WarSclerotic

‘Israel fought its own battles’.

Obama’s Syrian Gamble « Liveshots.

May 10, 2010 – 10:00 AM | by: Ben Evansky

Bret Stephens: What Is Happening to Turkey? – WSJ.com.\

Istanbul

Last week I asked Bernard Lewis where he thought Turkey might be going. The dean of Middle East historians speculated that in a decade the secular republic founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk might more closely resemble the Islamic Republic of Iran—even as Iran transformed itself into a secular republic.

Reading the news about Turkey from afar, it’s easy to see what Prof. Lewis means. Since coming to power in 2002, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has dramatically recast the traditional contours of Turkish foreign policy. Gone are the days when the country had a strategic partnership with Israel, involving close military ties and shared enemies in Syria and Iran and the sundry terrorist groups they sponsored. Gone are the days, too, when the U.S. could rely on Turkey as a bulwark against common enemies, be they the Soviet Union or Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

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Associated Press

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (left) and Syrian President Bashar Assad.

Today, Mr. Erdogan has excellent relations with Syrian strongman Bashar Assad, whom the prime minister affectionately calls his “brother.” He has accused Israel of “savagery” in Gaza and opened a diplomatic line to Hamas while maintaining good ties with the genocidal government of Sudan. He was among the first foreign leaders to congratulate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on his fraudulent victory in last year’s election. He has resisted intense pressure from the Obama administration to vote for a new round of Security Council sanctions on Iran, with which Turkey has a $10 billion trade relationship. And he has sabotaged efforts by his own foreign ministry to improve ties with neighboring Armenia.

The changes in foreign policy reflect the rolling revolution in Turkey’s domestic political arrangements. The military, long the pillar of Turkish secularism, is under assault by Mr. Erdogan’s Islamist-oriented government, which has recently arrested dozens of officers on suspicion of plotting a coup. Last week the Turkish parliament voted to put a referendum to the public that would, if passed, allow the government to pack the country’s top courts, another secularist pillar, with its own people. Also under assault is the media group Dogan, which last year was slapped with a multibillion dollar tax fine.

Oh, and America’s favorability rating among Turks, at around 14% according to recent polls, is plumbing an all-time low, despite Barack Obama’s presidency and his unprecedented outreach to Muslims in general and Turks in particular. In 2004, the year of Abu Ghraib, it was 30%.

All this would seem to more than justify Prof. Lewis’s alarm. So why do so many Turks, including more than a few secularists and classical liberals, seem mostly at ease with the changes Mr. Erdogan has wrought? A possible answer may be self-delusion: Liberals were also at the forefront of the Iranian revolution before being brutally swept aside by the Ayatollah Khomeini. But that isn’t quite convincing in Turkey’s case.

More plausible is Turkey’s economic transformation under the AKP’s pro-free market stewardship. Inflation, which ran to 99% in 1997, is down to single digits. Goldman Sachs anticipates 7% growth this year, which would make the country Europe’s strongest performer—if only Europe would have it as a member. Turks now look on the EU with diminished envy and growing contempt. One time arch-rival Greece mostly earns their pity.

Chief among the beneficiaries of this transformation has been the AKP’s political base: an Islamic bourgeoisie that was long shut out of the old statist arrangements between the country’s secular political and business elites. Members of this new class want to send their daughters to universities—and insist they be allowed to do so wearing headscarves. They also insist that they be ruled by the government they elected, not by the “deep state” of unelected and often self-dealing officers, judges and bureaucrats who defended the country’s secularism at the expense of its democracy and prosperity.

The paradoxical result is that, as the country has become wealthier and (in some respects) more democratic, it has also shed some of its Western trappings. Mr. Erdogan’s infatuations with his unsavory neighbors undoubtedly stems form his own instincts, ideology and ego. But it also reflects a public sentiment that no longer wants Turkey to be a stranger in its own region, particularly when it so easily can be its leader. Some Turks call this “neo-Ottomanism,” others “Turkish-Gaullism.” Whichever way, it is bound to discomfit the West.

The more serious question is how far it all will go. Some of Mr. Erdogan’s domestic power plays smack of incipient Putinism. The estrangement from Israel is far from complete, but an Israeli attack on Iran might just do the trick. And it’s hard to see why Mr. Erdogan should buck public opinion when it comes to Turkey’s alliance with the U.S. when he’s prepared to follow public opinion in so many other matters.

Most importantly, will the Erdogan brand of Islamism remain relatively modest in its social and political ambitions, or will it become aggressive and radical? It would be wrong to pretend to know the answer. It would be insane not to worry about the possibility.

Inside Hizballah’s Preparations for the Next War – TIME.

Lebanese Hizbollah members

With a startled shout from the outcrop above, the Hizballah fighter bounded down the rocky slope, cocked his AK-47 rifle in a dramatic flourish as he drew near. “What are you doing here?” he demanded, his face a mix of anger and astonishment. “This is a military zone. You should not be here.”

It turned out that the youthful militant had been guarding a small outpost created by the Shi’ite militia on a remote mountain top in south Lebanon. The location was well chosen, offering the Hizballah men commanding views over the hills and valleys of the southern Bekaa Valley, a likely battle front if a widely-anticipated — and feared — war breaks out between the Iran-backed group and Israel. (See rare pictures of Hizballah’s youth movement.)

The question of whether these rugged hills will see yet another war depends less on the likely combatants than it does on the U.S. and Iran. Hizballah is viewed as one component of Iran’s deterrence against a possible attack on its nuclear sites, should diplomatic efforts fail to resolve the standoff with the West over its enrichment of uranium. And recent conversations with Hizballah fighters reveal an organization at the peak of its military powers with an army of well-trained, disciplined, and highly motivated combatants wielding advanced weaponry, cultivating new tactics, and brimming with confidence.

“The next war is coming one hundred percent, but we don’t know when,” says Ali, a thickly-muscled university student. “We have big plans for it. God willing, you will see the end of Israel.” (See pictures of Lebanon in crisis.)

Like all Hizballah fighters interviewed for this article, Ali requested anonymity as he was not authorized to talk to the press. Although Hizballah and Israel both insist they do not want another war, neither side has disguised its preparations for that possibility. Since the end of its last bout with the Israeli military in July-August 2006, Hizballah has built new defensive lines and firing positions, the fighters say, in the hills flanking the Bekaa and along the rugged mountainous spine running up the middle of southern Lebanon.

One such position was this observation post near the town of Jezzine onto which a TIME reporter stumbled. It consisted of a couple of bunkers sunk into the hillside, an open fire place with a soot-blackened cooking pot and bags of onions and potatoes. Local residents say that at night they can hear the sound of explosions and gunfire echoing through the valleys as Hizballah trains. Israel vows that it will use far greater force in the next war and will treat the Lebanese state — in whose government Hizballah has a major role — as the enemy rather than just the Shi’ite militia, a prospect that frightens many Lebanese. But the resolve of the Hizballah combatants remains unshaken by Israeli threats. (Read “A Brief History of Hizballah.”)

“Israel is living a state of confusion because it perceives that any aggression it would launch against Lebanon would be lost,” boasted Hizballah’s deputy leader Sheikh Naim Qassem this week, adding that he does not believe a new war with Israel is on the horizon. Perhaps not, but the look in the eyes of Hizballah’s combatants suggest that not only are they fully prepared to fight one, they actually look forward to it.

“It doesn’t matter. We can always rebuild. Our dignity is more important than roofs over our heads,” says Haj Rida, a square-jawed unit commander. Such sang froid illustrates the single-minded determination of the Hizballah combatant nurtured by years of relentless religious instruction and military training. Ali, for example, was raised in an environment of Islamic piety and dedication to the cause, joining the party’s youth program at the age of 12. He eschews parties and listening to music, saying he has dedicated his life to “walking the path of the Prophet Mohammed”. (See pictures of the 2006 war in Lebanon.)

“I have my studies at university and my family, but I also have the life of jihad and preparations for the coming war,” he says. “I consider my jihad duties as something joyful. You cannot understand the joy of jihad unless you are in Hizballah.”

Acting on an internal assessment of its military performance in the 2006 war, Hizballah is seeking to improve its capabilities by developing new tactics and acquiring new weapons. They are placing particular emphasis on improved air defense systems to challenge Israel’s aerial superiority.

Reports over the past year suggest that Hizballah has received advanced Russian shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, and some fighters have been trained in Syria on larger truck-mounted missile systems.

U.S. and Israeli intelligence sources say Hizballah has also augmented its arsenal with larger, longer-range rockets with guidance capabilities. Many analysts believe that in the event of another war, Hizballah plans to strike strategic targets deep inside Israel. In February, the movement’s leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah hinted that Hizballah now had the ability to strike targets in Tel Aviv.

Although last month’s Israeli claims that Syria had transferred Scud ballistic missiles to Hizballah remain unsubstantiated — and some military analysts are skeptical given the rocket’s size and cumbersome logistical requirements — the group is believed to have acquired Syrian-manufactured M-600 guided rockets. The M-600, a copy of an Iranian rocket, can carry a 1,100 pound warhead for a distance of 155 miles, and its guidance system allows Hizballah to target Israel’s defense ministry in Tel Aviv from hidden bases in the northern Bekaa Valley. (Read “Israel Claims Iran Weapons Intercept.”)

Hizballah’s possession of the M-600 is “just the tip of the iceberg,” Brigadier General Yossi Baidatz, Israel’s top military intelligence analyst, told a Knesset committee on Tuesday. “Hizballah currently has an arsenal of thousands of rockets of all kinds and ranges, including solid fuelled rockets, with a longer range and more accurate,” he said.

Besides seeking new weapons systems, the Shi’ite militia is also finding innovative ways to utilize older armaments, such as the guerrilla-standard RPG-7 grenade launcher and the recoilless rifle, a near obsolete anti-tank weapon. “The RPG-7 is old but still a good weapon,” says Ali. “It’s how you use them that counts. We are always studying new combat techniques.”

Israel’s heavily armored tanks are to receive a newly-developed defense system that fires mini interceptors to destroy incoming antitank missiles. Hizballah fighters, without revealing details, say they are training to overcome such sophisticated defenses by “swarming” Israeli tanks with low-tech antitank weapons.

Hizballah’s battle plans may also including infiltrating fighters across the border into Israel to carry out raids and sabotage missions — a move that would be unprecedented in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israeli doctrine is to fight its wars in the territory of its enemies rather than on the home front. Says Ali, “God willing, we will go into Palestine next time.”

Despite the mounting tension, Israel’s pledge — and vast capability — to inflict catastrophic damage on Lebanon and the scale of Hizballah’s arms build-up functions as a kind of mutual deterrence that has brought the usually volatile frontier its longest period of calm in 40 years.

Medvedev, Assad to discuss Mideast peace – Israel News, Ynetnews.

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// Medvedev. Wants to assist with peace Photo: Reuters

Russian president expected to hand over message from Israel during visit in Damascus

AP and Roee Nahmias

JPost.com | BlogCentral | Rosner’s Domain | “Most Jews wont re-elect Obama”, if you care to believe polls.

The McLaughlin poll everybody’s talking about is all here:

And a couple of notes:

1. When one asks whether Jews will “consider voting” for “someone else” this doesn’t mean that they will consider voting for a Republican. They might not. That’s why I do not buy the “Obama lost half of Jewish support” headlines.

2. Previous studies have indicated that “41% of American Jews have visited Israel at some point during their lives.4 Among those who have been to Israel, a little over half (54%) have visited once, 17% have visited twice, and the remaining 29% have visited three times or more”. But the McLaughlin poll has 51% of visitors to Israel. This might mean that the poll is somewhat biased towards Jews more affiliated with Israel than the average – which means one should treat carefully the “total”.

3. By the way, the fact that there a clear “association between affiliation status and close family or friends who live in Israel” is well established. “Fifty-seven percent of affiliated Jews and half of the moderately affiliated have such a connection to Israel, as opposed to only 36% of those who do not have a Jewish organizational affiliation”.

4. Yet again, in the McLaughlin poll 56% have friends or family living in Israel. But according to NJPS the real number is 46% – a 10% difference that can have impact on the total.

5. On the other hand, this new poll has higher percentage of Democrats than the AJC Jewish opinion survey. Confusing? In some ways it is.

5. The number of Jews disapproving of Obama’s handling relations with Israel is much higher in this poll than in the quite recent AJC survey. On the other hand – differences between Orthodox, Conservative and Reform should not surprise anyone.

6. But in both surveys one can see the strong Jewish attachment to Jerusalem. Of all denominations. And also the deep suspicion that Arabs want to destroy Israel and not to make peace with it.

Update: Laura reminded me that Ron wrote an excellent post about this poll. You should read it (here).

Vice Prime Minister Ya’alon: Israel has the technological capability to strike Iran – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

Addressing a conference on air power, Ya’alon said Israel’s experience in carrying out air strikes against militants along its borders could easily be extended to distant sorties in Iran.

Vice Prime Minister Moshe Ya’alon said on Monday that Israel has the technological capabilty to launch a military strike against Iran.

	Vice PM Moshe Ya’alon pictured in August 2009.
	Photo by: Emil Salman

Addressing a conference on air power, Ya’alon said Israel’s experience in carrying out air strikes against militants along its borders could easily be extended to distant sorties in Iran.

“There is no doubt that the technological capabilities, which improved in recent years, have improved range and aerial refueling capabilities, and have brought about a massive improvement in the accuracy or ordnance and intelligence,” he said.

“This capability can be used for a war on terror in Gaza, for a war in the face of rockets from Lebanon, for war on the conventional Syrian army, and also for war on a peripheral state like Iran,” said Ya’alon, a former chief of Israel’s armed forces.

Israel, which is assumed to have the region’s only atomic arsenal, bombed Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981 and launched a similar sortie over Syria in 2007.

It has rarely used the term “war” in official statements on how to deal with Iran over a nuclear program which Israel and the West believe is aimed at building atomic weapons. Iran denies it has hostile designs.

Israeli leaders have spoken of leaving all options on the table in addressing the question of possible military action against Iran, and they have endorsed efforts by United Nations Security Council powers to impose new sanctions.

Israel’s veiled threats against Iran have been questioned by some independent analysts who see the potential targets as too distant, dispersed and well-defended for Israeli jets to take on alone.

In his address at the Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies, Ya’alon posited air strikes to “decapitate or blind” an enemy by targeting its leadership or early-warning defenses.

“As far as I’m concerned, attack remains the best form of defense,” he said.

Israel saw itself in a de facto war with Iran due to its sponsorship of Hezbollah and Palestinian Hamas, Ya’alon said.

“There is no doubt, looking at the overall situation, that we are already in a military confrontation with Iran,” he said. “Iran is the main motivator of those attacking us.”

Meanwhile, in separate remarks, Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor said “there is still time” for diplomacy to work. He sought to play down Israel’s interest in having Iran reined in, calling it a global challenge.

“If in the end of the day, Iran does get nuclear, in spite of what America says and wants, this will have grave implications for world order, the balance of power and the rules of the game,” said Meridor, who, like Yaalon, belongs to Netanyahu’s seven-member inner council.

DEBKAfile, Political Analysis, Espionage, Terrorism, Security.

Dmitry Medvedev visits Damascus

Although the Kremlin stated that no weapons deals will be signed during Russian president Dmitry Medvedev’s first state visit to Damascus, Monday, May 10, but they may be discussed and even approved, a prospect which has the US and Israel deeply concerned, debkafile‘s Washington and military sources report. These items may well include sophisticated weapons systems which Moscow has withheld from Iran.
Both Washington and Jerusalem were unpleasantly surprised by Moscow’s willingness to provide Bashar Assad with this public shot in the arm just a week after the Obama administration renewed US sanctions against Syria, citing its support for terrorist groups and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction as an “extraordinary threat” to American national security. Syria is widely shunned in the Middle East itself. Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak brusquely refused to receive Assad for a get-well visit to Sharm el-Sheikh.

The Syrian ruler will not doubt take the Russian gesture as support for his supply of long-range missiles to Hizballah and its substantial enhancement of the of the extremist Tehran-Damascus-Hizballah-Hamas alignment in the Middle East at the expense of the pro-Western moderate bloc led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
On April 30, DEBKA-Net-Weekly 443 carried a report on the negative import of the Medvedev visit, but Israeli government leaders were too busy dealing with the reopening of indirect talks with the Palestinians to gear up in time to forestall the damage to Israel’s interests predicted from expected Russian-Syrian deals.

Observers in Washington see the deepening of Moscow-Damascus relations as a failed mark for the Obama-Clinton drive to woo Assad. Some are saying that the Kremlin, for its part, seeks to use Syria as a fig leaf for its deepening crisis with Tehran, following the Russian president’s promise to Barack Obama to back tough sanctions against Iran. This promise was accompanied by Moscow’s secret assurance to hold back from activating Iran’s first nuclear reactor at Bushehr – in breach of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s pledge earlier this month to have the reactor up and running by August.

The Russian president needs to demonstrate that the Kremlin is not in Washington’s pocket on Iran – and certainly not aligned with Israel – hence his show of friendship toward Damascus and a possible major arms transaction with Syria that will give Iran a back door for acquiring the sophisticated weapons Moscow has denied to date.
In view of this concern, Israeli president Shimon Peres was dispatched to Moscow to attend Sunday’s events Sunday marking the 65th anniversary of the allied victory against the Nazis. He tried to discourage the Russian president from going to these lengths, but failed to obtain a clear response to his appeal from Medvedev.

The Pioneer > Online Edition : >> The future after Iran has the ‘Shia Bomb’.

Barry Rubin

Will Tehran risk a global blowback by arming terrorists with nuclear weapons?

One of the most controversial issues about what happens if Iran gets nuclear weapons is whether the regime would give them to anyone else. Since this is such an important question involving the lives of so many people, I want to clarify it.

Would the Iranian Government hand nuclear weapons to a terrorist group or fire off nuclear-tipped missiles itself?

It is easy for many experts and ‘experts’ to answer this question with a “No.” The reason would be that Iran has proven itself cautious historically and knows that it would be held responsible and punished for doing so. The responder might add that the Islamic regime has not been adventurous or crazy in its actual policy (as opposed to its words) during the last 30 years.

I’d agree with that response as far as it goes. But it misses some very key points that might end up getting a huge number of people killed.

First, Iran has not been adventurous or crazy in the manner that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was in 1979 and 1990, that is, Iran has not sent its military forces across the border to invade another country. Instead, Tehran has used subversion as its technique, backing and helping groups undermining other countries with terrorist attacks and a longer-term attempt to build a popular base in order to seize state power.

Thus, to say that Iran has not attacked a neighbour with conventional military forces is quite true, yet this may not tell us how Iran will behave regarding terrorist groups. Moreover, a nuclear-armed Iran may feel a little more confident than the pre-nuclear version.

Having said that I would correct the original response to be this: Iran will probably not give nuclear weapons to terrorist groups.

Probably means that the odds are higher — let’s say far higher — than 50 per cent that they won’t do so. The problem here is that even if there is a 10 or 20 per cent chance of that happening, that’s not the kind of risk one wants to take.

But there are other, more likely, scenarios that are never discussed but are quite important. Here are the two I think most important:

‘Private Donations’: I don’t think the ‘Iranian Government’ would ever give Hizbullah, Iraqi Shia groups, or Hamas nuclear weapons. That is, I don’t think there will be a top-level meeting where such a decision would be made officially. I do think that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which will be responsible for both the weapons and for liaison with terrorist groups, or other officials might give them nuclear weapons. Iran is not a tightly disciplined bureaucracy and the security of these arms — especially if some hot factional dispute breaks out or the regime is in danger of falling — is not going to be so tight.

The chance of an Iranian Dr Strangelove pushing a button, a mad ideologist rather than a mad scientist, is higher than that for the weapons held by the United States, USSR/Russia, Britain, France, or Israel over many decades.

I have never seen someone from the complacent Conventional Wisdom containment-is-no-problem mainstream deal with any of the above issues.

“The Defensive Umbrella for Aggression”: If groups like Hizbullah or others get their members to believe they have access to nuclear weapons, either through a transfer or a clear Iranian guarantee to use such weapons in their cause, wars could be set off by their over-confident calculations.

Iran’s main purpose in getting nuclear weapons is probably not to fire them off but to use them to protect its indirect aggression, encourage appeasement, and persuade millions of Muslims to join pro-Tehran revolutionary Islamist groups.

But no matter what Iran did — for example, establish its primary influence in Iraq by bringing its Shia allies to full power; helping Hamas seize the West Bank; making Hizbullah and other forces the sole ruling group in Lebanon — nobody could or would do anything about it because they feared Iran’s nuclear arsenal.

Consider, and this is not far-fetched, that Hizbullah concludes that if they attack Israel, Israel would be deterred from retaliation out of fear that Iran would launch nuclear missiles. From what Syrian leaders say, it seems they already believe this, which makes them far more daring in their hardline policies and encouragement for Hizbullah and Hamas.

A related scenario is that while the US promises might make Arabs feel a bit more secure, in practice that factor is meaningless. They would still be afraid to do anything Iran doesn’t like, not only because they didn’t have full trust in the Obama Administration but also because by the time the US kept its pledge and retaliated they would all be dead any way.

Consider also this true story told by Mr Haim Saban, the Power Rangers multimillionaire and donor to Democratic campaigns. In considering who he would support, Mr Saban met during the 2008 campaign separately with Ms Hillary Clinton and Mr Barack Obama. He asked each of them the same question: “If Iran nukes Israel, what would be your reaction?’ Ms Clinton answered: “We will obliterate them.” Mr Obama’s response? “We will take appropriate action.”

Since Mr Obama’s reaction was off-the-record and before the election the response cannot be attributed to presidential caution. Mr Saban interpreted it as something along the lines of (my words, not his): I’ll think about it. This reflects a state of mind and way of thinking.

That anecdote should be far more frightening to most Arab countries than it is to Israel, which has its own ability to respond to any such threat.

DEBKAfile, Political Analysis, Espionage, Terrorism, Security.

Tags: Israeli Air Force US bunker penetrators

US GBU-28 Hard Target Penetrator

The United States recently renewed supplies to the Israeli Air Force of GBU-28 Hard Target Penetrators and GBU-39 Small Diameter Bombs, as well as Attack Munitions (LDJAM) for more accurate targeting of bombs, debkafile‘s military sources report. In Moscow, Israeli president Shimon Peres said to Russian president Dmitry Medvedev Sunday, May 9, that Syria has only one object in arming the Lebanese Hizballah with missiles and that is warmongering.
That same day, US defense sources, normally chary of releasing information about US arms supplies to Israel, reported that Washington had released substantial quantities of smart bombs to different types to Israel, most of them suitable for striking Hizballah fortifications in Lebanon and Hamas tunnels in the Gaza Strip.
They fall into three categories:
1. The 2,268 kilo (5,000 pound), laser-guided Bomb Unit GBU-28 (nicknamed “Deep Throat”) Hard Target Penetrator which can burrow 31 meters into earth or 6.2 meters into reinforced concrete. They can penetrate the stronger Hizballah installations or be used on Iranian nuclear weapons or missile installations, if so decided.

2.  The Small Diameter 113 kilo GBU for IAF F-15I fighter-bombers, to be followed by the supplies for F-16I planes, which can be used against simpler installations, like the arms-smuggling tunnels dug by Hamas between Egypt and the Gaza Strip and Hizballah’s field fortifications.
They are small enough for fighter-bombers to carry in larger numbers, but they have a 5-8 meter margin of error with no more than a 50:50 chance of hitting the target.
3.  However, the Laser-Guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions (LJDAM), also on the list of arms supplies to the Israeli Air Force, directs smart bombs more accurately.  Developed jointly by Boeing Integrated Defense Systems and Israel’s Elbit Systems, LJDAM improves the accuracy of bombs fired from a maximum distance of 28 kilometers in most weathers.
debkafile‘s Washington sources report that the Obama administration decided to release this data to dispel rumors of a US arms embargo against Israel, especially of items that would enable Israel to attack Iran’s nuclear installations. The GBU-28 “Deep Throat” has that capability and is one of those items.

US defense sources declined to comment on the debkafile report of March 28, according to which President Barak Obama halted the delivery of advanced, high-precision bunker-buster Joint Direct Attack Munition-JDAM bombs to Israel on March 28, after Vice President Joe Biden ended his visit to Jerusalem. These bombs were already en route to Israel when they were diverted instead to the US base of Diego Garcia, thereby initiating an arms embargo designed to prevent an Israeli strike against Iran.