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Imagination Can be a Dangerous Thing: Why Iran Must be Denied Nuclear Weapons.

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Al Qaeda in Iran | Foreign Affairs.

Why Tehran is Accommodating the Terrorist Group

Seth G. Jones

SETH G. JONES is Senior Political Scientist at RAND and author of Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of al Qaeda Since 9/11. Between 2009 and 2011, he served at U.S. Special Operations Command, including as a Plans Officer and Senior Adviser to the Commanding General of U.S. Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan.

The Iran-Pakistan border. (snotch / flickr)

Virtually unnoticed, since late 2001, Iran has held some of al Qaeda’s most senior leaders. Several of these operatives, such as Yasin al-Suri, an al Qaeda facilitator, have moved recruits and money from the Middle East to central al Qaeda in Pakistan. Others, such as Saif al-Adel, an Egyptian that served as head of al Qaeda’s security committee, and Abu Muhammad al-Masri, one of the masterminds of the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa, have provided strategic and operational assistance to central al Qaeda. The Iranian government has held most of them under house arrest, limited their freedom of movement, and closely monitored their activities. Yet the organization’s presence in Iran means that, contrary to optimistic assessments that have become the norm in Washington, al Qaeda’s demise is not imminent.

Perhaps more disturbing, Iran appears willing to expand its limited relationship with al Qaeda. Just as with its other surrogate, Hezbollah, the country could turn to al Qaeda to mount a retaliation to any U.S. or Israeli attack. To be sure, the organization is no Iranian puppet. And the two have sometimes been antagonistic, as illustrated by al Qaeda in Iraq’s recent attacks against Shias. But both share a hatred of the United States. U.S. policymakers should think twice about provoking a closer relationship between them and should draw greater public attention to Iran’s limited, but still unacceptable, cooperation with al Qaeda.

Evidence of the Iranian-al Qaeda partnership abounds — and much of it is public. This past year, I culled through hundreds of documents from the Harmony database at West Point; perused hundreds more open-source and declassified documents, such as the U.S. Department of Treasury’s sanctions against al Qaeda leaders in Iran; and interviewed government officials from the United States, Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia.

Through that research, the history of al Qaeda in Iran emerges as follows: over the past several years, al Qaeda has taken a beating in Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and North Africa. In particular, an ongoing campaign of drone strikes has weakened — although not eliminated — al Qaeda’s leadership cadre in Pakistan. But the group’s outpost in Iran has remained almost untouched for the past decade. In late 2001, as the Taliban regime collapsed, most al Qaeda operatives fled Afghanistan. Many of the leaders, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s deputy and future successor, headed for Pakistan. But some did not, choosing instead to go west. And Iran was apparently more than willing to accept them. Around October 2001, the government dispatched a delegation to Afghanistan to guarantee the safe travel of operatives and their families to Iran.

Initially, Iran’s Quds Force — the division of the Revolutionary Guard Corps whose mission is to organize, train, equip, and finance foreign Islamic revolutionary movements — took the lead. Between 2001 and 2002, it helped transport several hundred al Qaeda-linked individuals. By 2002, al Qaeda had established in Iran its “management council,” a body that bin Laden reportedly tasked with providing strategic support to the organization’s leaders in Pakistan. Key members of the council included Adel, Sulayman Abu Ghayth, Abu al-Khayr al-Masri, Abu Muhammad al-Masri, and Abu Hafs al-Mauritani. All five remained influential over the next several years and retained close ties to bin Laden. Among the most active of the council, Adel even helped organize groups of fighters to overthrow Hamid Karzai’s regime in Afghanistan and provided support for the May 2003 terrorist attacks in Riyadh.

According to U.S. government officials involved in discussions with Iran, over time, the growing cadre of al Qaeda leaders on Iranian soil apparently triggered a debate among senior officials in Tehran. Some worried that the United States would eventually use the terrorist group’s presence as a casus belli. Indeed, in late 2002 and early 2003, U.S. government officials held face-to-face discussions with Iranian officials demanding the regime deport al Qaeda leaders to their countries of origin. Iran refused, but around the same time, the country’s Ministry of Intelligence took control of relations with the group. It set to work rounding up al Qaeda members and their families.

By early 2003, Tehran had detained all the members of the management council and their subordinates who remained in the country. It is not entirely clear what conditions were like for al Qaeda detainees. Some apparently suffered through harsh prison confinement, while others enjoyed informal house arrest with freedom to communicate, travel, and fundraise. Over the next several years, bin Laden, Zawahiri, and other leaders apparently sent messages to Tehran threatening to retaliate if al Qaeda personnel and members of bin Laden’s family were not released. Iran did not comply. Bin Laden did not follow through.

After that, the details of al Qaeda’s relationship with the Iranian government are hazy. It seems that many of the operatives under house arrest petitioned for release. In 2009 and 2010, Iran did begin to free some detainees and their family members, including members of bin Laden’s family. And the management council remained in Iran, still under limited house arrest. Tehran appears to have drawn several red lines for the council: Refrain from plotting terrorist attacks from Iranian soil, abstain from targeting the Iranian government, and keep a low profile. As long as it did so, the Iranian government would permit al Qaeda operatives some freedom to fundraise, communicate with al Qaeda central in Pakistan and other affiliates, and funnel foreign fighters through Iran.

Today, Iran is still an important al Qaeda hub. Suri, who was born in 1982 in al-Qamishli, Syria, is a key operative. According to U.S. Treasury Department accounts, Tehran has permitted Suri to operate discretely within Iran since at least 2005. He has collected money from donors and transferred it to al Qaeda’s leadership in Pakistan and other locations; facilitated the travel of extremist recruits from the Gulf to Pakistan and Afghanistan; and according to U.S. State Department accounts, “arranges the release of al-Qaeda personnel from Iranian prisons.”

On the surface, the relationship between Shia Iran and Sunni al Qaeda is puzzling. Their religious views do differ, but they share a more important common interest: countering the United States and its allies, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom. Iran’s rationale might be compared to that of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who declared, “If Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a favorable reference to the devil in the House of Commons.”

Iran is likely holding al Qaeda leaders on its territory first as an act of defense. So long as Tehran has several leaders under its control, the group will likely refrain from attacking Iran. But the strategy also has an offensive component. If the United States or Israel undertook a bombing campaign against Iran, Tehran could employ al Qaeda in a response. Tehran has long used proxies to pursue its foreign policy interests, especially Hezbollah in Lebanon, and it has a history of reaching out to Sunni groups. In Afghanistan, for example, Iran has provided limited support to the Taliban to keep the United States tied down. Al Qaeda’s proven willingness and ability to strike the United States make it an attractive partner.

Al Qaeda is probably making similar calculations. To be sure, some revile the Ayatollahs. Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, the now-deceased head of al Qaeda in Iraq, actively targeted Shias there. In a 2004 letter, Zarqawi explained that they are “the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion.” Yet, in a sign of Churchill-esque pragmatism, Zawahiri chastised Zarqawi in 2005, writing that the Shias were not the primary enemy — at least not for the moment. It was crucial, Zawahiri explained, to understand that success hinged on support from the Muslim masses. One of Zarqawi’s most significant mistakes, Zawahiri chided him, was targeting Shia communities, because such a strategy would cripple al Qaeda’s support among the broader Muslim community. And most al Qaeda operatives since the debacle in Iraq have cautiously followed Zawahiri’s lead.

Moreover, Iran is in many ways a safer territory from which al Qaeda can operate. The United States has targeted al Qaeda in Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, and other countries, but it has limited operational reach in Iran. In addition, Iran borders the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, making it centrally located for most al Qaeda affiliates. No wonder that Suri has been able to move money and recruits through Iran to various theaters, including al Qaeda central in Pakistan. Although most governments in the region have clamped down on al Qaeda, Iran’s willingness to allow some activity sets it apart.

With the management council still under limited house arrest, Iran and al Qaeda remain at arm’s length. But that could change if Washington’s relationship with Tehran does. So far, the conflict between Iran and the West has been limited to diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions. It has also occasionally deteriorated into cyber attacks, sabotage, assassinations, kidnappings, and support to proxy organizations. But much like the struggle between the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War, it has not spilled into overt conflict. Should an increase of those activities cause a broad deterioration in relations, however, or should the United States or Israel decide to attack Iranian nuclear facilities, Iran and al Qaeda could come closer together.

For one, Iran would likely respond to an attack by targeting the United States and its allies through proxies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries. The regime might increase its logistical support to al Qaeda by providing money, weapons, housing, travel documents, and transit to operatives — some of which it is already doing. In a worse scenario, Tehran might even allow al Qaeda officials in Iran to go to Pakistan to replenish the group’s depleted leadership there, or else open its borders to additional al Qaeda higher-ups. Several of the operatives already in Iran, including Adel and Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, would be especially valuable in this regard, because of their prestige, experience in paramilitary and external operations, and religious credentials. In an even more extreme scenario, Iran could support an al Qaeda attack against the United States or one of its allies, although the regime would surely attempt to hide its role in any plotting. Based on Iran’s cautious approach over the past decade, Tehran’s most likely strategy would be to gradually increase its support to al Qaeda in response to U.S. actions. That way it could go slowly, and back away at any time, rather than choosing an all-or-nothing approach from the start.

It would be unwise to overestimate the leverage Tehran has over al Qaeda’s leadership. The terrorist organization would almost certainly refuse Iranian direction. But given the group’s current challenges, any support or tentative permission to plot on Iran’s soil would be helpful. It could set about restoring its depleted senior ranks in Pakistan and other countries, or else rebuild within Iran itself. The organization might thus be amenable to working within Iranian constraints, such as seeking permission before planning attacks in the West from Iranian soil, as long as the taps were flowing.

It is true that the United States has limited leverage with Iran, but it still has several options. The first, and perhaps easiest, is to better expose the existence and activities of al Qaeda leaders in Iran. Al Qaeda has killed tens of thousands of Sunnis, Shias, and non-Muslims over the past two decades and has unified virtually all governments in the world against it. Iran, too, has become an international pariah. Its limited aid to al Qaeda is worthy of further public condemnation. But Iran has largely escaped such scrutiny.

The United States could encourage more countries to prohibit citizens and companies from engaging in commercial and financial transactions with al Qaeda leaders and their networks in Iran. The U.S. Treasury and State Departments have taken steps against some al Qaeda operatives and their supporters in Iran, including against Suri and his circle. But those efforts have not been coupled with robust diplomatic efforts to encourage other countries to do the same. Nor have they been successful in eliminating al Qaeda’s sanctuary in Iran.

Finally, the United States should think twice about actions that would push Iran and al Qaeda closer together — especially a preemptive attack on the country’s nuclear program. Thus far, Iran and al Qaeda have mutually limited their relationship. It would be a travesty to push the two closer together at the very moment that central al Qaeda in Pakistan has been severely weakened.

Thankfully, there is still time to deal with the problem. But the stakes are too high for the United States to remain quiet any longer.

Asia Times Online :: The consequences of war for Saudi Arabia.

By Brian M Downing

Discussion of a possible war between Iran and the coalition aligning against it centers on destroying Iranian nuclear sites and ensuring that oil tankers freely transit the Strait of Hormuz. Countries embarking on war scrutinize as many scenarios and possibilities as they can, but wars invariably present unexpected situations and changes within their borders are seldom anticipated.

Saudi Arabia is a family-ruled, tribal country with an array of tensions over religion, power, succession and foreign relations. Another Gulf war is not expected to be long or require an appreciable number of Saudi forces, nonetheless hostilities will bring significant challenges to the kingdom. After all, not even the

victor leaves a war the way it went in.

Sunni discontent
The Saudi-Iranian conflict pits Sunni against Shi’ite. In Saudi Arabia, the Wahhabi clergy deem Shi’ism a vile heresy and try to instill that view in the Sunni majority. A war, however, would bring about significant religious-centered concern.

War, in Islamic thought, should be between the faithful and the infidel and not between fellow Muslims. One need not look far back into history to the Umayyad or Fatimid dynasties for cases in point. In only the past few decades wars within the faithful have taken place in Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan.

In as much as the House of Saud was very much involved in these wars, by backing one side and even sending small troop contingents, the pious norm may be said to be quite frail. Some, however, may see the kingdom’s repeated disrespect for the norm as a call for reviving it in order to prevent deepening divisions within Islam and further outside interference.

Perhaps more importantly, Saudi Arabia’s non-Islamic allies against Iran will cause excited discussion – certainly in private, perhaps even in public. The chief power in the coalition against Iran is the United States – a state widely deemed arrogant, intrusive and evil.

Any war on Iran would rely overwhelmingly on US naval and air power, with Saudi forces playing only subordinate roles. Saudi feats of arms will be boldly proclaimed in official media, as they were in the 1991 Gulf War in which Saudi forces hardly distinguished themselves, but the underlying dependence on the US, however, cannot be kept from the public.

It will underscore the ineffectualness of the House of Saud and undermine its aura of legitimacy and claim to be guardian of Islam and its most holy sites.

Perception of weakness will heighten discontent and strengthen demands for reform which were squelched last March through shows of force but which have been kept alive by more audacious movements in the region.

The Saudi rulers may try to counter this perception by building up its armed forces. American, British and Chinese defense contractors will gladly help with the undertaking, but it will pose problems for already strained state coffers which currently dole out immense sums to tribes and family members.

The expenditures will also place more power in the military than the rulers or populace wish to see and serve to strengthen justification for revanchist plans in Iran.

It has scarcely gone unnoticed inside the kingdom that, at least in regard to Iran, Riyadh has been speaking almost in concert with Jerusalem – an embarrassing situation that official announcements can neither hide nor satisfactorily justify. Intelligence reports indicate that Saudi Arabia has granted flyover rights for an Israeli attack on Iran and will help refuel returning aircraft. Reports will merge freely with popular lore and take on greater magnitude.

Cooperation with Israel has required lowering the priority of the Palestinian issue for the time being. The plight of the Palestinians has long been prominent in the Saudi public mind, but it is appearing to be merely something their rulers invoke when it suits them.

Paradoxically, and quite obviously as well, Iran has been more consistent with its support for the Palestinians by backing Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, which is thought to have led to Saudi acquiescence to Israeli attacks on the Iranian proxies.

Conspiracies are very much part of Saudi folklore and foreign manipulation of Muslims is a recurring theme – an unsurprising legacy of Ottoman, British and US intrigues. It will take little encouragement for many to believe that the impetus to war with Iran comes from the machinations of Israeli and American bureaus.

(Curiously, Israelis worry that the US, European Union and Saudi Arabia will, upon settling the Iranian matter, plot to turn their concerted attention to imposing a Palestinian settlement on Jerusalem.)

Sunni discontent will be most pronounced in the Wahhabi clergy and traditionalist tribes, especially in those who are irked by the House of Saud’s impious allies and who are not overly influenced by the exuberant rulers and generals bruiting their victory over the Shiites.

Similarly, Saudi youth may be unimpressed by the victory and more concerned by lack of opportunity and the barrenness of subsidized lifestyles. For many of them, the Sunni-Shi’ite, Arab-Persian rivalry is irrelevant and akin to the absurd rallying cries of the dictators who are receding in relevance in the Middle East, though not quickly enough.

War and its aftermath will shape the course of the momentous succession dynamics that are forming as the sons of the old warrior king are well into old age and quite apparently infirm and often doddering.

A large number of men, some several thousand, can rightfully lay claim to be princes. Many of them resent the concentrated power of the dominant Sudairi clique and the very notion of a family-run state in the 21st century. They will press for greater opportunity and perhaps also for moving with the tide of change all around them. More than a few princesses may join them.

Shi’ite unrest
Saudi Arabia, though predominantly Sunni, has a Shi’ite minority of 10-15% that is concentrated in the oil-rich east and in the strategically important southwest. They do not have the same access to work and education of the Sunnis and are increasingly vocal in their protests.

Their position in national life has always been colored by their sectarian beliefs, no more so than in 1979 when some openly protested after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called for Islamist uprisings. They were swiftly crushed by Saudi security forces.

More recently, when Shi’ites joined with young Sunnis to ask for greater voice in their country’s affairs, they were suppressed – less forcefully this time. The Saudi state was convinced, with little if any evidence, that they were directed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).

War on Iran could lead to two Shi’ite responses inside the kingdom. First, there could be a purely indigenous movement, chiefly peaceful, that would repeat previous efforts to attain equal treatment. Angered by recent repression and encouraged by recent movements in Libya and Syria, the Shi’ites could defy state edicts and assemble peacefully, willing to endure suppression by security forces.

Second, a Shi’ite response could have international aspects, including ones quite worrisome for regional security. Iran, if attacked, will not sit back like a chastened student. It will strike back – in and out of the region, wisely or not, but reasonably swiftly and certainly violently.

The IRGC, it might be more than suspected, has been busily laying out responses for some time now. It could deploy its own personnel skilled in bomb-making and other guerrilla operations. To use the old insurgency maxim, these Iranian fish may find welcoming Shi’ite oceans in vital parts of Saudi Arabia. Their targets could include oil facilities, security forces, and even members of the ruling family.

Iran may look to the Saudi-Yemeni frontier as a base of operations. Already armed and operating there are the Houthis – a Shi’ite tribal movement that fights encroachments by the Yemeni government and its Saudi backers. Several thousand strong, the Houthis raid on both sides of the frontier and will provide sanctuaries for IRGC guerrillas to use for operations just to the north inside Saudi Arabia.

Despite Saudi allegations, there has thus far been little evidence of Iranian influence with the Shi’ites on either side of the Saudi-Yemeni frontier. A war on Iran, however, might make that influence both real and problematic.

Brian M Downing is a political/military analyst and author of The Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: War and Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam. He can be reached at brianmdowning@gmail.com.

DEBKAfile, Political Analysis, Espionage, Terrorism, Security.

DEBKAfile Exclusive Analysis January 30, 2012, 1:26 PM (GMT+02:00)

Syrian tanks occupy northern rebel center of Deir al-Zour

Assad contains Syria uprising for now, with credits for Russia and Iran
debkafile Exclusive Analysis

Ten months after the Syrian people launched an uprising against its rulers, Bashar Assad, if not yet safe in the saddle, has recovered the bulk of his army’s support and his grip on most parts of the country

Protesters have mostly been pushed into tight corners in the flashpoint towns and villages, especially in the north, hemmed in by troops and security forces loyal to the president.

Monday, Jan. 30, Syrian forces were close to purging the suburbs and villages around Damascus of rebel fighters. The operation began Sunday with 2,000 troops backed by tanks and armored personnel carriers. Six soldiers were killed when their vehicle blew up on a roadside bomb near Sahnaya, east of the capital.

The rebel Free Syrian Army and opposition groups continue to report heavy fighting in the Damascus area, and especially the international airport where they claim to have prevented Assad’s wife and children from fleeing the country. However, military watchers do not confirm either the fighting or the Assad family’s attempted flight.

While both sides spin propaganda, the extreme hyperbole of opposition claims attests to their hard straits and the Syrian president’s success in weathering their efforts and the huge sacrifices in blood paid by the people (estimated at 8,000 dead and tens of thousands injured) to oust him.
Having got rid of the Arab League monitoring mission, which gave up in despair of halting the savage bloodbath, Assad will shrug off the Arab-Western backed motion put before the UN Security Council Tuesday, Jan. 30, calling on him to step down and hand power to his vice president Farouk a-Shara. He will treat it as yet another failed effort by the combined Arab-Western effort to topple his regime.

The conflict is not over. More ups and downs may still be to come and there are signs of sectarian war evolving. But for now, Assad’s survival is of crucial relevance in seven Middle East arenas:
1. The Tehran-Damascus-Hizballah bloc is strengthened, joined most recently by Iraq;

2.  Iran chalks up a first-class strategic achievement for counteracting the US and the Saudi-led Gulf Arab emirates’ presentation of the Islamic regime as seriously weighed under by the burden of the crushing international sanctions imposed to halt its drive for a nuclear bomb.
3.  Hizballah has won a chance to recover from the steep slide of its fortunes in Lebanon. The Pro-Iranian Lebanese Shiite group stands to regain the self-assurance which ebbed during Assad’s hard times against massive dissidence, re-consolidate its bonds with Tehran, Damascus and Baghdad and rebuild its political clout in Beirut.

4.  It is hard to calculate the enormous extent of the damage Saudi Arabia, Turkey have suffered from their colossal failure in Syria. The Palestinians too have not emerged unscathed.
Saudi Arabia, Qatar and their security agencies, which invested huge sums in the Syrian rebellion’s removal of the Assad regime, were trounced by Syria’s security and intelligence services and the resources Iran provided to keep Bashar Assad afloat.
The Arab League, which for the first time tried its hand at intervention in an Arab uprising by sending observers into Syrian trouble spots to cut down the violence, watched impotently as its observers ran for their lives. Assad for his part first accepted than ignored the League’s peace plan.
Turkey, too, after indicating its military would step across the border to support the Syrian resistance and giving the FSA bases of operation, backed off for the sake of staying on good terms with Iran.
5.  Russia and China have gained credibility in the Middle East and points against the United States by standing up for Bashar Assad and pledging their veto votes against any strong UN Security Council motions against him. Moscow’s arms sales and naval support for the Assad regime and China’s new military and economic accords with Persian Gulf emirates have had the effect of pushing the United States from center stage of the Arab Revolt in the Egyptian and Libyan revolutions to the sidelines of Middle East action.

6.  The Syrian ruler has confounded the predictions by Israel’s Defense Minister Ehud Barak that he can’t last more than a few weeks. His survival and the cohesion of his armed forces have contributed to the tightening of the Iranian military noose around Israel.

The Syrian army was in sustained operation for almost a year without breaking, suffering only marginal defections. It is still in workable shape with valuable experience under its belt in rapid deployment between battlefronts. Syria, Iran and Hizballah also streamlined the cooperation between their armies and intelligence arms.

7.  The rival Palestinian Fatah and Hamas have again put the brakes on the on-again, off-again reconciliation, which was galvanized this time by Hamas’ decision to create some distance between Iran and the embattled Syrian regime. Seeing Assad still in place, Hamas’ Gaza prime minister Ismail Haniyeh will visit Tehran this week and Meshaal may delay his departure from the Syrian capital.Assad contains Syria uprising for now, with credits for Russia and Iran

Report: Attempt to smuggle Assad’s wife out of Syria foiled – Israel News, Ynetnews.

Syrian opposition sources tell Egyptian daily al-Masri al-Youm that Free Syrian Army rebel forces managed to prevent escape of first lady Asma Assad, relatives

Roi Kais

Has Bashar Assad’s wife been attempting to follow in the footsteps of the wife of Muammar Gadaffi?

Egypt’s al-Masri al-Youm newspaper reported Sunday that Syrian rebels thwarted an attempt to smuggle Asma Assad, wife of Syrian President Bashar Assad out of the country.

Sources within the Syrian opposition said that the Free Syrian Army forces managed to prevent the escape of the first lady of Syria and additional relatives through Damascus airport.

According to the Egyptian daily, the sources claimed that Asma Assad, her children, Bashar Assad’s mother and his cousin were all in a convoy on the way to the airport when rebel forces under the command of a former senior officer in the Syrian army, blocked the their path.

After heavy exchanges of fire, the presidential security forces managed to get the convoy back to the presidential palace. The opposition sources alleged that Assad’s security forces pursued the deserter general, Mahmoud Halouf, former head of the Palestine branch of Syrian intelligence.

Tactical withdrawal?

The general’s unit, all former soldiers who deserted with him, 300 in total, said that when they saw the convoy the believed it was an attempt to smuggle senior officials out of the country – which is why they blocked the convoy’s path.

Meanwhile, Armored forces loyal to President Assad took control on Sunday of eastern suburbs of Damascus that had fallen into opposition control after two days of bombardment and fighting with rebels, activists said.

“The Free Syrian Army has made a tactical withdrawal. Regime forces have re-occupied the suburbs and started making house to house arrests,” Kamal, one of the activists, said by phone from the eastern Ghouta area on the edge Damascus.

He was referring to army defectors loosely grouped under the Free Syrian Army.

If the report about Asma Assad’s attempted escape is true, it would not be the first time during the Arab Spring that relatives of a failing ruler find a way to escape. Last August Muammar Gaddafi‘s wife and three of his children managed to escape war-torn Libya and reach Algeria. Gaddafi was killed not long after.

Panetta: Iran could produce a nu… JPost – Iranian Threat – News.

By REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque

Iran would be able to produce a nuclear bomb within a year, US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said during an interview with CBS News Sunday night.

“The consensus is that, if they decided to do it, it would probably take them about a year to be able to produce a bomb and then possibly another one to two years in order to put it on a deliverable vehicle of some sort in order to deliver that weapon,” Panetta said.

Reiterating the US position on Iranian weapons – expressed in a previous CBS interview a month earlier – Panetta asserted that the United States does not want Iran to develop a nuclear weapon, and will take “whatever necessary steps to stop it.”

“That’s a red line for us,” he said. “And it’s a red line obviously for the Israelis so we share a common goal here. If we have to do it, we will do it.”

“If they proceed and we get intelligence that they’re proceeding with developing a nuclear weapon then we will take whatever steps are necessary to stop it,” he continued.

When questioned as to whether this included military steps, Panetta repeated a refrain used constantly by both US and Israeli leaders: “There are no options off the table.”