Archive for the ‘Egypt’ category

Turkey planning $5 billion for Gaza seaport

February 5, 2016

Turkey planning $5 billion for Gaza seaport, Israel National News, Ari Yashar, February 5, 2016

In the midst of ongoing normalization talks with Israel, Turkey is planning to invest $5 billion in reconstructing the Hamas stronghold of Gaza including a seaport – which Israel has fiercely opposed due to the blatant threat of weapons smuggling.

The Turkish Hurriyet Daily News on Friday reported that a team of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) announced the expensive rebuilding plan, which is being prepared by the Center for Multilateral Trade Studies at the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV).

The plans to reconstruct the Hamas-held region came after meetings with Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas officials, as well as Israeli officials.

“As the Turkish business world, we can fulfill this work,” said TOBB chairman Rifat Hisarciklioglu, who led the group. TEPAV claims that by 2020, Gaza will be “unlivable” with no drinking water left.

Indicating the subversive nature of the plan, TEPAV Executive Director Guven Sak said, “we made a strategic plan. A Gaza port will be one of the most important projects in this plan.”

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has rejected the idea of a port or lifting the maritime blockade on Gaza, which is meant to block the influx of weapons and which is fully legal according to international law, contrary to the claims of Israel’s opponents. Surprisingly, Agriculture Minister Uri Ariel (Jewish Home) in December called to build a seaport in Gaza.

The matter of the naval blockade has been a key sticking point in the reconciliation talks with Turkey, which continues to firmly support the Hamas terrorist organization. Turkey also continues to host Hamas terrorists, including those planning attacks in Israel.

With Israeli permission

Regarding the Turkish plan, TEPAV’s Sak said, “Turkish contractors will be an important part of this project,” while Hisarciklioglu said, “our contractors are materializing world-class works. They rank second in the world.”

The group met with Israeli officials unnamed in the report, and also met with Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah as well as several PA ministers and officials, in addition to Hamas officials and the Gaza Chamber of Commerce.

Israel gave the Turkish team permission to visit Gaza and plan the project according to the report, in an apparent sign of the growing rapprochement between the two states.

“It is not possible to go to Gaza without the permission of Israel,” said Hisarciklioglu. “But we did this. This is an indicator that the tensions between Turkey and Israel are easing.”

Israel’s normalization talks with Turkey have caused outrage in Egypt, where officials have urged Israel not to normalize ties.

Turkish defense sources revealed in December that Turkey is primarily interested in rapprochement so as to buy Israeli military hardware, with Ankara interested in buying more advanced Israeli drones as well as reconnaissance and surveillance systems for its fighter jets.

Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu in December also said that Turkey is only interested in the normalization talks so as to “benefit…Palestine and Gaza.”

Senior Israeli security sources for their part said they doubt Turkey is serious about rapprochement, noting on the crisis in ties with Russia – a key gas supplier for Turkey – that apparently prompted the desire for natural gas trade with Israel as Ankara hurts financially.

Bilateral ties disintegrated in the infamous 2010 Mavi Marmara flotilla incident, when IDF soldiers were forced to board the Turkish ship that had ignored repeated warnings to stop its attempt to breach the maritime blockade on Gaza.

The soldiers were brutally attacked by IHH Islamist extremists on board wielding knives and metal bars, and had no choice but to open fire, killing ten of the IHH members on board. After an investigation, Israeli authorities discovered the vessel to be carrying no humanitarian aid, despite the flotilla’s claims that it was on a “humanitarian” mission.

MB Apologists Arrive In U.S. For Anti-Sisi Rallies

January 22, 2016

MB Apologists Arrive In U.S. For Anti-Sisi Rallies, Investigative Project on Terrorism, John Rossomando, January 21, 2016

(Please see also, UK Review of Muslim Brotherhood: Top 13 Quotes. — DM)

Three Muslim Brotherhood supporters who caused a row in Egypt last year after they met with Obama administration officials and members of Congress returned to the U.S. Wednesday, according to the Facebook page of Egyptian Americans for Freedom and Justice (EAFJ).

During their 2015 trip, Brotherhood leader Gamal Heshmat, former Egyptian Judge Waleed Sharaby and Maha Azzam, head of the Egyptian Revolutionary Council (ERC) lobbied State Department and White House officials for help against the government of Egyptian President Abdel Fatal al-Sisi.

The ERC formed in 2014 with the aim of toppling Sisi and bringing the Brotherhood back to power in Egypt. Sisi took power in 2013 after the Egyptian army ousted President Mohamed Morsi, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party.

Heshmat has a long history of supporting Palestinian terrorists and was photographed in June 2014 with Hamas political chief Khaled Meshaal.

The State Department agreed with the delegation’s position that Sisi had not brought stability to Egypt, and that his removal would pave the way for a transition to democracy, Sharaby told Egypt’s Mekameleen TV in an interview last February. But that has not translated into concrete action to topple Sisi.

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EAFJ leaders Mahmoud El-Sharkawy, Hani Elkadi and Aber Mostafa greeted Heshmat, Sharaby and Azzam at New York’s JFK airport and posed for a picture with them displaying the Brotherhood’s four-fingered Rabaa salute which has become representative among those wanting the Brotherhood’s return to power in Egypt.

The three are scheduled to speak Friday at an event titled “Egyptian Revolution from Sacrifices to Victory” in North Bergen, N.J.

The event is timed to commemorate the Jan. 25 anniversary of dictator Hosni Mubarak’s fall from power in 2011. Heshmat wrote that his group had no plans to meet with Obama administration representatives during this visit, due to their “position biased” toward Sisi’s regime. They hope to speak with some congressmen, academics and others.

El-Sharkawy is a Brotherhood member and serves as liaison with Brotherhood members exiled in Turkey, Egypt’s Al-Bawaba newspaper reported last April.

He frequently reposts Muslim Brotherhood communiqués on his Facebook page. In December, El Sharkawy encouraged “all youth and revolutionaries” to distribute the official page of Brotherhood spokesman Muhammad Muntasir.

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Elkadi seemed to self-identify as a Brotherhood member in a March 9 Facebook post showing an cartoon of a man holding a sign with the Brotherhood logo and the words which translate to, “I am [Muslim] Brotherhood and I’m not threatened.”

Last year, Elkadi, El Sharkawy and Mostafa posted graphics on their Facebook pages seeming to support violence in Egypt.

El Sharkawy and Elkadi posted a Feb. 10 communiqué from the Popular Resistance Movement (PRM) which has launched attacks against Egyptian police and other targets. It features an image of a blood-red map of Egypt with a fist superimposed over it. It claims responsibility for targeting two police cars. “God, martyrs, Revolution,” it said.

Mostafa posted the personal information of a pro-Sisi owner of an Egyptian soccer team with the word “Attaaack!” the same day.

The Inside Track From Israel’s Gaza Border Defenders

January 21, 2016

The Inside Track From Israel’s Gaza Border Defenders, Investigative Project on Terrorism, Paul Alster, January 21, 2016

1339Photos courtesy of IDF Spokesperson.

Like it or not, the Iran nuclear deal is done. In much of the Middle East, defense officials in many states believe that a sizeable proportion of the soon-to-be released $100 billion Iranian windfall will be directed toward funding proxy armies of the Islamic Republic, for whom the Jewish state remains the prime target. Israel’s focus is now, more than ever, on defense and surveillance.

In the north, Hizballah, Iran’s proxy Lebanese army, remains a massive threat to regional stability, siding with Syria’s disgraced President Bashar Assad and his saviors from Russia. In Gaza, it is no secret that a previous rift between Iran and Hamas has been smoothed over to further mutual objectives and that another, and possibly more brutal round of hostilities between Israel and Hamas may not be far away.

“The sanctions relief and the nuclear deal with Iran represent a strategic shift that the IDF will have to tackle over the next decade,” Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot said Monday in a speech at the INSS conference in Tel Aviv. “We also see [Iran’s] attempt to influence Arab Israelis and those in the Gaza Strip, and the estimation is that as Iran’s economic situation improves, over the next one-to-two years, it will divert considerably more resources into opposing Israel, via the Iranian military industry.”

Last week, the Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT) saw first-hand the situation on Israel’s south-western border, meeting with a senior IDF source who cannot be identified for security reasons. Close to the Kerem Shalom border crossing, where Israel oversees the transfer of many hundreds of tons of goods and supplies every day into Gaza,  we scrambled up a sizeable sand dune that offered a panoramic view of the situation on the ground toward the closed Rafah crossing from Egypt into Gaza.

“We hear the explosions and the fighting [against the Islamists] on the Egyptian side. The Egyptian army is taking it seriously,” the senior IDF source explained as we looked across the triangular border junction and heard distant noises, apparently explosions. “We hear this every day. Terrorists continue to try to cross from Egypt into Gaza.”

Minutes later, a text message announced that the Keren Shalom crossing suddenly had been closed. It turned out that the Egyptian army reportedly engaged and killed 13 jihadists  just a couple of miles away. Two days earlier, an attempt to breach the Israel-Gaza border fence and plant an IED resulted in an Israeli airstrike reportedly eliminating a member of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.

Meanwhile, Hamas continues to test fire rockets into the sea, and in recent months other Islamic militants in Gaza sporadically lob rockets toward Israel. On the other side of the border triangle, Egypt is doing its best to keep a lid on ISIS and other Islamist forces in the Sinai Peninsula.

It’s clear that relations between the Israeli and Egyptian militaries are good, a dangerous common enemy helping to focus minds. Under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Egypt (despite a lack of support from the United States), has taken the fight to the terror organizations, often at a significant cost in Egyptian military lives. The horrific October downing of the Russian passenger jet out of Sharm el-Sheikh brought the scale of the task facing Egypt into focus. Israel remains alert for the jihadists turning their attention and firepower from Sinai, but for now believes that Gazan-based terror poses its most immediate threat.

“It’s been quite quiet with Hamas [since the 2014 Protective Edge war], but they don’t keep quiet for long,” the IDF source said. “We’re not looking for a fight – we have an interest that there will be quiet here – but if we have to deal with Hamas, this time we’ll deal with them properly.”

Many Israelis were dismayed when Israel unilaterally pulled out of Gaza in 2014 without a ceasefire, some criticism coming notably from members of the left-wing opposition and media for allowing Hamas off the hook when many believed it was in utter disarray. Now, despite ongoing attempts to stem the flow of weapons, reports suggest Hamas is rebuilding fast and may have some surprises in store for Israel if there’s another round of fighting.

“Look, we’re quite certain they are still building tunnels,” the official said, planting his heel in the sand and showing how easy it is to dig. “And yes, I’m sure they have new weapons – anti-tank, anti-aircraft etc. Like us, they will want to be better next time, but we understand more. The reality is different. We’re learning all the time what is going in Gaza. The army is always preparing for the war to come and [Hamas] won’t meet the same thing as in [Protective Edge].”

While Israeli soldiers and advanced technology such as its Guardium unmanned patrol vehicles are the first line of defense – the IDF indicated last year that the development of underground tunnel detection systems is also a priority project – the eyes of the military are actually in special units of female soldiers, known as the tazpitanyot. They monitor all movements, looking for suspicious activity, known terror operatives, and attempts to breach the border.

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They work in a series of non-descript trailers and shipping containers belying the fact that inside are massed banks of video screens and radar images, and the ability to combine pictures filmed from aerial blimps with other cameras – both day and night vision. This arrangement allows operatives to zoom in and see Gazans as far as a mile from the border fence.

When anything, or anyone suspicious pops up, there are pictures of ‘Wanted’ terror suspects close to the screens.  They instruct the on-the-ground forces to investigate. Never averting their gaze from the screen during a four-hour shift, each soldier has been trained to identify every landmark, tree, or rock within her specific area of surveillance. “If there’s even a single branch missing from a tree, they’ll spot it” the women’s commanding officer said. They also have remote control of the machine guns sited on border watch towers.

No security system is 100 percent foolproof, and during the first two weeks of the last round of fighting, four terror tunnels emerged on the Israeli side, only being detected at the last moment.  In two cases, the IDF fought gun-battles leaving  at least 10 terrorists and six Israeli soldiers dead. Hamas had hoped to kill civilians before luring Israeli soldiers back through the tunnels then kidnapping them or causing mass casualties.

Methods and practices of surveillance are being continually reviewed, but no-one in the Israeli military doubts the tatzpitanyot’s crucial front-line role in its border security, both north and south.

Egyptian Author Sayyid Al-Qemany: Al-Azhar Is a Terrorist Institution

January 13, 2016

Egyptian Author Sayyid Al-Qemany: Al-Azhar Is a Terrorist Institution, MEMRI-TV via You Tube, January 13, 2016

 

 

According to the blurb following the video,

In a January 2 interview on the Egyptian ON TV channel, author Sayyid Al-Qemany said that Al-Azhar should be placed on the list of terrorist organizations. “There are people working on this. They will file a suit in the international court, and I will provide them with documentation,” he said. ِFollowing the interview, it was reported in the press that Al-Azhar was planning to file a lawsuit against Al-Qemany for defamation of the institution.

Our World: In Pakistan, they trust

January 12, 2016

Our World: In Pakistan, they trust, Jerusalem Post, Caroline Glick, January 11, 2016

Pakistan viewA general view of houses from a hilltop in Abbottabad, Pakistan. (photo credit:REUTERS)

It is a testament to the precarious state of the world today that in a week that saw North Korea carry out a possible test of a hydrogen bomb, the most frightening statement uttered did not come from Pyongyang.

It came from Pakistan.

Speaking in the military garrison town of Rawalpindi, Pakistani Army chief Gen. Raheel Sharif said that any Iranian threat to Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity will “wipe Iran off the map.”

Sharif made the statement following his meeting with Saudi Arabia’s defense minister and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. According to media reports, Salman was the second senior Saudi official to visit Pakistan in the past week amid growing tensions between Iran and the kingdom.

Salman’s trip and Sharif’s nuclear threat make clear that following the US’s all-but-official abandonment of its role as protector of the world’s largest oil producer, the Saudis have cast their lots with nuclear-armed Pakistan.

When last October, the USS Harry Truman exited the Persian Gulf, the move marked the first time since 2007 that the US lacked an aircraft carrier in the region. Nine years ago, the US naval move was not viewed as a major statement of strategic withdrawal, given that back then the US had some one hundred thousand troops in Iraq.

While the USS Truman returned to the Gulf late last month, its return gave little solace to America’s frightened and spurned Arab allies. The Obama administration’s weak-kneed response to Iran’s live-fire exercises on December 26, during which an Iranian Revolutionary Guards vessel fired rockets a mere 1,370 meters from the aircraft carrier as it transited the Straits of Hormuz, signaled that the US is not even willing to make a show of force to deter Iranian aggression.

And so the Saudis have turned to Pakistan.

It would be foolish to view Sharif’s nuclear threat as mere bluster.

By every meaningful measure, Pakistan is little more than a failed state with nuclear weapons. Pakistan appears in every global index of failed or failing states.

To take just a few leading indicators, as spelled out by Basit Mahmood in a report last summer for The Political Domain, barely 1% of Pakistanis pay taxes of any kind. More than half the population lives in abject poverty. The government has no control over most Pakistani territory.

Between 2003 and 2015, more than 58,000 people were killed by terrorism countrywide.

Public health is a disaster. Polio, eradicated throughout much of the world, is now galloping through the country.

Last summer more than 1,300 people died in a heat wave in the supposedly advanced city of Karachi.

These data do not take into account the wholesale slaughter and persecution of minority groups – first and foremost Christians – and the systematic denial of basic human rights and widespread, violent persecution of women and girls.

As for its nuclear arsenal, a 2010 report by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists estimated that Pakistan possesses between 70 and 90 nuclear warheads. Other credible reports estimate the size of the arsenal at 120.

Pakistan refuses to adopt a no-firststrike policy. In the US and worldwide, it is considered to be the greatest threat to global nuclear security.

Following a Pakistani jihadist assault on the Indian parliament in late 2001, India and Pakistan both deployed forces along their contested border. In the months that followed, due to Pakistani nuclear threats, the prospect of nuclear war was higher than it had ever been.

Cold War nuclear brinksmanship – which reached its high point during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis – paled in comparison.

In 2008, following the Pakistani jihadist assault on Mumbai, India threatened to retaliate against Pakistan.

India’s threats rose as evidence mounted that, as was the case in 2001, the jihadists were tied to Pakistan’s ISI spy service. Once again, rather than clean its own house, Pakistan responded by threatening to launch a nuclear attack against India.

And now, following the unraveling of US-strategic credibility, Pakistan’s aggressive nuclear umbrella is officially coming to the Persian Gulf.

Saudi Arabia’s decision to turn to Pakistan for protection indicates that the second wave of the destruction of the Arab state model is upon us. The notion of Arab states was invented nearly 100 years ago by the British and French at the tail end of World War I. The Sykes-Picot agreement, which partitioned the Arab world into states, rewarded national dominion to the most powerful tribal actors in the various land masses that became the states of the Arab world.

With the possible exception of Egypt, which predated Sykes-Picot, the Arab states formed at the end of World War I were not nation states. Their populations didn’t view themselves as distinct nations. Rather the populations of the Arab states were little more than a hodgepodge of tribes, clans and sectarian and ethnic groupings. In each case, the British and French made their determinations of leadership based on the relative power of the various groups. Those chosen to control these new states were viewed either as the strongest factions within the new borders or as the most loyal allies to the European powers.

The first wave of Arab state collapse began six years ago. It submerged the non-royal regimes, which fell one after the other, like houses of cards.

Syria, Libya, Iraq and Yemen ceased to exist.

Egypt, which in the space of two years experienced both an Islamist revolution and a military counter-revolution, still teeters on the brink of collapse.

Lebanon will likely break apart at the slightest provocation.

Today we are seeing the opening stages of the collapse of the Arab monarchies, and most importantly, of Saudi Arabia.

Most of the international attention to Saudi Arabia’s current threat environment has focused on Iran. The Iranian threat to the Saudis has grown in direct proportion to the Obama administration’s determination to realign the US away from its traditional Sunni allies and towards Iran. The conclusion of the US-led nuclear pact with Tehran has exacerbated Iran’s regional aggression as it no longer fears US retaliation for its threats to the Sunni monarchies.

But Iran is just the most visible of three existential threats now besetting the House of Saud.

The most profound threat to the world’s largest oil power is economic.

The drop in world oil prices has endangered the kingdom.

As David Goldman reported last week in the Asia Times, according to an International Monetary Fund analysis, the collapse in Saudi oil revenues “threatens to exhaust the kingdom’s $700 billion in financial reserves within five years.”

The house of Saud’s hold on power owes to its oil-subsidized economy. As Goldman noted, last month dwindling revenues forced the Saudis to cut subsidies for water, electricity and gasoline.

According to Goldman, Riyadh’s mass execution of 43 long-jailed prisoners at the start of the month was an attempt by the aging royal house to demonstrate its firm control of events. But the very fact the Saudi regime believed it was necessary to stage such a demonstration shows that it is in distress.

The third existential threat the regime now faces is Islamic State. Since 1979, the Saudis have sought to deflect domestic opposition by promoting Wahabist Islam at home and Wahabist jihad beyond its borders.

Now, with Islamic State in control over large swathes of neighboring Iraq, as well as Syria and Libya and threatening the Saudi-supported Sisi regime in Egypt, the Saudi royal family faces the rising threat of blowback. Some analysts argue that given the popular support for jihad in Saudi Arabia, were Islamic State to cross the Saudi border, its forces would be greeted with flowers, not bullets.

If the House of Saud falls, then the Gulf emirates will also be imperiled.

The Egyptian regime, which is bankrolled by the Saudis and its Gulf allies will also be endangered. The Hashemite monarchy in Jordan, which is protected by the US and by Israel, will face unprecedented threats.

The implications of expanding chaos – or worse – in Arabia are not limited to the Middle East. The global economy as well as the security of Europe and the US will be imperiled.

Obviously, the order of the day is for the US security guarantee to Saudi Arabia to be reinforced, mainly through straightforward US action against Iranian naval aggression and ballistic missile development.

Unfortunately, the Obama administration can be depended on to take just the opposite approach. And as a consequence, at least for the next year, the main thing propping up the Gulf monarchies, and with them, the global economy and what passes for global security, is a failed state with an itchy finger on the nuclear trigger.

Israel and the Four Powers

January 9, 2016

Israel and the Four Powers, Algemeiner, Ben Cohen via JNS Org., January 8, 2016

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JNS.org The rulers of the Arab Gulf states are, it seems, increasingly attentive to what Israel has to say about the balance of power in the region. As a rising Shi’a Iran faces off against a Sunni coalition led by Saudi Arabia, the core shared interest between Israel’s democracy and these conservative theocracies — countering Iran’s bid to become the dominant power and influence in the Islamic world — has rarely been as apparent.

Hence the interview given by a senior IDF officer to a Saudi weekly, Elaph, which laid out how Israel analyzes the present wretched state of the Middle East. In the Israeli view, there are, the officer said, four powers that have coalesced in the region. The first power centers on Iran and its allies and proxies, such as the Bashar al-Assad dictatorship in Syria, Shi’a rebels in Yemen and Iraq, and most pertinently for Israel, Hezbollah in Lebanon. The second power contains what the officer called “moderate” states with whom Israel has “a common language” — Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf countries. The third power, one that is obviously waning, is represented in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, now vanquished in its Egyptian heartland but still reigning in Hamas-controlled Gaza. Finally, the fourth power is another non-state actor, the combined forces of jihadi barbarism like Al-Qaeda and Islamic State.

Israel’s goal in this situation is a modest one. As the IDF officer put it, “There is a danger that the strife will reach us as well if the instability in the region continues for a long time. Therefore, we need to take advantage of the opportunity and work together with the moderate states to renew quiet in the region.”

The key phrase here, it seems to me, is “renew quiet.” Foremost for the Israelis, that means counteracting Iran and especially its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah, and then minimizing the potential for jihadi terrorists to operate on or near Israeli-controlled territory. A broader strategic vision can also be detected here: Ultimately, both Israel and the conservative Arab states share the common interests of neutralizing Iran and eliminating the jihadi groups.

The partnership between Israel and these states is already in operation, at the levels of intelligence sharing and — not for the first time — cautious exploration of trade relations. That there is a strong military dimension as well to all this is entirely conceivable. And for the time being, it seems that neither side wants to expand or contract on their public ties with each other; Israel has long had embassies in Cairo and Amman, but that doesn’t mean there’ll be an Israeli ambassador in Riyadh anytime soon, much less a film festival or trade expo.

There’s another factor that has accelerated the formation of this undeclared, look-the-other-way alliance: the shift in American Middle East policy under President Barack Obama. Some readers will remember that back in 1991, the first Bush administration pointedly left Israel out of the coalition to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, so as not to antagonize the Gulf states. Now, frustration with Obama has compelled these very same states to recognize that they have an existential interest in cooperating with Israel.

You might say that the president deserves credit for bringing about a situation, in the wake of the nuclear deal with Iran, which has compelled the Gulf states to grasp the reality and permanence of Israel as never before. Still, the visions and prophecies of a Middle Eastern equivalent of the European Union, much indulged during the Oslo Accords years in the late 1990s, are not now in evidence, and that’s welcome. For their own reasons, neither Israel nor the Arab states feel obliged to articulate a sense of what their region should look like in the event that the Iranian threat is overcome.

Indeed, there’s a case that doing so would be counterproductive — it would impose political pressures upon a discreet yet strategically vital relationship that above all requires, in the parlance of the IDF officer, the “moderate” states to remain as moderate states. With the reorientation of American policy towards a rapprochement with Tehran, along with Russia’s active involvement in the Tehran-Damascus axis, Israel is the nearest reliable, not to say formidable, power that these countries can turn to.

In the present Middle Eastern context, then, the realism and discretion which has always underwritten Israeli foreign policy continues to prevail. That realism presumably extends to recognizing that regimes like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain might eventually succumb to their internal instabilities, already exacerbated by the further collapse of the price of oil.

When you consider the alternatives, the region’s architecture could be much worse for Israel than it is currently. Long an anomaly as the only open society in the region, the target of Arab military and economic warfare throughout the latter half of the last century, Israel in this century is now a partner in a regional bloc. To be sure, this is a bloc based upon interests, not common values, and is therefore necessarily limited in scope. But in the present storm, and amidst the appalling human suffering generated by the clash of these rival interests in Syria, it’s the closest thing we have to progress.

Iran-Saudi crisis spurs Hizballah strike on Israel

January 4, 2016

Iran-Saudi crisis spurs Hizballah strike on Israel, DEBKAfile, January 3, 2016

Iranian_protesters_set_fire_to_pictures_of_the_Saudi_royal_family_3.1.16

The heated verbal battle between Tehran and Riyadh over Saudi Arabia’s execution of a Shiite cleric escalated Sunday night, Jan 3, with the severance of diplomatic relations. On the broader front, the repercussions from the quarrel between the two leaders of the Muslim world’s Shia-Sunni split are widely seen in Middle East military and intelligence circles as spurring a fast-track Hizballah attack on Israel.

Among the 47 people executed by Saudi Arabia Saturday on terrorism charges was Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, Saudi Shiite leader and a prominent Shiite cleric in the region. Put to death with him were several Saudi Shiite and Sunni activists, which enraged Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to the point of threatening the Saudi royal family with “divine revenge.”

From Iran’s perspective, the Saudis committed the unpardonable act of executing Shiites together with Sunni Al Qaeda and ISIS terrorists. This made the House of Saud the first ruling power ever to treat Shiite and Sunni terrorists alike. This, more than anything, incensed Iran and its Lebanese proxy Hizballah, who are deep in a bloody war against the Sunni Islamic State and the Nusra Front terrorists in Syria. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards are additionally locked in a bitter conflict with ISIS in Iraq.

The Iranian war effort is backed by the US in Iraq and by Russia in Syria.

By the mass executions of both classes of terrorist at the same time, Riyadh issued four messages:

1. Washington and Moscow are wrong. The Iranians and the forces they back in the Persian Gulf, Syria and Iraq are just as much terrorists as ISIS and Al Qaeda.

2. The House of Saud is determined to fight both with equal resolve and severity

3. Riyadh has already taken Tehran on in Yemen, and indirectly in Syria, and is now ready to take the fight against Tehran all the way to the war on terror.

4. Taking off the diplomatic gloves, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir Monday night severed relations with Iran and ordered all Iranian diplomats to leave the kingdom within 48 hours. The foreign ministry said that by condemning the Nimr execution, Iran was supporting terrorism.

Saudi diplomats were already gone after protesters in Tehran torched and ransacked the Saudi embassy Saturday.

Amid all the sound and fury, Tehran’s attention was drawn to comments made by Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu in the light of a major terrorist attack in Tel Aviv. He pointed out that, in addition to the Palestinians, Israel is threatened by two streams of radical Islam, the Shiites and the Sunnis.

He was clearly referring to Iran and its terrorist arm, Hizballah, on the one hand, and ISIS and Al Qaeda, on the other, inspired less by the Tel Aviv outrage than by the gathering clouds of terror darkening the region, which place the Saudi royal family and Israel on the same side, sharing a similar perception of the two foes facing both countries.

Policymakers in Jerusalem noted the odd statement by Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan to reporters on Saturday, January 1 on the way home from a visit to Riyadh. After years of reviling the Jewish state, he said, “Israel is in need of a country like Turkey in the region. We have to admit that we also need Israel.”

He sounded as though he was urging the resumption of the old political and military alliance binding the two countries years ago.

DEBKAfile’s Middle Eastern sources point out that, since his comment came directly after his talks with Saudi King Salman in Riyadh, it appeared to open a path toward the possible creation of a new Middle East bloc consisting of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, perhaps Egypt, and Israel, bound by the same enemies. This grouping could serve as a counterweight against the Sunni-Shiite bloc of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Hizballah, which has the backing of the US and Russia on one hand, and fights ISIS on the other.

Iran’s leaders may curse the House of Saud without restraint, but they are canny enough not to go from words to deeds, knowing they would be on their own if they attacked the oil kingdom and earn no backing from either Washington or Moscow.

However, it might be easier for Tehran to take advantage of Netanyahu’s tough predicament in his war on terror, by sending Hizballah to strike Israel and, meanwhile, pre-empt the formation of a new anti-Tehran alliance. Speeding up Hassan Nasrallah’s promised revenge for the assassination of its master terrorist Samir Quntar would serve this purpose.

This possibility has prompted the IDF to keep artillery units pounding areas bordering on Israel during the past few days. The IDF says this action is necessary to stop Hizballah exploiting the stormy, snowy winter weather to attack Israel. Its military chiefs appear to be acting on information received of an approaching Hizballah operation as its leader has threatened.

Saudi and Egyptian marines capture Iran-held island at Red Sea chokepoint

December 11, 2015

Saudi and Egyptian marines capture Iran-held island at Red Sea chokepoint, DEBKAfile, December 11, 2015

HANISH-map

In a pivotal breakthrough in the Yemen civil war, Thursday, Dec. 11 the naval forces of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAR took by storm from Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels the Greater Hanish island, which is part of the strategic archipelago commanding the Strait of Bab al Mandeb. This is reported exclusively by DEBKAfile’s Middle East sources.

This highly strategic strait links the Indian Ocean with the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea – i.e. Africa and Asia – and is the world’s fourth busiest chokepoint for international oil traffic.

Captured by Yemeni rebels last May, the island was converted by Iranian officers into an armed base and one of Tehran’s largest depots for the supply of arms to its forces and proxies in the region. A fleet of small boats and fishing vessels kept the Yemeni Houthis amply armed for fending off the Saudi-led Arab coalition fighting to restore the exiled Yemeni government.

The Hanish island base also provided Iran with a commanding position for spreading its influence in Ethiopia and Eritrea on the eastern African seaboard.

Taking the island was a major breakthrough for the coalition, after long months of combat that was crowned by their capture of the southern Yemeni seaport of Aden in the past three months. With the occupation of Greater Hanish, Saudi-led forces are now in position not just to cut off Iran’s weapons supplies to the Yemeni rebels, but also to break its grip on the vital strait that connects the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal.

Iran maintained on Greater Hanish Island advanced radar and electronic tracking stations for keeping an eye on military movements on the southern Saudi border with northern Yemen. They could also shadow oil tanker and other shipping passing through the Red Sea, and stake out Israel’s south- and east-bound sea traffic as it passed through the Gulf of Aqaba.

DEBKAfile’s military and intelligence sources reveal that Saudi Arabia and Egypt finally decided that the seizure of the strategic island could not be delayed when last month, Iran won a permit to establish an air and sea base in Djibouti, the Horn of Africa nation opposite the Gulf of Aden’s entrance to the Red Sea.

Djibouti derives much of its revenue from renting out tracts of land to foreign nations seeking bases of operation in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. American and French bases are situated no more than 214 km from Greater Hanish Island.

Riyadh, Cairo and the UAE agreed that they could not afford to let Iranian air and naval forces gain control of the Bab El-Mandeb Strait from its twin footholds on the island and in Djibouti.

They were not the only interested parties. It may be taken for granted that their operation to take over Greater Hanish was quietly assisted by Western and Middle East interests that had been watching Iran’s takeover of these vital ocean pathways with grave concern.

Under secret Moscow-Cairo deal, first Egyptair passenger flights to Damascus, Aleppo

December 7, 2015

Under secret Moscow-Cairo deal, first Egyptair passenger flights to Damascus, Aleppo, DEBKAfile, December 7, 2015

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A new secret pact has taken shape in the Middle East. Last week, the offices of Russian Vladimir Putin and Egyptian President Abdel-Fatteh El-Sisi secretly formulated a tripartite accord for strengthening the ties between Moscow, Cairo and the Assad regime in Damascus, DEBKAfile’s exclusive military sources reveal. The pact had its first visible manifestation in the unannounced landings last Wednesday, Dec. 2, of the first Egyptair passenger flights at Damascus international airport and Aleppo in northern Syria.

The Egyptian national airline thus became the first of any Arab airline to renew flights to the war-torn Syrian capital since 2012. (see photo)

President El-Sisi’s gesture was tantamount to an eloquent vote of support for the Syrian ruler Bashar Assad in the face of his opponents in the Arab arena. It was also a demonstration of confidence in the Russian policy of preserving the Syrian ruler in power in the face of powerful voices in the West and the region calling for his ouster.

By sending a passenger plane to a Syrian airport, Egypt’ signaled its affirmation that Russian military intervention in Syria was making the embattled country a safer place where airliners could land without fear.

Moscow therefore attached supreme importance to the opening of the Egyptian-Syrian civilian air route, so much so that President Vladimir Putin pushed hard for it to take place ahead of the conference of Syrian rebel groups opening in Saudi Arabia Tuesday, Dec. 8.

In diplomatic communications with Riyadh, the Russians urged the Saudi hosts to prevail on the rebel groups whom they support with arms and cash to agree to enter into direct negotiations with Assad for ending the war.

Putin rewarded the Egyptian president for his gesture by ordering Russian airlines to resume their flights to Egypt. Those flights were suspended after the Russian Metrojet airliner was downed over Sinai by terrorists on Oct. 31 and 224 lives were lost in the crash. Their resumption will see Russian tourists again visiting Egypt, restoring a precious source of revenue to the strapped Egyptian economy, estimated at $5 bn per annum.

Our sources in Moscow declined to say whether the Russian passenger planes would again be calling at Sharm El-Sheikh like the ill-fated Metrojet. For the time being, they will most likely land at Cairo.

The Russian president is now trying to persuade El-Sisi to carry on making gestures for enhancing Assad’s standing.

No, the Islamic State Will Not Be Defeated — and if It Is, We Still Lose

November 25, 2015

No, the Islamic State Will Not Be Defeated — and if It Is, We Still Lose, BreitbartBen Shapiro, November 24, 2015

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Barack Obama has now created an unwinnable war.

While all of the 2016 candidates declare their strategies for victory against ISIS, President Obama’s leading from behind has now entered the Middle East and the West into a free-for-all that cannot end any way but poorly.

The best way to understand the situation in Syria is to look at the situation and motivation of the various players. All of them have varying agendas; all of them have different preferred outcomes. Few of them are on anything approaching the same page. And Barack Obama’s failure of leadership means that there is no global power around which to center.

ISIS. ISIS has gained tremendous strength since Barack Obama’s entry to power and pullout from Iraq. They currently control northern Syria, bordering Turkey, as well as large portions of northern Iraq. Their goal: to consolidate their territorial stranglehold, and to demonstrate to their followers that they, and not other competing terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, represent the new Islamic wave. They have little interest in toppling Syrian dictator Bashar Assad for the moment. They do serve as a regional counterweight to the increasingly powerful Iranians – increasingly powerful because of President Obama’s big nuclear deal, as well as his complete abdication of responsibility in Iraq.

Iran. Iran wants to maximize its regional power. The rise of ISIS has allowed it to masquerade as a benevolent force in Iraq and Syria, even as it supports Assad’s now-routine use of chemical weapons against his adversaries, including the remnants of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Iran has already expanded its horizons beyond Iraq and Syria and Lebanon; now it wants to make moves into heretofore non-friendly regions like Afghanistan. Their goal in Syria: keep Bashar Assad in power. Their goal in Iraq: pushing ISIS out of any resource-rich territories, but not finishing ISIS off, because that would then get rid of the global villain against which they fight.

Assad. The growth of ISIS has allowed Assad to play the wronged victim. While the FSA could provide a possible replacement for him, ISIS can’t credibly do so on the international stage. Assad knows that, and thus has little interest in completely ousting them. His main interest is in continuing to devastate the remaining FSA while pretending to fight ISIS.

Egypt/Saudi Arabia/Jordan. As you can see, ISIS, Iran, and Assad all have one shared interest: the continued existence of ISIS. The same is not true with regard to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, all of whom fear the rise of radical Sunni terrorist groups in their home countries. They are stuck between a rock and a hard place, however, because openly destroying ISIS on behalf of Alaouite Assad, they embolden the Shia, their enemies. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan would all join an anti-ISIS coalition in the same way they did against Saddam Hussein in 1991, but just like Hussein in 1991, they won’t do it if there are no Sunni alternatives available. Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan are the top three sources of foreign fighters for ISIS.

Turkey. The Turks have several goals: to stop the Syrian exodus across their borders, to prevent the rise of the Iranians, and to stop the rise of the Kurds. None of these goals involves the destruction of ISIS. Turkey is Sunni; so is ISIS. ISIS provides a regional counterweight against Iran, so long as it remains viable. It also keeps the Kurds occupied in northern Iraq, preventing any threat of Kurdish consolidation across the Iraq-Turkey border. They will accept Syrian refugees so long as those other two goals remain primary – and they’ll certainly do it if they can ship a hefty portion of those refugees into Europe and off their hands.

Russia. Russia wants to consolidate its power in the Middle East. It has done so by wooing all the players to fight against one another. Russia’s involvement in the Middle East now looks a good deal like American involvement circa the Iran-Iraq War: they’re playing both sides. Russia is building nuclear reactors in Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Iran. They’re Bashar Assad’s air force against both the FSA and ISIS. Russia’s Vladimir Putin doesn’t have a problem with destroying ISIS so long as doing so achieves his other goal: putting everyone else in his debt. He has a secondary goal he thought he could chiefly pursue in Eastern Europe, and attempted with Ukraine: he wants to split apart the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which he rightly sees as a counterbalance to check Russian aggression. Thanks to today’s Turkish attack on a Russian plane, and thanks to the West’s hands-off policy with regard to the conflict, Putin could theoretically use his war against ISIS as cover to bombard Turkish military targets, daring the West to get involved against him. Were he to do so, he’d set the precedent that NATO is no longer functional. Two birds, one war.

Israel. Israel’s position is the same it has always been: Israel is surrounded by radical Islamic enemies on every side. Whether Iranian-backed Hezbollah or Sunni Hamas and ISIS, Israel is the focus of hate for all of these groups. Ironically, the rise of Iran has unified Israel with its neighbors in Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. All three of those countries, however, can’t stand firmly against ISIS.

All of which means that the only country capable of filling the vacuum would be the United States. Just as in 1991, a major Sunni power is on the move against American interests – but unlike in 1991, no viable option existed for leaving the current regime in power. And the US’ insistence upon the help of ground allies is far too vague. Who should those allies be, occupying ISIS-free ISISland?

The Kurds have no interest in a Syrian incursion. Turkish troops movements into ISIS-land will prompt Iranian intervention. Iranian intervention into ISIS-land would prompt higher levels of support for Sunni resistance. ISIS-land without ISIS is like Iraq without Saddam Hussein: in the absence of solidifying force, chaos breaks out. From that chaos, the most organized force takes power. Russia hopes that should it destroy ISIS, Assad will simply retain power; that may be the simplest solution, although it certainly will not end the war within the country. There are no good answers.

Barack Obama’s dithering for years led to this. Had he lent his support in any strong way to one side, a solution might be possible. Now, it’s not.