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The War on ISIS: More Than One Battle

October 23, 2014

The War on ISIS: More Than One Battle, Wall Street Journal,  Max Boot, October 22, 2014

Kobani no longer looks to be in imminent danger of falling. It is even possible that ISIS will give up the fight and pull out. If this happens, it will certainly be good news. The remaining residents of Kobani would be saved from slaughter and their relief would give a moral boost to anti-ISIS efforts. But any celebration should be muted. Winning at Kobani will be no more devastating to ISIS than was the American victory at Khe Sanh to North Vietnam.

The problem is that ISIS can readily replace the fighters it loses in Kobani, and heavy weapons are not essential to its guerrilla style of warfare. Even as ISIS is losing a little ground at Kobani, it is gaining strength elsewhere.

Only 12 U.S. advisory teams have been deployed and only at the brigade level. The other 14 Iraqi brigades identified by the U.S. as “reliable partners” have no advisers at all. None of these advisers, moreover, is allowed to accompany Iraqi troops into combat, where they can be most effective. The U.S. also is not stepping in to offer direct assistance and training to the Sunnis of Anbar Province to allow them to fight back against ISIS, as they did against al Qaeda in Iraq in 2007-08.

Through the limited application of air power—a mere handful of daily strikes—the U.S. may achieve tactical progress to blunt ISIS’s momentum. But Khe Sanh showed the limits of tactical military victories if they are not married to larger strategic gains—and those are elusive in Iraq and Syria today

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On Jan. 21, 1968, North Vietnamese troops attacked the U.S. Marine garrison at Khe Sanh in South Vietnam near the border with Laos. A 77-day siege ensued, with the U.S. pouring in ever more firepower. The U.S. would drop 100,000 tons of bombs because Gen. William Westmoreland was determined that Khe Sanh not become another defeat like Dien Bien Phu, which had effectively ended France’s colonial presence in Vietnam 14 years earlier.

And it didn’t. Eventually the siege was relieved and the attacking forces melted away, having suffered more than 5,000 fatalities (while the defenders lost about 350 men).

Today, no one except some veterans and military historians remembers Khe Sanh because in the end it had scant strategic significance: Even though the U.S. won the battle, it lost the war. Not long after having “liberated” Khe Sanh, the U.S. dismantled the base because it served little purpose.

This history is worth mentioning because of the parallels, limited and inexact to be sure, between Khe Sanh and Kobani, a Kurdish town in northern Syria. Jihadist forces of Islamic State, also known as ISIS, have been besieging Kobani for weeks, and the U.S. has been ramping up efforts to prevent the town from falling. U.S. airstrikes have apparently taken a heavy toll, eliminating ISIS fighters, artillery, armored vehicles and other heavy weapons. Airstrikes have now been joined by airdrops of weapons and ammunition to the Kurdish defenders. Turkey, which had hitherto not lifted a finger to save Kobani, announced Monday that it would allow Iraqi Kurdish fighters to traverse Turkish territory to join in defending the town.

Kobani no longer looks to be in imminent danger of falling. It is even possible that ISIS will give up the fight and pull out. If this happens, it will certainly be good news. The remaining residents of Kobani would be saved from slaughter and their relief would give a moral boost to anti-ISIS efforts. But any celebration should be muted. Winning at Kobani will be no more devastating to ISIS than was the American victory at Khe Sanh to North Vietnam.

The problem is that ISIS can readily replace the fighters it loses in Kobani, and heavy weapons are not essential to its guerrilla style of warfare. Even as ISIS is losing a little ground at Kobani, it is gaining strength elsewhere.

Its fighters are advancing in Anbar Province with little resistance. They are poised on the outskirts of Baghdad; soon they may be within mortar range of Baghdad International Airport, whose closure would be a disaster. On Monday alone, its car bombs and suicide bombers in Baghdad and Karbala claimed at least 33 lives, a day after a suicide bomber in Baghdad killed at least 28 people in a Shiite mosque. The pattern is reminiscent of the terrorist atrocities perpetrated in 2006 by al Qaeda in Iraq, ISIS’s predecessor, aimed at rallying Sunnis to the terrorists’ side by provoking a civil war with Shiites.

As in those dark days, Sunni extremism is provoking an equally extreme response from Iranian-backed Shiites. The replacement of Nouri al-Maliki as Iraq’s prime minister with Haidar al-Abadi, an apparently less sectarian Shiite, was a small step in the right direction for which the Obama administration deserves credit. But there is little reason to think the Iranian hold over a substantial portion of the Iraqi state has been broken.

The Iraqi Parliament has approved ministers to run the two security ministries—Interior and Defense. While the Defense pick is Sunni technocrat Khalid al-Obedi, the Interior pick is far more worrisome: Mohammed Salem al-Ghabban is a member of the Badr Organization, one of the chief Iranian-backed Shiite militias that is further destabilizing Iraq with attacks on Sunni neighborhoods. The likelihood is that Mr. Ghabban will take orders from his ultimate sponsor, Gen. Qasem Suleimani, head of Iran’s Quds Force.

This means that the Interior Ministry, in charge of Iraq’s police forces, will become, if it is not already, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Shiite militias and their Iranian string-pullers. This happened in 2006 when the Iraqi police became notorious for kidnapping and torturing Sunnis. This helped bring Iraq to the brink of all-out civil war and will do so again if not checked.

The only way to counteract the Iranian capture of the Interior Ministry is to bolster the Iraqi army as an independent fighting force, but there is little sign of this occurring. Shiite sectarians have also deeply penetrated the army and the U.S. has little ability to counteract this insidious development because President Obama will not send a large number of “embedded” advisers to work alongside army units that remain more professional and less politicized.

Only 12 U.S. advisory teams have been deployed and only at the brigade level. The other 14 Iraqi brigades identified by the U.S. as “reliable partners” have no advisers at all. None of these advisers, moreover, is allowed to accompany Iraqi troops into combat, where they can be most effective. The U.S. also is not stepping in to offer direct assistance and training to the Sunnis of Anbar Province to allow them to fight back against ISIS, as they did against al Qaeda in Iraq in 2007-08.

In Syria the U.S. is also doing little to oppose the Assad dictatorship, leaving it free to continue attacks on areas held by moderate militias affiliated with the Free Syrian Army. This, too, is feeding the radicalization of Syria and Iraq by convincing many Sunnis, rightly or wrongly, that the U.S. is acquiescing to Iranian regional domination—and that ISIS is the only reliable defender that Sunnis have. That impression will be strengthened if the Obama administration reaches a deal with Iran next month that will allow Tehran to maintain its capacity to develop a nuclear weapon.

Through the limited application of air power—a mere handful of daily strikes—the U.S. may achieve tactical progress to blunt ISIS’s momentum. But Khe Sanh showed the limits of tactical military victories if they are not married to larger strategic gains—and those are elusive in Iraq and Syria today.

Categories: Air strikes, Baghdad, Combat troops, Intelligence, Iraq, Iraqi military, Islamic State, Obama, Syria
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How to defeat Islamic State’s war machine

October 15, 2014

How to defeat Islamic State’s war machine, Al-Monitor, Metin Turcan, October 14, 2014

(Which team is the “junior varsity?”

The article suggests the obvious need for close air support using trained ground forces to guide aircraft to strike useful targets. The U.S. has trained “boots” capable of doing that, but Obama continues to assert that the U.S. will have no ground combat presence in Iraq or Syria. U.S. spotters would need be in combat areas, would be targeted by Islamic State forces and would therefore need to engage in combat. Non-U.S. target spotters, in addition to needing substantial technical training, would also need to be capable of communicating with aircraft pilots. In many if not most case, spotters capable of communicating in English would be needed. –DM)

Although much has been written to explain the tactical military successes of the Islamic State (IS), there has not yet been a comprehensive assessment of how, since June 2014, IS has managed to rule over terrain larger than Lebanon to include 8 million Iraqis and Syrians.

How has it been possible that in a short three months IS has been able to control extensive terrain, with 3,000 IS fighters capturing Mosul, which was guarded by 30,000 Iraqi soldiers, and after seizing Mosul on June 10 engage in battles two days later with Iraqi forces in towns north of Baghdad, 230 miles from Mosul?

Although one can allude to the delayed reaction of the international community, the lack of strong military opposition to IS, the international support IS has acquired and the support from Sunni tribes and political bodies in areas it captures, none of it defies the reality that — at the tactical level — IS is an extremely lethal and effective war machine. To understand this key determinant of IS gains, one has to understand that reality. This article will attempt to analyze the factors contributing to IS’ military efficiency, particularly at the tactical level.

Factors that boost tactical effectiveness of IS can be summarized as fluid and decentralized command and control structure; novel hybrid military tactics blending conventional warfare with terrorist tactics; effective use of armored platforms in offensive operations; dispersion; preservation of momentum at all costs; effective exploitation of topographic and human terrains; simplicity and flexibility in planning; and conducting operations and high levels of initiative and morale.

Fluid and decentralized command control structure

IS does not have permanent and centralized command and control structure in the traditional sense of warfare. Unlike contemporary armies of the world, IS doesn’t make sharp distinctions between strategic, operative and tactical levels. In their traditional warfare, tactical achievements is the way to achieve strategic objectives. For IS, the basic goal is to score tactical successes and expand on them step by step. Deviating from the traditional approach, what IS fields is a bottom-up command structure focused on a fast pace for small military achievements. At the moment, US-led airstrikes have been mostly against IS communication and training facilities. It is extraordinary that there is not a single control facility that has been hit by allied airstrikes.

IS warfare combines and hybridizes terrorist tactics, urban guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare.

IS is adept enough to conduct armor attacks at night and is skilled in accurate firing of their main tank guns with thermal cameras, and is capable of planting improvised explosive devices in critical areas and routes. It wages hybridized guerrilla warfare and conventional armored warfare by deploying eight to 10 men teams carrying out building-by-building, block-by-block clear and hold operations in urban terrain.

After the recent air attacks, IS has dispersed its forces to the extreme. Its teams have been minimized to two or three vehicles and eight to 10 men. Their concealment has been highly professional. IS’ executive orders are brief, setting out what the mission is in simple terms, leaving how it is to be carried out to field units.

It is imperative to acknowledge that a typical IS militant is endowed with a win-win mindset that assures him that to kill in jihad is a blessing, but if he is martyred he will end up in paradise also. No wonder IS combatants are high-adrenalin fighters who can kill and get killed without hesitation.

A typical IS operation goes like this: An IS armored unit of tanks or a mobile unit of eight to 12 fighters with two to three vehicles are informed by WhatsApp, a message on Facebook or Twitter or phone text message, and if this mode is not available through their own radio net, to assemble at a certain place at a certain time. This is the first time we are seeing combat units making use of social media in combat operations. Before its operations, IS disseminates propaganda messages via social media to enemy fighters and civilians living in the targeted urban settlements to demoralize and dishearten them. IS operations and logistics units that are thus alerted assemble at a meeting point within two to three hours, and after another 1 ½ hours of coordination discussions and logistics preparations the operation is underway.

One must remember that a regular IS tank driver is trained to drive his tank at night with a thermal camera, and that the commander of the team has enough tactical military knowledge to best deploy his tanks. Then it is a matter of attacking the enemy’s weakest point, preferably after the morning prayers. Vehicles stage the first phase of the attacks, followed by infantry attacks that depend on the nature of the enemy’s opposition. In these attacks, IS has been remarkably successful in creating a balance between the phased campaign design and maintaining the tempo of warfare. The high tempo of combat is routine for an IS fighter, but usually too high for opposing soldiers.

How to defeat IS?

How to first stop IS and then defeat it? The secret is in a concept that has so far been lacking the forces fighting IS in Syria and Iraq: Close air support that can only be provided by intense cooperation between ground troops and air units. Coalition air attacks so far are at least limiting IS advances; close cooperation between ground forces and armed helicopters such as AH-64 or fixed-wing platforms such as A-10 Thunderbolts can enable full integration of each air mission with fire and movement of ground forces, and bring the end to IS.

The question then becomes how the US-led coalition can provide that level of air support, and who has the substantial technical know-how and military expertise needed on the ground.

We know special forces elements of countries contributing to the coalition are participating in operations to provide precision target guiding with laser pointers. But this has been limited. Then what can be the solution?

Either the local forces fighting against IS will have to learn this technique that requires high military expertise, or special detachments formed by countries contributing to the coalition will be assigned to each combat zone or to major units as a close air support coordinator. It is no surprise then that the hottest topic in ongoing military discussions is who will provide this close air support and how. When tailoring strategies of close air support, one should keep in mind that IS has MANPADs (man-portable air defense systems) that make air units providing close air support highly vulnerable in their low-speed and low-altitude missions.

 

Categories: Air strikes, Combat troops, Iraq, Islamic State, Obama, Syria, U.S. Military
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The Unresolved Problem with Boots on the Ground

October 10, 2014

The Unresolved Problem with Boots on the Ground, Commentary Magazine, , October 10, 2014

(If the U.S. were to put boots on the ground, how many would be needed to do what? Trainers? Spotters for airstrikes? Infantry? Artillery? Psychological operations? Field medics? Something else? Could we shift from a peacetime mode to a wartime mode in time to do significant damage to the Islamic State, et al? — DM)

[T]here is nothing more dangerous to any potential ground troops than to be inserted into a warzone without broad public consensus about their mission and to have a commander-in-chief who has consistently met the requests of forces in the field with indecision and a failure to deliver what ground commanders consider their minimum basic needs.

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A growing chorus of analysts, generals, and even cabinet secretaries who served under President Obama suggest that Obama’s stated goal to “degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIS is not going to occur by means of air power alone. That might be true, although it’s also true that Obama hasn’t used airpower to its full effect. To read a Pentagon press release is to read reports of five, six, or seven airstrikes. Given that an aircraft carrier can launch planes every 30 to 40 seconds, this suggests that the Obama administration is effectively committing the equivalent of three or four minutes of dedicated aircraft carrier time to achieve its goals. And even then, many of the strikes Obama has ordered (and the president has said that he approves every strike carried out inside Syria) attack empty buildings or equipment far away from the fronts of the fight.

But even if boots on the ground are necessary with an augmented air campaign, there is one problem that is unsolvable, and that is the personality and lack of commitment of the commander-in-chief. President Obama has the strategic equivalent of Attention Deficit Disorder. Despite his September 10 speech, it’s unclear whether he is truly committed to destroying ISIS or was simply reacting to the spike in public outrage following the murder of James Foley.

Now make no mistake: I personally feel that the defeat of ISIS is an overwhelming national interest, and that the goal should not simply be “deradicalization” for its fighters, but rather their death. That said, there is nothing more dangerous to any potential ground troops than to be inserted into a warzone without broad public consensus about their mission and to have a commander-in-chief who has consistently met the requests of forces in the field with indecision and a failure to deliver what ground commanders consider their minimum basic needs.

What can be done? Unfortunately, there’s no good answer with such lackluster leadership in the White House and Congress. But those serving in uniform and placing themselves in harm’s way should not be a political football. At present, however, that is exactly how the president and some members of both parties treat them and the ISIS problem. Until there is focus and responsibility in both the White House and Congress, and recognition that military action cannot be governed by polls or political timelines, it is foolhardy to insert ground forces.  Regardless of how they might be needed and how determined ISIS is to strike the United States, ground troops without serious leadership would be unwise. Never again should there be a deployment of ground forces without political consensus, broad public support. If these are lacking and we have to pay the consequence, then that will be a “teachable moment” for the public about the importance of freedom and the nature of the evil that the United State must confront.

Categories: Air strikes, Iraq, Islamic State, Obama, Syria
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The rules of war need to change

October 5, 2014

The rules of war need to change, Israel Hayom, Dan Margalit, October 5, 2014

(Could the U.S. and her allies put effective boots on the ground, or have the boots and the nation become too multiculturally damaged to do what needs to be done? More than the rules of war needs to change.

When the U.S. responded to the Russian supplied, trained and initially led North Korean invasion on June 25, 1950, we had been at peace for only five years. We were tired and wanted peace to continue but war came to us unexpectedly; it should have been expected. Our peacetime boots were badly supplied, trained and, more often than not, led. Some but not enough officers and senior noncoms had experienced war and knew what to do. Very few in the lower enlisted ranks had or did and “bug out” became a much used phrase. The NK troops had been hardened in combat, were adequately supplied, well trained and well led. Those who did not fight were executed. They pushed us back nearly to Pusan. By mid-September, we had more better led and trained troops; they had also become very angry at the NK troops, and intense anger is a powerful force multiplier. The NK tide was reversed, for a couple of years.

Were we now to try to put green boots on the ground to do what is necessary against well trained, led and financed Islamic troops, a  majority  of the public would oppose it and it would be politically unpopular. Were we to put boots on the ground anyway, they would likely need to undergo lengthy and deadly immersion-style baptism by fire. There would be substantial casualties and the opposition would increase.

Should we do it anyway if only the rules of engagement change? Can we, or is that now a fantasy? — DM)

The enlightened world must pummel Islamic State into a pulp. This cancer needs to be excised, leaving no metastases behind. If the world is soft, the way most greasy, petit-bourgeois masses tend to be, it will soon learn that these horrifying decapitations are in fact prompting thousands of new volunteers to join the ranks of Islamic State. A toothless war will come back to bite us like a boomerang. It will weaken the good guys.

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It was clear from the very beginning that the cruelest most terrible terror organization since the Khmer Rouge would not fold in the face of a flimsy, ill-timed attack by a few American, British and French jets. The possible addition of Australia, Canada and some Arab states — it is not yet clear where Turkey stands — to the coalition will not scare them either. On the contrary — Islamic State group draws its power from its image of extremist outlaws who will never compromise. At this point, refusing to surrender, the Islamic State group had no choice but to decapitate another innocent British national — Alan Henning — who only wanted to do good in this world.

The same fate awaits the next Westerner in line — an American by the name of Peter Kassig, who even converted to Islam to try to save his own life. But the murderers will not let up. Jihadi John is already sharpening his knife.

All this is happening because Islamic State is not an organization that can be defeated with slow, uncertain, limited action. It cannot be defeated without “boots on the ground.” It is imperative to hit them with force; with waves of growing intensity. They must be attacked continuously, without breaks, without cease-fires and with the utmost determination.

The day of Yom Kippur, regardless of the Jewish holiday, was a turning point in the war against Islamic State. They were bombed, yet immediately resumed decapitating prisoners. The reality has become one of walking on the edge; of all or nothing-style fighting. There can be no compromise; there can be no cease-fire. You are either with us or against us.

The enlightened world must pummel Islamic State into a pulp. This cancer needs to be excised, leaving no metastases behind. If the world is soft, the way most greasy, petit-bourgeois masses tend to be, it will soon learn that these horrifying decapitations are in fact prompting thousands of new volunteers to join the ranks of Islamic State. A toothless war will come back to bite us like a boomerang. It will weaken the good guys.

It will not be an easy victory. In the West, there are those who are afraid and who prefer to shut their eyes tight as part of a head-in-the-sand policy. There are those who are truly indifferent. There are bleeding hearts who find partial justification for the Islamist decapitations. One of them wrote an article blaming the Western violence for the rise of Islamic State. Others, at the U.N. of course, wondered whether bombing Islamic State targets would be in line with international law, or whether it could be a violation of Syrian sovereignty.

The hypocrisy is still benefiting the terrorists’ side. In our regional conflict, Hamas fires rockets indiscriminately at Jewish populations without prior warning, and the IDF, before retaliating (with much more force, granted), warns every Gazan to leave their homes to avoid getting hurt. Who gets blamed by the U.N.? Of course it is Israel, which warns the enemy, and not Hamas which fires in every civilian direction.

If, however, the familiar indifference doesn’t trip up the West, Islamic State will be vanquished and forever disgraced. Furthermore, the rules of war and international law will be amended in order to allow democracies to effectively defend themselves. The existing rules are good for guiding conflicts between enlightened nations. But these days, with Islamic State and its ilk dominating the scene, the enlightened world will have to allow itself to fight in a more resolute, effective manner if it doesn’t want to be defeated by Islamic terror.

At the end of the tunnel, a significant overhaul of the rules of war awaits.

Categories: Iraq, Islamic State, Islamism, Rules of war, Syria, U.S. Military
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Obama v. The Generals: Should Top Brass Contradict the Commander-in-chief in Public?

September 24, 2014

Obama v. The Generals: Should Top Brass Contradict the Commander-in-chief in Public? You Tube, September 23, 2014

 

Categories: Generals, Iraq war, Obama, Syria war
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Ellison’s Must Read of the Day

September 8, 2014

Ellison’s Must Read of the DayBY: Ellison BarberSeptember 8, 2014 10:21 am

via Ellison’s Must Read of the Day | Washington Free Beacon.

 

My must read of the day is “President Barack Obama’s Full Interview with NBC’s Chuck Todd,” in NBC News:

 

CHUCK TODD:

You’ve ruled out boots on the ground. And I’m curious, have you only ruled them out simply for domestic political reasons? Or is there another reason you’ve ruled out American boots on the ground? Because your own—your own guys have said, “You can’t defeat ISIS with air strikes alone.”

PRESIDENT OBAMA:

Well, they’re absolutely right about that. But you also cannot, over the long term or even the medium term, deal with this problem by having the United States serially occupy various countries all around the Middle East. We don’t have the resources. It puts enormous strains on our military. And at some point, we leave. And then things blow up again. So we— […]

—so—so we’ve got to have a more sustainable strategy, which means the boots on the ground have to be Iraqi … and in Syria, the boots on the ground have to be Syrian. […]

And so the— the strategy both for Iraq and for Syria is that we will hunt down ISIL members and assets wherever they are. I will reserve the right to always protect the American people and go after folks who are trying to hurt us wherever they are.

But in terms of controlling territory, we’re going to have to develop a moderate Sunni opposition that can control territory and that we can work with. The notion that the United States should be putting boots on the ground, I think would be a profound mistake. And I want to be very clear and very explicit about that.

It is undoubtedly important to work with troops in both Iraq and Syria. The people who advocated going into Syria three years ago argued a similar thing: arm and work with the moderates so we have a proxy and don’t have to send all of our guys in down the road, if (and now clearly when) the problem metastasizes. But now we’re going to solve the ISIL problem and there will be no U.S. ground troops? There’s just no way.

That’s not to pass judgment on whether it’s a good idea to send them in, but it’s disingenuous to continuously peddle this notion that there will be no combat troops.

If the goal is to destroy ISIL and the task will, by the administration’s account, take years—it only takes a little common sense to realize something like that will require some forces on the ground.

When the president first started to step into Iraq he unequivocally promised there would be no boots on the ground. Then it switched to, “well, we meant no combat troops and these are humanitarian troops; they’re only carrying out the humanitarian mission.”

Currently there are at least 1,100 troops in Iraq, but the administration maintains that they’re not engaging in combat.

Obama is so determined to avoid being the fourth consecutive president in Iraq, and not revisit “Bush’s War” that he refuses to accept reality. We will not be “putting boots on the ground” is a political statement that may make the administration feel better about what they’re doing, but it is not rooted in reality.

In this same interview, Obama said when he addresses the nation on Wednesday it will be in an effort to level with the American people.

“More than anything,” he said, “I just want the American people to understand the nature of the threat and how we’re going to deal with it and to have confidence we’ll be able to deal with it.” 

That’s a noble aim, but it is immediately undermined by futile promises and absolutes like “no ground troops.” The American people deserve to hear a general plan, and they deserve to hear one that’s honest. There are boots on the ground, there will be boots on the ground, and it’s unlikely ISIL can be destroyed without them.

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