WarSclerotic

In the eye of the observer – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

Israeli Military Intelligence believes Assad will fall in 2012, though it won’t commit to a date, and it is not clear whether Assad understands this himself.

By Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff

It was a slightly less routine week than usual in Syria. The protest against the regime continued, and last Friday a record number of people – several hundred thousand – took part in the demonstrations against Bashar Assad and his government. However, the presence of a few dozen Arab observers had the effect of somewhat reducing the level of violence by the security forces. The average number of those killed every day in Syria was halved – from 40-50 to 20-25 – after the observers’ arrival.

The arrival of the inspectors, who were sent by the Arab League, was roundly criticized by opposition elements in Syria. They claimed that the presence of the observers would only help Assad survive. Similarly, the appointment of Mustafa Dabi, a Sudanese general who was apparently involved in the genocide in his country, to head the team of observers was deeply resented. Last week, immediately after the team reached Homs, Dabi described the situation in the city as “quite calm.” He added that it was premature to arrive at conclusions, but it’s difficult to understand a comment like that in the light of the situation in Homs, which was shelled by the Syrian army just a few hours before the observers arrived.

	Syrian President Bashar Assad greets crowd during visit to Raqqa city in eastern Syria, November 6, 2011.
	Photo by: Reuters

On Wednesday, the Arab League, in an attempt to rebuff the criticism, promised to send another large group of inspectors in the days ahead. In a few cities members of the team rented offices in which, they said, they would take testimony from the local residents about the events. However, residents of Hama complained this week that Syrian security forces were stationed at the entrance to the offices and were keeping a record of everyone who entered.

Western intelligence officials said this week that despite the relative decrease in the level of violence, Assad was continuing to lose ground. Among the thousands of defectors from
Assad’s army includes hundreds of officers, including dozens with the rank of major and up, and a few colonels. In the past week the first testimonies were recorded to the effect that the army is using air power to attack areas in which the opposition is heavily concentrated.

Israeli Military Intelligence believes that the die is cast – Assad will fall in 2012 – though it won’t commit to a date. It’s not clear whether Assad himself understands this. Anyone who saw the interview he gave to Barbara Walters could only conclude that his subordinates are cutting him off from reliable information about events.

The power groups in Syria and in the neighboring countries are already readying themselves for the period after the fall of the Alawite regime. The most credible indication of this came this week when the Druze leader in Lebanon, Walid Jumblatt, who after zigzagging furiously between Syria and its adversaries, called on Iran and Russia to back changes in the Damascus regime. The only exception was Tehran. Assad’s allies in Iran had begun criticizing the Syrian president’s policy two months ago, but more recently they have again begun to refer to him publicly as a leader who will be in power in Syria for many years.

There is no outstanding and recognized opposition body leading the demonstrations, not even the Muslim Brotherhood. Perhaps the most significant figure is Colonel Riad al-Asaad, the commander of the Free Syrian Army – the official name of the guerrilla forces operating against the Syrian military. Asaad claims to have 23 battalions under his command. Probably, though, they are no more than companies with outmoded military equipment.

An attempt to draft a document of understandings between the different opposition groups for the post-Assad era seemed to bear fruit last Saturday, when the National Syrian Council and the National Coordinating Committee signed an accord obligating a democratic future for Syria.

The agreement stipulates that after Assad is gone a transition year will be declared in which parliamentary and presidential elections will be held, with freedom of religion guaranteed for every Syrian citizen. However, these two central groups did not co-opt Asaad and his people.

The day after the signing, key figures in both groups and in the other opposition bodies began to dissociate themselves from it.

Extreme scenarios

This week the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, headed by Dr. Dore Gold, a former ambassador to the United Nations (during Benjamin Netanyahu’s first term as prime minister), held a discussion about Syria’s future with the participation of experts and researchers from the Center for Middle Eastern Affairs. The most extreme scenario, according to Dr. Shimon Shapira, a retired brigadier-general who was Netanyahu’s military secretary during his first term as prime minister, is that Assad will try, just before his downfall, “to go down in the Arab world’s pantheon as the leader who dared to launch a war against Israel.” In other words, the president will want to subject Israel to a missile attack.

As for possible successors to Assad, the likelihood, according to Shapira, is a coalition consisting of a Sunni elite (which is currently divided between opposition groups based in Damascus and Turkey), with the addition of the former vice president, Abdel Halim Haddam, and the head of the National Syrian Council, Burhan Ghalioun. “My working assumption is that the Alawite sect will lose its strength and status after Bashar falls,” Shapira says. “Another possibility involves intercommunal bloodshed which will end with the formation of a Sunni coalition.”

Another extreme scenario, about which the group of experts was divided, states that the new regime will sign a peace treaty with Israel. According to Shapira, if the next Syrian regime gets Washington’s backing, the administration will try to bring about a peace agreement through the new government. He does not rule out the possibility that the new regime will agree to all the security arrangements Israel wants in return for a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights, including the withdrawal of Syrian forces to Damascus. In this context, Samir Nashar, one of the leaders of the Syrian National Council, told the Washington Post that the new Syria can be expected to accept the Arab Peace Initiative. Colonel (res.) Jacques Neriah, who was a policy adviser to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, disputed this scenario. He does not think that the new regime in Syria will volunteer to be the first of the new Arab regimes to make peace with Israel. Nor does Neriah believe in the possibility that Syria will become a canton state). The reason: the country’s monolithic population structure (80 percent Sunni). In Neriah’s view, the national motif in Syria is very strong, as is the secular motif.

“The civilian infrastructure of the Muslim Brotherhood, which existed in Egypt under Mubarak, does not exist in Syria. The Islamists are part of the uprising but are not its spearhead,” he argued. Neriah does not see a war with Israel on the horizon, due to the new Syrian regime’s probable weakness. Former Israeli ambassador to Egypt Zvi Mazel thinks that the assumption that after 6,000 dead the opposition will not agree to let Assad stay is based on Western logic. “There is a possibility that Bashar will be part of a coalition of forces and that the transfer of power will be made in a controlled and cautious manner. In addition, it is possible that the Alawites will want to be rid of him and hook up with the Sunnis, without an intercommunal confrontation.”

All the participants in the discussion agreed that if Assad goes the big losers will be Hezbollah and Iran. According to Shapira, Hezbollah has already begun to prepare for this eventuality and they might move a large percentage of its long-range missiles into Lebanon (they had been stored in facilities on the Syrian side of the border in order to avoid Israeli attacks on them). It is likely, he added, that some of the Syria’s chemical weapons (one of the largest stockpiles of its kind in the world) will also come into Hezbollah’s possession. However, it is not clear what line Hezbollah will take after Assad’s removal.

The team of researchers believes that the possibility of a military takeover of Lebanon by Hezbollah exists, but so does a heightening of the organization’s political involvement. Only recently Hezbollah began to work for a revision of the ethnic-division agreement in Lebanon which has been in force since 1943. Hezbollah wants representation that corresponds with its present political strength (under the agreement a citizen of Shiite descent cannot serve as president or prime minister). Hezbollah can propose this to the present parliament and even get it passed by majority vote, though it would likely trigger Christian resistance, possibly of a violent character.

In Shapira’s view, if Hezbollah demands elections under a new system which will be commensurate with its strength and will make it possible for the organization to elect a president, the result could be a civil war and the subsequent cantonization of the country. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Segall, a former intelligence officer whose specialty is the Iranian arena, maintained that Assad’s possible fall is worrying Tehran. However, he noted, the Islamic awakening across the Middle East affords the Iranians some compensation, on the assumption that it will be easier for them to crystallize the camp under their leadership in an Islamist region.

In Segall’s view, Iran is making considerable efforts to disseminate Shiite Islam in its “backyard”: Bahrain, the Shiite areas of Saudi Arabia and above all in Iraq. Iran is allocating resources and efforts to this end, the team of experts explains, recall its encroachment in Lebanon in the 1980s. It cannot be ruled out that Iraq, after the withdrawal of the American forces, will become a new member of the radical axis being led by Iran in the region, in place of Syria. The instability in Syria has implications for Israel. In the immediate range, last May and June saw two violent attempts by demonstrators to cross the border into the Golan Heights. The result: dozens killed by the Israeli army. This phenomenon is likely to persist and be intensified in the form of cross-border terrorist attacks, as in Sinai. Israel is following with concern the state of the Syrian army’s stocks of missiles and rockets, along with the chemical and biological material. In addition to stepping up the procurement of steep-trajectory missiles and rockets, Assad also recently acquired advanced antiaircraft and antitank missiles of Russian manufacture. The antiaircraft missiles might limit somewhat the Israeli Air Force’s freedom of action in the northern arena. The tension within the Syrian army, combined with its upgraded ability, heightens the risk of an incident with Israeli planes in the north at this time.

Arab monitors escape attack by Syrian forces in Damascus suburb.

Friday, 06 January 2012

A member from the Arab League observers delegation makes a video recording of his visit to al-Msefra town near Deraa, southern Syria on Jan. 5, 2012. (Reuters)

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Opinion: On the matter of Israel’s bomb and Iran – Bennett Ramberg – POLITICO.com.
By: Bennett Ramberg
January 6, 2012 04:31 AM EST

During the GOP debates, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich raised a specter that no U.S. or Israeli public official dare mention — the plausibility that Israel would use its atomic arsenal to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

“If my choice was to collaborate with the Israelis on a conventional campaign or force them to use their nuclear weapons,” Gingrich said, “it will be an extraordinarily dangerous world if, out of a sense of being abandoned, they went nuclear and used multiple nuclear weapons in Iran. That would be a future none of us would want to live through.”

Though some might take Gingrich’s remarks as political theater, the fact remains that we don’t know how far the Jewish state will go to fulfill the “all options are on the table” threat.

So does Gingrich’s concern, repeated in several debates, have any basis in reality? History says no. But Israel never confronted an emerging nuclear adversary quite like Iran. While Jerusalem’s bomb may be the last arrow in its quiver, when it comes right down to it, the country remains an atomic enigma that raises questions how far it would go to stop Tehran.

Israel is the most unusual of nuclear armed nations. Unlike others, it never mentions, publically plans, parades or visibly deploys the arsenal. It doesn’t acknowledge testing a device — despite reports that it detonated at least one weapon in the Indian ocean off South Africa. Nor does it disclose the number of weapons it possesses.

Israel’s nuclear behavior (or non-behavior) adds to the puzzle. Consider when the country faced the most dire circumstances—the 1967 and more challenging 1973 war. It never even issued a threatening peep to intimidate or deter.

Applying secrecy to discourage regional copy-cats dictated Israel’s use of force, rather than deterrence to stem nuclear rivals. The result — the 1981 attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor and the 2007 strike on Syria’s secret Al-Kibar plant.

However, Israel responded differently to Iran. Despite its repeated statements that , “all options are on the table” and posturing in military exercises, timidity substituted for action. The international community stepped into the void. The International Atomic Energy Agency has repeatedly sought to coax Iran to fess up and halt suspect nuclear activities. The European Union offered economic and diplomatic incentives. The Security Council applied multiple rounds of political and economic sanctions. All failed.

Israel, possibly in coordination with the U.S. and others, decided to tear a page from the run-up to its bombing of Osirak. It applied assassination of scientists and disruption of nuclear exports to stop Baghdad. Along with allies, it seems to have added computer viruses and, possibly, sabotage of Iranian nuclear and missile development plants.

But success would buck history. In Iraq, international inspectors with authority to destroy weapons of mass destruction after the 1991 Gulf War shut Baghdad’s program. In South Africa. peaceful regime change proved the key. In South Korea and Taiwan, Washington exercised overwhelming political and military leverage.

Only with Libya, in 2003, did we see isolation, sanctions and, in the end, diplomacy move a regime then worried about its own survival following the fall of Iraq.

In contrast, North Korea, Israel, India and Pakistan overcame impediments. And Iran appears on the way.

This pessimistic backdrop suggests international efforts to stop Iran’s nuclear effort is tread milling. Yes, we can still hope new sanctions and covert action will move Tehran’s Mullahs. But it remains a slim bet.

This leaves the Osirak template — a conventional military strike on Iran’s nuclear program. But unlike the Iraqi or Syrian reactors that Israel destroyed, Iran has multiple key sites, some presumably undisclosed and others, like the recently opened Fordow nuclear enrichment plant, hardened in the interior of a mountain. Without international inspectors with authority to ferret out remaining nuclear contraband and prevent reconstruction, these facts suggest an assault would delay but not terminate Iran’s efforts.

Conventional attack raises other complications. Were the international economy to slip into dramatic decline — as a result of possible oil shocks — Israel could find itself a global pariah. Isolated, Gingrich’s nuclear scenario becomes more compelling – especially if Israel were to fear its conventional strikes wouldn’t stop nuclear reconstruction by a vindictive Iran.

This scenario should prompt Washington to consider next possible steps. If sanctions and covert actions fail to stop the Mullahs, should Washington use force to make good its repeated declaration it will not allow Iran to become a nuclear weapons state? Or should we put resources toward dramatically boosting its gulf military presence to intimidate Iran?

Would offering Jerusalem a military alliance to defend Israel against Iran reduce its anxieties and the temptation to preempt? Or, given the blood and treasure the U.S. has spent across the Middle East and Southwest Asia, should Washington let the region fend for itself — perhaps with extra U.S. material aid?

Now—not the cusp if crisis—is the time for the American public to consider if and how far the country ought to go

Bennett Ramberg served as a policy analyst on the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs during the George H.W. Bush administration. His books include, “Nuclear Power Plants as Weapons for the Enemy.”

Iran to hold another naval drill near Strait of Hormuz next month – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

Iranian Defense Minister announces new exercise one day after Israel, U.S. plan major joint drill, and days after the culmination of a 10-day Iranian maneuver in the area.

By Haaretz

Iran plans to hold another extensive naval exercise in the Strait of Hormuz in February, Iran’s defense minister said on Friday, just days after a 10-day drill ended amid a spat with the U.S. over the crucial waterway.

	Iranian navy fires a Mehrab missile during the “Velayat-90” naval wargames in the Strait of Hormuz in southern Iran on January 1, 2012.
	Photo by: AFP

The Iranian navy carried out drills near the Strait of Hormuz last week after it threatened to block the strait, where some 35 percent of the world’s seaborne oil passes, if the West imposed new sanctions over its disputed nuclear program.

The United States on Saturday approved sanctions targeting Iran’s oil sector, the government’s main source of income, and the European Union will consider similar measures later this month. Iran denies western claims that its nuclear program has a military dimension.

The United States has dismissed a warning by Iran not to return a US aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf. The aircraft carrier USS John C Stennis left the Gulf on December 27 and a Pentagon spokesman said it would return.

Speaking to the Fars news agency on Thursday, Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi referred to the recently culminated drill, saying that “the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps plans to conduct its greatest naval war games in the same region in the near future.”

According to a report by Iran’s state television Press TV, the drill, the seventh in a series of drills dubbed the “Great Prophet,” will take place in February.

The report of another Iranian exercise near the sensitive waterway came after the Israel Defense Forces said it would soon hold a major missile defense exercise with U.S. -forces.

The IDF said the drill with the U.S. was planned long ago and is not tied to recent events.

The drill is called “Austere Challenge 12” and is designed to improve defense systems. No date for the drill was given by the military on Thursday.

Israel has deployed the “Arrow” system, jointly developed and funded with the U.S., designed to intercept Iranian missiles.

The West is adopting new sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program, charging that Iran is making weapons. Iran insists its program is peaceful. Israel considers Iran a strategic threat because of its nuclear and missile programs.

Iran’s Quds Force expanding in E… JPost – Iranian Threat – News.

Iranian threat to close oil lanes could backfire – Analysis, Opinion – Independent.ie.

Friday January 06 2012

THE last time Iran tried to close the Strait of Hormuz, the trade artery linking the oil-rich Gulf states to the outside world, the Revolutionary Guards had only a few rubber dinghies and primitive mines to achieve their goals. Next time, they will be far better prepared.

For the ayatollahs, the Strait of Hormuz, which lies between Iran and the tiny sheikdoms of the Gulf, has become a national obsession in their long-standing confrontation with the West.

They know that, for all their long-held nuclear ambitions, they will never be able to match America’s military supremacy.

Even if they were to develop the know-how to fit a nuclear warhead to a ballistic missile, the odds are that the weapon would be shot down the moment it left its launch pad by one of the hundreds of anti-missile batteries the US has deployed around the Gulf.

So far as the ayatollahs are concerned, a far more effective way of attacking the West would be to place a stranglehold on their economies.

The economies of many major developed powers would be thrown into chaos if the Iranians carried out their threat to close the Strait of Hormuz.

On average, 14 crude oil tankers pass through the Strait each day carrying an estimated 17 million barrels, more than a third of the world’s seaborne oil shipments.

In addition, it has become a vital conduit for tankers carrying liquefied natural gas from states such as Qatar, as the Western economies become ever more dependent on gas for their energy needs.

At a time when tensions over Iran’s nuclear programme are reaching crisis point, it was almost inevitable that Tehran should start making ominous noises about closing the Strait if the US and its European allies follow through on their threat to impose wide-ranging sanctions on Iran’s oil industry.

Oil revenues make up around 80pc of Iran’s foreign currency earnings. The rial, Iran’s currency, fell 12pc this week after it emerged the European Union had agreed to implement a complete ban on oil shipments from Iran.

The prospect of increased sanctions has prompted senior Iranian political and military figures to warn that the strait could be closed in retaliation.

This week, General Ataollah Salehi, the commander-in-chief of Iran’s armed forces, threatened to attack the US Navy if it attempted to move an aircraft carrier into the Gulf.

To many, this is nothing more than the Iranians indulging in yet another tiresome exercise in anti-Western sabre-rattling. With parliamentary elections due in March, the regime is keen to demonstrate its refusal to be intimidated over its nuclear programme.

But in view of the Iranian government’s inherent instability, it would be prudent for the West to be on its guard.

The Iranians’ military capabilities have come a long way since the mid-1980s, the last time they made any serious attempt to disrupt Gulf shipping.

But the ayatollahs vowed that, if ever the need arose again to blockade the Gulf, they would have the means to do so.

Consequently the Iranian military has spent much of the past two decades overhauling its capabilities, to the extent that if the order were given to close the Strait of Hormuz it could actually carry out the threat — albeit for only a few days.

IRAN would be able to deploy anti-ship cruise missiles, submarines, mines and thousands of small watercraft that could be used in “swarm” attacks against shipping if the ayatollahs decided to impose a blockade.

Such is the confidence of senior Iranian commanders in their firepower that Admiral Habibollah Sayari, the head of Iran’s navy, recently boasted that closing the strait would be “as easy as drinking a glass of water”.

But the Pentagon insists that it still would be no match for US firepower.

Iran would, therefore, be taking an enormous gamble and any hint of military confrontation could see oil prices soar by 50pc within days, with potentially catastrophic consequences for the world’s leading developed economies.

Iran, meanwhile, would react to any attack on its nuclear facilities by carrying out its long-standing promise to attack Israel.

It would not be long before a confrontation that began as a dispute over access to shipping lanes escalated into a major regional conflict.(© Daily Telegraph, London)

Israel’s 2012 security outlook – Israel Opinion, Ynetnews.

Op-ed: Despite short-term threats, Israel’s strategic situation may improve in 2012

There is no doubt that the wave of uprisings that swept through the Arab world in 2011 changed the rules of the game in the region and created potential old-new threats for Israel. With most of them we already successfully contended in the past – for example, the Egyptian army’s deployment in the Sinai or terror on our borders with Jordanand Syria. Yet alongside the substantive and potential threats piling up at the outset of 2012, mostly in the short term, we can see quite a few positive developments that may improve Israel’s strategic position in the medium and long range.

For example, the blow to be sustained by the “Iranian axis of evil” should Assad’s regime in Syriabe toppled; or the determination and actions of Sunni Gulf states in contending with Iran’s strategic threat using all means – political, economic and military. Even the political rise of Islamic movements as result of the regional uprisings is apparently much less menacing and dangerous for Israel than it seemed.

Egypt uprising (Photo: EPA)

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan represents what experts refer to as “hybrid Islam” that combines national-social identity with Islamic identity. As opposed to all-out Jihad movements such as al-Qaeda and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Muslim Brotherhood clearly prefers the people’s economic and social welfare over Jihad. Hence, it will likely adopt a pragmatic policy and aim to distinguish itself from and even fight the fundamentalist Salafists.

The Muslim Brotherhood won’t be in love with Israel and harass us at every opportunity, but it will be careful not to annul the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan and avoid an all-out war that would harm the Arab people. This will likely be true for the post-Assad regime in Syria as well. Hence, the recent clichés about the Arab Spring making way for an “Islamic winter” should be reconsidered. There is good reason to assume that the political success of Islamic parties will not last forever.

Deterrence intact

On the military front, there was no significant erosion in Israel’s overall deterrence in 2011, both in respect to closer and to more distant rivals. This is attested to by the relative quiet on the Syrian, Lebanese and Jordanian borders, the calm in the West Bank, Hamas’ aversion for a wide-ranging clash, Iranian tensions in the wake of talk of an Israeli strike, and the fact that the Syrian regime does not rush to use its missiles and rockets against Israel despite the temptation to do so.

For the time being, we are not facing a substantive existential threat. Our deterrence is not the only reason for it, yet it is an important factor. Moreover, Israel’s abilities and readiness to cope with military threats have improved and continue to improve. These capabilities are already high at this time, especially on the offensive front, where Israel can surprise both its nearby and remote foes.

Israeli deterrence intact (Photo: EPA)

On the defensive front, Israel’s capabilities are still at an initial juncture – the multilayered anti-rocket system is still in early phases and the armored corps only possesses a few anti-rocket systems. However, the bottom line is that should Israel invest the required resources, it has a good chance to successfully cope with the threats against it within a few years and boost its deterrent power.

The Iran threat

And what about the Iranian bomb? Here too we can see some positive developments. Despise scientific progress, Iranhas not yet decided to produce nuclear weapons. The main reasons for this are the concerns about political survival in the face of paralyzing sanctions and the fear of a military strike. Hence, the West still has a year to a year-and-a-half to adopt harsh means, including a strike. The next decision point will likely come about in March of 2012.

In this context, experts and intelligence officials note that the sanctions already imposed on Iran affect the regime and force it to adopt austerity measures. Hence, in the next year or two it would be deterred from taking drastic steps and especially the decision to produce a bomb.

Iran fears strike (Photo: Reuters)

In addition, the shocks in the Arab world produced several other phenomena that have a positive potential for Israel. The civil war is weakening the Syrian army and should the regime fall, Hezbollah would lose a military ally and its logistic home front. In other words, Hezbollahwill become easier prey not only for Israel but also a weaker foe for other ethnicities in Lebanon. For that reason, Nasrallah is very careful not to take adventurous initiatives at this time.

Meanwhile, Hamas‘ government in Gaza is concerned that upheaval in the Arab world would also reach the Strip and undermine the group’s rule. Hamas also faces economic distress as result of Iranian cutbacks. Hence, the group seeks reconciliation with the Palestinian Authority as well as calm with Israel, in order to secure global legitimacy and money. This creates an opportunity for indirect dialogue – no peace will come out of it, but a long period of quiet is a realistic possibility.

Elsewhere, Egypt’s Supreme Military Council is showing a clear intention to continue serving as the leading and dominant political element. Indeed, it has a significant interest in maintaining the close and rewarding ties with the US. Hence, should the Council manage to enforce its will on other political elements, including the Muslim Brotherhood, there is a good chance that the peace treaty with Israel will survive

Meanwhile, there are two initiatives that our government can take and may change Israel’s security-strategic situation for the better in an immediate, dramatic fashion. The first move is an initiative that would prompt the renewal of direct negotiations with the Palestinians. The second move is a decision to strike in Iran (on condition that there is a high likelihood that such strike would secure its objectives.)

The two affairs are linked: The renewal of the diplomatic process, despite Mahmoud Abbas’ evasive maneuvers, may help Israel extract itself from international isolation and cope with the global response to an Iran strike. Hence, it would be worthy for an initiative on the Palestinian front to promote an initiative to strike. Netanyahu and Barak, as well as other top ministers, know this well. The question is whether they will have the personal courage and political ability to operate on both tracks, as required by Israel’s strategic interests.

Red Sea ‘electronic fence’ to foil Sinai terro… JPost – Defense.

(My Red Sea and my old unit in the Navy. – JW)

    A virtual electronic fence in the Red Sea as well as new fortified military positions and a significant increase in the number of IDF units along the border with Egypt are some of the changes that have taken place in recent months amid concern over the growing terrorist presence in Sinai.

On Thursday, The Jerusalem Post toured the border with officers from the IDF’s 80th Division and received an insider’s look at how the military plans to thwart terrorist attacks. In August, eight Israelis were killed in a coordinated terrorist assault along the border.

Since then, the navy has boosted the number of electronic sensors along the coast. It can now detect and track targets the size of soda cans floating in the sea, said Lt.-Cmdr. Ronen, commander of the patrol ships in the Red Sea.

“The border between Israel and Sinai continues into the sea, and when one part is closed there might be someone on the other side who thinks that they can try to come into Israel a different way, maybe via the sea,” he told the Post. “We understand that our operations have significant and strategic consequences.”
One of the noticeable changes on land is the rapid pace of construction along the 240-kilometer border, 100 kilometers of which are now closed by a newly built barrier.

In August, for example, there was barely any barbed wire along the section of the border used by the terrorists to cross into Israel.

Last week, the Defense Ministry completed the construction of a 6-meter-high fence wrapped with barbed wire along the entire section.

In addition, the IDF plans to erect new fortified positions along the border to protect key strategic locations, such as the Netafim crossing, 12 km. north of Eilat. It is also investing large resources in intelligence gathering, to create a clearer understanding of terrorist groups that operate in Sinai.

Road 12, where the attack took place last summer and which runs just meters away from Egypt, remains closed due to the threat, although the IDF is confident that it will be able to open to the public soon.

“There are a number of challenges within this area, proven by the terror attack in August,” Lt.-Col. Tal Carmel, the 80th Division’s chief operations officer, told the Post during a tour on Thursday of the scene of the attack. “We are working to secure the border and are doing everything possible to protect Israel and Israelis.”

Another change along the border is the placement of small concrete blocks every few kilometers on Road 12.

The idea, Carmel explained, is that if cars came under fire from within Egypt, they would be able to find cover behind them.

The IDF has also established a new brigade along the border, currently under the command of OC Nahal Brigade Col. Amir Abulafia. The new unit will receive its own brigade commander when it receives all of the necessary manpower and units, something expected to happen in 2012. The army has also established a new Combat Collection Unit, which is responsible for operating the electronic sensors – cameras and radars – along the border.

At sea, the situation is not that much different and the IDF is working hard to improve its defenses. After the tour of the border, the Post joined the navy on a patrol mission in the Red Sea, off the coast of Eilat, Aqaba and Taba.

The sea was calm but the sailors aboard the Dvora-class fast patrol boat were on high alert, a direct result of the attack in August and the development of the new terrorist threat in the Sinai Peninsula.

The threats on the Navy’s mind include a potential terrorist infiltration by sea into Eilat, an attempt to detonate an explosives-laden boat next to an Israel Navy vessel and an attack against a vessel by an anti-ship missile.

“Before the revolution in Egypt, the threats that we prepared for were for the most part theoretical,” explained Ronen. “Now, we know that they are real, and that is why even if we lack intelligence about a specific attack we prepare ourselves according to the capabilities we know are on the other side.”

DEBKA.

Tehran used its 10-day Velayati 90 naval exercise ending Monday, Jan. 2, as the impetus for blocking the Persian Gulf against US warships with a flood of menacing rhetoric and new rules for navigating the strategic water.
The belligerence radiating from Tehran caused the United States and Gulf Cooperation Council members to double-check their military capabilities for withstanding Iran. They asked themselves whether the GCC defense pact was up to operations against Iranian targets, and whether the alliance could manage without the aid of an American air and naval shield.
The answer to both questions was affirmative, DEBKA-Net-Weekly’s military and intelligence sources report; the GCC commands enough air and sea strength for the job, provided its rulers have the will to use it. Until now, they have shown little taste for direct military action, with the sole exception of the Saudi-led expeditionary force mounted last year to rescue the Bahraini throne from an Iranian-backed Shiite revolt.
American and GCC response plans for meeting an adversarial Iran are not the same although there is some overlap.
Washington and Riyadh, along with most of the oil emirs, agree that a limited Iranian operation partially and temporarily closing the Strait of Hormuz would warrant an equally limited response on their part.
An Iranian attack as an opening for recovering three lost islands
From that point on, they differ: GCC rulers would confine their military response to Iranian seaborne targets in the Persian Gulf (which they refer to as “the Arabian Gulf”), whereas Washington maintains that if American targets were attacked, an aggressive Iran must be made to pay a much heavier price, such as strikes on military and strategic shore installations related to its marine presence in the Persian Gulf, the Straits of Oman and Aden and, in extreme circumstances, targets on its Arabian Sea coast.
The seaborne targets in GCC sights would include the three small disputed Persian Gulf islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs seized by Iran from the United Arab Emirates forty years ago. The emirates are confident of commanding the military resources for a surprise attack for their recovery.
In 1992, Iran assumed full control of islands of and strung out a network of military bases there. They include a submarine base and Revolutionary Guard marine and air force facilities for assault helicopters, armed with anti-ship and anti-tank rockets. Built there too were logistical depots to house supplies for reinforcements brought in from the mainland on their way to attack GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia.
The three islands also boast missile batteries for defense against attacks by air or sea.
This military system may sound formidable, but in recent years Tehran has let the facilities fall into disrepair and neglected to replenish weaponry with more up-to-date hardware – probably because of budget shortfalls.
Neglected defenses, valuable strike forces
Strategic infrastructure on the Iranian mainland and defenses for nuclear facilities rated higher priority for top-of-the line weaponry. Even so, key Iranian nuclear sites, such as the UF6 gas production plant in Isfahan and the heavy water plant under construction at Arak, are still not equipped with effective defense systems against missile and air attacks.
So it is no wonder that that the defenses of Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs were allowed to rust, so providing the GCC with a chance for getting them back.
But Iran will not let them go without a fight because, as DEBKA-Net-Weekly’s military sources report, lodged there are some pretty effective strike forces.
They include about a quarter of Iran’s speedboat fleet of bomb vessels and Revolutionary Guards torpedo boats, and models of the record-breaking British Bradstone Challenger speedboat, the prototype of which Tehran purchased in April 2010. These high-performance 51-foot crafts are scattered in hidden harbors of the three islands.
When the Challenger was acquired, it was suspected in the West and the Gulf that Iran would arm the craft with high-speed Russian torpedoes and use it for sinking a US aircraft carrier and conducting hit-and-run raids.
Also ensconced on the islands are elements of two crack marine brigades, trained like the US Navy SEALs in all types of guerilla warfare, beach landings and operations behind enemy lines.
US intelligence and the GCC spy agencies reckon that these units will carry out the dual tasks of helping to block the Strait of Hormuz and going into action against Persian Gulf oil installations at the start of a US or Israel attack on Iran.
The islands are key to controlling Hormuz
US and GCC military planners agree that the islands can be liberated without a large army. Their strategic importance is substantial. A glance at the map attached to this article shows that a controlling presence on those islands also commands the movements of oil shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
In Washington, Riyadh, Kuwait and Dubai, strategists are trying to think ahead of potential Iranian action for preventing a US aircraft carrier transiting the Strait of Hormuz.
They ask: Would such Iranian action justify an operation to capture the three islands?
Another question: Will Gulf rulers, ever distrustful of President Barack Obama‘s Middle East objectives, do the operation alone, or opt for coordinating with the United States?
According to DEBKA-Net-Weekly’s intelligence sources, they are all fully conscious of the furious payback the Iranians will probably unleash for a US invasion of the three islands, with or without the Arab emirates’ cooperation: “Volunteer” forces from Iran and Iraq would be set loose in Bahrain to “liberate” the kingdom from “Saudi and GCC occupation.”
But no one in those capitals can decide if this is an empty threat or whether Iran will be driven into expanding hostilities from Hormuz out to more distant parts of the Persian Gulf region.

DEBKA.

DEBKA-Net-Weekly #523 January 5, 2012

President Barack Obama is juggling three hot, anti-Iran warfronts in the air.
On the economic front, he is wielding international isolation and sanctions on Iran as his main weapons.
This front will peak twice in the course of 2012: At the end of January, European Union members are committed to approving an embargo on the purchase of Iranian oil. Then, in six months, if Tehran still refuses to relent and halt its nuclear program, US sanctions against the Iranian national bank, CBI, go into force and affect 60-80 percent of Iran’s entire income.
This timeline was enough to sink Iran’s currency, the rial. It was saved from collapse when the central bank intervened after a 30 percent nosedive against the US dollar.
Even so, Tehran refuses to budge one inch on its nuclear weapon program.
The covert operations front has a very broad spectrum – from cyber warfare to the pursuit and destruction of Iran-bound cargoes of nuclear materials and equipment shipments, targeted assassinations of key nuclear officials, and the sabotage of military facilities in Iran related to the production of nuclear weapons.
After many major US and Israeli achievements, the covert war was seriously set back on Dec, 4 by Iran’s downing of America’s top secret stealth RQ-170 Sentinel drone over its territory.
Iran kicks back hard from its home waters
The third war entails trimming the influence of Iran’s Middle East allies.
To this end, the US is quietly backing the movement to topple Syria’s President Bashar Assad. His removal would knock over the Islamic Republic’s strongest strategic pillar and sever Tehran’s access to the Mediterranean and direct link to its Lebanese proxy Hizballah, the only credible pro-Iranian military force in the Middle East.
To give his three-pronged anti-Iran offensive military muscle, President Obama detached just over 40,000 troops from the US army which exited Iraq last month and scattered them around US Middle East bases.
While Iran has benefited from the distancing of American troops from its western borders and, so long as Bashar Assad is in power, gained a straight through corridor to Syria, it has also landed itself with US military strength building up uncomfortably close by in Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman waters, the only outward shipping route for Iranian and Gulf Arab oil.
In that sense, Iran’s horizon for expansion has shrunk to its own front door. This accounts for the principal US-Iranian sparring arena shifting so dramatically in recent weeks to the Persian Gulf. Tehran was bound to kick back hard.
Monday, Jan. 2 Iran’s Armed Forces Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi said: “The transit of ships via the Persian Gulf is not illegal, but the presence of foreign warships in the Persian Gulf on the pretext of thwarting threats is unacceptable. Iranian navy warships are stationed in the Persian Gulf and they permit the transit of foreign ships after registering their name and other details.”
The transit of American, British, French and Russian vessels to the Persian Gulf for many years, said the Iranian general, is motivated by their greed for the region’s energy resources. Those foreign countries share out the cost of their presence in the region “for plundering its oil.”
Pentagon: US will continue its decades’ long deployment
The next day, Jan. 3, Lt. Gen. Ataollah Salehi, the Iranian Army commander, translated this theme into practical terms. He threatened action if a US aircraft carrier (the USS Stennis), which sailed out through the Strait of Hormuz in the course of Iran’s 10-day naval exercises, returned to the Gulf.
“Iran will not repeat its warning… the enemy’s carrier has been moved to the Sea of Oman because of our drill. I recommend and emphasize to the American carrier not to return to the Persian Gulf,” Salehi said. “I advise, recommend and warn them (the Americans) over the return of this carrier to the Persian Gulf because we are not in the habit of warning more than once.”
Washington tried brushing off Iranian threats as proof that “sanctions are working.” The Pentagon stressed that the deployment of US military assets in the Persian Gulf will continue as it has for decades.
But so long as the Stennis or any other US carrier tries does not cross through the Strait of Hormuz to reenter the Persian Gulf, Tehran’s threats and its assumption of the right to make the rules for these waters remain unchallenged.
So the sand in the hourglass for a US-Iranian clash of arms over Persian Gulf waters began running out on the third day of 2012 with the gauntlet thrown down by Gen. Salehi.
Time for President Obama in an election year is also at a premium.
Not only has he entered the presidential election year, but he faces strong heat for a counter-move from the Arab oil producers led by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, lest Iran be allowed to get away with dictating the rules of navigation in the Persian Gulf. And no one doubts that if Obama neglects to order a US warship to enter those waters fairly quickly, Tehran will not let the grass grow under its feet before pressing its advantage.
Is Iran looking for a chance to attack a US military asset?
And indeed, Wednesday, Jan. 4, Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi said on Iranian state television:
“Iran will do anything to preserve the security of the Strait of Hormuz at the entrance to the Gulf… We have said the presence of forces from beyond the region in the Persian Gulf is not needed and is harmful,” The comments echoed a warning issued Tuesday by Iran’s military that it would unleash its “full force” if a US aircraft carrier is redeployed to the Gulf.
Most Western pundits argue that Iran would not dare strike an American aircraft carrier for fear of a forceful US response developing into an operation to cripple Iran’s nuclear facilities and demolish Revolutionary Guards command centers.
DEBKA-Net-Weekly’s military and Iranian sources beg to differ.
The Iranians are on a roll, but they are crafty enough to try and not get caught. They may settle for an attack causing limited damage to a US warship in a way that makes its source hard to pin down, modeling it on their operation against the Japanese oil tanker Star M on July 28, 2010.
A mysterious explosion struck the Star M as it passed through the Strait of Hormuz near Oman injuring crew members. US and Gulf sources admitted reluctantly at the time that “it could have been an attack,” but then made every effort to obscure the fact that an international oil tanker had been attacked in the vital waterway. The same inclination for denial exists today.
US and Gulf forces on high war alert
After a cooling-off period, US Fifth Fleet munitions experts established that the Japanese tanker had been hit by a missile fired from an Iranian Revolutionary Guard speedboat. So Iran’s threat to international oil shipping in the Strait of Hormuz has been in force for 18 months, ignored by the Obama administration until this week.
Since then, Tehran has acquired a whole range of weaponry for menacing Gulf shipping – more sophisticated sea mines, midget submarines, mobile anti-ship cruise missiles and a fleet of small speedboats.
A highly proficient marine force has been trained in naval special operations and frogman tactics to make good on Defense Minister Vahidi’s threat “to do anything to preserve security of the Strait of Hormuz and entrance to the Gulf.”
To clothe Iran’s highhanded steps with a semblance of legality, Iran’s parliament (Majlis) announced Wednesday the drafting of a bill prohibiting foreign warships from entering the Persian Gulf without Tehran’s permission
Well aware of how close the US-Iranian standoff is to exploding, DEBKA-Net-Weekly’s military sources report that since early this week all American forces in the Persian Gulf and the armies of the Gulf States-GCC went on a high state of preparedness.