Archive for August 8, 2010

A brushfire or a spark for conflict?

August 8, 2010

A brushfire or a spark for conflict?.

On Tuesday, Lebanese soldiers opened fire on an IDF unit removing a tree near the border security fence. In the resulting fighting, a senior IDF officer, two Lebanese soldiers, and a Lebanese journalist were killed, making the clash the most intense military engagement in the north since the 2006 war between Israel and Hizbullah.


The spike in border tension coincides with increased concerns about a possible return to sectarian violence in Lebanon. Spurred by reports that the tribunal investigating the 2005 murder of former premier Rafik Hariri will soon indict Hizbullah officials, these concerns prompted an unprecedented joint visit to Beirut a week ago by Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah and Syrian President Bashar Asad. Saad Hariri – Rafik’s son and current prime minister – praised the visit for bringing “considerable stability to the country.”

Despite this optimistic pronouncement, with the border heating up and murder indictments pending, tensions remain high. Also in the background is Iran – Hizbullah’s main supporter, Syria’s ally, and Saudi Arabia’s regional rival.

Contradictory accounts have emerged about the border skirmish. Israel said that it informed the UN Interim Force in Lebanon of its intention to remove the tree. Located beyond the security fence adjacent to Kibbutz Misgav Am, the tree was nevertheless on the Israeli side of the internationally recognized Blue Line, the border with Lebanon. When Israel began clearing the tree several hours after submitting the request, Lebanese forces called on the Israeli forces to withdraw.

When they refused, Lebanese snipers opened fire, killing battalion commander Lt.-Col. (res.) Dov Harari, who was standing 180 meters inside Israeli territory. Israel responded with light arms fire followed by a helicopter attack on the battalion command center at Taybeh, killing two Lebanese soldiers and a journalist from the pro-Hizbullah Al-Akhbar newspaper.

Lebanon claims that it asked Israel to delay the removal process for 24 hours. According to Beirut, when Israeli personnel began removing the tree three hours later, Lebanese forces shouted for them to stop and fired warning shots, to which Israeli forces responded with light arms fire and artillery.

The incident is under investigation by UNIFIL and the IDF. So far, the former inquiry has confirmed that Israel precoordinated the tree removal with UNIFIL personnel, who passed the information on to the Lebanese Armed Forces. UNIFIL has also confirmed that the incident took place inside the Blue Bine, on Israeli territory. Meanwhile, the United States has urged both sides to exercise “maximum restraint to avoid an escalation and maintain the cease-fire that is now in place.”

Although the incident is the most significant clash between Israel and Lebanon since the Second Lebanon War in 2006, it is not without precedent. In 2007, the Lebanese Armed Forces opened fire on an IDF bulldozer that had crossed the security fence to remove debris south of the Blue Line. The operation had been coordinated with UNIFIL but rejected by the LAF, which fired warning shots at the bulldozer; Israel responded with a single tank round. An IDF soldier was shot dead on the same stretch of road in 2003, reportedly by a Hizbullah sniper.

Tuesday’s incident unfolded amid spiraling tensions and a war of words between Israel, Hizbullah and Damascus regarding Syria’s reported transfers of Scud and M600 long-range missiles to Hizbullah. Incidents in Lebanon related to the Hariri tribunal and Hizbullah’s growing influence have only exacerbated these tensions.

In the aftermath of the February 2005 Hariri assassination in Beirut, the UN established an International Independent Investigation Commission, which quickly implicated Syria in the killing. More recently, however, the commission and its prosecutorial arm, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, have focused on Hizbullah’s alleged role.

Several media reports since 2009 have confirmed the organization’s involvement, with some sources implicating senior Hizbullah official Mustafa Badreddine, brotherin- law of former top commander Imad Mughniyah.

Recent reports assert that between two and six Hizbullah members will be indicted this year.

The prospect that the Special Tribunal will accuse Shi’ites of assassinating the leader of Lebanon’s Sunni community has fueled concerns of a return to sectarian violence. Indeed, given the indictment forecasts, it is not difficult to imagine Sunni retaliation against Shi’ite targets similar to the 2006 Samarra mosque bombing in Iraq, which sparked a cycle of bloodshed. Apparently, the prospect of such fighting – in which Hizbullah-led Shi’ites would have the upper hand against Saudi Arabia’s Sunni allies in Lebanon – prompted King Abdullah’s intervention.

Although Asad accompanied Abdullah, Syria’s calculation behind the visit was no doubt different. Damascus sees increased tension next door as an opportunity to reestablish itself as the guardian of stability in Lebanon – a situation that many in the region, if not in Washington, appear resigned to accepting.

Asad described the visit as “excellent” and, in a speech a few days later at Syria’s Army Day celebrations, said that “the specter of real peace in the region is disappearing, and the possibility of war is increasing.”

Another outside actor that should be mentioned is Qatar, which so often seems to play deliberate diplomatic games against Saudi Arabia. Last weekend, for example, Qatari leader Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani visited southern Lebanon.

On July 22, Hizbullah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah held a press conference in response to rumors of pending indictments against members of the group.

According to him, a “great scheme” was “targeting the resistance, Lebanon and the region” via the Special Tribunal.

Not only was the five-year investigation politically biased, he claimed, but it “brought along false witnesses” and never even considered the possibility that the murder was carried out by Israel, which had “the motive, the capabilities, the control and the interest” to kill Hariri.

Alleged Israeli involvement in the assassination has been a focus of Nasrallah’s remarks in recent months, as he has sought to undermine the Special Tribunal and deflect pressure from Hizbullah. During a speech on July 16, for example, he described the Special Tribunal as an “Israeli project” targeting the resistance and creating internal divisions in Lebanon by fabricating a Hizbullah connection to the murder.

According to Special Tribunal sources, highly advanced telecommunications analysis will form the basis of indictments. Unsurprisingly, Nasrallah has begun to focus on the credibility of this data, which he says has been manipulated by Israeli spies in the Lebanese telecommunications system. Over the past year, more than 70 alleged Israeli spies have been arrested in Lebanon, including five senior officers in Lebanese telecom firms, most recently a technician at Alfa, a cellphone provider.

Nasrallah’s accusations are intended to raise doubts about some of the Special Tribunal’s most compelling technical evidence. Although Hizbullah claims may not dissuade the tribunal from proceeding with indictments, they could undermine domestic support for the process.

At least for the short term, peace appears to have returned to the area. The incident is considered over, and the IDF is returning to normal border operations.

But any sense of “business as usual” will be absent; in the view of the Israeli military, the Lebanese Armed Forces (or at least its local units) have demonstrated that they are unpredictable.

Israel will be prepared to respond with substantial force in the event of further incidents. In completing the brush clearing operation on Wednesday, the IDF deployed strong armored and infantry forces to cover the action, serving as a deterrent to any further LAF action and a signal of what will happen if there is another incident.

A potential complication for the United States is that the LAF is supplied with American equipment. Future supplies could be jeopardized if, for example, the LAF is judged to be working closely with Hizbullah.

In any case, history shows that events happen fast on the border. As in 2006, a routine activity escalated into a serious clash, although in this case escalation was controlled. Yet the situation could have evolved very differently if Hizbullah had become directly involved, the IDF had taken more casualties, or the LAF had not backed down.

This event must also be placed in the context of increasing political tensions within Lebanon and the growing potential for a Hizbullah-Israel conflict. Although it has been relatively quiet for four years, the border is becoming an increasingly dangerous place.

This article originally appeared on the The Washington Institute for Near East Policy’s Web site (www.washingtoninstitute.org). David Schenker is the Aufzien fellow and director of the Program on Arab Politics at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Andrew J. Tabler is a Next Generation fellow at the institute. Jeffrey White is a defense fellow at the institute.

Inflection Point: Bushehr

August 8, 2010

The Greenroom » Inflection Point: Bushehr.
posted at 6:33 pm on August 7, 2010 by J.E. Dyer

The silly season may be about to get sillier. A number of bloggers picked up this week on reports that drones “crashed” in southwest Iran near the site of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. (More on that in a moment.)

Russia contracted some years ago to complete the construction of the light-water reactor (LWR) at Bushehr, which was begun by the French during the Shah’s reign, in the 1970s. Bringing the reactor online – fueling it with enriched uranium and taking it critical – has been postponed repeatedly since 2007.  The Russians are an integral part of this process, so it has depended to some extent on political calculations in Moscow.

The Russians have stated on multiple occasions this year, however, that they expect to have the Bushehr LWR online in the August-September timeframe. It being now August, the global Bushehr Watch is going into overdrive. And what happens with Bushehr will, in spite of countervailing technical reality (see below), be a bellwether of how things are likely to go with Iran’s nuclear weapons program, the fate of Russia’s association with it, and the alignments of the Middle East.

First, the technical reality.  Bushehr is not an efficient source of weapons-grade fissile material.  Lighting off the LWR would advance Iran’s program to develop nuclear weapons hardly at all, in the context of any operationally significant timeline.  It matters, yes; but not soon.  One LWR would take years to produce a meaningful amount of weaponizable material.  (The heavy-water reactor being built in the north at Arak, on the other hand, can produce plutonium – like North Korea’s plutonium reactor – somewhat more efficiently.  Weaponization is a different design problem in that case, but the foreign associations of Iran’s nuclear program suggest both avenues have been pursued.)

Iran’s key nuclear facilities

Therefore – and this is important to understand – the change of conditions represented by Bushehr going critical is not centered on what this event means to the timeline for a nuclear weapon.  Israel may well not regard it as essential to strike the reactor and prevent it from being brought online.  The US certainly may not (and in my estimation, probably doesn’t).  Iran’s ability to produce a weapon is based on centrifuge enrichment of the current uranium stock, combined with laboratory testing of detonators and the design and testing of warheads.  Striking the LWR at Bushehr affects none of these elements of the program.

So it would be wrong to assume that we’ve gone soft if we (by which I mean the US or Israel) don’t attack the reactor before it’s brought online.  (Prior assumptions along these lines are a separate issue.)  This is a different problem from the Iraqi reactor at Osirak in 1981.  Bushehr represents much less of Iran’s potential stock of weaponizable uranium than the Iraqi reactor represented for Saddam.

The important cut-off, however, is the fueling of the reactor.  Any strike decision has to be made before it’s fueled.  Once it’s fueled, disabling or destroying it without an unacceptable release of toxins is a problem that, while not technically insuperable, falls in the category of “too hard,” short of regime-change in Tehran.

This brief outline of factors brings us to where Iran and Russia now sit.  Iran – my assessment – is concerned that preparing to fuel the LWR at Bushehr will bring the Israeli Air Force (IAF) down on it.  Regardless of the larger truths about Iran’s program, Israel has twice struck reactors in the region: at Osirak in ’81 and in Syria in 2007. (In both cases – unlike the Iran timeline – building the reactors was more significant to obtaining weaponizable material.)

And if Iran is preparing to fuel the reactor, Iranian actions in the past week could be related to that.  Iran’s fresh claim to have received four batteries of the S-300 air defense system from Belarus – as speculated by Western analysts in 2006 – looks like more than a random propaganda eruption. As this analysis suggests, meanwhile, the story of the crashed drones near Bushehr might have arisen from an Iranian exercise, in which drones were used as targets to test local air defenses.  (There is no way to cross-check the references in the IPS analysis, but the conclusion makes sense.)

The hand of Iran in the attacks on southern Israel this week may be related as well.  This report reinforces the analysis that Iran was behind them, although reporters and editors are still catching up to that emerging pattern.  The headline says “Hamas Ordered Rocket Attacks,” but the text reads as follows:

[Hamas militant leader] Atar carried out the attack with the approval of Hamas politburo chief Khaled Meshal, based in Damascus, and with the backing of Iranian intelligence agents, who appear to have initiated the mission.

According to intelligence sources, a number of Gaza militants crossed into Sinai through the Rafah tunnels, where they were met by Egyptian drivers and the rockets.

The italicized portions implicate Iran’s network in the Sinai (see “attacks on southern Israel” link for further reading).  Especially if the additional reporting about an attack on the observer force in the Sinai (MFO) is valid, the very unusual nature of this group of attacks argues a particular central motive beyond the scope of Hamas’ interests. Bogging Israel down in local security disturbances (which include the incident on the border with Lebanon) would help to serve Iran’s purpose of deflecting an air strike on Bushehr.

I doubt that this was Iran’s sole motive. That said, Bushehr would be one of Iran’s best reasons for acting funny in August 2010. Tehran’s big scare in June, when the mullahs declared a state of emergency on the northwestern border with Azerbaijan and feared an imminent US-Israeli attack, has no doubt produced lingering effects of its own, coloring the Iranian leadership’s current calculations as well.

Russia, meanwhile, is the participant in this drama with the power to either undermine US policy, or effectively support it.  I assess that President Obama would prefer the LWR at Bushehr not be fueled just yet.  The symbolism of that event will be tremendous, if it does happen, and will not redound to his credit.  Although the Russians could argue that they are not technically in breach of UN sanctions if they supply the reactor fuel (as they are contracted to do), there is no doubt that taking that action would put Moscow publicly and categorically at odds with US and European policy.

If Russia does commit to that watershed break, it’s “on” in the Middle East, in terms of patronage and alignments.  But I predict Putin and Medvedev will hold out for a little while longer before deciding which way to come down.  Winning more concessions from Obama is one motive; another is squeezing palm-greasers out of Iran.

As frustrating as it will be to watch, the best outcome we can probably hope for is the Bushehr inflection point being lengthened, most likely by a watchful Russia trying to time the break.  Bushehr going critical will have game-changing political meaning.  But striking Bushehr doesn’t make sense on its own.  Politics aside, that will be the real reason for not doing it.

Iran tops US terror list

August 8, 2010

Iran tops US terror list.

WASHINGTON – Iran has remained the “most active” state sponsor of terrorism, according to the 2009 US annual terrorism report released last week.

Meanwhile, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Saturday questioned the death toll in the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, saying there was no evidence that 3,000 people were killed, according to Reuters.

The US report reads, “Iran’s financial, material and logistic support for terrorist and militant groups throughout the Middle East and Central Asia had a direct impact on international efforts to promote peace, threatened economic stability in the Gulf and undermined the growth of democracy.

“Iran remained the principal supporter of groups that are implacably opposed to the Middle East peace process,” the report continued, highlighting the role of the Quds Force – the external operations branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – as the regime’s primary for cultivating and supporting terrorists abroad.

The report points to the Islamic Republic’s provision of weapons, training and funding to Palestinian groups including Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

In addition, Teheran has provided “hundreds of millions of dollars” to support and train Hizbullah, including hosting thousands of the group’s fighters at training camps in Iran.

The report also notes that “while Israel remained vulnerable to rocket and mortar attacks launched from inside Gaza, it continued to be largely successful in confronting the threat posed by suicide bombers and rockets from the Palestinian territories.”

It also cited Israel’s transfer to the Palestinian Authority of control of territory in the West Bank as security conditions allowed.

Overall, terrorist attacks dropped worldwide by about 6 percent, which corresponded to a 5% decrease in death from such attacks. More than 15,700 people were killed by terrorists in 2009.

More attacks took place in South Asia than in the Middle East, the first time that’s occurred since the reports began to be compiled. Congress mandated the annual terror report following the attacks of September 11, 2001.

“In South Asia, incident totals have crept up, so that for the first year, since we’ve been doing this at least, South Asia has proven to be more violent than the Middle East, [and] the rest of the world basically flat,” National Counterterrorism Center Deputy Director Russ Travers told reporters on Thursday after the report was released. “In the Middle East, what we’ve seen over the last three or four years is a pretty substantial decline in total number of incidents.”

Ahmadinejad, in his speech on Saturday, also accused the United States of trumping up the September 11 attacks to “create and prepare public opinion” for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and said that no “Zionists” were killed in the attacks because “one day earlier they were told not go to their workplace.”

Ahmadinejad has previously denied the September 11 attacks, calling them “a big fabrication.”

Ahmaedinejad said, “They announced that 3,000 people were killed in this incident, but there were no reports that reveal their names. Maybe you saw that, but I did not.

“What was the story of September 11? During five to six days, and with the aid of the media, they created and prepared public opinion so that everyone considered an attack on Afghanistan and Iraq as [their] right,” he said in the televised speech, Reuters reported.

The Iranian president also repeated his denial of the Holocaust.

Jerusalem Post staff contributed to this report.