight paths could be chosen to Iranian nuclear sites. A third option is to use decoys to lure Iran into focusing its attention on the wrong targets. This was Israel’s deception strategy in the 1982 Bekaa Valley attack on Syrian anti-aircraft batteries. A fleet of Israeli UAVs was detected by Syrian radar. Subsequently, the anti-aircraft positions were exposed as the decoys were targeted. One can also try to pretend that the planes belong to the adversary. This might be the reason for Iran’s recent decision to copy Israel’s Heron design for its Fotros UAV. Iranian-made UAVs operated by Hezbollah have penetrated Israeli air space several times in the past: twice during the Second Lebanon War in 2006 and once in October 2012. Should a Fotros UAV penetrate Israeli airspace, it might take some time for Israel to identify it as hostile. The same could apply to Israeli jets or UAVs operating in Iranian air space.

As they examine the difficulties of carrying out a strike, Israeli operational analysts can take comfort in the fact that Israel has achieved surprise many times before. Iran, as the intended target of a potential attack, is faced with several problems. One is to detect the decision to attack. Another is to accurately assess the timing and conduct of the operation. And a third problem is to take measures to prevent it. Iran was caught off guard by Iraq’s invasion in September 1980. Could it get caught napping again?

Thomas Saether is a Norwegian security analyst and a post-graduate from the MA program in security studies at Tel Aviv University.