WarSclerotic

via Yorkshire CND – Nuclear Explosions in Orbit – 6/04.

June 2004
Nuclear Explosions in Orbit
By Daniel G. Dupont
Source: Scientific American, Vol. 290 Issue 6, p100
http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm…

Abstract:

Discusses how the increase in the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles raises the possibility of atomic attacks on the global satellite system. Threats posed to satellites used to provide critical communications, navigation, broadcast and cable television, and earth-imaging and weather-forecasting services; Lack of defense for the commercial and military satellites orbiting in the lower altitudes; Capability of countries such as Russia, China, France, and Israel to conduct high-altitude nuclear explosions (HANEs) tests; Speculation about how the use of HANEs may increase peak radiation levels in parts of low earth orbit; Efforts of the U.S. Pentagon to safeguard satellites from the effects of nuclear explosions.

The spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles raises fears of atomic attacks on the global satellite system

On July 9, 1962, U.S. military researchers on a tiny Pacific atoll called Johnston Island fired a thermonuclear weapon into outer space. Code-named Starfish Prime, the launch onboard a Thor ballistic missile was the latest of a series of similar classified tests the U.S. Defense Department had begun four years before. But as the rocket rose on its smoky plume, few on the launch team realized that the forthcoming 1.4-megaton orbital burst was to yield surprising long-term results.

Hotel operators in Hawaii, some 1,300 kilometers away, were expecting a good show, though. Word had leaked of this latest “rainbow bomb” test shot, so a few enterprising resorts had organized rooftop parties from which guests could better view the distant fireworks. When the warhead detonated that evening at an altitude of 400 kilometers, it produced a brilliant white flash that momentarily lit up sea and sky like a noonday sun. Then, for about a second, the heavens turned light green.

Other Hawaiians witnessed some less welcome aftereffects. Streetlights suddenly blinked out on the island of Oahu. Local radio stations shut down, and telephone service failed for a time. Elsewhere in the Pacific, very high frequency communications systems malfunctioned for half a minute. Scientists later realized that Starfish Prime had sent a strong, disruptive electromagnetic pulse (EMP) sweeping through the vast region below the blast.

During the next several minutes, a blood-red aurora spread across the horizon. Scientists had anticipated this stage of the process; each previous orbital test had left an artificial cloud of charged particles in space. Eventually the planet’s magnetic forces molded the energetic clouds into globe-girdling belts that resembled its natural Van Allen radiation belts. But almost no one expected what happened during the following months: the intense man-made belts crippled seven low earth orbit (LEO) satellites, a third of the planet’s fleet at the time. U.S. military researchers went on to conduct three more high-altitude nuclear explosions (HANEs) later that year but then stopped when the Cuban Missile Crisis led to the signing of the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty.

HANE Alert

SINCE THE EARLY HANE TESTS, relatively little has been said in public about the threat such events pose to the growing constellation of satellites that today provides critical communications, navigation, broadcast and cable television, and earth-imaging and weather-forecasting services. Some 250 commercial and military satellites now orbit in the lowest altitudes, according to the Satellite Industry Association, and most of them are defenseless against the radiation that would be released by a high-altitude atomic burst. As knowledge of nuclear-weapon and ballistic-missile technology proliferates among potential adversary states and, perhaps, terrorist groups, concerns mount for the future of the global satellite system. One small atomic warhead detonated at the optimum altitude over the U.S. “could have a very serious effect on communications, electronics and all sorts of systems–a devastating effect on our society and everyone else’s, too,” states Robert S. Norris, senior research associate with the Natural Resources Defense Council’s nuclear program.

The prerequisites for a nation, or a nonstate entity, to conduct a HANE are relatively straightforward: a small nuclear weapon and a standard ballistic-missile system, something not much more sophisticated than a SCUD. Eight countries–the U.S., Russia, China, the U.K., France, Israel, India, Pakistan and probably North Korea–now possess such a capability. It appears that Iran is also close to acquiring the necessary technology, some Pentagon analysts say.

In 2001 a space policy committee chaired by Donald H. Rumsfeld (before he became secretary of defense) warned that “the U.S. is an attractive candidate for a ‘Space Pearl Harbor.'” Further, the group (formally the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization) called for the country’s leaders to act soon to reduce America’s exposure to a surprise attack in orbit and to limit the consequences of such an event.

Even though the U.S. is installing a missile defense system designed to defend against long-range strikes, the system is unproved and may never be able to fully protect the nation. Ironically, use of an antimissile interceptor against a nuclear-tipped target with a proximity fuse could in fact set off a destructive HANE phenomenon.

The Pentagon’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) attempted to predict the results of various hypothetical scenarios involving the use of HANEs against LEO satellites in 2001. The shocking conclusion: a single low-yield nuclear weapon (10 to 20 kilotons, the size of the Hiroshima bomb) detonated between 125 and 300 kilometers above the earth’s surface “could disable–in weeks to months–all LEO satellites not specifically hardened [protected] to withstand radiation generated by that explosion.” K. Dennis Papadopoulos, a plasma physicist at the University of Maryland who studies the effects of HANEs for the U.S. government, puts it slightly differently: “A 10-kiloton nuclear device set off at the right height would lead to the loss of 90 percent of all low-earth-orbit satellites within a month.”

A high-altitude atomic explosion could raise peak radiation levels in parts of low earth orbit by three to four orders of magnitude, the DTRA report found. Models cited by the Defense Department study group indicate that radiation flux levels could remain elevated for two years. Any satellites in the affected region would accumulate radiation exposure much more quickly than they were designed to do, slowing electronic switching speeds and raising power requirements. The first subsystems to go, according to the study, would most likely be a satellite’s attitude-control electronics or its communications links. “Eventually,” it states, “the active electronics fail and the system becomes incapable of performing its mission.” Although some unshielded satellites would survive, their useful life spans would be shortened dramatically.

Meanwhile the high radiation levels would preclude the launch of replacement spacecraft. The study notes that “the manned space program would have to stand down for a year or more as radiation levels subside.” It also concludes that the side effects of a HANE could lead to more than $100 billion in replacement costs–and this estimate does not even begin to account for the damage to the global economy from the loss of so many crucial space assets. Despite the recent scrutiny, however, the threat of HANEs has not been given “anywhere near the attention it deserves,” cautions Representative Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania, a longtime advocate for missile and nuclear defense on the House Armed Services Committee.

Low Earth, High Risk

THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET HANE TESTS of the 1950s and 1960s remain the only real-world examples of the phenomenon for today’s scientists to examine. Researchers know that a nuclear fireball is a rapidly expanding sphere of hot gases that sends forth a supersonic shock or blast wave. At the same time, the fireball radiates tremendous amounts of energy in all directions in the form of thermal radiation, high-energy x-rays and gamma rays, fast neutrons, and the ionized remnants of the fission device itself. Near the ground, the atmosphere absorbs the emitted radiation, a process that heats the air to the exceptionally high temperatures required to set a fireball alight. The air molecules also attenuate to some degree the generation of an electromagnetic pulse. Any immediate destruction wreaked by a near-earth burst comes from pulverizing shock waves, violent winds and hellish heat.

High-altitude nuclear blasts produce significantly different effects. In the lower reaches of vacuous space, the resulting fireball grows much larger and faster than it does near the ground, and the radiation it emits travels much farther.

The strong EMP that results has several components, according to Papadopoulos. In the first few tens of nanoseconds, about a tenth of a percent of the weapon yield appears as powerful gamma rays with energies of one to three mega-electron volts (MeV, a unit of electromagnetic energy). The gamma rays rain down into the atmosphere and collide with air molecules, depositing their energy to produce huge quantities of positive ions and recoil electrons (also known as Compton electrons). The impacts create MeV-energy Compton electrons that then accelerate and spiral along the earth’s magnetic field lines. The resulting transient electric fields and currents that arise generate electromagnetic emissions in the radio-frequency range of 15 to 250 megahertz (MHz, or one million cycles per second). This high-altitude EMP occurs between 30 and 50 kilometers above the earth’s surface.

The size of the emitting region depends on the altitude and yield of the nuclear burst. For a one-megaton explosion at 200 kilometers in altitude, the diameter is about 600 kilometers, Papadopoulos states. The high-altitude EMP can create electric potentials that can exceed 1,000 volts–enough to cripple any sensitive electrical infrastructure on the ground that is within direct line of sight. At orbital elevations, EMP fields are small and generally cause little interference, he adds.

In unclassified documents, U.S. government scientists estimate that at least 70 percent of a fission bomb’s yield typically emerges as x-rays. These x-rays, as well as the accompanying gamma rays and high-energy neutrons, strike everything within line of sight, doing severe damage to nearby satellites. The radiation’s energies decrease with distance, diminishing the effect on satellites farther away from the fireball.

“Soft,” or low-energy, x-rays produced by a HANE would not penetrate deeply into any spacecraft they encountered. Instead they would generate extreme heat at the outer surfaces, which itself could harm the sophisticated electronics inside. Soft x-rays would also degrade solar cells, impairing a satellite’s ability to generate power, as well as damaging sensor or telescope apertures. When high-energy x-rays strike a satellite or other system components, however, they create strong internal electron fluxes that produce strong currents and high voltages that can fry sensitive electronic circuitry.

Soon after this point, ionized bomb debris from the blast interacts with the earth’s magnetic field, pushing the field out to a radius of 100 to 200 kilometers, Papadopoulos explains. This moving electromagnetic field gives rise to a low-frequency electric field pulse. These slowly oscillating waves reflect back and forth off the earth’s surface and the underside of the ionosphere, propagating around the globe. Although the magnitude of the electric field is small (less than a millivolt per meter), it can generate large voltages in long terrestrial and underwater cables, triggering widespread disruption of electric power circuits. This phenomenon caused the failures in the electrical and telephone systems on the Hawaiian Islands after the Starfish Prime test.

After the immediate effects, the extensive cloud of energetic electrons and protons released by a HANE is accelerated by the earth’s magnetic field into the magnetosphere, pumping up the sizes of the naturally occurring Van Allen radiation belts that surround the planet. These charged particles also leak into the area between the natural belts, forming artificial radiation belts–an effect named for Nicholas Christofilos, the scientist who forecast it in the mid-1950s. A series of high-altitude detonations designated the Project Argus tests, conducted by the U.S. in the late 1950s, confirmed his hypothesis. Christofilos saw potential military utility in man-made radiation belts, which he thought might be able to block radio communications or even disable incoming ballistic missiles.

Shielding Satellites

THE PENTAGON has been working for decades to safeguard its orbital assets against the effects of nuclear explosions. Many key military satellites have been placed in high orbits and are thus considered relatively safe against nuclear events. Moreover, engineers install protective shields to harden military satellites against radiation. These metallic enclosures attempt to defend the vulnerable electronics inside by forming Faraday cages–sealed conductive boxes that exclude external electromagnetic fields. Satellite builders surround sensitive components with metallic (often aluminum) shielding layers that can attenuate the flow of electrical charge. The aluminum sheets range in thickness from less than 0.1 to one centimeter. Ground-based weapons, communications and other critical systems are insulated against EMP effects as well.

Hardening satellites is a costly endeavor, however. Greater protection means more expense and more massive protective materials. And heavier satellites cost significantly more to launch. Just in the design phase, hardening efforts add 2 to 3 percent to the multimillion-dollar price tags of satellites, Defense Department sources affirm. According to some estimates, installing the shielding panels and hardened components and launching the extra weight can add from 20 to 50 percent to the total cost of a satellite. Finally, electronic components capable of withstanding the high radiation levels of a HANE-about 100 times as great as natural levels–offer functional bandwidths only about one tenth the size of those offered by commercially available processors, a fact that can raise operating costs by an order of magnitude.

Yet shields can do only so much, Papadopoulos reports. Designers say that the worst problem caused by a HANE’s radiation is deep dielectric charging from the MeV-energy electrons. This destructive charge buildup can occur when high-energy particles penetrate spacecraft walls or protective shielding and then bury themselves in the dielectric semiconductor materials in microelectronics or solar ceils. These interlopers lead to false system voltages and catastrophic discharges. If metal shielding exceeds a centimeter, electromagnetic protection declines drastically, he explains, because impacts by energetic particles can cause strong electromagnetic Bremsstrahlung radiation that can result in extensive damage. (Bremsstrahlung is German for the “braking radiation” produced when a charged particle decelerates rapidly as a result of collision with another body.)

Spacecraft can be protected in other ways, says Larry Longden of Maxwell Technologies, a company that shields satellites. Sensors can be installed to detect the presence of harmful radiation. A satellite equipped with such a device can be cued to shut down its computer processors and electronic circuits to wait for the destructive episode to pass. Despite the risks to civil orbiters, however, the Defense
Department so far has failed to persuade U.S. satellite builders to harden their spacecraft voluntarily, states Barry Watts, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

Cleaning Up after HANEs

IF AN ADVERSARY succeeded in detonating a nuclear device in space today, the U.S. would be at a loss to remediate its long-term effects. Down the road, though, cleanup techniques now being studied might do the job. One approach is to eliminate harmful radiation “more quickly than nature would,” says Greg Ginet, a program manager at the Air Force Research Laboratory. Researchers at the facility, along with others funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), are investigating whether generating very low frequency radio waves in space might send the resulting radiation out of orbit more rapidly.

To understand how that procedure might work, Papadopoulos says, it helps to consider an analogy. The earth’s radiation belts in some ways resemble leaky buckets. Planetary magnetic forces pump energetic particles, or plasma, into the buckets. The rate at which they leak out depends on the amplitude of very low frequency (VLF, or between one hertz and 20 kilohertz) electromagnetic waves in the vicinity. A nuclear explosion, however, overfills the buckets, creating the artificial
belts. The key to removing the plasma more rapidly from the  magnetosphere is to increase the rate at which the radiation leaks out into the atmosphere, a process akin to widening the hole in the bottom of the buckets.

One way to do this, scientists say, would be to deploy a fleet of satellites designed to inject radiation belts artificially with VLF waves. To that end, DARPA and the U.S. Air Force are experimenting with the VLF transmitters at the High Frequency Active Auroral Research Project (HAARP) facility in Gakona, Alaska. HAARP is devoted to the study of the ionosphere–or, more specifically, how the ionosphere can be manipulated by man-made means. The facility it is being expanded in part to provide the Pentagon with a way to test whether it can reduce the population of charged particles in the earth’s radiation belts.

HAARP researchers are trying to determine how many satellites might be needed for a global mitigation system. They are buoyed in this effort by work conducted by Stanford University during the 1970s and 1980s. Stanford scientists injected VLF waves into the Van Allen belts using a transmitter located near the South Pole, and those waves, they found, were sometimes significantly amplified by the trapped electrons in the belts. This amplification occurs by tapping the free energy associated with the trapped particles, Papadopoulos notes. The resonance-based process is analogous to the electron-stimulation effect that occurs in free-electron lasers where a “wiggler” magnet accelerates electrons so that they emit synchrotron radiation.

This amplification phenomenon lies at the heart of the HAARP effort. By boosting the VLF waves sent out by a fleet of satellites using natural means, the U.S. could employ far fewer emitting spacecraft, which could save billions of dollars. Defense Department researchers have shown that this amplifying effect could cut the number of satellites needed from more than 100 to fewer than 10.

Scientists have demonstrated that the facility can generate extremely low frequency (ELF) and VLF waves and inject them efficiently into the radiation belts. It does this by periodically altering the flow of the auroral electrojet–a natural current that exists in the ionosphere some 100 kilometers overhead. The modulation, which produces a virtual ELF and VLF antenna in the sky, is accomplished by periodically turning on and off a high-frequency transmitter to change the temperature and thus the conductance of the plasma current. Researchers expect the completed facility to have sufficient power to determine whether the amplification and mitigation scheme can work. A space experiment to test these hypotheses may be conducted later this decade, according to Ginet, but any operational ground or satellite system is years beyond that.

How Remote a Threat?

A NUMBER OF GEOPOLITICAL scenarios could lead to a HANE incident. The DTRA study emphasized the hazards arising from a HANE as a warning shot to display a nation’s resolve to fight and as a deterrent against attack. Using the lingo and modeling techniques of military planners, the DTRA group tackled two primary scenarios, both set in 2010. In one example, Indian armored forces cross the Pakistani border during a clash over the fate of Kashmir. The Pakistani government responds by detonating a 10-kiloton weapon 300 kilometers over New Delhi, high enough to avoid destructive ground effects but low enough to demonstrate clearly the ability to launch a deadly nuclear attack. Another case study has North Korea facing possible invasion, so its leaders order the explosion of a nuclear warhead above its own territory as a demonstration of the country’s determination to resist. A U.S. missile defense system engages and destroys the booster rocket, but the warhead explodes 150 kilometers above the earth.

John Pike, who runs Globalsecurity.org, a defense watchdog organization, envisions a scenario in which North Korea decides to test its nascent nuclear arsenal–in space. “Most people assume that if North Korea conducts a test, it would be an underground test,” he says. “That would not be my advice to [North Korean leader] Kim Jong II.”

Experts have considered other possible plots, some of which involve detonations over the U.S. Very few countries are capable of this type of attack from their home soil, and such an attempt is unlikely. A mobile, sea-based platform, however, could be used to launch a crude missile with a small atomic payload that could still do significant damage. Although it is extremely difficult to assess the probability of these kinds of situations (remote though they may be), the consequences are so devastating that they cannot be ignored.

In addition to the enormous damage a HANE would cause, there is the question of response. A nuclear attack on the U.S. or an ally would provoke an immediate military reply, but what about a HANE? Weldon, who for years has been pondering that question–what he calls an “ethical dilemma”–has no answer. “From a moral standpoint, does the detonation of a nuclear warhead in space justify going in and killing people?” he asks. “Does that justify a nuclear response? Probably not.”

PHOTO (COLOR): ARTIFICIAL AURORA appeared a few minutes after a 1.4-megaton hydrogen bomb exploded 400 kilometers above the Pacific Ocean during a 1962 U.S. test called Starfish Prime. Excited atomic oxygen produced the striking red glow.

PHOTO (COLOR): U.S. MILITARY SCIENTISTS conducted the Teaktest in 1958 to evaluate antiballistic-missile effects. The 3.8-megaton, 77-kilometer-high blast halted radio communications throughout the Pacific and even grounded civilian and military aircraft in distant Hawaii.

PHOTO (COLOR): IN THE KINGFISH TEST, a U.S. Thor missile carried a nuclear warhead [with a yield less than 1,000 kilotons} to a height of 97 kilometers. Shock-excited oxygen atoms produced the red glow. The phenomenon at the bottom resulted from high-energy beta particles striking the relatively dense air at lower altitudes. This 1962 shot disrupted radio communications over the central Pacific for three hours.

PHOTO (COLOR): ORANGE WAS THE CODE NAME for a 1958 burst of a 3.8-megaton nuclear device at an altitude of 43 kilometers. The test had little effect on radio communications and electrical systems in the Pacific area.

DANIEL G. DUPONT has covered national security and science and technology issues for more than 11 years. He is the editor of InsideDefense.com, an online news service, and publisher of the Inside the Pentagon family of newsletters. His articles have appeared in the Washington Post, Mother Jones, Government Executive, mediabistro.com and elsewhere, and he is a frequent contributor to Scientific American. A native New Englander, Dupont lives in Arlington, Va., with his wife, Mary, and their three sons.

Overview/Orbital Nukes

* The launch and detonation of a nuclear-tipped missile in low earth orbit could disrupt the critical system of commercial and civil satellites for years, potentially paralyzing the global high-tech economy.
* More nations (and maybe nonstate entities) will gain this capability as nuclear-weapon and ballistic-missile technology spreads around the world. The possibility of an attack is relatively remote, but the consequences are too sever to be ignored.
* In the event of a nuclear explosion in space, clever manipulation of very low and extremely low frequency electromagnetic waves may reduce the number of charged particles resulting from the blast, clearing the way for renewed satellite operations.

MORE TO EXPLORE

The Effects of Nuclear Weapons – by Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan.
U.S. Government Printing Office.
Available at: http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/effects/effects.shtml

The Elliott School of International Affairs, Security Space Forum Resource Center.
Available at: http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/spaceforum/resource.html

The Nuclear Weapon Archive: A Guide to Nuclear Weapons.
Available at: http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s briefing: “High-Altitude Nuclear Detonations against Low-Earth Satellites,”, April 2001.
Available at: http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/asat/haleos.pdf

K. Dennis Papadopoulos’s briefing:, “Satellite Threat due to High Altitude Nuclear Detonations.”
Available at: http://www.lightwatcher.com/chemtrails/Papadopoulos-chemtrails.pdf

http://www.weeklystandard.com/print/blogs/bomb-irans-bushehr-nuclear-reactor

Speculation about a possible attack on Iranian nuclear sites has reached a fever pitch over the summer.  The talk is so wild that even level-headed commentators on the right like Michael Barone opine aloud that perhaps Israel won’t be the instigator; rather the Obama administration might order a U.S. strike.

This still seems beyond unlikely but there is no question that the climate has changed.  True, the president’s National Security Advisor the other day reiterated the administration’s willingness for Obama to meet with his Iranian counterpart assuming certain conditions were met—conditions that no one expects will be met.  But inside the White House and national security bureaucracy, opinions about Iranian behavior and intentions appear to be hardening.  Robert Kagan recently recounted a briefing by the president and top officials in which they made as clear as they could that their patience with Iran has all but run out.

So what’s next?  Various chess pieces have been moving but it would take a Kasparov to divine a clear strategy—on either side—from what can be observed.  The United States announced a $60 billion sale of advanced weaponry—including F-15s and Apache helicopters—to Saudi Arabia, and the Israelis, uncharacteristically, have declined to voice even mild reservations.  Reports of an Israeli-Saudi deal for overflight rights over the kingdom draw predictable denials but continue to surface—without causing the political uproar one would expect.  An Iranian nuclear scientist who vanished last year suddenly turned up in the United States and asked to go home.  Al Qaeda figures—some blood relatives of the top brass—who have been living in Iran since shortly after 9/11 have pulled up stakes.  Weapons caches of Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon and (to a far lesser extent) Hamas in Gaza—both key Iranian proxies on Israel’s borders—have been growing.  A fourth round of sanctions passed the UNSC with nominal Russian and Chinese support, but Moscow and Beijing undermine them any way they can.  Tehran announced that a long-anticipated delivery of coveted S-300 anti-aircraft missiles had finally been made—though not from Russia, the principal seller, but from Moscow-lackey Belarus.  American officials cast doubt on the “news” but nobody really knows.

Now comes word that Russia will, after a decade-and-a-half of stop-and-go work, finally fuel and start Iran’s nuclear reactor at Bushehr by August 21st.  Similar word has come many times before.  The Russians are, in the parlance of the region, adept at selling this particular rug over and over.  Somehow the carpet never actually changes hands.  Could this time be different?

Only Vladimir Putin and his immediate circle really know.  It matters because, once fueled and operational, Bushehr will produce plutonium 239, which can be used to make nuclear weapons.  The plant is also large, impossible to conceal or move, and relatively easy to destroy from the air.  But once it has gone critical, any attempt to do so would risk the release of a radioactive plume that might kill civilians and poison surrounding areas.

This leaves any would-be attacker of Iran’s nuclear sites with a difficult choice.  An attack is likely to cause collateral damage no matter how carefully it’s planned and is certain to result in a PR uproar.  A radioactive release would compound both problems by several orders of magnitude.  Israel in particular can expect outrage—some, but by no means all, feigned—from virtually the whole world should it move against Iranian nuclear sites.  Jerusalem presumably does not wish to intensify the inevitable vitriolic reaction by causing radioactive contamination.

Which means that if the story is true, and if the Israelis judge Bushehr to be a dangerous installation, they will have to move quickly—as in, within the next week.  Both are big “ifs.”  Reports from inside the Israeli defense establishment suggest that they don’t fear Bushehr nearly as much as the uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz and Qom.  Certainly, the latter have been operating for years and have produced thousands of pounds of highly enriched uranium, whereas Bushehr has yet to produce so much as one gram of pu239 (or one watt of electricity for that matter).  Also, it’s far from clear whether Iran has the technology, much less the capability, to extract plutonium from spent reactor fuel rods.

These are fair reasons not to be worried about Bushehr right now.  But they aren’t good reasons to be unconcerned forever.  Pu239 is an inevitable byproduct of the operation of a nuclear reactor.  Once operational, Bushehr will produce bomb fuel over time.  The half-life of plutonium is 24,000 years.  Having produced the stuff, Tehran’s incentive to master reprocessing will be high.  And when it does, the plutonium will be ready and waiting.  That incentive will only grow once/if Iran has lost or suffered a severe setback in its HEU production capability.  Suddenly Bushehr would be Tehran’s only route to the bomb.

And it’s an objectively better route than HEU.  Breeder reactors churn out far more plutonium, much more quickly, than centrifuge cascades can produce HEU.  Plutonium also makes a better bomb: smaller, lighter, more powerful and more deliverable on a larger variety of vehicles.

The possible repercussions of an attack on Iran have been gamed out thoroughly.  Opinions differ on how serious they might be.  It seems reasonable to assume that adding one target to a lengthy list would not make them materially worse.  Any nation prepared to incur all that risk from striking Iran’s HEU sites may as well take out Bushehr as well.  If nothing else, at least the attacker could know for sure that the plant would be gone.  As many opponents and skeptics of a strike have noted, no such certainty would apply to attacks on the buried and largely hidden Natanz and Qom sites.  Plus, the Israelis have twice destroyed nuclear reactors in the region but never enrichment cascades.  It’s hard to see what sense it would make to mount the difficult, unprecedented, uncertain operation while leaving standing the one site they know they can eliminate.

So this news—if it really is news—would appear to be one more move on the chessboard that suggests the endgame may be coming soon.  A grandmaster might assume that anything he could game out, the Russians and Iranians could too.  Are the Russians fueling Bushehr knowing—or even hoping—that doing so might precipitate an attack?  Certainly Moscow has reasons not to welcome a nuclear armed Iran.  Goading someone else into doing the dirty work has significant advantages.  As does the inevitable rise in hydrocarbon prices following a Middle East conflagration.

Then again, it could be just another feint.  Or the above analysis could be wrong.  Or it could be right, but the Israelis decide not to act for other reasons.  In chess, the players’ intentions may be unknown but at least all the moves are visible.  Not so in politics.

Update (7:05 p.m.): The Wall Street Journal is reporting that the Obama administration, as part of the price for a Russian vote in favor of June’s UNSC sanctions resolution against Iran, agreed not to oppose Russian help to get Bushehr started.  Their rationale is that Bushehr doesn’t pose a proliferation risk because the Russians will be reclaiming all of the plant’s spent fuel rods.  This of course entails trusting three parties—the governments of Iran and Russia, plus the International Atomic Energy Agency—which have not exactly proved trustworthy on this issue in the past.  It’s an odd position for an administration so committed to “nuclear zero” to take.

However, it should put to rest any speculation that the United States might be contemplating an attack of our own—at least on Bushehr.  It also must complicate Israeli calculations.  Israel will no doubt do what it believes it has to do.  Bush administration officials reportedly communicated to Jerusalem in advance their opposition to the attack on Syria’s reactor in 2007—an attack that went forward anyway.  But this time such an attack would have to take place not merely in spite of an ally’s private objections to the operation but of its public approval of the targeted project.

One of the many difficult calculations Jerusalem must make is whether a potential U.S. backlash over a strike the Obama administration doesn’t want is worse than the consequences of not striking.  No Israeli government could take lightly the prospect of a serious and potentially fatal breach of relations with the United States.  That’s not an existential threat.  But it would be dire enough that it’s not worth risking unless the consequences of inaction truly are existential.  That’s a hard and unenviable call to have to make.

Michael Anton is policy director at Keep America Safe.

Will Israel Strike Iran? – Associated Content – associatedcontent.com.

Once again sources reportedly within or close to the halls of power in Israel and the U.S. are leaking that an Israeli military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities is practically imminent. The Atlantic recently went so

far as to report that such a strike is likely within the next 12 months. Assuming that some dramatic change in the behavior of the Government of Iran doesn’t take place, some are proposing that sometime after December we may well see an Israeli military intervention against the Islamic Republic.

In light of these reports, there are three critical questions that Western and Middle Eastern government leaders and intelligence analysts are likely grappling with. First, is an Israeli strike more likely now than in the past? Second, what would be the consequences, regional and global, of such a strike? And third, perhaps just as sobering a question as number two, what are the consequences of not reigning in Iranian nuclear ambitions, through military force or otherwise, over the course of the next 12 months?

The Reality for Israel:

Of all the enemies in the region, Iran likely concerns Israel the most. The apocalyptic rhetoric of President Ahmadinejad, coupled with Iranian interference in the region (such as supposedly providing arms shipments to Hezbollah), make Iran a clear and present danger in Israeli eyes. Add to this that Israel has rarely shied away from doing whatever it feels necessary to defend itself against nuclear threats (remember the raids on Osirak, Iraq in 1981 and a suspected nuclear weapons-related site in Syria in 2007). It is likely that few doubt that the will is there to conduct an offensive operation against Tehran. And given that Western suspicions of Iranian intent with its nuclear program seem to be supported, at least in part, by International Atomic Energy Agency declarations that recent Iranian uranium production is in violation of UN Resolutions, it is difficult to believe that Israel is planning for a peaceful resolution of the current crisis.

It is no secret that Prime Minister Netanyahu would rather that the United States step up and take the necessary steps to decisively remove the threat of a nuclear Iran. Reportedly, however, there is a growing belief that President Obama has no intention of invading another Middle Eastern country. In Israeli eyes, this reality further limits their available responses.

The Reality for the Arab World

No one in the Arab world wants a nuclear-armed Iran. At least, no one in the governments of the Arab nations. As recently as July, the UAE Ambassador to the US stated flatly “We cannot live with a nuclear Iran.” But in a potentially astonishing change in Arab attitudes, the 2010 Arab Public Opinion Poll indicates that not only do 57 percent of the poll respondents believed that Iran’s nuclear program is intended to develop nuclear weapons, but these respondents also believed this to be a positive thing.

If these poll numbers are even close to reality (and in their analysis of this poll the Washington Times does highlight some who were skeptical of the polling methodology), it should be taken as a warning. Rarely has the “Arab Street” been overly sympathetic to the theocracy in Tehran. Ethnic divisions (Persian versus Arab) and religious differences (Sunni versus Shi’a) have traditionally established a suspicious gulf between Iran and the rest of the Arab Middle East. If the bitter feelings towards Israel and the U.S. have metastasized to the point that Arabs are willing to live under the shadow of a nuclear Iran, then such solidarity could help unleash a much more unified uprising against Arab governments that are seen as giving tacit support to an Israeli strike against fellow Muslims.

Israel and the West need to look beyond a potential strike, to the aftermath of military intervention. Even assuming that the strikes are successful, and all major sites in Iran are destroyed or seriously degraded, what kind of world will exist afterwards? Among the most grim possibilities are a wider war, as Iran retaliates and begins to draw in the United States and the surrounding regional states; a unified Muslim (versus a unified Arab) uprising in the Middle East against Western interests; and economic seizures and crippling oil disruptions. Add to that the ever present threat of the overthrow of (relatively) friendly Arab governments (many of whom would delight in seeing Iranian power checked by Israel) and seeing them replaced with radical extremists just as dedicated to the destruction of Israel as Iran.

The options for dealing with Tehran grow more severe and potentially painful the closer the world moves to a nuclear Iran. The more Iran continues to play the same cat and mouse game that Saddam played before 2003, the more likely the world will face the same consequences, only this time potentially more severe.

Ron Radosh » Obama’s Indecision and the Iranian Bomb.

Does President Obama even know what he wants? Having what appeared to be an endorsement of the Cordoba Project mosque being built on Ground Zero, the New York Times ran the headline: “Obama Strongly Backs Islam Center Near 9/11 Site.” Suddenly late Saturday, the president ran for cover and told both Politico and the New York Times “that he wasn’t endorsing the specific project but making a general plea for religious tolerance toward all.” As the once paper of record reported on Saturday, “ he was ‘not commenting on the wisdom’ of that project, but rather trying to uphold the broader principle that government should treat ‘everyone equal, regardless’ of religion.”

The White House press office quickly explained, “Just to be clear, the president is not backing off in any way from the comments he made last night” — except, just to be clear, he is backing off from them. Can we be any more confused? In seeking his outreach to the Muslim world, the president now seems to be emulating the Arab leaders whose respect he courts — the same leaders who regularly say one thing to their own constituency and something else when talking to the West. But in this case, the president was addressing Americans on both nights — and hence made obviously contradictory statements, only one of which can be true.

Is it then any wonder that when it comes to what the Israelis think of Obama, they are totally confused and perplexed when they try to figure out what he really thinks of their nation and of America’s “special relationship” with it? In this regard, one must turn to the very important and penetrating lead article in the latest issue of The Atlantic by their star reporter on the Middle East, Jeffrey Goldberg.

I cannot think of a more essential article than the one Goldberg has just published. He has talked and spoken to every important player on both sides of the world, including a one-on-one with Benjamin Netanyahu a short time before he was sworn in as prime minister. Goldberg leaves Israel with the thought that if sanctions against Iran do not work by next spring — and few believe that they will — then Israel will have no option left but to bomb Iran. Of course, it would be better if the United States, and not Israel, did the job. But would Obama do it if all signs point to its necessity? The key paragraph in Goldberg’s article comes at the beginning of his long essay:

“But none of these things—least of all the notion that Barack Obama, for whom initiating new wars in the Middle East is not a foreign-policy goal, will soon order the American military into action against Iran—seems, at this moment, terribly likely. What is more likely, then, is that one day next spring, the Israeli national-security adviser, Uzi Arad, and the Israeli defense minister, Ehud Barak, will simultaneously telephone their counterparts at the White House and the Pentagon, to inform them that their prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has just ordered roughly one hundred F-15Es, F-16Is, F-16Cs, and other aircraft of the Israeli air force to fly east toward Iran—possibly by crossing Saudi Arabia, possibly by threading the border between Syria and Turkey, and possibly by traveling directly through Iraq’s airspace, though it is crowded with American aircraft. (It’s so crowded, in fact, that the United States Central Command, whose area of responsibility is the greater Middle East, has already asked the Pentagon what to do should Israeli aircraft invade its airspace. According to multiple sources, the answer came back: do not shoot them down.)”

So we evidently will not stop Israeli aircraft from doing the job, but we will leave it to them. The reason they will do so, Goldberg writes, is rather simple: “[T]he Israelis will tell their American counterparts that they are taking this drastic step because a nuclear Iran poses the gravest threat since Hitler to the physical survival of the Jewish people. The Israelis will also state that they believe they have a reasonable chance of delaying the Iranian nuclear program for at least three to five years. They will tell their American colleagues that Israel was left with no choice. They will not be asking for permission, because it will be too late to ask for permission.”

FT.com / US & Canada – US issues arms deal ultimatum to Turkey.

By Daniel Dombey in Washington

Published: August 15 2010 23:05 | Last updated: August 15 2010 23:05