WarSclerotic

Lee Smith: How Iranian nukes would reshape the Middle East | News for Dallas, Texas | Dallas Morning News | Opinion: Points.

President Barack Obama has promised to “do everything that’s required” to keep Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons – but the fact that “engagement” has given way to new catchwords, like “deterrence” and “containment,” suggests that we may well choose to learn to live with an Iranian bomb. In that case, we will probably see the birth of a new Middle East, but not as we have ever envisioned it.

Today, there is an American-backed regional system, and then there are those – from Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Soviet Union to Osama bin Laden and the Islamists – who are eager to create a new Middle East of their own design.

Since 1944, Saudi Arabia, home of the world’s largest known oil reserves, has been the anchor of the American order, with the other Gulf states and Jordan also safely within our orbit. And so, even after all the apparent upheaval of the last eight years – war, a tenuous democracy in Iraq and more war – the essential structure of the Middle East remained the same.

However, an Iranian nuclear program would rearrange the region’s political, economic and cultural furniture. Therefore, what’s most dangerous is not an Iranian bomb but the new Middle East that would issue from it.

If Iran gets the bomb, other regional powers will pursue nuclear programs – if they are not already doing so. Inevitably in a region as volatile as this, there will be a few small-scale nuclear catastrophes, probably rulers targeting their own people. Saddam Huusein gassed the Kurds and slaughtered the Shiites, Hafez Assad massacred the Sunnis of Hama, and mass graves throughout the region testify to the willingness of Arab rulers to kill their own people; in their hands, a nuclear weapon is merely an upgrade in repressive technology.

Still, it’s extremely unlikely the regimes will use these weapons against their regional rivals. Remember, the main reason these states support nonstate terror groups is to deter each other and thus avoid all-out war.

However, the prospect of states transferring nukes to so-called nonstate actors is a nightmare for the United States, which does not fare well against such tactics. Consider that our response to 9/11 was to use our armed forces to democratize the Middle East. Also, consider that the most convoluted reason for making war against the Taliban is to keep the nukes of a neighboring country out of the hands of its intelligence service’s dangerous elements. That is to say, we cannot even deter Pakistan, our ally.

In the hands of an adversary, an Islamic bomb is concrete evidence that Iran’s strategy of “resistance” to the West is a winning one. And this will change the region’s political culture from radical to many times more radical.

At best, this means that even those U.S.-friendly regimes that have much to fear from “resistance” will have no choice but to raise the pitch of their anti-American rhetoric to stay in step with their rivals – and their populations. Consequently, the basing rights that we have throughout the Gulf states are likely to be terminated.

At worst, an Iranian bomb sends a message to the more ambitious actors in the region that they should feel free to make a run at the Americans. If Tehran showed that it is less profitable to play nicely with Washington than it is to extort the Americans and kill their soldiers and allies, why shouldn’t they do the same? We will not be deterring Iran but inviting the rest of the region to shoot at us.

The one ally that shares our interests and is capable of defending them against Iran and its assets is Israel. Containment requires that the superpower persuade its allies that they should put aside local concerns and look at the big picture; but in this case it is Israel that is focused on Iran while the Obama administration has pecked away at the Netanyahu government over settlements. In Cold War terms, that is as though President Ronald Reagan had directed his “tear down this wall” speech not to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev but to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Instead, Reagan put Pershing missiles at Kohl’s back and pointed them at Moscow.

Still, it is worth noting that our position will not necessarily be secured by an Israeli strike on Iran, for there are some things that need to be done by the alpha dog. Soft power, or what used to be called prestige, is effective only in proportion to how much our hard power is feared by enemies and prized by allies. If we leave Iran to Israel, we are enhancing Jerusalem’s prestige at the expense of our own.

At least all the talk of deterrence and containment should remind us why we fought the Cold War: to protect our way of life, a life sustained by oil. Without cheap oil, the life we came to associate with peace would not have been the same. The Persian Gulf was the Cold War’s strategic grand prize, and that we have held onto it for 65 years is a credit to the design of Washington’s policy of preventing any adversary from breaking out with just the sort of game-changing threat that the Iranian nuclear program represents.

In other words, the American order of the Middle East is containment; its unraveling will not allow for a different form of containment but spells the end of our hegemony in the region.

Human history is nothing but the record of nations that have miscalculated their capacity to project power, the willingness (and ability) of their allies to support them, and the determination of their rivals to reshape the world after their own image. As the debate over Iran policy has devolved from strategy to pop psychology – e.g., the discussion of whether the Iranians are acting rationally – the fact is that no regime consciously wishes to bring its own existence to an end.

And yet states and regimes do nonetheless cease to exist. No sane person believes that the United States is suicidal, but if a nation will not or cannot defend its way of life, it has taken the first step toward its inevitable decline, which is tantamount to suicide.

Lee Smith is a visiting fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington. His book, “The Strong Horse: Power, Politics, and the Clash of Arab Civilizations,” will be published in January. A version of this column originally appeared at Slate.com.

An Israeli Strike on Iran – Council on Foreign Relations.

INTRODUCTION
Successive Israeli governments have held that a nuclear weapons capability in the region, other than
Israel’s own, would pose an intolerable threat to Israel’s survival as a state and society. Iran’s nuclear
program—widely regarded as an effort to obtain a nuclear weapon, or put Tehran a “turn of a screw”
away from it—has triggered serious concern in Israel. Within the coming year, the Israeli government
could decide, much as it did twenty-eight years ago with respect to Iraq and two years ago with respect
to Syria, to attack Iran’s nuclear installations in order to delay its acquisition of a weapons capability.
While U.S. officials—including the president––have declared a nuclear armed Iran to be “unacceptable,”
the administration has been clear in wanting to prevent such an outcome through peaceful
diplomatic means. Without forswearing the eventual use of military force, senior U.S. officials have
also indicated that a preventive strike on Iran by Israel would be “ill advised,” “very destabilizing,” and
“likely very bad,” and thus not in the U.S. interest. These concerns have evidently been transmitted
privately to the Israeli government.
This contingency planning memo assesses the likelihood of an Israeli strike against Iran despite
U.S. objections, the implications for the United States should it take place, the policy options available
to reduce the chances of its occurrence, and the measures that could be taken to mitigate the potentially
negative consequences.
THE C ONTINGENCY

An Israeli attack would likely concentrate on three locations: Isfahan, where Iran produces uranium
hexafluoride gas; Natanz, where the gas is enriched in approximately half of the eight thousand centrifuges
located there; and Arak, where a heavy water research reactor, scheduled to come on line in
2012, would be ideal to produce weapons-grade plutonium. It is conceivable that Israel may attack
other sites that it suspects to be part of a nuclear weapons program if targeting data were available,
such as the recently disclosed Qom site, whose location is known, or centrifuge fabrication sites, the
location(s) of which have not yet been identified. The latter would be compelling targets since their
destruction would hobble Iran’s ability to reconstitute its program. But attacks against the sites at
Natanz, Isfahan, and Arak alone would likely stretch Israel’s capabilities, and planners would probably
be reluctant to enlarge the raid further.
Israel is capable of carrying out these attacks unilaterally. Its F-16 and F-15 aircraft, equipped
with conformal fuel tanks and refueled with 707-based and KC-130 tankers toward the beginning
and end of their flight profiles, have the range to reach the target set, deliver their payloads in the face
of Iranian air defenses, and return to their bases. The munitions necessary to penetrate the targets are
currently in Israel’s inventory in sufficient numbers; they include Bomb Live Unit (BLU)-109 and
BLU 113 bombs that carry two thousand and five thousand pounds, respectively, of high-energy explosives.
These GPS-guided weapons are extremely accurate and can be lofted from attacking aircraft
fifteen kilometers from their target, thereby reducing the attackers’ need to fly through air defenses.
Israel also has a laser-guided version of these bombs that is more accurate than the GPS variant and
could deploy a special-operations laser designation unit to illuminate aim points as it is reported to
have done in the attack on the al-Kibar facility in Syria.

These munitions could be expected to damage the targets severely. Natanz is the only one of the
three likely targets that is largely underground, sheltered by up to twenty-three meters of soil and
concrete. BLU-type bombs, used in a “burrowing” mode, however, could penetrate deeply enough to
fragment the inner surface of the ceiling structures above the highly fragile centrifuge arrays and even
precipitate the collapse of the entire structure. Burrowing requires that attacking aircraft deliver their
second and third bombs into the cavity created by the first. GPS-guided munitions are accurate
enough to do this a little less than half of the time. The probability of successful burrowing increases
with the number of shots. The use of three bombs per aim point would confer better than a 70 percent
probability of success. (Laser-guided munitions are more capable of a successful burrow on the
first try.) The uranium conversion facility in Isfahan and reactor at Arak are not buried and could be
heavily damaged, or completely destroyed, relatively easily. This would be possible even if Iran managed
to down a third of the Israeli strike package, a feat that would far exceed historical ratios of
bomber losses by any country in any previous war.
These relatively upbeat ballistic assessments do not mean that the mission as a whole would be
easy. On the contrary, a coordinated air attack would be complicated and highly risky. The three
plausible routes to Iran involve overflight of third countries: the northern approach would likely follow
the Syrian-Turkish border and risk violation of Turkey’s airspace; the central flight path would
cross Jordan and Iraq; a southern route would transit the lower end of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and possibly
Kuwait. All but two of these countries are to a greater or lesser degree hostile to Israel. The exceptions,
Jordan and Turkey, would not wish their airspace to be used for an Israeli attack against
Iran. Turkey recently canceled an annual trilateral exercise involving Israel, in part to signal its opposition
to an Israeli strike. In any case, overflight would jeopardize Israeli diplomatic relations with
both countries. With respect to Syria and Saudi Arabia, operational concerns would trump diplomatic
ones. If either country detects Israeli aircraft and chooses to challenge the overflight using surfaceto-
air missiles or intercepting aircraft, Israel’s intricate attack plan, which would have a razor-thin
margin for error to begin with, could well be derailed.
Overflight of Iraq, whose airspace is under de facto U.S. control, would also be diplomatically
awkward for Israel and would risk a deadly clash with American air defenses since the intruding aircraft
would not have the appropriate Identification, Friend, or Foe (IFF) codes. Israel would have to
carefully weigh the operational risk and most of all the cost of a strike to its most vital bilateral relationship,
especially if President Barack Obama had explicitly asked Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
not to order an attack.
The sheer distances involved pose a challenge, as well. The targets lie at the outermost 1,750-
kilometer range limits of Israeli tactical aircraft. Diplomatic and military factors would confine Israeli
refueling operations to international airspace where tankers could orbit safely for long periods. These
locations, while usable, are suboptimal. They would yield the attackers little leeway to loiter in their
target areas, or engage in the fuel-intensive maneuvering typical of dogfights and evasion of surfaceto-
air missiles. The limited number of tankers would limit the number of sorties.
A final consideration for Israeli planners would be the effect of explosives on the nuclear materials
stored at the uranium conversion facility at Isfahan and the enrichment facility at Natanz. Both
facilities are likely to possess uranium hexafluoride and Natanz produces low enriched uranium.
Though these materials are not radioactive and do not pose radiological risks, the release of uranium
into the environment would almost certainly raise public health concerns due to heavy metal contamination.

This combination of diplomatic and operational complexities would clearly give Israeli leaders
pause. To act, they would have to perceive a grave threat to the state of Israel and no reliable alternative
to eliminating that threat.
A S S E S S I N G T H E LIKELIHOOD OF AN I SRAELI ATTACK
The likelihood of this contingency depends on Israeli assessments of U.S. and international resolve to
block Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability; the state of the Iranian program; the amount of
time a successful strike would buy to be worth the expected risks and costs, a point on which there is a
spectrum of Israeli views, from six months to five years; whether Israel believes there is a clandestine
Iranian program, which would lead some Israelis to conclude that an attack would not buy any time at
all; and the effect of a strike on the U.S.-Israel relationship. Because none of these factors is constant,
estimates about the likelihood of an Israeli strike within the coming year will vary.

For example, Israel is probably somewhat less likely to attack now than it was before the Qom installation was disclosed,
the P-3 took a firmer stance, and Russia appeared to concede that stronger sanctions had to be considered.
If Iran were to agree to ship the bulk of its uranium to France and Russia for enrichment—a
deal that has been agreed in working level negotiations but may never be consummated—Israel’s incentive
to accept the risks of an attack against Iran would probably diminish. Should diplomatic initiatives
run aground, the likelihood of an Israeli attack could be expected to increase accordingly.
Probability assessments will vary based on other factors, as well. Iranian rhetoric that reinforces
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s themes of Holocaust denial and the inevitable disappearance of
Israel only strengthen the hand of attack proponents within Israel by justifying fears about Iran’s intentions,
while lowering diplomatic barriers to an attack. Certain factors that will not be publicly apparent
could play a role, such as developments regarding Israel’s overflight options that reduce the
risks inherent in the mission; the availability to Israel of new, more accurate targeting intelligence,
especially relating to single points of failure, or other potentially catastrophic vulnerabilities in Iran’s
installations; and technical advances, particularly in air defense suppression, that reduce the risks in
attempting penetration.
It is clear, however, that Israel sees the stakes as very high. Netanyahu’s UN General Assembly
speech emphasized the existential nature of the threat that he and others in the current government
believe Iran represents. His emphasis on the Holocaust as a defining feature of Jewish history and his
self-conception as the one who bears the burden of preventing yet another such disaster suggest that
U.S. calculations of risk and benefit that tilt toward Israeli restraint might prove to be mirror-imaging
of a particularly deceptive sort. Given Iran’s supportive relationship with certain terrorist groups in
the region, Israel also cannot ignore the risk that a nuclear device might be transferred to them in the
future.

The longer-term impact of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons on triggering further proliferation
in the Middle East, not least among states hostile to Israel, will also enter into their strategic calculus.
Israeli officials are aware that no conceivable Israeli strike could completely eliminate the nuclear
threat posed by Iran and that an attack might only intensify longer-term risks as Iran reconstituted
covertly, advancing an argument long made by counterterrorism officials that any effort to counter
Iran’s nuclear challenge is going to be like “mowing the lawn.” Just as the grass will grow again, so will
the nuclear program; Israel will just have to mow again. And as Iran’s reconstitution effort goes underground
and its defenses are enhanced, Israel’s intelligence and military capabilities will have to
keep pace. They also argue, however, that the advantages of buying time should not be disregarded.

Thus, the 1981 Osirak attack won two crucial decades during which Operation Desert Storm effectively
disarmed Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom finally decapitated it. Neither tectonic event could
have been predicted in 1981. (The counterargument is that the Osirak raid stimulated Iraq to switch
to an highly enriched uranium [HEU] route and vastly increased the money and manpower devoted
to the program. Whether or not the bombing set back Iraq’s program, the point is that many Israelis
believe that it did.) On this Israeli view, a strike might prove worthwhile in ways that neither Israel
nor the United States can anticipate at this stage.
In assessing the likelihood of an attack, it is useful to look back on the origins of the Six Day War
in 1967 and the raid on the Osirak reactor in Iraq. In each case, Israel attacked only after a long period
of procrastination. In 1967, Washington’s hands-off posture tipped the balance in the cabinet in favor
of preemption. In the case of Osirak, the Carter and Reagan administrations’ unwillingness or
incapacity to intervene left Israel feeling cornered and compelled to act unilaterally. One lesson to be
learned from this is that Israel is more likely to use force if it perceives Washington to be disengaged.
Finally, if the Russian analysis is correct—namely, that the sort of crippling sanctions that would
help stave off an Israeli attack would also drive Iran out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT)—then the probability of an Israeli strike would be correspondingly higher, since Iranian withdrawal
from the NPT would itself be a casus belli. Moreover, Iran’s withdrawal would diminish the
diplomatic opportunity cost of an attack.
WARNING I N D I CATOR S
Surprise would be essential to the success of an attack and Israel’s operational security would be correspondingly
strong. Accordingly, tactical warning would be elusive. However, certain indicators
have already surfaced; the appearance of others could indicate an Israeli intent to attack.
One indicator would be Israeli efforts to enhance the operational feasibility of the military option
before a political decision to attack. Such actions would also serve the dual purpose of signaling Iran
and others of Israel’s resolve and capability with an eye to deterring further Iranian movement toward
a nuclear weapons capability.

Recent developments in this category include the June 2008 longrange
joint-air exercise—involving one hundred aircraft, long-range combat search and rescue helicopters,
and refueling aircraft—which corresponded in scale and reach to an Israeli strike against
Iran. The unprecedented June 2009 passage of an Israeli submarine through the Suez Canal, which
showed that Israel had a maritime attack option in addition to air strikes, and that Jerusalem would
have the support of at least one regional state, namely Egypt, represents another such signal. Similar
indicators that might not be apparent outside of intergovernmental deliberations or the intelligence
domain could include requests for targeting data and/or repositioning of strike aircraft within Israel
once an attack path had been selected.
Other operational preparations could also portend Israeli action. These include bolstering homeland
security, especially if it involves an emphasis on shelter locations, distribution of gas masks,
or similar precautions against retaliatory attack. Tactical changes, including redeployment of ground
forces to reinforce Israeli Northern Command and potentially enter Lebanon from a cold start, could
also indicate a stronger likelihood of an Israeli attack.
Political developments inside Israel and Iran could also presage a decision to attack. For instance,
broader public references to the Holocaust and warnings that time is running out would suggest an
increasing probability of Israeli action. Netanyahu has sounded these themes regularly. If the political
opposition echoed them, domestic political barriers to attack would have lowered.
Finally, delivery of advanced Russian S-300 surface to air missiles to Iran, which would multiply
the risks of an air attack, Might spur Israel to strike before the missiles were fielded.
POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES F O R U . S . INT E R E S T S
Some observers would view an Israeli attack that significantly degraded Iran’s nuclear weapons capability
as beneficial to U.S. counterproliferation objectives and ultimately to U.S. national security.
The United States has a clear interest in the integrity of the NPT regime and the compliance of member
states with meaningful inspection arrangements. The use of force against Iran’s nuclear program
would, at a minimum, show that attempts to exploit the restraint of interested powers, manipulate
the diplomatic process, game the NPT, and impede International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
access to nuclear-related facilities could carry serious penalties. Were Iran to acquire a nuclear weapons
capability, the ability of the U.S. military forces to operate freely in the vicinity of Iran could,
under some circumstances, be constrained. Looking into the future, a hostile Iran could also develop
reliable long-range delivery systems for nuclear warheads that could strike American territory.
At the same time, an Israeli attack—even if operationally successful—would pose immediate
risks to U.S. interests.
First, regardless of perceptions of U.S. complicity in the attack, the United States would probably
become embroiled militarily in any Iranian retaliation against Israel or other countries in the region.
Given uncertainties about the future of Iraq and a deepening commitment to Afghanistan, hostilities
with Iran would stretch U.S. military capabilities at a particularly difficult time while potentially derailing
domestic priorities.
Second, an Israeli strike would cause oil prices to spike and heighten concerns that energy supplies
through the Persian Gulf may become disrupted. Should Iran attempt to block the Strait of Hormuz
by mining, cruise missile strikes, or small boat attacks, these fears would become realized. According
to the GAO, however, the loss of Iranian oil for eighteen months would increase prices by only $6 to
$11/bbl, assuming that the International Energy Agency coordinated release of reserves. This said, at
the onset of the crisis, prices might hit $200/bbl (up from the current level of around $77/bbl) for a
short period but would likely quickly subside.
Third, since the United States would be viewed as having assisted Israel, U.S. efforts to foster
better relations with the Muslim world would almost certainly suffer. The United States has an enduring
strategic interest in fostering better relations with the Muslim world, which is distinct from
the ruling elites on whom the United States depends for an array of regional objectives. In part, this
interest derives from the need to lubricate cooperation between the United States and these governments
by lowering some of the popular resentment of Washington that can hem in local leaders and
impede their support for U.S. initiatives. A narrative less infused by anti-Americanism also facilitates
counterterrorism goals and, from a longer-range perspective, hedges against regime change. The perceived
involvement of the United States in an Israeli attack would undercut these interlocking interests,
at least for a while.
Fourth, the United States has a strong interest in domestically generated regime change in Iran.
Although some argue that the popular anger aroused in Iran by a strike would be turned against a
discredited clerical regime that seemed to invite foreign attack after its bloody postelection repres6
sion of nonviolent opposition, it is more likely that Iranians of all stripes would rally around the flag.
If so, the opposition Green movement would be undermined, while the ascendant hard-line clerics
and Revolutionary Guard supporters would face fewer constraints in consolidating their hold on
power.
Fifth, an Israeli attack might guarantee an overtly nuclear weapons capable Iran in the medium
term.
Sixth, although progress toward an Israeli-Palestinian final status accord remains elusive, an
Israeli strike, especially one that overflew Jordan or Saudi Arabia, would delay fruitful renewed negotiation
indefinitely. Both Washington and Jerusalem would be too preoccupied with managing the
consequences of an attack, while regional capitals would deflect U.S. appeals to upgrade relations
with Israel as an incentive to concessions. If Hamas or Hezbollah were to retaliate against Israel, either
spontaneously or in response to Iranian pressure to act, any revival of the peace process would
be further set back.
Finally, the United States has an abiding interest in the safety and security of Israel. Depending
on the circumstances surrounding an Israeli attack, the political-military relationship between Jerusalem
and Washington could fray, which could erode unity among Democrats and embolden Republicans,
thereby complicating the administration’s political situation, and weaken Israel’s deterrent.
Even if an Israeli move on Iran did not dislocate the bilateral relationship, it could instead produce
diplomatic rifts between the United States and its European and regional allies, reminiscent of tensions
over the Iraq war.
U. S . POLICY O P T I ONS T O FORESTALL AN I SRAELI STRI K E
Assuming that the U.S. continues to assess an Israeli attack to be undesirable, options to forestall or
hedge against a strike would have to be geared to negating factors that would lead Israel to assess that
the benefits of an attack outweigh the costs. These factors include perceptions that the White House
has given at least a yellow light to the strike; that the United States is disengaged either because it has
run out of diplomatic options or because an agreement with Iran has met Washington’s security objectives
but left Israel exposed; and that the United States has not proffered to Israel convincing security
guarantees against a nuclear-capable Iran. This list implies the importance of firm, direct communication
of U.S. opposition to a strike from the White House to the Israeli prime minister; continued
U.S. engagement that reflects an awareness of Israel’s greater exposure to the Iranian threat relative
to that of the United States; and a willingness to consider a palpable tightening of the U.S.-Israel
strategic relationship that secures Israeli restraint and, conversely, warns of a rupture should Israel
attack Iran despite the U.S. president’s explicit opposition. If, over time, events develop in a way that,
from a U.S. perspective, more fully warrants Israeli anxiety, the balance between warning and reassurance
would of course shift, both privately and publicly.
To facilitate this new bilateral understanding, Washington could take any or all of the following
preventive measures:
 make progress toward a verifiable, highly transparent agreement with Iran that will make it
very difficult to produce highly enriched uranium and/or weapons-grade plutonium, and secondarily
to weaponize.

 recreate the “Eagleburger” Mission. In 1991, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger
led two small delegations to Israel when it was under Iraqi Scud attack. His objective was to
urge Israeli restraint. The missions succeeded because the United States was firm in refusing
Israeli access to Iraqi airspace, but worked with Israel on ways the United States could destroy
the Scuds. The United States should establish a similar channel to Israel (if it has not been already)
to gauge Israeli intentions and discuss steps to reduce the threat to Israel, while arguing
that an Israeli military option would test the U.S.-Israel relationship without reducing the longterm
Iranian threat. Other objectives would be to make clear that overflight of Iraq would not
be permitted; share the U.S. assessment of the risks and potential costs of overflight of third
countries; and explore Israeli expectations and response options about Iranian retaliation.

 continue to declare the “unacceptable” nature of a nuclear Iran and that “all options remain on
the table” to reassure Israel that the United States would not seek a diplomatic accommodation
that compromised Israel’s security.
 send high-profile visitors to Israel on reassurance missions; a presidential visit to express solidarity
with Israel and emphasize measures the United States is taking on the nuclear issue
would be helpful.
– extend to Israel the option of a defense treaty with the United States. Such a treaty would
contain unambiguous security guarantees to Israel that it would be covered by the U.S.
“nuclear umbrella” so as to deter Iran. Although it is unclear whether Israel would welcome
such a treaty, other states that felt threatened by Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, notably
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, would likely demand similar coverage if it were extended to Israel.

Finally, the United States could also consider the option advocated by former national security adviser
Zbigniew Brzezinski, that of the United States actively impeding an Israeli attack once it is
under way. It is hard to imagine, however, that the United States would risk the severe—even permanent––
damage such action would incur on its longstanding strategic relationship with Israel.
U. S . P OLICY OP T I ONS T O MITIGATE/MANAGE A C R I S I S
While doing all it can to forestall an Israeli attack, the United States must also plan for managing and
minimizing the crisis that would ensue if the primary policy fails and Israel does in fact attack Iran.
Such planning should include the following steps:
 work with basing countries—especially Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE)—on first response, consequence management capacities, and intelligence exchanges;
 ramp up air defenses and force protection in the Gulf and Iraq;
 discuss the possibility of Iranian retaliation and responses with Iraqi president Nuri al-Maliki
and senior Iraqi security officials;
8
 approach Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait with requests to increase oil production should
Iran attempt to block the Strait of Hormuz, attack shipping, or damage transloading facilities
or offshore installations;
 ensure the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve is sufficient to offset shortages if necessary;
 use diplomatic and intelligence channels to urge increased readiness levels in friendly countries
where there is an Iranian Revolutionary Guard or a Hezbollah presence; and
 provide additional ballistic missile defense capabilities to Israel to defend against potential Iranian
retaliation.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Israeli leaders have stated repeatedly that the problem posed by Iran’s pursuit of mastery over the
nuclear fuel cycle was the responsibility of the international community. For straightforward diplomatic
reasons, Israel has not wanted the problem to be seen as Israel’s alone. Such a perception would
essentially permit important players to abandon the field, leaving Israel to cope with a threat that
many believe to be existential. While the historical record shows Israel will act in the face of such a
threat, there is a keen awareness among Israelis that the use of force would carry profound risks and,
potentially, be open-ended. Room exists, therefore, for the United States to persuade Israel to exercise
restraint. This goal will require a delicate balance of caution and reassurance.
As a first step, the United States and Israel should establish a high-level back channel to explore
the issues raised by Iran’s behavior and share views about managing them. Diplomacy, even secret
diplomacy, does not necessarily entail total self-disclosure. But the situation demands frank discussion.
As close allies exposed unequally to a consequential threat, conducting it will not be easy. There
will be contentious issues, including definition of red lines and the comprehensiveness of U.S. assurances
necessary to win the cooperation of a close ally boxed in by an indispensable patron and an implacable
enemy.

Above all, Israel must not be left to feel alone. Accordingly, the second step will be to
maintain the cohesion of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany
(the 5 + 1) that have taken the lead in diplomatic efforts, and to keep up the pressure on Iran. Simultaneously,
the United States must hedge against the failure of a war-avoidance policy, and begin preparing
for an Israeli attack on Iran and Iranian retaliation. This will be a thorny process insofar as defensive
measures the United States takes in the region, or urges its allies to take, could be read in Tehran
as preparation for an attack and thus cast as justification for further destabilizing Iranian action.
Israel is not eager for war with Iran, or to disrupt its special relationship with the United States.

But the fact remains that it considers the Iranian threat an existential one and its bilateral relationship
with the United States a durable one, and will act if it perceives momentous jeopardy to the Israeli
people or state. Thus, while Israel may be amenable to American arguments for restraint, those arguments
must be backed predominantly by concrete measures to contain the threat and reaffirmations
of the special relationship, and only secondarily by warnings of the deterioration of the relationship,
to be persuasive.

DEBKAfile – Iran successfully simulates nuclear warhead detonation – report.

December 4, 2009, 10:14 AM (GMT+02:00)

Nuclear-capable missile explained to Ahmadinejad

German intelligence reports that Iranian scientists have successfully simulated the detonation of a nuclear warhead in laboratory conditions, in an effort to sidestep an underground nuclear test like the one that brought the world down on North Korea’s head earlier this year.

DEBKAfile‘s Iranian and intelligence sources report that this development is alarming because detonation is one of the most difficult technological challenges in the development of a nuclear weapon. Mastering it carries Iran past one of the last major obstacles confronting its program for the manufacture of a nuclear warhead.

After this breakthrough, the German BND intelligence believes it will take Tehran no more than a year to perfect its expertise and stock enough highly-enriched uranium to make the last leap toward building the first Iranian nuclear bomb or warhead. DEBKAfile‘s military sources confirm that simulated detonation of a warhead takes Iran to the highest level of weapons development.

Using the example of Israel and other nations, Western nuclear arms experts have claimed in recent years that since the emergence of simulated detonation technique, nuclear tests are no longer necessary.

With this hurdle overcome, Tehran has set about restructuring its defense ministry for the coming task of actually making a weapon.

The new Department for Expanded Technology Applications – FEDAT was set up to speed up the military nuclear program. It is divided into sub-departments for uranium mining (to increase the output of the Yazd mines), enrichment (to guarantee the quantity of high-grade uranium needed for weapons), metallurgy, neutrons, highly explosive material and fuel supply.

Wednesday, Dec. 2, Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said: “The Iranian nation will by itself make the 20 percent (nuclear) fuel (enriched uranium) and whatever it needs.”

President Barack Obama has reminded Tehran that it has until the end of the year for a negotiated accommodation on its nuclear program that will uphold its international obligations. However, tor Iran’s leaders, progress toward a nuclear weapon is now unstoppable by any diplomatic means.

AFP: Russia’s Putin to visit Israel in 2010.

MOSCOW — Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin will visit Israel in 2010, he said on Friday, following a recent chill in ties between Moscow and Israel’s arch-enemy Iran.

Putin’s pledge to visit the Jewish state came during a meeting in Moscow with Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, who told him: “We would be happy to see you in Israeli in 2010.”

“Thank you very much for the invitation. I will definitely come,” replied Putin, who also said: “Israel is one of our highest-priority partners in the Middle East.”

The announcement came after Russia’s ties with Iran, a longtime partner, became strained in recent weeks due to an apparent toughening in Moscow’s stance on the Iranian nuclear programme.

On Tuesday, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad lashed out at Russia for supporting a vote by the UN’s nuclear watchdog IAEA censuring Tehran over its nuclear plans, in a rare criticism of Moscow by the Iranian leader.

Iranian officials have also complained that Russia is dragging its feet on fulfilling a contract to supply Iran with advanced S-300 surface-to-air missiles.

Iranian Defence Minister Ahmad Vahidi last month called on Russia “to fulfil the contract and not be influenced by Zionist pressure.”

Moscow has never officially confirmed the existence of the S-300 contract.

Iran can shut down vital oil route: US navy.

Iran announced in June that a home-made submarine, named Ghadir 948, had joined the naval brigade of the first naval zone.

Middle East Views | Has Iran leapt into the unknown?.

Tariq Alhomayed

Iran has announced its intention to build 10 uranium enrichment plants, and to study the possibility of achieving 20 percent uranium enrichment on its own territory. This means that Tehran will move closer to producing enough highly enriched uranium necessary for a nuclear bomb, and so in effect Iran has chosen escalation, and to follow the policy of brinkmanship.

There are several ways to interpret the Iranian escalation, especially as Tehran was very confused and [attempted] to play down its threatening announcement, saying that it had said what it said as a reaction to the decision taken by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] which condemned Iran for its lack of cooperation.

At this point it is true to say that the Iranian regime has tied its legitimacy to the nuclear project, and the Supreme Leader of Iran previously made reference to this. Therefore it is difficult [for the Iranian regime] to simply abandon this project, especially taking into account the domestic situation in Iran, which has become even more complex after Tehran announced its intentions to build the 10 [uranium enrichment] plants.

The opposition [in Iran] is waiting for the big question: what will the Iranians gain from an agreement [with the IAEA], and will this lead to an Iranian open-door policy to the West? If there is no open-door policy [to the West] this means a political and economic crisis [in Iran], but if there is an open-door policy, the reformists will say: If this is the case, why are we being accused of treason when the regime is running after the West? All of this means that the regime in Tehran is caught in a predicament according to the famous proverb “damned if you do, and damned if you don’t.”

There is another interpretation [of the situation] that says that Iran is pushing things to the edge of the abyss in order to obtain greater concessions from the West, and this is in order to promote itself internally. However this is very risky, and the proof of this is that nuclear experts told our newspaper that Iran’s threats are “empty” and of no value, and this of course indicates that Iran is not sincere in everything that it has told the western negotiators.

Another interpretation is that Iran is escalating matters betting that the West, and particularly the US, is unable to undertake a military showdown [with Tehran] due to the economic conditions, and Washington’s position in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result of this, the US will not allow Israel to conduct military operations [against Iran], and therefore this gives Iran the opportunity to buy time.

All of the above are reasonable interpretations [of the situation], but the question is: does this mean that Iran is in a position of strength?

I think not! There are two clear features in Iran and they are chaos and confusion; and the Iranian regime has taken a leap into the unknown. It is true that Obama has shown more flexibility towards Tehran, but it is [also] in his power today to use this against Iran, and he will have international support [in this]. This would lead to international resolutions that result in harsh sanctions being placed on Iran, and matters may even develop into military confrontation or action by Israel [against Iran].

Israel is waiting for the green light to attack Iran, as Tel Aviv wishes to move on from the complications that it is facing in the region, and this is not to mention its concerns over Tehran’s intentions. Iran is a very big fish to catch for whoever wants it in these troubled waters.

Therefore the Iranian escalation is a leap into the unknown, rather than an operation with calculated consequences.

Iran builds navy to hold vital strait – UPI.com.

Smuggler: Iran Preparing for War with U.S. – CBS News.

Man Pleads Guilty to Plotting to Ship Sensitive Military Technology to Iran; Says Leaders Expect War

(AP) An Iranian man has pleaded guilty to plotting to ship sensitive military technology to Iran, and told an undercover investigator his country’s leaders think war is coming, court papers revealed Wednesday.

The documents show that Amir Ardebili gave a stark explanation for why he was trying to buy so many different weapons parts, including technology that would help protect Iran from missile attacks.

“By his own admission, Ardebili was assisting Iran in preparing for war with the United States,” prosecutor David Hall wrote in a sentencing memorandum.

Ardebili “directly threatened the security of the United States,” the prosecutor wrote. “He was a prolific acquisitions agent procuring or attempting to procure a wide range of components, for his sole customer, the government of Iran.”

The papers also said that during a 2007 meeting with an undercover agent, Ardebili said he wanted so much material in case the U.S. goes to war with Iran, so that “the government (of Iran) could defend… Because they think the war is coming.”

The case represents the latest example of what past and present U.S. officials say is an intense and ominous effort by Iran to evade export controls and acquire critical military technology amid a long-running standoff with the West over its nuclear program.

Federal authorities are set to discuss at a Delaware news conference the case against Ardebili, following a lengthy investigation by Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents. Court papers say he secretly pleaded guilty May 2008 to a number of charges, including violating the Iranian arms embargo.

Ardebili was arrested in 2007 following a clandestine meeting with an undercover agent in the Caucasus nation of Georgia.

His capture has already been the subject of tense back-and-forth, after the Iranians complained this year of his earlier arrest in the Caucasus nation of Georgia. The Iranians have argued to United Nations officials that Ardebili and a handful of others have been improperly seized through U.S. efforts.

Iranian President says Tehran to Produce High-Grade Uranium | Middle East | English.

President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad strikes a defiant tone in a televised speech, saying Tehran would produce 20-percent high-grade uranium for its nuclear program.

Edward Yeranian | Cairo 02 December 2009

Photo: AFP

An image grab taken from Iran’s English-language official Press TV station shows Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad giving a speech from the central city of Isfahan, 02 Dec 2009

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad struck a defiant tone in a televised speech. Speaking in the shrine city of Isfahan, he said Tehran would defy world powers even further by producing high-grade uranium, enriched to 20 percent, for its nuclear program.

Mr. Ahmedinejad thumped his fists on the podium lectern as he drove home his point that Tehran could care less about what the outside world thinks of its nuclear program, insisting that “neither Israel, nor its backers can stop it.

He said that he declares  that with God’s grace, the Iranian nation will produce 20-percent fuel and whatever else it needs on its own.  Iran asked the West for the [highly enriched uranium], he insisted, and it tried to use the issue “to pressure us.”  The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], he claimed, was obligated to provide that fuel.

He also stressed that he is not worried about the military option being used against Iran’s nuclear facilities, despite talk of a possible Israeli attack:

He said many people warned him, when he visited the United Nations in September, that Israel would attack Iran’s nuclear facilities.  He said that is media hyperbole, because there is nothing that Israel can do to stop us.

The Iranian president repeated a phrase that he used during Iran’s presidential campaign, last spring, saying Iran’s “nuclear dossier is closed, and will not be reopened.”

Mr. Ahmedinejad also expressed disappointment with U.S. President Barack Obama, noting that he was “not happy” with the direction dialogue between the two countries was taking, and that he feared Mr. Obama would be influenced by Israel to take a harder stance against Tehran.

It was the second day, Mr. Ahmedinejad grabbed the spotlight on national TV to drive home the point that he is in charge of the country’s nuclear agenda and that he would not compromise an inch.

The Iranian president criticized Russia, on television Tuesday, saying Tehran was disappointed with Moscow and Iran did not need its help, anyway.

He says he is disappointed over Russia’s decision to join an IAEA censure of Tehran’s nuclear program, and he believes Moscow’s decision was wrong, and the Russians do not have an accurate conception of Iran’s nuclear program.  Moscow’s help, he added, is based on self-interest and the Russians need us more than we need them.

He also repeated Tehran’s habitual claim that it is “not seeking nuclear weapons,” citing Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has said “Islam is against atomic weapons.”

Mr. Ahmedinejad also stressed that any further U.N. sanctions against Tehran “would be futile,” because, as he put it, “it is impossible to isolate a country like Iran, in [today’s] multipolar world.”

How ElBaradei misled the world about Iran’s nuclear program – Haaretz – Israel News.

This week, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei ended his controversial and unsuccessful term as director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. His last days on the job caused a great deal of consternation, even more than the rest of his 12 years in the bureau overlooking the Danube, at United Nations headquarters in Vienna.

On Sunday, the Iranian government announced it would set up another 10 facilities for enriching uranium, beyond the existing two at Natanz and Qom. This was Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s defiant response to the IAEA board of governors’ concern about aspects of Iran’s nuclear program that “have military potential,” and the agency’s call that Tehran stop building at Qom and enriching uranium. The decision can also be considered a rude gesture to the person who was considered Iran’s most important supporter and benefactor in the international community, ElBaradei.

ElBaradei was born 67 years ago in Egypt, and studied law at the universities of Cairo, Geneva and New York. He served in the Egyptian foreign service for about 15 years, and then began a three-decade career with the United Nations, first in New York and later in Vienna.

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He started off as an inconspicuous lawyer, but after being elected to head the IAEA in 1997, everything changed. Three nuclear crises took place during his term, in Iraq, North Korea and Iran. Thanks to the first crisis, he won worldwide fame when the Americans invaded Iraq. ElBaradei and his aides refuted the Bush administration’s claims that Saddam Hussein had a secret nuclear program, and maintained that documents detailing Iraq’s supposed attempts to acquire uranium from Niger were forged. They were right. Bush made a mistake, was misled or perhaps even lied.

ElBaradei’s conduct regarding Iraq’s non-existent nuclear weapons brought him a great deal of international prestige. He became a popular speaker in important forums around the world, and in 2005 he and the agency received the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts to curtail nuclear proliferation.

The prize, as people who knew him observed, went to his head and made him haughty, arrogant and self-righteous. But that’s when things began to go downhill.

“He started to behave as if he knew better than anyone else and could not make a mistake,” one of the senior officials in the agency complained. But it was after winning the prize that his career reached a nadir that stained his earlier achievements. While it could be argued that ElBaradei hardly had any control over North Korea’s unstable and defiant nuclear program, the poor management of the crisis with Iran has to be attributed largely to him – the Egyptian diplomat is responsible for his organization’s placatory approach toward the Iranian nuclear program. For almost a decade, starting in 1992, the agency inspectors did not notice that Iran had a secret nuclear program that violated its international commitments. Even when the agency had the information, in 2002 (to a considerable degree thanks to American, British, German and Israeli intelligence), ElBaradei ignored it and made every possible effort to undermine its reliability.

He intervened repeatedly to distort his inspectors’ reports on Iran’s nuclear sites, and he made sure that the IAEA’s periodic reports about Iran would be camouflaged in diplomatic gibberish. Time and again they repeated the phrase that “no proof was found” that Iran’s nuclear program had military aspects, even though they were blatantly obvious. ElBaradei was opposed to sanctioning Iran, not to mention military action, and repeatedly attempted to conduct a dialogue with Tehran in order to reach a compromise.

It is not clear whether his backing for Iran stemmed from his origin – as some Israeli Atomic Energy Commission officials and others believe; from his legal background and careful phrasing; or from a naive belief in international diplomacy and dialogue at any price, while consistently rejecting the military option. Maybe it was all these factors. Whatever the case may be, his conduct toward Iran raised the ire of George W. Bush’s administration, which sought to have him replaced.

ElBaradei’s relationship with Israel, which he visited twice, was tense. To the chagrin of the international agency, he repeatedly called for a nuclear-free Middle East, which was interpreted as targeting Israel. His animosity toward Israel found special expression after the attack in September 2007 on Syria’s nuclear facility. He ensured that Israel’s name be mentioned in the IAEA reports about the Syrian nuclear plan, even though this was not necessary. And he added a paragraph stating that Israel had carried out the attack, even though it had never officially admitted doing so.

Given his conduct toward Iran and his attitude toward Israel, some in Israel even considered trying to defame him by presenting him as an Iranian collaborator.

Toward the end of his term, ElBaradei changed his tone about Iran, creating the impression that he had had awakened from his illusion that Iran could be convinced to compromise. In the past few weeks, he made several resolute declarations, saying that perhaps Iran indeed wanted to nuclear weapons, as Israeli and American spokesmen had been claiming for years. But this was too little, too late. It will not suffice to clear his reputation in the West, and more importantly, it will have no effect whatsoever on the fact that he misled world opinion about the real nature of the Iranian nuclear program.