WarSclerotic

Off Topic: State TV says Russia could turn US to ‘radioactive ash’ – The Times of Israel.

Influential anchor presents image of a gigantic mushroom cloud, says Americans consider Putin ‘a stronger leader than Obama’

By AFP March 17, 2014, 5:04 pm

Off Topic: Jews love Jerusalem more than we do, Islamic Jihad head complains in Iran – The Times of Israel.

(He still doesn’t get it. As long as they hate the Jews more than they love Jerusalem and the Holy Land they will have neither peace nor their own country. – Artaxes)

Hailing Israeli attachment to holy city, terror chief at clerical conference quotes in Hebrew from Naomi Shemer’s inspirational ‘Jerusalem of Gold’

Off Topic: Kerry: Possible Sanctions Against Russia Not a ‘Threat’ Or Meant In a ‘Personal Way’ – The Washington Free Beacon.

(The folks at the Beacon don’t get it.
These are incredibly discreet threats, threatening incredibly discreet sanctions.
In fact, they are both so descreet that Putin will hardly notice.
If they have any effect Putin will have to ask himself what caused that effect.
Maybe someday he’ll discover that it was because of his behaviour. – Artaxes)

Sec. of State shows more weakness at London press conference

BY: Washington Free Beacon Staff
March 14, 2014 1:58 pm

Secretary of State John Kerry emphasized talk of possible sanctions against Russia are not a “threat” or meant in a “personal way” towards Russian President Vladimir Putin Friday in a London press conference:

JOHN KERRY: We hope President Putin will recognize that none of what we’re saying is meant as a threat, it’s not meant in a personal way. It is meant as a matter of respect for the international, multilateral structure that we have lived by since World War II, and for the standards of behavior about annexation, about succession, about independence, and how countries come about it.

Kerry’s non-confrontational words appear to reinforce a report from The Daily Beast’s Josh Rogin which characterized the White House as “bracing” for the possibility of Russian retaliation to economic sanctions.

Former Bush administration official Elliott Abrams slammed the Obama administration earlier on Fox News for being “afraid” of Putin, arguing the Russian president lacks the ability to inflict significant damage on American interests:

Iran’s Ramped-Up Cold War With Israel Is a Sign of Tehran’s Weakness, Not Strength – Tablet Magazine.

As the war in Syria deepens sectarian splits among Muslims, Iran’s choice to send rockets to Gaza is a sign the emperor has no clothes

By Josh Nason|March 14, 2014 12:00 AM

The Iranian UAV Industry is Booming – Israel Defense.

(Thanks to the generous sanctions relief by Mr. Hope and Change it booms even more.
“… Try with a little help from my friends …” – Artaxes)

The tendency to regard reports of modern Iranian-made weapon systems as “merely a whim and PR spectacle” notwithstanding, the Iranian UAV industry succeeds in developing vehicles that are worthy of more serious consideration

Tal Inbar | 15/3/2014

 

Observers of formal Iranian reports dealing with the development of various weapon systems have been familiar, for years now, with the ritual where various weapons are presented to senior officials, normally in the presence of the Iranian Defense Minister, who has the honor of unveiling “the world’s best and most advanced” weapon systems, as they are normally introduced. Knowledgeable authorities in the field of ordnance, platforms and weapon systems, upon carefully examining the images distributed by the various Iranian news agencies, often find themselves chuckling in the face of non-operational systems.

Do the armed forces of Iran rely on weapon systems made of fiberglass and sheet-metal? Apparently, various journalistic sources (worldwide as well as in Israel) tend to dismiss the Iranian presentations as a capricious whim of the Iranian regime or as a spectacle put on for the benefit of the masses of the Iranian people, who are not fully familiar with the intricacies and secrets of the trade.

Over the years, we have become accustomed to seeing tanks mobilized on trailers, old missiles repainted over and over again, and various other outdated items or mock-ups. It would seem, however, that with regard to very few categories, the Iranian presentations are not misrepresentations. This applies, for example, to Iran’s heavy missiles and satellite launchers. Recently, another category of Iranian products has joined the realm of “real stuff” rather than just a spectacle – Unmanned Airborne Vehicles.

In July 2006, during the second Lebanon war, UAVs operated by Hezbollah in Lebanon entered Israel’s airspace. These UAVs, shot down over Israeli territory, were identified by the media as Ababil (“swallow”) UAVs and their technical quality was rather poor. Over the years, Iran presented an extensive range of UAVs at exhibitions, military exercises and through various official publications.

Some of the Iranian developments make one wonder. One example that comes to mind is the Unmanned Combat Airborne Vehicle designated Karrar (“striker”): this turbojet UAV carries unguided GP bombs but does not have even a rudimentary surveillance system. Another example was the public introduction of a UAV fitted with an oversized canopy designed to accommodate a satellite communication system (like similar western vehicles) – while Iran has no communication satellites of its own, and relying on commercial communication satellites for communicating with an operational vehicle of this type appears questionable at best. Many of the experts who evaluated the Iranian capabilities in the field of UAVs tended to remain unimpressed. Apparently, however, the Iranian manufacturing capabilities in the field of UAVs have undergone a substantial change recently, and some of the vehicles unveiled by the Islamic Republic seem fairly advanced, although they tend to resemble western vehicles generally and Israel-made UAVs in particular.

Iran’s latest developments in the field of UAVs are based in part on direct copying of foreign UAVs that had crashed in Iranian territory and were subsequently salvaged, as in the case of the small, tactical ScanEagle UAV built by Boeing (through its subsidiary Insitu), which evolved in Iran into the Yassir UAV. An analysis of various images and video clips distributed by the Iranians has shown that an Iranian facility manufactures copies of the original UAV, and many dozens of UAVs were seen at the facility in various assembly stages. A close examination of the materials released by Iran revealed that the actual building of the Iranian UAV conforms to much higher quality standards than the cruder and more familiar UAVs, including those employed in the skies over Syria – a fact that signifies an improvement in the work and assembly procedures of aerial platforms made from composite materials. One bit of information that has not been clarified until now involves the source supplying the engines for these UAVs – that and the quality characteristics of the payload. It may be assumed, with a high degree of probability, that external resemblance, regardless of how high the quality of the copying has been, cannot necessarily indicate equally high quality standards of the avionics and surveillance systems. This UAV has two configurations that differ in their tail sections.

In October 2013, a Yassir UAV was presented to a Russian military delegation visiting Tehran as a gesture of goodwill, and possibly as an act of defiance toward the USA. In November 2013, clips filmed in Syria began to crop up on the web, showing an airborne Yassir UAV in the service of the Assad regime. Photographs of such vehicles that had crashed or were shot down and subsequently presented to the media by rebel organizations indicate with certainty that the vehicle in question is the Iranian-made UAV. Another interesting UAV presented by Iran is the Shahed-129 (“eye witness”) UAV, defined as a Medium-Altitude, Long-Endurance (MALE) UAV. This UAV was introduced to the world in 2012, and resembles the Elbit System Hermes-450 UAV made in Israel. The vehicle was unveiled initially through a series of rather blurred clips, with no breakdown of its capabilities. In September 2013, during the visit of senior Iranian officials at the plant that manufactures this UAV, additional information was made available. Of particular interest was the fact that this UAV is armed. The ordnance it carries looks like TOW antitank missiles, probably with a laser guidance head. The configuration in which the missiles were presented – carried under the wings of the UAV – was a departure from standard operational installation (which requires canisters), but it was obvious that the two armament suspension points under the wings of the UAV carried four missiles. Photographs enable a close examination of the payload carried by this UAV, which appears to be an industry standard product containing a stabilized camera with day and night channels, and possibly also a system for guiding precision guided munitions. A relatively advanced airborne vehicle, possessing a reasonable carrying capacity and an endurance of twenty hours or more constitutes a major breakthrough as far as Iran’s UAV capabilities are concerned. The operational implication for Israel is fairly obvious and presents a challenge to the Israeli air defense systems. Penetration by a single UAV from Lebanon during peacetime, against which IAF fighters may be scrambled to engage and shoot down the enemy UAV is not the same as the ‘trickling’ of numerous vehicles during an all-out confrontation, during which massive amounts of rockets are also launched into Israel. The status picture of the sky that Israel should assemble, as well as the advance identification required, present complex challenges. It should be stressed, however, that the damage sustained by the State of Israel thus far as a result of penetrating enemy UAVs was mainly a damage to morale, and the Israeli public perceives such incidents as serious and even as “failures”.

The latest innovation presented by Iran, for now (November 2013), is the Fotros UAV, defined by Iranian spokesmen as a “strategic” vehicle. It is a large UAV with a central fuselage and twin-boom configuration and a wingspan of about 15 meters. Its endurance is up to 30 hours, its official service ceiling is up to 25,000 feet and its range is 2,000 kilometers. If these performance characteristics, officially presented by Iran, are reliable, then for the first time, Iran possesses an indigenous UAV capable of flying from Iran to Israel. The UAV was presented in an armed configuration, carrying missiles that resemble the US-made AGM-114 Hellfire antitank missiles. It is unknown whether Iran actually possesses real missiles of the type described above. The resemblance between the Iranian Fotros UAV and the IAI Heron UAV made in Israel was clearly visible, and there is no doubt that the Iranian engineers were “inspired” by the Israeli UAV. One should not rule out the possibility that in their configuration selection considerations the Iranians did not just want to rely on successful and proven designs, but also attempted to reach a high degree of visual resemblance that would make it difficult to identify their UAVs as hostile, thereby improving their survivability should they be employed over Israel. In conclusion, it appears that the Iranian UAV industry has undergone a substantial transformation in recent years, as it currently presents products that are more advanced than those presented in the past. The UAVs we currently see in Iran are employed, in part, in various areas of conflict (Syria, Sudan) and are also being delivered to Hezbollah.

The Israeli defense establishment should pay heed and prepare to deal with these threats well in advance.

***

The writer is the head of the Space Research Center at the Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies

 

Al-Qaeda-linked group claims border attack on IDF – The Times of Israel.

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, an enemy of Hezbollah, tweets responsibility for targeting Israeli patrol at Lebanon border

By Times of Israel staff March 14, 2014, 11:22 pm

The long arm of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard – Israel Hayom.

Iran arms, funds and trains Hamas and Islamic Jihad to cause death and destruction inside Israel • Last week’s capture of the Klos C was just one chapter in the ongoing struggle against the Iranian threat.

Nadav Shragai

Kfir Rosen heard the reports last week about the capture of the weapons ship Klos C and his heart muscles immediately expanded. He was listening to the commentators describe the capabilities of the M-302 missiles that were discovered underneath the large bags of cement stashed in the belly of the ship. Then, in one fell swoop, he flashed back in his mind to the images, the sounds, the smell, and the awful quiet which ensued following the direct hit his apartment in Rishon Lezion sustained when a Fajr-5 missile exploded inside it one day in November 2012.

During Operation Pillar of Defense, 1,506 rockets were fired at Israel. Just 421 were intercepted by the Iron Dome anti-rocket system. On November 20th, the seventh day of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, sirens were heard in Rishon Lezion. Instead of sprinting toward a bomb-proof zone, Rosen went out to his balcony in order to witness the Iron Dome interception. Only, it never came.

The Fajr-5 rocket carries 90 kilograms (200 pounds) worth of explosives in its warhead. This powerful weapon directly struck a residential building that is home to 70 people, turning part of it into a mangled piece of bent iron and pieces of concrete.

“I felt a wave of heat passing over my shoulder,” Rosen said, recalling that fateful night. “Today, I know it was a rocket. Afterward, there was a loud boom, and a torrent of stones and dust fell on us from the top floor. We went downstairs. We didn’t recognize our building, which was partially turned into rubble. It was as if somebody did copy-paste on an image from the blitz in London [during World War II].”

The building was eventually restored, but the traumatic mark left on Rosen led him to move.

“God help us,” he told us this week. “If a rocket with a 90-kilogram warhead crushed a building in Rishon Lezion, I don’t want to think what a missile with a 170-kilogram warhead, the kind that the IDF confiscated from the Klos C, would do. What a stroke of luck, huge luck.”

Israel knows well what a missile carrying 170 kilograms (375 pounds) worth of explosives is capable of. It has also “gotten a taste”of them in the past. In the summer of 2006, during the Second Lebanon War, these powerful missiles struck Hadera, Afula, and Haifa, leaving behind a trail of destruction while claiming casualties.

S., one of the IDF soldiers involved in the seizure of the arms-carrying ship Victoria some 200 miles off Israel’s coast, also experienced a kind of deja vu when he heard about the capture of Klos C. The Victoria was carrying Iranian-manufactured C-704 surface-to-sea missiles hidden underneath bags of cotton and vegetables.

Over the years, Iran has used various means in attempting to smuggle arms that it wishes to deliver to terrorist organizations in the south. Even when it managed to smuggle into Gaza 122-millimeter Grad rockets, Iran made sure that its engine was comprised of four parts in order to make it easier to conceal.

With thanks, the Palestinians

Now Iran is denying that it is behind the shipment of arms found on Klos C. The international community is also living in a sort of denial, closing its eyes and ignoring the incriminating facts that have been unearthed. Even in Israel, some in the news media are trying to downplay the significance of the event.

It would be worthwhile to dive head-first into the treasure trove of material accumulated in recent years by the staff members of the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. This information points to a direct link between Iran and Palestinian terrorist groups operating in the Gaza Strip, in particular Islamic Jihad.

These materials generated renewed interest this week. Obviously, they are much more relevant in light of the current circumstances. The ITIC is an independent, semi-official organization that uncovers facts and figures that are difficult to bring to the public’s attention.

The latest ITIC report about Iranian assistance to Palestinian terrorist organizations offer a detailed account of what the capture of Klos C confirmed: Iran is the party most responsible for Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s buildup of its military capabilities. It is Iran that is constantly working to rebuild their military capabilities which were rolled back during Pillar of Defense. It is Iran that has placed an emphasis on rebuilding the rocket and missile infrastructure in Gaza, the reason being that it believes these arms pose the greatest threat to the Israeli homefront.

The Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force, the elite paramilitary outfit that serves as the spearhead of Iran’s drive to “export the Islamic revolution,” is the organization whose task it is to deliver military assistance to terrorist groups in the Palestinian Authority.

For many years, the Iranians preferred to keep this part of its foreign policy secret. Following Pillar of Defense, however, they changed their approach, openly acknowledging the aid they extend to terrorist groups in Gaza, something which they are now denying. As it appears, Tehran is keen on preventing other Muslim countries who supported Hamas from reaping undeserved political dividends. At the same time, spokespersons for Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah profusely thanked Iran for the assistance.

There have been too many public comments to count. Israel will soon make use of them in order to score public relations points (hasbara). The most explicit statements made thus far came from the mouth of Ramadan Shalah, the leader of the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine (operating in Gaza). Shalah’s group is wholly affiliated with the Iranians. Its operatives view terrorism as the exclusive means to attain their goals, chief among them the liquidation of the State of Israel and the establishment of a theocratic, Islamist Palestinian state on all of “Palestine.” Islamic Jihad is considered a terrorist organization by Israel, the United States, Britain, the European Union, Japan, Canada, and Australia.

“Iran provided us with assistance and support,” Shalah, who is based in Damascus, said following Pillar of Defense. “The weapons used by the resistance — the entire world knows that their primary supplier was Iran, or that [its delivery] was financed by Iran.”

Ziyad al Nakhalah, Islamic Jihad’s deputy secretary general, also offered effusive praise for Iran.

“I would like to thank our brothers in Iran,” he said. “The weapons with which the resistance is fighting, and even the weapons used by Hamas, are Iranian weapons, from the first bullet to the last missile. Even everything that is manufactured locally is for all intents and purposes Iranian. The Fajr-5 rockets which brought us victory were also given to us by Iran.”

“It’s no secret that the arms supplied to the Palestinian resistance, from A to Z, from bullets to rockets, is from the Islamic Republic,” said Daoud Shahab, an Islamic Jihad spokesman. “It is Iranian assistance.”

Even Hamas officials like Ali Barakeh, its chief representative in Lebanon, acknowledge that “Iran is the chief military supporter and financier of most Palestinian organizations in the Gaza Strip, with no strings attached and expecting nothing in return.”

Weapons ties

What is even more significant now, given Iran’s denial of its involvement in the Klos C affair, is that the Iranians have in the past boasted proudly of their assistance to the Palestinians. Ali Larijani, the current chairman of the Iranian parliament, bragged that “our support for the Palestinians came in the form of money and armaments.”

The Iranian newspaper Kayhan wrote that Hamas was launching Iranian missiles at Israel. The Iranian news site Tabnak observed: “If it weren’t for Iran’s financial and military support for Hamas, the results of the current clash (Pillar of Defense) would’ve been completely different. The Iranian missiles launched toward Israel are the main reason for the fear that is now surfacing among Israelis and the cease-fire that was imposed on Israel.”

Iran has provided the organizations in Gaza with a variety of rockets, chief among them are the Fajr-5 models. These projectiles have longer ranges (75 kilometers, 50 miles). Some of them were manufactured in Gaza, with training and guidance from Iran. Most of these rockets were destroyed by the IDF on the first day of Pillar of Defense. They have struck targets in Rishon Lezion as well as the outskirts of Jerusalem. There are also the 122-millimeter Grad rockets capable of reaching targets at a distance of 20 to 40 kilometers (12 to 25 miles). These are the weapons that have wreaked havoc on Beersheba and Ashdod.

Iran has also provided various mortars, anti-tank missiles (like the Sagger, the Fagot, and the Konkurs) that were used extensively by Hezbollah during the Second Lebanon War.

Another missile supplied by Iran is the Kornet, one of which was fired at a bus carrying schoolchildren in the western Negev in April 2011. One child was killed and two others were wounded. Iran has also provided anti-tank rockets, shoulder-fired missiles, and technological know-how for the production of weaponry, with a special emphasis on medium-range artillery and sophisticated explosives.

Not only have Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives received Iranian weapons, information, and assistance, but they have also undergone training and instruction in Iran itself. Upon their return, they disseminated the information they were taught to large numbers of terror operatives. The British newspaper Sunday Times has exposed details of these training sessions in the past. It revealed that the Revolutionary Guards trained hundreds of Hamas operatives who came to Iran by way of Egypt. From there, they flew to Syria before continuing to Tehran.

The Iranians have also assisted terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip to prepare the infrastructure for the manufacturing of unmanned aerial vehicles which were to be launched toward Israel. These factories were destroyed by the Israeli air force. At one point, Palestinians floated barrels of explosives toward Israeli beaches, some of which reached close to Palmachim Beach, but they were neutralized by sappers.

The Sudanese corridor

The major route through which Iranian arms reached Gaza passed through Sudan by sea and by air. From there, the weapons were transferred through Egypt to the Gaza Strip by means of a complicated tunnel system that was built along the Sinai-Gaza border. A significant amount of the weapons came from the storage facilities in Libya which were looted following the fall of Moammar Gadhafi.

The smuggling system that stretches from Sudan to Gaza is aided by a network of smugglers whose motives are primarily economic. The weapons are first loaded onto ships that are docked in the Syrian port of Latakia and, like the Victoria, sent on their way to Alexandria, Egypt.

Israel has not been sitting idly by, watching these developments unfold. In March 2009, Arab and American media outlets reported that Israeli warplanes attacked a convoy of arms in Sudan. The convoy, which was said to be carrying a variety of armaments, was on its way to the Gaza Strip. According to the reports, the shipment originated in Iran and was financed by the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation. It was said to include Fajr rockets capable of reaching Tel Aviv. That same month, Israel attacked again in Sudan, at least according to foreign media reports.

Researchers with the ITIC believe that Iran has also used cargo flights with the Sudanese carrier Badr Airlines in order to load arms from Iran and send them to Sudan, where smugglers would transport them to Palestinian groups in the Gaza Strip.

“The containers were transported on the Iran-Sudan route by way of Oman and Saudi Arabia as well as the Syria-Sudan route by way of Jordan and Egypt,” ITIC researchers wrote, basing their information on WikiLeaks documents dated March 29, 2009. According to the secret diplomatic communiques revealed by WikiLeaks, the U.S. warned Sudan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen that enabling the transport of Iranian arms through their territory constituted a violation of U.N. resolutions.”

In 2010, five containers of weapons were delivered from Iran to Sudan. In 2012, arms were sent to Sudan via cargo flights. The mysterious explosion which occurred at the Yarmouk weapons factory in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum in October 2012 was reportedly the result of arms manufacturing and the smuggling of arms to Palestinian groups in Gaza. The site in question was owned by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.

Iranian assistance to Palestinian terrorism also included the transfer of large sums of cash to various organizations, including Islamic Jihad. The money would be funneled through banks based in Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. In years past, these funds were used to subsidize the worst terrorist atrocities committed against Israelis.

The Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades received a lump sum of $400,000 and the Islamist opposition groups in the PA received $700,000. Documents obtained by the defense and security establishments revealed that these sums were earmarked for the Hamas military wing, and the purpose for the transfer was for these funds to be used to encourage suicide bombings.

Iran’s closest ties to a Palestinian organization are the ones it shares with the Islamic Jihad, which was founded in the Gaza Strip in the mid-1980s. The al-Quds Brigades are the Islamic Jihad’s military wing. This organization has been responsible for some of the deadliest terrorist attacks, the most notorious among them is the double-bombing of the Beit Lid junction in 1995, in which 21 soldiers and civilians were killed. It also masterminded the 2001 car bomb attack in the Mahane Yehuda open air market. Over the course of the second intifada, it carried out 422 attacks which claimed the lives of 134 Israelis and maimed 880.

Annually, Iran provides millions of dollars to this organization, a large chunk of which is earmarked for terrorism. Since the lull that was agreed upon in 2005, Islamic Jihad has become one of the main groups responsible for rocket fire against Israel. Experts believe that the Klos C shipment was at least partially intended for Islamic Jihad operatives.

During the annual conference held by the Institute of National Security Studies, Military Intelligence chief Maj. Gen. Aviv Kochavi said that Israel is currently being threatened by 170,000 missiles pointed at it, particularly from the north. The one organization that is deemed to be “most unpredictable” is Islamic Jihad, which doesn’t even take its orders from Hamas.

Defense experts believe that Iran will continue to try to bolster the arsenals of both Jihad and Hamas. Tehran is determined to beef up the potential to threaten Israel, which managed to scale back the threat significantly during Pillar of Defense. After the operation, the Palestinian organizations were left with just 7,000 rockets of various kinds and models in their possession. Since the operation, that number has doubled, defense officials believe.

Preventing an Iranian Breakout after a Nuclear Deal – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Washington must urgently reestablish the credibility of its military threat, along with other steps, to guard against noncompliance from Tehran.

James F. Jeffrey and David Pollock
March 12, 2014

Assuming a final Iranian nuclear agreement is achieved, whatever the details, the task of the United States, the rest of the P5+1 (Britain, China, France, Russia, and Germany), and U.S. allies and friends in the region to manage the threat of an Iranian nuclear program will not slacken. Thus, the arrangements to encourage Iran to stick with an agreement will be every bit as important as the specifics of an agreement itself. It is thus important to begin thinking about these arrangements now.

Furthermore, even with an agreement, the United States and its partners will face a long-term Iranian push for hegemony in the Middle East. That fact, plus analogous recent Russian and Chinese behavior and questions about U.S. responses, offers the context within which any nuclear deal, and plans to maintain it, must be considered. 

In any likely final agreement with Iran, a residual nuclear enrichment program, however undesirable, will likely be permitted. This will necessitate a regime to prevent Iran from breaking out of that agreement to develop nuclear weapons, or exploiting the threat of a breakout for regional intimidation. Such a regime would require three interlocking components: specific limitations on Iran’s program, in order to maximize Iran’s prospective breakout time; extensive verification, monitoring, and intelligence capabilities, inside and outside the agreement, to spot any breakout as soon as possible; and, finally, credible response scenarios should a breakout occur. Steps for achieving these essential goals are inventoried as follows:

Immediate next steps. The path to enforcing a final deal begins with enforcement of the current interim deal. The administration has rejected the option of passing conditional congressional sanctions in case a final deal proves beyond reach. But neither that nor the language of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), as the interim agreement is known, should stop the White House from immediately underlining that any Iranian infringement of the interim deal will incur new sanctions, along with other enforcement actions. Iran will protest, but this should be the first signal of U.S. resolve in enforcing any deal with Tehran. Iran is unlikely to walk away from the talks in response. And if it does, that will be an invaluable warning of the inherent fragility of agreements with the regime. Moreover, if the United States cannot credibly enforce a limited interim deal, how will it ever enforce a final one?

One way for the White House to reinforce this crucial early message would be to clearly state that it prefers no extension of the interim deal beyond its first six-month timeframe. As it is unlikely that this call would gain wider acceptance, however, Washington could lay down a clear marker that only one six-month extension will be acceptable. Otherwise, the temptation to extend the interim deal indefinitely, offering no real rollback of Iran’s nuclear program while sanctions erode, may well prove irresistible to Iran and to some other interested parties.

Verification of a final deal. Verification is critical to deterring Iranian breakout, spotting Iranian noncompliance, and triggering a rapid international-community reaction, including sanctions and ultimately use of force. It is thus essential that the most intrusive monitoring regime possible be secured in any agreement, building on the enhanced International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection regime in the JPOA and following up on Iranian commitments to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty’s Additional Protocol as part of the final agreement. National means of verification must be strengthened and their findings accepted, once tested and confirmed, as a supplement to the IAEA.

Any UN Security Council resolution adopting a final agreement should empower the IAEA’s on-site personnel to provide certain reporting to the Security Council through — but not requiring votes by — the IAEA board. A precedent is UN Security Council Resolution 1022 on the Dayton Accords, which directed NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) commander to report through its channels to the Security Council.

Enforcement of a final deal. Any agreement, or the UN Security Council resolution adopting the agreement, necessarily would have provisions for alleged or proven noncompliance. At a minimum, these provisions would resemble those of UN Security Resolution 3118, on Syrian chemical weapons, which “Decides, in the event of non-compliance with this resolution…to impose measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.” Even better would be to include the specific enforcement measures directly in the UN Security Council resolution under Chapter VII.

Second, certain current UN sanctions on Iran, rather than being lifted, should be suspended. Third, sanctions relief, rather than occurring immediately, should be phased in as an incentive for compliance, especially concerning the inspections regime.

Setting a military redline. Most important of all, the U.S. administration must maintain, convincingly, its explicit threat to use force if Iran attempts to develop a nuclear weapon, as the president has affirmed repeatedly. To reinforce this aim, the United States should push for military force authority in the adopting UN resolution, as a complement to, but not a prerequisite for, a unilateral U.S. threat. The United States should, further, make clear its redline that would spark a military response. At least as important will be the strict avoidance of mixed public messages, such as previous statements by senior officials about how “destabilizing” or “unpredictable” a necessary military action might be. Any such statement should be immediately and publicly disavowed by the president, or else his own credibility will suffer.

The Obama administration understandably has previously refused to spell out what specific Iranian action would trigger a U.S. military response, along with the details of that response. But a verified violation of a nuclear agreement is different from an ambiguous development of a dual-use capability.

Recent experience and various other factors point to a limited military response focused on nuclear infrastructure and missile systems. But the United States also has a compelling interest in neutralizing Iran’s retaliation to a U.S. or international strike. So it should prepare if Iran retaliates not to slog out an air-sea campaign in the Gulf but rather to strike back asymmetrically against Iran’s strategic command, control and communications, fuel production, and electrical generation capabilities, with standoff, precision-guided weapons — making sure Iran is aware of these intentions.

Establishing military credibility. For any planned military response to serve as a deterrent, the threat must be credible. Given the present administration’s considerable deficit in this area, it must strengthen its regional military presence and encourage other states, such as France and Britain, to follow suit. Some such developments are under way, but public attention needs to be kept on this issue. Moreover, U.S. military actions, from Afghanistan to NATO missile defense and deployment cancellations, can color perceptions of its determination and thus of its deterrence. Worst of all is an administration that actually intends to respond militarily to a breakout, with an Iran that does not believe it.

Restoring the balance following a breakout attempt. The United States needs a game plan for “the day after” any breakout attempt is stopped, whether by negotiations, sanctions pressure, or military action. Possibilities include ending Iranian enrichment altogether, restricting oil exports, confidence-building measures including U.S. and other military presence, and diplomatic steps to sustain P5+1 and alliance solidarity.

Diplomatic Efforts

Implementing the program just outlined requires multiple simultaneous negotiations. A breakout response regime, especially one automatically linking Iranian failure to comply with a UN Security Resolution to the use of force, would be controversial. Washington would have to persuade its fellow P5+1 states, some of which recoil at the idea of military action, that such a regime is a sine qua non of any agreement. Likewise, Iran would have to tolerate intrusive verification and breakout enforcement provisions. Aside from the “sticks” discussed in this piece, “carrots” to encourage Iran to remain with any agreement, while outside the scope of this discussion, will likewise be important. Finally, Gulf allies and Israel will need to be convinced of the wisdom of any nuclear agreement.

Domestic Considerations

The U.S. Congress and the American people are skeptical about a deal with Iran, but, as the Syrian chemical weapons scenario showed, both can also be leery about using force. Here, only the president can make the case. He should make clear that he would use his presidential prerogatives, consulting with but not requiring consent from Congress, if military force were needed. Congress, in turn, could relieve some of the administration’s burden at the time an agreement was reached by passing a general resolution of support, including for a U.S. military response if the deal were violated. Because this would significantly enhance the military option’s credibility, it would be well worth the advance consultations with Congress, starting right now, required to secure its explicit endorsement.

Concluding Recommendations

For any agreement to secure regional stability and prevent a nuclear-armed Iran, the elements discussed here for a breakout response must be strong and mutually supporting. And they must be reinforced with the following understandings: (1) an agreement with Iran would not signal the creation of a new ally; (2) a credible, internationally endorsed response to any violation is obligatory; (3) U.S. military action must be at the core of any such response; and (4), relatedly, credibility must urgently be restored to the much-doubted U.S. threat of military force against Iran.

James F. Jeffrey is the Philip Solondz Distinguished Visiting Fellow at The Washington Institute. David Pollock is the Institute’s Kaufman Fellow and director of Fikra Forum.

U.S. Senators Tailor Ukraine Bill to Maintain Moscow’s Mideast Backing – Global Security Newswire.

UPDATE: High Alert in the South Due to Fears of Rocket Attacks During Purim – Jerusalem Online. 

This morning, educational institutions across the country celebrated Purim. Despite the recent escalation in the south, it was decided that studies would continue like normal. During the night, the IDF attacked terror groups inside the Gaza Strip. This morning, southern Israel is on high alert in case of renewed rocket fire.