WarSclerotic

Obama to Iranians: ‘We have the opportunity to start down a new path’ – CNN.

(YESS, we can! And don’t forget your famous reset button that worked like a charm with Putin.
Hach, it’s all hope and change all over again. I feel a thrill. What wonderful exciting times so full of hope  and optimism.
What? You’ve got already a Nobel Peace Prize? How about the Nobel Piss Prize?  – Artaxes)

By Greg Botelho, CNN

March 20, 2014 — Updated 1708 GMT (0108 HKT)

 

(CNN) — In a message to the Iranian people, an upbeat President Barack Obama said Thursday that the long isolated Middle East nation can soon improve its economy, its world standing and its people’s lives if there’s a breakthrough nuclear deal.”For the first time in many years, we have the opportunity to start down a new path,” Obama said in a message timed for Nowruz, the Persian new year.

A lot has changed since the last Nowruz.

For one, Iranians elected Hassan Rouhani — who campaigned, in part, on opening up Iran more to the world including negotiations on its nuclear program — as president last summer.

Significant changes in Tehran’s approach followed, leading to an interim agreement in November involving Iran and the so-called P5+1 — the United States, China, Russia, Britain, France and Germany. The deal called for Iran to roll back parts of its nuclear program in return for relief from some sanctions. That agreement went into effect in January.

The challenge now is to reach a permanent deal acceptable to all sides.

Obama said Thursday that “a comprehensive agreement … this year can help open up new possibilities and prosperity for the Iranian people for years to come.” That includes more open trade, more jobs and “more opportunities for Iranian students,” according to the President.

Noting the progress that has been made, Obama stressed that “this will be difficult.” At the same time, he insisted the United States is ready to talk.

“I’m committed to diplomacy,” the President said, “because I believe there is the basis for a practical solution.”

 

For Gulf Allies, Obama’s Turn Away From the Region Looks Like a Gift to Tehran – Tablet Magazine.

(A must read.
I agree with the author of this excellent article. This is a recipe for disaster.
It doesn’t matter if this disaster happens tomorrow or in the coming years.
The fact that it involves roughly 50% of the worlds oil production will make the economic impact of ObavezCare pale in comparison.
But aside from that impact the other ramifications are equally scary. – Artaxes)

Disengagement from a region whose power structures are predicated on American management is a recipe for disaster

By Lee Smith | March 19, 2014 12:00 AM

The Case for Zero Enrichment in Iran – The Arms Control Association.

Michael Singh

In the debate over sanctions on Iran—their role in bringing Tehran to the negotiating table and their proper place in U.S. diplomatic strategy in the future—scant attention has been paid to a major shift in the negotiating position of the P5+1, the group of six countries (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) that is negotiating with Tehran over the Iranian nuclear program.

No longer is the P5+1 demanding that Iran halt uranium enrichment. Indeed, in the November 24 first-step nuclear accord, the Joint Plan of Action,[1] the P5+1 all but concedes that Iran will be permitted to enrich in perpetuity. In separate comments that have quickly become conventional wisdom among Iran analysts, U.S. negotiators now characterize their previous position that Iran should halt enrichment as “maximalist.”[2] Although undoubtedly expedient, this shift away from a zero-enrichment negotiating position is misguided and unnecessary.[3]

The U.S. shift away from zero enrichment to limited enrichment represents a significant diplomatic victory for Iran. For the last decade, the position of the EU-3 (France, Germany, and the UK) and then the P5+1 had been that Iran must “suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development.” This position was enshrined as an Iranian obligation in a series of UN Security Council resolutions.[4] Iran, however, asserted a “right to enrich” and refused to halt enrichment after resuming it when nuclear talks with the European Union broke down in 2005. This difference formed the core of the confrontation that subsequently developed between Iran and the allies.

Beginning in 2005, the United States, the EU, and others imposed onerous sanctions on Iran, effectively cutting the country off from the global financial system and sharply curtailing its oil revenues and other forms of trade. Nevertheless, it was not Iran but the P5+1 that flinched first. In October 2009, the allies proposed a fuel swap, under which Iran would ship low-enriched uranium out of the country in exchange for fuel plates for its Tehran Research Reactor, which uses uranium enriched to a higher level to produce medical isotopes. The proposal did not explicitly recognize Iran’s claimed right to enrich, but seemed to implicitly accept that Iran would continue enriching uranium to a low level of 5 percent or less. The November 24 joint plan represents the culmination of this shift.

Iran, which is a net exporter of fossil fuels and electricity, has insisted that it desires enrichment solely for peaceful purposes. The text of the joint plan indicates that Iran will be permitted a “mutually defined enrichment program with mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical needs.” The notion that Iran has any practical need for enrichment, however, is a dubious one.

Iran is blessed with abundant resources of oil and natural gas, so much so that it was one of the world’s leading exporters of these fuels before the recent sanctions.[5] It provided refined fuel to domestic consumers at deeply subsidized rates, making Iranian per capita consumption of gasoline among the highest in the world.[6] Even if one puts this aside and accepts Tehran’s argument that it wants to diversify its energy supply for environmental and other reasons, enriching uranium makes little sense. Because importing fuel is much more economical, very few non-nuclear-weapon states enrich their own uranium.

Iran may claim that it does not want to import reactor fuel—although this is precisely what it does for the Bushehr reactor—so that it can ensure a secure supply. Because Iran has minimal uranium reserves, however, it would remain dependent on imports of natural uranium. Indeed, Iran’s two reported uranium mines together annually produce insufficient uranium for even a single 1,000-megawatt reactor.[7] As former Los Alamos National Laboratory Director Siegfried Hecker and former Secretary of Defense William Perry recently observed, “Iran can never become self-sufficient” in its nuclear energy program.[8] Iran’s energy security would be far better served by reducing its reliance on imports of refined petroleum and natural gas and lowering domestic consumption.

A common argument is that Iran must retain an enrichment capability because the Iranian people demand it, or because Iran, having made a major investment in enrichment, needs to save face.[9] Although a recent poll indicated that 96 percent of Iranians believe that “maintaining the right to advance a nuclear program is worth the price being paid in economic sanctions and international isolation,” only 6 percent agreed that “continuing our nuclear enrichment program” is one of the top concerns they want the Iranian government to address.[10] Of far greater priority are issues such as economic recovery and increased employment. This suggests that the Iranian people would be open to compromises that provide economic relief while preserving Iran’s civilian nuclear energy program without specifically permitting enrichment.

In short, Iran has no “practical need” for uranium enrichment, unless its actual desire is to build or preserve the option to build a nuclear weapon. Indeed, the Iranian government has not even convinced its own people that its intentions are peaceful. The poll cited above finds that 55 percent of Iranians believe that Iran “has ambitions to produce nuclear weapons.”[11]

One might argue that even if Iran has no practical need for enrichment, the P5+1 shift from zero to limited enrichment is expedient because it eases the way to a diplomatic agreement while incurring little cost to the P5+1. This neglects the serious downsides of permitting enrichment in Iran.

First and foremost, allowing Iran to enrich complicates the task of verifying that Iran is not diverting ostensibly safeguarded material to a parallel, covert nuclear weapons program. If Iran is permitted to enrich, by implication it also will be permitted to mine, convert, and stockpile uranium. In addition, it will be permitted to manufacture centrifuges and possibly import centrifuge components and related materials. Under the joint plan, Iran is even permitted to continue to research and test advanced centrifuges. Such work could significantly shorten Iran’s breakout time if it abrogated the nuclear agreement or that agreement expired.

Verifying nondiversion at every point along this supply chain is a formidable task. If Iran were to agree to forgo enrichment entirely and instead import its reactor fuel, however, any of the above activities, if detected, would serve as an early warning of possible clandestine nuclear activities.

Allowing Iran to enrich raises questions about broader U.S. policy on enrichment. Washington has sought to contain the spread of this technology, given its dual-use nature. The United States held out as a “gold standard” the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement it signed with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2009, whereby the latter voluntarily agreed to forgo enrichment and reprocessing.[12] This was meant to be not only a signal to Iran, but also an effort to strengthen the nonproliferation regime globally, although the question of whether this standard should be applied universally is debated by nonproliferation experts.[13]

U.S. abandonment of its effort to require Iran to halt enrichment would not only threaten the agreement with the UAE, which, like Iran’s other regional rivals, would have an incentive to match Tehran’s capabilities, but undermine any effort to persuade countries to forgo enrichment and reprocessing, whether as the result of a legal or merely political commitment. In seeking to do so, Washington would be in the unenviable and perhaps unsustainable position of seeking to deny allies the technology it has permitted to a country that it views as an adversary and that has repeatedly violated the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The likely result would be the spread of enrichment technology.

Finally, permitting Iran to enrich, especially in the context of an agreement that does not require Tehran to abandon support for terrorism or other destabilizing policies, will be seen as a defeat for Washington. At a time when U.S. influence in the Middle East is already at low ebb, the message to allies and adversaries alike would be one of diminishing U.S. will. The effect on the global nonproliferation regime would be the same: Iran will have successfully defied the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors and the UN Security Council after rejecting the legitimacy of both, sending the message that international nonproliferation obligations are malleable.

Zero enrichment is hardly a maximalist position; it entails offering Iran something it deeply needs (sanctions relief) in exchange for something it does not (enrichment). There was no tactical need for the P5+1 to walk away from zero enrichment. At a time when sanctions are having a significant impact on the Iranian economy, the P5+1 should allow the pressure of sanctions to work to full effect. Yielding on enrichment may hasten a nuclear agreement, but would threaten vital U.S. interests such as nonproliferation and regional stability.

Michael Singh is managing director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He was senior director for Near East and North African affairs at the National Security Council under President George W. Bush.

Iran’s Fortunes Rising in a Middle East Vacuum – Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Segall, March 19, 2014

Vol. 14, No. 7 March 19, 2014

• On March 12, 2014, Israel was hit by massive rocket fire from Gaza by Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). PIJ is completely dependent on Iran for its funding and equipment, and some of its operatives have also undergone training in Iran for the manufacture of rockets and explosives and for guerrilla warfare. There have also been recurring attacks on IDF border forces in Israel’s north as well – including along the Syrian border – where Hizbullah’s ties with Iran are well-known. All of these attacks on Israel come in the wake of the green light given by Iran against the backdrop of changing power equations in the broader Middle East.

• Iran has been leading an “axis of evil” as it devises and implements an ambitious plan to increase its influence across the Middle East and mold it in line with its revolutionary Islamic ideology. Central to that plan is ejecting the United States and the West from the region, along with what remains of their influence.

• The change in Iran’s behavior reflects its growing self-confidence since the recent rounds of nuclear negotiations with the West began, along with America’s rapidly declining regional and international status (vivid in the Ukrainian crisis as well). The more the United States’ regional and international status sinks, the more Iran’s self-confidence rises.

• Iran regards the U.S., and the West in general, as lacking the capacity to use military force to stop its nuclearization, or to curtail Iran’s assertive measures against the Gulf States and in the Middle East generally. Iran sees an opportunity to continue driving the U.S. and the West out of the region.

• Iran views Hizbullah and the Palestinian terror organizations as major components in its national security strategy, part of its long arm. Iran acts ceaselessly to provide these actors with rockets and the knowledge to manufacture them, along with other weapons. The latest developments, coupled with Iran’s growing realization that it is immune to a Western military attack, could lead it to make even bolder moves by itself and through its proxies.

• U.S. policy is increasingly impelling states in the Middle East to alter their framework of alliances. They view the United States as less and less reliable, and are seeking an alternate power instead. Possibilities include Russia, China, or – closer to home – Iran.

A Green Light from Iran to Strike at Israel

The massive rocket fire from Gaza at Israel by Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) on March 12, 2014, under the rubric of “breaking the silence,” coupled with the detonation of explosive charges by Hizbullah along the northern border fence on Mt. Dov on March 14 and in the northern Golan Heights on March 18, suggests that Iran’s two main allies in the region were given a green light to step up the friction with Israel and gradually change the rules of the game that has been played so far.

PIJ is completely dependent on Iran for its funding and equipment, and some of its operatives have also undergone training in Iran for the manufacture of rockets and explosives and for guerrilla warfare. The already well-known ties between Iran and Hizbullah are now reaching a new level as Iran involves Hizbullah in the effort to rescue the Assad regime in Syria. President Bashar Assad’s war on the numerous, fragmented opposition factions has entered its fourth year, while so far costing some 150,000 lives.

These recent attacks on Israel, whose timing is not coincidental, were preceded by Israel’s interdiction of the Klos C weapons ship with its cargo of forty Syrian-made M-203 long-range missiles, along with mortars. The intended recipient was PIJ in Gaza. These large-warhead, precision missiles were meant as a game-changer in Gaza, to give Iran’s client a strategic advantage over Hamas, which has been increasingly beleaguered, with Sinai and al-Sisi’s Egypt in turmoil.

Iran is also reestablishing its ties with Hamas after a two-year hiatus in the wake of disagreements over support for Assad in the Syrian civil war. According to Palestinian sources, a high-level Hamas delegation headed by Khaled Mashal, head of its political bureau, intends to visit Iran soon to discuss “important issues.” The same source denied that “Tehran has closed all its doors in Hamas’ face,” and emphasized that “the relationship between the two sides has started to be restored in a positive and gradual manner.”¹

According to the pan-Arab daily Al-Quds al-Arabi, Mahmoud al-Zahar, a Hamas co-founder and member of the political bureau, and Marwan Isa, deputy commander of Al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, played a crucial role in arranging the meeting in Tehran.² Ali Larijani, head of the Iranian Majlis, said recently that the relationship between Iran and Hamas has returned to the way it was in the past and that Iran supports Hamas since it belongs to the resistance front, and since “our Islamic duty commands us to support the resistance.”³

Improving Ties among Iran, Syria, and Hizbullah

The course taken by the Klos C cargo – from Syria to Iran to Iraq – again reveals the key points of the “axis of evil” and the tightening links between them. This axis is led by Iran, which has been devising and implementing an ambitious plan to increase its influence in the Middle East and mold it in line with its revolutionary ideology. Central to that plan is ejecting the United States and the West from the region, along with what remains of their influence.

Especially noteworthy in this context is the intensifying cooperation among the Iran-Syria-Hizbullah triangle. At Iran’s behest, Hizbullah has entered the struggle to salvage Iran’s strategic asset, the Assad regime. Despite growing domestic criticism, in part due to scores of Hizbullah casualties on Syrian soil, Nasrallah has been carrying out Tehran’s directives. He has been compensated with advanced weapons (some of them Russian-made) that have been transferred to Hizbullah from Syria (according to foreign reports, some of these weapons consignments have been destroyed by Israel). Among other weaponry, Yakhont (Sapphire) surface-to-sea missiles along with surface-to-air missiles could affect the IDF’s future operational range. In addition, Iran has generously paid off Hizbullah with UAVs for attacking and intelligence-gathering, as well as in funds. From Iran’s standpoint, Syria and Lebanon have somewhat coalesced.

The Decline of the West

The change in Iran’s behavior reflects its growing self-confidence since the nuclear negotiations with the West began, along with America’s rapidly declining regional and international status (seen in the Ukrainian crisis as well). That decline was especially evident in Washington’s hesitant approach to the Syrian crisis after the regime’s use of chemical weapons was revealed, and in the adoption of the Russian diplomatic solution. Tehran saw this compromise as a victory for Iran in particular and for its resistance axis in general, and as clearly indicating the future deterrent capability of this axis vis-à-vis the U.S.-led West. The commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Mohammad Ali Jafari, said the United States had been defeated in Syria. “The scheme whereby they wanted to intervene militarily in Syria was defeated and their main plan failed, like the rest of their plans….This while the enemy said, ‘If we do not succeed to overcome Syria, we also will not succeed to overcome Iran.’”⁴

The more the United States’ regional and international status sinks, the more Iran’s self-confidence rises. That, in turn, will affect Iran’s approach to the nuclear talks and its willingness to compromise; the chances of its doing so were never high in the first place.

As Washington continues in its conciliatory course, which has come to be known as “leading from behind,” and Russia’s international status and power projection keep improving, Russia’s partners, including Iran, will take increasingly bold, subversive action in the region. Iran regards the United States, and the West in general, as lacking the capacity to use military force to stop its nuclearization, or to curtail Iran’s assertive measures against the Gulf States and in the Middle East generally (including supplying terror organizations with advanced weapons, promoting subversion, and aiding Islamic organizations). On the contrary, Iran sees an opportunity to continue driving the United States and the West out of the region.

Lessons for Iran from the Ukrainian Crisis

In that spirit, the Iranian Kayhan newspaper, which usually reflects the views of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, wrote that Iran should draw lessons from the Crimean crisis and learn from Russia’s conduct. The paper said Iran should rely on its military (implicitly, also nuclear) power and exploit evolving regional crises. Iran already seems to be applying these lessons.

Kayhan also claimed the events in Ukraine had again shown the effectiveness of military force, notwithstanding international relations theories about the supposed primacy of economic and media factors over military ones. “Military forces can decide, at a sensitive moment, the fate of a particular conflict…as long as they are under wise leadership. That is what happened in the Ukraine affair….We learn that the way to overcome a certain country, and stop its other kinds of power from functioning, is to weaken its military status.” For thirty-five years, Kayhan asserts, the West has striven to weaken Iran militarily, and is continuing to do so in the nuclear talks. And yet,

the resolve of the Russians and the alacrity of President Putin have brought the West to passivity. The fact that the Western states are (again) talking of economic sanctions and the fact that NATO (despite having signed a defense pact with Ukraine) has not mounted a military response to Russia’s military move and maneuvers in Ukraine, instead settling (as is typical) for declarations – shows that the West is in a passive position.

Kayhan draws links between the West’s frictions with Iran and with Russia, and remarks:

From a national perspective, Russia is helped by Iran in addressing most of its security and diplomatic concerns, and in return Iran is helped by Russia’s support on the Syrian, Lebanese, Iraqi, Afghan, nuclear, and other issues. Furthermore, in this affair Russia is in conflict with our enemies, that is, the West. That in itself means we must be pleased with the defeat of our enemies, even if we have criticism of the Russian side.

Kayhan went on to criticize Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif for saying Iran was worried by the developments in Ukraine, and concluded that “it was Russia that had learned from Iran to stand firm against the West and cause it to be passive….We have to look at the benefits accruing from the Ukrainian crisis and use them to extend our power and influence.”⁵

Iran views Hizbullah and the Palestinian terror organizations as major components in its national security strategy, part of its long arm. Iran acts ceaselessly to provide these actors with rockets, missiles, and the knowledge to manufacture them, along with other weapons (antitank, antiaircraft, etc.). The latest developments, coupled with Iran’s growing realization that it is immune to a Western military attack, could lead it to make even bolder moves, sometimes through its proxies, than it has taken so far. The more confidence Iran feels, the more this tendency will grow, affecting its behavior toward its Persian Gulf neighbors as well.

Israel’s Destruction Is on the Islamic Agenda

Iran’s confidence is also apparent in its ongoing calls for Israel’s destruction. As the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guard commanders move further from the “Rouhani effect” of Iran’s June 2013 presidential elections, even as Rouhani keeps winning international favor, they have been resuming their harsh anti-Israeli and anti-Western statements. For example, the Guard’s deputy commander, Hossein Salami, said recently at a conference on “The Islamic World’s Role in the Geometry of the World Power,” under a headline stating “Iran’s Finger on Trigger to Destroy Zionist Regime”:

Today, we can destroy every spot which is under the Zionist regime’s control with any volume of fire power (that we want) right from here….

Islam has given us this wish, capacity and power to destroy the Zionist regime so that our hands will remain on the trigger from 1,400 km. away for the day when such an incident (confrontation with Israel) takes place.⁶

He added, hinting at the aid Iran provides to states bordering Israel, that Iran is not the only state with such capabilities, since some of the other Muslim states’ artillery can reach targets within Israel.

There Is No Vacuum in the Middle East

In sum, if one connects the dots between the recent developments in the regional and international arenas, it emerges that the more America’s regional and international power wanes, the more Iran’s self-confidence grows. In the Middle East, Iran aspires to fill the void. The perception of American weakness makes Iran more self-assured and impels it toward more audacious moves on the Syrian-Lebanese and Palestinian fronts, as Iran makes use of the resistance camp in waging its ongoing anti-Israel struggle. If Iran continues to perceive American weakness, it will also step up its activities against its Persian Gulf neighbors.

One should view Iran’s reconciliation with Hamas against this background. It is not occurring due to ideology but as part of the wider struggle for influence that Iran is waging against Saudi Arabia in various parts of the Middle East as part of the broader Sunni-Shiite struggle. Iran seeks to benefit from the disagreements within the Sunni camp (such as between Qatar and the rest of the Gulf States) on various issues (such as the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt). Iranian control in Gaza would enable it to more broadly influence its political associates as well as the newly reconstituted Egyptian arena.

Ongoing American weakness and mounting tensions with Russia will likely have negative implications in general and on the nuclear talks in particular. Russia, which so far has played a negative role in those talks and usually has shielded Iran from strong measures, will be even less prepared to countenance such measures as the talks approach the point of decision. Hence, the chances of the talks diverting Iran from its military nuclear path, which were quite low to begin with, will dwindle to nothing. Moreover, given U.S. behavior in the recent crises, Iran has concluded that it will be able to violate a nuclear agreement without incurring penalties.

As Iran and other regional states view the matter, the Ukrainian crisis is another in a long series of regional and international crises in which Putin has emerged as a resolute, decisive leader on regional issues, while Obama has appeared weak, indecisive, and passive. The region’s Arab leaders, especially those of states once considered U.S. allies (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and even Jordan), are not impressed by U.S. conduct in the Syrian crisis and are closely watching Obama’s moves in the Ukrainian predicament; they are likely to be disappointed once more.

U.S. policy is increasingly impelling these states to alter their framework of regional and international alliances. They view the United States as less and less reliable, and are seeking an alternate power instead. Possibilities include Russia, China, or – closer to home – Iran. In the Middle East, where change occurs at a dizzying pace, anything can happen.

Iran, in any case, is acting to make itself the dominant, stable power of the region.

* * *
Notes

1. http://alarabalyawm.net/?p=130781

2. Al-Quds al-Arabi, March 15, 2014.

3. http://www.irna.ir/en/News/81080143/Politic/Larijani_Zionist_regime_unlikely_to_start_a_new_war

4. http://www.mehrnews.com/detail/News/2136361

5. http://kayhan.ir/fa/news/7585/%D9%86%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%88%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86-%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2

6. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13921220000944

About Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Segall

IDF Lt.-Col. (ret.) Michael (Mickey) Segall, an expert on strategic issues with a focus on Iran, terrorism, and the Middle East, is a senior analyst at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and the Terrogence Company.

Syria confirms Israeli airstrike, warns against endangering stability in region – Jerusalem Post.

Syrian army say 1 killed, 7 wounded in Israeli strike early Wednesday that targeted 3 sites near Qunaitra.

By REUTERS 03/19/2014 13:19

Israeli air strikes on Wednesday against Syrian military sites near the Golan Heights killed one person and wounded seven others, Syria’s armed forces said, warning that the attacks endangered stability in the region.
An armed forces statement said the strikes targeted three sites near the town of Qunaitra

It is periodically necessary for Israel to take “aggressive action” so that the quiet in the north will be maintained, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said Wednesday just hours after the IAF hit targets in Syria in response to Tuesday’s attack on an IDF jeep on the Golan Heights.

Netanyahu, speaking at the weekly cabinet meeting that was postponed from Sunday because of Purim, said that the targets hit belonged to Syrian elements who not only allowed the attack to take place, but assisted in it.

“Our policy is very clear,” he said. “We strike those who strike us.”

Netanyahu also said that Israel, to the best of its ability, consistently thwarts the transfer of weapons.

Amos Yadlin, a former chief of Israeli military intelligence, said there was “no desire for escalation” on Israel’s part, noting the air force was capable of carrying out attacks far more dramatic than Wednesday’s pre-dawn strikes.

The Israeli military said targets of the latest air strikes had included a Syrian military headquarters, a training facility and artillery batteries on the Syrian-held side of the Golan.

Occasional spillover violence on the Golan from the Syrian civil war has often drawn Israeli return fire against Syrian positions, ending what had previously been a stable ceasefire between the foes since the 1973 Middle East war.

“There is no spillover here,” Yadlin told Army Radio, referring to the roadside bombing.

“When the other side changes the rules of the game, Israel has to make clear it carries a very high price. I think Assad understands the price,” said Yadlin, who heads Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies.

Off Topic Joke: Another Such Isolation and We Are Undone.

(I’ve just realized that we need a new category for artcles. 
Off Topic Jokes. – Artaxes)

Rick Richman | @jpundit

Secretary of State Kerry held a town hall yesterday, delivering remarks to students on “Making Foreign Policy Less Foreign” and then taking questions. The last question came from a woman named “Yulia,” a University of Georgia student originally from Kiev in Ukraine. She was disturbed by the rise in Putin’s approval ratings and the inability to inform the Russian public of the facts relating to Ukraine: 

QUESTION: … Given [Putin’s] policy in Ukraine, that’s frankly a little bit terrifying. And the fact that I heard the other day a statistic that only about 11 percent of Russians have regular access to the internet also makes it difficult for us to give them any other kind of message besides what they’re hearing from the likes of Dmitry Kiselev and (inaudible) and the kind of just nasty propaganda that’s being told about us.   

SECRETARY KERRY: … you’re right; [Putin’s] approval ratings have gone up significantly. They’re at 70 percent or something. Everybody’s feeling great about flexing their muscles about this, quote, “achievement,” as they put it. But in the end, I think it’s going to be very costly if they continue to go down that kind of a road. Because it will wind up – I mean, the vote in the United Nations on a resolution the other day about this was 13 in favor of the resolution; one abstention, China; and one no, Russia. I call that isolation. [Emphasis added].  

I call it an un-adopted UN resolution. In UN parlance, the “no” from Russia was a “veto.” 

The Obama administration prides itself on “isolating” U.S. adversaries. (1) North Korea: last year, after its third nuclear test, following a ballistic missile launch two months before, President Obama issued a written statement calling it “a highly provocative act” that violated numerous UN resolutions and agreements and threatened U.S. and international security, declaring North Korea “increasingly isolated.” (2) Syria: during the third 2012 presidential debate, Obama declared: “What we’ve done is organize the international community, saying Assad has to go. We’ve mobilized sanctions against that government. We have made sure that they are isolated.” (3) Iran: Obama declared at a 2012 press conference, “When I came into office, Iran was unified, on the move, had made substantial progress on its nuclear program … [currently] Iran is politically isolated.”

Now Russia joins the list: it is supposedly isolated because of an un-adopted UN resolution. 

They are laughing at the American president in North Korea, Syria, Iran, and Russia (literally in the latter case): do not cross President Obama, or he might “isolate” you. Meanwhile, the nuclear tests, ICBM launches, civilian massacres (using only conventional weapons), centrifuge whirrings, and cross-border military moves go on, undeterred by past or prospective Obama “isolations.”

Off Topic: Baltic States, Poland Said Unimpressed by U.S. Response to Ukraine Crisis – Global Security Newswire.

Off Topic: Duck and Cover – The Washington Free Beacon.

Study: Effective civil defenses in Israel town have greatly reduced deaths via terrorist rocket attacks

BY: Abraham Rabinovich
March 19, 2014 9:56 am

JERUSALEM—An effective civil defense system has cut casualties in Israeli towns near the Gaza Strip by 86 percent, according to a study led by professor Edward Kaplan of Yale University’s School of Management.

Taking as a case study the town of Sderot, only a mile from the Gaza Strip, Kaplan and one of his former students, Lian Zucker, calculated that it had been hit by 5,000 Qassam rockets between 2001 and 2010. Ninety percent of residents reported a rocket landing on their street or one adjacent. There were 10 fatalities in the town during this period.

Kaplan told the Jerusalem Post this week that a scenario based on shrapnel dispersal and “spatial allocation models” projected a median death toll of 75 for these randomly fired rockets during the decade. A “best case” scenario showed three times as many fatalities as Sderot suffered and a “worst case” scenario would have nine times as many.

“Casualties are low because Israel is protecting its citizens via its civil defense infrastructure,” Kaplan said.

These defenses include bomb shelters, safe rooms, and an early warning system that sets off sirens when a rocket lift-off in Gaza is picked up by an advanced radar system. There are also small shelters spaced along the streets where residents can go when the sirens sound.

The Iron Dome system, which has been highly effective in downing longer-range rockets, is not effective for Sderot because the range from Gaza is too short for Iron Dome’s interceptors to engage incoming Qassams. However, the Israel Defense Ministry has announced plans to unveil next year a laser weapon, dubbed Iron Beam, which would down short-range rockets.

This is not to suggest that the constant rocket barrage has not had a cost.

Although fatalities have been relatively few in Sderot, there have been 500 reports of injuries over the decade, either physical or psychological. Almost 50 percent of children in Sderot and other communities on the Gaza perimeter have suffered post-traumatic stress disorder. Medical authorities also report a high rate of depression and miscarriages from years of rocket attacks.

Kaplan said he had been motivated to undertake the study by the fact that Israel has suffered relatively few fatalities despite the thousands of rockets fired at it. “There has been a concerted attempt by [critics of Israel] to portray Qassam rockets as essentially harmless, symbolic weapons,” Kaplan said. “These rockets are not harmless.”

The Qassam rockets are relatively simple devices produced in Gaza by Hamas and smaller militant groups. The warhead is filled with smuggled TNT and fertilizer.

Since Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005, the Palestinians have smuggled in from Sinai larger rockets produced abroad, including Iran. The foreign rockets can reach the Tel Aviv metropolitan area and have much heavier warheads.

Israel, in turn, has stepped up its anti-rocket capabilities. When the pace of rocketing becomes unbearable, Israel has responded either with ground incursions into Gaza or intensive air attacks, which generally bring a halt or diminution in rocketing for a period of time.

Dennis Ross: Netanyahu, Obama at odds on Iran — and they’re both right – Jewish Telegraphic Agency.

(Dream on, Mr. Ross. Are you blind or are you a deceiver?
If Putin “has no real interest in having the Iranians with a nuclear weapons capability either” why is he allowing Iran to go all the way to having such a capability? Do you imply that Putin relies on the US/Israel to stop Iran at the last moment? Or do you imply that Putin himself is willing to stop Iran at the last moment either by force, by sanctions or by breaking his alliance with Iran?
Please, don’t make me laugh.
For this and other delusions, read the whole article. – Artaxes)

Iran will not give up uranium enrichment: Rouhani – The Daily Star.

March 19, 2014 05:36 PM