WarSclerotic

DEBKA.

The exclusive DEBKA-Net-Weekly map attached to this article is the first publication of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff’s targeting plan for striking the military infrastructure guarding Iran’s first nuclear reactor at Bushehr and its oil region.
On August 1, Adm. Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said the United States had a military plan for attacking Iran. He told several interviewers, “I think the military options have been on the table and remain on the table. It’s one of the options that the president has. Again, I hope we don’t get to that, but it’s an important option and it’s one that’s well understood.”
A Revolutionary Guards spokesman responded Thursday, Aug. 19, with a threat of their own: If American attacks Iran, he said, we will strike the enemy anywhere in the world.
The map presented here indicates the targets selected by the US military around the city of Ahwaz, capital of the largely Arab-speaking, restive Khuzestan province in southwest Iran, where most of the country’s oilfields are concentrated and the Bushehr nuclear plant located.
Our mapmakers have marked as US targets many of the military facilities and logistics centers assigned to the Iranian forces defending the reactor from air and missile attack, marine raiders coming in from the Persian Gulf, or special forces infiltrating the sensitive region from the Gulf or by helicopter.
Any such US attack would set back Iran’s nuclear program and take down the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) defenses for its oilfields.
The key to the map is provided here by number:

1. The Ahwaz steel plant in the suburbs turns out metals for the centrifuges operating in Iran’s uranium enrichment plants. Experiments are underway for improving the metals’ quality for increasing spin velocity at higher temperatures.

2. IRGC Ahwaz Headquarters, which is responsible for Khuzestan regional security, including Bushehr.

3. IRGC Ahwaz Armored Forces HQ – until 2000, the Guards General Staff Headquarters in the province.

4. The Somiyah military base for the IRGC Brigade responsible for tribal areas in the remote province of Boyir Ahmadi and Kohkiluye. These fairly isolated tribes are monarchist, remaining loyal to the shah and adamantly opposed to the revolutionary regime in Tehran. Western and Persian Gulf intelligence agencies find willing collaborators in this region.

5. A secret IRGC facility, marked only by a code, is the address of frequent comings and goings by military personnel. Its purpose remains a mystery although there is speculation that its location at the foot of a mountain points to its use as a storage site for radioactive materials.

6. The 92nd Armored Corps of Ahwaz’s ammunition depots.

7. The Emam Reza Military Hospital which belongs to the IRGC medical branch. It is a modern and well-equipped hospital built with thick, bomb-proof concrete walls. This facility has several field hospital units which can be rapidly deployed.

8. The Command HQ of the 92^nd Armored Division and its 1^st Brigade.

9. The Habib-Allahi military base (named for a martyr) for combat training.

10. IRGC training school for foreign volunteers, used for recruits to Iraqi Shiite terror organizations, such as Jeish A-Shaabi, Lebanese Hizballah fighters and Palestinian terrorists. Its name is unknown.

11. Ahwaz 92^nd Division commando companies, which operate independently under their own command and are better known as “independent companies.” This site is also used by elements of the division’s 2^nd Armored Brigade.

12. IRGC 92^nd Armored Division’s 3^rd Armored Brigade.

13. The IRGC’s Isfahan Artillery Brigade.

14. Fuel depots which serve IRGC and Iranian security forces in and around Ahwaz City. They are located midway between Ahwaz and Andimeshk.

15. The Zargan power station for the military camps in the region which runs on gas.

16. The Ramin power station in the Sheyban-Molla Thani region near the Ahwaz-Masjed Soleyman highway.

17. The old Ahwaz industrial zone, home to several important steel and aluminum plants supplying Iran’s military industry and an oxygen plant for smelting and other smaller factories.

18. A yacht and speedboat marina, recently renovated, for the private use of Revolutionary Guards commanders based in the region.

19. Ahwaz airport for mostly local traffic.

20. A light aircraft airport for ferrying farm produce..

21. A 500-meter-wide canal, which links the Karun River to the Majnoun islands in Iraq. Huge barges stand by there in case of an emergency calling for troops to be moved quickly inside the Khuzestan province.

22. A missile-anti-aircraft gun cluster for defending Ahwaz and its environs.

DEBKA.

Lieutnant-General Alexander Zelin

Moscow has made two seemingly unconnected moves on the Iranian chess board in ten days. On August 11, it announced the deployment of the powerful S-300 interceptor missiles in Abkhazia on the Black Sea and, the next day, set Aug. 21 as the date for loading the first delivery of Russian fuel in the Iranian nuclear reactor in Bushehr marking the onset of its physical launch.
Unclear about possible reactions, anonymous Russian sources tried backpedalling on the latter by putting out word that the announcement was premature and Iran’s first nuclear reactor would not be activated before Sept. 26.
In the event, administration circles in Washington shrugged it off with the remark that Russia has set datelines in the past and nothing came of them. In the parlance of the region, Moscow is adept at selling the same carpet (activating Bushehr) over and over but the merchandise has never changed hands.
Moscow used the same tactics with regard to the S-300’s deployment in Abkazia – first publicizing it over Russian media, then having “spokesman” backtracking by remarking the missile interceptors were put there two years ago. This flatly contradicted the Russian Air Force commander Gen. Alexander Zelin, who said the missiles had been installed in the last few days. “We have deployed the S-300 system on Abkhaz territory which, alongside other aircraft defense systems of the ground forces, will solve the problems of air defense of the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,” he said.
But Russia’s exercise in obfuscation did not stop there.
So what’s the fuss about?
DEBKA-Net-Weekly‘s Moscow sources report that Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin‘s office recruited Abkhaz foreign minister, Maxim Gvinjia, to tell the BBC that Gen. Zelin’s remark about the S-300s had been misinterpreted.
Adding to the confusion, Sergey Shamba, the breakaway region’s prime minister, claimed the missiles were in Abkhazia – and had been there for about a year. US State Department spokesman P. J. Crowley also bolstered the Russian line by saying Washington had been informed of the missiles’ deployment two years ago. “It is our understanding,” he said, “that Russia has had S-300 missiles in Abkhazia for the last two years. We can’t confirm whether they have added to them or not.”
According to our sources, both the Russian and American statements on the S-300 interceptors are misleading and wide of the facts. Moscow never notified Washington it was going to install a new advanced system of S-300 missiles at the Gudauta base in Abkhazia on the Black Sea coast, surrounding it with other anti-aircraft batteries, some of which were also deployed in South Ossetia.
Nor did Moscow ever let Washington know that the new missiles were in service and fully integrated in the networks of Russia’s Crimean Peninsula naval and air bases and the Russian Black Sea war fleet.
US commanders know better
The common assumption of US military commanders in the Black Sea and Mediterranean regions, according to DEBKA-Net-Weekly‘s military sources, is that the Russians emplaced their most sophisticated anti-air anti-missile weapon on Abkhazia’s Black Sea coast to counteract US Sixth Fleet warships in the two seas and the two big American air bases near the Black Sea in Romania and Bulgaria – Mikhail Kogalniceanu Air Base near the city of Constanta, and Bezmer Bulgarian Air Base just 50 kilometers from the coast.
Strategic planners of US and Israeli Air Forces, whose air crews are training at these bases, have no doubt that Russia moved the S-300 into Abkhazia in order to seal a potential Israeli air corridor to Iran’s northern nuclear installations over the Caucasus and Caspian Sea.
Earlier this month, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did in fact call the White House and asked for clarifications on the intelligence he had received that Moscow had finally determined to get the Bushehr plant finished after endless delays. He was told that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin had assured Washington they would keep their promises to President Barak Obama not to activate the Bushehr reactor this year.
Those promises went by the board ten days later with Moscow’s public announcement of the August 21 date for its activation.
By then, Israel’s leaders – though not its intelligence chiefs – appeared to be too deeply mired in the scandals surrounding the IDF generals’ battle for the post of next chief of staff to take much notice of the Russian moves. (See a separate item in this issue on the imploding Netanyahu government.)
Moscow goes back to justifying Tehran’s nuclear ambitions
Seeing neither Washington nor Jerusalem connecting the dots or reacting to Moscow’s two interconnected steps – even Medvedev’s Abkhazia visit for a last check on the military set-up there ahead of the Bushehr inauguration went unnoticed – Putin gave the go-ahead for shipping the fuel to be loaded at the Bushehr reactor this coming Saturday.
Monday, Aug. 16, Moscow announced that Sergei Kirienko, a former Russian prime minister and current head of Rostom, the Russian state nuclear corporation, would arrive at Bushehr with Russian energy minister Sergei Shmatko on Friday, August 20, in time for the transport of Russian fuel to the Bushehr reactor the next day. The event is to be marked by a press conference held jointly by the head of the Iranian Nuclear Energy Committee Ali-Akhbar Salehi and his Russian guests.
Moscow also stressed its undertaking to supply the reactor with fuel for the next ten years – a warning to any would-be attackers that the Iranian project was now under Russian protection.
Russian and Iranian officials jointly emphasize the peaceful nature of the Bushehr reactor and underline its lack of military applications.
By these statements, DEBKA-Net-Weekly‘s sources note, Moscow has reverted to its former position that the West had never proved Iran’s nuclear program was anything but peaceful and its military component was pure surmise.
Driving this point home, a Russian spokesman said: “A nuclear power plant just generates electricity. There are two dual-purpose elements – enrichment and spent fuel management. Both of these elements are taken out of Iran’s responsibility, because we are going to supply the Bushehr power plant with nuclear fuel.”
Tehran’s unique nuclear logic
On the same Monday, the Iranian nuclear expert Mehdi Mohammadi placed his government’s intentions, backed by Moscow, on the table when he said that, by enriching uranium at home, Iran would guarantee its access to fuel supplies from world markets.
“Experience has shown that if Iran fails to produce nuclear fuel inside its territory, international markets will not be open to it.”
Even Russia’s decision to ship fuel to Iran, he said, rests on its confidence that Iran is itself technically capable of producing fuel. He added, “We are confident that if enrichment in Iran comes to a standstill for whatever reason, the country’s access to international markets will face serious problems. The Russians, who claim they are committed to supply fuel to the Bushehr reactor, will in the future refuse to do so or set illogical conditions.”
Mohammadi brushed aside a diplomatic accommodation with the West when he maintained, “We realized that since we were incapable of enriching uranium to 20 percent level or did not want to do so at that time, the Western parties imagined that they could take advantage of the issue and make other requests such as the suspension of enrichment.”
(Last year the Six-Power negotiations with Iran broke down over Tehran’s refusal to send low-enriched uranium for reprocessing abroad.)
The Iranian expert concluded that the higher the enrichment level Iran is capable of attaining, the more nuclear cooperation it can expect from Russia and the other nuclear nations, like China and India.
Russia bids to supplant America in lead role on Iran
Putin’s green light Monday for the final steps for bringing the Bushehr reactor on stream drew congratulations from Tehran – although they were typically grudging.
In fact, Salehi’s remarked Tuesday, August 17, that while Iran is grateful to Russia for commissioning the Bushehr nuclear power plant, “the Russians, for their part, should thank us because the launching… provides them with a good opportunity to show the world their capabilities and even enhance them.”
Moscow took these half-hearted congratulations in good spirit because the Iranian nuclear chief had a point – or, as DEBKA-Net-Weekly‘s analysts find, five net gains from its “favors” to Tehran:
1. By concluding its outstanding Bushehr business with Tehran, Moscow aims to ride into position for supplanting the Obama administration in its lead role on the Iranian nuclear issue. In the next round of talks between the P5+1 forum (US, Russia, the UK, France, China and Germany), Moscow will not sit alongside the United States but move to the Iranian side of the table, so weakening the US-led forum.
(The talks were supposed to resume next month but Wednesday, Aug. 18, spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stipulated that America must first lift sanctions.)
2. Moscow is rounding off the circle President Medvedev started drawing on July 12, when he advised a group of Russian diplomats to eschew “simplistic approaches” on the Iranian nuclear problem because, he explained, possession of nuclear weapons does not violate any international charters including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to which Tehran is a signatory; it only prohibits their distribution to other countries or parties.
Moscow’s move was not challenged by Washington, which uttered no word of protest or applied any sort of pressure on the Kremlin to reconsider.
Russian S-300 interceptors defend Iran – from outside its borders
3. The Russian deployment of S-300 in Abkhazia told Washington that Moscow is keeping faith with the Medvedev-Putin commitment to Obama not to let Iran have this sophisticated anti-air missile. Instead, they are deployed in an outer protective ring around Iran against sites from which Moscow perceives US or Israel is preparing to strike the Islamic Republic.
Moscow suspected such preparations were afoot last month by Israel from US air bases in Romania and Bulgaria – hence the Abkhazia deployment.
DEBKA-Net-Weekly adds: This pattern was repeated in Azerbaijan, hitherto within the American and Israeli military and intelligence sphere of influence. In July, Rosobornexport, which handles Russian armament exports, quietly informed Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev that S-300 missiles would be made available to his country.
This transaction, valued at around $300 million, is the costliest one-time weapons purchase by a former Soviet Republic. Even if Moscow tries to deny the sale, ruling and military circles in Baku are treating it as a done deal.
4. By commissioning the Bushehr reactor, Moscow seeks to undermine faith in the Persian Gulf region, especially in Saudi Arabia, in the Obama administration’s promises not to let Iran acquire a nuclear bomb. Their trust that at the end of the day, Israel would take military action to abort a nuclear-armed Iran was also badly dented this week by Israel’s failure to utter a word against Russia’s launching of the plant.
5. The efforts Russia, along with China, India and Turkey, have invested in recent weeks to blunt the impact of US and European sanctions on Iran have made good headway.
Not only are the penalties failing to achieve the goal formulated by President Obama of halting the Iran’s military nuclear program, but that program is steadily gaining momentum.

Arabs terrorists preparing for war with Israel – Israel News, Ynetnews.

Hezbollah reportedly builds tunnel system ‘more impressive than Paris underground’ to counter IDF strikes; Yemenite Qaeda leader tells followers to prepare for Israel-Iran war, urges pilots to replicate 9/11 attacks in Israel

Roee Nahmias and Ynet

51% Say U.S. Should Help Israel If It Attacks Iran – Rasmussen Reports™.

Iran’s first nuclear plant is expected to go online within the next few days, and some speculate that Israel will take military action to prevent it. Fifty-one percent (51%) of U.S. voters believe the United States should help Israel if it attacks Iran.

A new Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey finds that 35% say the United States should do nothing in the event of an Israeli attack on Iran, and two percent (2%) think America should help the Iranians.

Support for helping Israel is up nine points from two years ago when just 42% believed the United States should help the Jewish state if it launched an attack on Iran.

Despite Iran’s claims that the nuclear facility is intended for energy production, 66% of voters in this country think the purpose of Iran’s nuclear program is to develop weapons. Just seven percent (7%) say its purpose is the development of energy. But a sizable number (27%) are not sure.

Eighty percent (80%) say it is at least somewhat likely that Iran will develop nuclear weapons soon, with 53% who believe it is Very Likely. Only 10% say Iran is not very or not at likely to develop such weapons in the near future.

Americans have expressed a similarly high level of concern about Iran’s nuclear weapons development for several years.

Middle East Views | Bolton’s disappointment and the Iranian “deterrence”.

It has become known that Iran is taking pleasure in what it describes as being “psychological deterrence” through the containment of the Israeli threats to strike its nuclear facilities with counter threats that are made on a quasi daily basis. Moreover, it is certain that the Iranians will be pleased about the disappointment of Former American Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton, toward Israel’s wasting of an “opportunity” to bomb the Iranian nuclear Bushehr reactor which will be inaugurated the day after tomorrow.

As for the traditional question regarding whether or not there will be war, it will probably not find a comprehensive answer in the mutual American-Israeli instigation, which is particularly revealing the wish of Barack Obama’s administration and Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to see the other side launching the first rocket on the Iranian facilities – regardless of the extent to which the combat will expand and even if the two sides were to fight as part of one front. In other words, regardless of whether or not the strike were to turn into a regional nuclear war.

A few days ago, and while talking about joint training with the Marines in Negev, it was among the rare times when the Israeli television recognized the “side by side against a common enemy” combat scenario, if the “changes within the Middle East” were to call for it. The Hebrew state is not showing any concern while it is getting ready for this possibility, as it is relying on the experience accumulated by the two armies in Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan, at a time when the Iranian “deterrence” is threatening to paralyze the American military bases in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In the game of exchanged prices, the Americans might argue that the Iranian threat in itself constitutes a public recognition of Tehran’s ability to recruit “agents,” allies or both, in order to bomb those bases, considering that the missile strikes alone will not be sufficient to neutralize the American military “reserves tank” in Iraq and Afghanistan. As for the renewed Iranian threat to paralyze the Hormuz Strait and international navigation through it, i.e. the international oil vein, it cannot be separated from calculations related to the ability of the Revolutionary Guard with its miniature submarines to face the NATO fleets. Nonetheless, this threat remains favored by this “Guard” to pressure the West and the Gulf States (to get them to continue opposing war). It is certain that the closing of the Hormuz Strait will be considered an act of war, and that it will topple the justifications validating the “neutrality” of many states toward the problem of the Iranian nuclear program.

The inauguration of Bushehr, a new step in the series of crises affecting this program, is once again raising questions regarding whether or not the American administration trusts the promises of Netanyahu’s government in regard to “self-restraint” and the “non-staging” of a military strike without Washington’s knowledge. While the paradox which emerged during the last few days revolves around the purpose of the exchanged instigation between the two sides in order not to show leniency with the Iranian “zero option” in its defiance of the sanctions, the Israeli military sources that were chosen to “leak” inclinations prevailing within the Hebrew state, do not conceal an optimism felt toward the “opportunity” of the American pullout from Iraq which they perceived as being a helping factor in getting Washington to focus its efforts on the “Iranian threat.”

However, will Iran not rush to fill the vacuum which will be caused by the pullout in Iraq through allies and agents? Moreover, can the command of the Israeli army and the Marines that are training in Negev ignore the rise of the Iranian cards in filling this vacuum and turning all the countries of the two rivers into a third line for the defense of the trade-off (between “nuclear power” and regional influence) following the Lebanon and Gaza lines?

For months now, the Israeli army’s command has been talking about the necessity not to waste time in confronting Tehran’s maneuvers… with media muscles. For that purpose, it has been flaunting the defense systems which will render the “Iron Dome,” the “David Sling” and the “Magic Wand” sufficient to face a space raining rockets from Hezbollah’s and Hamas’s bases and the remote platforms of the Iranian army. And since defense implicates an attack carried out by the other side – while in this case it will be a retaliation response – the chances of an Israeli surprise attack remain more likely.

Behind the commotion of the threats, the timing of a possible war is fading away, although some in the region still believe it unlikely even if the circumstances of the “major deal” become ripe. In the meantime, the American is wagering on its “magician’s wand,” i.e. the effects of the painful sanctions whose symptoms will not be seen before many months.

*Published in the London-based AL-HAYAT on Aug. 19, 2010.

Al Qaeda Plans for War With Israel – The Daily Beast.

Undated video still of Saeed al Shehri. (AP Photo)

The terror group’s arm in Yemen is ordering jihadists across the region to ready themselves for a war “by the Jews against Iran” that will spread across the globe, according to a new audio message. Bruce Riedel on the assassinations al Qaeda is plotting to exploit the conflict—and the new threats against America.

Al Qaeda is warning its supporters and sympathizers to prepare for a new war in the Middle East, which it says will pit Israel against Iran. Al Qaeda’s franchise in Yemen, the self-styled al Qaeda in the Arabian Pennisula (AQAP), issued an audio message this month with a lecture by its second-in-command Saeed al Shehri in which he tells jihadists in the Middle East that “what is expected is for the war to begin by the Jews against Iran.” Israel will stage air strikes on Iran’s nuclear installations to start. Shehri expects the Iranian Shia regime to try to take advantage of an Israeli attack on its nuclear facilities to seize the holy cities of Mecca and Medina by blaming Saudi Arabia for helping Israel attack. In turn, the Israelis will seize territory in the Levant to establish “the greater state of Israel.” The Sunni Arab population of the Middle East will be caught between the “Jews in the Middle East and Iran in the Peninsula.”

Iran will attack American installations in the Gulf, encourage its proxies in Iraq and Afghanistan to attack Americans, and engage in a global terror campaign.

Shehri was held in Guantanamo for six years after being caught in Pakistan in December 2001 before being sent back home to his native Saudi Arabia and then fleeing to Yemen to help set up AQAP. He has been a creative strategist for AQAP from its start and was behind the plot to assassinate Saudi Arabia’s deputy interior minister, Muhammad bin Nayef, a year ago that failed only by inches when the suicide bomber tripped at the last minute. In this message, Shehri tells the jihadist faithful that this climatic war will offer many opportunities for al Qaeda and that they should begin planning now how to exploit the conflict. Any sympathizer who has access to Arab leaders like the princes of the House of Saud, for example, should look for a chance to kill one in an act of terror reminiscent of the assassination of the “tyrant Anwar Sadat” in 1981. Any pilot in the Saudi air force or other Arab air forces who secretly supports the jihad should fly his plane into Israeli air space and try to blow up a target by smashing into it. Other practical ways to create terror and mayhem are laid out as well.

Al Qaeda has consistently said a struggle between Israel and Iran can only be good for the global Islamic jihad by blooding two of its enemies and forcing America to side with Israel. But this warning is the most vivid by far and comes with the most explicit instructions on how to exploit a new conflict.

Shehri tells his supporters that AQAP is ready for the next war. He says the “Shura Council of the Mujahedin in the Arabian Peninsula” has held a meeting to prepare for the coming apocalypse and is ready to act. AQAP has demonstrated in the last year that it can reach beyond Yemen to carry out its plans when it dispatched the suicide bomber who tried to blow up Northwest Flight 253 last Christmas. It has been active this summer in attacking intelligence officers of the Yemeni government and in publishing Inspire, the first al Qaeda journal in English on the Internet. General James Mattis, the new commander of Central Command, told the Senate this week that al Qaeda is putting significant pressure on the Yemeni government, already stretched by other internal problems and that there are “signs of decline in the capacity of Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Salih to control the situation.”

So why does al Qaeda want another war? Because it calculates an Israeli strike on Iran will prompt Iran to strike back against not only Israel but also the United States. Iran will attack American installations in the Gulf, encourage its proxies in Iraq and Afghanistan to attack Americans, and engage in a global terror campaign. In Lebanon, Hezbollah will start another war, raining missiles down on northern Israeli cities and towns and provoking Israeli airstrikes on Beirut and maybe even into Syria. Iran might even try to close the Strait of Hormuz and disrupt the global energy market. All this chaos and violence will make America even more unpopular in the Islamic world and open doors for al Qaeda to exploit. In this they are right, another war will be blamed on America rightly or wrongly. Shehri and his boss, Osama bin Laden, probably don’t really know if another war is in the making but they are almost certainly right that if it comes it will be good news for al Qaeda.

Commentary: Some important concerns about Russia-Iran nuclear power cooperation « sdjewishworld.

WASHINGTON, D.C. –It isn’t exactly Iran’s Bushehr reactor that is making people really nervous this week, and it isn’t exactly the Russians. It is the understanding that no matter what the United States and the West say about Iran with nuclear technology, Iran is moving toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons technology and capability – and moving on the path toward the creation of an actual nuclear weapon(s).

That is coupled with the possibility that Russia will next deliver the S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems to Iran, providing a serious new level of protection for the regime and its illegal uranium enrichment program.

The Russians, who took over construction of the reactor in 1995, twenty years after Germany started the project, delivered the fuel in 2007 and 2008, but held off installing it. They say they are now preparing to install the fuel rods and plan to have the reactor up and running within weeks, bringing it up to speed over the next six months. According to public reports, it will be tied to the Iranian electricity grid, monitored by the IAEA, and appears to have no link to Iran’s uranium enrichment program. In addition, the Russians claim to have struck a deal with Iran for the return of spent fuel to preclude production of weapons-grade plutonium.

On its face, the Russian position seems reasonable – since Iran repeatedly said it wouldn’t cooperate with the IAEA on enrichment activities because Tehran was being prevented from having even civilian energy reactors, the Russians took away that excuse. They also contrived to retain control of the spent fuel. The Russians appear smug about the arrangement and their role as Iran’s energy partner. And as long as the Russians have control, there appears to be no problem.

At least that’s what the State Department implied. Unwilling, perhaps, to “re-reset” relations, a State Department spokesman said the United States does not regard Bushehr as a proliferation risk. “Russia’s support for Bushehr underscores that Iran does not need an indigenous enrichment capability if its intentions are purely peaceful,” and the Russian fuel deal mirrors the failed Western offer for a broader fuel swap.

But what if its intentions are not “purely peaceful”? The United States had previously expressed three concerns about Bushehr:

Weapons grade plutonium could be processed from the reactor’s uranium allowing the Iranians to construct nuclear weapons.

The Russians and Iranians could use Bushehr as a cover for the transfer of sensitive technology.

The knowledge gained by Iranian scientists working at Bushehr could further Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

Even assuming the Russians have the first covered, what about the others?

As recently as May, two German men were arrested for trying to buy dual-use parts prohibited under EU sanctions for use at Bushehr. And Iranians working at Bushehr would certainly gain important understandings about nuclear technology that can be transferred to other parts of Iran’s program – secret parts. The State Department spokesman did note, “the world’s fundamental concerns with Iran’s overall nuclear intentions,” and the fact that “Iran remains in serious violation of its obligations to the IAEA, particularly as regards separate enrichment.”

The UK Daily Telegraph reports that Iran has announced plans for ten new enrichment plants “within protected mountain strongholds… The move is a response to sanctions imposed on Iran in an attempt to stop it from producing enriched uranium, which can be used as fuel for nuclear power plants but for weapons if produced in higher levels. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad also issued an edict ordering the government to offer only ‘minimum levels of co-operation’ with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN nuclear watchdog.”

It is that – “minimum levels of cooperation,” new enrichment facilities in “mountain strongholds” and the clear determination of Iran to move ahead on the nuclear front coupled with threats well understood by Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Israel – which makes us very nervous about the possibility that Russia will, in fact, load up Bushehr.

*
Bryen is senior director of security policy of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs.  Her column is sponsored by Waxie Sanitary Supply in memory of Morris Wax, longtime JINSA supporter and national board member.