WarSclerotic

Use of force tops agenda on Iran – FT.com.

How close is the west getting to all-out conflict with Iran? As 2012 gets under way, the question is right at the top of the international security agenda. Hardly a day goes by without some striking news from the region – be it Iran’s decision to enrich uranium at a new underground site; or the unexplained killing of another Iranian nuclear scientist; or Iran’s threat to close the Strait of Hormuz.

It is hard to think of any moment since 2002 – the year that Iran’s nuclear programme was first uncovered – when the situation has seemed so hot. That said, the alarm can be overdone. Given the sheer number of military exercises being conducted by Iran, Israel and the US in the next few weeks, there is an outside chance that a conflict could accidentally erupt because of some misunderstanding in the Gulf. Otherwise, the big moments of decision in this long-running saga are still at least a year away.

There is one factor which explains why the situation around Iran has suddenly become inflamed: the decision by the US and European Union to impose sanctions that ban oil imports from Iran.

Until now, sanctions have mainly been targeted at entities related to Iran’s nuclear programme, the very thing the west is trying to halt. But the move to cut off Iran’s oil exports is already seriously hitting the country’s beleaguered economy. It is also prompting Iran’s threats over the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s main oil trade arteries.

Many in the west still doubt whether Iran’s threat to close the Strait is serious. By closing it Iran would be blocking its own oil exports. It would also likely be defeated by US naval and air power in any conflict. Besides, the EU – like the US – will next week be careful to phase in its sanctions. This may defer the pain inflicted on Iran for up to six more months.

But even if an immediate military conflict in the Strait is averted, this still leaves a wider question: how much longer can Israel and the US wait before they bomb Iran’s nuclear sites?

Events are once again throwing a spotlight on this question. Last November, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the world’s nuclear watchdog, judged that “Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear device”. Iran’s decision this week to build a second uranium enrichment site at Qom – a site that cannot be bombed from the air – is also significant. It raises fears in Israel that the nuclear programme is moving to a point where it will no longer be possible to halt it by external military action.

All this is alarming. Still, there are two reasons why an attack by Israel and the US is not imminent. First, both states continue to fear that an attack would trigger serious retaliation by Iran and could only delay, not halt, the nuclear programme. Secondly, while Iran is assembling a wide range of nuclear capabilities, the leadership has still not taken the big strategic decision to construct a nuclear bomb. As Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies puts it: “Iran certainly seeks a nuclear weapon in the long run. But there is no evidence that they have taken the final decision to build one. If they took that decision now, it would be another year before they could conduct a test, given all the facilities we know about.”

Some western intelligence agencies believe Iran will bide its time a little longer and enrich more uranium – but will not take the big strategic decision to race for the bomb in 2012. Still, in every other respect, the auguries are not good.

Some diplomats hope that the nuclear programme can be sabotaged by killing scientists or infecting it with computer worms. But there is no sign yet that this is bringing a decisive blow. Others hope that the Iranian leadership will be forced to negotiate. But the Iranian leadership seems increasingly determined to resist international demands to stop enriching uranium. If Iran sticks to this approach, then the question of whether or not to bomb will be the overwhelming issue at the start of the next US presidential term.

False Flag – By Mark Perry | Foreign Policy.

A series of CIA memos describes how Israeli Mossad agents posed as American spies to recruit members of the terrorist organization Jundallah to fight their covert war against Iran.

BY MARK PERRY | JANUARY 13, 2012

Buried deep in the archives of America’s intelligence services are a series of memos, written during the last years of President George W. Bush’s administration, that describe how Israeli Mossad officers recruited operatives belonging to the terrorist group Jundallah by passing themselves off as American agents. According to two U.S. intelligence officials, the Israelis, flush with American dollars and toting U.S. passports, posed as CIA officers in recruiting Jundallah operatives — what is commonly referred to as a “false flag” operation.

The memos, as described by the sources, one of whom has read them and another who is intimately familiar with the case, investigated and debunked reports from 2007 and 2008 accusing the CIA, at the direction of the White House, of covertly supporting Jundallah — a Pakistan-based Sunni extremist organization. Jundallah, according to the U.S. government and published reports, is responsible for assassinating Iranian government officials and killing Iranian women and children.

But while the memos show that the United States had barred even the most incidental contact with Jundallah, according to both intelligence officers, the same was not true for Israel’s Mossad. The memos also detail CIA field reports saying that Israel’s recruiting activities occurred under the nose of U.S. intelligence officers, most notably in London, the capital of one of Israel’s ostensible allies, where Mossad officers posing as CIA operatives met with Jundallah officials.

The officials did not know whether the Israeli program to recruit and use Jundallah is ongoing. Nevertheless, they were stunned by the brazenness of the Mossad’s efforts.

“It’s amazing what the Israelis thought they could get away with,” the intelligence officer said. “Their recruitment activities were nearly in the open. They apparently didn’t give a damn what we thought.”

Interviews with six currently serving or recently retired intelligence officers over the last 18 months have helped to fill in the blanks of the Israeli false-flag operation. In addition to the two currently serving U.S. intelligence officers, the existence of the Israeli false-flag operation was confirmed to me by four retired intelligence officers who have served in the CIA or have monitored Israeli intelligence operations from senior positions inside the U.S. government.

The CIA and the White House were both asked for comment on this story. By the time this story went to press, they had not responded. The Israeli intelligence services — the Mossad — were also contacted, in writing and by telephone, but failed to respond. As a policy, Israel does not confirm or deny its involvement in intelligence operations.

There is no denying that there is a covert, bloody, and ongoing campaign aimed at stopping Iran’s nuclear program, though no evidence has emerged connecting recent acts of sabotage and killings inside Iran to Jundallah. Many reports have cited Israel as the architect of this covert campaign, which claimed its latest victim on Jan. 11 when a motorcyclist in Tehran slipped a magnetic explosive device under the car of Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, a young Iranian nuclear scientist. The explosion killed Roshan, making him the fourth scientist assassinated in the past two years. The United States adamantly denies it is behind these killings.

According to one retired CIA officer, information about the false-flag operation was reported up the U.S. intelligence chain of command. It reached CIA Director of Operations Stephen Kappes, his deputy Michael Sulick, and the head of the Counterintelligence Center. All three of these officials are now retired. The Counterintelligence Center, according to its website, is tasked with investigating “threats posed by foreign intelligence services.”

The report then made its way to the White House, according to the currently serving U.S. intelligence officer. The officer said that Bush “went absolutely ballistic” when briefed on its contents.

“The report sparked White House concerns that Israel’s program was putting Americans at risk,” the intelligence officer told me. “There’s no question that the U.S. has cooperated with Israel in intelligence-gathering operations against the Iranians, but this was different. No matter what anyone thinks, we’re not in the business of assassinating Iranian officials or killing Iranian civilians.”

Israel’s relationship with Jundallah continued to roil the Bush administration until the day it left office, this same intelligence officer noted. Israel’s activities jeopardized the administration’s fragile relationship with Pakistan, which was coming under intense pressure from Iran to crack down on Jundallah. It also undermined U.S. claims that it would never fight terror with terror, and invited attacks in kind on U.S. personnel.

“It’s easy to understand why Bush was so angry,” a former intelligence officer said. “After all, it’s hard to engage with a foreign government if they’re convinced you’re killing their people. Once you start doing that, they feel they can do the same.”

A senior administration official vowed to “take the gloves off” with Israel, according to a U.S. intelligence officer. But the United States did nothing — a result that the officer attributed to “political and bureaucratic inertia.”

“In the end,” the officer noted, “it was just easier to do nothing than to, you know, rock the boat.” Even so, at least for a short time, this same officer noted, the Mossad operation sparked a divisive debate among Bush’s national security team, pitting those who wondered “just whose side these guys [in Israel] are on” against those who argued that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

The debate over Jundallah was resolved only after Bush left office when, within his first weeks as president, Barack Obama drastically scaled back joint U.S.-Israel intelligence programs targeting Iran, according to multiple serving and retired officers.

The decision was controversial inside the CIA, where officials were forced to shut down “some key intelligence-gathering operations,” a recently retired CIA officer confirmed. This action was followed in November 2010 by the State Department’s addition of Jundallah to its list of foreign terrorist organizations — a decision that one former CIA officer called “an absolute no-brainer.”

Since Obama’s initial order, U.S. intelligence services have received clearance to cooperate with Israel on a number of classified intelligence-gathering operations focused on Iran’s nuclear program, according to a currently serving officer. These operations are highly technical in nature and do not involve covert actions targeting Iran’s infrastructure or political or military leadership.

“We don’t do bang and boom,” a recently retired intelligence officer said. “And we don’t do political assassinations.”

Israel regularly proposes conducting covert operations targeting Iranians, but is just as regularly shut down, according to retired and current intelligence officers. “They come into the room and spread out their plans, and we just shake our heads,” one highly placed intelligence source said, “and we say to them — ‘Don’t even go there. The answer is no.'”

Unlike the Mujahedin-e Khalq, the controversial exiled Iranian terrorist group that seeks the overthrow of the Tehran regime and is supported by former leading U.S. policymakers, Jundallah is relatively unknown — but just as violent. In May 2009, a Jundallah suicide bomber blew himself up inside a mosque in Zahedan, the capital of Iran’s southeastern Sistan-Baluchistan province bordering Pakistan, during a Shiite religious festival. The bombing killed 25 Iranians and wounded scores of others.

The attack enraged Tehran, which traced the perpetrators to a cell operating in Pakistan. The Iranian government notified the Pakistanis of the Jundallah threat and urged them to break up the movement’s bases along the Iranian-Pakistani border. The Pakistanis reacted sluggishly in the border areas, feeding Tehran’s suspicions that Jundallah was protected by Pakistan’s intelligence services.

The 2009 attack was just one in a long line of terrorist attacks attributed to the organization. In August 2007, Jundallah kidnapped 21 Iranian truck drivers. In December 2008, it captured and executed 16 Iranian border guards — the gruesome killings were filmed, in a stark echo of the decapitation of American businessman Nick Berg in Iraq at the hands of al Qaeda’s Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In July 2010, Jundallah conducted a twin suicide bombing in Zahedan outside a mosque, killing dozens of people, including members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The State Department aggressively denies that the U.S. government had or has any ties to Jundallah. “We have repeatedly stated, and reiterate again that the United States has not provided support to Jundallah,” a spokesman wrote in an email to the Wall Street Journal, following Jundallah’s designation as a terrorist organization. “The United States does not sponsor any form of terrorism. We will continue to work with the international community to curtail support for terrorist organizations and prevent violence against innocent civilians. We have also encouraged other governments to take comparable actions against Jundallah.”

A spate of stories in 2007 and 2008, including a report by ABC News and a New Yorker article, suggested that the United States was offering covert support to Jundallah. The issue has now returned to the spotlight with the string of assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists and has outraged serving and retired intelligence officers who fear that Israeli operations are endangering American lives.

“This certainly isn’t the first time this has happened, though it’s the worst case I’ve heard of,” former Centcom chief and retired Gen. Joe Hoar said of the Israeli operation upon being informed of it. “But while false-flag operations are hardly new, they’re extremely dangerous. You’re basically using your friendship with an ally for your own purposes. Israel is playing with fire. It gets us involved in their covert war, whether we want to be involved or not.”

The Israeli operation left a number of recently retired CIA officers sputtering in frustration. “It’s going to be pretty hard for the U.S. to distance itself from an Israeli attack on Iran with this kind of thing going on,” one of them told me.

Jundallah head Abdolmalek Rigi was captured by Iran in February 2010. Although initial reports claimed that he was captured by the Iranians after taking a flight from Dubai to Kyrgyzstan, a retired intelligence officer with knowledge of the incident told me that Rigi was detained by Pakistani intelligence officers in Pakistan. The officer said that Rigi was turned over to the Iranians after the Pakistani government informed the United States that it planned to do so. The United States, this officer said, did not raise objections to the Pakistani decision.

Iran, meanwhile, has consistently claimed that Rigi was snatched from under the eyes of the CIA, which it alleges supported him. “It doesn’t matter,” the former intelligence officer said of Iran’s charges. “It doesn’t matter what they say. They know the truth.”

Rigi was interrogated, tried, and convicted by the Iranians and hanged on June 20, 2010. Prior to his execution, Rigi claimed in an interview with Iranian media — which has to be assumed was under duress — that he had doubts about U.S. sponsorship of Jundallah. He recounted an alleged meeting with “NATO officials” in Morocco in 2007 that raised his suspicions. “When we thought about it we came to the conclusion that they are either Americans acting under NATO cover or Israelis,” he said.

While many of the details of Israel’s involvement with Jundallah are now known, many others still remain a mystery — and are likely to remain so. The CIA memos of the incident have been “blue bordered,” meaning that they were circulated to senior levels of the broader U.S. intelligence community as well as senior State Department officials.

What has become crystal clear, however, is the level of anger among senior intelligence officials about Israel’s actions. “This was stupid and dangerous,” the intelligence official who first told me about the operation said. “Israel is supposed to be working with us, not against us. If they want to shed blood, it would help a lot if it was their blood and not ours. You know, they’re supposed to be a strategic asset. Well, guess what? There are a lot of people now, important people, who just don’t think that’s true.”

Russia fears Israel is pushing U.S. toward Iran war; EU tackles details of oil embargo.

Thursday, 12 January 2012

Iran has threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz, which is a vital sea route for oil shipments. (File photo)

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Russia slams Iran sanctions, holds firm on Syria.

Friday, 13 January 2012

Deputy Foreign Minister Gannady Gatilov’s comments came as European governments moved closer to an agreement on an Iranian oil embargo that would give companies six months to phase out contracts with Tehran. (File photo)

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Iran agrees to U.N. nuclear inspection as oil embargo gathers support.

Friday, 13 January 2012

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief inspector Herman Nackaerts has been a very busy man lately. (File photo)

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Postscript: Obama’s dilemma on Ir… JPost – Opinion – Columnists.

Photo by: REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque

By HIRSH GOODMAN
01/12/2012 22:29

Is US president facing same dilemma that perplexed Menachem Begin when he decided to bomb the Iraqi nuclear reactor shortly before elections?

    There are those who argue that this is the time for the US to deal fundamentally with the Iranian nuclear threat, which, in any language, means bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities.

The assassination of a scientist here, or sabotage there, is not going to solve the problem, they say. While even a military attack may not do the job completely, the Iranian nuclear program would never fully recover. For the Iranians, just living with the knowledge that if they start up again, they may be attacked again, one can assume would be a major lesson in itself.

The timing has never been better, they say. With the Americans now out of Iraq, Iran’s options for revenge are much more limited.

They can’t hit back by attacking American forces and interests in Iraq through surrogates, for example.

Also, with its forces out of Iraq, and not yet fully demobilized, America has a significant pool of battle-tested, highly trained, fully equipped and rapidly deployable reserves, that it could use to further punish Iran if it reacts to the attacks on its nuclear facilities.

The second wave would, by definition, be much more destructive than the first, which would be limited to Iran’s nuclear facilities. It would be aimed at the sources of power, the economic and military assets of the Revolutionary Guards who make it possible for the ayatollahs to continue to rule, and other targets that would hurt Iran far more than not having a bomb.

This, one suspects, the Iranians know and understand. America is no longer encumbered by its war in Iraq; its forces are no longer exposed, far away from home.

America is no longer overextended.

On the contrary, it has instantly available reserves at its disposal that could be used to settle a long open account with the Iranian regime, and this, some say, should be incentive in itself for bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities. Perhaps, if the Iranians act injudiciously, there is an opportunity here to bring the entire house down on the heads of the regime, and not just the “kitchen,” where the nuclear bomb was being cooked up.

Then there is something else to be taken into account, those who arguing for an American attack argue. US President Barack Obama cannot automatically assume that he is going to be reelected. If he loses, it will take time for the next president to catch up, to understand the technicalities involved and, crucially, have the self-confidence to make a decision that could drag America into another unwanted war. We have all been told 2012 is a crucial year, that after this the program will be so well concealed it will be impossible to effectively attack with conventional weapons, that it will have passed the point of no return.

If this is indeed the case, Obama is faced with the same dilemma that so perplexed Menachem Begin when he decided, in 1981, to bomb the Iraqi nuclear reactor shortly before a general election in Israel: to bomb and do what you have to do, or worry that people will accuse you of cheap electioneering.

Yes, if America does attack Iran’s nuclear facilities in the coming months, Obama will be accused by some of cheap electioneering. If he allows this consideration, however, to determine whether an attack on Iran is warranted or not, he will have missed the point. If in 2012 Iran does indeed pass the point of no return, if other methods such as sanctions don’t set back the program, what has to be paramount in Obama’s mind is his legacy, not what people say of his election tactics.

If 2012 is indeed a critical year, the voice of those calling for an American attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities gains credence. To do nothing would give the Iranians exactly the window they need to complete their program.

Things have changed dramatically, and not to Iran’s advantage. The US is back in the saddle, and has the power to both attack Iran’s nuclear facilities and to hit back hard if Iran is not deterred from reacting. Obama knows the score better than anyone. He knows that if he does attack, America’s allies will applaud, the world will heave a sigh of relief, his Republican foes will shout hurrah, and he will go down in history as a true and courageous leader.

If 2012 is not a critical year, as all have claimed, then better not to do anything at all. If the Iranians are about to pass the point of no return, there is no real option other than to attack. If they are not, put the idea aside. Wars are to be fought only when there is no alternative, and not because this or that strategic constellation is currently in place. You know where wars start and not where they end. That is always a risk, but nothing as risky to the general welfare of the world as the specter of a nuclear Iran,

The writer is a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University. His most recent book is The Anatomy of Israel’s Survival published by Public Affairs, New York.

Savir’s Corner: Syria after Assad – JPost – Opinion – Columnists.

    Like Mubarak, Ben Ali and Gaddafi, Bashar Assad is doomed to fall from power. Few experts would have predicted that the ironclad dictatorship would have such furious open opposition in the streets of all major Syrian cities, including Damascus. Perhaps never before in their modern history, since Syria’s independence in 1946, have its people shown such courage as in facing the brutal army and security forces, who have killed more than 5,000 of their own thus far.

The world stands idly by, with the exception of seemingly ineffective sanctions against the regime. Russia still threatens to veto any meaningful measures or intervention. The Arab world has turned against Syria – most Arab countries broke their diplomatic relations with Damascus and the Arab League has sent meaningless observers. But even this was unimaginable in dealing with the “mother of Arab nationalism.”

In many ways the Syrian rebellion is the most significant symptom of the Arab Spring, given the fully totalitarian and nationalistic nature of the Assad regime.

Bashar Assad, a member of the Alawite minority (the Alawites are roughly 10 percent of Syria’s population, Sunnis are roughly 74%), is in unsplendid isolation, left with a sole ally, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, his dictatorial brother in Tehran. Even Erdogan’s Turkey has turned away from its alliance with Damascus, calling to “stop the massacre.”

The end of Bashar’s rule is a matter of time, and the real question is what will follow? Such an analysis is necessary to define the implications of a possible shift in the balance of power in the Middle East.

It is likely that after the fall of Assad, we will witness a coalition of forces taking over. Mostly Sunni leaders, relatively liberal opposition groups and the elements of the army who defected from Assad.

Syria’s two main opposition groups have already signed an agreement for setting up a democracy. The first aim of the transitional powers will be to recreate social cohesion, which may be possible given the vast Sunni majority and Syrian-Arab nationalism. There does not seem to be any real danger from Syrian fundamentalism, as such elements are less significant in Syria than in Egypt, for example.

Syria is a more secular country. Iran’s chief allies in Damascus, the Hamas leadership, are already on the run.

The real challenge, as in all post-revolution countries, will be dealing with the economic crises, exacerbated by political crisis. The Bashar Assad regime did in a very limited and insufficient way try to introduce minor reforms, such as privatizing the banks, but will be leaving the country in shambles with declining oil production and tourism revenues, and high unemployment of about 15%. At the core of the problem is that Syria under the Assads, which as opposed to Egypt, does not suffer from overpopulation, is a pariah state.

Unlike Sadat in Egypt and his successor Mubarak, the Assads did not opt for peace; as a result they had no economic relations to speak of with the United States, and limited relations with the EU.

Most of Syria’s income comes from the Arab world, mainly Iraq. Thus, the main challenge for a new Syrian regime is to turn to the West by adhering to greater social openness and respect for human rights, and opening the road to peace talks with Israel.

Syria has two powerful neighbors, to the east Iran, and to the north Turkey.

The Assad regime made a clear choice – the mullahs of Tehran. As recently as 2010, Assad had a summit with his allies, Ahmadinejad and Hezbollah’s Nasrallah, creating an Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis and emphasizing “brotherly ties.”

Syria was the route through which Iran armed Hezbollah in order to rule Lebanon. At the time, the other fundamentalist partner in policy and ideology, Khaled Mashaal of Hamas, also belonged to that axis. Mashaal has already understood that this axis is broken, and intends to move to Jordan. The Iranians too understand that the balance of power in the region is gradually shifting.

The new Syrian regime will most probably try to restore relations with the West, initially through Ankara and without breaking completely with Tehran. From there it will find itself approaching France, its former colonizer, and the EU, and ultimately the United States.

This challenge should be welcomed by a West shamefully paralyzed despite the brutal butchering carried out by the Assad regime. Such a turn may very well have the support of Syria’s young generation, who after Assad may “discover” social media (with which some are already illegally familiar).

The median age of Syrians is 21.9 years. This is a young population seeking employment and modernity, among them many young women who have played an important role in the demonstrations, such as 32-year-old humanrights activist Catherine al-Talli, who was detained by the regime and has many young followers and supporters.

This may very well be the trend, but it risks being a gradual and unstable process.

It is a cardinal challenge for the Western powers to strengthen the young forces of democratization in the Arab world. The main support from the West should be economic and aimed at the young generation. In the same way an aid mechanism was established for the Palestinians after Oslo, one should be structured in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, advancing nation-building projects and high-quality and affordable education for the young of the region.

Syria also has a neighbor to the south, Israel. I have had the the privilege to lead our negotiation team during the Wye Plantation talks with Syria in 1995- 1996, under the courageous leadership of then-prime minister Peres. My impression then, and my opinion today, is that while the Syrians are obsessed with the the full return of the Golan Heights, they are fairly pragmatic when it comes to future “normal peaceful relations,” as defined by them, emphasizing trade and tourism. Thus, Israel should prepare itself for the possible shift in power in the region, keep quiet for the moment, and keep all options open, including a return to the Rabin formula, according to which “Israel is ready for a full withdrawal from the Golan, provided that all our peace, security and water needs are met.”

We tend to say, “From the north an evil shall break forth…” (Jeremiah, 1:14), yet this time, the fall of Assad may result in opportunity breaking forth from the north. When it does, we should not miss it, despite Netanyahu’s traditional alarmism over shifting sands. Israel can and must become a strong and peaceful player in the new balance of forces in the Middle East in the years to come. We must prepare for the worst, and work for the best.

The writer is president of the Peres Center for Peace and served as Israel’s chief negotiator for the Oslo Accords.

‘Russian-operated arms ship reaches Syria’ – JPost – Middle East.

Ahmadinejad: Iran not developing nuclear bomb –.

  Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Friday denied claims that the Islamic Republic was trying to develop a nuclear bomb, AFP reported.

Ahmadinejad, who is currently on an official visit to Ecuador, said that Iran would continue its resistance against Western pressure over its nuclear program, according to the report

“They insult our country and our citizens, of course we’ll resist pressure, Ahmadinejad said during a press conference. “The nuclear question is a political excuse. They all know full well Iran isn’t interested in producing nuclear bombs. We don’t believe in making atom bombs. We believe it is immoral.”

Ahmadinejad visited Cuba on Wednesday where he said Iran had done nothing to warrant enmity from its enemies.

He said nothing about the bomb attack that killed an Iranian nuclear scientist in Tehran earlier in the day, which his government blamed on Israel and the United States, the leaders of international opposition to Iran’s nuclear program.

Shortly after arrival in the Cuban capital he told students in veiled remarks at the University of Havana that Iran was being “punished” for no good reason.

“Have we assaulted someone? Have we wanted more than we should have? Never, never. We have only asked to speak about and establish justice,” Ahmadinejad said.

Earlier, he declined to comment upon landing at Havana’s Jose Marti International Airport, where he smiled and flashed the victory sign several times at reporters as he was met by Esteban Lazo, one of Cuba’s vice presidents.

Iranian Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi, in charge while Ahmadinejad travels, told Iranian state television “this terrorist act was carried out by agents of the Zionist regime (Israel) and by those who claim to be combating terrorism (the United States) with the aim of stopping our scientists from serving” Iran.

He said Iran’s nuclear program would go on.

The White House denied any US role in the car bomb attack and Israel has declined to comment. But the controversy overshadowed the display of Iran’s ties with Cuba, which is just 90 miles (145 km) from the United States, its longtime ideological foe.

Before his speech, the University of Havana awarded Ahmadinejad an honorary doctorate in political science, saying he had strengthened relations with Cuba and other Latin American countries and “valiantly defended the right of his people to self-determination” in the face of international pressure.

It was not yet known if Ahmadinejad would visit former Cuban leader Fidel Castro, who is now mostly retired at age 85 but still meets occasionally with visiting foreign leaders.

Iran preparing a nuclear test?: Voice of Russia.

Photo: AFP

Iran is ready for serious talks with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany, on its controversial nuclear program, speaker of Iran’s parliament Ali Larijani said Thursday during his visit to Turkey. Mr. Larijani stressed that Iran’s nuclear program is for purely peaceful purposes.

In the meantime, Israeli open source military intelligence web site, Debka.com, claims that Iran is preparing an underground test of a one-kiloton nuclear device during 2012 or in early 2013, much like the test carried out by North Korea in 2006.

Assessing the likelihood of such a nuclear test is quite a challenging task. To develop a nuclear warhead, Iran needs to have uranium enriched to 90% purity. Meanwhile, Iran`s technology is not that sufficient to ensure the implementation of this test. Although chances are still there for the country to receive enriched uranium from abroad, says Pyotr Topychkanov, a scientist at the Russian Academy of Sciences:

“In the 1990s or in the early 2000s Iran could have illegally received enough uranium from abroad. There are international networks smuggling nuclear technology and materials, like the one in Pakistan, named after prominent nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.”

It is worth mentioning, however, that unlike Israel or Pakistan, Iran signed the Comprehensive Nuclear – Test – Ban Treaty, and insists on its adherence to the nuclear non – proliferation regime. So, if Tehran is really preparing an underground nuclear test, it should first quit several international agreements it had previously signed. But Iran may choose an alternative way to go, believes Pyotr Topychkanov…

“It is possible that Iran decides not to quit these international agreements and carry out a test secretly, saying it is for peaceful purposes, or stage it abroad, say, in Pakistan or North Korea.”

The expert admits, however, that Iran’s nuclear test would by all means result in the Arab states and Turkey also willing to seek nuclear technology and weapons. As far as Israel, the U.S. and Europe are concerned, their reaction to the test is going to be very tough, and a military attack on Iran should not be excluded.

Yevgeny Satanovsky,President of the Middle East Institute, has a different point of view…

“As soon as the test will have taken place, attacking Iran won`t make any sense. Remember North Korea: nobody is going to invade it now precisely because it possesses one or even two nuclear bombs. At the same time, Muammar Gaddafi, who renounced a nuclear program, did not survive. Saddam, who failed to implement his nuclear program, was executed. It is very simple: you will survive only if your have nukes.”

In view of this, the statement released by Israel on Debka.com can be interpreted as a provocation from Iran, Mr. Satanovsky believes…

“Such kind of statements may be made on purpose, even by Iran itself, for example, to threaten Israel and the West. By doing so, Tehran might want to warn everyone that it is about to become a nuclear state.”

Both experts interviewed by the VoR agree that although the information on the Israeli web site is difficult to verify, it is hardly a provocation since there exist other media outlets where such statements can be made, and using a different tone, too. This very report appears to be a leak created on purpose amid the continuing aggression against Iran. The task of world powers now is to prevent this information from becoming a reality, and this is where Russia and China, who have always insisted on a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, come in.