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The War on ISIS: More Than One Battle

October 23, 2014

The War on ISIS: More Than One Battle, Wall Street Journal,  Max Boot, October 22, 2014

Kobani no longer looks to be in imminent danger of falling. It is even possible that ISIS will give up the fight and pull out. If this happens, it will certainly be good news. The remaining residents of Kobani would be saved from slaughter and their relief would give a moral boost to anti-ISIS efforts. But any celebration should be muted. Winning at Kobani will be no more devastating to ISIS than was the American victory at Khe Sanh to North Vietnam.

The problem is that ISIS can readily replace the fighters it loses in Kobani, and heavy weapons are not essential to its guerrilla style of warfare. Even as ISIS is losing a little ground at Kobani, it is gaining strength elsewhere.

Only 12 U.S. advisory teams have been deployed and only at the brigade level. The other 14 Iraqi brigades identified by the U.S. as “reliable partners” have no advisers at all. None of these advisers, moreover, is allowed to accompany Iraqi troops into combat, where they can be most effective. The U.S. also is not stepping in to offer direct assistance and training to the Sunnis of Anbar Province to allow them to fight back against ISIS, as they did against al Qaeda in Iraq in 2007-08.

Through the limited application of air power—a mere handful of daily strikes—the U.S. may achieve tactical progress to blunt ISIS’s momentum. But Khe Sanh showed the limits of tactical military victories if they are not married to larger strategic gains—and those are elusive in Iraq and Syria today

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On Jan. 21, 1968, North Vietnamese troops attacked the U.S. Marine garrison at Khe Sanh in South Vietnam near the border with Laos. A 77-day siege ensued, with the U.S. pouring in ever more firepower. The U.S. would drop 100,000 tons of bombs because Gen. William Westmoreland was determined that Khe Sanh not become another defeat like Dien Bien Phu, which had effectively ended France’s colonial presence in Vietnam 14 years earlier.

And it didn’t. Eventually the siege was relieved and the attacking forces melted away, having suffered more than 5,000 fatalities (while the defenders lost about 350 men).

Today, no one except some veterans and military historians remembers Khe Sanh because in the end it had scant strategic significance: Even though the U.S. won the battle, it lost the war. Not long after having “liberated” Khe Sanh, the U.S. dismantled the base because it served little purpose.

This history is worth mentioning because of the parallels, limited and inexact to be sure, between Khe Sanh and Kobani, a Kurdish town in northern Syria. Jihadist forces of Islamic State, also known as ISIS, have been besieging Kobani for weeks, and the U.S. has been ramping up efforts to prevent the town from falling. U.S. airstrikes have apparently taken a heavy toll, eliminating ISIS fighters, artillery, armored vehicles and other heavy weapons. Airstrikes have now been joined by airdrops of weapons and ammunition to the Kurdish defenders. Turkey, which had hitherto not lifted a finger to save Kobani, announced Monday that it would allow Iraqi Kurdish fighters to traverse Turkish territory to join in defending the town.

Kobani no longer looks to be in imminent danger of falling. It is even possible that ISIS will give up the fight and pull out. If this happens, it will certainly be good news. The remaining residents of Kobani would be saved from slaughter and their relief would give a moral boost to anti-ISIS efforts. But any celebration should be muted. Winning at Kobani will be no more devastating to ISIS than was the American victory at Khe Sanh to North Vietnam.

The problem is that ISIS can readily replace the fighters it loses in Kobani, and heavy weapons are not essential to its guerrilla style of warfare. Even as ISIS is losing a little ground at Kobani, it is gaining strength elsewhere.

Its fighters are advancing in Anbar Province with little resistance. They are poised on the outskirts of Baghdad; soon they may be within mortar range of Baghdad International Airport, whose closure would be a disaster. On Monday alone, its car bombs and suicide bombers in Baghdad and Karbala claimed at least 33 lives, a day after a suicide bomber in Baghdad killed at least 28 people in a Shiite mosque. The pattern is reminiscent of the terrorist atrocities perpetrated in 2006 by al Qaeda in Iraq, ISIS’s predecessor, aimed at rallying Sunnis to the terrorists’ side by provoking a civil war with Shiites.

As in those dark days, Sunni extremism is provoking an equally extreme response from Iranian-backed Shiites. The replacement of Nouri al-Maliki as Iraq’s prime minister with Haidar al-Abadi, an apparently less sectarian Shiite, was a small step in the right direction for which the Obama administration deserves credit. But there is little reason to think the Iranian hold over a substantial portion of the Iraqi state has been broken.

The Iraqi Parliament has approved ministers to run the two security ministries—Interior and Defense. While the Defense pick is Sunni technocrat Khalid al-Obedi, the Interior pick is far more worrisome: Mohammed Salem al-Ghabban is a member of the Badr Organization, one of the chief Iranian-backed Shiite militias that is further destabilizing Iraq with attacks on Sunni neighborhoods. The likelihood is that Mr. Ghabban will take orders from his ultimate sponsor, Gen. Qasem Suleimani, head of Iran’s Quds Force.

This means that the Interior Ministry, in charge of Iraq’s police forces, will become, if it is not already, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Shiite militias and their Iranian string-pullers. This happened in 2006 when the Iraqi police became notorious for kidnapping and torturing Sunnis. This helped bring Iraq to the brink of all-out civil war and will do so again if not checked.

The only way to counteract the Iranian capture of the Interior Ministry is to bolster the Iraqi army as an independent fighting force, but there is little sign of this occurring. Shiite sectarians have also deeply penetrated the army and the U.S. has little ability to counteract this insidious development because President Obama will not send a large number of “embedded” advisers to work alongside army units that remain more professional and less politicized.

Only 12 U.S. advisory teams have been deployed and only at the brigade level. The other 14 Iraqi brigades identified by the U.S. as “reliable partners” have no advisers at all. None of these advisers, moreover, is allowed to accompany Iraqi troops into combat, where they can be most effective. The U.S. also is not stepping in to offer direct assistance and training to the Sunnis of Anbar Province to allow them to fight back against ISIS, as they did against al Qaeda in Iraq in 2007-08.

In Syria the U.S. is also doing little to oppose the Assad dictatorship, leaving it free to continue attacks on areas held by moderate militias affiliated with the Free Syrian Army. This, too, is feeding the radicalization of Syria and Iraq by convincing many Sunnis, rightly or wrongly, that the U.S. is acquiescing to Iranian regional domination—and that ISIS is the only reliable defender that Sunnis have. That impression will be strengthened if the Obama administration reaches a deal with Iran next month that will allow Tehran to maintain its capacity to develop a nuclear weapon.

Through the limited application of air power—a mere handful of daily strikes—the U.S. may achieve tactical progress to blunt ISIS’s momentum. But Khe Sanh showed the limits of tactical military victories if they are not married to larger strategic gains—and those are elusive in Iraq and Syria today.

Categories: Air strikes, Baghdad, Combat troops, Intelligence, Iraq, Iraqi military, Islamic State, Obama, Syria
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Uncertain Future for Kobane Prisoners: Turkey’s Border War (Dispatch 3)

October 21, 2014

Uncertain Future for Kobane Prisoners: Turkey’s Border War (Dispatch 3), You Tube, Vice News, October 20, 2014

 

Categories: Air strikes, Islamic State, Kobani, Kurdish fighters, Kurds, Syria, Turkey
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What do Kobani airdrops mean for regional politics?

October 21, 2014

What do Kobani airdrops mean for regional politics? Al-Monitor, Amberin Zaman, October 20, 2014

Smoke and flames rise over Syrian town of Kobani after an airstrikeSmoke and flames rise over the Syrian town of Kobani after an airstrike, as seen from the Mursitpinar crossing on the Turkish-Syrian border in the southeastern town of Suruc, Oct. 20, 2014. The United States told Turkey that a US military airdrop of arms to Syrian Kurds battling the Islamic State in Kobani was a response to a crisis situation and did not represent a change in US policy. (photo by REUTERS/Kai Pfaffenbach

The US will use its new leverage over the PYD to push the Kurds to engage with factions opposed to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, particularly the Free Syrian Army. The YPG’s existing battleground alliance with various rebel factions will, therefore, probably expand.

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On Oct. 19, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that it had conducted multiple airdrops near the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobani, which has remained under siege by Islamic State (IS) fighters for more than a month. CENTCOM said US C-13 cargo planes had made multiple drops of arms, ammunition, and medical supplies provided by Kurdish authorities in Iraq. The move is set to have a profound effect on regional balances between Turkey, the Kurds and the United States that will likely reverberate in Tehran and in Damascus as well.

For several weeks now, the US and its allies have been bombing IS positions around Kobani. But the delivery of weapons takes the de facto alliance between the Syrian Kurds and the United States to a new level.

Turkey, which borders Kobani, is best positioned to help the Syrian Kurds. But the country’s ruling Justice and Development (AKP) party has spurned repeated Syrian Kurdish demands to allow weapons and fighters to cross through Turkey into the Syrian Kurdish enclave. On Oct. 18, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), whose armed wing the People’s Protection Units (YPG) is battling IS in Kobani, were “the same as the PKK. “It’s a terrorist organization. It would be very, very wrong to expect us to openly say ‘yes’ to our NATO ally America to give this kind of [armed] support [to the PYD],” Erdogan declared.

Erdogan was referring to the PYD’s close links to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has been fighting on and off for self-rule inside Turkey since 1984. The PKK is on the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations, and until last month successive US administrations refused to have any contact either with the PKK or the PYD. But the PKK and the YPG’s effectiveness against IS both in Iraq and Syria has triggered a paradigm shift in US strategic thinking. The US and the Syrian Kurds are now allies in the war against IS.

US Secretary of State John Kerry told reporters in Jakarta, Indonesia that while the Obama administration understood Turkey’s concerns, it would have been “irresponsible” and “morally difficult” not to support the Syrian Kurds in their fight against IS.

Kerry said IS had chosen to “make this a ground battle, attacking a small group of people there who, while they are an offshoot group of the folks that our friends the Turks oppose, they are valiantly fighting ISIL and we cannot take our eye off the prize here.” Kerry stressed, however, that it was “a momentary effort” and that the US had “made it very clear” to Turkey that it “is not a shift in the policy of the United States.”

Kerry’s words came hours after US President Barack Obama spoke over the telephone with Erdogan about Kobani. News emerged soon after that Turkey would be allowing Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga fighters to cross through Turkey into Kobani carrying fresh weapons for the YPG. How in the space of 48 hours did Turkey go from calling the PYD terrorists to opening an arms corridor for them?

As analysts ponder these dizzying changes, here a few immediate factors to consider:

      1. Turkey could have led the effort to support anti-IS forces in Kobani by letting arms and fighters through its borders weeks ago. This would have bolstered the peace process between Turkey and its own Kurds, while averting the public relations disaster caused by images of Turkish tanks and soldiers looking on as the Syrian Kurds battled IS in Kobani, thereby reinforcing claims that “Turkey supports IS.

      2. The fact that Turkey was forced into opening a corridor to Kobani only after the US informed Ankara that it would go ahead with the airdrops anyway only increases doubts about Turkey’s commitment to working with its Western partners. It also plays into the hands of Erdogan’s domestic rivals, who will now say he is America’s poodle and that the US is using the PKK to tame Turkey.

      3. One big question is whether the recent days’ events mean that the PYD will move away from the PKK. The likely answer is that the PKK will seek to move closer to the US. The PKK has already established a channel of communication with the US via the PYD in Syria, and is also fighting alongside US-supported Kurdish peshmerga forces in Iraq. Any attempt to drive a wedge between the PYD and the PKK is doomed to fail. Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned founder and leader of their PKK, commands the loyalty of Syrian and Turkish Kurds alike.

      4. Any US-PKK dialogue would make the PKK less likely to resume violence against the Turkish army, as this would tarnish its burgeoning legitimacy. Turkey could yet turn the situation to its advantage and make goodwill gestures to the Syrian Kurds. These could include opening the sealed border with the PYD-controlled town of Serkaniye (Ras al Ain). The fact that US drones flew drone reconnaissance missions over Kobani out of the Incirlik air base has gone largely unnoticed in the media. So Turkey actually has helped, but chose not to advertise this.

      5. The Kurds adeptly used the media and global public opinion — which depicted them as the region’s secular, pro-Western force, a space formerly occupied by Turkey — to draw the US into the battle for Kobani. The battle for Kobani then became a symbol of the contest between IS and the coalition, one that the US could no longer afford to lose. Moreover, the concentration of IS forces around Kobani allowed the US to inflict heavy losses on IS fighters.

      6. Iraqi Kurdish President Massoud Barzani is probably unhappy about US engagement with the PYD/PKK, which he views as rivals. But, unlike Turkey, he has turned the situation to his own advantage by projecting himself as a benevolent leader who has aided fellow Kurds in their time of need.

      7. The US will use its new leverage over the PYD to push the Kurds to engage with factions opposed to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, particularly the Free Syrian Army. The YPG’s existing battleground alliance with various rebel factions will, therefore, probably expand.

      8. Is the de facto non-aggression pact between the Syrian regime and the Kurds coming unstuck? It’s too early to say, because the US insists that its military intervention in Syria is limited to countering IS. The Kurds are likely to continue to hedge their bets for as long as they can.

      9. And what of the PYD’s other primary benefactor, Iran? Will its friendship with the Americans anger the clerics? Much will depend on whether the US and Iran can reach a deal over Iran’s nuclear program. Should the talks fail, the PKK may become an instrument of US policy to be used against Iran.

      10. Any alliance in the Middle East should never be taken for granted.

 

Categories: Air strikes, Free Syrian Army, Iran, Iraq, Islamic State, Obama, Syria, Turkey
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Syria tribal revolt against Islamic State ignored, fueling resentment

October 21, 2014

Syria tribal revolt against Islamic State ignored, fueling resentment, Washington Post, Liz Sly, October 20, 2014

(Aside from responding to anticipated domestic political pressure after the (non-Islamic) Islamic State beheaded an American, what are we doing in Iraq and Syria and why? Are we trying to win hearts and minds, to maintain the semblance of a coalition of the unwilling or merely to do “something?” — DM)

“When you see your relatives being slaughtered, you will be forced to accept compromises you would otherwise never have been prepared to accept,” he said. “And when you see the world has abandoned you, you will do nothing about it.”

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REYHANLI, Turkey — The cost of turning against the Islamic State was made brutally apparent in the streets of a dusty backwater town in eastern Syria in early August. Over a three-day period, vengeful fighters shelled, beheaded, crucified and shot hundreds of members of the Shaitat tribe after they dared to rise up against the extremists.

By the time the killing stopped, 700 people were dead, activists and survivors say, making this the bloodiest single atrocity committed by the Islamic State in Syria since it declared its existence 18 months ago.

The little-publicized story of this failed tribal revolt in Abu Hamam, in Syria’s eastern Deir al-Zour province, illuminates the challenges that will confront efforts to persuade those living under Islamic State rule — in Iraq as well as Syria — to join the fight against the jihadist group, something U.S. officials say is essential if the campaign against the militants is to succeed.

The Abu Hamam area has now been abandoned, and many of the bodies remain uncollected, offering a chilling reminder to residents elsewhere of the fate that awaits those who dare rebel.

Just as powerful a message for those living under the militants’ iron fist was the almost complete international silence on the bloodbath.

(Please go to the link for a video — DM)

The fiercest fighting in days shook the Syrian border town of Kobane, forcing more refugees to pour into Turkey for shelter from the violence. (Reuters)

News of the massacre coincided with President Obama’s decision to order airstrikes to turn back an Islamic State advance unfolding farther east in Iraq, toward the Kurdish regional capital of Irbil, as well as humanitarian airdrops to help desperate Iraqi Yazidis trapped on a mountain by the onslaught.

Many Syrians in the opposition are starting to complain about unequal treatment.

U.S. warplanes have carried out more airstrikes on Islamic State forces besieging the Kurdish town of Kobane on Syria’s border with Turkey than on any other single location in Iraq or Syria. And Washington announced Sunday that U.S. planes had airdropped weapons and medical supplies to the beleaguered Kurdish fighters there.

Yet even now, Washington has directed little effort toward helping Sunni Arabs who want to fight the militants but lack the resources to do so, said Abu Salem, who was among the Shaitat tribesman and rebel commanders who gathered recently in an apartment in the Turkish border town of Reyhanli to recount the killings of their clansmen.

“We saw what the Americans did to help the Yazidis and the Kurds. But they have done nothing to help the Sunnis against the Islamic State,” he said.

Abu Salem and the other men said they did not so much begrudge the efforts to help Kurds as wonder why no one had helped them when their community was under attack. The carnage inflicted on the Shaitat tribe has instilled in the Abu Hamam survivors a loathing for the Islamic State and the warped brand of Islamist politics for which it stands, said Abu Siraj, another of the tribesmen. A former lawyer, he, like most of the men, asked to be identified only by his nom de guerre because he fears being tracked even to Turkey by the jihadists.

“Now we hate everyone who prays,” he said. “Now we hate even beards.”

But finding support for efforts to organize against the militants is proving hard, he said, pulling out his mobile phone to show a photograph released that day of the trussed, decapitated body of a friend who had purportedly been caught attempting to throw a hand grenade against them.

“When you see your relatives being slaughtered, you will be forced to accept compromises you would otherwise never have been prepared to accept,” he said. “And when you see the world has abandoned you, you will do nothing about it.”

U.S. officials say the Kobane attacks were not intended to show preference for one community over another, but rather served as an opportunity to take aim at the large number of militant fighters who converged on the town to capture it. The Pentagon claims to have killed hundreds of Islamic State militants around Kobane, in keeping with the wider U.S. goal of targeting the Islamists’ infrastructure and resources in Syria to downgrade their ability to reinforce and finance their operations in Iraq.

The primary focus of the American strategy, Gen. Lloyd Austin, the U.S. Central Command leader, stressed last week, remains on Iraq, and on preventing the Islamic State from projecting power there.

“Iraq is our main effort, and it has to be,” he said at a news conference in Washington. “And the things we are doing right now in Syria are being done primarily to shape the conditions in Iraq.”

Such comments have reinforced perceptions among Syrians that the U.S.-led air war does not have their interests at heart. Differences over the purposes and direction of the war risk alienating the many rebel groups that were engaged in battling the Islamic State before the U.S. government intervened, said Steven Heydemann of the U.S. Institute of Peace.

“It’s already become an impediment,” he said. “I don’t think the administration has fully taken on board how much damage the way they’ve conducted this campaign has done to the relationships they’ve developed with some of these actors.”

‘We were finished’

The Sunni areas of Syria occupied by the Islamic State would seem to be a more likely venue for a revolt than Iraq, where the extremists’ extensive territorial gains this year were aided by local Sunni insurgents and tribes alienated by the discriminatory behavior of the Shiite-led Iraqi government.

In Syria, however, the Islamic State’s conquests came at the expense of local rebels who already had fought to eject their government and then found themselves outgunned and outmaneuvered by the newly emerging Islamist extremists.

The Shaitat tribe, along with many others in the oil-rich province of Deir al-Zour bordering Iraq, spent much of this year battling to retain control of their area against encroachments by the Islamic State, and they might have prevailed had the Islamic State not swept into the Iraqi city of Mosul in June, rebels say. The vast amounts of U.S. weaponry the Islamic State captured were trundled across the rapidly dissolving border with Syria, said Abu Salem, who commanded a rebel battalion in the area before he escaped to Turkey.

“After they took Mosul, we were finished,” he said.

Abu Hamam and a cluster of villages nearby were targeted. After the new armaments from Iraq arrived, “we realized we had no hope. We were surrounded. We wanted to save our people,” said Abu Abdullah, another of the Shaitat fighters, describing how they agreed to a truce with the militants in mid-July.

The Islamic State was permitted to enter the town and establish a garrison, but local leaders were left in charge, he said.

Relations quickly frayed. The crunch came, the tribesmen in Reyhanli said, when Islamic State fighters whipped a local man who was caught smoking a cigarette in the street, a crime under the Islamic State’s harsh interpretation of Islam. The man’s brother, incensed, shot at a passing Islamic State patrol, killing one of its fighters.

The brother was arrested and publicly beheaded, triggering an outpouring of rage. Residents marched on the Islamic State’s headquarters, forcing its fighters to flee. The militants then brought in reinforcements and began shelling the town, using artillery they had captured the previous month in Iraq.

After a three-day barrage, the Islamic State militants moved in. They rounded up all the surviving men and boys older than 15 they could find and set about systematically killing them, the fighters in Reyhanli said.

A photo essay on an Islamic State blog boasted of the different ways tribesmen were killed, including beheadings, mass shootings and a crucifixion. A video shows how the militants lined up scores of captives on a road, their hands bound, then set about clumsily decapitating them, one by one. The executioners, speaking in Tunisian, Egyptian and Saudi accents, taunted those not yet dead by swinging severed heads in front of their faces and telling them, “It’s your turn next.”

The tribesmen in Reyhanli, like many other rebel fighters in Deir al-Zour now living in Turkey or elsewhere in Syria, said they managed to slip away using fake identity cards or escape routes honed during their battle against the government.

They said they are plotting their return, to take revenge and fight — without counting on international support.

“We are tribal people. We will never forget to avenge,” said Abu Salem, the commander of the group. “But we will do it by ourselves, in our own way. We won’t take any help from anyone.”

Categories: Air strikes, Caliphate, Iraq, Iraqi military, Islamic State, Kurdish fighters, Kurds, Obama, Syria, Turkey
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Fiercest fighting in days hits Syrian border town

October 19, 2014

Fiercest fighting in days hits Syrian border town, Reuters, Humeyra Pamuk, October 19, 2014

(Islam is the religion of peace. The (non-Islamic) Islamic State recruits Islamists who then engage in violence because of Israeli intransigence when ordered to commit suicide; thus spake Ubermench Zarathustra Secretary Kerry. — DM)

Smoke rises over the Syrian town of KobaniSmoke rises over the Syrian town of Kobani after an airstrike, as seen from the Turkish-Syrian border in the southeastern town of Suruc, October 19, 2014.

The fiercest fighting in days shook the Syrian border town of Kobani overnight as Islamic State fighters attacked Kurdish defenders with mortars and car bombs, sources in the town and a monitoring group said on Sunday.

Islamic State, which controls much of Syria and Iraq, fired 44 mortars at Kurdish parts of the town on Saturday and some of the shells fell inside nearby Turkey, according to the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. It said four more mortars were fired on Sunday.

The month-long battle for Kobani has ebbed and flowed. A week ago, Kurds said the town would soon fall. The United States and its coalition partners then stepped up air strikes on Islamic State, which wants to take Kobani in order to strengthen its position in northern Syria.

The coalition has been bombing Islamic State targets in Iraq since August and extended the campaign to Syria in September after Islamic State, a group that espouses a rigid interpretation of Islam and initially fought Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces, made huge territorial gains.

Raids on Islamic State around Kobani have been stepped up, with the fate of the town seen as an important test for U.S. President Barack Obama’s campaign against the Islamists.

NATO member Turkey, whose forces are ranged along the border overlooking Kobani, is reluctant to intervene. It insists the allies should also confront Assad to end Syria’s civil war, which has killed close to 200,000 people since March 2011.

“We had the most intense clashes in days, perhaps a week, last night. (Islamic State) attacked from three different sides including the municipality building and the market place,” said Abdulrahman Gok, a journalist in Kobani.

“Clashes did not stop until the morning. We have had an early morning walk inside the city and have seen lots of damaged cars on the streets and unexploded mortar shells,” he said.

CAR BOMBS

The Observatory reported two Islamic State car bombs hit Kurdish positions on Saturday evening, leading to casualties. A cloud of black smoke towered over Kobani on Sunday.

A fighter from one of the female units of the main Syrian Kurdish militia in Kobani, YPG, said Kurdish fighters were able to detonate the car bombs before they reached their targets.

“Last night there were clashes all across Kobani … this morning the clashes are still ongoing,” she said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The Observatory said 70 Islamic State fighters had been killed in the past two days, according to sources at the hospital in the nearby town of Tel Abyab, where Islamic State bodies are taken. Reuters cannot independently confirm the reports due to security restrictions.

The Observatory said some Syrian Arab fighters from the Revolutionaries of Raqqa Brigade, who are fighting alongside Kurdish fighters, had executed two Islamic State captives.

“One was a child of around 15 years old. They shot them in the head,” he said.

Islamic State have also used executions throughout their campaigns in Syria and Iraq, killing hundreds of enemy combatants and civilians who oppose their cause, according to Islamic State videos and statements.

Welat Omer, a doctor caring for the few remaining civilians in Kobani, told Reuters by telephone that he was looking after 15 patients, including children and the elderly.

“We need medicine, including antibiotics and milk for the children, and medicine for the elderly, who have heart conditions, diabetes and high blood pressure,” Omer said.

Hundreds of thousands have fled Islamic State’s advance. Turkey hosts about 1.5 million Syrian refugees, including almost 200,000 Syrian Kurds from Kobani.

Ankara has refused to rearm beleaguered Kurdish fighters, who complain they are at huge disadvantage in the face of Islamic State’s weaponry, much of it seized from the Iraqi military when the militants took the city of Mosul in June.

Turkey views the YPG with suspicion for its long-standing links with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has waged a 30-year armed campaign for self-rule in Turkey.

President Tayyip Erdogan was quoted in the Turkish media on Sunday as saying Ankara will never arm the YPG through its political wing, the PYD.

“There has been talk of arming the PYD to establish a front here against Islamic State. For us, the PYD is the same as the PKK, it’s a terrorist organization,” he was quoted as saying.

This stance has sparked outrage among Turkey’s own Kurds, who make up about 20 percent of the population. Riots in several cities earlier this month killed left than 35 people dead.

In a call with Erdogan on Saturday night, Obama expressed appreciation for Turkey hosting over a million refugees, including thousands from Kobani.

“The two leaders pledged to continue to work closely together to strengthen cooperation against ISIL (Islamic State),” the White House said.

Obama’s approach to Islamic State has drawn fire from his political opponents at home.

“We have dropped a bomb here and a missile there, but it has been a photo-op foreign policy,” U.S. Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, a Republican and a potential presidential candidate in 2016, said on CNN’s “State of the Union” show.

He criticized Obama for delays in aiding Kurdish fighters in desperate need of weapons and assistance.

Categories: Air strikes, Iraq, Islamic State, Kobani, Middle East, Syria, Turkey, Urban areas
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Peshmerga head speaks of struggle against IS

October 18, 2014

Peshmerga head speaks of struggle against IS, Al-Monitor, Faraj Obaji, October 17, 2014

Kurdish peshmerga fighters stand guard around vehicles left behind by fleeing Islamic State militants during clashes in the al-Zerga area near Tikrit cityKurdish peshmerga fighters stand guard around vehicles with weapons and ammunition left behind by fleeing Islamic State militants during clashes in the al-Zerga area near Tikrit city in Salahuddin province, Oct. 8, 2014. (photo by REUTERS)

Commenting on the criticism of certain Kurdish parties inside Kobani, regarding the lack of support provided by KRG to the besieged city, he said, “Despite the differences with certain Kurdish political parties in the city, the KRG expressed its readiness to support our brothers in the city and we asked Washington and its allies to help the resisting Kurdish fighters.

“We helped them as much as possible, and the KRG’s president affirmed this. But, we cannot offer more. We are still waiting for international aid. The region initially includes 5 million people, add to that one and a half million displaced from Syria and the Iraqi provinces. We are helping them and taking care of them, and this is a huge burden.”

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Eliminating the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq does not seem to be an easy mission that will happen anytime soon; it seems rather impossible. The terrorist attacks against Iraq exposed how weak the Iraqi army is, how fragile its military structure and intelligence services are, and how it is unable to protect its country against any attack.

Some believe that the responsibility of the army’s failure to fight IS should be borne by the political authority ruling the country since 2004, which was unable to build an army based on a unified doctrine. Others consider the policies adopted by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki faulty and the maliciousness allowed the terrorist group to enter the country, while the political conflicts between the central government and the Sunni leaderships provided an embracing environment for the group in Sunni provinces.

Secretary-General of the Ministry of Peshmerga Lt. Gen. Jabbar Yawar spoke to An-Nahar regarding the situation in Iraq in general, and in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in particular, in light of the IS threat, which occupied a number of Iraqi provinces, reaching the besieged Kobani.

The peshmerga harasses IS

The Kurdish military leader welcomed the international aid provided to the KRG, which is fighting a crucial battle against IS. He said, “The military aid which reached KRG saved it from falling into the hands of the terrorist group and allowed peshmerga forces to move from the negative defense position to the striker position, inflicting heavy losses on IS.”

Yawar does not hesitate to say, “The peshmerga forces’ position in the fight against IS is much better than the Iraqi army’s position. We are in a continuous fight along the 1,050-kilometer [650-mile] border of five Iraqi provinces, starting from Mosul to Erbil and passing through Kirkuk, Saladin and Diyala.”

He said, “The peshmerga forces have liberated the Mosul Dam and continues to liberate the rest of the regions that have fallen into the hands of IS, while creating plans to completely achieve this.”

The fall of Mosul and Anbar

Yawar attributed the fall of Mosul and Anbar to several reasons, most importantly, the fragility of the army in both provinces. He said, “The army in Mosul was fragile, and its six military units failed to withstand IS. There were also the political conflicts between the Sunni blocs and the government in Baghdad, which prevented these forces from fighting IS in Mosul, Saladin and parts of Kirkuk. These forces either handed over their advanced and heavy weapons to the group and fled, or joined and began to fight alongside IS.”

“The lack of a unified fighting doctrine among the army, and the shortage of air support, were all elements that contributed in the army’s quick collapse and IS’ occupation of a number of Iraqi provinces, especially the Sunni ones,” he said.

The difficulty in liberating Sunni regions

On the subject of the army’s situation in provinces in general, Yawar said that he found “a certain difficulty in liberating the Sunni-dominated regions from IS, such as Anbar, Saladin and Mosul, especially after it fell into the hands of the terrorists who took over its weapons on June 10.” He said that although they used all available means, the Iraqi forces were unable to liberate the city of Heet in Anbar and Tikrit, the center of Saladin province. “The situation on the field unfortunately proves that IS only controls the Sunni-dominated regions. We hope that our Sunni brothers, who are suffering the group’s injustice, will cooperate with the federal government and the KRG in order to eliminate this terrorist group,” he explained.

How did IS reach Erbil’s borders?

When asked how IS was able to reach KRG even though its intentions to occupy the region were obvious, Yawar answered with regret: “We knew before the group attacked Mosul on June 10 that it was up to no good in Iraq and Mosul. We were alerted by the joint committees and meetings that we used to hold in Baghdad, that there were some suspicious and dangerous movements on the borders with Syria. We were advised to strike them at an early stage, but we did not listen. The federal government and its former prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, believed our proposals were political outbidding. Even when IS attacked Mosul, we asked them to allow us to support the federal forces there, but they told us that they were able to fight back themselves. Then Mosul fell, its residents fled and, due to Maliki’s faulty policy, IS was able to reach Baghdad’s borders.”

When asked why the terrorist group was able to reach Erbil, Yawar said, “When IS’ attack began, the peshmerga fought with all its strength, but it does not own advanced weapons such as the ones the group took from Mosul, because Maliki’s government never reinforced, trained or funded the peshmerga forces, although they are official governmental forces, according to the federal constitution.

“Despite all this, the peshmerga withstood IS from June 10 until the beginning of August. However, when we ran out of munitions and had no source of getting any, the group was able to penetrate our defense and move toward Erbil. Yet, thanks to Washington’s assistance and some of the countries participating in the international alliance, we were able to change the negative defense equation in Erbil and attack IS to liberate our lands,” he said.

Baghdad will not fall

The Kurdish leader ruled out the possibility of Baghdad falling for the time being, according to the available security data. “Until now, the Iraqi army can protect Baghdad and prevent the penetration of IS, which has spread in neighboring regions, such as Amiriya, Fallujah, Saqlawiyah and Ramadi,” he said.

We helped Kobani as much as we could

Commenting on the criticism of certain Kurdish parties inside Kobani, regarding the lack of support provided by KRG to the besieged city, he said, “Despite the differences with certain Kurdish political parties in the city, the KRG expressed its readiness to support our brothers in the city and we asked Washington and its allies to help the resisting Kurdish fighters.

“We helped them as much as possible, and the KRG’s president affirmed this. But, we cannot offer more. We are still waiting for international aid. The region initially includes 5 million people, add to that one and a half million displaced from Syria and the Iraqi provinces. We are helping them and taking care of them, and this is a huge burden.”

Yawar said, “The region has not been able to help Kobani like it should, due to its tough and complex geographic location, as it is 300 kilometers [185 miles] from the Syrian border, and it’s hard for aid to reach it. Kobani’s situation is geographically similar to Gaza or Sinjar.”

Raids

Yawar is not afraid that IS, which he believes is an extension of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, will persist. He said, “The situation in Iraq and Syria today is similar to that of Tora Bora and Afghanistan. The airstrikes are beneficial for the peshmerga, Kobani and even for the Iraqi government, as they halt the advance of IS militants and drain them. These strikes also destroy IS warehouses and heavy weapons. But, to free these areas completely from IS, a comprehensive international operation should be put in place, like the one in Afghanistan, and there should be an actual training campaign for the Iraqi forces to defend themselves. However, I rule out the possibility of a foreign land intervention in Iraq, with the existing conflict between the ruling political parties.”

No Kurdish expansion

Political circles have been talking about a Kurdish expansion in an attempt to build the awaited state. In this regard, Yawar says, “We are part of the federal state, and neither of us expands into the other’s territories. Until now, there aren’t any official international borders between us and the federal state. We have some problems in many regions administratively. But the KRG and Baghdad are both facing IS threat. We should destroy it first, then resort to the constitution to solve the pending problems with the Baghdad government regarding the land, oil, the budget and Peshmerga.”

 

Categories: Air strikes, Baghdad, Iraq, Iraqi military, Islamic State, Kobani, Kurdish fighters, Kurds, Syria, Turkey
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It’s official: U.S. will build new Syrian rebel force to battle Islamic State

October 16, 2014

It’s official: U.S. will build new Syrian rebel force to battle Islamic State, McClatchy DC, Hannah Allam, October 15, 2014

(Phase Two of “Operation We Got It Wrong Again.” Will Kurds or newbies be supplied, equipped and trained? By whom will the “moderates” be vetted and trained? By now focusing on the Syrian political opposition, will we be distancing ourselves from Assad’s supporter Iran?– DM)

Airstrike KobaniSmoke rises following an airstrike by US-led coalition aircraft in Kobani, Syria, during fighting between Syrian Kurds and the militants of Islamic State group, Oct. 9, 2014. (AP Photo/Lefteris Pitarakis)

This time, Allen said, the United States and its allies will work to strengthen the political opposition and make sure it’s tied to “a credible field force” that will have undergone an intense vetting process.

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WASHINGTON — John Allen, the retired Marine general in charge of coordinating the U.S.-led coalition’s response to the Islamic State, confirmed Wednesday what Syrian rebel commanders have complained about for months – that the United States is ditching the old Free Syrian Army and building its own local ground force to use primarily in the fight against the Islamist extremists.

“At this point, there is not formal coordination with the FSA,” Allen told reporters at the State Department.

That was perhaps the bluntest answer yet to the question of how existing Syrian rebel forces might fit into the U.S. strategy to fight the Islamic State. Allen said the United States’ intent is to start from scratch in creating a home-grown, moderate counterweight to the Islamic State.

For most of the three years of the Syrian conflict, the U.S. ground game hinged on rebel militias that are loosely affiliated under the banner of the Free Syrian Army, or FSA. Their problems were no secret: a lack of cohesion, uneven fighting skills and frequent battlefield coordination with the al Qaida loyalists of the Nusra Front.

This time, Allen said, the United States and its allies will work to strengthen the political opposition and make sure it’s tied to “a credible field force” that will have undergone an intense vetting process.

“It’s not going to happen immediately,” Allen said. “We’re working to establish the training sites now, and we’ll ultimately go through a vetting process and beginning to bring the trainers and the fighters in to begin to build that force out.”

The Syrian arena is important, Allen said, but to the U.S., “the emergency in Iraq right now is foremost in our thinking.” There will be a simultaneous training-and-equipping campaign for Iraq, where the U.S.-trained military collapsed during the Islamic State’s summer offensive.

Allen said the new training program is “for those elements of the Iraqi national security forces that will have to be refurbished and then put back into the field,” with the ultimate goal of reclaiming Iraqi territories seized by the Islamic State.

Allen sounded confident that the United States and its allies could juggle two massive training efforts even as the Islamic State has shown itself to be resilient under weeks of coalition airstrikes.

“We have the capacity to do both, and there is significant coalition interest in participating in both,” Allen said of the twin force-building efforts in Iraq and Syria.

But, as he stressed repeatedly in his remarks, “it’s going to take a while.”

Ahmad Tomeh, who was just re-elected prime minister of the Syrian opposition’s interim government, told McClatchy that Allen met six leaders of the political opposition during his trip to Istanbul last week, but had no talks with any of the ground commanders, including the vetted, trained commanders the U.S. has been supporting. They asked for increased help, Tomeh said, but got no commitment.

Categories: Air strikes, Combat troops, Free Syrian Army, Iraq, Islamic State, Kurdish fighters, Obama, Syria, Turkey, U.S. Military
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How to defeat Islamic State’s war machine

October 15, 2014

How to defeat Islamic State’s war machine, Al-Monitor, Metin Turcan, October 14, 2014

(Which team is the “junior varsity?”

The article suggests the obvious need for close air support using trained ground forces to guide aircraft to strike useful targets. The U.S. has trained “boots” capable of doing that, but Obama continues to assert that the U.S. will have no ground combat presence in Iraq or Syria. U.S. spotters would need be in combat areas, would be targeted by Islamic State forces and would therefore need to engage in combat. Non-U.S. target spotters, in addition to needing substantial technical training, would also need to be capable of communicating with aircraft pilots. In many if not most case, spotters capable of communicating in English would be needed. –DM)

Although much has been written to explain the tactical military successes of the Islamic State (IS), there has not yet been a comprehensive assessment of how, since June 2014, IS has managed to rule over terrain larger than Lebanon to include 8 million Iraqis and Syrians.

How has it been possible that in a short three months IS has been able to control extensive terrain, with 3,000 IS fighters capturing Mosul, which was guarded by 30,000 Iraqi soldiers, and after seizing Mosul on June 10 engage in battles two days later with Iraqi forces in towns north of Baghdad, 230 miles from Mosul?

Although one can allude to the delayed reaction of the international community, the lack of strong military opposition to IS, the international support IS has acquired and the support from Sunni tribes and political bodies in areas it captures, none of it defies the reality that — at the tactical level — IS is an extremely lethal and effective war machine. To understand this key determinant of IS gains, one has to understand that reality. This article will attempt to analyze the factors contributing to IS’ military efficiency, particularly at the tactical level.

Factors that boost tactical effectiveness of IS can be summarized as fluid and decentralized command and control structure; novel hybrid military tactics blending conventional warfare with terrorist tactics; effective use of armored platforms in offensive operations; dispersion; preservation of momentum at all costs; effective exploitation of topographic and human terrains; simplicity and flexibility in planning; and conducting operations and high levels of initiative and morale.

Fluid and decentralized command control structure

IS does not have permanent and centralized command and control structure in the traditional sense of warfare. Unlike contemporary armies of the world, IS doesn’t make sharp distinctions between strategic, operative and tactical levels. In their traditional warfare, tactical achievements is the way to achieve strategic objectives. For IS, the basic goal is to score tactical successes and expand on them step by step. Deviating from the traditional approach, what IS fields is a bottom-up command structure focused on a fast pace for small military achievements. At the moment, US-led airstrikes have been mostly against IS communication and training facilities. It is extraordinary that there is not a single control facility that has been hit by allied airstrikes.

IS warfare combines and hybridizes terrorist tactics, urban guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare.

IS is adept enough to conduct armor attacks at night and is skilled in accurate firing of their main tank guns with thermal cameras, and is capable of planting improvised explosive devices in critical areas and routes. It wages hybridized guerrilla warfare and conventional armored warfare by deploying eight to 10 men teams carrying out building-by-building, block-by-block clear and hold operations in urban terrain.

After the recent air attacks, IS has dispersed its forces to the extreme. Its teams have been minimized to two or three vehicles and eight to 10 men. Their concealment has been highly professional. IS’ executive orders are brief, setting out what the mission is in simple terms, leaving how it is to be carried out to field units.

It is imperative to acknowledge that a typical IS militant is endowed with a win-win mindset that assures him that to kill in jihad is a blessing, but if he is martyred he will end up in paradise also. No wonder IS combatants are high-adrenalin fighters who can kill and get killed without hesitation.

A typical IS operation goes like this: An IS armored unit of tanks or a mobile unit of eight to 12 fighters with two to three vehicles are informed by WhatsApp, a message on Facebook or Twitter or phone text message, and if this mode is not available through their own radio net, to assemble at a certain place at a certain time. This is the first time we are seeing combat units making use of social media in combat operations. Before its operations, IS disseminates propaganda messages via social media to enemy fighters and civilians living in the targeted urban settlements to demoralize and dishearten them. IS operations and logistics units that are thus alerted assemble at a meeting point within two to three hours, and after another 1 ½ hours of coordination discussions and logistics preparations the operation is underway.

One must remember that a regular IS tank driver is trained to drive his tank at night with a thermal camera, and that the commander of the team has enough tactical military knowledge to best deploy his tanks. Then it is a matter of attacking the enemy’s weakest point, preferably after the morning prayers. Vehicles stage the first phase of the attacks, followed by infantry attacks that depend on the nature of the enemy’s opposition. In these attacks, IS has been remarkably successful in creating a balance between the phased campaign design and maintaining the tempo of warfare. The high tempo of combat is routine for an IS fighter, but usually too high for opposing soldiers.

How to defeat IS?

How to first stop IS and then defeat it? The secret is in a concept that has so far been lacking the forces fighting IS in Syria and Iraq: Close air support that can only be provided by intense cooperation between ground troops and air units. Coalition air attacks so far are at least limiting IS advances; close cooperation between ground forces and armed helicopters such as AH-64 or fixed-wing platforms such as A-10 Thunderbolts can enable full integration of each air mission with fire and movement of ground forces, and bring the end to IS.

The question then becomes how the US-led coalition can provide that level of air support, and who has the substantial technical know-how and military expertise needed on the ground.

We know special forces elements of countries contributing to the coalition are participating in operations to provide precision target guiding with laser pointers. But this has been limited. Then what can be the solution?

Either the local forces fighting against IS will have to learn this technique that requires high military expertise, or special detachments formed by countries contributing to the coalition will be assigned to each combat zone or to major units as a close air support coordinator. It is no surprise then that the hottest topic in ongoing military discussions is who will provide this close air support and how. When tailoring strategies of close air support, one should keep in mind that IS has MANPADs (man-portable air defense systems) that make air units providing close air support highly vulnerable in their low-speed and low-altitude missions.

 

Categories: Air strikes, Combat troops, Iraq, Islamic State, Obama, Syria, U.S. Military
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Kurds make grisly discoveries after retaking ISIS-held territory

October 15, 2014

Kurds make grisly discoveries after retaking ISIS-held territory, Hot Air, Noah Rothman, October 14, 2014

(How serious are we and our coalition of the unwilling about at least degrading the Islamic State? — DM)

There is mixed news from the two fronts in Iraq and Syria where coalition airpower and indigenous partner forces on the ground are fighting Islamic State militants.

Near the Syrian border city of Kobani, reports indicate that Kurdish defenders are beginning to make some gains as they continue to defend the city against the ISIS onslaught. A key hill atop which ISIS fighters famously planted their flag late last week has reportedly been retaken by Kurdish forces.

“The advance came as the US said it had conducted 21 air strikes near the town, slowing down the IS advance,” the BBC revealed. “Tall Shair hill had been captured more than 10 days ago by IS militants.”

As ISIS retreated from the front near the Syrian-Turkish border, Kurdish forces made a series of gruesome discoveries.

“Refugees in Suruc, Turkey, have told how relatives and neighbors were beheaded by [ISIS] militants, while another spoke of how he had seen ‘hundreds’ of decapitated corpses in the besieged town,” The Independent reported on Tuesday.

Amin Fajar (38) a father-of-four who left Kobane and made it across the border and into Suruc, told a British newspaper: “I have seen tens, maybe hundreds, of bodies with their heads cut off.

“Others with just their hands or legs missing. I have seen faces with their eyes or tongues cut out – I can never forget it for as long as I live.”

The Daily Telegraph confirmed The Independent’s reporting about the activities in which ISIS engaged in the areas under their control:

“I have seen tens, maybe hundreds, of bodies with their heads cut off. Others with just their hands or legs missing. I have seen faces with their eyes or tongues cut out — I can never forget it for as long as I live,” Amin Fajar, a 38-year-old father of four, told the Daily Mail about the incredible scene in Kobane.

“They put the heads on display to scare us all.”

Another resident, 13-year-old Dillyar, watched as his cousin Mohammed, 20, was captured and beheaded by the black-clad jihadis as the pair tried to flee the battle-scarred town.

“They pushed him to the ground and sawed his head off, shouting, ‘Allahu Akbar,’ ” the boy said. “I see it in my dreams every night and every morning I wake up and remember everything.”

This unconfirmed video featuring Kurdish fighters in Kobani, flagged by Jeff Gauvin, reveals the extent of the damage done to the city over the course of weeks of fighting.

While America’s partners on the ground are enjoying some successes in Syria, the dispatches from Iraq are far more grim.

There, ISIS continues its siege on Anbar province in preparation for an assault on the capital city of Baghdad. After taking control of a military training base on Monday, CNN reported that ISIS has surrounded one of the largest Iraqi airbases in the country on Tuesday and is preparing to take it.

“According to police sources,” CNN’s Ben Wedeman reported, “the Ayman Asad Airbase, which is about 110 miles to the west of Baghdad – one of the biggest bases in Anbar province – is now surrounded by ISIS fighters, and the people on the base are expecting an attack within the coming hours on that base.”

“We understand that there are Iraqi soldiers who have already fled the base,” Wedeman continued. “We were getting reports for several hours that some of the soldiers had left, shedding their uniforms, leaving their weapons behind.”

That depressing revelation should concern military advisors who believe Iraqi forces defending Baghdad can hold out against an ISIS assault on Baghdad despite outnumbering the attackers by a reported six-to-one ratio. These latest developments reinforce the position of Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond Odierno who said with some trepidation recently he was only “somewhat” confident Baghdad could hold out.

Categories: Air strikes, Baghdad, International Community, Iraq, Islamic State, Kobani, Kurdish fighters, Kurds, Middle East, Obama, Syria, Syria war, Turkey
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Obama’s Kobani Crossroads

October 15, 2014

Obama’s Kobani Crossroads, Algemeiner, Noah Beck, October 14, 2014

(Obama needs high profile stuff and photo ops to keep his polls from falling even more dramatically than they have. He needs help from Iran and little if anything else matters. It will be rewarded. — DM)

Obama on phone with RouhaniFrom the Oval Office, U.S. President Barack Obama speaks on the phone with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on Sept. 27, 2013.

Instead of preemptively stopping ISIS from spreading into Iraq, Obama effectively waited until some high-profile beheadings forced him to focus on the danger. While such gruesome murders can reliably rally public opinion in favor of military action, the duty of the Commander-in-Chief is to lead and take military action when and how national security requires it, and not just when terrorists provoke some tardy and token airstrikes into empty buildings.

Kobani also has geostrategic importance to the Iranian nuclear threat. The more ISIS succeeds at capturing territory and recruiting fighters, a trend bolstered by Kobani’s fall, the more desperate the U.S. becomes for help from Iran, which, as leader of the Shiite world, is the natural enemy of the Sunni ISIS fighters.

[A]s Iran watches how feebly the U.S. responds to the loss of Iraq and how Obama cowers from a relatively minor fight in Kobani, the Ayatollahs can rest assured that there really is no U.S. military option to stop their nuclear program. This conclusion becomes all the more inevitable, when they look at Obama’s waning influence at home, as he enters the lame-duck period of his presidency.

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President Obama has consistently disregarded the advice of his military experts on the ISIS threat. And he seems to have written off the Kurdish-Syrian town of Kobani, which may soon be overrun by ISIS.

Whatever the U.S. accomplished after about a decade of war in Iraq has, in a matter of months, deteriorated to a situation that may become unprecedented in its instability and threat to Western interests. Obama’s clumsy departure from Iraq, his military mismanagement of the mess that ensued, and his refusal to intervene in Syria – again, overruling his top security advisers – are what produced the current quagmire.

The loss of Christianity in Mosul didn’t have to happen. Obama’s tardy airstrikes managed to prevent the Mosul Dam from falling, but the city may never be the same. Similarly, why did the Yazidis have to find themselves besieged on Mount Sinjar before the U.S. took action?

Instead of preemptively stopping ISIS from spreading into Iraq, Obama effectively waited until some high-profile beheadings forced him to focus on the danger. While such gruesome murders can reliably rally public opinion in favor of military action, the duty of the Commander-in-Chief is to lead and take military action when and how national security requires it, and not just when terrorists provoke some tardy and token airstrikes into empty buildings.

As the next disaster is about to unfold on Obama’s watch, he should recognize that there is much more at stake with the fight for Kobani than just the loss to ISIS of a small town on the Syria-Turkey border.

Above all, letting Kobani fall means betraying our only ally fighting ISIS on the ground, and allowing them to be massacred while the world watches. What message does the U.S. send to Mideast partners and the world at large, if the Kurds are the only force providing the ground troops that Obama so desperately needs now, and yet Obama is unwilling to support them enough to avoid the horrific slaughter that will follow an ISIS victory in Kobani?

Kobani also has geostrategic importance to the Iranian nuclear threat. The more ISIS succeeds at capturing territory and recruiting fighters, a trend bolstered by Kobani’s fall, the more desperate the U.S. becomes for help from Iran, which, as leader of the Shiite world, is the natural enemy of the Sunni ISIS fighters. Because Iran also has one of the most powerful militaries in the region, and has – even before the ISIS crises – outmaneuvered the West in talks to curb Iranian nuclear ambitions, Iran could easily leverage the situation to secure tacit Western acceptance of its nukes. Indeed, Iran has already signaled its fight-ISIS-for-nukes strategy.

Even more important, as Iran watches how feebly the U.S. responds to the loss of Iraq and how Obama cowers from a relatively minor fight in Kobani, the Ayatollahs can rest assured that there really is no U.S. military option to stop their nuclear program. This conclusion becomes all the more inevitable, when they look at Obama’s waning influence at home, as he enters the lame-duck period of his presidency.

There is also a moral dimension to Kobani. Obama – in his 2009 and 2012 speeches on Holocaust Remembrance Day – proudly recalled how his great uncle helped to liberate a Nazi death camp. Yet Obama’s inaction in Syria has left about 200,000 dead, including many who were simply massacred, and Kobani may be where the next atrocities happen. Does the U.S. not hold itself to a higher standard than that of Turkey, which has thus far chosen just to watch the fighting a mere mile from its border?

Turkish history already includes genocides against the Armenian Christians and the Kurds (in the Dersim Massacre), so it’s no surprise that the Islamist regime of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan would let his army stand idly by, watching and waiting for ISIS to slaughter thousands of Kobani Kurds. But does the U.S. really want to be in the same camp as the Turks on this one? How much more shame will fall upon the United States, and the Obama legacy, when the Internet overflows with images of mass graves containing Kobani’s brave and abandoned fighters, along with Kurdish civilians who were too weak, infirm, or elderly to flee the approaching ISIS barbarism?

As if the above concerns weren’t enough to goad Obama into action, there is also the strategic impact of letting Kobani fall. As good as ISIS recruiting on social media already is, the popularity of this terrorist army among Islamists worldwide will surge when ISIS can boast about one more example of how even the mighty U.S. military can’t stop them.

Having foolishly telegraphed that he won’t send ground troops to confront ISIS, Obama can still try to convert his error into a feint by doing the opposite and sending troops to Kobani. At least that would restore some element of unpredictability to how ISIS regards U.S. military moves in the region.

Obama is effectively weeks away from the lame-duck portion of his presidency. If Republicans take Congress in next month’s midterm elections, then Obama will become that much more ineffectual. But the president can still try to demonstrate some leadership by changing his strategic approach to Mideast threats – if only to prevent his legacy from going into freefall. If the Middle East has only one lesson for Obama, it is that much can go terribly wrong in very little time. With Iranian nukes around the corner and ISIS on the march, two years of Mideast deterioration is a frighteningly long time to be on Obama’s watch.

Categories: Air strikes, Christians, Iranian nukes, Iraq, Islamic State, Kobani, Kurdish fighters, Kurds, Obama, Syria, Turkey
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