Understanding the Dispute Over Peshmerga Command, Kurdistan News, Laurie Mylroie, August 20, 2016
The battle to liberate Mosul, as well as the ongoing “shaping operations,” in which Peshmerga are prominently involved, is not the responsibility of the State Department. It is the job of the Defense Department—one reason to question the authoritativeness of State Department statements on this matter.
Moreover, there is a crucial difference between how the State and Defense Departments interpret White House guidance on Iraq.
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A dispute has erupted between Washington and Erbil over command and control of Peshmerga forces. Most probably, the argument reflects a State Department misunderstanding.
On Wednesday, the State Department’s Deputy Spokesperson was questioned about the recent remarks of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, in which he said, “The Peshmerga should stay where they are now, and they should not expand their presence even if they help the Iraqi Army.”
When asked to comment on that statement, the Spokesperson replied, “The Peshmerga and all the various fighting groups in Iraq need to be under the command and control of the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi military.”
In turn, the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) responded, “The Peshmerga are not under the command or control of the Iraqi government. According to the Iraqi constitution, the Peshmerga are part of Iraq’s defense system, but the Iraqi government has not supplied the Peshmerga with weapons or military training, and they have not assumed any responsibility toward the Peshmerga.”
The battle to liberate Mosul, as well as the ongoing “shaping operations,” in which Peshmerga are prominently involved, is not the responsibility of the State Department. It is the job of the Defense Department—one reason to question the authoritativeness of State Department statements on this matter.
Moreover, there is a crucial difference between how the State and Defense Departments interpret White House guidance on Iraq.
According to that guidance, Baghdad is in the lead, and the US (and others) follow its direction. The White House believes this is the best way to ensure Baghdad’s continuing cooperation in the fight against IS.
But the interpretation of that guidance varies. The State Department tends to adhere to it strictly; the Defense Department applies it more loosely.
For example, the Defense Department decided to support the Peshmerga directly, rather than channel aid through Baghdad. In July, it signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Erbil. The Pentagon secured Baghdad’s approval by telling the Iraqis what it intended to do and then asking them if they had any objection.
The State Department, however, tends to leave such decisions to the Iraqi government, as it did regarding the anti-ISIL Coalition meetings in Washington last month. KRG representation was minimal because Iraq’s Foreign Minister decided, as he liked.
The State Department’s restrictive interpretation of this guidance led them to make a major misstatement before. That came in response to a query of mine, following the recent International Pledging Conference that raised $2.1 billion in humanitarian aid for Iraq.
What mechanisms existed to ensure that the Kurdistan Region—which hosts 2/3 of the refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Iraq—received its fair share, given Baghdad’s notorious corruption?, I asked a State Department Spokesperson.
She did not address the issue of Baghdad’s corruption but clearly affirmed, “Funding and support will go through Baghdad.”
That statement also prompted protest from Erbil. But it turned out to be wrong. The State Department soon clarified that the international aid would go through the UN, not Baghdad.
The State Department’s answer to any question that raises criticism of the Iraqi government, as I have learned, is likely to begin with an affirmation of US backing for Baghdad, and the rest of the answer will probably not address the criticism.
When the question involves a dispute between Baghdad versus Erbil, almost certainly, the answer will favor Baghdad. So I have learned not to ask such questions, unless Baghdad’s actions are so clearly wrong that the question itself will highlight the folly of the answer—and the policy behind it.
The spokespersons are the messengers, not the decision-makers, I regularly remind myself. Their deference to Baghdad’s decision-making may prove a grave error, as it does not seem to acknowledge the sectarian nature of the Iraqi government and the influence Tehran exerts over it. But they are not responsible for that policy.
And their jobs are not easy. For an hour each day, they stand before a camera, answering questions, which can be quite hostile, about a wide range of topics. Such questions may come from ambitious journalists who seem to think that their incessant, repetitive questioning may trap the spokespersons into revealing the kernel of some big scoop. Or they may come from the representatives of hostile states, who seem to think that through their barrage of queries, they can embarrass the US.
This situation happens in real time, on an indelible record, to be posted for the whole world to view. The spokespersons bear the hour with unflagging courtesy, and sometimes even good humor, all the while aware that certain slip-ups can create an international incident.
My guess is that is what happened with the misguided statement about command and control of the Peshmerga.
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