WarSclerotic

Iran’s Gamble – The Proliferation Sprint – Defense/Security – News – Israel National News.

A-Jad Nuclear Float

Reuters

Iran stands at the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability as the world watches in indecision.

Sanctions, covert action, and diplomacy have failed to alter Iran’s nuclear policy. Nor have they had a visible effect Iran’s the enrichment program – including Tehran’s growing stockpile of 19.75% low-enriched uranium (LEU).

Obtaining weapons-grade high-enriched uranium (HEU) is the most difficult and technically challenging obstacle to acquiring a nuclear weapon.

Assessing the “breakout” time – the time required to convert LEU to weapons-grade HEU – is therefore a critical component of determining progress toward a nuclear weapons capability.

Iran’s bank of rapidly spinning centrifuges has produced a growing stockpile of low-enriched uranium, able to fuel nuclear reactors, but able also to fuel nuclear weapons if further enriched. Enrichment raises the concentration of the uranium isotope U-235, which fissions in first-generation nuclear weapons.

As Iran increases its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, and its stockpile of uranium is enriched to 20 percent U-235, it will consolidate its status as a “virtual” nuclear weapon state.

Iran’s enrichment activities occur at its facilities in Natanz and Fordow. The Natanz facility is above ground and – despite Iran’s attempts to protect it with anti-aircraft defenses and a fighter screen – remains vulnerable to attack.

As a result, Iran has accelerated its uranium enrichment activities at the Fordow facility. The site – once covert and grossly mischaracterized by US officials as a façade – is buried in the side of a small mountain outside Qom.

Considered a “hard target” by military analysts, Fordow is the focus of intense scrutiny by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the subject of the nuclear watchdog’s detailed analysis of Tehran’s weaponization work.

According the IAEA, Fordow began producing uranium enriched to 20 percent earlier this year and has recently seen an expansion of its advanced centrifuges – the key and difficult-to-obtain component in enrichment activities.

These developments reduce the time Iran needs to produce fuel for a nuclear weapon and accelerate the stockpiling of weapons grade uranium. Should Iran choose to make a dash for a nuclear weapon, the world will be faced with a narrow window in which both to discover the move and take action to stop it.

The most recent IAEA report published earlier this month predicts Iran will possess enough 19.75% LEU for a 15 kiloton nuclear bomb – sufficiently large to be strategically useful – by 1 June 2012.

The worst case scenario is that Iran could reach the 90% HEU threshold for weapons grade uranium within one month of beginning its proliferation sprint. However, this scenario is considered highly unlikely and relies on contested technical assumptions about Iran’s enrichment capabilities.

Proliferation experts say the most likely scenario would be Iran’s reaching 90% HEU within 2.5 to 3 months of beginning its break-out.

A second concern is Iran’s attempts to render its critical centrifuge operations both more diffuse and impenetrable, which would take Iran into Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s “immunity zone.”

At present the destruction of the Fordow and Natanz sites could set Tehran’s enrichment program back years, giving sanctions time to have their desired effect. While the Natanz site is vulnerable to attack, US officials have recently said neither Washington nor Jerusalem have the ability to penetrate the Fordow facility.

Simply destroying the Natanz facility while Fordow remains operational would only extend the window for an Iranian nuclear break out – to perhaps one year – rather than stopping it. According to Air Force officials, its current 20.5 foot-long Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) carries over 5,300 pounds of explosive material and is designed to penetrate up to 200 feet underground before exploding.

The mountain above the Iranian enrichment site at Fordow is estimated to be at least 200 feet tall, which has raised doubts about the MOPs ability to effectively destroy Fordow. Those doubts have prompted Pentagon officials this month to secretly submit a request to Congress for funding to enhance the bomb’s ability to penetrate deeper into rock, concrete and steel before exploding.

The push to boost the power of the MOP is part of stepped-up contingency planning for a possible strike against Iran’s nuclear program, say U.S. officials. US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has said the current generation of MOPs could cause “a lot of damage” to the Fordow facility, but wouldn’t necessarily destroy it outright.

“We’re developing it. I think we’re pretty close, let’s put it that way. But we’re still working at it because these things are not easy to be able to make sure that they will do what we want them to.” he said. Panetta added: “But I’m confident, frankly, that we’re going to have that capability and have it soon.”

As a result, Tehran finds itself facing a ticking clock of its own and will have to time its nuclear sprint – should it choose to make one – to beat Washington’s own rush for a bigger and better bunker-buster. The Air Force has so far contracted to buy 20 of the new bombs and more deliveries are expected in early 2013.

Israel has large bunker-buster bombs, but the US hasn’t provided the MOP to Jerusalem. Nor is Washington likely to provide Israel with its replacement in 2013. Analysts believe it is highly unlikely repeated strikes with Israel’s current bunker-busters would prove effective in destroying Fordow. Those doubts render an Israeli strike on Iran fraught with difficulty and potential failure.

This stark reality that Israel’s leaders must confront is rendered even more complicated and dangerous by the Obama administration’s diffident posture vis-a-vis taking direct military action against Iran. Washington has declared an Iranian nuclear bomb is “unacceptable,” but refuses to commit to a strike on Natanz and Fordow should Iran choose to make a nuclear sprint.

That leaves leaders in all three capitals – Jerusalem, Tehran, and Washington – watching the clock and waiting for the starter’s gun to fire.

Will Saudi Arabia Support an Israeli Attack on Iran In June? – Forbes.

One of the great cliches of war-craft is that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. This expression comes to mind in considering the plausibility of a claim made in my recent conversation with a weapons dealer. He thinks that this June, Israel will use Saudi Arabia as its base for an attack on Iran’s suspected nuclear site.

This weapons dealer has been traveling to Tel Aviv and Jeddah to meet with military leaders who are loading up on his specific weapon category in anticipation of a war with Iran. According to my source — who is planning another trip to both countries soon to sell more weapons – the military leaders are looking to launch the attack in June.

Why would Saudi Arabia support Israel instead of attacking it? The answer there is that Saudi Arabia is dominated by Sunnis; whereas Iran’s leaders are Shi’ite. My source believes that Saudi Arabia’s rage against the Shi’ites exceeds its dislike of its Jewish neighbors.

Meanwhile, my source claims that along with launching missiles on the nuclear site in Iran, Israel will also occupy southern Lebanon in order to take control of millions of missiles that Iran has stationed there to launch aerial attacks on Israel in the event of an Israeli airstrike on Iran.

Moreover, the U.S. will not be simply an innocent bystander in the event of a Saudi supported Israeli attack on Iran. Rather, my source believes that U.S. troops will be withdrawn from Afghanistan in the wake of the recent killing of two Americans in a NATO facility.

He expects the U.S. to announce victory in the next few months and to make the troops in Afghanistan available to support the Israeli attack on Iran in some way.

Is any of this plausible? The Economist reports that there is a perception that Iran is enriching uranium. It writes that Iran is ”acquiring the technology it needs for a weapon. Deep underground, at Fordow, near the holy city of Qom, it is fitting out a uranium-enrichment plant that many say is invulnerable to aerial attack.”

And certainly the price of oil has spiked since last February despite tepid demand and an increase in supply. Oil’s price is up 20% in the last year — Brent Crude sold for $104 a barrel in February 2011 and was a whopping $125 a barrel, as of February 24, 2012.

Supply and demand do not explain a 20% leap in the price of crude. After all, demand growth has been very slow. For example, in 2011, world oil demand crept up a mere 0.8% and that demand is expected to rise a mere 0.9% in 2012 to 89.9 million barrels a day, according to the International Energy Agency.

Meanwhile, the IEA reports that supply is up and is likely to rise in 2012 as well. For example, in January 2012, global oil production was 90.2 million barrels/day — a million barrels/day higher than the year before. Meanwhile, IEA forecasts a considerable increase in OPEC and non-OPEC supply in 2012.

And even if Iran stops producing, supply should not be affected. How so? Reuters reports that Saudi Arabia plans to “increase its output to cover any shortfall to the world supply from Iranian exports.”

And Reuters reported Saturday that Saudi Arabia had increased exports to “just over 9 million barrels a day last week, compared with an average of about 7.5 million in January.” Meanwhile, Iran currently produces 2.2 million barrels of oil per day — supplying “2.24% of the daily oil consumption in the world,” according to SeekingAlpha.

Nevertheless, an attack on Iran raises the level of political uncertainty quite considerably. For example, if there are countries that are supplying arms to Iran — such as Russia and China – they may feel compelled to take sides against Israel’s backers.

This would probably be good for those betting on a rise in the price of oil and gold. But it would not be so good for the global economy — after all a rise in oil prices would boost gasoline prices and put the brakes on an economic recovery in the U.S.

Certainly, rising gasoline prices tax consumers’ budgets. According to AP, “every one-cent increase in the price of gasoline costs the economy $1.4 billion.” If the price of gasoline rises by, say, $2 a gallon, that would reduce GDP by about $280 billion — representing 2% of GDP.

Politically, such a war has the potential to boost President Obama’s chances for reelection. Even if the U.S. is not directly involved in fighting Iran, such a military action would make Americans focus their attention on whether they would prefer the Republican candidates — none of whom have experience in the military – to a commander-in-chief who gave the order to kill Osama bin Laden, ended the war in Iraq, and led the coalition that took out Gaddafi.

Frederick Kagan and Maseh Zarif: America’s Iranian Self-Deception – WSJ.com.

Let’s admit the facts about its nuclear program and then have an honest debate about what to do.

By FREDERICK W. KAGAN AND MASEH ZARIF

Americans are being played for fools by Iran—and fooling themselves. There is no case to be made that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. There is no evidence that Iran’s decision-makers are willing to stop the nuclear program in exchange for lifting sanctions or anything else. The International Atomic Energy Agency reported on Friday that it has made no progress in its negotiations with Iran and that Iran continues to accelerate its enrichment operations, which are in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions and agreements with the IAEA.

Yet the policy discussion in the U.S. is confused. Former Ambassador Dennis Ross writes that the Iranians are ready for talks. Anonymous administration officials refer to one of the most dangerous Iranian nuclear installations, Fordow, outside the city of Qom, as “a Potemkin facility.” The media are full of comparisons to Iraq in 2003, when suspicions that Iraq was pursuing a covert nuclear program led to war.

People are conflating intelligence assessment with policy recommendation. The prospect of war with Iran is so distasteful that people are desperate to persuade themselves that the problem is not serious.

IAEA inspectors on the ground at Iran’s nuclear facilities reported the following facts on Friday: Iran’s inventory of centrifuges enriching uranium isotopes has been steadily expanding, along with the stockpiles of uranium enriched to 3.5% and 20%—important stages on the road to weapons-grade uranium. Iran has installed and run advanced centrifuges in the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant. Iran has buried an enrichment facility under a small mountain at Fordow, installed air-defense systems around it, and brought new centrifuges online there.

Iran is developing techniques and technologies needed to turn weapons-grade uranium (which it is not yet producing) into an atomic bomb. The IAEA reported that the Iranians “dismissed the Agency’s concerns [about weaponization] . . . largely on the grounds that Iran considered them to be based on unfounded allegations.” The Iranians have denied inspectors access to the facilities that inspectors suspect are being used to work on weaponization.

The price of this refusal, including U.N. and international sanctions, has devastated the Iranian economy. Unemployment and popular dissatisfaction with the regime are high. Unprecedentedly harsh sanctions imposed by the Obama administration are driving off customers for Iran’s oil.

What peaceful purpose could be served by accepting such damage to pursue an illegal nuclear program? The international community has repeatedly offered Iran enriched uranium for its reactors to produce both electricity and medical isotopes—and Iran has refused. Iran’s behavior makes sense only if its leadership is determined to have a nuclear program that can develop and field atomic weapons.

The pressure on Iran’s economy and tensions within its political elite persuade some observers that Iran’s leaders are nearing a decision to trade the nuclear program for relaxed sanctions. That may be true—but there is no evidence for it. Iran’s leaders continue to insist on Iran’s right to the nuclear program as it is being built. No Iranian leader has suggested that Iran should comply with the IAEA or abandon the program.

Western observers are confusing internal Iranian disagreements about how to manage their economic challenges with disagreements about foreign policy. Increasing external pressure this year could fracture the Iranian leadership on this issue, but no one has adduced any convincing evidence that is happening.

Iran is, however, preparing rhetorically for war with the West. Iran’s military has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, attack American naval ships passing through it, and pre-empt what it perceives to be preparations for an attack on Iran. The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other political figures have seconded these threats, and no Iranian leader has denounced them.

By contrast, there has been no vocal outcry for military action against Iran in the U.S. Even Israel’s threats have been muted and confused. The bellicosity in this crisis is coming almost entirely from Tehran. Why should a state seeking a peaceful nuclear program work so hard to whip up war fever?

Some say that Iran’s leaders are irrational. But their statements and actions in this instance—juxtaposing bellicosity with offers of negotiations—make perfect sense if they are intended to cover the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability.

The Iranians are advancing technically as fast as they can to acquire the fuel for a nuclear bomb. They also are pursuing key elements of a weaponization program separately and covertly. At the same time, they have attempted to draw the IAEA inspectors into protracted negotiations that would buy time to reach what the Israelis call the “zone of immunity” after which Israel no longer has a viable military option.

Add it up any way you like: Iran is starting to race to reach a breakout point at which the international community will be unable to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons, short of a massive American military strike. The evidence available supports no other conclusion.

This is not a recommendation for a military strike on the Iranian nuclear program. One could decide that allowing Iran to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities is preferable to the consequences of a military strike, or one could accept at face value President Obama’s statements that the prospect of Iran acquiring a nuclear arsenal is unacceptable (which implies a willingness to use military force to prevent it). But the debate must take place on the basis of a reality not skewed to support one or another policy option.

Those who oppose military action against Iran under any circumstances must say so, and must accept the consequences of that statement. Those who advocate military action must also accept and consider the consequences—regional and possibly global conflict and all of the associated perils of war. But neither American nor Israeli nor any Western interest is served by lying to ourselves and pretending the predicament will go away.

Mr. Kagan is director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Zarif is research manager at the Critical Threats Project and leads its Iran team.

Barak heads to DC for Iran talks – JPost – Diplomacy & Politics.

By HERB KEINON 02/27/2012 04:38

US, Israel see unprecedented frequency of high-level talks as defense minister prepares to meet with Biden, Panetta; President and PM to follow Barak to Washington for meetings with Obama.

By Reuters/Blaire Gable

Defense Minister Ehud Barak is scheduled to leave for Washington on Monday for talks expected to center on Iran, as the frequency of senior- level US-Israeli meetings is at a pace not seen in years.

Barak will be followed to Washington later in the week by President Shimon Peres, who will address the annual AIPAC policy conference next Sunday, and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who will speak to the conference the next day.

Both Peres and Netanyahu will meet President Barack Obama, with Peres doing so on Sunday, and Netanyahu on Monday.

The two men met on Friday to coordinate positions ahead of those meetings.

The Peres-Netanyahu meeting came a day after a Haaretz report, strongly denied by Peres, claimed that the president would tell Obama he was opposed to an Israeli attack on Iran.

Barak – who was in Washington just two months ago and who has since hosted Gen. Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff – is scheduled to meet Vice President Joe Biden; Defense Secretary Leon Panetta; National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, who was in Israel just last week; and Director of National Intelligence James Clapper.

US Ambassador Dan Shapiro said last week that the frequency of the visits, as well as the senior levels that were involved, was unprecedented.

“There is no other country in the world, relationship in the world, where senior leaders invest that kind of time to ensure that they have total coordination,” he said.

Barak is expected to be in the US for just over two days, returning on Thursday to brief Netanyahu before he leaves for North America.

Netanyahu is slated to leave Thursday evening for Ottawa, where he is set to meet with Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper before continuing on to Washington on Sunday.

Netanyahu told the weekly cabinet meeting on Sunday that while the events in the region – including the “deplorable massacres that we see being perpetrated against innocent civilians in Syria” – would be among the topics discussed during his visit, there is no doubt that the “continued strengthening of Iran and its nuclear program” will be at the center of the talks.

Netanyahu said the newest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report released over the weekend provided further proof, to those still in need, that “Israel’s assessments were correct,” and that “Iran is continuing to make rapid progress in its nuclear program, without let-up, while defying and grossly ignoring the decisions of the international community.”

The IAEA issued a report on Friday saying Iran has increased its capacity to enrich uranium to 20 percent, while ignoring international demands not to do so.