Archive for June 27, 2011

Iron Dome heads north

June 27, 2011

Iron Dome heads north – Israel News, Ynetnews.

One anti-missile system battery deployed in Haifa as part of testing process. Batteries slated to be installed in various other locations including in Central Israel Hanan Greenberg

The Iron Dome anti-missile has reached the Haifa region as part of its operational testing process.Its deployment in Haifa is meant to test the battery’s various systems and the connection between the radar and interception devices.

 

Two Iron Dome batteries were deployed in various points in Israel’s south following mounting tensions on the Gaza border, including in Beersheba, Ashdod and Sderot.

 

Military elements said that the IDF continues to test various operational aspects on all sectors to achieve maximum readiness in states of emergency.

 

According to plans, Iron Dome batteries will be deployed in other locations including in Central Israel. The Air Force is due to receive a third battery in the coming months, and a fourth is expected within two years.

 

The system’s main advantage is its portability and can be moved from one sector to another within hours.

 

The IDF Spokesman’s Unit said: “The Iron Dome continues its introduction process. The battery’s location was decided by the relevant elements, according to a status evaluation and the changing security state.”

 

Iran official: Bushehr nuclear plant will be operational by end of August

June 27, 2011

Iran official: Bushehr nuclear plant will be operational by end of August – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

Foreign Minister Ali-Akbar Salehi says ‘all technical problems have been resolved’ at the plant; Bushehr will be ready for connection to electricity network by end of August.

By DPA

The nuclear power plant of Bushehr in southern Iran was expected to become operational by the end of August, Foreign Minister Ali-Akbar Salehi said Monday.

“All technical problems have been resolved and the plant would be secure for connection to the national electricity network after the fasting month of Ramadan, or the end of August,” Iran’s semi-official ISNA news agency quoted Salehi as saying.

The Russian-built 1,000-megawatt reactor was opened after more than three and a half decades last August and scheduled to go on line before the end of that year, but its launch has been delayed several times.

Due to technical problems, operators in February decided to swap out the facility’s entire fuel core, and finished restoring the fuel in May.

Bushehr - AP - Aug. 21, 2010 The reactor building of the Bushehr nuclear power plant is seen, just outside the southern city of Bushehr, Iran.
Photo by: AP

The delays prompted speculation about the cause of the problems, ranging from the Stuxnet computer worm virus to alleged sabotage by Russia.

Critics in Iran said it would have taken less time to build a new nuclear plant than waiting for the Russians to complete the Bushehr facility.

Deterrent and defense against a nuclear Iran

June 27, 2011

Deterrent and defense against a nuclear Iran – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

If Iran has nuclear weapons a year from now, Israel still has options for deterrence and defence.

By Louis Rene Beres, John T. Chain

Iran is now probably within a year of becoming a nuclear weapons state. When that happens, Israel’s preemption option will be gone. Ideally, however, the Jewish State’s remaining strategic choices will then still include optimal and interrelated forms of nuclear deterrence and active defense.

The core of Israel’s active defense plan for Iran remains the phased Arrow anti-ballistic missile program. Iron Dome is intended primarily for intercepting shorter-range rockets.

Looked at exclusively from Israel’s technical side, everything looks very good. In principle, the implications of Israel’s nearly-lost preemption option may remain tolerable.

But there is still a problem with premature optimism. It lies in untenable assumptions about any system of active defense. No system of ballistic missile defense can ever be altogether reliable.

Intercept system reliability is a “soft” concept: Any missile defense system will have “leakage.”

A small number of Iranian missiles penetrating Arrow defenses might be “acceptable” if their warheads contained “only” conventional or chemical payloads. But if the incoming warheads were in any measure nuclear and/or biological, even an extremely low rate of leakage would be unacceptable.

Now, Israel must move, recognizably, to strengthen its still-ambiguous nuclear deterrence posture. To be dissuaded from launching an attack, a rational adversary would always need to calculate that Israel’s second-strike forces could outlast any contemplated first-strike aggressions.

Facing the Arrow, this adversary could require steadily increasing numbers of missiles in order to achieve an assuredly destructive first-strike against Israel. But once Iran were able to assemble a certain determinably larger number of deliverable nuclear warheads, Arrow could cease to serve its deterrent function.

What if the Iranian leadership does not act according to rational behavior? What if Tehran does not value Iran’s national survival as a state above all else?

Such circumstances, improbable, but still possible, could render it impossible to deter an Iranian nuclear adversary with any threats of “massive retaliation” and/or “flexible response.”

Nonetheless, Israel must continue to develop, test and implement an Arrow-based interception capability to match the cumulative enemy threat. It must also take corollary steps to enhance the credibility of its opaque nuclear deterrent.

More precisely, Israel must prepare to take its bomb out of the basement on short notice, and to make operational a recognizable second-strike nuclear force. This force, hardened and dispersed, must be ready to inflict an unacceptable retaliatory salvo against identifiable enemy cities.

Israel must also clarify that Arrow defenses would always operate simultaneously, or in tandem, with Israeli nuclear retaliations. Iran must, therefore, be made to understand that Israel’s Arrow deployment will never preclude, or even render less probable, an Israeli nuclear reprisal.

In the very best circumstances, Iran would never have been allowed to develop a nuclear program with impunity. Now, however, Israel will have to deal with a persistently recalcitrant enemy regime by implementing steady enhancements of both its nuclear deterrence and active defense capabilities.

Although regime-change in Tehran might first appear as an attractive alternative option, Israel should understand that any such transformation could, at best, offer only temporary national security benefits.

Soon, Iranian nuclear peril could be directed toward Israel not only via direct missile strike, but also by way of terrorist-proxy delivery systems, including cars, trucks and boats. Should a newly-nuclear Iran ever decide to share its weapons-usable materials and scientific personnel with Hezbollah in Lebanon, Israel might then have to face a heightened prospect of nuclear terrorism.

For Israel, even comprehensive efforts at upgrading nuclear deterrence postures and long-range active defenses could be insufficient. To deal satisfactorily with the less visible but still-urgent derivative component of an Iranian nuclear program, a deliberate strategy for inflicting nuclear terror, Israel will have to accelerate its layered integration of Iron Dome with Arrow.

In the absence of viable preemption options, such acceleration may also prove indispensable to secure protection from expressions of enemy irrationality in Tehran.

 

Louis Rene Beres is professor of political science and international law at Purdue. The author of many major books in the field, he was chairman of Project Daniel (Israel ).

U.S. Air Force Gen. John T. Chain (Ret. ) was commander-in-chief of the U.S. Strategic Air Command and director of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. He has also served as chief of staff of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and director of the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Politico Military Affairs.

The benefits of the ‘Arab Spring’

June 27, 2011

The benefits of the ‘Arab Spring’ – JPost – Opinion – Columnists.

Arab Spring.

  There are two types of strategic perspectives in Israel today. They aren’t contradictory, but they have different priorities. These can be called the “northern” and the “southern” views.

The “northern” approach is the more traditional one, focusing on the situation in that direction. The key longer-term concern is over Iran and its drive for nuclear weapons. More closely, there are both concerns and hopes regarding Lebanon and Syria.

Regarding Iran, the new feature is the assumption that Israel will not attack Iran to prevent it from getting nuclear weapons. This means Israel will be constructing a multi-level defensive system that includes long-range attack planes, the ability to subvert Iran’s nuclear force through covert operations, possibly submarine platforms, and several types of anti-missile missiles and defenses.

The goal here is fourfold:
• To delay as long as possible Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and to minimize the size and effectiveness of its arsenal through sanctions, international pressure, sabotage and other means.

• To have the maximum ability to deter Iran from launching a nuclear attack and demonstrating the ability to stop its missiles. The aim is to discourage Iran from launching such an attack, given a nearcertainty that it can be stopped and, as a result, it would suffer very heavy damage.

• Of course, ordinary deterrence is not a sufficient safeguard against Iran, given the Islamic regime’s ideological extremism and passionate hatred of Israel, the recklessness of some key elements there, and the rulers’ shortcomings in assessing reality.

Consequently Israel must put a high priority on stopping any Iranian attack from happening or succeeding.

• To be able, if Israel determines there is a real danger of an Iranian attack, to launch a first strike to inflict maximum damage on Iran’s nuclear strike force. In other words, an Israeli attack would be premised not on Iran getting nuclear weapons, but on Iran being likely to use them.

US deterrence, early-warning, and anti-missile efforts would supplement this system, but this strategy is not premised on any dependence on the US government.

BUT ISRAEL also knows that an equal or even greater danger is the spread of Iranian influence, taking over Arab countries or turning them into proxies. Here, the northern focus is on Syria and Lebanon.

On the surface, the news from these two countries is potentially bad. Lebanon is now controlled by Hezbollah and other Syrian or Syrian-Iranian clients. Hezbollah can thus use Lebanon as a virtual fiefdom for building its military power and attacking Israel. This is much worse than the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel war, when Lebanon as a government and army had a separate identity.

Syria itself is faced with a serious internal upheaval that seems likely to bring down President Bashar Assad. Here the “glass halfempty” analysis is that Assad might be replaced by a regime even more hostile to Israel.

There is also a “glass half-full” analysis. As long as Syria is in such turmoil, it cannot so effectively threaten Israel. And if Assad is overthrown, a government that is more preoccupied by internal affairs, and less eager to start a conflict, might take power.

Iraq offers a good model here.

Between the interests of the Kurds, the internal conflict, a greater focus on domestic development and other factors, Iraq has dropped out of the conflict with Israel.

Hezbollah also suffers from this turmoil. Since it has sided with the Assad regime, it has gone from being wildly popular to widely hated by the Syrian people. Hamas, which has sided against the Syrian regime and in favor of its Muslim Brotherhood comrades, has thus lost Syrian patronage. Finally, Syria’s aggressive behavior has opened a rift between that country and Turkey’s government, which has been increasingly acting like an ally of the Iranian and Syrian regimes.

CONSEQUENTLY, WHILE this is no ideal situation, Israel can be considered to have benefitted from this aspect of the “Arab spring.” From Israel’s standpoint, the relative stability in Jordan and Saudi Arabia is a plus, since these countries are unlikely to be transformed into radical Islamist states under a government linked to al-Qaida, Iran or the Muslim Brotherhood. The turmoil in Bahrain, Yemen and Tunisia is of relatively little strategic significance to Israel.

Generally there can be a hope that democracy and domestic development will become a higher priority than fighting Israel, thus easing the pressure on Israel, or at least preoccupying Arabs and Muslims for a while. Clearly, merely calling dissidents Zionist agents and hoping to unite the people around an anti-Israel platform no longer works for incumbent governments.

In time, this strategy might work for replacing Islamist governments, but that hasn’t happened yet.

Moreover, American weakness and the Obama administration’s cooler view toward Israel is worrisome. So is the possibility that things might be moving in a way to strengthen Iran.

IF ONE looks at the southern front, though, it is harder to find a silver lining. Egypt is likely to elect a radical government more hostile than anything Israel has faced there since about 1974. The future of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty is gloomy.

Peace between Israel and the Arab world’s most populous country cannot be taken for granted.

There is also the problem of the Egypt-Hamas relationship. Egypt is likely to see itself as Hamas’s ally and patron. In a future Hamas-led conflict with Israel, Egypt could take the side of the Palestinian Islamists, and will certainly help them. The long-quiet southern front now has to be treated as a very possible war zone.

This is the basic way things look for Israeli strategists.

One can stress better- or worse-case scenarios and different parts of the challenge, but there is a general consensus on the fundamental challenges – and on whether they will be met successfully.

The writer is director of the Global Research in International Affairs Center (www.gloriacenter.org) at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya and editor of Middle East Review of International Affairs. He blogs at http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin

Iran to launch military exercise, test long-range missiles

June 27, 2011

Iran to launch military exercise… JPost – Iranian Threat – News.

Iranian ballisitic missile launched at war game.

  Iran’s Revolutionary Guard was scheduled to launch a large-scale military exercise entitled the “Great Prophet Mohammad War Games 6” on Monday, Iranian news agency IRNA reported.

Revolutionary Guard Brig-Gen Amir Ali Hajizadeh said that the purpose of the drill was to test the IRGC forces defensive preparedness as well as to practice the use of advanced equipment.

Hajizadeh added that Iran’s arsenal of missiles, including the country’s long range missiles, would be tested during the exercise. Among Iran’s arsenal of missiles is the Sajjil, with a range of nearly 2,000 km, which would allow it to strike targets as far away as Israel or southeast Europe.

The Iranian military official emphasized that the purpose of the maneuver was not to threaten Iran’s neighbors, but rather to ensure the Islamic Republic’s defensive capabilities.

Earlier this month, the United States slapped sanctions on the Revolutionary Guard for its part in human rights abuses within Iran.

“The United States stands with all Iranians who wish for a government that respects their human rights, their dignity and their freedom, and we call on the Iranian government to end its systematic human rights abuses and political hypocrisy,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in announcing the sanctions.

Last week, the European Union sanctioned three commanders of the Revolutionary Guard accused of supporting Syrian President Bashar Assad’s suppression of dissent.

The Iranians were Major-General Qasem Soleimani and Brigadier Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari of the Revolutionary Gaurd, and the Guard’s deputy commander for intelligence, Hossein Taeb.

Iran is at loggerheads with major powers over its nuclear work, which it says is peaceful and intended solely for generating electricity but which Washington and its allies fear is aimed at making nuclear bombs.

Israel sees the potential of a nuclear armed Iran — which refuses to recognize the Jewish state and supports Hamas and Hezbollah — as a major threat and both it and its ally Washington do not rule out military action to prevent such a scenario.

Iran has said it would respond to any attack by targeting US interests and Israel.

Hilary Leila Krieger and Reuters contributed to this report