Posted tagged ‘Islamic State’

The truth about diversity

October 8, 2014

The truth about diversity, Israel Hayom, Clifford D. May, October 8, 2014

(Please see also a satirical post by Mike at Make an Effort, in which he proposes a Middle East solution. Here’s an excerpt:

Here in the United States we have an abundance of Well Trained, Amazingly Equipped and Overly Funded Diversity Trainers.  (It’s worth noting that many of these same people are cross-trained in Sexual Harassment Education and Gender Sensitivity Issues.  All Added Value as far as my Proposal is concerned.)

I cannot believe it would take much to initiate a Mission composed of the Majority of these ‘Special Operators’ to head over to Syria and Iraq to impose Mandatory Diversity Training.  We can even make sure they wear comfortable shoes so they don’t challenge the President’s ‘No Boots on the Ground’ edict.

It may well be the best idea yet. It’s short; please read the entire thing.- DM)

Freedom may not be everyone’s cup of tea.

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In theory, we Americans are great proponents of diversity. In practice, how many of us stop to seriously consider the meaning of the word? If peoples really are diverse — if we differ not just about clothes and cuisine but over ideas, values, interests, morality, and human rights — that implies there is no “international community,” certainly not one that embraces “international norms.” For years, we’ve told ourselves the world is a “global village.” Turns out it may be more like the “several remote nations” to which Gulliver traveled.

Multiculturalists of the Left are most likely to misconstrue diversity. But there also are those on the Right who believe all human hearts yearn for freedom. By now, I think, it’s become apparent: Freedom may not be everyone’s cup of tea.

The Iranians who took to the streets chanting “Death to the dictators” in 2009: I am convinced they did — and still do — want freedom, which, at a minimum, would mean liberation from theocracy, limiting the power of the billionaire mullahs, as well as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and the Basij thugs who have oppressed ordinary Iranians since the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

Those protesting in Hong Kong now are risking life and limb to prevent Beijing Communist Party bosses from encroaching on their freedoms. Under the 1984 declaration that paved the way for the British colony to be turned over to China, Hong Kong was promised “a high degree of autonomy” for the half century following the transfer of sovereignty in 1997. The idea was not that when 2047 rolled around the people of Hong Kong would accept dictatorship with bovine passivity. Rather, it was assumed that by then dictators would have been relegated to the dustbin of history. At this point, that seems rather a long shot.

In a diverse world, there will be those who believe in peaceful coexistence and those who believe in what Franklin Roosevelt called “philosophies … based on conquest and the subjugation of other people”; those who believe that liberal democracy is the best form of governmental organization and those who prefer authoritarianism or totalitarianism; those who regard the intentional killing of other people’s children for political purposes as wrong, and those who kill other people’s children for political purposes, as well as moral relativists who say: “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”

Addressing the U.N. General Assembly last month, President Barack Obama asserted that “the future belongs to those who build, not those who destroy.” First: That’s a hope, not a fact. Second: The hundreds of young Muslim men (and some women) flocking to the Islamic State group in Syria and Iraq see no contradiction between the two.

As they destroy ancient Christian, Yazidi, Kurdish and “apostate” Muslim communities, they also intend to build a caliphate for the 21st century, an empire in the image of what they imagine Muhammad founded in the seventh century, what my colleague Reuel Marc Gerecht calls “a new conquest society.” Obama may not think that’s a useful thing to construct but, in a diverse world, he can hardly expect everyone to concur.

Similarly, Hamas wants to build “an Islamic state in Palestine, all of Palestine” as Hamas Political Bureau member Mahmoud al-Zahar said last week. That would, obviously, require the destruction of Israel, a goal to which Hamas has always been openly and unequivocally committed.

Some of the Americans and Europeans who hold up signs reading “Free Palestine” ignore that. Others are just not troubled by it. Many turn a blind eye to this, too: Wherever Islamic militants rule, freedom is limited to a choice between submission and death. In Gaza, as in Islamic State, as in the Islamic Republic of Iran, no one gets up on a soap box in the public square, speaks his mind, criticizes those in power, and then goes home for a quiet dinner with the family. In a diverse world, some people are tolerant; others jail or slaughter those who displease them.

There is diversity among Islamists. For example, Hamas, al-Qaida and Iran don’t recognize the legitimacy of Islamic State. Over the weekend, however, the Pakistani Taliban declared its allegiance to Caliph Ibrahim, as the entity’s ruler, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, now calls himself. That must have come as a disappointment to al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahri, who is al-Baghdadi’s rival (but not his enemy — there’s a difference).

There are Russians who value freedom. President Vladimir Putin is not among them. Then-president George W. Bush was mistaken when he looked into Putin’s eyes and thought he saw an aspiring democrat, just as Obama was wrong to think he could “reset” relations with Russia based on mutual respect and a shared commitment to peace and international law.

If the polls are to be believed, more than eight out of 10 Russians support Putin. An analysis by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty leads to the conclusion that most Russians value national pride and power over freedom and democracy. That’s diversity for you.

Within the U.S., diversity is most loudly trumpeted on our campuses — ironic because a scholar with unfashionable ideas has about as much chance of getting tenure as of winning the lottery. People forget that tenure was supposed to protect intellectual diversity, not abolish it.

And while many Americans continue to treasure freedom, others are more concerned with equality of outcome. There is a tension between the two because when individuals with dissimilar backgrounds, habits and talents compete in a free market they inevitably wind up in different places. But that’s not the kind of diversity most of those who claim to be championing diversity are willing to defend.

Turkey’s leaders see Kobani as opportunity, not threat

October 8, 2014

Turkey’s leaders see Kobani as opportunity, not threat, al Monitor, Amberin Zaman, October 7, 2014

A protester throws stones at an armoured army vehicle during a pro-Kurdish demonstration, near the Mursitpinar border crossing on the Turkish-Syrian border, in SurucA protester throws stones at a Turkish armored vehicle during a pro-Kurdish demonstration in solidarity with the people of Kobani, near the Mursitpinar border crossing on the Turkish-Syrian border, Oct. 7, 2014. (photo by REUTERS/Umit Bektas)

The fall of Kobani would deal a severe blow to Kurdish independence hopes and bolster Turkey’s political goals.

The town has emerged as a symbol of Kurdish resistance.

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As Islamic State (IS) fighters keep up their battle to gain control over Kobani, a strategic Syrian Kurdish-controlled enclave on Turkey’s border, the effects of the conflict are being felt in Turkey itself. Thousands of Kurds took to the streets across the country on Oct. 7 to protest Turkey’s inaction against IS’ seemingly unstoppable advance. In the southeastern town of Varto, the government slapped curfews on six provinces in the mainly Kurdish southeast region after clashes between protestors and the security forces, and between rival Kurdish groups, left at least 14 people dead. Elsewhere across the country, police clashed with demonstrators, trying to push them back with pressurized water and pepper spray while the Kurds responded with Molotov cocktails in a foretaste of the violence that is likely to engulf the country should Kobani fall.

None of this comes as a surprise. Many Kurds continue to believe that Turkey is complicit in the jihadists’ onslaught against Kobani. Cemil Bayik, one of the top commanders of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), repeated this claim in a Sept. 25 interview with Al-Monitor. Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned PKK leader, is threatening to call off peace talks with the Ankara government should there be a massacre in the enclave. Turkey denies it is siding with IS.

But it is doing little to aid the Kurds. This in turn invites the question of whether Turkey sees the Kurds as a greater threat than the jihadists, who stand to grab their third border crossing with Turkey. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan appeared to suggest that IS and the PKK were equally dangerous. “It is wrong to view them differently, we need to deal to them jointly,” he told reporters Oct. 3 in Istanbul. Erdogan’s comments hold the key to understanding Turkey’s policy on Kobani.

Turkey’s inaction over Kobani is undermining the peace process. Erdogan’s hopes of winning Kurdish support for constitutional amendments that would boost his presidential powers hang on friendship with the Kurds. A breakdown of the PKK’s 18-month-long cease-fire would likely jeopardize his ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) chances in nationwide parliamentary elections scheduled for June. None of this appears to faze the Ankara government. This is because Erdogan and his AKP disciples view Kobani as an opportunity rather than a threat.

The opportunity ought to be to win the hearts and minds of Turkey’s Kurds by riding to the rescue of their brethren in Syria. Instead, Erdogan has chosen to exploit Kobani’s imminent fall to wrest maximum concessions from assorted Kurdish leaders. This was amply on display during last week’s secret meeting in Ankara between Salih Muslim, the co-chair of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), and senior Turkish officials from the Foreign Ministry and the national intelligence agency, MIT. Muslim reportedly beseeched the officials to allow the passage of arms and, most crucially, anti-tank weapons through the Mursitpinar border crossing with Kobani to enable Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) fighters to fend off IS. Turkey said it would do so only if the PYD severed all its ties with the Syrian regime, joined the rebels, dissolved the PYD-dominated local governments running the enclaves, shared power with rival Syrian Kurdish parties and distanced itself from the PKK.

Muslim seems to have offered conflicting versions of what transpired, telling Al Jazeera that “agreement was reached in a number of areas” and the BBC that Turkey “did not keep its promises.” He has not responded to Al-Monitor’s repeated requests for comment. Either way, it’s hard to imagine that he yielded to Turkey’s demands or that he even has the authority to do so, because Ocalan and the PKK leadership in the Kandil Mountains call the final shots.

Turkey to its credit has offered sanctuary to more than 100,000 refugees from Kobani, and it is letting wounded YPG fighters in for treatment in hospitals. But Turkey would probably be happy to see Kobani fall. The town has emerged as a symbol of Kurdish resistance. It hosted Ocalan when he used to live in Syria under the patronage of the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. Kobani also has huge strategic significance. It lies between a swath of uninterrupted Kurdish-controlled towns and villages to the east collectively known as the canton of Jazeera and the Kurdish-administered town of Afrin to the southwest. The Kurds have long wanted to link the three by pushing out IS and other Syrian rebels from the areas separating them. The prospect of a Kurdish entity run by the PKK is more than Turkey, and especially its generals, can stomach.

Kobani’s fall would deal a humiliating blow to the PKK and weaken its support among Syria’s Kurds. It would also force Muslim and the PYD to patch up their differences with Massoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, who claims to be the “true leader” of all the Kurds. Although Barzani has spoken in defense of Kobani, he has yet to reproach Turkey over its stance.

Meanwhile, the PKK’s threats to resume its war sound like bluster to Turkish ears. Aaron Stein, a security analyst, told Al-Monitor, “The Turkish government is banking on the fact that the PKK can ill afford to open a second front against Turkey when it is battling IS in Iraq and in Syria.” Not only that, Ocalan would be loath to condemn himself to political irrelevance and spend the rest of his days rotting in prison. No matter how bitter, Kobani is a pill the Kurds will be forced to swallow. Ocalan will be forced to continue the peace talks, the pro-Kurdish People’s Democracy party (HDP) will play along and the PKK will hold its fire. This, anyway, seems to be Ankara’s thinking.

But it is fraught with risk.

The new generation of Kurds, as Bayik warned in his interview with Al-Monitor, is so radicalized that even the PKK finds it hard to keep them in line. Should Ocalan be perceived as capitulating to Turkey, he would lose his grip over them, too.

It was the fear of a PKK-dominated Kurdish statelet in Syria that propelled Turkey to resume peace talks with Ocalan in 2012 in the hope that he would keep the Syrian Kurds’ aspirations in check. The plan doesn’t seem to have worked. “The peace process began because of Syria’s Kurds,” recalls Arzu Yilmaz, a scholar of Kurdish affairs at Ankara University. “And it is because of them that it will unravel,” she concludes.

Editor’s Note: This piece has been updated since its initial publication.

 

 

U.S. officials: ISIS will capture Kobani, but it’s not a big concern to us

October 8, 2014

U.S. officials: ISIS will capture Kobani, but it’s not a big concern to us, CNN, Holly Yan and Elise Labott, October 8, 2014

(Please see video at the link. Turkey is not interested in helping the Kurds in Kobani, including the Kurdish fighters who are getting overwhelmed. Is keeping Turkey happy part of the Obama Administration war “strategy?”– DM)

As Time.com put it, “If the ISIS militants take control of Kobani, they will have a huge strategic corridor along the Turkish border, linking with the terrorist group’s positions in Aleppo to the west and Raqqa to the east.”

And Staffan de Mistura, U.N. special envoy for Syria, warned of the horrors ISIS could carry out against the people of Kobani — horrors it has carried out elsewhere. “The international community needs to defend them,” he said. “The international community cannot sustain another city falling under ISIS.”

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The key Syrian border city of Kobani will soon fall to the Islamist terror group ISIS, several senior U.S. administration officials said.

They downplayed the importance of it, saying Kobani is not a major U.S. concern.

But a look at the city shows why it would mark an important strategic victory for the Islamic mlitant group. ISIS would control a complete swath of land between its self-declared capital of Raqqa, Syria, and Turkey — a stretch of more than 100 kilometers (62 miles).

As Time.com put it, “If the ISIS militants take control of Kobani, they will have a huge strategic corridor along the Turkish border, linking with the terrorist group’s positions in Aleppo to the west and Raqqa to the east.”

And Staffan de Mistura, U.N. special envoy for Syria, warned of the horrors ISIS could carry out against the people of Kobani — horrors it has carried out elsewhere. “The international community needs to defend them,” he said. “The international community cannot sustain another city falling under ISIS.”

Coalition batters ISIS positions with airstrikes

A U.S.-led coalition has been pounding ISIS positions in the region with airstrikes for a few weeks.

The latest strikes, late Tuesday into Wednesday, included nine in Syria, the U.S. military said. Six were in the Kobani area, destroying an ISIS armored personnel carrier, four armed vehicles and two artillery pieces, U.S. Central Command said. U.S. and coalition forces also conducted five airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq, the military said.

The primary goal of the aerial campaign is not to save Syrian cities and towns, the U.S. officials said. Rather, the aim is to go after ISIS’ senior leadership, oil refineries and other infrastructure that would curb the terror group’s ability to operate — particularly in Iraq.

Saving Iraq is a more strategic goal for several reasons, the officials said. First, the United States has a relationship with the Iraqi government. By contrast, the Obama administration wants Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to step down.

Another reason: The United States has partners on the ground in Iraq, including Iraqi forces and Kurdish fighters known as Peshmerga.

Local fighters apparently made some headway Wednesday morning, when some ISIS militants in Kobani were pushed back to the city’s perimeter, Kurdish official Idriss Nassan said.

The battles have been bloody. More than 400 people have been killed in the fight for Kobani since mid-September, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said. The opposition group said it has documented the deaths of 219 ISIS jihadists, 163 members of the Kurdish militia and 20 civilians.

Kobani mapMap: Kobani (Ayn al-Arab)

U.S. plan against ISIS: Iraq first, then Syria

The United States’ goal is to first beat back ISIS in Iraq, then eliminate some of its leadership and resources in Syria, the U.S. administration officials said.

If all goes as planned, by the time officials turn their attention to Syria, some of the Syrian opposition will be trained well enough to tackle ISIS in earnest.

Washington has been making efforts to arm and train moderate Syrian opposition forces who are locked in a fight against both ISIS and the al-Assad regime.

Training Syrian rebels could take quite a long time.

“It could take years, actually,” retired Gen. John Allen said last week. “Expectations need to be managed.”

The United States also wants Turkey to do more, the officials said. The administration is urging Turkey to at least fire artillery at ISIS targets across the border.

But the Turkish reluctance, the officials say, is wrapped up in the complex relationship with their own Kurds and the idea that they don’t want to help any of the Kurds in any way.

Hundreds of strikes, millions of dollars

The United States and its allies have made at least 271 airstrikes in Iraq and 116 in Syria.

The cost? More than $62 million for just the munitions alone.

The effect? Negligible, some say, particularly in Iraq.

One by one, the cities have fallen to ISIS like dominoes: Hit, Albu Aytha, Kubaisya, Saqlawia and Sejal.

And standing on the western outskirts of Baghdad, ISIS is now within sight.

“That’s DAIISH right over there,” said Iraqi Brig. Gen. Ali Abdel Hussain Kazim, using the Arabic acronym for ISIS.

The militants’ proximity to the capital is cause for concern. If the terror group manages to infiltrate and launch attacks in Baghdad or its green zone, the results could be disastrous.

Kazim said ISIS has not been able to move from eastern Anbar province to Baghdad. But another brigadier general said that’s not even the biggest threat.

The real danger to the Iraqi capital, Brig. Gen. Mohamed al-Askari said, is from ISIS sympathizers in the city.

“They are a gang,” he said. “They deploy among civilians. They disappear into the civilian population and camouflage themselves.”

Is it a ‘war’? An ‘armed conflict’? Why words matter in the U.S. fight vs. the Islamic State.

October 8, 2014

Is it a ‘war’? An ‘armed conflict’? Why words matter in the U.S. fight vs. the Islamic State, Washington PostKaren DeYoung, October 7, 2014

(The teachings of “international law” are amorphous; meanings depend largely on who interprets it and why. See also  Humpty Dumpty: “”When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”  “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s all.” — DM)

When is a war not a war? Does it matter, when a bomb is dropped or a missile launched, whether it’s called “counterterrorism,” or “armed conflict,” or “hostilities”?

Actually, it does — especially to a president who has said he wants to keep American military action within the bounds of U.S. and international law, and to administration officials who have spent countless hours in recent weeks parsing the language used to describe operations in Syria.

It matters to the American people, who have said in surveys that they favor airstrikes against Islamic State militants in both Syria and Iraq but aren’t much interested in fighting another Middle East ground war. It also matters to Congress, which has not authorized a war since World War II but may decide to approve this specific “use of military force.”

For civilians on the ground, the likelihood of being hit by a U.S. airstrike may be different under President Obama’s narrow guidelines for non-war counterterrorism than under broader international rules governing “armed conflict.” And European allies, several of which have joined U.S. air operations in Iraq, remain uncertain of the international legal justification for military action in Syria.

The administration’s definition of what it is doing has continued to evolve in recent weeks. As government lawyers struggle to provide the president with maximum flexibility under both domestic and international law, the results at times have seemed both inconsistent and confusing.

When Obama announced on Sept. 10 that he had authorized offensive U.S. military action, he emphasized the potential threat the Islamic State posed to the U.S. homeland and said his objective was to “degrade and ultimately destroy” the group. Neither the president nor White House briefers who provided additional context for his remarks mentioned a request by the government of Iraq to conduct airstrikes in Syria.

Yet that request is now cited as a key international legal underpinning for the strikes that began on Sept. 22. It is not clear when it was initially made. On Sept. 23, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power referred to an Iraqi letter sent to the U.N. secretary general three days earlier reporting an appeal to the United States to “lead international efforts to strike ISIL sites and military strongholds in Syria in order to end the continuing attacks on Iraq.”

Power cited the U.N. Charter’s recognition of the legitimacy of using force for both individual and collective self-defense. She did not mention the objective of destroying the Islamic State, also known as ISIL and ISIS.

The day after Obama’s nationwide address, CNN asked Secretary of State John F. Kerry whether the United States was at war with the Islamic State. That was the “wrong terminology,” Kerry said. “What we are doing is engaging in a very significant counterterrorism operation.”

Three days later, on CBS’s “Face the Nation,” Kerry called such semantic debates “a waste of time.” But, he said, “If people need a place to land . . . yes, we’re at war with ISIL.”

Obama, who has said in the past that the United States is “at war with al-Qaeda,” seemed to disagree when asked the war question about the Islamic State on CBS’s “60 Minutes” on Sept. 28.

“This is not America against ISIL,” he said. “This is America leading the international community to assist a country [Iraq] with whom we have a security partnership with, to make sure that they are able to take care of their business.”

When reporters asked the Pentagon press secretary, Rear Adm. John F. Kirby, on Tuesday whether the U.S. military was “at war with ISIL,” his response was succinct. “Yes, yes,” Kirby said.

Administration lawyers, seeking outside advice, have discussed the Iraq and Syria operations with a number of former officials. “We have encouraged them . . . to clarify publicly their legal theories under both domestic and international law,” said a participant in some of those closed-door discussions who would only discuss a private meeting on the condition of anonymity.

‘Armed conflict’ vs. ‘war’

International law, which uses the words “armed conflict” instead of “war,” applies whether states are fighting each other or against “non-state actors,” such as terrorist groups, although terrorists by definition do not follow the rules.

The law recognizes the possibility of civilian casualties. But governments cannot intentionally target civilians, and any action putting civilians at risk must be proportionate to the importance of the military objective.

In guidelines for lethal counterterrorism action he outlined last year, Obama imposed the narrower standard of “near certainty” that there would be no civilian casualties. But “that was then and this is now,” said John B. Bellinger III, State Department legal counsel in the George W. Bush administration. “I mean that seriously. When they were coming up with all those rules a year ago, they thought the terrorist threat was heading in one direction. Now it seems to be a completely different direction.”

Amid reports of civilian casualties from U.S. strikes in Syria — which the Pentagon said it had not confirmed — administration officials said the “near certainty” standard applied only “outside areas of active hostilities,” based on “among other things, the scope and intensity of the fighting,” said a senior administration official who spoke on the condition of anonymity about legal conclusions.

“We consider Iraq and Syria to be ‘areas of active hostilities,’ based on what we are seeing on the ground right now,” the official said. “This is not the same as a determination that an armed conflict is taking place in the country at issue.” Nevertheless, the official said, the administration has chosen to comply with laws applicable to armed conflict where possible civilian casualties are concerned.

But “in international law, there is only one concept — an armed conflict, or not,” said one former senior administration official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to candidly describe the administration’s quandary. The United States, the former official said, now recognizes something in between — a new category of “a hot battlefield, or an area of active hostilities.”

The administration has also said its actions are a legal response to the threat because Syria is “unwilling or unable” to fight the Islamic State itself. Naz Modirzadeh, founding director of the Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict, called that concept an example of “folk international law.”

Established law, she wrote Thursday on the Lawfare blog, includes no such distinction for violations of sovereignty.

The role of Congress

Under the Vietnam-era War Powers Resolution, the president must notify Congress whenever he sends U.S. forces into “hostilities” and must withdraw them after 60 days unless lawmakers agree.

Obama observed the requirement when launching U.S. military operations in Libya in the spring of 2011 but then adopted what critics called an elastic definition in deciding that the situation did not constitute “hostilities” that put U.S. military personnel at risk, and thus was not subject to the deadline.

In Iraq and Syria, Obama sent the notifications but has said he does not need congressional approval, because U.S. actions are separately justified by the president’s constitutional authority as commander in chief and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) against al-Qaeda and its associates.

Last year, Obama proposed narrowing, and ultimately repealing, the al-Qaeda measure as outdated in an era in which that organization’s core leadership had been “decimated” and new, independent terrorist threats were emerging. Although he pledged to consult Congress on new authorizations for new threats, and some legislation was proposed, nothing had happened by the time the Islamic State took over vast territory in both Syria and Iraq.

The Islamic State and al-Qaeda have mutually and publicly rejected any association with each other. But the administration has said the once-rejected AUMF is valid, because the Islamic State is rooted in an al-Qaeda-linked group born in Iraq a decade ago.

Midnight in Obama’s Garden of Good and Evil

October 7, 2014

Midnight in Obama’s Garden of Good and Evil

October 6th, 2014 – 8:23 pm

by Roger L Simon

via Roger L. Simon » Midnight in Obama’s Garden of Good and Evil.

 

 

Increasingly, I am thinking that Barack Obama does not know the difference between good and evil. Now I realize implying that someone can’t make that distinction, really the difference between right and wrong, is a harsh condemnation indeed, but I think it is something that should be examined in Obama’s case since it would explain many of the extraordinary missteps of his presidency. Those missteps are only escalating at the present moment as evil stalks the globe at an ever rising pace.

In fact, before looking very far backwards, consider this: Would the United States today be doing anything at all about the Islamic State — now for the first time waving its black flag above Kobane on the Turkish-Syrian border, on the brink of a massacre of its Kurdish population, while still besieging Baghdad — had ISIS not bothered to behead publicly a few Westerners?

Let’s be honest — not a chance with this president, although 99.9 percent of the horrific activities of the Islamic State had nothing to do with the beheading of a handful of Americans and Brits. ISIS had already provided us with more than enough examples of mass murder and other Holocaust-like actions to last several lifetimes. In two videos I saw, dozens of Middle Eastern men were decapitated, their severed heads placed on poles while others were shot through the back of the neck and dumped unceremoniously into pits they had dug for themselves. It was unclear whether they were alive or dead, probably a little of each. Those videos, one of them almost an hour long, were like recruiting films for an Islamic version of the Khmer Rouge or the Wehrmacht. Straight from Hell.

But they were largely ignored by our president, who had proclaimed these people the JV or wanted to believe as much in order not to disrupt his post-modern, morality-free weltanschauung. It was not until the American public was aroused by the beheadings of the Westerners that Obama did much of anything – and even that was, and still is, as little as possible. Evil does not interest him, especially if it has nothing to do with votes. Evil does not even exist for him. Only fairness. If only those ISIS people could be “fair” — hence his dopey remarks about what people do or do not do in the 21st century, as opposed, I suppose, to the bloodthirsty 20th. (Ironically, the worst mistake — from their point of view — the Islamic State made was to behead the Westerners. It may be have been good for recruiting, but had they avoided it, they might be in Baghdad by now… even more powerful for recruiting.)

At the same time as IS is rampaging, Obama’s equally morality-challenged crew at the State Department is busy criticizing (what else?) Israel, yet again for Jewish construction and apartment purchase in Jerusalem Arab neighborhoods. (At least this time it wasn’t for murdering civilians, one of the more hypocritical accusations of recent years, considering who made it.) Netanyahu, a man with a moral center a tad larger than Obama’s, struck back on CBS’ Face the Nation but (surprise, surprise) the court eunuchs at CBS removed the Israeli PM’s criticism from the broadcast. Nevertheless, by then the State Department’s Jen Psaki had already taken umbrage at Netanyahu for daring to question His Majesty. The Times of Israel summed up the ensuing brouhaha:

When asked about Netanyahu’s allegations that the US was telling Jews that they could not buy houses in the Arab East Jerusalem neighborhood of Silwan, which several Jewish families moved into earlier the week, Psaki did not clarify Washington’s position regarding the Ir David group’s independent purchase of Arab-owned houses there.

Instead, Psaki said that there were questions involving building permits and construction — an answer that seemed to address the municipality’s involvement in Givat Hamatos rather than the private initiative in Silwan.

Commentary’s Seth Mandel continued: “It wasn’t clear that Jen Psaki even knew what she was being asked about. The degree to which this administration’s advisors and spokesmen are uninformed about issues on which they pronounce judgment is simply incredible.”

Well, it’s not incredible if you don’t know the difference between something as elemental as good and evil. Without that, there’s nothing to pronounce judgment on. Pick on Israel while allowing the entire Middle East to turn into a veritable Islamist sea of beheadings, rapes, sexual slavery and mass murder. It’s all a power game. You pick on someone who is sane and will therefore listen to you. Never mind that the only ones genuinely trying to help anybody in the region are the Israelis, who are actually treating Syrian ISIS victims and spending Israel’s money to do it. As the old saying goes, “No good deed goes unpunished,” particularly when you don’t know what a good deed is. (A distillation of Obama’s moral deficit is that he would prefer Islamists like Egypt’s Morsi and Turkey’s Erdogan to Netanyahu.)

At its basis, the problem is cultural relativism, the tawdry mother philosophy of political correctness that suffused the academy when Obama was going to school and still does. Under CR, all cultures are equal, ours and the Islamic State. We are imperialist to think otherwise. Morality is a thing of the distant past, some artifact of St. Anselm or Maimonides. Not cool, even if it protects us from murdering each other.

Speaking of moral absurdity, I couldn’t resist having a grim laugh at the extraordinary naiveté of Ben Affleck on the subject of Islam. It took Bill Maher to straighten him out — or try — that Islam’s ideology just might have something to do with its actions. Who knew?

Good and evil are difficult concepts for everybody, especially we products of the modernist educational system. But we ignore them at our peril. Otherwise, we really are at Midnight

Who Does Turkey Support?

October 7, 2014

Who Does Turkey Support? Gatestone InstituteBurak Bekdil, October 7, 2014

(Oh well.

— DM)

In short, to finish off jihadists, Washington will now work with the man who until recently funded and reinforced these same jihadists, and is proud of his love affairs with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas’s overseas command center happens to be based in Turkey. Good luck.

Turkish soldiers in tanks are lined up along Turkey’s border with Iraq, “observing” ISIS troops close in on the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobani, in what appears an approaching massacre.

In pragmatic Islamist thinking, one does not properly become a “martyr” if he gets killed by an army other than Israel’s.

As of this writing, on the Turkey-Syria border, CNN correspondent Phil Black hourly beams pictures of the Syrian Kurdish city of Kobani, with a black ISIS flag atop a building in the eastern part of the city, as Turkish soldiers in tanks lined up along the Turkish border “observe” ISIS troops close in for the approaching massacre.

Washington is expecting Ankara wholeheartedly to fight the rougher boys of the Islamist camp to which it belongs? Good luck.

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Last week, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden had to zigzag between the truth that accidentally spilled out of him and Washington’s pragmatism. In a speech at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Biden said: “[Turkish] President (Recep Tayyip) Erdogan, he is an old friend, said you were right, we let too many people through, now we are trying to seal the border.”

The “people,” however, whom Erdogan said Ankara had “let through” were the jihadists whom Turkey had supported with arms and money, and who have now become an international nightmare.

In other words, the U.S. vice president was publicly saying that the Turkish president had confessed to supporting terrorists.

Then Erdogan threatened: “If he [Biden] really said that, he would become history for me.” Finally, a White House statement announced: “The vice president apologized for any implication that Turkey or other allies and partners in the region had intentionally supplied and facilitated the growth of ISIL or other extremists in Syria.”

Erdogan has never hidden that he is ideologically a next of kin to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. Hamas’s overseas command center happens to be based in Turkey. Erdogan has been Hamas’s staunchest (non-Hamas) cheerleader in the last decade, and the Brotherhood’s key regional ally. Press reports say that Turkey has recently welcomed in the Brotherhood’s top brass, who were expelled on Sept. 13 from their five-million-star hotels in Qatar. Ankara has not denied that it is offering a safe haven to the leaders of the Islamist organization.

In short, to finish off the jihadists who have captured large swathes of land in Iraq and Syria, Washington will now work with the man who until recently funded and reinforced these same jihadists (and their various offspring) and is proud of his love affairs with Hamas and the Brotherhood. More ironically, a U.S.-led coalition of nations including Arab states recently killed one of Erdogan’s heroes when the coalition forces struck an ISIS camp in Syria.

733Turkish tanks near the border with Syria, October 2014

When, in 2010, a Turkish-led flotilla that included the ship Mavi Marmara sailed towards Gaza to “break Israel’s siege” of the Hamas-controlled land, Erdogan greeted everyone on board as “heroes.” And when the Israel Defense Forces [IDF] raided the Mavi Marmara and killed nine Turks aboard, Erdogan greeted the Turks as “martyrs.”

Since then, Erdogan has vehemently denied any Turkish governmental support for the Mavi Marmara. He claims he was merely objecting to “Israel’s unjust oppression of the Palestinians.”

But, he insists, no governmental involvement at all.

About a fortnight after the incident, the foreign press in Turkey received a package from the Press and Information General Directorate, a government office reporting to Erdogan. The envelope did not contain a letter, or an explanatory note. Instead, its only content was a DVD, the cover of which showed a photomontage of an Israeli soldier pointing a rifle at a vessel. The vessel was encircled in David’s Star. The DVD cover read: “Moments of Horror.” The line below that read: “Interviews With the Injured Aboard the Aid for Gaza Ship / With English Subtitles.”

As the package arrived, the radio was still quoting Erdogan and his ministers as saying that the flotilla was entirely a nongovernmental initiative.

The Mavi Marmara incident was a wake-up call to Jerusalem, where diplomats had earlier been unrealistically optimistic about building a working relationship with Erdogan despite several other, earlier, warnings, including Erdogan’s famous tirade in Davos against (then) Israeli President Shimon Peres that, “You (Jews) know well how to kill!” The Turkish government has since frozen ambassadorial-level diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel, and Erdogan has increased his calculated explosive rhetoric against Israel.

Erdogan’s principal argument was that a foreign military had killed Turkish nationals outside of Turkey; that those who were killed were martyrs; and that he would never allow a foreign military to harm one single Turkish citizen. Once again, he was wrong.

One of the lucky survivors of the Mavi Marmara was Yakup Bulent Alniak, an Islamist activist for the Turkish “humanitarian aid group” IHH which organized the Gaza-bound flotilla. IHH is listed by many Western countries as a terrorist organization; but its members, including Alniak, were simply heroes for Erdogan.

Alniak survived the IDF raid in 2010 but lost his life recently, at the end of September, when a U.S.-Arab coalition struck one of the largest ISIS camps in Syria. A coalition of foreign armies had killed a Turkish citizen whom the Turkish leader had declared a hero, but since then Erdogan has remained mute.

Will Erdogan downgrade Turkey’s diplomatic ties with the U.S. and five Muslim nations because their militaries killed a Turkish citizen outside of Turkish territory? No. Probably because, in the pragmatic Islamist thinking, one does not properly qualify as a “martyr” if he gets killed by an army (or armies) other than Israel’s.

As of this writing, on the Turkey-Syria border, CNN correspondent Phil Black hourly beams pictures of the Syrian Kurdish city of Kobani, with a black ISIS flag atop a building in the eastern part of the city, as Turkish soldiers in tanks lined up along the Turkish border “observe” ISIS troops close in for the approaching massacre.

Washington is expecting Ankara wholeheartedly to fight the rougher boys of the Islamist camp to which it belongs? Good luck.

Wiping out Israel would be easier from West Bank, Hamas official says

October 7, 2014

Wiping out Israel would be easier from West Bank, Hamas official says, Israel Hayom, Dr. Ronen Yitzhak, October 7, 2014

[Some] have said Hamas wants to create an Islamic emirate in Gaza,” says senior Hamas official Mahmoud al-Zahar tells Palestinian news outlet Al-Ayyam. “We won’t do that, but we will build an Islamic state in Palestine, all of Palestine.” Daniel Siryoti.

al-ZaharSenior Hamas official Mahmoud al-Zahar | Photo credit: Reuters

If Hamas manages to establish a foothold in the West Bank, it would be able to wipe out Israel and establish an Islamic state in its stead, senior Hamas official Mahmoud al-Zahar told Palestinian news outlet Al-Ayyam on Wednesday.

The interview, translated and posted by Palestinian Media Watch on Sunday, revealed Hamas’ previously covert intention of taking over the West Bank.

“[Some] have said Hamas wants to create an Islamic emirate in Gaza. We won’t do that, but we will build an Islamic state in Palestine, all of Palestine,” he said.

According to al-Zahar, if Hamas could “transfer what it has or just a small part of it to the West Bank, we [Hamas] would be able to settle the battle of the final promise with a speed that no one can imagine.”

Al-Zahar alluded to Hamas’ goal with a passage from the Quran: “Then when the final promise came, [We sent your enemies] … to enter the Temple in Jerusalem, as they entered it the first time, and to destroy what they had taken over with [total] destruction,” implying a war in which Israel is wiped out.

In August, it was released for publication that the Shin Bet security agency uncovered a Hamas plot to topple the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. Hamas then claimed it was an Israeli ploy to disrupt the recently struck Palestinian unity deal.

Surrender in the War of Ideas

October 7, 2014

Surrender in the War of Ideas, Washington Free Beacon, October 7, 2014

(The U.S. Constitution, ignored by the Obama Administration whenever convenient, has very little to do with the matter. In any event, Obama has repeatedly claimed that the Islamic State is not Islamic, thus erroneously interpreting and supporting what he apparently considers to be Islamic religious doctrine. — DM)

Constitutional religious clause prevents Obama administration from countering Islamic State ideology.

Mideast IraqIslamic State militants pass a checkpoint bearing the group’s trademark black flag in the village of Maryam Begg in Kirkuk, 290 kilometers (180 miles) north of Baghdad, Iraq / AP

Obama stated in a speech on Sept. 10 that ISIL is “not Islamic” despite the group’s use of a fundamental Islamic precept of jihad, or holy war, in expanding its reach and imposing anti-democratic, hardline Islamic sharia law in areas it now controls.

Analysts and statements by the president and other administration spokesmen also indicate the administration may not clearly understand ISIL ideology, a required first step in developing a counter to it.

The Obama administration, under pressure from domestic Muslim advocacy organizations, has adopted a politically correct approach toward Islam and terrorism that has resulted in removing mentions of Islam from its current policies and programs. Instead, counterterrorism programs and policies are carried out under the less-specific rubric of “countering violent extremism” (CVE).

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The Obama administration is failing to wage ideological war against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS) terrorists over fears that attacking its religious philosophy will violate the constitutional divide between church and state, according to an in-depth inquiry by the Washington Free Beacon.

Instead, the task of countering what President Obama called the “warped ideology” of ISIL is being farmed out to foreign states and Muslim communities that often share some of the same goals as the groups the administration calls violent extremists. This approach allows the administration to avoid identifying links between terrorism and Islam.

“While the government has tried to counter terrorist propaganda, it cannot directly address the warped religious interpretations of groups like ISIL because of the constitutional separation of church and state,” said Quintan Wiktorowicz, a former White House counterterrorism strategist for the Obama administration.

“U.S. officials are prohibited from engaging in debates about Islam, and as a result will need to rely on partners in the Muslim world for this part of the ideological struggle,” he said in an email interview.

Is ISIL Islamic?

Obama announced last month for the first time that his new counterterrorism strategy includes programs aimed at countering ISIL’s ideology. But a review of administration efforts shows very little—if anything—is being done to defeat or destroy the terrorist group’s religious ideology in a war of ideas.

At the United Nations on Sept. 24, the president asked the world body to come up with a plan over the next year designed to counter ISIL and al Qaeda’s ideology. He said ending religious wars through an ideological campaign in the Middle East will be “generational” and led by those who live in the region. No external power, the president insisted, can change “hearts and minds,” and as a result the United States would support others in the unspecified program of “counter extremist ideology.”

The administration’s so-called soft power approach to countering Islamist terrorism also appeared to have difficulty with clearly defining the religious doctrine behind the ideology of the resurgent al Qaeda offshoot now rampaging its way across Iraq and Syria.

Obama stated in a speech on Sept. 10 that ISIL is “not Islamic” despite the group’s use of a fundamental Islamic precept of jihad, or holy war, in expanding its reach and imposing anti-democratic, hardline Islamic sharia law in areas it now controls.

Analysts and statements by the president and other administration spokesmen also indicate the administration may not clearly understand ISIL ideology, a required first step in developing a counter to it.

Sebastian Gorka, a counterterrorism specialist, said the major problem for the administration in countering ISIL ideology is that most senior officials hold “post-modern” and “secular” views.

“As a result, they have almost no ability to understand the drivers of violent terrorists which are religious,” said Gorka, the Horner chairman of military theory at the Marine Corps University.

“When you don’t take religion seriously, it’s almost impossible for you to comprehend the philosophy of a suicide bomber, or someone who cuts off the heads of people in the name of jihad,” Gorka said.

Senior State Department officials have expressed the view that ideology plays no role in Islamist terror and is spawned instead by “local grievances” such as poverty or other economic and social privation, Gorka said. “That is utterly fallacious. If that were true, half of India would be terrorists,” he said.

The latest issue of the ISIL English-language magazine Dabiq reveals some of the group’s ideology, using references to Islamic practices of jihad and sharia law. “The Islamic State has long maintained an initiative that sees it waging jihad alongside a dawah [proselytizing campaign] that actively tends to the needs of its people,” the magazine said, adding that the group “fights to defend the Muslims, liberate their lands, and bring an end to tawaghit[the evil corrupt system].”

The magazine also sought to legitimize its mass executions, beheadings, and other atrocities as religiously justified responses to all opponents who refuse to submit to its ideology.

The president stated in his Sept. 10 speech announcing the anti-ISIL strategy that the group is “not Islamic” because it kills Muslims and innocents, something he asserted no religion condones, and a claim disputed by many experts on Islam.

“I’ve studied Islam and I did not find a very peaceful religion,” said a current senior U.S. counterterrorism specialist who disagrees with the administration’s approach of not directly addressing the Islamic nature of terrorism in counter-ideology efforts.

Wictorowicz, the former counterterrorism strategist, defended the State Department approach. “Having spoken to them at length about this, their position is that Islam, as a religion, is not the issue,” he said. “It is particular interpretations of Islam that are, in part, driving support for violence.”

Not fighting a war of ideas

The Obama administration, under pressure from domestic Muslim advocacy organizations, has adopted a politically correct approach toward Islam and terrorism that has resulted in removing mentions of Islam from its current policies and programs. Instead, counterterrorism programs and policies are carried out under the less-specific rubric of “countering violent extremism” (CVE).

Discussing Islam also has been placed off limits in many government and intelligence community counterterrorism programs as a result of pressure groups and Muslim advisers who insist such topics would violate constitutional separation of church and state issues.

That pressure has inhibited the U.S. government from addressing Islamist ideology in a significant way, critics say. Instead, the government has been forced to indirectly counter claims by terrorists, such as the false notion that the United States and the West are at war with Islam. It used public diplomacy programs and global “messaging” campaigns whose effectiveness has been questionable, to try and counter such claims.

James Glassman, former undersecretary of state for public diplomacy, said “absolutely,” that the administration is hampered by concerns over First Amendment constitutional religious issues from conducting aggressive counter-ideology efforts against groups such as al Qaeda and ISIL.

“There is reticence, especially at State, to criticize a noxious political ideology based on a religion,” said Glassman, now with the American Enterprise Institute.

Glassman said from the start, Obama has played down the war of ideas in the struggle against terrorism.

During the transition from the Bush to Obama administration, “I was told by the Obama operatives assigned to State that the term ‘war of ideas’ was not to be used,” Glassman said.

“The war of ideas had been my focus at State, but the administration had no interest in continuing the work we were doing,” he said. “Ideology provides the environment and the justification for the activities of al Qaeda and ISIL. It must be dealt with—just as we dealt with communism from 1945 to 1990. It’s a long battle.”

“The way around the problem is leadership,” Glassman said. “The president needs to make clear—as President Bush did immediately after 9/11—that the terrorists have constructed a phony ideology and that they are trying to take over an entire religion.”

Obama appears to be in the early stages of doing that “but it is very late in the game and he needs to devote resources, not just words, to the war of ideas,” Glassman said.

Looking for allies

Obama told the United Nations in a speech to the General Assembly Sept. 24 that “extremist ideology” has spread despite more than a decade of military and intelligence efforts to kill al Qaeda leaders. Groups such as ISIL and al Qaeda have “perverted one of the world’s great religions,” he said.

The world, and specifically “Muslim communities,” the president said, must now take steps to “explicitly, forcefully, and consistently reject the ideology of al Qaeda and ISIL.”

However, most of the Islamic countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, so far have not denounced the ISIL ideology and do not appear to be engaged in counter-ideological campaigns designed to discredit the motivating force behind the group.

The president elaborated in the U.N. speech on his administration’s approach to countering ISIL’s message, but not its Islamist ideology. He called for a “new compact” among civilized peoples to stop the “corruption of young minds by violent ideology.”

He called for cutting off funding and contesting terrorists’ use of social media to recruit and propagandize. Additionally, he called upon religious leaders of all faiths to join together and propagate the Christian concept of “do unto thy neighbor as you would have done unto you.”

“The ideology of ISIL or al Qaeda or Boko Haram will wilt and die if it is consistently exposed, confronted, and refuted in the light of day,” Obama said.

Wiktorowicz said he agrees more needs to be done. “Not enough resources are being devoted to the counter-ideology component of the administration’s strategy,” he said. “The long war is the war against violent ideologies and there hasn’t been the resource investment since 9/11. As a result of this and other factors, we’re seeing the reincarnation of al Qaeda as ISIL in Iraq and Syria.”

Wiktorowicz also said the administration is working with partners in the Muslim world “who can push back against the ideology.”

“The Salafi jihadists, however, have assassinated and intimidated Islamic scholars and others who have spoken out against violence, increasing the danger for the brave individuals involved in the counter-ideological struggle,” he said.

A hashtag campaign

To date, the allied campaign against ISIL is limited to U.S.-led missile, drone, and air strikes against vehicles and command posts of the group in territories it controls in Iraq and Syria. The bombing has slowed but not reversed territorial gains by the group.

The Obama strategy as outlined last month will involve four elements: Air strikes; support for local forces on the ground; counterterrorism efforts to prevent ISIL attacks; and humanitarian assistance to deal with the mass of refugees fleeing ISIL control.

Under the counterterrorism program, the president declared: “Working with our partners, we will redouble our efforts to cut off its funding; improve our intelligence; strengthen our defenses; counter its warped ideology; and stem the flow of foreign fighters into and out of the Middle East.”

Asked for specifics on what the White House is doing to counter ISIL ideology, White House and National Security Council spokesmen declined to discuss the matter. Ned Price, an NSC spokesman, provided a recent White House “fact sheet” that contains no reference to counter-ideology efforts.

Price said White House counterterrorism coordinator Lisa Monaco was “too busy” to discuss the counter-ideology campaign.

The fact sheet mentions various steps being taken, including the adoption of a “whole-of-government-approach,” cutting off funds to ISIL, and preventing foreigners from joining the group. An international group called the Global Counterterrorism Forum and other, non-government organizations also are said to be focusing on unspecified efforts to prevent foreign fighters from joining ISIL.

At the State Department, a State-led interagency Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications is engaged in “messaging” on social media and elsewhere. But those efforts appear limited to a counter-terror Twitter feed with few followers and limited reach.

A glimpse into the center’s activity was disclosed in February by a Saudi national who said he was paid to use Twitter in an online campaign to discredit Syrian jihadists.

The Saudi said he was unemployed when he was approached with an offer of money to attend a U.S. workshop with instructors who schooled him on the covert campaign against both al Qaeda and rival ISIL in Syria. The goal was to use Twitter to link both groups to Iran and its Lebanese surrogate, Hezbollah, he said.

The training included the use of hashtags designed to expand the reach of tweets to the largest number of people, particularly women. Instructions were relayed to the Saudi from a special iPhone application downloaded from the State Department web site.

State Department spokesmen ignored repeated emails seeking comment on the counter-ideology campaign, and the department’s public affairs office blocked the Free Beacon from speaking to officials in the center, without explanation.

Ideology as the center of gravity

At the Pentagon, spokesman Adm. John Kirby told reporters two days after the president’s speech that a “purely military solution” would not be enough to destroy ISIL.

“It also is going to take the ultimate destruction of their ideology,” Kirby said.

Ideological destruction, Kirby said, will be done through “good governance” in Iraq and in Syria. “And in a responsive political process so that the people that are falling sway to this radical ideology are no longer drawn to it,” he said. “That’s really the long-term answer.”

Because ISIL is not a formal military organization but a terrorist group, its center of gravity, in military terms, is the group’s ideology, Kirby said, adding that one non-military goal is delegitimizing ISIL while using U.S. and allied forces to destroy its ability to conduct attacks and control territory in the region.

Kirby did not elaborate and referred questions to the Central Command, the military command in charge of military operations against ISIL.

Lt. Col. Steven Wollman, a Central Command spokesman, said the command’s counter ideology efforts against ISIL are focused on exposing al Qaeda and ISIL “fallacies, particularly their incongruity with Islam and their penchant for violence, crime, and terror.”

“We demonstrate that despite their claims of creating a Caliphate for the good of the Muslim world their sole method is violence and only violence which has no positive short term or long term impact on the population,” Wollman said in a statement to the Free Beacon.

“To do so we highlight their total disregard for basic human needs and desires such as education, medical care, a free press, use of tobacco, and an expectation of freedom of choice.”

Additionally, the command said ISIL’s use of extreme violence such as beheadings, mass executions, and rape are “totally out of line of any Islamic teachings,” an aspect highlighted to local and regional audiences.

Terrorist groups also are using all forms of communication, including social media to recruit, fundraise, and spread violent ideology, Wollman said.

“It would be inappropriate to disclose all the specifics of what we are currently doing to counter the al Qaeda and ISIL fallacies campaign, but I can tell you that this command’s information operations activities are focused on foreign audiences across the region,” Wollman said, adding that message dissemination includes website, social media, print media, radio, and television in local languages.

“We align our efforts with other U.S. government agencies, and often are in direct support of U.S. ambassadors and with the knowledge of our partnered nations,” he said.

Additionally, “all of this is conducted by, with, and through our partner nations, often with our partner’s face on the message,” Wollman said.

“We also conduct training on how to combat extremist ideologies with our regional partner nations, as part of Foreign Internal Defense, Security Force Assistance, Building Partner Capacity, and other State Department-led activities.”

‘We won that battle already’

The administration’s point man for propaganda and so-called “soft power,” Rick Stengel, a former Time magazine reporter who is now undersecretary for public diplomacy, said in a recent speech that the administration is not trying to wage a war of ideas against ISIL.

“I would say that there is no battle of ideas with ISIL,” Stengel said. “ISIL is bereft of ideas, they’re bankrupt of ideas. It’s not an organization that is animated by ideas. It’s a criminal, savage, barbaric organization—I feel like we won that battle already.”

However, ISIL and its supporters are using social media effectively both to promote their Islamic-centered ideology and to recruit both foreign and regional fighters to their cause.

Twitter and Facebook have cracked down on ISIL supporters since the new counterterrorism campaign began last month. But the group has found ways to circumvent the crackdown, through innovative ways of creating new social media accounts.

In fact, the group has been so successful online that U.S. and foreign intelligence agencies have been able to use information publicly available on the Internet to track and identify ISIL targets for bombing. In response, ISIL supporters on Twitter and Facebook have launched a campaign to limit the information about the group online to undermine the bombing strikes.

ISIL also uses social media to link to recruitment videos and publications that, according to U.S. officials, have gained wide circulation.

All the videos and publications highlight the group’s adherence to Islamic principles.

Syrian Rebels Seize Russian Spy Station Near Israeli Border

October 7, 2014

Syrian Rebels Seize Russian Spy Station Near Israeli Border, Daily BeastJosh Rogin, October 7, 2014

Russian spy baseYouTube

The FSA found photos and lists of senior Russian intelligence and military officials who visited the facility, pictures of Russian personnel running the base, and maps showing the location of Israeli military units. Israeli news reports earlier this year said the Russian government had upgraded an advanced surveillance and intelligence gathering station in that area which could snoop on Israel, large parts of Jordan, and western Iraq, potentially to warn Iran in advance of an Israeli strike. Initial reports said documents from the facility suggested the Russian equipment was used to spy on Israel, Saudi Arabia and Jordan

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When the Free Syrian Army pushed Assad’s soldiers out of a town south of Damascus, the last thing they expected to find was a Russian spy post, a few miles from the Golan Heights.

Syrian rebels have overtaken a joint Russian-Syrian secret facility that they claim was a covert intelligence collection base. Opposition fighters say the post was used to snoop in on the communications of opposition groups — and perhaps even the nearby Israelis.Free Syrian Army officials, U.S. officials, and independent experts told The Daily Beast that the evidence of Russian involvement in the facility, just a few miles from Syria’s border with Israel, if verified, would show a level of Russian involvement in the Syrian civil war that was not previously known.

Free Syrian Army officials posted several videos on YouTube showing both the outside and the inside of the facility, which the FSA captured over the weekend during a battle near Al Harah, south of Damascus, next to the Golan Heights.

The videos and accompanying photos show insignias representing a branch of Syrian intelligence and the Russian Osnaz GRU radio electronic intelligence agency. The FSA found photos and lists of senior Russian intelligence and military officials who visited the facility, pictures of Russian personnel running the base, and maps showing the location of Israeli military units. Israeli news reports earlier this year said the Russian government had upgraded an advanced surveillance and intelligence gathering station in that area which could snoop on Israel, large parts of Jordan, and western Iraq, potentially to warn Iran in advance of an Israeli strike. Initial reports said documents from the facility suggested the Russian equipment was used to spy on Israel, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

U.S. defense officials told The Daily Beast the photos of the Russian insignia first shared on blogs were legitimate. But that evidence, at the same time, may not necessarily mean the facility captured by the opposition was controlled by Russia’s military; it could just mean that Russians were working there, as advisors or partners to Syrian troops.

Mark Galeotti, an expert on Russia’s military and intelligence services at New York University said the term “Osnaz” on the insignia just meant a special unit of any kind. “It’s the kind of unit that the Russians would have had there because Syria is not the easiest area to operate in, they are an element of the radio-technical intelligence boys who do this.”

Firas Al Hawrani, the official spokesman for the FSA in southern Syria, told The Daily Beast Monday that FSA forces had seen about 15 Russian personnel operating in the Al Harah area before the FSA took the facility, but they left before the area fell out of regime control.

“The Russians who were at the Al Harah mountain, the regime took them to Damascus by plane two weeks ago,” he said.

Galeotti said these Russian advisers would specifically be working on intercepting radio communications of opposition figures. “They would be running an operation for detailed radio technical intelligence, we are not talking about intercepting telemetry and aircraft,” he said. “This is for eavesdropping on rebel radio communications. Cell communications are easier identified through other means. And this is also for identifying the presence of these units, which leads directly into targeting.”

Russia has been one of Syria’s most important allies for years. The port of Tartus is Russia’s only naval base on the Mediterranean, for example. And since the civil war in the country broke out in 2011, Russia has provided the country with advisers and billions of dollars’ worth of heavy military equipment. Galeotti said Syria’s security services are good as “traditional secret police skills,” such as interrogation and bugging telephones. The facility taken over by the Syrian opposition, however, suggests the Russians gave the regime “a whole new capability,” Galeotti said. “A lot of the Syrians are very clumsy. Some of the more precise attacks in the last year have suggested a new sophistication.”

Sen. John McCain told The Daily Beast Monday that the apparent Russian involvement in the base, which was also reportedly tasked with collecting signals intelligence and communications of rebel groups, showed of the depth of Moscow’s collusion with Damascus in the Syrian civil war.

“If what they’ve recovered is true and I have no reason to believe it’s not, it really is very indicative of the significant involvement of Russia in this conflict,” he said. “It shows significant coordination, establishment of a facility they could use for coordination and intelligence capabilities including intercepts. It’s a pretty sophisticated operation there that they’ve uncovered.”

Meanwhile, in Northern Syria, ISIS continued a major assault on the city of Kobani near the Turkish border as Kurdish and tribal forces tried to repel them. Dr. Najmaldin Karim, the governor of Kirkuk, was in Washington last week asking U.S. officials to expand the airstrikes in both Iraq and Syria and to increase aid to the Kurdish forces in both countries.

Not only is ISIS advancing in Northern Syria, they are digging in their positions in several Iraqi cities, including Mosul and Ramadi, Karim told The Daily Beast in an interview. Gen. John Allen, whom President Obama appointed to coordinate the international coalition against ISIS, said in Baghdad that the drive to free key cities like Mosul may take as long as a year.

“A lot of the front lines are basically frozen,” said Karim. “The worst thing would be for the United States, the region, and for Iraq, would be if the situation stays like this and festers. These guys have been there since June. If it goes further, it becomes a way of life. It will become like Somalia.”

Turkey, the Kurds and Iraq: The Prize and Peril of Kirkuk

October 7, 2014

Turkey, the Kurds and Iraq: The Prize and Peril of Kirkuk, Stratfor, Reva Bhalla, October 7, 2014

Turkey cannot be comfortable with the idea that Kirkuk is in the hands of the Iraqi Kurds unless Ankara is assured exclusive rights over that energy [oil] and the ability to extinguish any oil-fueled ambitions of Kurdish independence.

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In June 1919, aboard an Allied warship en route to Paris, sat Damat Ferid Pasha, the Grand Vizier of a crumbling Ottoman Empire. The elderly statesman, donning an iconic red fez and boasting an impeccably groomed mustache, held in his hands a memorandum that he was to present to the Allied powers at the Quai d’Orsay. The negotiations on postwar reparations started five months earlier, but the Ottoman delegation was prepared to make the most of its tardy invitation to the talks. As he journeyed across the Mediterranean that summer toward the French shore, Damat Ferid mentally rehearsed the list of demands he would make to the Allied powers during his last-ditch effort to hold the empire together.

He began with a message, not of reproach, but of inculpability: “Gentlemen, I should not be bold enough to come before this High Assembly if I thought that the Ottoman people had incurred any responsibility in the war that has ravaged Europe and Asia with fire and sword.” His speech was followed by an even more defiant memorandum, denouncing any attempt to redistribute Ottoman land to the Kurds, Greeks and Armenians, asserting: “In Asia, the Turkish lands are bounded on the south by the provinces of Mosul and Diyarbakir, as well as a part of Aleppo as far as the Mediterranean.” When Damat Ferid’s demands were presented in Paris, the Allies were in awe of the gall displayed by the Ottoman delegation. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George regarded the presentation as a “good joke,” while U.S. President Woodrow Wilson said he had never seen anything more “stupid.” They flatly rejected Damat Ferid’s apparently misguided appeal — declaring that the Turks were unfit to rule over other races, regardless of their common Muslim identity — and told him and his delegation to leave. The Western powers then proceeded, through their own bickering, to divide the post-Ottoman spoils.

Under far different circumstances today, Ankara is again boldly appealing to the West to follow its lead in shaping policy in Turkey’s volatile Muslim backyard. And again, Western powers are looking at Turkey with incredulity, waiting for Ankara to assume responsibility for the region by tackling the immediate threat of the Islamic State with whatever resources necessary, rather than pursuing a seemingly reckless strategy of toppling the Syrian government. Turkey’s behavior can be perplexing and frustrating to Western leaders, but the country’s combination of reticence in action and audacity in rhetoric can be traced back to many of the same issues that confronted Istanbul in 1919, beginning with the struggle over the territory of Mosul.

The Turkish Fight for Mosul

Under the Ottoman Empire, the Mosul vilayet stretched from Zakho in southeastern Anatolia down along the Tigris River through Dohuk, Arbil, Alqosh, Kirkuk, Tuz Khormato and Sulaimaniyah before butting up against the western slopes of the Zagros Mountains, which shape the border with Iran. This stretch of land, bridging the dry Arab steppes and the fertile mountain valleys in Iraqi Kurdistan, has been a locus of violence long before the Islamic State arrived. The area has been home to an evolving mix of Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, Yazidis, Assyro-Chaldeans and Jews, while Turkish and Persian factions and the occasional Western power, whether operating under a flag or a corporate logo, continue to work in vain to eke out a demographic makeup that suits their interests.

mosul-vilayet

At the time of the British negotiation with the Ottomans over the fate of the Mosul region, British officers touring the area wrote extensively about the ubiquity of the Turkish language, noting that “Turkish is spoken all along the high road in all localities of any importance.” This fact formed part of Turkey’s argument that the land should remain under Turkish sovereignty. Even after the 1923 signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, in which Turkey renounced its rights to Ottoman lands, the Turkish government still held out a claim to the Mosul region, fearful that the Brits would use Kurdish separatism to further weaken the Turkish state. Invoking the popular Wilsonian principle of self-determination, the Turkish government asserted to the League of Nations that most of the Kurds and Arabs inhabiting the area preferred to be part of Turkey anyway. The British countered by asserting that their interviews with locals revealed a prevailing preference to become part of the new British-ruled Kingdom of Iraq.

The Turks, in no shape to bargain with London and mired in a deep internal debate over whether Turkey should forego these lands and focus instead on the benefits of a downsized republic, lost the argument and were forced to renounce their claims to the Mosul territory in 1925. As far as the Brits and the French were concerned, the largely Kurdish territory would serve as a vital buffer space to prevent the Turks from eventually extending their reach from Asia Minor to territories in Mesopotamia, Syria and Armenia. But the fear of Turkish expansion was not the only factor informing the European strategy to keep northern Iraq out of Turkish hands.

The Oil Factor

Since the days of Herodotus and Nebuchadnezzar, there have been stories of eternal flames arising from the earth of Baba Gurgur near the town of Kirkuk. German explorer and cartographer Carsten Niebuhr wrote in the 18th century: “A place called Baba Gurgur is above all remarkable because the earth is so hot that eggs and meat can be boiled here.” The flames were in fact produced by the natural gas and naphtha seeping through cracks in the rocks, betraying the vast quantities of crude oil lying beneath the surface. London wasted little time in calling on geologists from Venezuela, Mexico, Romania and Indochina to study the land and recommend sites for drilling. On Oct. 14, 1927, the fate of Kirkuk was sealed: A gusher rising 43 meters (around 140 feet) erupted from the earth, dousing the surrounding land with some 95,000 barrels of crude oil for 10 days before the well could be capped. With oil now part of the equation, the political situation in Kirkuk became all the more flammable.

The British mostly imported Sunni Arab tribesmen to work the oil fields, gradually reducing the Kurdish majority and weakening the influence of the Turkmen minority in the area. The Arabization project was given new energy when the Arab Baath Socialist Party came to power through a military coup in 1968. Arabic names were given to businesses, neighborhoods, schools and streets, while laws were adjusted to pressure Kurds to leave Kirkuk and transfer ownership of their homes and lands to Arabs. Eviction tactics turned ghastly in 1988 under Saddam Hussein’s Anfal campaign, during which chemical weapons were employed against the Kurdish population. The Iraqi government continued with heavy-handed tactics to Arabize the territory until the collapse of the Baathist regime in 2003. Naturally, revenge was a primary goal as Kurdish factions worked quickly to repopulate the region with Kurds and drive the Arabs out.

ethnic-composition-of-kirkuk

Even as Kirkuk, its oil-rich fields and a belt of disputed territories stretching between Diyala and Nineveh provinces have remained officially under the jurisdiction of the Iraqi central government in Baghdad, the Kurdish leadership has sought to redraw the boundaries of Iraqi Kurdistan. After the Iraqi Kurdish region gained de facto autonomy with the creation of a no-fly zone in 1991 and then formally coalesced into the Kurdistan Regional Government after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Kurdish influence gradually expanded in the disputed areas. Kurdish representation increased through multi-ethnic political councils, facilitated by the security protection these communities received from the Kurdish peshmerga and by the promise of energy revenues, while Baghdad remained mired in its own problems. Formally annexing Kirkuk and parts of Nineveh and Diyala, part of the larger Kurdish strategy, would come in due time. Indeed, the expectation that legalities of the annexation process would soon be completed convinced a handful of foreign energy firms to sign contracts with the Kurdish authorities — as opposed to Baghdad — enabling the disputed territories to finally begin realizing the region’s energy potential.

Then the unexpected happened: In June, the collapse of the Iraqi army in the north under the duress of the Islamic State left the Kirkuk fields wide open, allowing the Kurdish peshmerga to finally and fully occupy them. Though the Kurds now sit nervously on the prize, Baghdad, Iran, local Arabs and Turkmen and the Islamic State are eyeing these fields with a predatory gaze. At the same time, a motley force of Iran-backed Shiite militias, Kurdish militants and Sunni tribesmen are trying to flush the Islamic State out of the region in order to return to settling the question of where to draw the line on Kurdish autonomy. The Sunnis will undoubtedly demand a stake in the oil fields that the Kurds now control as repayment for turning on the Islamic State, guaranteeing a Kurdish-Sunni confrontation that Baghdad will surely exploit.

The Turkish Dilemma

The modern Turkish government is looking at Iraq and Syria in a way similar to how Damat Ferid did almost a century ago when he sought in Paris to maintain Turkish sovereignty over the region. From Ankara’s point of view, the extension of a Turkish sphere of influence into neighboring Muslim lands is the antidote to weakening Iraqi and Syrian states. Even if Turkey no longer has direct control over these lands, it hopes to at least indirectly re-establish its will through select partners, whether a group of moderate Islamist forces in Syria or, in northern Iraq, a combination of Turkmen and Sunni factions, along with a Kurdish faction such as Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party. The United States may currently be focused on the Islamic State, but Turkey is looking years ahead at the mess that will likely remain. This is why Turkey is placing conditions on its involvement in the battle against the Islamic State: It is trying to convince the United States and its Sunni Arab coalition partners that it will inevitably be the power administering this region. Therefore, according to Ankara, all players must conform to its priorities, beginning with replacing Syria’s Iran-backed Alawite government with a Sunni administration that will look first to Ankara for guidance.

However, the Turkish vision of the region simply does not fit the current reality and is earning Ankara more rebuke than respect from its neighbors and the West. The Kurds, in particular, will continue to form the Achilles’ heel of Turkish policymaking.

In Syria, where the Islamic State is closing in on the city of Kobani on Turkey’s border, Ankara is faced with the unsavory possibility that it will be drawn into a ground fight with a well-equipped insurgent force. Moreover, Turkey would be fighting on the same side as a variety of Kurdish separatists, including members of Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which Ankara has every interest in neutralizing.

Turkey faces the same dilemma in Iraq, where it may unwittingly back Kurdish separatists in its fight against the Islamic State. Just as critical, Turkey cannot be comfortable with the idea that Kirkuk is in the hands of the Iraqi Kurds unless Ankara is assured exclusive rights over that energy and the ability to extinguish any oil-fueled ambitions of Kurdish independence. But Turkey has competition. Iraqi President Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan is not willing to make itself beholden to Turkey, as did Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party, while financial pressures continue to climb. Instead, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan is staying close to Iran and showing a preference to work with Baghdad. Meanwhile, local Arab and Turkmen resistance to Kurdish rule is rising, a factor that Baghdad and Iran will surely exploit as they work to dilute Kurdish authority by courting local officials in Kirkuk and Nineveh with promises of energy rights and autonomy.

This is the crowded battleground that Turkey knows well. A long and elaborate game of “keep away” will be played to prevent the Kurds from consolidating control over oil-rich territory in the Kurdish-Arab borderland, while the competition between Turkey and Iran will emerge into full view. For Turkey to compete effectively in this space, it will need to come to terms with the reality that Ankara will not defy its history by resolving the Kurdish conundrum, nor will it be able to hide within its borders and avoid foreign entanglements.

Turkey, the Kurds and Iraq: The Prize and Peril of Kirkuk is republished with permission of Stratfor.”