Archive for July 7, 2012

Damascus and Tehran: The war for military preparedness

July 7, 2012

via Damascus and Tehran: The war for military preparedness.

Previously I pondered as what Iran could do even if it possessed a nuclear bomb. Of course, it would not do anything even if it’s on brink of political craziness or becomes frightened of the regional and international changes.
Yet Tehran makes mistakes that can be a game changer. While Iran has dedicated all time and resources to gain military prowess, it failed to unify its social constituents. It suffers from an acute weakness that is a source of security concerns.

All international relations theories, diplomatic negotiations theories and winning cards are betraying Iran today and are putting Iran to face political, oil, and economic sanctions. Iran does not have many choices but messing with the regional and energy security. This is particularly true after it lost the capability of selling its oil.

To add salt to wound, other importing countries are trading the Iranian oil with commodities rather than with U.S. dollars. The decision to do this kind of tradeoff is a statement of the weakness of the political capabilities of Iran. All indicators show that Assad’s regime is over and the Iraqi prime minister is on retreat not in favor of Sunni forces but in favor of civil and democratic forces. In Syria, the choice is for the civil and democratic diverse society.

According to some Israeli intelligence information, Assad called the Russian leadership saying that he had a plan and pledged to prevail over the protesters within a couple of months. Assad decided to get rid of the military officers who started complaining of a lack of a solution. He gave them a leave provided that they stick to their houses.

In their place, Assad appointed the thugs ordering them to implement all force at their disposal to wipe out the protesters. Therefore, the coming months are expected to be bloody ones. And yet this will only mark the end of Assad and the beginning of a genuine political settlement.

Tehran, which loses some $80 million a day, is also facing a catastrophic reality caused by the political, oil, and economic sanctions. It also realizes that Assad is on retreat and that Moscow is negotiating with the Syrian opposition and the army.

Iran will only have the worse options and it will not resort to any of these options as its domestic affairs are deteriorating. Various ethnic and national groups within Iran are adopting wait and see strategy. They will decide their course of action once Assad’s grip on power ends. Not surprisingly, Tehran throws all of its power behind Iraq Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. It remains to be seen as to what would happen in case al-Maliki falls down and a civic state begins to take root in Syria.

Will Tehran close the Strait of Hormuz? Of course no. Iran does not dare do that in the first place even if Iran has the capability to affect this policy. Notwithstanding statements uttered by leaders of the Iranian revolutionary guard, Iran will unlikely close the strait. It is about time for Iran to realize that the stinging sanctions imposed by the West are a result of its policies rather than an act of war. The West has given Iran many opportunities and Iran failed to seize them. The way the west deals with Iran is the opposite of the way it dealt with Saddam Hussein.

Needless to say that a closure of the Strait of Hormuz will not hurt that Saudi Arabia. Riyadh can easily transport from 20 to 30 percent of its oil away from the strait. United Arab Emirates dealt with the situation by building a 380-kilometer pipeline with a capacity of transporting some 1.5 millions barrels a day out of 2.5 millions barrels that Emirates produces a day.

For this reason Iran adopts a bombastic and grandstanding attitude by threatening Turkey, the American presence in the Gulf, and wiping out Israel from the map. That said, Iran is looking forward to the Ankara meeting as a watershed in the dialogue with the west. The problem, however, will continue as the Iranian-European talks are not expected to lift sanctions on Iran.

Some sources confirm that Assad and his family themselves are under administrative detention and that a battalion of the Republican Guard control the President’s movement and his communication.

The authority is actually in the hand of his brother, Maher. Therefore, some sources confirm that placing high-ranking officers under administrative detention and instating thugs in their place is nothing but the plan for the end.

The international community will not keep silence this time. The Syrian media attempt to show Assad along with his wife playing sports will not deceive the rest of the people of the gravity of the situation. Still, the situation is difficult and the west is waiting from an internal coup in Syria especially after Moscow conducted dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhoods of Syria. Equally important, a national unity government means the exclusiveness of Assad from the political arena.

(The writer is a Saudi columnist. The article was published in Arab News on July. 07, 2012)

U.S. court fines Iran $813 million for 1983 Lebanon attack

July 7, 2012

U.S. court fines Iran $813 million for 1983 Lebanon attack.

In 1983, 241 American soldiers, including 220 Marines, were killed in a bomb attack in their barracks in Lebanon. (AFP)

In 1983, 241 American soldiers, including 220 Marines, were killed in a bomb attack in their barracks in Lebanon. (AFP)

A U.S. federal judge has ordered Iran to pay more than $813 million in damages and interest to the families of 241 U.S. soldiers killed in the 1983 bombing of a Marine barracks in Lebanon.

“After this opinion, this court will have issued over $8.8 billion in judgments against Iran as a result of the 1983 Beirut bombing,” Judge Royce Lamberth wrote in a ruling this week, a copy of which was seen Friday by AFP.

“Iran is racking up quite a bill from its sponsorship of terrorism,” the Washington judge added, noting that “a number of other Beirut bombing cases remain pending, and their completion will surely increase this amount.”

On October 23, 1983, 241 American soldiers, including 220 Marines, were killed in Beirut when a truck packed with explosives rammed through barricades and detonated in front of the U.S. barracks near Beirut’s international airport.

The attack was one of the deadliest ever against Americans.

The same day, in a coordinated attack, 58 French paratroopers were killed by a truck bomb at the French barracks in Beirut.

The twin bombings have been blamed on Lebanese Shiite militia Hezbollah, which is backed by Iran.

Lamberth, whose ruling was delivered Tuesday, wrote that “no award — however many billions it contained — could accurately reflect the countless lives that have been changed by Iran’s dastardly acts.”

The nearly $813.77 million verdict is the eighth against Iran resulting from the 1983 bombing.

In 2007, under a law allowing foreign governments to be sued in US courts, the same judge ordered Iran to pay $2.65 billion to victims’ families, an amount he wrote at the time “may be the largest ever entered by a court of the United States against a foreign nation.”

“The court applauds plaintiffs’ persistent efforts to hold Iran accountable for its cowardly support of terrorism,” Lamberth wrote in this week’s ruling.

“The court concludes that defendant Iran must be punished to the fullest extent legally possible for the bombing in Beirut on October 23, 1983. This horrific act impacted countless individuals and their families, a number of whom receive awards in this lawsuit,” the federal court in Washington added.

The evidence shows that we have not succeeded in Syria, says Kofi Annan

July 7, 2012

The evidence shows that we have not succeeded in Syria, says Kofi Annan | The Times of Israel.

( Really?   You don’t say!  Wait till you read his solution… – JW )

UN envoy says Iran is a major player and should be part of the solution

July 7, 2012, 4:28 pm 1
Kofi Annan, the UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy for Syria. (photo credit: AP/Hussein Malla)

Kofi Annan, the UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy for Syria. (photo credit: AP/Hussein Malla)

BEIRUT (AP) — Special U.N. envoy Kofi Annan acknowledged in an interview published Saturday that the international community’s efforts to find a political solution to the escalating violence in Syria have failed.

Annan told the French daily Le Monde that more attention needed to be paid to the role of longtime Syrian ally Iran, and that countries supporting military actors in the conflict were making the situation worse.

“The evidence shows that we have not succeeded,” he said.

Annan, the special envoy for the United Nations and the Arab League, is the architect of the most prominent international plan to end the crisis in Syria, which activists say has killed more than 14,000 people since March, 2011.

His six-point plan was to begin with a cease-fire in mid-April between government forces and rebels seeking to topple the regime of President Bashar Assad. But the truce never took hold, and now the almost 300 U.N. observers sent to monitor the cease-fire are confined to their hotels because of the escalating violence.

Activists reported at least 67 people killed on Friday alone, after some 800 people last week.

Annan defended the unarmed observers, saying it was not their job to stop the violence, but to monitor the sides’ adherence to the truce.

He offered few suggestions on how the plan could be salvaged, only saying that Iran “should be part of the solution” and that criticism too often focused on Russia, which has stood by the regime.

“Very few things are said about other countries that send arms and money and weigh on the situation on the ground,” he said, without naming any specific countries.

Iran is a longtime Syrian ally that has stood by the regime throughout the uprising. It is unclear what role Annan envisions for Iran. Tehran’s close ties could make it an interlocutor with the regime, though the U.S. has often refused to let the Islamic Republic attend conferences about the Syria crisis.

Russia provides the Assad regime with most of its weapons. No countries are known to be arming the rebels, though some Gulf Arab states have spoken positively of doing so. The U.S. and other Western nations have sent non-lethal aid, like communications equipment.

The Syrian uprising began in March, 2011, when people first took to the streets to call for political reforms. Since then, the government has waged a brutal crackdown, and many in the opposition have taken up arms, sidelining peaceful activists and changing the conflict into an armed insurgency.

Scores of independent rebel groups now operate in the country, regularly attacking regime bases and convoys.

Activists in Syria on Saturday reported fierce government offensives to try to retake rebellious areas outside of the northern city of Aleppo and near the capital Damascus, as well as government shelling across the country.

The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, which relies on an activist network inside Syria, called the bombardment of a number of villages in Aleppo province “the most violent” since the army launched a recent campaign to retake control of the area.

The group said that rebels in the area had killed many regime soldiers in recent months. It did not provide casualties figures for the recent fighting. It said two rebels and one civilian were killed in clashes in the northern city of Izaz. Five government soldiers also were killed when rebels blew up their vehicle.

The activist claims could not be independently verified. The Syrian government rarely comments on its military operations and blames the uprising on foreign-backed gangs seeking to weaken the country.

The violence has raised fears that the unrest will spill over into Lebanon, which has extensive sectarian and political ties to its eastern neighbor.

On Saturday, shells fired from inside Syria killed two Lebanese civilians and wounded 10 others, security officials said, in the latest incident of violence spilling across the border.

One woman was killed when a shell hit her home in the Wadi Khalid area of northeast Lebanon, also wounding five others. Another shell hit the nearby village of al-Hisheh, killing an 8-year-old boy and wounding his father and four other children.

The officials spoke on condition of anonymity in line with government regulations.

Despite mounting international condemnation, Assad’s regime has largely held together. On Saturday, however, France announced the defection of Brig. Gen. Manaf Tlass, an Assad confidant and son of a former defense minister who helped ease Assad into power.

Tlass is the highest ranking official to abandon the regime so far, and Western powers and anti-regime activists hoped his departure would encourage others to leave, too.

News of the defection largely overshadowed an international conference in Paris on Saturday attended by the U.S., its European and Arab partners and members of Syria’s fractured opposition.

The so-called “Friends of Syria” said they would provide means for the opposition in Syria to better communicate among themselves and with the outside world and increase humanitarian aid.

They also called on the U.N. Security Council to adopt a resolution that would force the regime to comply with the two peace plans that have been largely ignored by both sides in the conflict.

Syrian allies Russia and China would likely veto any resolution seen as too critical of the Syrian government, as they have in the past.

___

Associated Press writer Angela Charlton contributed to this report from Paris.

Gulf sabers rattle as Iran sanctions bite | Reuters

July 7, 2012

Gulf sabers rattle as Iran sanctions bite | Reuters.

The Sterett Destroyer escorts the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) during a transit through the Strait of Hormuz, February 14, 2012. REUTERS-Jumana El Heloueh

LONDON | Fri Jul 6, 2012 9:03am EDT

(Reuters) – Iran and the United States might be talking up their readiness for war in the Gulf but beneath the rhetoric, all sides appear keen to avoid conflict and prevent accidental escalation – at least for now.

This week, a string of hawkish Iranian statements – including a renewed threat to close the Strait of Hormuz and destroy U.S. bases “within minutes” of an attack – helped push benchmark Brent crude oil prices above $100 for the first time since June.

Western military officials and analysts say Tehran does have the capability to wreak regional havoc. But the current saber-rattling, they believe, is more about moving markets and trying to give the West second thoughts over the ever-tightening oil sanctions aimed at cutting back Tehran’s nuclear program.

A European Union ban on trading Iranian oil announced earlier in the year entered force on July 1, while the United States is also tightening financial restrictions. Even Asian buyers such as China that had hoped to keep taking Iranian crude appear to be scaling back purchases, struggling to find shipping insurance or banking – leaving Iran increasingly isolated.

“What we tend to see is that rhetoric from Iran tends to peak when you have developments around the sanctions issue,” U.S. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Vice Admiral Mark Fox told a naval conference at London’s Royal United Services Institute.

“We saw this in 2010, we saw it in January this year. They use rhetoric and military exercises to make their point … but it is always best to be prepared, and we always are.”

Washington has highlighted its own military buildup, pointing to new minesweepers, patrol craft and the assault ship USS Ponce joining its Fifth Fleet, which includes the USS Abraham Lincoln and Enterprise carrier battle groups.

Iran has often threatened reprisals for any Israeli or U.S.-led strike on its nuclear sites, whose activities it says are purely peaceful but the West suspects are geared to developing arms. But this week’s statements were more aggressive than most.

In one headline on its website, state-run Press TV described Western warships in the Gulf as “sitting ducks”. An Iranian parliamentary committee said it would pass a bill allowing Tehran to block passage through Hormuz, the conduit for all Gulf oil exports, to ships of any country backing sanctions.

“Iran is essentially reminding the U.S. and its regional allies that if it were attacked, it is capable of responding,” said Michael Connell, an Iran specialist at the Centre for Naval Analysis, which provides analysis to military and other clients as part of larger U.S. government-funded think tank, CNA.

“There is also a domestic component – reassuring their own populace that their armed forces are respected and feared.”

Four months before a U.S. presidential election in which the economy could prove the deciding factor, Iran probably sees the ability to influence global oil prices as a potent and much more usable weapon than actual military action.

“As the impact of European sanctions … begins to create some economic hardship for Tehran, the timing of this announcement suggests that Iran is trying to imply that it in turn can cause economic pain for the world,” said Nikolas Gvosdev, professor of national security studies at the U.S. Naval War College.

MIDDLE EAST “TINDERBOX”

Whatever the intent, the growing number of military forces in close proximity brings obvious dangers.

“The risk of Iran actually carrying out the actions they are threatening is low,” said Ari Ratner, a former Middle East adviser to the State Department earlier in the Obama administration and now a fellow at the left-leaning Truman National Security Foundation.

“However, there is an increasing danger that this rhetoric or the increasing provocative actions by the Iranian side … could result in a miscalculation … The Gulf is becoming a tinderbox and an accidental spark may come at any time.”

Military experts say the opening salvos of any such conflict could prove hugely damaging, with even sophisticated warships vulnerable to suicide speedboats, midget submarines or truck-mounted missiles. But the ultimate outcome, they say, would never be in doubt: a massive U.S.-led retaliation that left Iran’s military devastated.

For all the talk, however, naval officers say tensions in the Gulf between U.S.-led forces and their Iranian counterparts are if anything lower than several years or even months ago, with clear signals that Tehran itself is holding back.

Last week, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan Greenert told a news briefing that the Iranian navy continued to be “professional and courteous”. Confrontations with Revolutionary Guard naval units – in which they came too close to U.S. warships for comfort – were also down in number, he said.

Despite occasional talk of Iran refusing to allow U.S. carriers through Hormuz, U.S. naval officers say that in fact Iranian units appear to have had instructions to steer well clear when the giant ships transit the strait.

When foreign warplanes approach Iranian air space, they find themselves swiftly warned off with a simple but firm radio warning in English.

For its part, the U.S. Navy says it has rescued dozens of Iranian sailors from Gulf and Indian Ocean waters, including several from a dhow held captive by Somali pirates.

“I have never worked harder to prevent a conflict,” said Vice Admiral Fox, formerly commander of U.S. naval forces in the region. “We are going out of our way to send the message that we are not there to over pressurize (the situation).”

The current increase in forces in the Gulf, naval insiders say, was planned months ago – but tough choices lie ahead.

Washington says it plans to keep two carriers in the region for at least the next fiscal year and will shortly decide on the next. Maintaining those forces in the longer run, particularly given the planned U.S. “pivot” to Asia, may be harder to sustain.

But the focus on Hormuz, some suggest, may simply be missing the bigger picture.

EXPECT THE UNEXPECTED?

“Yes, we’re seeing another spike in saber-rattling from Iran and to a lesser extent from the United States,” said Henry Smith, regional analyst at London-based consultancy Control Risks. “But neither of those countries has any intention of starting a war in the Persian Gulf. The country you need to watch as the protagonist is Israel.”

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has long said it reserves the right to strike directly at Iran if it does not believe Washington and others are doing enough – through diplomacy or sanctions – to stop it going nuclear.

Such action could still take place this year, despite doubts among many analysts that Israel has the capability to deliver a truly knockout blow and could simply end up motivating the Iranians to work faster to achieve nuclear capability.

But there are growing perceptions that this prospect may already be receding, with Israel and the United States likely instead continuing to rely on covert tactics such as the computer worm Stuxnet to slow Iran’s nuclear progress.

Netanyahu may himself already have decided to wait, hoping that a newly elected Republican president, Mitt Romney, would prove more supportive and at least give Israel the sophisticated bunker-busting munitions needed to reach buried laboratories.

With perhaps no one genuinely willing to risk escalation for now, the face-off in the Gulf is likely to continue largely unchanged, albeit with periodic market-moving bouts of high profile tension.

Even if an accidental clash were to down an aircraft or damage a warship, some believe all parties would find a way to swiftly de-escalate.

“This rise in tensions was to be expected,” said Reva Bhalla, head of strategy at U.S.-based geopolitical risk consultancy Stratfor. “But to an extent, both sides are indulging in theatre. They know what they are doing and they have too much to lose from an actual confrontation.”

Not everyone, however, believes that pattern is sustainable.

With Tehran believed to be moving closer to the ability to produce a workable nuclear device – most intelligence services believe Iran has not so far made a political decision to do so – and sanctions inflicting worsening economic hardship on ordinary Iranians, they say something must eventually give.

Pushed too far, the fear is that the Islamic Republic’s leaders might start a fight in the hope of uniting the people behind them against a common enemy.

“We’re essentially backing them into a corner,” said one veteran naval officer with much experience in the region. “As an old fighter pilot, we used to say: ‘When you are out of options, redefine the fight that you’re in’ … They’ll have to either capitulate or do something unexpected. I believe they’ll do anything if it comes down to defending the regime’s existence.”

(Editing by Mark Heinrich)

 

US sends further reinforcements to Gulf amid Iran tensions

July 7, 2012

US sends further reinforcements … JPost – Iranian Threat – News.

 

By REUTERS

 

07/07/2012 18:25
Naval ship deployed to Gulf in latest step of gradual US build-up; move follows string of hawkish Iranian statements – including a renewed threat to close Strait of Hormuz and destroy US bases in the region.

US aircraft carrier in Strait of Hormuz [file]

Photo: REUTERS

DUBAI – A US navy ship that had been slated for decommissioning has been sent instead to the Gulf to help mine-clearing operations, the US Fifth Fleet based in Bahrain said, the latest move in a gradual US build-up as tensions with Iran smoulder.

A fleet spokesman in Manama said the USS Ponce, described as an “afloat forward staging base” (AFSB), had arrived on Thursday after undergoing refitting for its new mission.

“Ponce’s primary mission is to support mine countermeasures operations and other missions, such as the ability to provide repair service to other deployed units,” the spokesman said in a statement. “Additionally, Ponce also has the capability to embark and launch small riverine craft.”

Vice Admiral John Miller, commander of regional navy forces, said the Ponce boasted “enhanced capability to conduct maritime security operations, and gives us greater flexibility to support a wide range of contingencies with our regional partners”.

Four US minesweepers arrived in the Gulf last month to bolster the Fifth Fleet and ensure the safety of shipping routes in a waterway through which 40 percent of the world’s seaborne oil exports flow.

They arrived amid a flaring war of nerves between the United States and Iran over Tehran’s disputed nuclear energy program and Iranian threats to block the Strait of Hormuz, the slender oil shipping channel out of the Gulf, in retaliation for a new European Union ban on its oil exports.

The four minesweepers were ticketed for a seven-month deployment in an area of operations that includes the Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea and parts of the Indian Ocean.

Tensions have simmered in the Gulf with big-power diplomacy to ease the nuclear dispute at an impasse and Israel renewing veiled threats to attack Iranian atomic sites from the air if sanctions and negotiations fail to curb Iran’s nuclear advances.

A string of hawkish Iranian statements – including a renewed threat to close the Strait and destroy US bases in the region “within minutes” of an attack – over the past week helped thrust benchmark Brent crude oil prices above $100 for the first time since June.

Iran has repeatedly warned of reprisals for any Israeli or US-led strike on its nuclear installations, whose activities it says are purely peaceful but the West suspects are geared to developing the means to produce nuclear arms.

Security and Defense: The Chinese connection

July 7, 2012

Security and Defense: The Ch… JPost – Features – Week in review.

By YAAKOV KATZ07/05/2012 23:31
Israeli-Sino military ties have entered a new period of warmth, although their content mostly remains a mystery.

IDF Chief of Staff with his Chinese counterpart. Photo: Nir Elias/Reuters

In 2010, commander of the Israel Navy Adm. Eliezer Marom was invited to China. The invitation had special significance for Marom, whose German father and Chinese mother had met and lived in China until 1955.

The seventh of eight children, Marom was born just weeks after his family moved to Israel but quickly earned the nickname “Chiney” due to his Asiatic features.

When the invitation arrived at his office in the Kirya Military Headquarters in Tel Aviv, Marom understood what it was for and that the trip would need to be approved by the chief of staff and the defense minister.

After years of being locked out from the Israeli defense market, the Chinese were looking for someone inside Israel who could help advance their cause and get the ban on Israeli defense exports to China lifted. They thought Marom – the so-called “Chinese-Israeli admiral” would help out.

They were wrong.

While the ban on Israeli defense exports appears to still be in place, there is no question that Israeli-Sino military ties have entered a new period of warmth – although the content of those ties largely remains a mystery.

Just take a look at the frequency and level of state visits back and forth between Jerusalem and Beijing. In May, IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Benny Gantz was in China for high-level talks with the Chinese defense establishment.

Last August, Gen. Chen Bingde, Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army, visited Israel. It was the first time that a Chinese military chief visited the country.

Two months before Bingde’s trip, Ehud Barak traveled to China for the first visit of an Israeli defense minister in a decade.

Weeks before his trip, Barak had met with Adm. Wu Shengli, commander of the PLA Navy, during his visit to Israel.

In the summer of 2010, Maj.-Gen. Yair Golan, then head of the Home Front Command, headed an Israeli military delegation to China a few months after Amos Yadlin – then head of Military Intelligence – had flown to Beijing together with Vice Prime Minister Moshe Ya’alon.

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is now reportedly also planning a trip to Beijing and next month Matan Vilnai, the current Home Front Defense minister and former deputy chief of staff, will take up his new post as Israel’s new ambassador to China.

The increase in ties, which comes after nearly a decade of disconnect between the PLA and the IDF, has not gone unnoticed in Washington. There, a number of senior officials in the State Department and the Pentagon have raised eyebrows over the tightening of ties between China and Israel.

Israeli officials are quick to stress that all of the visits – whether to Israel or to China – are first cleared with the United States.

“We never outright request permission but we are sure to always call and update the Pentagon about the trips and the scheduled itineraries,” explained a former senior defense official who had worked closely with the US.

Historically, China’s connection to the Jewish people dates back hundreds of years. An ancient Jewish enclave still remains in Kaifeng, a cosmopolitan center on the Silk Road and an attraction for Sephardic Jews from India and Persia between the 10th and 12th centuries.

In the 1930s and ’40s, around 20,000 Jews fleeing from the Nazis escaped to China, establishing a large Jewish community in Shanghai. Both countries were also established within a year of one another – Israel in 1948 and the People’s Republic of China in 1949. But while Israel was quick to recognize chairman Mao Zedong’s regime, official diplomatic ties and Chinese recognition for the Jewish state would have to wait more than 40 years.

Military ties flourished in the 1980s and ’90s. The Chinese military was largely based on old Soviet platforms and Israeli defense firms were experts in modernizing tanks and combat aircraft.

One defense official, who has worked in China, explained that the interest in ties with Israel was based on three key elements: appreciation of a fellow ancient culture, a genuine belief that Jews are some of the smartest people in the world and interest in Israeli military tactics and technology that helped defeat its various Arab enemies.

But in the late 1990s everything changed with the finalization of a $1 billion deal for the sale of Phalcon early-warning aircraft and systems to the Chinese. It was around the same time that US-Sino relations began to deteriorate but Israel – first under Netanyahu as prime minister and then under Barak – thought it could convince the White House and Pentagon of the importance of the deal. They were both wrong, and in 2000 Barak had no choice but to cancel the deal.

In late 2004, Israel again was caught in American crosshairs after it received for maintenance a number of Harpy drones it had sold to China several years earlier. The US accused Israel of upgrading the Chinese drones with American systems. Israel denied the accusations but saw an immediate downgrade in defense ties with Washington.

“The dispute between Israel and the US stemmed from their respective assessments regarding the nature of the Chinese military-strategic threat,” Uzi Eilam, former head of research and development at the Defense Ministry, wrote in a paper analyzing the crisis. “According to the American perception… China constitutes a significant strategic threat to the United States and its interests, particularly in eastern Asia. Israel did not perceive early enough the seriousness with which the US relates to the provision to China of weapon systems that it regards as strategic.”

Either way, the crisis finally ended in the summer of 2005 with an agreement according to which Israel granted the US veto rights over arms sales to select countries – like China – which Washington felt compromised its national security.

“Our policy remains the same today,” a senior defense official explained recently.

“We do not sell them anything that is defense related and that would jeopardize our ties with the US.” If that is the case then the question many are asking is about the content of the meetings that Gantz, Barak, Yadlin, Ya’alon, Marom, Golan and others are holding with their Chinese counterparts.

For the time being, this appears to be a case of mutual interests. Beijing’s interest in upgrading ties with Israel stems from a hope that one day Israeli technology will once again be available to China but also due to a desire to be involved in what is happening in the Middle East, particularly after it was caught by surprise with the ongoing upheavals in the region.

The main issue the Israel brings up with China is Iran and its continued pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Israel looks to China as a key player in stopping Iran’s nuclear program by cutting its dependency on Iranian oil and by stopping to supply the Islamic Republic with weapons and missile components.

There is also an Israeli interest in expanding its economic reach – particularly to an economic superpower like China – and to forge security and diplomatic ties that could be called on in dire times. On Tuesday, for example, Transportation Minister Yisrael Katz was in Beijing to sign a historic cooperation deal with China to build a multi-billion dollar railway to Eilat.

Armed with dossiers with intelligence on Iran, including documents and satellite photos, the delegations that have traveled to Beijing make a number of arguments.

Firstly, the officials argue that Saudi Arabia could fill the gap in Chinese energy demands if it was willing to cut off its supply from Iran.

The Israelis have also tried to impress upon the Chinese what would happen to their economy if Israel goes ahead and attacks Iran. That is why, for example, Bank of Israel Governor Stanley Fischer joined one of the delegations a couple of years ago.

For the time being, the discussions with the Chinese focus mostly on regional issues but also on low-scale military cooperation.

The Chinese, for example, are concerned that their military might be rusty after not fighting a major war in several decades. Since Israel has, they are looking to the IDF for guidance on military doctrine, instruction and training.

This could explain why Maj.-Gen. Yossi Baidatz, commander of the National Defense College, accompanied Gantz to Beijing in May – probably to discuss military education and also possibly intelligence (Baidatz had previously served as head of Military Intelligence’s Research Directorate).

Israel is extremely sensitive to US concern over its ties with China. In 2010, the Chinese had initially invited Israel Air Force commander Maj.-Gen. Ido Nehushtan to visit but the IDF decided that a visit of the IAF commander – a key post involved in operations and the development of technology – would not be perceived well in Washington. That is how Golan – then head of the Home Front Command – found himself on a flight to Beijing.

“Golan can talk about civil defense, preparations for an earthquake and medical issues,” a senior IDF officer explained at the time. “Humanitarian is okay. Operations is not.”

The increase in ties with China, though, particularly with Iran in the background, has some people wondering whether Israel might be planning to try to use its technology for diplomatic purposes. This happened in 2010 when Israel announced it was selling drones to Russia. Several months after the deal was signed, Moscow announced it was canceling the sale of the sophisticated S- 300 air defense system to Iran.

The government claims that such a deal is not in the works but, as one senior cabinet minister explained after a trip to China, “If we could sell them technology, they would buy everything we have to offer.”

For the time being Israel is committed to its alliance with the United States, but it will need to maneuver carefully so as not to make the same mistakes of the last decade as it moves forward in its relationship with China.

A scapegoat for Syria? – The Washington Post

July 7, 2012

A scapegoat for Syria? – The Washington Post.

By Editorial Board, Saturday, July 7, 2:17 AM

IT WAS just a week ago that Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton cheerfully reported that Russia was ready to “lean” on the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad as part of a new United Nations plan for a transitional government.

“They have told me that,” she assured one interviewer following a June 30 conference in Geneva. “They’ve decided to get on one horse, and it’s the horse that would back a transition plan that Kofi Annan would be empowered to implement,” she told another.

Oops. It immediately became clear that Moscow had no such intention. In the past week, the official Ms. Clinton cited as her source — Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov — has said repeatedly that his government will not pressure Mr. Assad to leave power. “This is either an unscrupulous attempt to mislead serious people who shape foreign policy or simply a misunderstanding of what is going on,” Mr. Lavrov said Thursday. Western policy, he added, “is most likely to exacerbate the situation, lead to further violence and ultimately a very big war.”

At yet another conference on Syria, in Paris on Friday, Ms. Clinton had changed her tune. Now she is accusing Russia and China of “blockading” progress on Syria, insisting that is “no longer tolerable” and warning that they “will pay a price.” She pleaded with participating governments to lobby Vladi­mir Putin to change course. This raises an interesting question: Was Ms. Clinton taken in by Mr. Lavrov? Or did she know all along that the new U.N. plan she has been promoting was stillborn?

Either way, the Obama administration’s Syria diplomacy is making it look foolish as well as feckless. U.S. officials, apart perhaps from Ms. Clinton, appear to have no faith in their own policy. Conceding that the plan to appoint a transitional government is going nowhere, while Syrians die by the score every day, they resort to blaming Russia — as if they are shocked to discover that the Kremlin doesn’t want to support a pro-Western, pro-democracy agenda.

In fact Mr. Putin’s intransigence was entirely predictable. Apart from the fact that the Assad regime is a longtime Russian client and arms purchaser, the KGB-trained strongman seethes at the notion of Western intervention to support a popular revolution against a dictator. Blocking such action — and being seen to do so — ­is his overriding priority. The more Ms. Clinton blames him for “blockading,” the more Mr. Putin preens.

The administration does have reason to pretend that Russia is cooperating or can be induced to do so. Were it to acknowledge that that cause is hopeless — and that action at the United Nations is therefore impossible — it might come under pressure to consider other measures. One would be the protection of an rebel safe zone in northern Syria, which could help turn the military tide against the regime. The Turkish government reportedly proposed — again — at a NATO meeting last week that preparations for such a step be made. According to the Hurriyet newspaper, the idea was rejected by the United States, among others.

So which government is preventing effective action on Syria, and which will pay the price? Ms. Clinton’s attempt to pin the blame on Russia looks like a diversion.

Why Russia Supports Syria – NYTimes.com

July 7, 2012

Why Russia Supports Syria – NYTimes.com.

MANY in the West believe that Russia’s support for Syria stems from Moscow’s desire to profit from selling arms to Bashar al-Assad’s government and maintain its naval facility at the Syrian port of Tartus. But these speculations are superficial and misguided. The real reason that Russia is resisting strong international action against the Assad regime is that it fears the spread of Islamic radicalism and the erosion of its superpower status in a world where Western nations are increasingly undertaking unilateral military interventions.

Since 2005, Russian defense contracts with Syria have amounted to only about $5.5 billion — mostly to modernize Syria’s air force and air defenses. And although Syria had been making its scheduled payments in a fairly timely manner, many contracts were delayed by Russia for political reasons. A contract for four MiG-31E fighter planes was annulled altogether. And recently it became known that Russia had actually halted the planned delivery of S-300 mobile antiaircraft missile systems to Syria.

Syria is among Russia’s significant customers, but it is by no means one of the key buyers of Russian arms — accounting for just 5 percent of Russia’s global arms sales in 2011. Indeed, Russia has long refrained from supplying Damascus with the most powerful weapons systems so as to avoid angering Israel and the West — sometimes to the detriment of Russia’s commercial and political ties with Syria.

To put it plainly, arms sales to Syria today do not have any significance for Russia from either a commercial or a military-technological standpoint, and Syria isn’t an especially important partner in military-technological cooperation.

Indeed, Russia could quite easily resell weapons ordered by the Syrians (especially the most expensive items, like fighter jets and missile systems) to third parties, thus minimizing its losses. And even if the Assad government survives, it will be much weaker and is unlikely to be able to continue buying Russian arms.

The Russian Navy’s logistical support facility at Tartus is similarly unimportant. It essentially amounts to two floating moorings, a couple of warehouses, a barracks and a few buildings. On shore, there are no more than 50 seamen. For the Navy, the facility in Tartus has more symbolic than practical significance. It can’t serve as a support base for deploying naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea, and even visits by Russian military ships are carried out more for demonstrative purposes than out of any real need to replenish supplies.

Russia’s current Syria policy basically boils down to supporting the Assad government and preventing a foreign intervention aimed at overthrowing it, as happened in Libya. President Vladimir V. Putin is simply channeling public opinion and the expert consensus while playing his customary role as the protector of Russian interests who curtails the willfulness of the West.

Many Russians believe that the collapse of the Assad government would be tantamount to the loss of Russia’s last client and ally in the Middle East and the final elimination of traces of former Soviet prowess there — illusory as those traces may be. They believe that Western intervention in Syria (which Russia cannot counter militarily) would be an intentional profanation of one of the few remaining symbols of Russia’s status as a great world power.

Such attitudes are further buttressed by widespread pessimism about the eventual outcome of the Arab Spring, and the Syrian revolution in particular. Most Russian observers believe that Arab revolutions have completely destabilized the region and cleared the road to power for the Islamists. In Moscow, secular authoritarian governments are seen as the sole realistic alternative to Islamic dominance.

The continuing struggles in Arab countries are seen as a battle by those who wear neckties against those who do not wear them. Russians have long suffered from terrorism and extremism at the hands of Islamists in the northern Caucasus, and they are therefore firmly on the side of those who wear neckties.

To people in Moscow, Mr. Assad appears not so much as “a bad dictator” but as a secular leader struggling with an uprising of Islamist barbarians. The active support from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey’s Islamist government for rebels in Syria only heightens suspicions in Russia about the Islamist nature of the current opposition in Syria and rebels throughout the Middle East.

Finally, Russians are angry about the West’s propensity for unilateral interventionism — not to mention the blatantly broad interpretation of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council and the direct violations of those resolutions in Libya.

According to this view, the West, led by America, demonstrated its cynicism, perfidy and a typical policy of double standards. That’s why all the Western moralizing and calls for intervention in Syria are perceived by the Russian public as yet another manifestation of cynical hypocrisy of the worst kind.

There is no doubt that preserving his own power is also on Mr. Putin’s mind as his authoritarian government begins to wobble in the face of growing protests that enjoy political approval and support from the West. He cannot but sympathize with Mr. Assad as a fellow autocratic ruler struggling with outside interference in domestic affairs.

But ideological solidarity is a secondary factor at best. Mr. Putin is capitalizing on traditional Russian suspicions of the West, and his support for Mr. Assad is based on the firm conviction that an Islamist-led revolution in Syria, especially one that receives support through the intervention of Western and Arab states, will seriously harm Russia’s long-term interests.

 

Ruslan Pukhov is director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, a research organization. This essay was translated by Steven Seymour from the Russian.

 

Are Israeli Agents Assassinating Iranian Scientists? A New Book Argues

July 7, 2012

Are Israeli Agents Assassinating Iranian Scientists? A New Book Argues – The Daily Beast.

Jul 7, 2012 4:45 AM EDT

In an excerpt from their new book, Spies Against Armageddon, Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman argue that Mossad special agents are behind the assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists. But will it be enough to stop Iran from getting nukes?

Executions are just a matter of time, as Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is out to show that it is not completely helpless in the face of four assassinations and one failed attempt in the streets of the capital, Tehran, over the last two years. Israeli officials refuse to comment on who specifically might be guilty or innocent, but they publicly expressed their joy that “God’s finger” had acted against Iran’s nuclear program. They also indicate that no credence should be placed in the “confessions” that will doubtless be televised by Iran.

Before Majid Jamali Fashi was hanged two months ago, as the convicted “murderer” of a nuclear scientist in January 2010, the 24-year-old kick boxer was shown on official TV reciting a tale of having been flown to Israel for training by the Mossad. His interrogators, who probably wrote the confession for him, had seen far too many B-movies about spies and were wrong on many details, including the location of Mossad headquarters.

Our in-depth study of fifty years of assassinations by Israel’s foreign espionage agency—including conversations with current and former Mossad operatives and those who work with them in countries friendly to Israel—yields the conclusion that Fashi and the twenty other suspects now being held were not the killers. The methods, communications, transportation, and even the innovative bombs used in the Tehran killings are too sensitive for the Mossad to share with foreign freelancers.

Instead, the assassinations are likely the work of Israel’s special spy unit for the most delicate missions: a kind of Mossad within the Mossad called Kidon (Bayonet). Kidon operatives are even more innovative, braver, and physically fitter than other Mossad men and women. Again and again, they have fulfilled their missions without leaving much of a trace.  The Israeli government has never confirmed Kidon’s existence or its actions.

The assassinations of physicists and nuclear scientists in Iran have been what Israelis call “blue and white” operations, referring to the colors of their nation’s flag. Without giving full details, senior Israeli officials have revealed that fact to counterparts in the CIA and the White House. In at least one instance, U.S. officials were obviously displeased that the Mossad took action at a delicate juncture in multilateral nuclear talks with Iran.

iran

Mourners carry the coffin of Iranian nuclear scientist Mostafa Ahmadi-Roshan, during his funeral in Tehran on January 13, 2012, one day after he was killed when two men on a motorbike slapped a magnetic bomb on his car while it was stuck in Tehran traffic. (Atta Kenare / AFP / Getty Images)

Although Iran has no diplomatic relations with Israel and bans any visits by Israelis, Mossad operatives seem to have no trouble entering and leaving the country. Despite being a heavily patrolled police state, Iran has long borders that stretch across mountains and wasteland. Two of the neighboring former Soviet republics, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, provide an excellent launching pad for cross-border penetrations. Also, for over half a century now, the Mossad has cultivated close cooperation with Kurds— who were stateless, but now run the Kurdish autonomous zone of northern Iraq which borders Iran. Israel used to secretly help Kurds when they were oppressed by Iraq’s government, and the Mossad has excelled in living by the ancient dictum that the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

Israeli intelligence has also expressed an interest in collaborating with disaffected minority groups inside Iran. Meir Dagan—the director of the Mossad from 2002 through 2010—was quoted in a State Department cable obtained and released by Wikileaks. He is said to have told a senior American official in 2007 that disaffection among Baluchi, Azeri, and Kurdish minorities could be exploited by the United States and Israel. In addition, Dagan suggested supporting student pro-democracy activists, if only to cause unrest inside Iran.

The official summary said Dagan felt sure that the U.S. and Israel could “change the ruling regime in Iran and its attitude toward backing terror regimes,” and that “we could also get them to delay their nuclear project.” According to the cable, Dagan said, “The economy is hurting, and this is provoking a real crisis among Iran’s leaders.” The minority groups that the Mossad and CIA could support or exploit are “raising their heads and are tempted to resort to violence.”

Economic woes and high unemployment have only become worse in Iran, as U.S.-led sanctions have begun to bite. From the Mossad’s perspective, unhappy and aimless young males in Iran represent an opportunity to recruit sources of information, agents who can be trained, and even mercenary or rebel armies.

Yet for such a sensitive, dangerous, and daring mission as a series of assassinations in Iran’s capital, the Mossad would not depend on hired-gun mercenaries. They would be considered far less trustworthy, and there was hardly any chance that the Mossad would reveal to non-Israelis the unique methods developed by the Kidon unit.

Naturally, no one in Jerusalem was talking about any operational details of how Israelis entered and left Iran—or where they stayed while inside the Islamic Republic. Since the beginning of the State of Israel in 1948, its covert operatives have never found it difficult to masquerade as locals in every corner of the vast Middle East.

There were many possibilities. Obviously, Israeli operatives traveled using the passports of other countries, including bogus documents produced by skilled Mossad forgers and genuine passports where the photographs might be altered slightly. The spy agency’s use of phony, borrowed, and probably stolen non-Israeli passports has been inadvertently revealed several times, over many years. After a Mossad team led by Kidon assassins killed a Palestinian Islamist militant in a hotel in Dubai in January of 2010, the local police chief gleefully displayed video footage from security cameras that showed surveillance teams doing their shadowy work –frequently changing wigs and eyeglasses—and even the men wearing tennis whites, shorts, and others with baseball caps who were almost certainly the killers.

spies against armageddon
“Spies Against Armageddon.” By Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman. $16.99; Levant Books; 356 pages.

The police chief, General Dahi Khalfan, showed the visages of 27 men and women, displaying photos from their apparently bogus passports. Although the British, Australian, and Irish governments expressed anger at the Mossad for abusing their passports, diplomatic damage to Israel was minimal. In fact, Meir Dagan was fully satisfied with the outcome of the Dubai operation: The target—Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, in charge of arms acquisition for Hamas—was dead. All the Mossad operatives returned safely to Israel. And no one was arrested or even accurately named.

Over the years, some stories about Kidon’s prowess have leaked to the public. With the little that was known about them, The Team’s operatives were considered synonymous—in Israel and outside—with assassins, liquidators, and murderers.

More broadly, there is a Mossad mythology that is based on decades of half-truths and rumors. Many of those stemmed from the secret agency’s “war of the spooks” against Palestinian radicals in the 1970s all over Europe—as a response to the massacre of eleven Israeli athletes at the Summer Olympic games in Munich, Germany, in September of 1972.

“Our attitude was that in order to defend ourselves, we have to go on the attack,” former Mossad chief Zvi Zamir told us. “Those who accuse us of being motivated simply by revenge are talking nonsense. We didn’t wage a vendetta campaign against individuals. It was a war against an organization, aiming to halt and prevent concrete terrorist plans. We concentrated on what was expected to happen.”

Zamir’s analysts found it satisfying that PLO activists in Europe and at their headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon—rather than devoting their energies to terrorist planning—were now looking over their shoulders, out of fear that they themselves were about to be attacked.

The truth, however, about the myth is that since the Mossad’s creation in the early 1950s, it has been involved in only a few dozen killing operations—certainly fewer than 50. But the public imagination worldwide has been captured by the notion of constant assassinations, and the Mossad might find it difficult to refute the image with facts. So it does not bother.

Dagan clearly believed in assassinations, and he did not shy away from planning missions in the heart of enemy countries. A Kidon squad managed to plant itself in Damascus, Syria, long enough to locate and kill Imad Mughniyeh in February of 2008. Mughniyeh, the Hezbollah faction’s military chief and a veteran hijacker and bomber, had long been on America’s list of most wanted terrorists.

Overall, Dagan could be proud that during his eight years in charge, there were more killings by the Mossad in enemy or “target” countries—Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates—than ever before. In the past, such activities had mostly been confined to the safer “base” countries where Israelis did not necessarily have to pretend to be something else. The change to a bolder pattern was the “dagger between the Mossad’s teeth” that Ariel Sharon, the prime minister who appointed Dagan, had demanded.

Despite tactical successes in Iran, the Mossad and its top political master—Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—know that the entire Iranian nuclear weapons program will not be demolished by assassinations of nuclear scientists and military officers.

Yet, any delay in Iran’s nuclear work represents an achievement for Israel. Their strategic thinking—exercised in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere—holds that temporary disruptions to an enemy’s dangerous projects are sufficient cause for taking significant risks.

This was even truer when it came to killing Iranian specialists, who worked on unique tasks that required years of study.  These men were not available in abundant supply, despite Iran’s relatively large and advanced technological infrastructure. The assassinations have also had a strong psychological objective: sending a loud and clear message to scientists that working for the nuclear program was dangerous. The Mossad was telling them, in effect: Stay in your classrooms. Do your academic work. Get your research published. Enjoy the university life. But do not help Iran go nuclear. Otherwise, your career could be cut short by a bullet or a bomb.

Indeed, Israeli intelligence noticed that the assassination campaign was paying off, with what it called “white defections”: Iranian scientists were scared, many contemplated leaving the program, and some actually did.

With rare exceptions, they did not depart Iran and defect to the Western or Israeli side, but they dissociated themselves from the nuclear program. There were also indications of scientists being reluctant to join the program, despite lucrative terms offered by the Iranian government.

The intimidation campaign definitely showed an impact on foreigners. While in the past, Chinese, Russians, Pakistanis and others were happily accepting invitations—and high pay—to work in Iran, the only ones who still seemed attracted were North Koreans.

Mossad chief Dagan was pleased by the missions in Iran and the “cleanliness” of their execution: no clues, no fingerprints, not even motorcycles left behind. Iranian authorities could only guess who was attacking, in broad daylight, in their capital.

Yet the deeply intimidating impact that Dagan aimed to create in Iran seems to be exhausted. This is apparent to Tamir Pardo, the new head of the Mossad who had been Dagan’s deputy. (Dagan actually advised Netanbyahu to appoint another candidate.) The baby-faced Pardo is soft spoken, but his body language is misleading. Pardo is no less shrewd and cunning than his predecessor.

But the new director has a reputation for knowing that one should not push one’s luck too far. Iran is becoming more dangerous for Mossad and other foreign intelligence operatives. One can expect a halt, at least temporarily, of the assassination campaign.

Dagan, in retirement, has become outspoken in his opposition to a military strike by Israel against Iran. He warns that retaliation by Iran and its proxies could be highly damaging to normal life in the Jewish state. Dagan also believes that an attack by Israel would unite most Iranians around their regime and would give Iran’s scientists and engineers a major reason to speed up their underground nuclear work.

His private advice boils down to pointing out that there is still plenty of disruption to be accomplished within Iran by sabotage, assassinations, and a truly innovative weapon—cyberwarfare. The worm called Stuxnet, that took over Iranian nuclear lab computers, was a product of Israeli and U.S. intelligence agencies working together; and it was not the only computer virus created by the highly skilled programmers in both nations.

While Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak seem highly skeptical that international economic sanctions will persuade Iran to cancel its nuclear bomb program, Dagan and other former and current intelligence officials believe that sanctions are biting and could be a major factor in the ayatollahs’ thinking.

Dagan, in particular, seemed unconcerned by Barak’s public warning that Iran was entering a “zone of immunity”—a situation in which air raids by Israel’s limited air force could not reliably destroy a good deal of Iran’s nuclear potential. Dagan seems confident that, in order to prevent Iran from developing nukes, the United States would attack Iran. His analysis is guided by years of close ties with the George W. Bush and the Obama administrations. “I always prefer that Americans will do it,” he told the very few journalists he has met since he left office.

Dagan sees a strong possibility that, depending on circumstances, the United States will strike at Iran. He told Mossad staff members that economic factors in the modern world are powerful. He explained that he carefully studied the motivations of American leaders in formulating foreign policy and realized that the United States went to war in Iraq—twice—because of energy interests.

Dagan, it seems, has reached the conclusion that the U.S. would not allow Iran to have nuclear weapons—not only out of concern that a messianic Shi’ite regime might use the bomb or intimidate Israel—but mainly because Iran would become the most powerful nation among energy producers.

The United States, in the world according to Dagan, would not permit that to happen.

 

Iran Nuclear Program Should Be Abandoned, State TV Viewers Say

July 7, 2012

Iran Nuclear Program Should Be Abandoned, State TV Viewers Say.

Ahmadinejad

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

A television poll conducted by Iranian state television backfired on Wednesday when 63 percent of respondents said they wanted to abandon Iran’s nuclear program, according to a report by The Telegraph. The results led the channel to hastily shut down voting and accuse the BBC of manipulating results.

The poll, which was conducted online by state broadcaster IRIB, asked viewers how Iran should respond to a new oil embargo imposed by the European Union. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has criticized the new sanctions, calling them “the strongest ones that have ever been applied against a country” and vowing not to cave to Western pressure.

“Our enemies assume that they are able to corner Iran in a weak position with these sanctions,” he told IRIB earlier this week.

But contrary to Ahmadinejad’s defiant stance, Iranians overwhelmingly backed the poll’s option for “giving up uranium enrichment in return of the gradual removal of sanctions.” Only 20 percent of respondents said they supported closing the Strait of Hormuz, the passage for oil shipments from the Persian Gulf, in retaliation.

IRIB blamed the results on Western interference, accusing the BBC of having hacked into their website to alter the poll. The Daily Telegraph reported that “the Iranian broadcaster insisted the true figure supporting uranium enrichment suspension was only 24% while the rest backed retaliatory measures.”

The BBC issued a statement on Thursday calling the accusations “both ludicrous and completely false.”

The channel also claimed that the poll did not represent the views of Iranians because only 2000 people had participated.

However, the aftermath of the poll seemed to suggest otherwise. According to the Telegraph, the channel pulled down the poll on Wednesday, but suffered more embarrassment when a follow-up question on closing the Strait found 89 percent of voters against the move. The polls then disappeared in favor of an article on Persepolis, a popular Tehran soccer club.