WarSclerotic

US: ‘Hard work’ needed to agree with Iran on enrichment – Ynet.

Iran and 6 world powers lock horns over Arak nuclear reactor that could yield plutonium as negotiations meeting comes to end.

VIENNA – It will be very difficult to overcome differences between Iran and six world powers over Tehran’s uranium enrichment programme, though all parties aim to adhere to their 6-month deadline to reach a nuclear deal, a senior US official said on Wednesday.

“It’s a gap (on enrichment) that’s going to take some hard work to get to a place where we can find some agreement,” the senior US administration official said after the latest round of negotiations on Iran’s atomic programme in Vienna.

The official said the differences over Iran’s planned Arak heavy-water reactor, which Western powers fear could yield weapons-grade plutonium, remained similarly wide. However, Tehran’s foreign minister voiced optimism that their July 20 deadline for a deal is within reach.

Negotiators for Iran and six world powers on Wednesday adjourned what they described as “substantive and useful” nuclear talks and said they will resume April 7 in Vienna.

The two sides spoke at the end of two days of negotiations focused on curbing Tehran’s atomic activities in exchange for full sanctions relief. Their joint statement was read by EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, who speaks for the six countries negotiating with Iran, and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif.

At this week’s round, the two sides attempted to iron out their positions on two of the most thorny issues: the level of uranium enrichment conducted in Iran, and its Arak heavy water reactor that the West sees as a possible source of plutonium.

The United States has called on Iran to scrap or radically alter the planned reactor, but Tehran has so far rejected that idea while hinting they could modify it. A Western diplomat said on condition of anonymity that the goal of the current round of negotiations was not to reach any final agreements.

“The goal of these sessions is not to solve any topics at this point (but) to be talking through the gaps and working on how to narrow them,” the diplomat told Reuters.

Western nations want to ensure that the Arak reactor, which is still under construction, is modified sufficiently to ensure it poses no bomb profiferation risk. Iran insists the facility will be free to operate under any deal, saying it will be geared solely to producing radio-isotopes for medical treatments.

Possible options that could allow Iran to keep the reactor while satisfying the West that it would not be used for military purposes include reducing its megawatt capacity and altering the way it would be fuelled.

Iran and the six powers aim to wrap up a lasting settlement by late July, when their groundbreaking interim deal from last November expires and would need to be extended, complicating diplomacy.

The talks are meant to overcome ingrained mutual mistrust and give the West confidence that Iran would not be able to produce atomic bomb and Tehran – in return – deliverance from economic sanctions that have crippled the OPEC state’s economy.

Iran denies that its declared civilian atomic energy programme is a front for developing the means to make nuclear weapons, but its restrictions on U.N. inspections and Western intelligence about bomb-making research raised concerns.

Tehran’s chief delegate voiced optimism about the talks.

“At this stage we are trying to get an idea … of the issues that are involved and how each side sees various aspects of this problem,” Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif told Reuters at the start of the second day of talks in Vienna.

Asked whether he expected negotiators to be able to meet their deadline, he said: “Yes, I do … I am optimistic about July 20”.

Zarif said talks were going well so far but few details have emerged. One Western diplomat told Reuters on Tuesday that no agreements on any individual issues would be reached at the Vienna discussions, expected to end late on Wednesday.

The sides are conscious it may be difficult to reach gradual deals without having the overall picture in sight and are insisting that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”.

Much of the progress so far has been achieved since last year’s election of pragmatist President Hassan Rouhani, who launched a policy of “constructive engagement” to end Iran’s international isolation.

Since then, the day-to-day relations between Iranian and six-power negotiators have improved dramatically, with senior officials addressing each other by their first names and using English in talks, rather than going through onerous translation.

But the vast gap of expectations about the final deal could still scupper diplomacy.

Both the U.S. and Iranian delegations – the two pivotal players in the negotiations – face intense pressure from hawkish critics back home. In Washington, a big majority of U.S. senators urged President Barack Obama to insist that any final agreement state that Iran “has no inherent right to enrichment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”.

That would be a non-starter for Iran, which cites a right under the NPT to produce nuclear energy for civilian purposes.

The final settlement will also have to address the acceptable level of uranium enrichment, the extent of research Iran is allowed to conduct into new enrichment technologies, and its remaining nuclear facilities.

The powers will also want to spread out the sanctions relief over years, or possibly decades, to ensure they maintain their leverage over Tehran and that it meets its end of the deal.

The Islamic Republic has already suspended its most sensitive, higher-grade enrichment – a potential path towards bomb fuel – under the November accord and won modest respite from sanctions.

The Vienna talks were being held under the shadow of the Ukraine crisis, which has pitted the United States and the European Union against Russia over its move to annex the Russian-majority Ukrainian region of Crimea.

Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, Abbas Araqchi, said that the crisis in Ukraine – the worst confrontation between the West and the East since the Cold War – had so far had “no impact” on talks with the six nations.

“We also prefer the (powers) to have a unified approach for the sake of negotiations,” he told reporters late on Tuesday, noting that the first day of talks was “positive and very good”.

A spokesman for European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, who coordinates diplomacy with Iran on behalf of the six, said the powers were working in a “unified fashion”.

Araqchi said that the next round of talks were expected to be held in the Austrian capital on April 7-9.

In the past, Russia has generally enjoyed warmer relations with the Islamic Republic and suggested Western fears about any nuclear weapons designs by Tehran are overblown.

Reuters and the Associated Press contributed to this report

What motivates Iran to fight in Syria? – Al Arabiya.
Tuesday, 18 March 2014

Jamal Khashoggi

What does Iran want by being so politically active and making its population pay such a dear price? The population, like others in the Muslim world, suffers from poverty and disease, despite the countries massive oil industry. Iran is planning to bolster its power and influence, seeking to confirm its readiness to fight in Syria , propagating conspiracy in Iraq and spoiling its relations with Saudi Arabia and other neighbors. It also applies pressure on the West at times and eases pressure at other times. What does Iran want out of all of this?

It is easy to answer the question: what did Britain want from India? It took interest in India as an investment which gave English politicians and businessmen abundant income. This enabled them to enjoy an aristocratic lifestyle. By understanding their reasons for occupying India, we can understand the reasond behind their occupation of South Yemen, their interest in the Gulf sheikhdoms and Egypt.

Based on the same logic we can explain the foolish reason behind Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. He saw Kuwait as a source of money as it has enormous oil reserves. He saw it as a means to solve all the economic problems caused by Iraq’s eight year war with Iran.

Turning to Egypt, why did Gamal Abdel Nasser send his army to Yemen in an adventure that went awry? There was no clear benefit to the Yemen campaign, it seems it was simply about feeding Nasser’s ego. He wanted to lead the Arab nation into conflict for his own personal glory. There was no economic gain or strategic influence for Egypt in the mountains of Yemen.

The case of Syria

I use the example as a reference when answering the question: Why is Syria so important to Iran? The answer is not based on old imperialist economic calculations; there is no economic gain for Iran in Syria nor in Lebanon, nor in Yemen.

Australian researcher Roger Shanahan focused on the Sayeda Zeinab Shrine as a reason for the attention of Iranian Shiites on Syria, in an article published by the Carnegie Center a few weeks ago. He asked: What does Syria mean to the Shiite of the region? He was unable to provide a better answer than saying Syria is a strategic extension of Iran’s influence in the region. He also added that “It is as well necessary to ensure the supply line to Hezbollah in Lebanon , being the most powerful manifestations of the Islamic revolution.”

Real reasons

However, those reasons are purely political , and they do not justify the high cost borne by the Iranian economy, and Iran’s extreme support of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. It also does not justify the intervention of Iran in Yemen . Iraq alone provides an economic incentive to motivate Iran to be involved in the country. Involvement in Iraq provides huge gains for some of the men in power in Tehran.

Nevertheless it is certain that is not honest or sustainable money that is gained in Iraq. Iraq is rife with corruption and injustice, an obscene price paid by the Iraqi people, resulting in poverty, ignorance and a tremendous deterioration in the simplest of services.

Does Iran seek to open markets for its products and companies? Yes it does, like the Soviet Union and his neighboring Communist countries. But even if this is the case, to justify it economically they do not need to establish militia parties such as Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran does not have to finance and arm ideological movements such as the Houthis in Yemen. In addition to that, weapons smuggling into Nigeria does not serve the policy of opening markets. Saudi Arabia and Turkey, for instance, are opening markets in Middle East countries without the need to form militias.

Seeking to spread Shiism

What if Iran is seeking to spread Shiism in the region and the Islamic world? This is a fact , and Iran is ready to bear the consequences. Iran knows that this resulted in anger in many countries, with protests ranging from Malaysia to Morocco. It is possible to justify the reason as being the duty of any ideological state. They don’t need to establish militias and secret networks for that. Saudi Arabia spends money on a lot of schools and mosques around the world openly and clearly. Egypt and its Azhar Mosque do the same, but without the need to establish militias.

What motivates Iran and stimulates its appetite for domination? One opinion is that it was Iran’s consistent purpose since the Shah’s time, who once wanted to be the Gulf’s policeman. However, Iran in its current state is pragmatic; domination according to the colonial era idea of the concept has become an obsolete idea.

Times have changed and the Gulf is no longer in need of a policeman after the American cop entered the scene. It is better for the Iranians to practice the Turkish model, encouraging business and not domination. Iran has a skilled labor force looking for jobs and factories looking for markets.

I found some answers in what Dr. Juma Hamad al-Essa wrote in his book Time of Strife: Shiites against Sunnis, Sunnis against Shiites.” From what I understood, radicalism drives Iran’s ayatollahs. They have a dream of building an Islamic state in preparation to receive the Mahdi, the 12th Imam who they expect to return at the end of times, a concept in Iranian Shiite Islam. Iranian ayatollahs want to facilitate his mission of unifying the Muslim world and preventing injustice.

When Sunni Fundamentalism became active, an example being the Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia, the dispute was centered on ideology and not sectarianism. However, when Shiite fundamentalism was activated, the dispute was defined within the parameters of sectarianism: it was about Sunni vs. Shiite and vice versa.

The problem with Iranian, or Shiite, fundamentalism is that it occurred outside the borders of Iran, where the majority of the public is different. Other countries’ weaknesses tempted Iran into believing it was her time to lift the perceived oppression of the region’s Shiites.

Why is Iran involved?

There are points of contact for the Shiite fundamentalism in the entire Islamic world outside of Iran. Even in Iraq , which some people assume is a Shiite bloc, there is a Shiite majority but if the Kurds are ruled out, it is not enough to make it a Shiite country . Logic, reason and history dictate that secularism is best for Iraq. This will preserve the rights of Shiites and Sunnis. But if someone insisted on a different approach, it will cause the partition of Iraq and that is what is happening today.

Syria was never Shiite, so why does Iran fight in Syria with such ferocity? It is fighting to defend the system of minority dictatorship that can only prevail by force. It is a non – sustainable cause, unless radicalist Iranians believe that they can convince the majority of the Syrian Sunni population to become Shiite.

The dream of transforming Syria into a Shiite country is one of the most important sectarian causes for Iran’s involvement. Tehran is dealing with Syria as it is in Iran’s backyard in terms of distance. Iran is trying desperately to defend Bashar al-Assad and his regime and it is involved in the fighting, sending experts and volunteers to the country.

Even the argument of confronting extremist groups in Syria is compelling. Those become the problem of the Sunni majority in Syria before they can be considered as a problem for the Shiites.

We, as Muslims – Sunni and Shiite – have enough problems and challenges. We all suffer underdevelopment, ignorance, disease, intolerance and tyranny. We are all in underdeveloped third world countries.

This article was first published in al-Hayat on March 15, 2014.

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Jamal Khashoggi is a Saudi journalist, columnist, author, and general manager of the upcoming Al Arab News Channel. He previously served as a media aide to Prince Turki al Faisal while he was Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States. Khashoggi has written for various daily and weekly Arab newspapers, including Asharq al-Awsat, al-Majalla and al-Hayat, and was editor-in-chief of the Saudi-based al-Watan. He was a foreign correspondent in Afghanistan, Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan, and other Middle Eastern countries. He is also a political commentator for Saudi-based and international news channels.
Last Update: Tuesday, 18 March 2014 KSA 12:06 – GMT 09:06

Iran Nuclear Deal Looks Weaker Than Ever – Commentary Magazine.

Tom Wilson | @TomJamesWilson
03.17.2014 – 5:25 PM

Few will have been surprised by the announcement by the State Department that it believes the Iranians have been using the black market to purchase components necessary for the expansion of their nuclear infrastructure. More remarkable, on the other hand, was the way the State Department’s Vann Van Diepen apparently casually explained that these moves are not explicitly in contravention of the existing P5+1 interim agreement that Iran is signed up to. Indeed, it is being widely reported that Iran has been complying with the terms of the agreement. Yet, this fact says little in defense of the Iranians and much to condemn Secretary of State Kerry and the EU’s Catherine Ashton for having been complicit in formulating a deal that is so ineffectual as to permit this kind of thing.

We have been repeatedly assured by the administration that they had achieved some great feat, a diplomatic triumph, in getting the Iranians to sign onto the interim agreement. Yet, surely it is now obvious to any serious observer that an agreement so flimsy that it permits Iran to purchase new parts for the very nuclear infrastructure that this deal is supposed to work toward dismantling isn’t fit for purpose. This is the embodiment of the bad deal that Kerry assured us we wouldn’t get. “No deal is better than a bad deal,” or so we were told. If this deal isn’t bad, then it certainly sets the benchmark for good pretty low.

Not only does the interim agreement permit the continuation of nuclear enrichment, albeit at a lower level, but the fact that it allows for the Iranians to continue acquiring new nuclear parts is a reminder that this agreement is still more permissive than what had been agreed to even by the UN. Indeed, since 2006 the Security Council has placed sanctions on those selling such parts to Iran. The P5+1 interim agreement on the other hand has failed to proscribe such activity.

Negotiations for reaching an agreement that would definitively end Iran’s nuclear program resume once again this week. Yet, in recent weeks both Baroness Ashton and the Iranian foreign minister have expressed their skepticism about the likelihood of a deal being reached for the time being. Speaking from Tehran last week Ashton said that there was no guarantee that a final comprehensive deal would actually be reached. More recently Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, has not only said that the Iranians do not expect to reach an agreement this time around; he has even claimed that a final agreement isn’t on the agenda for these talks.

With both parties in these talks apparently so unconvinced that these negotiations are leading anywhere, one has to ask what on earth they are doing taking part in them. The answer is that both sides are in these talks because they have to be, not because they want to. The sanctions regime that the West spent years meticulously constructing eventually forced the Iranians to the table. But Kerry and Ashton are only at that table because they must be seen to be doing something. The idea that the military option ever really existed for the Obama administration now looks completely implausible. Rather, both the Europeans and the administration knew that the military option was being seriously considered by Israel and others in the region. As such they are obliged to go through these diplomatic motions as a means of diverting anyone else from carrying out a strike on Iran which they no doubt fear would drag them into having to take a side in a conflict they wish to avoid at all costs.

With the threat of military action being more terrible in the eyes of both the Europeans and the Obama administration than the prospect of a nuclear Iran, one has to wonder what their calculus is. Presumably they are playing some kind of waiting game. With the sanctions now unraveling, and little hope of being able to reconstruct them in time to have any useful effect the possible trajectories seem clear. Either by some miracle the Iranians will lose all interest in their nuclear project, or, protected by the diplomatic process, Iran will cross the threshold of weapons capabilities by which point a military strike will become unthinkable in any case. The main objective for Obama and Kerry is to ensure that neither Israel nor the Saudis act on their threats of military action. And after that, Obama knows his time as president will be up, and the mess he has left becomes someone else’s problem.

Off Topic: On How to Punish Putin, Listen to the Guy Who Devised Iran Sanctions – Global Security Newswire.

Off Topic: The Price We, and the World, Will Pay for Obama’s Re-election – Real Clear Politics.

By Mona Charen – March 18, 2014

Second minister joins call for IDF to invade Gaza – The Times of Israel.

Yuval Steinitz says military operation needed in order to halt terrorist groups’ ongoing armament

Off Topic: Syria chemical weapons store attacked by rockets – Jerusalem Post.

Four of the rockets hit land and one fell in the sea; the chemical transports were not hit.

By REUTERS     03/18/2014 16:54

Off Topic: US rejects criticism of ‘toothless’ sanctions following Crimea referendum – The Guardian.

(The saga of the incredibly discreet sanctions continues. The Iranians are surely watching with interest and they must be laughing their rear ends off. If this is the price to pay for violating international law and treaties they must truly feel encouraged. After correctly understanding the threat of the military option as a merely rhetorical device they must view the other threats as merely rhetorical as well.

“… Moscow treated the sanctions with derision. The Russian deputy prime minister, Dmitry Rogozin, who faces sanctions on the US list, was dismissive, tweeting that the move drawn up by Obama must have been the work of a ‘prankster’ …”.

– Artaxes)

Russia issues decree recognising Crimea as sovereign state as US and EU enact measures against 32 Russians and Ukrainians

Ewen MacAskill, Shaun Walker and Dan Roberts in Washington
theguardian.com, Monday 17 March 2014 19.44 GMT

Link to video: Barack Obama announces sanctions on Russian and Ukrainian officials

The US and the European Union retaliated over the Crimea referendum by targeting sanctions against Russian and Ukrainian officials on Monday, a move widely greeted with scepticism as “toothless”.

The White House imposed sanctions against 11 named individuals: seven senior Russian politicians and officials and four Crimea-based separatist leaders accused of undermining the “democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine“.

But the US pointedly avoided targeting the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, or key figures in his inner circle.

The EU imposed sanctions on 21 individuals but did not immediately disclose the names. There are divisions within Europe over how to respond to Russia, and this is reflected in the fact that action is being taken against less than two dozen from an original proposed list of 120.

The sanctions came on the eve of an address to the Russian parliament by President Vladimir Putin on the next moves for Crimea.On Monday night, Putin posted a decree recognising Crimea as a sovereign state on the Kremlin’s website in what appeared to be a first step toward integrating Crimea as a part of the Russian Federation.

The decree, which took effect immediately, says Moscow’s recognition of Crimea as independent is based on “the will of the people of Crimea”.

Barack Obama, who is set to visit Europe next week to discuss the crisis with European allies, warned of further action. “If Russia continues to interfere in Ukraine, we stand ready to impose further sanctions,” he said. Russian troops have also massed near the border with Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine where there have been fatalities during clashes between pro- and anti-Moscow demonstrators in recent days.

Obama added: “We will continue to make clear to Russia that further provocations will achieve nothing except to further isolate Russia and diminish its place in the world.”

The White House insisted the sanctions were “by far and away the most comprehensive sanctions since the end of the cold war”, and rejected criticism that they were too limited in scope or would be easily circumvented by asset transfers.

“We think they will be effective,” one senior administration official told reporters in Washington. But the kind of sanctions that might bite, such as hitting Russian oligarchs or even their companies, particularly energy firms, were pointedly absent.

The sanctions came on the eve of an address to the Russian parliament by Putin on the next moves for Crimea. He could take steps to formalise the incorporation of Crimea into Russia.

The sanctions follow the referendum in Crimea on Sunday, in which there was an overwhelming vote in favour of union with Russia. The EU condemned the referendum as illegal and said it would not recognise the outcome.

The Crimean parliament, in the aftermath of the referendum, declared independence from Ukraine on Monday and confiscated Ukrainian state property. Crimea also sent a delegation to Moscow to discuss what will happen next.

Moscow treated the sanctions with derision. The Russian deputy prime minister, Dmitry Rogozin, who faces sanctions on the US list, was dismissive, tweeting that the move drawn up by Obama must have been the work of a “prankster”.

The Russian market was equally dismissive, with the rouble doing well on the day. Markets rose elsewhere in Europe, judging that the prospect of trade battles was receding.

Kathleen Brooks, research director at Forex.com, told AP: “So far the sanctions seem fairly toothless and much less severe than had been expected last week. From the market’s perspective, the biggest risk was that the referendum would trigger tough sanctions against Russia that could lead to another cold war.”

David Cameron’s spokesman, asked whether the sanctions were feeble, said they should be seen in the context of others already announced and that the EU was prepared to add to them if necessary. Asked about Rogozin’s response, the spokesman insisted the sanctions were “important measures”.

Asked what would happen if Russia goes into eastern Ukraine, the spokesman said: “What we are saying very clearly is that they should not escalate.”

The relative weakness of the sanctions may reflect a sense in the US and European governments that Crimea is already lost and the focus should be on preventing a Russian takeover of major population centres in eastern Ukraine.

Increasing the numbers on the sanctions list is almost certain to be discussed at the EU summit on Thursday and Friday. Some EU states are torn about taking punitive measures against Russia for fear of undoing years of patient attempts to establish closer ties with Moscow and increase trade. The EU has already suspended talks with Russia on an economic pact and a visa agreement.

A meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels decided on the reprisals following non-stop talks over the weekend until late on Sunday. Senior EU officials expect the Kremlin to retaliate in a tit-for-tat sanctions war that is likely to spiral. EU leaders are to meet in Brussels on Thursday for a summit dominated by Ukraine and could agree to lengthen the blacklist.

European ministers and EU officials said the 21 people – mainly political rather than business figures – would face a freeze on assets as well as a travel ban. That number could be expanded later in the week, they added.

It is notoriously difficult to secure EU agreement on sanctions anywhere because they require unanimity from the 28 member states. There were wide differences over the numbers of Russians and Crimeans to be punished, with countries such as Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria and Spain reluctant to penalise Moscow for fear of closing down channels of dialogue.

The Dutch foreign minister, Frans Timmermans, described sanctions as inevitable, saying: “I hope the Russians will realise that sanctions will hurt everyone, but no one more than the Russians themselves.”

The aim of some members is to gradually increase sanctions, just as the EU did with Iran, to put pressure on Putin rather than apply all the pressure now.

The German foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, said any measure must leave “ways and possibilities open to prevent a further escalation that could lead to the division of Europe”.

EU member states are threatening to move to broader economic and trade blocks on the Russians, leading to fears of a full-blown trade war that could be ruinous to both sides.

The Hungarian government warned of a “long economic war” between Russia and the EU, while the Polish foreign minister, Radek Sikorski, described the Kremlin’s effective land grab in Ukraine as an ‘anschluss’ or annexation, using the term coined to describe Hitler’s takeover of Austria in 1938.

“The EU does not recognise the illegal ‘referendum’ and its outcome,” a statement said following the Brussels meeting. “It was held in the visible presence of armed soldiers under conditions of intimidation of civic activists and journalists, blacking out of Ukrainian television channels and obstruction of civilian traffic in and out of Crimea.”

The Lithuanian foreign minister, Linas Linkevicius, predicted that Thursday’s European summit, which will be dominated by the Ukraine crisis, would expand the sanctions against Russia.

“The targeted sanctions against Russia are just the beginning as long as Russia does not change its strategy of gradual escalation,” said the leading German christian democratic MEP, Elmar Brok. “These measures include an embargo on munitions and dual-use technologies, as well as measures against Russian companies and their subsidiaries.”

The EU and Ukraine are scheduled to sign the political part of their association pact at the summit on Friday.

Ukraine’s foreign minister, Andriy Deshchytsya, visited Nato headquarters on Monday and was promised “increased ties with Ukraine’s political and military leadership.”

Nato, in a statement, described the referendum as “illegal and illegitimate”.

The US alleged a series of specific irregularities in the conduct of the referendum, but there is no suggestion they would have been enough to change the outcome of a vote given the wider political and military circumstances.

Officials in Washington suggested results showing 96.8% of those voting in favour of joining Russia and a 83.1% turnout were implausibly high, especially when an estimated 99% of Crimean Tatars refused to take part.

White House sources also claimed it was suspicious that there was not a single complaint to election authorities, and have promised extra funding to help make sure there is a record number of international observers present when Ukraine holds its national elections in May.

“There has been broad speculation and some concrete evidence that ballots have arrived in Crimea for the referendum and had been pre-marked in many cities,” said a senior US administration official.

“There are massive anomalies in the vote, even as it is recorded, including the fact that, based on the census in Sevastopol city, 123% of the Sevastopol population would have had to have voted yes for the referendum.”

Additional reporting by Ian Traynor in Vienna and Rowena Mason

The seven Russians targeted by US sanctions

Vladislav Surkov, a Putin aide
Sergey Glazyev, a Putin adviser
Leonid Slutsky, a state Duma deputy
Andrei Klishas, member of the Federation Council (the upper house of the Federal Assembly of Russia)
Valentina Matviyenko, head of the Federation Council
Dmitry Rogozin, deputy prime minister
Yelena Mizulina, a state Duma deputy

While West Focuses on Crimea, Russia Continues To Make Trouble in the Middle East – Tablet Magazine.

The Kremlin’s interests in the region are deep—and it may see an opportunity to gain leverage in the current crisis

By Josh Cohen | March 17, 2014 12:00 AM

Until February, when pro-European protesters who spent all winter occupying Independence Square in central Kiev succeeded in bringing down the Russian-backed government of Ukraine, the biggest standoff between Moscow and the West was in the Middle East—specifically in Syria, where President Bashar al-Assad, with support from Russian President Vladimir Putin, is embroiled in a brutal four-year civil war.But while Washington’s policymakers are focusing on Putin’s actions in Eastern Europe, events in the eastern Mediterranean continue to unfold with their own momentum—and it’s highly unlikely that the Kremlin, however preoccupied it is with managing the situation in Crimea, will let its other geo-strategic priorities drop. Russian interests in the Middle East are both wide and deep—as deep as, and perhaps deeper than, the West’s—and in extremis, it’s even possible that Putin may decide to use Russia’s influence and relationships in the Middle East to severely damage Western interests there in order to gain leverage in Ukraine.

Historically, Syria was the main venue through which the Soviets projected power in the Middle East, and a number of military, political, and economic factors ensure the Kremlin’s continued hand in events there. For starters, Russia maintains a naval base in the coastal Syrian city of Tartus—Russia’s only port in the Mediterranean and a crucial sea link given that access to and from the Black Sea is controlled by Turkey, a NATO-member country. Last May, the Russian navy established what was described as a permanent Mediterranean naval task force, part of Putin’s project of reinvigorating the Russian military and projecting power globally. Without access to Tartus, Russian ships and submarines would have nowhere in the eastern Mediterranean to refuel.

Russia also has a deep fear of Islamic—and specifically Sunni—fundamentalism and has engaged in what it perceives as its own long-running battle against Islamic radicalism, first in Afghanistan and for the last 15 years in the Caucasus. In Syria, where a post-Assad regime would likely be dominated by hard-line Sunni Islamists, Putin genuinely fears that loss of Syria to an Islamist government will result in some kind of blowback on Russia’s southern fringe. Already Moscow knows there are a considerable number of Chechens fighting with al-Qaida-linked jihadist groups against the Assad regime, and the Russians are naturally concerned about these individuals returning to Russia if Assad is overthrown.

The Russians also have deep economic interests in Syria. The total value of Syrian contracts with the Russian defense industry likely exceeds $4 billion. And the recent discovery of natural-gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean provides a new potential revenue stream for Russia, whose state-owned natural-gas firm Soyuzneftegaz signed a contract with the Assad regime in December to explore offshore drilling opportunities in Syrian waters.

Russia’s influence over Assad is substantial—the Syrian regime is virtually a client-state of Moscow’s—and without the support of Russia the Assad regime’s survival would be in great doubt. The Russians have been both a major arms conduit for the Assad regime and have also supplied Syria with crucial political support at the United Nations, where they have vetoed a number of anti-Assad resolutions. While Russia has so far publicly encouraged both sides in the Syrian conflict to reach some kind of peaceful resolution, Putin is in a position to leverage his relationship with Assad to create headaches for the West—providing him with more advanced weaponry, or even inserting Russian military advisers to support the Assad regime. Such actions would only embolden Assad and could easily result in an even greater increase in chaos and bloodshed in Syria, with potential spillover into Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan.

Meanwhile, Russia maintains a complex relationship with its other longtime ally in the region, Iran. Historically, first under the tsars and then under the Soviets, Tehran feared Russian expansionism. With the break-up of the Soviet Union, however, relations improved greatly, as Russian and Iranian interests began to substantially converge—particularly when it came to limiting American influence and power in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Both Russia and Iran remain major backers of the Assad regime, in part because of their shared interest in opposing Sunni fundamentalism.

Unlike with Syria, however, Iran is not a client state of Russia, and there are a number of areas where Russian and Iranian interests are in conflict with each other. Economically, Russia has benefited tremendously from the international boycott against Iran. Tension in the Persian Gulf and Iran’s difficulty selling its oil in international markets has supported the high price of this commodity, which is critical for a Russian economy heavily based on its oil and gas resources. Sanctions against Iran also have prevented Central Asian states such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan from constructing export pipelines for their oil and gas through Iran to the Persian Gulf, allowing Russia to continue to exert a substantial influence over these countries by retaining a stranglehold on their oil- and gas-export routes.

Russia also, it should be emphasized, does not wish for Iran to obtain nuclear weapons. While the Russians remain strongly opposed to a Western or Israeli attack on Iran—believing it would be a “catastrophe” that would inflame sectarian tensions in the Middle East—the Kremlin has no interest in welcoming another nuclear power in its neighborhood, especially one that could compete with Russian influence in the Muslim states of the former Soviet Union. Putin is well aware that if Iran goes nuclear, Saudi Arabia—which in Moscow’s view is responsible for fomenting unrest in the Caucasus—might also choose to go nuclear via its alliance with Pakistan. Accordingly, while the Russians have resisted all U.N. sanctions against Syria, they have actually voted in favor of U.N. resolutions condemning Iran’s nuclear-enrichment program.

The Russians could easily leverage their relationship with Iran in a number of ways—starting by reactivating the deal to supply Iran with the S-300 missiles. Indeed, Putin may already be signaling Russia’s capabilities to retaliate against Western sanctions with his decision to send a Russian atomic energy official to Tehran to discuss building a second nuclear plant in Iran.

In a best-case scenario—a diplomatic settlement on Ukraine—Putin could decide to increase his cooperation with the West in the Middle East. In Syria, for example, Putin could reduce or even cut off the flow of weapons to the Syrian regime; push Assad to negotiate more seriously with the moderate opposition; or make a statement of some sort indicating that Russia does not see Assad as an indispensable part of Syria’s future. On Iran, Putin could signal support for the Western position simply by ending discussions on additional nuclear energy cooperation with Tehran, as well as by publicly pushing Iran to reach a settlement freezing its nuclear program.

But now, in the wake of the Crimean referendum, we’re heading into a field of unknowns—and if Putin decides he’s willing to upend his relationship with Europe, there’s no reason to think he wouldn’t exercise his capacity to significantly damage Western interests in the Middle East if he so chooses.

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Josh Cohen is a former U.S. State Department official who was involved in managing economic reform projects in the former Soviet Union. His Twitter feed is @jkc_in_dc.

Off Topic: Arab Hackers Threaten Cyberattack April 7 – Israel National News.

One year after previous wave of cyberattacks, ‘Anonymous Arab’ trhreatens to do it again.

By Gil Ronen
First Publish: 3/17/2014, 7:20 PM