Posted tagged ‘U.S.’

Erdogan slams US on Syria again, days after Biden visit

December 1, 2014

Erdogan slams US on Syria again, days after Biden visit, Al-Monitor, Week in Review, November 30, 2014

U.S. VP Biden meets with Turkey's President Erdogan in IstanbulUS Vice President Joe Biden (L) meets with Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at Beylerbeyi Palace in Istanbul, Nov. 22, 2014. (photo by REUTERS/Murad Sezer)

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan calls US “impertinent” on Syria, says West likes seeing Muslim children die; Israel considers extension of Iran nuclear talks as better than a bad deal.

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Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on Nov. 26 that he is “against impertinence, recklessness and endless demands” coming from “12,000 kilometers away” (7,456 miles), his latest not-so-veiled rebuke of US policy toward Syria.

Erdogan’s outburst came four days after US Vice President Joe Biden departed Turkey. Biden, the latest in a seemingly endless stream of senior US official visitors to Ankara, spoke of the “depth” of the US-Turkish relationship and how the United States “needs” Turkey. The US vice president praised Turkey’s turnaround, for now, in its ties with Iraq, as reported this week by Semih Idiz, and Turkey’s handling of close to 1.6 million Syrian refugees (the UN High Commissioner for Refugees puts the number at approximately 1.1 million).

Despite the predictable deadening public platitudes, Biden’s visit, like those of other senior US officials, was a flop for the anti-Islamic State (IS) coalition. Erdogan prefers to hold his support against IS as ransom for a US-backed buffer or no-fly zone inside Syria. Not that the Turkish president, or others hawking such a plan, present any “day after” strategies for Syria; explain how a buffer zone or “doubling down” on the Syrian opposition would do anything more than prolong the war and wreck what remains of the Syrian state; lay out how the United States can avoid another Libya or another Iraq (that is, a failed state or a prolonged occupation) if it pursues regime change in Syria; identify where a post-transition stabilization force may come from given the limitations of Syrian rebel forces; or explain why the jihadists would not gain the upper hand in a divided post-Assad Syria with such a weak and fragmented opposition.

Turkey’s unwillingness to combat IS and other terrorist groups stands in contrast with US allies Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Bahrain, as well as Iran, all of whom have concerns about US policy but are nonetheless engaged in combat operations against terrorists in Syria and Iraq.

Bruce Riedel explains how Saudi Arabia, which uncovered an IS-linked cell operating in the kingdom this week, is struggling with managing the threat from IS and its regional rivalry with Iran, but is nonetheless playing a leading role in the anti-IS coalition. Hossein Mousavian points out that among the “ground forces” combating IS, besides US-supported Syrian rebel forces, are the Iraqi and Syrian armies and Hezbollah, which are all backed by Iran. According to Mousavian, Tehran could be ready to do more if a nuclear deal is reached. Ali Hashem reports this week on Hezbollah’s role in Iraq, and Ali Mamouri chronicles the higher profile role that Iran Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani is playing with Iraqi forces battling IS. Iraqi Kurdistan Region President Massoud Barzani, whose forces are also on the frontlines of the battle against IS, praised Iran’s role, saying in August that “Iran was the first country to provide us with weapons and ammunition” to confront the IS advance toward Erbil. Syrian government warplanes bombed Raqqa, an IS stronghold, on Nov. 25, although the United States accused Syria of killing many civilians in the process. US-led coalition forces also conducted airstrikes against IS forces in Raqqa this week.

Erdogan appears to be the odd man out in the coalition, compared with the actions of the other regional powers, and his policies and statements should raise broader questions about the direction of Turkish foreign policy, including what it means for Turkey’s membership bid in the EU and its role in NATO. Idiz writes that Erdogan appears to be turning his back on Turkey’s EU membership bid. On Nov. 28, the eve of Pope Francis’ visit to Turkey, Erdogan offered the following about Western countries: “Believe me, they don’t like us,” AFP reported him as saying. “They look like friends, but they want us dead — they like seeing our children die. How long will we stand that fact?”

The United States might soon tire of the all-pain, no-gain appeals to Turkey and simply ask Erdogan to pick a side in the US war against terrorists, making clear, as US President Barack Obama recently said, that the United States is not planning to remove Syrian President Bashar al-Assad at this time. Turkey is a critical US ally that must play a constructive role in Syria and the region, but the trends are becoming alarming. The United States, for its part, does not “need” Turkish bases to train anti-IS or anti-Assad rebels, does not “need” Turkish troops in Syria, and certainly does not “need” a buffer or no-fly zone, unless Washington is longing for a quagmire. What the coalition “needs” is for Turkey to crack down, hard, on the terrorist transit, trade and financial networks operating through Turkey into Syria, which have contributed to the rise of these groups over the past three years. Turkey’s intensified efforts at border security and counterterrorism cooperation would be a major contribution to the coalition. It does not seem to be an unreasonable ask, even if Ankara disagrees with the US approach to Assad.

As this column wrote on Nov. 16, it is the prospect of a nuclear deal with Iran, and the potential for regional cooperation with Iran, that is the key to a settlement of many of the region’s problems, including a political settlement in Syria and whether Assad stays or goes: “US interests in both defeating IS and securing a political settlement to end the Syria war depend on Iran’s good offices in Damascus. The United States cannot deal with Assad, but Iran can. Iran, like Washington’s regional allies, has a high tolerance for the spilling of Syrian blood. If the United States wants to deal Iran out in Syria, especially in the context of a bid to oust Assad, then Iran’s card will be to make the awful situation in Syria go from bad to worse. Iran is not necessarily immovable on Assad’s survival. Iran’s four-point plan for Syria includes a decentralization of power away from the Syrian presidency. Iranian officials privately signal that Assad may not be untouchable, under the right conditions, but such conversations — if they are to bear fruit — can only occur with Iran in a spirit of collaboration, not confrontation. Otherwise, Iran will simply hunker down, and the war will go on.”

Israel OK with extension of Iran nuclear talks

The seven-month extension of the P5+1 nuclear talks with Iran has sparked reactions across the region. Laura Rozen reports from Vienna that progress was made as the Nov. 24 deadline approached but observers are still divided on whether this can be turned into a finished deal in the upcoming months.

Ben Caspit writes of the furious diplomatic effort by Israel to fend off what it would consider a bad deal: “Israel has invested enormous amounts of energy in this. Over the past few months, and especially in the last few weeks, Minister of Intelligence Yuval Steinitz, who has coordinated these efforts, has become a ‘frequent flyer,’ plowing through the relevant capitals right and left. And Steinitz wasn’t alone in this. Senior Israeli intelligence officials also made frequent trips abroad to present their colleagues in different relevant capitals with intelligence documents, intelligence per se, and plenty of new information obtained by the Mossad and other Israeli intelligence agencies about the dangers inherent in that ‘bad agreement.’

“As the deadline approached this week, Steinitz intensified his activities, making two more quick visits, to London and to Paris, and meeting with German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Steinitz’s message, backed as always with intelligence reports, expert assessments and various analyses: ‘The agreement under discussion is a terrible agreement. It leaves room for huge potential breaches, which means that it is propped up on weak foundations. If those gaps are not sealed, it would be preferable to avoid reaching any agreement whatsoever than to sign the current one.’”

Retired Israel Defense Forces Gen. Michael Herzog writes that Israel views the extension of the talks as the least of all possible evils, “The truth is that Israel’s ability to influence the relationship between Iran and the West has reduced considerably. The credibility of its military option (which still exists) has decreased in the eyes of the United States and Iran, and its tense relationship with US President Barack Obama’s administration makes it difficult to engage in open dialogue between the two country’s top leaders. At this stage, as long as Iran is not hurtling toward the critical nuclear threshold, all that is left for Israel to do is to maintain the hope that Iran will continue to be intransigent, and that the US Congress will continue to play tough.”

 

What do Kobani airdrops mean for regional politics?

October 21, 2014

What do Kobani airdrops mean for regional politics? Al-MonitorAmberin Zaman, October 20, 2014

Smoke and flames rise over Syrian town of Kobani after an airstrikeSmoke and flames rise over the Syrian town of Kobani after an airstrike, as seen from the Mursitpinar crossing on the Turkish-Syrian border in the southeastern town of Suruc, Oct. 20, 2014. The United States told Turkey that a US military airdrop of arms to Syrian Kurds battling the Islamic State in Kobani was a response to a crisis situation and did not represent a change in US policy. (photo by REUTERS/Kai Pfaffenbach

The US will use its new leverage over the PYD to push the Kurds to engage with factions opposed to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, particularly the Free Syrian Army. The YPG’s existing battleground alliance with various rebel factions will, therefore, probably expand.

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On Oct. 19, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that it had conducted multiple airdrops near the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobani, which has remained under siege by Islamic State (IS) fighters for more than a month. CENTCOM said US C-13 cargo planes had made multiple drops of arms, ammunition, and medical supplies provided by Kurdish authorities in Iraq. The move is set to have a profound effect on regional balances between Turkey, the Kurds and the United States that will likely reverberate in Tehran and in Damascus as well.

For several weeks now, the US and its allies have been bombing IS positions around Kobani. But the delivery of weapons takes the de facto alliance between the Syrian Kurds and the United States to a new level.

Turkey, which borders Kobani, is best positioned to help the Syrian Kurds. But the country’s ruling Justice and Development (AKP) party has spurned repeated Syrian Kurdish demands to allow weapons and fighters to cross through Turkey into the Syrian Kurdish enclave. On Oct. 18, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), whose armed wing the People’s Protection Units (YPG) is battling IS in Kobani, were “the same as the PKK. “It’s a terrorist organization. It would be very, very wrong to expect us to openly say ‘yes’ to our NATO ally America to give this kind of [armed] support [to the PYD],” Erdogan declared.

Erdogan was referring to the PYD’s close links to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has been fighting on and off for self-rule inside Turkey since 1984. The PKK is on the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations, and until last month successive US administrations refused to have any contact either with the PKK or the PYD. But the PKK and the YPG’s effectiveness against IS both in Iraq and Syria has triggered a paradigm shift in US strategic thinking. The US and the Syrian Kurds are now allies in the war against IS.

US Secretary of State John Kerry told reporters in Jakarta, Indonesia that while the Obama administration understood Turkey’s concerns, it would have been “irresponsible” and “morally difficult” not to support the Syrian Kurds in their fight against IS.

Kerry said IS had chosen to “make this a ground battle, attacking a small group of people there who, while they are an offshoot group of the folks that our friends the Turks oppose, they are valiantly fighting ISIL and we cannot take our eye off the prize here.” Kerry stressed, however, that it was “a momentary effort” and that the US had “made it very clear” to Turkey that it “is not a shift in the policy of the United States.”

Kerry’s words came hours after US President Barack Obama spoke over the telephone with Erdogan about Kobani. News emerged soon after that Turkey would be allowing Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga fighters to cross through Turkey into Kobani carrying fresh weapons for the YPG. How in the space of 48 hours did Turkey go from calling the PYD terrorists to opening an arms corridor for them?

As analysts ponder these dizzying changes, here a few immediate factors to consider:

      1. Turkey could have led the effort to support anti-IS forces in Kobani by letting arms and fighters through its borders weeks ago. This would have bolstered the peace process between Turkey and its own Kurds, while averting the public relations disaster caused by images of Turkish tanks and soldiers looking on as the Syrian Kurds battled IS in Kobani, thereby reinforcing claims that “Turkey supports IS.

      2. The fact that Turkey was forced into opening a corridor to Kobani only after the US informed Ankara that it would go ahead with the airdrops anyway only increases doubts about Turkey’s commitment to working with its Western partners. It also plays into the hands of Erdogan’s domestic rivals, who will now say he is America’s poodle and that the US is using the PKK to tame Turkey.

      3. One big question is whether the recent days’ events mean that the PYD will move away from the PKK. The likely answer is that the PKK will seek to move closer to the US. The PKK has already established a channel of communication with the US via the PYD in Syria, and is also fighting alongside US-supported Kurdish peshmerga forces in Iraq. Any attempt to drive a wedge between the PYD and the PKK is doomed to fail. Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned founder and leader of their PKK, commands the loyalty of Syrian and Turkish Kurds alike.

      4. Any US-PKK dialogue would make the PKK less likely to resume violence against the Turkish army, as this would tarnish its burgeoning legitimacy. Turkey could yet turn the situation to its advantage and make goodwill gestures to the Syrian Kurds. These could include opening the sealed border with the PYD-controlled town of Serkaniye (Ras al Ain). The fact that US drones flew drone reconnaissance missions over Kobani out of the Incirlik air base has gone largely unnoticed in the media. So Turkey actually has helped, but chose not to advertise this.

      5. The Kurds adeptly used the media and global public opinion — which depicted them as the region’s secular, pro-Western force, a space formerly occupied by Turkey — to draw the US into the battle for Kobani. The battle for Kobani then became a symbol of the contest between IS and the coalition, one that the US could no longer afford to lose. Moreover, the concentration of IS forces around Kobani allowed the US to inflict heavy losses on IS fighters.

      6. Iraqi Kurdish President Massoud Barzani is probably unhappy about US engagement with the PYD/PKK, which he views as rivals. But, unlike Turkey, he has turned the situation to his own advantage by projecting himself as a benevolent leader who has aided fellow Kurds in their time of need.

      7. The US will use its new leverage over the PYD to push the Kurds to engage with factions opposed to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, particularly the Free Syrian Army. The YPG’s existing battleground alliance with various rebel factions will, therefore, probably expand.

      8. Is the de facto non-aggression pact between the Syrian regime and the Kurds coming unstuck? It’s too early to say, because the US insists that its military intervention in Syria is limited to countering IS. The Kurds are likely to continue to hedge their bets for as long as they can.

      9. And what of the PYD’s other primary benefactor, Iran? Will its friendship with the Americans anger the clerics? Much will depend on whether the US and Iran can reach a deal over Iran’s nuclear program. Should the talks fail, the PKK may become an instrument of US policy to be used against Iran.

      10. Any alliance in the Middle East should never be taken for granted.

 

U.S. Humanitarian Aid Going to ISIS

October 20, 2014

U.S. Humanitarian Aid Going to ISIS, Daily BeastJamie Dettmer, October 19, 2014

Not only are foodstuffs, medical supplies—even clinics—going to ISIS, the distribution networks are paying ISIS ‘taxes’ and putting ISIS people on their payrolls.

While aid is still going into ISIS-controlled areas, only a little is going into Kurdish areas in northeast Syria.

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GAZIANTEP, Turkey — While U.S. warplanes strike at the militants of the so-called Islamic State in both Syria and Iraq, truckloads of U.S. and Western aid has been flowing into territory controlled by the jihadists, assisting them to build their terror-inspiring “Caliphate.”

The aid—mainly food and medical equipment—is meant for Syrians displaced from their hometowns, and for hungry civilians. It is funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development, European donors, and the United Nations. Whether it continues is now the subject of anguished debate among officials in Washington and European. The fear is that stopping aid would hurt innocent civilians and would be used for propaganda purposes by the militants, who would likely blame the West for added hardship.

The Bible says if your enemy is hungry, feed him, and if he is thirsty, give him something to drink—doing so will “heap burning coals” of shame on his head. But there is no evidence that the militants of the Islamic State, widely known as ISIS or ISIL, feel any sense of disgrace or indignity (and certainly not gratitude) receiving charity from their foes.

Quite the reverse, the aid convoys have to pay off ISIS emirs (leaders) for the convoys to enter the eastern Syrian extremist strongholds of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, providing yet another income stream for ISIS militants, who are funding themselves from oil smuggling, extortion and the sale of whatever they can loot, including rare antiquities from museums and archaeological sites.

“The convoys have to be approved by ISIS and you have to pay them: the bribes are disguised and itemized as transportation costs,” says an aid coordinator who spoke to The Daily Beast on the condition he not be identified in this article. The kickbacks are either paid by foreign or local non-governmental organizations tasked with distributing the aid, or by the Turkish or Syrian transportation companies contracted to deliver it.

And there are fears the aid itself isn’t carefully monitored enough, with some sold off on the black market or used by ISIS to win hearts and minds by feeding its fighters and its subjects. At a minimum the aid means ISIS doesn’t have to divert cash from its war budget to help feed the local population or the displaced persons, allowing it to focus its resources exclusively on fighters and war making, say critics of the aid.

One of the striking differences between ISIS and terror groups of the past is its desire to portray the territory it has conquered as a well organized and smoothly functioning state. “The soldiers of Allah do not liberate a village, town or city, only to abandon its residents and ignore their needs,” declares the latest issue of the group’s slick online magazine, “Dabiq.” Elsewhere in the publication are pictures of slaughtered Kurdish soldiers and a gruesome photograph of American journalist Steven Sotloff’s severed head resting on top of his body. But this article shows ISIS restoring electricity in Raqqah, running a home for the elderly and a cancer treatment facility in Ninawa, and cleaning streets in other towns.

Last year, a polio outbreak in Deir ez-Zor raised concerns throughout the region about the spread of an epidemic. The World Health Organization worked with the Syrian government and with opposition groups to try to carry out an immunization campaign. This has continued. In response to a query by The Daily Beast, a WHO spokesperson said, “Our information indicates that vaccination campaigns have been successfully carried out by local health workers in IS-controlled territory.”

“I am alarmed that we are providing support for ISIS governance,” says Jonathan Schanzer, a Mideast expert with the Washington D.C.-based think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “By doing so we are indemnifying the militants by satisfying the core demands of local people, who could turn on ISIS if they got frustrated.”

U.S. and Western relief agencies have been caught before in an aid dilemma when it comes to the war on terror. Last December, the Overseas Development Institute, an independent British think tank focusing on international development and humanitarian issues, reported that aid agencies in Somalia had been paying militants from the al Qaeda offshoot al-Shabab for access to areas under their control during the 2011 famine.

Al-Shabab demanded from the agencies what it described as “registration fees” of up to $10,000. And in many cases al-Shabab insisted on distributing the aid, keeping much of it for itself, according to ODI. The think tank cited al-Shabab’s diversion of food aid in the town of Baidoa, where it kept between half and two-thirds of the food for its own fighters. The researchers noted the al Qaeda affiliate developed a highly sophisticated system of monitoring and co-opting the aid agencies, even setting up a “Humanitarian Co-ordination Office.”

Something similar appears to be underway now in the Syrian provinces of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor.

Aid coordinators with NGOs partnering USAID and other Western government agencies, including Britain’s Department for International Development, say ISIS insist that the NGOs, foreign and local, employ people ISIS approves on their staffs inside Syria. “There is always at least one ISIS person on the payroll; they force people on us,” says an aid coordinator. “And when a convoy is being prepared, the negotiations go through them about whether the convoy can proceed. They contact their emirs and a price is worked out. We don’t have to wrangle with individual ISIS field commanders once approval is given to get the convoy in, as the militants are highly hierarchical.” He adds: “None of the fighters will dare touch it, if an emir has given permission.”

That isn’t the case with other Syrian rebel groups, where arguments over convoys can erupt at checkpoints at main entry points into Syria, where aid is unloaded from Turkish tractor-trailers and re-loaded into Syrian ones.

Many aid workers are uncomfortable with what’s happening. “A few months ago we delivered a mobile clinic for a USAID-funded NGO,” says one, who declined to be named. “A few of us debated the rights and wrongs of this. The clinic was earmarked for the treatment of civilians, but we all know that wounded ISIS fighters could easily be treated as well. So what are we doing here helping their fighters, who we are bombing, to be treated so they can fight again?”

What becomes even more bizarre is that while aid is still going into ISIS-controlled areas, only a little is going into Kurdish areas in northeast Syria. About every three or four months there is a convoy into the key city of Qamishli. Syrian Kurds, who are now defending Kobani with the support of U.S. warplanes, have long complained about the lack of international aid. Last November, tellingly, Syrian Kurds complained that Syria’s Kurdistan was not included in a U.N. polio vaccination campaign. U.N. agencies took the position that polio vaccines should go through the Syrian Red Crescent via Damascus when it came to the Kurds.

The origins of the aid programs pre-date President Barack Obama’s decision to “degrade and defeat” ISIS, but they have carried on without major review. The aid push was to reach anyone in need. A senior State Department official with detailed knowledge of current aid programs confirmed to The Daily Beast that U.S. government funded relief is still going into Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor. He declined to estimate the quantity. But an aid coordinator, when asked, responded: “A lot .”

The State Department official said he, too, was conflicted about the programs. “Is this helping the militants by allowing them to divert money they would have to spend on food? If aid wasn’t going in, would they let people starve? And is it right for us to withhold assistance and punish civilians? Would the militants turn around,. as al-Shabab did when many agencies withdrew from Somalia, and blame the West for starvation and hunger? Are we helping indirectly the militants to build their Caliphate? I wrestle with this.”

Western NGO partners of USAID and other Western agencies declined to respond to Daily Beast inquiries about international relief going to ISIS areas, citing the complexity of the issue and noting its delicacy.

Mideast analyst Schanzer dismisses the notion that ISIS can use an aid shutdown as leverage in its PR campaign: “I think this is false. In areas they control everyone understands they are a brutal organization. This is their basic weakness and by pushing in aid we are curtailing the chances of an internal revolt, which is the best chance you have of bringing down ISIS.”

 

Manufacturing Excuses So Iran Can Get Nukes

September 24, 2014

Manufacturing Excuses So Iran Can Get Nukes, Gatestone InstitutePeter Huessy, September 24, 2014

(Islam is the religion of peace death and a nuclear armed Iran will act accordingly. — DM)

We assume Iran’s leaders will abide by the very international rules they are dedicated to destroying.

When we refer to Iranian missiles as a legitimate form of “deterrence,” we just fool ourselves into imagining that Iranian missiles, which support aggression, are no different from American and allied missiles, which prevent and deter aggression.

The U.S. has said it would not address Iran’s 30-plus years of sponsorship of terror nor is extensive ballistic missile program, even though the U.S. officially designates Iran as the leading state-sponsor of terror in the world.

While security threats have been increasingly serious, the United States and its allies have not been willing honestly to face the challenges of our time — especially from the coalition of oil-rich, rogue state sponsors of terror and their jihadist affiliates.

Instead they have been content to push for declining defense budgets and jettisoning their security obligations. This has — and is — making it increasingly difficult to find the leadership necessary to lead a coalition of nations to defeat the threats we face.

The United States is making three critical mistakes.

First, much of the deterrent effect of U.S. military power is being squandered. Not only have the U.S. and its NATO allies neglected their defense needs and cut defense budgets by a collective $2 trillion from the base budgets of 2009[1], but many leaders have adopted the view that military power is the problem, not part of the solution.

In the United States, critics of wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq have claimed that U.S. military power was the cause of much of the terrorism and aggression we see around the world. They see less military presence — even a complete withdrawal from parts of the world — as the key to a more peaceful world.[2]

This “blame America first” view was wrong in 1984 — as Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick explained then — and it is wrong now. “They [San Francisco Democrats] said that saving Grenada from terror and totalitarianism was the wrong thing to do,” Kirkpatrick said then. “They didn’t blame Cuba or the communists for threatening American students and murdering Grenadians — they blamed the United States instead. But then, somehow, they always blame America first.”[3]

The second mistake the U.S. is making is not taking the threats we face seriously. Oddly, this seems true even when we admit that the threats are real and warrant action.

In June 2000, for instance, the top administration counter-terrorism expert, Richard Clarke, told a private Congressional briefing that, “we [the U.S.] could not prioritize the terrorist threats we faced because there were too many.” He concluded that therefore the administration could not “prioritize how to spend counter-terrorism funds.”[4]

The third mistake, also one of long standing, is that we have relied on false assumptions. One is that our adversaries adhere to international law, support “stability,” hold similar humanitarian concerns and are afraid of “being isolated.”

The other is we can persuade our adversaries to change by threatening them with paying an economic price for aggressive behavior. We hope that our adversaries will fear that “tough” economic sanctions levied on them will be painful enough to compel them to stop acting aggressively.

Then we hope that our adversaries will conclude that there is no long-term benefit even to starting aggression in the first place, and that therefore a series of peaceful deals are possible — theoretically as the only “reasonable alternative” our adversaries have.

From this rosy, wishful view we often see our adversaries’ intransigence only as a reaction to our “unfair” negotiating position, or to our supposedly threatening behavior — and not due to our determination to prevent them from carrying out their aggressive designs.

The late Senator Arlen Specter, for instance, traveled to Iraq in June 1990 and concluded that Saddam Hussein was “sincere” and had no territorial designs on his neighbors. On his return to Washington, he led a successful effort to block the imposition of sanctions against Iraq by the Bush Sr. administration, arguing Saddam Hussein had no territorial ambitions against Kuwait. Two months later Saddam invaded Kuwait.[5]

Taken together, dismantling a credible military capability, minimizing dangers to our security and failing to understand the intentions of our enemies markedly increases the danger to our Republic and our allies especially at a time when strong U.S. leadership is increasingly uncertain.

Probably the most serious of these mistakes is undermining the respect once given America’s combined military and diplomatic power. The United Arab Emirates and Egypt bombed Libya this past month without consulting the U.S. — this a time when Washington believes there is an effective central government in Tripoli, a conclusion clearly not shared by the UAE or Egypt.

Adam Garfinkle of the Foreign Policy Research Institute explains with understated disbelief: “According to [US] Administration fantasists, a competent and democratically elected Libyan central government exists and is in basic control of the country—excepting maybe a little militia kerfuffle, you know—so outsiders should not be dropping ordnance on warring groups so that the United Nations can work its diplomatic magic.”

In addition, Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority is going to unveil a new initiative to resolve (he claims) the Palestinian-Israeli conflict but has announced the plan will not be shared beforehand with the United States.

When the red line on Syria’s use of chemical weapons disappeared during the first political sandstorm, it was clear the U.S. was contributing to this enfeebled state of affairs.

Meanwhile, even as U.S. intelligence sources for the past year have warned both Congress and administration officials of the expansion and growing danger to both Syria and Iraq from the armed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ISIS], it was dismissed by the administration as a “JV” [junior varsity] affiliate of the more “serious” threat of Al Qaeda.

A Congressional Reference Service had reported to Congress in June 2014: “Senior U.S. officials have [over the past year] stated that ISIL poses a serious threat to the United States and maintains training camps in Iraq and Syria”.

After three videotaped beheadings of American journalists and British aid worker, even the American people, who have no stomach for more war, are said by at least one recent poll — by an overwhelming margin approaching 90% — to want a strong U.S. response to the threat from ISIS.[6]

Withdrawing precipitously from the international arena — avoiding “war” — does not buy peace. Avoiding war buys only more bad actors who march in wherever a vacuum has been created — creating, ironically, even greater threats.

American leaders have failed to lead the country toward what needs to be done simply because what needs to be done looked unpopular.

As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned: “A free standing diplomacy is an ancient American illusion. History offers few examples of it. The attempt to separate diplomacy and power results in power lacking direction and diplomacy being deprived of incentives.”

When confronted with similar isolationist public perceptions, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President Ronald Reagan, because of their extraordinary “complete cultural self-belief” succeeded. “[T]he world shifted toward them” as they led the U.S. and Great Britain with a policy of “peace through strength,” not “peace through retreat.”

The lawyer and constitutional scholar, John W. Howard, summed matters up:

“America has squandered 60 years of assiduous diplomacy and expanding American influence in the Middle East… Successive presidents, Republican and Democrat alike, carefully navigated the esoteric alleyways of shifting Middle Eastern politics to American advantage. American primacy was solidified by the decline and collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving a uni-polar sphere of influence. If there is one principle underlying Middle Eastern political culture, it is an acute sense of the importance and consequences of power and alliances.”

In confronting even those threats we admit must be faced, consider the deployment of missile defenses in Europe. They are a good thing, especially if you happen to be a state near Russia.

Many in the media, Hollywood, politics and academia, however, have charged that U.S. missile defense deployments in Europe “might upset the Russians” or “fuel an arms race.”

Their criticism started with the first proposed defense deployments early in the George W. Bush administration and continued long after the Polish and Czech governments had agreed to install the missiles and their associated radars.

The Bush-era pledge of a missile defense shield was scrapped, however, in 2009 by the current U.S. administration. Today, as Russia violates the Budapest memorandum of 1994 by invading Ukraine, we are still — again! — told that the new deployments of missile defense elements will “inflame tensions.”[7]

The missile defense components in Europe, specifically those now in Spain and England, but also those planned for Poland and Romania, were initiated primarily in response to missiles deployed by Iran, not the other way around.

Today, it is both Russian and Iranian missiles that are creating tensions. Both countries are carrying out terrorist acts or acts of aggression, safe in the belief that they are secure from being challenged because there is no threat from the West or its missiles.

This lack of seriousness extends to our allies as well. We are about to deploy a limited number of new THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Air Defenses] batteries in South Korea. These missile defenses are also a good thing, especially if you happen to be a state near North Korea, Russia or China.

But a spokesman for the South Korean government felt compelled to reassure Russia and China that the missile defenses are “only to protect American troops” and not part of any emerging South Korean “missile defense cooperative effort” with the United States.[8]

Conversely, Russia threatens to deploy Iskander nuclear-tipped missiles in the Crimea along with other nuclear-armed cruise missiles with the range to threaten all of Western Europe. Missiles of between 500-5500 kilometers are currently forbidden by the 1987 U.S.-Russia INF treaty — an agreement the US has formerly charged Russia with violating. If such missiles were deployed in the Crimea, their range could cover all of Europe.

Opponents of U.S. and NATO missile defense deployments admit Russia has already deployed such threatening missiles even absent any US missile defense. However, they are already charging that should the U.S. accelerate its plans for missile defenses in Europe to defend against these Russian missiles, “it would do nothing to reduce the Russian threat and would likely give Moscow reason to move Iskander short-range missiles closer to NATO.”[9]

In the face of recent Russian aggression against Ukraine, the U.S. initially put into place only relatively weak and limited sanctions against certain Moscow entities.

One part of those sanctions would prohibit prominent Russians from banking in New York City, but Russians have long since moved their money out of Russia, and would certainly not give up their pretensions to reconstituting their empire; they will continue to try to “shoot” Ukraine back into being the subsidiary of a new Russian state.

Since then, U.S. sanctions have been measurably strengthened, but the first action was what was noticed, and it was lacking in seriousness. Even today, as it is still not clear what further sanctions the U.S. is prepared to put into place, the sheer lack of resolve is associated with a lack of seriousness.

Another example of the U.S. lack of seriousness regarding national security threats is what former Army War College Russian expert Steve Blank calls the “cottage industry” of manufacturing excuses for Russian aggression.

One essay published by The Nation proclaimed that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine was really not an invasion because, after all, Ukraine was not a real country. The essay went on to excuse Russian aggression even further with the explanation that the “non-invasion” had simply taken place out of concern for “corruption” in the Kiev government — corruption being long known as a key concern of the Russian government![10]

Then, in addition to making excuses for our enemies, we go out of our way to announce to our adversaries that the U.S. military power will be used only in a very limited way. Airstrikes are to be only “pin pricks.” Military campaigns are advertised as “unbelievably small.” There will be “no boots on the ground,” or only “for limited objectives” or “only to protect American personnel.”

Years ago, President Eisenhower is reported to have warned his successor: “Never tell your enemies what you willnot do.”[11] Minimalist tactics, while perhaps popular, denote a lack of seriousness, which our adversaries see as incentives for continuing their aggression, while our friends further doubt our resolve and strength.

We appear to pick only those tools of war designed not to upset our political supporters rather than the tools needed to get the job done.

Then we assume that our enemies actually share some of our common objectives — such as “stability”, not being “isolated” and wanting “approval” from the “international community.”

The U.S. also deliberately handicaps itself by apparently believing that some kind of UN-sponsored “deal” — which no one will implement, that is if they even try — purporting to uphold international law, is the only workable solution to the threats we face.

After 9/11, Admiral James Loy, the Commander of the Coast Guard, explained to the author how helpful the United Nations International Maritime Organization [IMO] was in working to guard against attacks on our ports. The IMO effort was successful, he explained, because members of most host countries, and associated private commercial interests, all had an extremely strong economic interest in maintaining free trade and international commerce.[12]

Other U.N. institutions, however, are far less serious in the extreme. Not only has the UN’s Human Rights Council, for example, been chaired by Iran, but its current members include such “champions” of human rights such as Venezuela, Cuba, China, Pakistan, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. Further, over 70% of all the council’s past decade of inquiries have been about the supposed crimes or human rights violations of the only open, transparent, democratic human-rights adherent in the region: Israel.

The newest U.N.-approved inquiry about Gaza is being directed by London professor William Schabas, a Canadian citizen who reportedly refuses to describe Hamas as a terrorist outfit. That the U.S. continues to fund nearly a quarter of the budget of such a fraud once again shows the degree of contempt in which the U.S. holds its taxpayers.

Nowhere is this disingenuousness more evident than in the more than three decades of U.S. relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. During this period, the U.S. has engaged in a variety of charades with Tehran, always with the Americans assuming that they would end with a deal in which the U.S. would no longer be the “Great Satan” and the mullahs would no longer seek nuclear weapons.[13]

In the current discussions with Iran over its nuclear program, however, the U.S. has said it would not address Iran’s 30-plus years of sponsorship of terror nor its major ballistic missile production programs — even though the U.S. officially designates Tehran as the leading state-sponsor of terror in the world and has repeatedly assessed its missile programs as dangerous.

The U.S. also seems not to understand that Iran calls America the “great arrogance” for a reason — because America was the major country putting together the “rules of the road” internationally after World War II.

Naturally, it is precisely these rules or “norms” — such as those governing international trade, the right to have nuclear weapons, which currencies are convertible, and, most critically, the rules against the use of force, assassinations and terrorism in conducting international relations — that Tehran seems to want to drop into the next ash-heap of what it considers historically bad ideas.

There is a message there, but we are not listening. We assume Iran’s leaders will abide by the very international rules they are dedicated to destroying.[14]

The U.S. administration also seems to be trying to downplay the extent to which Tehran’s extraordinarily robust missile production program, costing tens of billions of dollars, is now a threat now to the U.S., or will be into the future.

When asked whether a third East Coast missile-defense site would be beneficial to protect America from Iranian missiles, the administration reassures the American people that the mullah’s missiles cannot reach New York. (Yet.)

Spencer Ackerman of the Washington Post, in a February 24, 2012 essay, quotes intelligence officials: “Calm down, Iran’s missiles can’t (and won’t) hit the East Coast.” Former CIA Mideast analyst Paul Pillar assures us that, “the intelligence community does not believe the Iranians are anywhere close to having an ICBM”.

Even when the U.S. acknowledges that Iranian missiles can hit targets throughout the Middle East and much of Europe, especially U.S. allies and key security facilities, some intelligence analysts find a way to make such missiles seem less threatening.

709An Iranian “Khalij Fars” mobile ballistic missile on parade in Iran. (Image source: Wikimedia Commons)

U.S. intelligence reports to Congress, for example, proclaim in all seriousness that Iran’s missiles, and even its nuclear programs, exist merely to ensure regime survival.

The Arms Control Association, for instance, approvingly quotes an administration report that, “Since the revolution, Iran’s first priority has consistently remained the survival of the regime” and that is why they are building and deploying ballistic missiles.

Iran’s missiles, we are told, are a “deterrent.” The deterrent, it is implied — is to protect Iran from the US and its allies.

Well, who can argue with that? Without their missiles and their nuclear weapons program (which, we are repeatedly assured they do not have — yet), they would be wide open to a U.S. invasion, don’t you see? And if the United States or Israel has nuclear weapons, why cannot Iran? So, the thinking seems to go, if we just leave Iran alone, then Iran’s missiles and bombs might very well go away.

This viewpoint is more widespread than many might believe. The former Director General of the United Nations International Atomic Energy Administration [IAEA], Mohamed Mustafa ElBaradei, admonished the United States and the Bush administration: “You can’t bomb your way through countries” to stop nuclear proliferation. He was implying that the U.S wanted to end nuclear proliferation in Iran, Iraq and Libya to give the U.S. a free hand to commit serial aggression against them.

During his entire time as head of the IAEA, ElBaradei also repeatedly downplayed or ignored the nuclear weapons threats from North Korea, Iran and Iraq. He said it was unfair for some countries such as the U.S. to have nuclear weapons while denying them to others, such as Iran.

He was also opposed to the liberation of Iraq, and claimed that the use of military force made terrorist problems worse. He ridiculed the U.S. and British elimination of the Libyan nuclear program largely because his agency, the IAEA, had “mysteriously” missed its very existence although it was their responsibility to monitor exactly such activities.[15]

One Times of India story put it this way: “Disarmament is for wimps. Go get your nukes if you can”.

The Washington Post ran an essay on December 2, 2013, in which nuclear-abolitionist Joe Cirincione of the Ploughshares Fund was quoted complaining, “Why is the U.S. okay with Israel having nuclear weapons but not Iran?” — again implying that U.S. concern over Iran’s potential nuclear proliferation was “unfair.”

A Christian Science Monitor essay concluded about the troubling lesson of Libya’s President Muammar Qaddafi giving up his nuclear weapons: that if he hadn’t, the U.S. and NATO would not have bombed him out of power.[16]

This sounds logical, but it is wrong. The U.S. government worked with the Libyan government to get rid of its nuclear program — which had not produced nuclear weapons fuel, let alone nuclear warheads. The two governments discussed normalizing relations after the elimination of Qaddafi’s nuclear program.

The bombing of Libya in 2011-12 took place in reaction to the terrorist threat emerging in Benghazi and the potential for mass killings in Libya. The bombing may have been misguided, but it was not triggered by Libya giving up its nuclear program in 2007.

Thus, by alleging that the US concern with Iranian or Libyan nuclear weapons programs is less than genuine, arms controllers and others in the U.S. then claim that Iran’s reluctance to abide by the rules of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty — which prohibits all but the permanent five members of the UN Security Council from having nuclear weapons — is understandable.

This view then leads to calls for even greater U.S. concessions to Iran — in order to “get a deal.” After all, it is claimed, Iran obviously has a legitimate reluctance to give ups its nuclear program with the knowledge that once Libya gave up its nuclear centrifuges in 2007, the U.S. then bombed Libya and helped overthrow the Qaddafi government four years later in 2011.

That supposed lesson is also being applied to Ukraine. In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine transferred its nuclear arsenal back to Russia with the assurance that Russia would guarantee Ukraine’s borders.

Today, some lawmakers in Kiev and critics of the 1994 deal have concluded that if Ukraine still possessed nuclear weapons, Russia would not have invaded either Crimea or Donetsk.

Yet at the time, Ukraine’s new leaders had no desire to become a new nuclear power and so they happily worked with the U.S. government to remove the Soviet-era nuclear weapons from their soil.

Glenn Greenwald, writing in the Guardian, echoes the idea that U.S. adversaries such as Iran have to keep whatever nuclear program they have because such weapons — once acquired — would allow Iran to “deter U.S. attacks.”[17]

The implication is that, as the U.S is such an out-of-control threat, Iran has every good reason to seek and build nuclear weapons.

The entire premise, however, that rogue states should resist having their nuclear programs dismantled because they are then more likely “to be invaded,” is wrong.

There are roughly 190 countries in the world with no nuclear weapons. Although they all lack nuclear weapons, the U.S., and its NATO and East Asian allies, have not invaded any of them and have no intention of invading them.

Afghanistan and the Taliban were removed from power because, with Osama bin Laden, they were partners in the 9-11 attacks.

Iraq was liberated from the murderous regime of Saddam Hussein because, since 1991, the Baghdad government had done everything not to comply with 17 UN resolutions; it had undermined and violated sanctions; it had armed and gave sanctuary to terrorists, and it remained committed to securing WMDs.[18]

When we refer to Iranian missiles as a legitimate form of “deterrence,” we just fool ourselves into imaging that Iranian missiles, which support aggression, are no different from American and allied missile defenses, whichprevent and deter aggression.

We have come to see Iran as a mirror image of ourselves. We assume Iran’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are solely for deterrence and regime survival because, after all, that is why we in the US have both nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles — to protect our security.

But Iran’s ballistic missiles and potential nuclear weapons are to protect Tehran’s projection of power and terrorist activities, which are critical to its goals of dominating the Middle East, uniting all Muslims under its version of Islamic Shariah law, and gain the prize of having control over nearly 70% of the world’s conventional oil and gas resources — a hardly benign objective.

Judging from recent failures to counter Syria, Libya, Russia and ISIS, the U.S.’s squandering of its military might, taking a casual view of threats, and misunderstanding its enemies has led it to becoming an object of ridicule, instead of an object of fear, trust or respect.

Those can only be gained through the serious waging of war — economic, political, diplomatic and militarily — until our adversaries and enemies are defeated. Only then will they cease to fight.


[1] America in Retreat: The New Isolationism and the Coming Global Disorder by Bret Stephens (forthcoming Nov 18, 2014)

[2] See Sandy Davis, Progressive Democrats of America, “We Need To End the Disastrous Failure Of The War On Terror by Sandy Davis, February 4, 2014; or ABC News Blog: “Ron Paul Recruits Anonymous to Attack Rudy’s Foreign Policy,” May 22, 2007; and Jack A. Smith, “Terrorism–Cause and Effect”, May 29, 2010, anti-War.com; and Glen Greenwald on Salon: “A Rumsfeld-era reminder about what causes Terrorism”, October 20, 2009.

[3] Jeanne Kirkpatrick “They Always Blame America” from Jim Geraghty, The Campaign Spot, National Review, April 24th, 2013.

[4] This was explained in a detailed June 2000 letter from Congressman Chris Shays to Richard Clarke following the latter’s appearance before Shays Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations of the Committee on Government Reform.

[5] This is but one example of many cited by Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute in his new book “Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes“, 2014, p. 209. Rubin notes that Senator Specter later acknowledged he had been “played by Saddam”.

[6] CNN poll as reported in FDD, 8 Sept 2014, “Majority of Americans Alarmed by ISIS”

[7] MDA Digest, September 4, 2014

[8] MDA Digest, September 4, 2014

[9] MDA Digest, August 29, 2014; and Tom Collina, “Nukes are Not the Answer to Containing Russia,” in Breaking Defense, April 11, 2014

[10] Stephen Cohen cited in the Daily Kos, February 20, 2014, “Stephen Cohen accuses Obama Administration of Coup Attempt in Ukraine” by Mark Lippman

[11] This quote was referenced by General Jack Keane, (US Army-Ret) on Fox News, Monday September 8, 2014.

[12] Admiral John Loy told me this about the IMU in a 2006 conversation we had at one of my NDUF Congressional breakfast seminars where he was the featured speaker. For an excellent review of the distortions of the UN see “UN Perversion of Human Rights“, J. Puder, Frontpage, September 8, 2014.

[13] Michael Ledeen in his “Accomplice to Evil: Iran and the War Against the West”, 2009; and Michael Ledeen, “How to Protect Against a Bad Deal With Iran“, The Hill, July 9, 2014.

[14] In a January 2014 Carnegie Europe report titled “Tehran Calling: Understanding a New Iranian Leadership”, Cornelius Adebahr says the norms Iran has had difficulty adhering to are “prohibitions against using assassinations and terrorism as legitimate tools of diplomacy” although he says the use of such tools by Iran is only “alleged” although he does admit “Iran does not accept all norms governing today’s international system”.

[15] Match Blog, October 26, 2004 and Ben Smith in Politico, January 31, 2011, quoting Malcolm Hoenlein, of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations.

[16] See Reza Sanati, in the Christian Science Monitor, August 30, 2011, “A troubling lesson from Libya: Don’t give up nukes”. And NewsMax, “Ukraine Pays Price for US Advice to Give Up Nuclear Weapons” March 20, 2014; Ukrainian legislator Pavlo Rizanenko sums up the Crimea crisis: “If you have nuclear weapons, people don’t invade you.” See also “Ukraine’s Broken Nuclear Promises”, by Owen Matthews, March 19, 2014, Newsweek.

[17] Critics of US policy toward North Korea and Iran often assert both rogue states have or seek nuclear weapons to deter the United States from attacking — a variation on the “Always Blame America First Theme”. Here are two such essays: “DPRK Briefing Book: Confronting Ambiguity: How to Handle North Korea’s Nuclear Program”, by Phillip Saunders, Arms Control Association, March 3, 2003; and Glenn Greenwald, “The true reason US fears Iranian nukes: they can deter US attacks” in theguardian.com, Tuesday 2 October 2012. Greenwald also asserts “GOP Senator Lindsey Graham echoes a long line of US policymakers: Iran must not be allowed to deter US aggression”.

[18] On March 17, 2014, former Congressman Ron Paul wrote an essay in USA Today in which he said we have no interest in a fight “many thousands of miles from the US” about a country and people of “which we know almost nothing.” In the 2008 book “Munich: The 1938 Appeasement Crisis” by David Faber, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain is quoted saying this on September 27, 1938, just before traveling to Munich to sign a peace agreement with Chancellor Adolph Hitler:

“How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing. It seems still more impossible that a quarrel that has already been settled in principle should be the subject of war.

In light of the lack of seriousness with which we are treating the threats we face, it is instructive to refer to an exchange that reportedly took place between then Prime Minister Chamberlain and Winston Churchill. In this story Churchill told Prime Minister Chamberlain when the latter complained that preparing to defend England against Nazi aggression “might upset trade with Germany”: “Well, yes, Mr. Prime Minister”, said the representative from Epping/Woodford, “That would be the idea.”