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Congress Eyes New Iran Terror Sanctions After Failed Push on Nuclear Penalties

March 28, 2014

Congress Eyes New Iran Terror Sanctions After Failed Push on Nuclear Penalties – Global Security Newswire.

Firefighters seek to contain flames from an apparent January suicide bombing in a Hezbollah stronghold in Beirut, Lebanon. U.S. legislators are considering a potential push to impose new sanctions on Iran for supporting Hezbollah.

Firefighters seek to contain flames from an apparent January suicide bombing in a Hezbollah stronghold in Beirut, Lebanon. U.S. legislators are considering a potential push to impose new sanctions on Iran for supporting Hezbollah. (AFP/Getty Images)

A stalled U.S. push to advance new nuclear sanctions against Iran has lawmakers mulling how to hit it with terrorism-related penalties instead, al-Monitor reports.

A proposal to further exact a cost on Iran for supporting Hezbollah has been under consideration at the House Foreign Affairs Committee for months, the publication said in a Thursday article. However, the initiative reportedly gained new momentum after Democratic lawmakers stopped pushing to advance separate legislation that would threaten new nuclear sanctions against the Middle Eastern nation.

The United States and five other countries agreed not to impose fresh atomic penalties against Iran for the duration of a six-month atomic deal that took effect in January. Any new nuclear sanctions, according to Tehran, would prompt it to withdraw from an ongoing dialogue over concerns about its nuclear program.

Iran extended that warning to cover any sanctions that would be triggered if Tehran does not agree to specific terms in a potential final nuclear accord. The Persian Gulf power insists its atomic ambitions are purely peaceful, but has voiced openness to potentially accepting long-term restrictions on the efforts in return for sanctions relief from the five permanent U.N. Security Council member nations and Germany.

President Obama previously issued a veto threat for the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act, one bill containing Iran penalties. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) subsequently blocked floor consideration of the proposal, which has 59 co-sponsors.

According to one House staffer, Obama officials “can’t say to Congress that we’re going to blow up the nuclear negotiations by passing further authorizations for Hezbollah sanctions.”

Former U.S. Treasury Department Matthew Levitt, though, suggested that a number of Obama insiders “would probably not want to see it right now if it has anything to do with Iran at all.”

Israel, Ukraine and NATO

March 28, 2014

Israel, Ukraine and NATO – Artaxes’ brainbench.

By Charles Artaxes

This article is a response to an Op-ed titled “Israel must stay out of Ukraine crisis” by Elyakim Haetzni.
Before I begin I want to make clear for the reader not familiar with my writings that the name Obavez refers to the US president who reminds me more of Hugo Chavez than of an US president.
The author of the op-ed made some very good points that demonstrate that Putin is not motivated by hate or negative emotions towards Jews and Israel but that he is rather sympathetic towards Jews and Israel.
I agree with the author. For the time being Israel should stay out of the Ukraine crisis.
At the same time it seems to me that the author is somewhat naive.
It is very believable that Putin has some sentimental feelings and even sympathy for the Jews and Israel BUT he also supports Syria and Iran (both deadly enemies of Israel) very strongly and even doesn’t care if the Iranians get a nuke.
He is not driven by hate but he is a cool strategists who acts in his own selfinterest.
Iran is a figure in his game against the West. He will not let his sympathy for Jews get in the way of his ambitions. If his actions are bad for Israel then so be it. He will not hesitate one second and do what he has to do to win.
Israel for its part will do the same and act in its own self interest and do everything for its survival.
Israel actually has a very strong card: Syria.
If Israel acts decisively in Syria this may even force Putin to stop his expansionist policy in Eastern Europe.
It may even come to the point where Obavez and Putin come closer again and try to negotiate a solution.
While Obavez puts pressure on Israel to stop its action in Syria Putin stops his expansion in Eastern Europe.
As far as Eastern Ukraine is concerned, the party is not over.
The current Russian military buildup on the Ukrainian border seems to indicate that Putin wants to invade Eastern Ukraine.
How?
Perhaps he will play the Yugoslavian scenario. There is already an intensive propaganda campaign in the Russian media under way.
With the Ukrainians painted as fasciscts and nazis and reports about violence against ethnic Russians and Russophiles in the eastern parts of Ukraine.
There are reports of armed Ukrainian thugs threatening Russians. Whether these reports are true has not been independendly verified.
But one thing is clear: The Russian media deliberately incites hate and fear. In such a situation where national passions are high it does not take much to ignite an explosion.
Whether by a spontanious outbreak or through a manufactured terrorist attack, once the violence starts Russia will have the perfect pretext to invade claiming that the Russian army is in the Ukraine to protect the people and to restore law and order.
As far as the West is concerned Obavez already has made clear that the US will not act militarily in the Ukraine conflict and so far the US isn’t even willing to give Ukraine support in the form of military hardware thus turning the 1994 Budapest memorandum, which gave the Ukraine security assurances from the US and UK, into a worthless piece of paper.
Since Ukraine is not a NATO member NATO is neither willing nor obligated to help the Ukraine militarily.
In my analysis if Putin wants Eastern Ukraine, it is already gone to Russia. The West will not prevent him from grabbing the parts of Ukraine that he wants.
The real test for NATO would come if Putin thinks he can play the same game in other Eastern Europan countries which are NATO members.
Estonia for example has a 25% ethnic Russian population. If that happens all bets are off. Estonia will invoke article 5 of NATO which obligates all members of NATO to give military assistence.
If, and I stress IF that happens two things will be the possible result:
War between NATO and Russia.
OR
The end of NATO.
The best thing for NATO to do is: impose the strongest possible sanctions and support Ukraine with weapons, military hardware and trainers if Putin goes ahead and grabs Eastern Ukraine and whether he invades Ukraine or not NATO needs to put the militaries in Eastern Europe on a hightened state of alert and a military buildup must also take place (with deployments from other NATO countries).
This would be a signal that this is the red line Putin will not be allowed to cross.
Which moves Putin makes next does not depend so much on his actual strength or NATO’s actual strength (which is definitely greater) but on how much he thinks the West is willing to oppose him.
Going back to Israel, I believe that sooner or later Israel will be in confrontation with Russia. Not a direct confrontation but through his allies Syria, Hisbollah and Iran.
But for the time being, I believe that Israel should stay out of the mess in Europe. The mess in the middle East is already big enough.

Off Topic: Russian Troop Movements Near Eastern Ukraine Trigger Fears of Imminent Invasion

March 27, 2014

Off Topic: Russian Troop Movements Near Eastern Ukraine Trigger Fears of Imminent Invasion – The Washington Free Beacon.

House leaders voice ‘alarm,’ urge Obama to take action

BY:
March 27, 2014 5:00 am

Ukrainian soldiers transport their tanks from their base in Perevalnoe, outside Simferopol, Crimea

Ukrainian soldiers transport their tanks from their base in Perevalnoe, outside Simferopol, Crimea / AP

U.S. intelligence agencies warned Congress late Wednesday that Russian military forces are massing near Ukraine’s borders and appear ready to launch an invasion with little or no warning.

According to defense and intelligence officials, Russian military forces include more than 20,000 troops massing along Ukraine’s eastern border, with some units within 10 miles of the border.

“We’re certainly watching the buildups very, very closely,” said a senior defense official. “They are reinforcing their forces in the southern and eastern portions of Ukraine.”

According to the officials, buildup is alarming because of the numbers and the level of readiness.

“Based on both the size and the types of forces, they certainly have the capability and the readiness level to move into Ukraine should they choose to do this,” the defense official said.

Adding to the war fears are signs the Russians are positioned to carry out an invasion with little or no warning.

Another intelligence indictor was the Russian military announcement Wednesday that an undisclosed section of airspace was closed for “military exercises.”

However, the officials said concerns about the massed troops were heightened by the lack of signs that the troops, tanks and armored vehicles are not conducting in exercises.

“What we’re seeing is not a lot of exercising, but a lot of reinforcing and setting in place,” the defense official said.

One theory of possible Russian military action is that the troops and tanks in eastern Ukraine are preparing to invade and take control of three major eastern Ukrainian cities of Kharkov, Loans, and Donetsk, and then create a land bridge that would allow easy access to Russia’s recently annexed Crimea, on the Black Sea. Currently, Russia has access to Crimea only by ship.

At the Pentagon Wednesday, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel was asked about military action by Russia and said he spoke last week with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoygu. “I asked him specifically why the Russians were building up their western border, and I asked him specifically what the intentions were as to that buildup,” Hagel said. “He told me that they had no intention of crossing the border into Ukraine.”

Ukrainian military forces have been mobilizing for the past several weeks since the Russians forcibly annexed Crimea. Crimea then held a referendum to join the Russian Federation. Among the Ukrainian military action in recent days has been the digging of an anti-tank trench along borders.

A classified intelligence briefing for members of Congress Wednesday afternoon prompted the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, and seven other committee members to issue an urgent appeal to President Obama for the administration to take steps to head off a military attack.

“We write today with urgency and alarm, based on new information in the committee’s possession,” the lawmakers stated in a letter to Obama. “We are gravely concerned about the aggressive posture of Russian forces along the eastern border of Ukraine, as well as reports that Moscow may be making threatening moves towards allies in the Baltics.”

The congressmen asked the administration to share intelligence with Ukraine’s government to take steps to protect the country.

“We also believe it is imperative that the United States take precautionary steps to improve the posture and readiness of U.S. military forces in the region, and pursue additional measures to bolster the security of our eastern and central European allies and partners,” they said.

Details of the intelligence remain classified. However, a congressional aide said the letter to the president was based on intelligence indicating a military action could take place soon.

The Russian forces include large-scale troop movements under the guise of military exercises, along with the presence of significant numbers of Russian Spetsnaz special operations commandos operating in eastern Ukraine that are engaged in fomenting unrest, the congressmen stated in their letter.

Additionally, there are troop and naval movements by the Russians near the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, they said.

“There is deep apprehension that Moscow may invade eastern and southern Ukraine, pressing west to Transdniestria [near southwestern Ukraine], and also seek land grabs in the Baltics,” the letter stated.

According to the letter, the commander of U.S. forces in Europe, Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, who is also NATO forces commander, and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, are alarmed by the potential for new Russian military action.

Breedlove has been in Washington this week for congressional testimony and has raised concerns with senior U.S. officials. “The [Russian] force that is at the Ukrainian border now to the east is very, very sizeable and very, very ready,” Breedlove said earlier this week in Brussels. “There is absolutely sufficient [Russian] force postured on the eastern border of Ukraine to run to Transdniestria if the decision was made to do that and that is very worrisome.”

The lawmakers urged the president to increase the alert posture of U.S. forces in Europe “without delay” including the stationing of forward-deployed U.S. quick reaction forces.

“A failure to take such deterrent actions in the face of continued Russian aggression will certainly risk the very diplomatic and peaceful outcome that we all desire,” they stated. “Inaction by the U.S. and NATO will only further embolden Russian military planners, making further escalation more–not less–likely.”

The members also called for the United States to call an emergency session of the North Atlantic Council to request that NATO allies bolster their force posture and readiness “in the event that an Article V response is required.”

Article V is the section of NATO’s charter that directs the use of military forces.

“Mr. President, we still have opportunity to deter Russia aggression, but President Putin must see our commitment to Ukraine and to our European allies and partners,” the letter said. “He must visibly see our resolve, including our military resolve, and clearly understand the costs.”

In addition to McKeon, the letter was signed by Committee Vice Chairman Mac Thornberry (R., Texas), Rep. J. Randy Forbes (R., Va.), Rep. Joe Wilson (R., S.C.), Rep. Michael R. Turner (R., Ohio), Rep. Mike Rogers (R., Ala.), Rep. Robert J. Wittnam (R., Va.), and Rep. Joseph J. Heck (R., Nev.).

Verification in Iran: No Substitute for Prevention

March 27, 2014

Verification in Iran: No Substitute for Prevention – INSS.

INSS Insight No. 533, March 26, 2014
Ephraim Asculai , Emily B. Landau

Ephraim Asculai Emily B. Landau

The claim by US negotiator Wendy Sherman that “verification” is the key element in ensuring that the Iranian nuclear program is and remains completely peaceful has resonated in a string of US statements in the same vein, aimed to reassure skeptics that the United States will be able to detect and deal in a timely manner with an Iranian breakout to nuclear weapons. However, while verification is no doubt an essential component of any comprehensive deal with Iran, it should not be regarded as the linchpin of a successful agreement. Placing so much weight on successful verification is a dangerous proposition, and raises the concern that the P5+1 may be willing to entertain a deal that does not dismantle all the key components of Iran’s program that support military ambitions. The role of verification is to ensure that Iran upholds its commitment to remain non-nuclear, but verification is no substitute for the commitment itself.
Arriving in Israel after the first round of talks with Iran on a comprehensive nuclear deal, US negotiator Wendy Sherman said, “There is only one measure of success of a comprehensive agreement with Iran, and that is if an agreement means that Iran will never obtain a nuclear weapon.” While this sounds all very well and good, she also noted that the key element in ensuring that the Iranian nuclear program is and remains completely peaceful is “verification.” Sherman’s remarks on verification are only the latest in a string of US statements in the same vein, aimed to reassure skeptics that the United States will be able to detect and deal in a timely manner with an Iranian breakout to nuclear weapons. The administration has been keen on insisting that it will be in total control of any ominous development in the Iranian nuclear project. From President Obama’s assertion that the US will detect Iran in time if it moves to break out, to statements by other White House and State Department officials as well as Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, this theme has dominated the US approach to any agreement with Iran.
While verification is no doubt an essential component of any comprehensive deal with Iran, it should not be regarded as the linchpin of a successful agreement.

US Under Secretary Wendy Sherman (center) at the P5+1 talks with Iran, Vienna, February 18, 2014 AFP/Getty Images

Placing so much weight on successful verification is a dangerous proposition, and raises the concern that the P5+1 may be willing to entertain a deal that does not dismantle all the key components of Tehran’s program that support Iran’s military ambitions. Indeed, why insist on dismantling if the nature of all activities can be verified? In fact, however, the true key to a successful deal with Iran is not verification; it is, rather, clear indication that Iran has opted to abandon its military nuclear ambitions. If Iran decides to do so, the problematic aspects of its program would be rendered unnecessary. Moreover, verification, while helpful, is not guaranteed to stop Iran in time. The history of intelligence in general, and of verification in particular, is replete with instances of failure. The limitations inherent in verification attempts as well as past experience in actual verification missions demand extreme caution in this regard.

The role of verification is to ensure that Iran upholds its commitment to remain non-nuclear, but verification is no substitute for the commitment itself. In order to convince Iran to back away from its military intentions, the leverage that accrues from strong international pressure is critical. In addition, it must be made fully clear that for decades Iran has been working on a military nuclear program while cheating on its NPT commitment. Iran’s current and consistent narrative is that it does not have, and never had, military nuclear ambitions. Yet Iran cannot be allowed to hold onto the claim that it has done no wrong; otherwise it can say that it is being required to back away from something that does not exist. As such, clarifying what is known as the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program must be an integral part of any comprehensive deal.

On this critical PMD issue, Sherman has not communicated a determined, unequivocal US stance. She reportedly said that “the more” Iran works with the IAEA on the PMD, “the better chance” of getting a comprehensive deal. That is not the same as saying that the PMD are an essential (sine qua non) component of any final comprehensive deal. And in another report, an unnamed US official (likely Sherman herself) diluted this less-than-resolute message even further by adding (to a statement almost identical to that attributed to Sherman above) that “we don’t want to do the job that belongs to the IAEA.” This should go without saying. Does this mean, then, that it is not certain that the P5+1 will demand that Iran provide answers to the IAEA? As the leading entity confronting Iran, the P5+1 should make it clear that while the IAEA will handle the PMD investigation, the interest of the P5+1 in getting those answers is identical to that of the IAEA. Ironically, in 2013 the P5+1 actually weakened (at least implicitly) the hand of the IAEA: according to recent reports, the Agency inexplicably scrapped a new report on Iran’s PMD – with additional information corroborating its previous conclusions regarding Iranian military activities – due to the election of Rouhani and a new round of negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran.

IAEA verification is based on the Agency’s own verification mechanism, conducted by its inspectors, supplemented by information provided by IAEA member states, and carried out according to agreements concluded with the inspected state. With Iran, this is still based on the outdated “Full Scope” mechanism. In the 1990s this mechanism was superseded by the more advanced Additional Protocol (AP); however, while Iran signed the AP in late 2003, it still does not adhere to its requirements. Moreover, even the AP lacks two major conditions: it does not permit the IAEA to conduct general searches for undeclared facilities, activities, and materials, nor does it cover the weaponization and delivery aspects of the development of nuclear weapons.

These shortcomings serve Iran’s interests quite well. For example, Iran did not declare concealed facilities until it was forced to admit their existence, and Iran has indeed been consistent in not acknowledging or revealing any details of its military-related nuclear project, even after evidence to this effect was disclosed by the IAEA in an open report in late 2011. Iran has admitted to falsifying facts and misleading the IAEA inspectorate because of allegations that the IAEA does not keep essential information secure.1 There can be no doubt that this kind of behavior will continue even if a permanent agreement is signed. Vital information could be withheld by the Iranians, causing the world to be complacent when the agreement is actually breached.

IAEA verification activities are carried out only with the goodwill of the inspected state and with its consent. Moreover, consent can be withdrawn, including in cases where verification is part of a binding international treaty. The inspectors must be accepted by the inspected state, and are subject to visa requirements that can be withdrawn, or denied in the first place. There have been cases in which Iran (ab)used its privileges and accused inspectors of wrongdoings, including withdrawing their accreditation. In short, if goodwill and cooperation are lacking, verification suffers.

Acting in a timely manner on the basis of information received is another thorny issue for effective verification, especially if the information is provided by an international organization, which necessitates ascertaining the facts, their correct interpretation, and the agreement of many partners to the discussion. All of the shortcomings, loopholes, and imperfections of IAEA verification mechanisms, as well as their dependence on intelligence information, mean that putting one’s confidence in these mechanisms to provide timely warning of an Iranian nuclear breakout is highly problematic.

Exaggerated and unwarranted expectations regarding the ability of the IAEA to verify Iranian compliance with a nuclear deal could end in disaster. The only true basis for a comprehensive deal with Iran is if it owns up to its military program and agrees to dismantle – as Assad did in the chemical realm last summer. Excessive reliance on verification as the key to a successful deal is an illusion. There is no basis in reality for the expectation that verification and intelligence – which are not actions in and of themselves, but only the basis upon which international actors can then take action – will enable these actors to coordinate and respond to an Iranian breakout in time.
_______________________________________________
1See Steven Ditto, “Iranian Suspicions About the IAEA,” PolicyWatch 2227, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 21, 2014, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iranian-suspicions-about-the-iaea.

Key Envoy Leaves Open Possibility of Unaccounted Syrian Chemicals

March 27, 2014

Key Envoy Leaves Open Possibility of Unaccounted Syrian Chemicals – Global Security Newswire.

Workers handle a mock grenade during a March demonstration at a German facility expected to support the destruction of warfare chemicals from Syria. A U.S. diplomat on Wednesday avoided publicly stating whether the international community is aware of the full extent of Syria's chemical arsenal.

Workers handle a mock grenade during a March demonstration at a German facility expected to support the destruction of warfare chemicals from Syria. A U.S. diplomat on Wednesday avoided publicly stating whether the international community is aware of the full extent of Syria’s chemical arsenal. (Nigel Treblin/Getty Images)

A senior U.S. envoy declined to publicly say if the full extent of Syria’s chemical arsenal is known to other governments, ABC News reports.

Thomas Countryman, U.S. assistant secretary of State for international security and nonproliferation, on Wednesday told lawmakers that he would discuss the matter only in a classified briefing. Syrian President Bashar Assad’s government last year gave international authorities what it said was a comprehensive declaration of its chemical arms as part of a plan to eliminate the entire inventory by June. But outside issue experts have surmised that small numbers may remain unaccounted for, even after the disarmament effort draws to a close.

Countryman issued the statement in response to Senator Tim Kaine (D-Va.), who had asked “whether there are undeclared weapons we need to isolate and identify.”

The diplomat said he could “only offer to brief [Kaine] on that in a closed session.”

“It will be illuminating,” Countryman added during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Syria’s three-year-old civil war.

Assad’s regime agreed to give up its chemical arms late last summer, as it faced threats of an international military response to a nerve-agent strike weeks earlier in an opposition-controlled area near Damascus.

Meanwhile, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said two March rocket strikes on a Syrian coastal city “did not stop the removal” of chemical weapons through the port, the Associated Press reported on Wednesday.

The U.N. chief issued the assurance in his introduction to a new report by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which is overseeing the disarmament operation. The document notes that more than 49 percent of Assad’s declared chemical inventory has left Syria through the regime-controlled Latakia seaport.

Ban warned, though, that “the precarious and unstable nature of the security situation further underlines” a need to quickly transfer out the remaining warfare chemicals.

Opposition forces seized portions of the port city’s province over the last week, the Christian Science Monitor reported on Wednesday.

Iran Oil Sales May Outstrip Sanctions Cap for Fifth Month

March 27, 2014

Iran Oil Sales May Outstrip Sanctions Cap for Fifth Month – Global Security Newswire.

A technician works as a helicopter lands at an Iranian oil platform in the Persian Gulf in 2004. Iran appears poised for a fifth month to sell more oil than the average it is permitted to export under an interim nuclear deal with six world powers, according to observers.

A technician works as a helicopter lands at an Iranian oil platform in the Persian Gulf in 2004. Iran appears poised for a fifth month to sell more oil than the average it is permitted to export under an interim nuclear deal with six world powers, according to observers. (Behrouz Mehri/AFP/Getty Images)

Iran appears poised for a fifth month to sell more oil than the average it is permitted to export under a short-term nuclear deal, Reuters reports.

An industry observer said Iran has sent out oil at an overall pace of 1.3 million barrels a day this month, the news agency said on Wednesday. However, the nation agreed not to average more than 1 million barrels in sales each day for the six-month duration of the atomic accord that took effect on Jan. 20.

The limits are intended to help pressure Tehran to accept restrictions on its nuclear program, which Washington and other Western capitals consider a potential vehicle for achieving a nuclear-weapons capability.

Obama administration officials expect Iran to cut its petroleum sales in coming months to bring its average exports down to the cap it accepted in November, according to Reuters.

Still, advocates of stringent economic penalties said Iran’s burgeoning oil sales show that the interim accord has loosened financial restrictions on the country more than negotiators intended. Tehran insists its nuclear program is peaceful, but agreed to limit the atomic effort in return for sanctions curbs under the agreement with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

“Iran will have to reduce exports by over 40 percent over the next three months in order not to exceed the average of last year,” said Tim Wilson, an analyst with the pro-sanctions Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Tehran sold an average of 1.1 million barrels of oil each day in 2013.

Meanwhile, a high-level Iranian government insider said his nation intends to boost its purchases of gasoline within the next 12 months, Reuters reported in a different article. U.S. economic penalties have separately targeted Iran’s ability to obtain gas from abroad.

Off Topic: US spokesman calls for immediate release of Iranian border guards

March 26, 2014

Off Topic: US spokesman calls for immediate release of Iranian border guards – IRNA.

(DISGUSTING! While the American Pastor Saeed Abedini is being beaten by his prisoners and is rotting in a notorious Iranian prison the US state department calls for the release of two Iranian soldiers.  – Artaxes)

Tehran, March 26, IRNA – Spokesman for the US Department of State Alan Eyre called for immediate release and safe return of the kidnapped Iranian border guards in Pakistan.

The Persian-language speaking spokesperson made the remarks in an interview with the BBC Persian on Tuesday.

Touching on possible martyrdom of one of the five abducted Iranian border guards named Jamshid Danaie far, he added that the US has seen the unconfirmed reports on the killing of the Iranian guard by terrorist group-let called ˈJeish al-Adlˈ.

Saying that the US is closely watching the case, he expressed hope that the report is not true.

It’s Not Just Ukraine

March 26, 2014

It’s Not Just Ukraine – MOSAIC Magazine.

(This excellent article not only explains the failure of US policy vis a vis Russia but it also helps to understand the game that Russia plays in the MidEast. – Artaxes)

What his actions in Eastern Europe tell us about how Vladimir Putin sees the Middle East.

Russian President Vladimir Putin signs bills making Crimea part of Russia, Friday, March 21, 2014. Photo credit: AP/Sergei Chirikov.

Does the Ukraine crisis mark the beginning of a new cold war? The answer from President Obama is a firm no. “The United States does not view Europe as a battleground between East and West, nor do we see the situation in Ukraine as a zero-sum game. That’s the kind of thinking that should have ended with the cold war,” he told a Dutch newspaper.

The president is partially correct. Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia has neither the intention nor the capability to challenge the entire European order, and it is certainly not mounting a global revolutionary movement. Nevertheless, it is a revanchist power, and its appetites are much larger than the president cares to admit.

That Russian President Vladimir Putin sees Ukraine as a zero-sum game seems obvious. Somewhat less apparent is the fact that his revisionist aspirations also extend elsewhere, and most saliently to the Middle East.

Obama’s first-term effort to “reset” relations with Russia was rooted in the firm conviction that the main cause of Russian-American competition in the Middle East lay in the previous Bush administration’s war on terror, which was read by the Russian leader as a pretext for a global power grab. Bush’s freedom agenda, with its support for democratic reform inside Russia, only confirmed Putin’s worst suspicions.

Alienating Putin, the Obama White House believed, had been a strategic blunder, depriving the United States of a potentially valuable partner. Putin, whatever his faults, was a realist: someone who could cut a deal in situations—like those in the Middle East—where Russia and America shared many interests. Once Putin fully grasped our sincerity, demonstrated by our ending the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russian fears of American aggressiveness would dissipate and Russian-American cooperation would blossom.

Unfortunately, getting through to Putin proved harder and took longer than expected—though not for want of trying. Famously, during the 2012 American presidential campaign, an open microphone caught Obama making his pitch. “This is my last election. After my election I have more flexibility,” he told then-Russian President Dimitry Medvedev. “I understand,” Medvedev answered. “I will transmit this information to Vladimir.”

Eventually, Putin did seem to grasp the concept. When Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stepped forward last September with an offer to strip Syria’s Bashar al-Assad of his chemical weapons, Obama saw the move as a breakthrough, precisely the kind of mutually beneficial arrangement that the Russian reset was designed to generate. Soon, working together on the chemical-weapons problem, Secretary of State John Kerry and Lavrov also conspired to launch Geneva II, a peace conference designed to find a diplomatic solution to the Syrian civil war.

In the dawning new era, Syria was seen by the White House as a prototype: a model for stabilizing the Middle East and containing its worst pathologies. If successful, it could be applied to other problems in the region—including the Iranian nuclear program, the greatest challenge of all. In his speech at the General Assembly last September, the president was eager to defend his friendship with Putin in just these terms. “[L]et’s remember this is not a zero-sum endeavor,” Obama reminded his critics. “We’re no longer in a cold war.”

Today, just six months later, the new model is collapsing before our eyes. The proximate cause is the spillover from the Ukraine crisis. On March 19, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov warned that if the West imposed sanctions over the annexation of Crimea, Russia would retaliate by exacting a much greater price: it would throw its support to Iran in the nuclear talks. “The historic importance of what happened . . . regarding the restoration of historical justice and reunification of Crimea with Russia,” Ryabkov explained, “is incomparable to what we are dealing with in the Iranian issue.”

Even before Ryabkov issued this extortionate threat, there were clear signs that the Kremlin never truly supported the new model of Middle East cooperation. Kerry and Lavrov did convene Geneva II in January, but the conference ended in abject failure thanks to the intransigence of the Assad regime—which after all is Russia’s client. Shortly thereafter, Kerry openly blamed Russia for the Syrian disaster. “Russia needs to be a part of the solution,” he complained, “not contributing so many more weapons and so much more aid that they are really enabling Assad to double down.”

In the Middle East as in Eastern Europe, then, the reset looks increasingly bankrupt. In fact, being based on two major errors, it never had a chance.

The administration’s first error was the failure to appreciate Putin’s either-or perspective on politics, a viewpoint succinctly expressed in Lenin’s famous formula: “who-whom?” Who will dominate whom? In Putin’s view, all accommodations with the United States are tactical maneuvers in a struggle—sometimes overt, sometimes covert—for the upper hand.

In the bad old days of the cold war, the overtly malevolent intentions of the Kremlin were hard to misread (although, even then, some American leaders did try to misread them). Today, Russia’s motivations are more complex: a unique mix of Great Russian nationalism, crony capitalism, and autocratic whimsy. This makes it difficult to predict the Kremlin’s behavior. For 364 days of the year, a deal between a Western client and Gazprom, the largest Russian natural-gas supplier, will function like a normal business transaction. On the 365th day, to teach the recipient a lesson about who’s really in charge, Putin will cut the gas flow.

Adding to the unpredictability is Putin’s mercurial-seeming personality. Perhaps the single most revealing fact about him is his interest in Sambo, a Russian form of judo whose techniques have been deliberately tailored to the requirements of each state security service. “Judo teaches self-control, the ability to feel the moment, to see the opponent’s strengths and weaknesses,” Putin writes in his official biography on the Kremlin website. “I am sure you will agree that these are essential abilities and skills for any politician.” As a former KGB agent and judo black belt, Putin is undoubtedly adept at the deceptive move that turns an ordinary handshake into a crippling wristlock, instantly driving the adversary’s head to the ground.

Turning a blind eye to such niceties, Western politicians assumed that by enmeshing Putin in a web of diplomatic and economic deals, they would foster in Moscow a sense of shared destiny that would ultimately work to moderate Russian behavior. As the Ukraine crisis demonstrates, the web has indeed created mutual dependencies. But the crisis also reveals that the two sides do not approach dependency in a spirit of reciprocity. When shaking hands on a deal, Putin never fails to assess whether he has positioned himself for a speedy takedown of his partner.

The Sambo approach to diplomacy is particularly suited to the Middle East, where international relations, more often than not, is a zero-sum game dominated by brutal men with guns. This is Putin’s natural habitat; as prime minister in 1999, he supported the Russian military’s use of ballistic missiles against civilians in Grozny. It is a simple truism that a leader habitually photographed shirtless while performing feats of derring-do will understand the politics of the Middle East better than sophisticated Westerners who believe that the world has evolved beyond crude displays of machismo.

Lack of attention to the perfect fit between Putin’s mentality and Middle East reality constitutes the second error of the administration’s Russian reset.

With respect to political alignments, the most influential event in today’s Middle East is the Syrian civil war. That the conflict is barbarous is easily gleaned from a slogan of the pro-Assad forces, scrawled on buildings in all major cities: “Assad, or we will burn the country.” This demand has divided the entire region into two groups. On one side stand the allies of America: the Saudis, Turks, and other Sunni Muslim states, all of whom agree that, come what may, Assad must go. On the other side, the Iranians, together with Hizballah, have lined up squarely behind Assad, their partner in the so-called Resistance Alliance.

For Putin, Syria has raised two key questions, each a variant of who-whom: (1) who will dominate inside Syria; (2) who will dominate in the region more broadly. It was Foreign Minister Lavrov who two years ago, in a rare slip of the tongue, best explained how Putin saw these questions: “if the current Syrian regime collapses, some countries in the region will want to establish Sunni rule in Syria.” More bluntly, the Kremlin sees itself as the great-power patron not just of the Assad regime but also of Iran and Hizballah—the entire Resistance Alliance. At the time, Moscow’s unvarnished preference for Shiites won little attention in the United States, but it sparked a storm of outrage in the Sunni Arab world, leading one prominent Saudi commentator to dub the foreign minister “Mullah Lavrov.”

Not surprisingly, Putin’s position was in perfect keeping with one of the most fundamental rules of strategy, perhaps best expressed by Machiavelli: “A prince is . . . esteemed when he is a true friend and a true enemy, that is, when without any hesitation he discloses himself in support of someone against another.” In the Middle East, Machiavelli’s logic is inescapable, and Putin grasps it intuitively. Not so Obama, who has convinced himself that he can hover above the gritty game on the ground yet somehow still remain an influential player.

In Syria, the United States criticizes Assad harshly and says it sympathizes with the opposition. But it releases only dribs and drabs of military aid to opposition forces while simultaneously qualifying and hedging its diplomatic support. Fretting incessantly about the Sunni jihadist elements fighting the Assad regime, it develops no strategy to combat them; instead, it cozies up to Assad’s Russian and Iranian patrons. When the Sunni allies of the United States compare the confusion of American policy with the clarity of Russian strategy, it’s no wonder they despair.

Obama is not entirely oblivious of the problem. In a recent interview, the journalist Jeffrey Goldberg asked him bluntly, “So why are the Sunnis so nervous about you?” His answer: “[T]here are shifts that are taking place in the region that have caught a lot of them off-guard. I think change is always scary. I think there was a comfort with a United States that was comfortable with an existing order and the existing alignments, and was an implacable foe of Iran.” This exercise in condescension, while doing nothing to allay and everything to aggravate the fears of America’s allies, offers a glimpse into the mindset that generated the reset, a mindset that dreamed of a concert arrangement whereby both Russia and America would place a greater value on comity with each other than either would put on its relations with allies.

To be sure, Putin will gladly sign on to American-sponsored initiatives like Geneva II. But he will insist on guiding them in directions that, regardless of their stated intentions, serve the interests of his clients. If the Obama administration has yet to admit or adjust to this reality, that is partly because the Russians do not wave a flag identifying themselves as the great-power patrons of Iran, Syria, and Hizballah. Nor does Putin back Tehran and Damascus to the hilt as the Soviet Union backed its clients in the cold war.

It is thus more accurate to say that Russia in an alignment, not an alliance, with Iran and Syria. Depending upon competing priorities and the vicissitudes of world politics, Putin will tack this way today, that way tomorrow. In the end, however, he will never sell out Tehran and Damascus in order to win compliments in Washington; if forced to choose, he will always side with the former against the latter, and will certainly leave them in no doubt that Russia is their most dependable friend in the United Nations Security Council.

It is this fact that makes Russia a revisionist power in the Middle East and the permanent adversary of the United States.

What, then, about the Iranian nuclear question? Hasn’t Russia consistently called for preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon? Didn’t it vote in favor of six Security Council resolutions against Tehran? Hasn’t it signed on to the economic sanctions? Surely all of these actions support the Obama administration’s contention that Russia, in certain contexts, is a valuable partner.

Indeed, Putin has a strong track record of supporting some actions designed to prevent an Iranian bomb; in an ideal world, he would probably prefer an Iran devoid of such weapons. But he also has a strong track record of building the Iranian nuclear program and of providing security assistance to the Iranian military. Whatever his preferences in an ideal world, in the here and now his goal is less to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon than to garner as much power and influence for Russia as he can. He is supportive enough of the United States and its key European partners to maintain credibility with them. On the key issue of stopping Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, he is never so supportive as to be taken for granted.

How this cynical game works was revealed in Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov’s extortionate threat mentioned earlier. It has placed Obama on the horns of a severe dilemma. If, on the one hand, the president simply acquiesces in Putin’s power play in Ukraine, he will embolden not just Russia but also Iran, Syria, and Hizballah by demonstrating that, just as in Syria, he retreats when challenged. If, on the other hand, he marshals a robust Western response, he could well provoke the threatened Russian countermeasures of increased support for Iran.

No matter which course the president follows, the Ukraine crisis has damaged the prestige of the United States in the Middle East. America’s Arab friends in the region, who are on the front line against Iran, Syria, and Hizballah, already feel the pinch, and are deeply uncertain about how to respond. Unlike the Resistance Alliance, they are not accustomed to cooperating on their own. As Karl Marx notoriously said of peasants, America’s Arab allies are like potatoes. When U.S. leadership provides a sack, they take on a single form and become hefty in weight. In its absence, they are a loose assortment of small, isolated units.

The ally who most immediately feels the fallout is Israel. On March 17, Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon described, with unusual bluntness, the consequences of what he called the “feebleness” of American foreign policy. The Obama administration’s weakness, he argued, was undermining the position not just of Israel but also of America’s Sunni allies. “The moderate Sunni camp in the area expected the United States to support it, and to be firm, like Russia’s support for the Shiite axis,” Yaalon lamented.

Yaalon spoke no less despairingly of Obama’s ability to make good on his pledge to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. “[A]t some stage,” he observed, “the United States entered into negotiations with them, and unhappily, when it comes to negotiating at a Persian bazaar, the Iranians were better.” On the matter of Iran, Yaalon concluded, inevitably, “we have to behave as though we have nobody to look out for us but ourselves.”

Whether Israel actually has the political will and military capability to launch an independent strike against Iran is anybody’s guess. But two facts are undeniable. First, Putin’s muscular foreign policy and Washington’s timorous response have increased the pressure on Israel to strike independently. Second, Obama has lost influence over the Israelis—just as he lost influence over his Arab allies when he refused to back them on Syria.

Adrift in Machiavelli’s no man’s land, neither a true friend nor a true enemy, Washington is left with the worst of both worlds, treated by its adversaries with contempt, charged by its friends with abandonment and betrayal. President Obama was correct to say at the UN that the U.S. and Russia are no longer locked in a cold war. But it was a strategic delusion to assume that Putin’s handshake was an offer of partnership. It was instead the opening gambit in a new style of global competition—one that, in the Middle East, Russia and its clients are winning and the United States, despite huge natural advantages, is losing.

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Michael Doran, a senior fellow of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, is a former deputy assistant secretary of defense and a former senior director of the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. He is finishing a book on Eisenhower and the Middle East. He tweets @doranimated.

Al-Qaida Pursues New Home in Syria: U.S. Officials

March 26, 2014

Al-Qaida Pursues New Home in Syria: U.S. Officials – Global Security Newswire.

Syrian opposition fighters train in the city of Deir Ezzor on Tuesday. Recent U.S. findings suggest al-Qaida leaders in Pakistan may want to establish a base in Syria for coordinating new attacks against Western nations.

Syrian opposition fighters train in the city of Deir Ezzor on Tuesday. Recent U.S. findings suggest al-Qaida leaders in Pakistan may want to establish a base in Syria for coordinating new attacks against Western nations. (Ahmad Aboud/AFP/Getty Images)

Al-Qaida operatives may be infiltrating Syria to establish a staging ground for new attacks against the West, the New York Times reports.

U.S. intelligence and antiterrorism specialists believe Syria has seen an influx of mid-ranking and other veteran al-Qaida members from Pakistan in past months, the newspaper said on Tuesday.  The concern emerged as secret intelligence findings hinted at possible work by Ayman al-Zawahiri and other al-Qaida commanders to prepare a more sophisticated strategy for tracking down and taking in Syrian rebel fighters from Western countries.

The terror group could exploit Syria to “recruit individuals and develop the capability to be able not just to carry out attacks inside of Syria, but also to use Syria as a launching pad,” CIA Director John Brennan told members of the House of Representatives.

Antiterrorism personnel said the possible initiative could reinvigorate al-Qaida’s central organization, and give the group its first safe haven beyond Pakistan’s borders for plotting strikes against the West.

Still, certain U.S. allies have differed on whether the growing al-Qaida presence they see in Syria is part of a broader plan to launch attacks against international targets.

“At this stage, it’s a lot less organized than a directed plan,” a Western security insider said. “Some fighters are going to Syria, but they’re going on an ad hoc basis, not at an organized level.”

One U.S. insider suggested Zawahiri might currently be “soft-pedaling” activities in Syria “to consolidate al-Qaida’s position for the future.”

“There is going to be push and pull between local operatives and al-Qaida central on attack planning,” the source said. “How fast the pendulum will swing toward trying something isn’t clear right now.”

Only a ground offensive will defeat the enemy, says senior IDF source

March 26, 2014

Only a ground offensive will defeat the enemy, says senior IDF source – Jerusalem Post.

Ground forces make upgrades to prepare for war with Hezbollah; 40% of artillery rounds to be high-accuracy shells.

By YAAKOV LAPPIN        03/26/2014 03:05

A tank from the 52nd Armored Battalion in the Jordan Valley.

A tank from the 52nd Armored Battalion in the Jordan Valley. Photo: IDF Spokesman’s Office

In the event of another war, only a full-scale ground offensive will achieve a convincing defeat of Hezbollah in Lebanon, a high-ranking IDF source said on Tuesday.

“It’s clear to the general staff that a ground maneuver is what’s needed” to extinguish the threat of mass rocket attacks, the source said. This view holds true despite the highly advanced capabilities developed in recent years by the air force, which enable it to strike a myriad of targets in a short space of time, he said.

The Ground Forces Command embarked on a series of upgrades designed to better prepare it for the day forces are ordered to storm hostile ground.

“The enemy is growing powerful” in its ability to rain down rockets and missiles on the Israeli home front, the source said, but it remains challenged by the IDF’s ability to launch ground offensive, which Hezbollah sees as an Israeli advantage.

One change under way involves an upgrade to weapons systems. Some 40 percent of artillery shells are being converted into precision shells that accurately strike targets as far as 40 km. away.

The shells come equipped with fins and other adaptations to make them accurate.

“It’ll prevent the need to place artillery forces deep into enemy territory. The new shells have 150% more range. This gives us more operational flexibility,” the source said.

This enables a battalion commander to request whatever firepower he needs and receive it within a few minutes.

“We don’t have to get the air force to drop 250kg. bombs on every target. Sometimes a shell going through a structure is enough,” the source said.

The remainder of the Artillery Corps’s shells – which are classed as statistical firepower – will be made more efficient, the source said. The IDF is in advanced stages of purchasing a new artillery gun to replace its aging M109 155mm. self-propelled Howitzers.

Ground Forces planners are taking into account an enemy that knows how to strike and “disappear,” while operating in closed spaces where much of the IDF’s firepower is more limited, the source said.

“They [Hezbollah] have many missiles and explosive devices [to target advancing IDF armored vehicles],” he said, adding that Hezbollah’s armament efforts are “unceasing.”

As a result, Ground Forces planners are aiming to inject units into the depth of Hezbollah’s territory.

“For us, that means we must restructure and prepare, and to stay ready for a clash that can occur tomorrow, in a few months, or a few years,” he said.

“A ground offensive has to be deadly, defensible, network- based and agile, with advanced firepower adapted to… a changing battlefield,” the source said. “It’s clear to us that we have to shorten a conflict. A ground maneuver will accomplish that.”

Other areas of improvement include working in conjunction with the air force and receiving and applying intelligence in real time.

Command and control tools, such as the Digital Ground Army, link up various forces to a computer-generated map showing target locations, the source said, describing such developments as the most advanced in the world.

“A tank gunner will see a target as it is seen by fighter jet pilot. Companies on the ground will be able to detect targets and place them on a [digital] map,” he said.

“We are developing a battle doctrine based on the need to operate in enemy’s depth. It is focused on how to get forces there, how to fight in closed spaces, destroy tunnels, and take on fortified targets.

It looks at how an [infantry] company enters a home to destroy a rocket launcher,” he said.

Structural changes to the Ground Forces are under way.

These include giving territorial army divisions greater autonomy.

If war breaks out with Hezbollah in the North, the Gaza Division in the South will be able to “solve its own problems” and formulate independent responses to rocket attacks from Gaza, freeing up the General Staff to deal with the Lebanese arena.

All-purpose divisions that can fight on multiple fronts (there are a few such divisions) have been enlarged with extra battalions, such as Engineering Corps units, the source said.

“We have to get to the enemy and strike its ability to fire on us. In the end, this creates pressure on it and on Lebanon, and this is an enemy that understands when it’s starting to lose,” he said.