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Iran: Rethinking the Endgame

February 3, 2014

Iran: Rethinking the Endgame – The National Interest.

(Abject surrender. Wishful and inconsistent thinking. Denial of reality. Still worth a read because I believe that it reflects accurately the thinking of the current US goverment. – Artaxes)

Robert A. Manning, James Clad | February 3, 2014

It is with no small amount of trepidation that US and EU negotiators gear up for new talks on a final nuclear deal with Iran later this month. Fierce US congressional criticism of the “5+1” nuclear deal with Iran is missing the point, and promise, of an accord. One need not buy President Rouhani’s self-serving assertion in Davos recently of Iran’s “priority to constructively engage the world” to see that there is more at play than implementation of the nuclear accord.

All would be well advised to take a wider angle view of Iran. Consider this: Even with an acceptable final nuclear deal, if Iran’s regional behavior remains otherwise unaltered (as in the Syria chemical-weapons disposal deal), the core problem of Iran’s Persian/Shia imperial quest to dominate the region by any means necessary remains unmitigated. How much of the strategic problem is really solved? Yet a rabid segment in Congress seeks still more sanctions, aiming at complete abolition of Iran’s enrichment program—a desirable but highly implausible objective. Having spent billions for the program, and endured many multiples of that sum in lost revenue due to sanctions crippling its economy, Iran is unlikely to give up enrichment entirely. None of that trumps national pride.

The outcome which Iran can swallow probably resembles the “Japan option,” i.e., permissible fuel-cycle activity providing a latent nuclear capability but putting in place a status quo falling well short of nuclear-weapons development. That would mean no more than 5 percent enrichment and a limited amount of centrifuges, shutting down the Fordo plant, shutting down the Arak heavy-water plant (or at least converting to a light-water reactor), and shipping out to a third country or neutralizing all of its 20 percent enriched uranium. An outcome in which Tehran genuinely implements the IAEA additional protocol, and provides ample transparency enabling early warning of a breakout push towards nuclear weaponization—that will be about as good as it gets.

To be sure, the only explanation for Iran’s nuclear behavior and cat-and-mouse games with the IAEA (well-documented in IAEA reports) is a desire for more than just civil nuclear capabilities. And while Iran’s claim of an inherent “right to enrich” is contrived, the NPT does says that parties have an “inalienable right” to develop “research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.” Indeed, not only Japan, but Argentina, Brazil and several European nations—fourteen in all—engage in fuel-cycle activities. So Iran has a point. But it is their intentions that are suspect—a long track record of dubious behavior documented in a decade’s worth of IAEA reports underscores that point. Fully transparency is part of the answer.

Yet if Iran’s behavior outside of the deal remains in place and unchanged; if (in other words) it remains a Cause as much as a Nation-State, how much will be gained? Tehran’s intentions would rightfully continue to be just as suspect. Let’s assume an Iran which has become a ‘virtual nuclear state’ like Japan but which continues to foment trouble from Lebanon to Central Asia. Better to aim at an Iran which cooperates in the management of the transition in Afghanistan, acts to moderate rather than instigate mayhem in Iraq, and joins in counternarcotics efforts.

Is this naïve or even far-fetched? Prior to 1979, Iran had been a key pillar of US policy in the Gulf. After that pivotal year, it faced Iraqi aggression, saw its civic and economic life crippled by ignorant clerics, and has now fallen to a place where it produces less oil than Texas. Sanctions have choked foreign investment and made ordinary daily finances an ordeal. Two-thirds of its citizens are under thirty; jobs are few and far between. The brain drain since 1979 continues, and now a third post-revolutionary generation rejects the nonsense and cries out for normalcy. Sanctions have done their job, up to this point.

Piling on more sanctions however, oblivious of altered circumstances, makes nonsense of sanctions’ stated aim: altered behavior. The catalogue of stagnation and exhaustion brought Rouhani his stunning electoral win. Like economic reformers in China (who ironically got underway in 1979) , Rouhani seems to be basing his regime on more on performance than Islamic correctness and on improving people’s lives.

This suggests a different calculus, one to which the nay-sayers in Congress remain obdurately oblivious. If economic improvement and the stability on which it depends have an uppermost place in Rouhani’s calculations, then an Iraq in turmoil has less appeal. And Tehran has little wish to see Sunni zealots prevail in Afghanistan after the US departs this year.

In parallel with the nuclear diplomacy, a quiet parallel effort to test Iranian intentions gives an extra dimension to the nuclear issue. Proud countries do not turn on a dime just because America wants them to—but demonstrable cooperation on Afghanistan, Syria, counternarcotics and counterterrorism (and, dare we add, Iraq) offer a real metric. Elsewhere, and down the road, one could envisage Tehran pledging to respect any decision made by the Palestinians about their future—rather than seeking to obstruct it.

There’s another reason why we should think hard about these prospects. The pseudo-state system, unhappily grafted on the region after the Sykes-Picot agreement carved up the Ottoman Empire, is unraveling. By comparison, Persia’s historic civilization and identity appear much more durable. We should strive for gradual, action-for-action transactional rapprochement with this country, an erstwhile US partner. While the interplay of overlapping US/Iranian interests fell into abeyance after 1979, mutual geopolitical interests, mainly involving balance and stability, remain pretty much as they were.

It’s time to revive this interplay, even with a regime we find distasteful. The skeptics of this approach see an Iran only ready to pocket Western concessions and continue a reckless quest for regional dominance. They could well be right. If they are, it means that President Rouhani cannot come close to achieving his mandate of making life in Iran more tolerable, of having (for example) such basics as the use of credit cards and a chance to pull in the huge investments needed to modernize its oil and gas sector. The usual political games can’t coexist beside these aims.

For electoral reasons, Congressional skeptics love making bellicose noises. Ritualistically, President Obama also leaves the “military option on the table.” But military strikes will not destroy Iran’s nuclear program, and may only set it back a year or two. Knowledge of nuclear weapons cannot be “uninvented.” The so-called “military solution” will simply confirm arguments within Iran that only a full-fledged nuclear-weapons capability will keep attackers at bay. An attack would probably result in Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT, thereby removing the hook for diplomacy. The Iranians would bury their facilities still deeper—and they already have in place some of the world’s toughest, strongest steel and special concrete bunkers. Never mind an attack’s impact on world oil prices and the world economy.

As a variant of Ronald Reagan’s adage, we should “mistrust but verify” when dealing with the Rouhani government. Up to now, sanctions have inexorably turned the rack, but it’s now a moment for statesmanship. Sure, it’s easier to pile on, condemning Iran’s nefarious ways, but we would be idiots to deny the existence of occasional inflection points in history, places of time and circumstance when patterns of behavior shift. We should test the proposition that Iran has become concerned enough about its internal failings, and about regional turmoil, to alter its behavior.

Robert A. Manning is a senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center for International Security and formerly served on the State Dept. Policy Planning staff and National Intelligence Council (NIC); James Clad is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. Both served in the George W. Bush administration.

Danish boycotter of Israel funded North Korean missiles for Iran.

February 3, 2014

Danish boycotter of Israel funded North Korean missiles for Iran. – Debka.

(Disgusting. They boycotted on “legal and ethical grounds.”. But hey, they had no problem dealing with regimes that murder, oppress and starve their citizens. What does that tell you about their ethics? – Artaxes)

DEBKAfile February 3, 2014, 9:13 AM (IST) 

Danske Bank helped finance the North Korean Tanchon company that sold ballistic missiles to Iran, according to a State Department cable of 2009, first revealed by Wikileaks. Last week, Danske Bank cut off banking business with Israel’s Bank Hapoalim on “legal and ethical grounds.”  The missiles the bank financed were sold to Shahid Hernmat Industrial Group, which develops Iran’s liquid-fuel ballistic missile program and was designated under UN Security Council Resolution 1737 for an asset freeze. After two State Department reminders, Dankse finally declared in 2010 it had cut off ties with the North Korean company.

Iran: We’re serious about nuke talks

February 2, 2014

(Sure, you are serious about talking. Talking never hurts. – Artaxes)

Iran: We’re serious about nuke talks – Politico.

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif is pictured. | AP Photo

‘I think the opportunity is there, and I think we need to seize it,’ says Zarif. | AP Photo

By ASSOCIATED PRESS | 2/2/14 7:46 AM EST

MUNICH — Iran’s foreign minister said Sunday his country is prepared to move ahead in negotiations over its nuclear program, assuring Western diplomats that Tehran has the political will and good faith to reach a “balanced” long-term agreement.

Mohamad Javad Zarif told a gathering of the world’s top diplomats and security officials that his country and Western nations were at a “historical crossroads” and just beginning to build the trust necessary for a long-term agreement.

“I think the opportunity is there, and I think we need to seize it,” he said.

The comments came after Zarif met one-on-one with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry on the sidelines of the conference Sunday morning.

Kerry reiterated to Zarif the importance of both sides negotiating in good faith, and of Iran abiding by its commitments, according to the State Department. Zarif described it as a “good meeting.”

Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency struck a deal Nov. 11 granting U.N. inspectors wider access to Iran’s nuclear facilities. The deal is parallel to an agreement reached with world powers Nov. 24 in Geneva to have Iran halt its most sensitive uranium enrichment activities in return for an easing of Western sanctions over its nuclear program.

“That’s an important beginning, it’s not the end of the road,” Zarif said of the two deals. “There are important questions and we are prepared to address them.”

IAEA director general Yukiya Amano said he could report that “practical measures are being implemented as planned” by Iran, and that there would be new negotiations over the next phase on Feb. 8.

Iran also has agreed to a new round of negotiations on Feb. 18 in Vienna with a six-nation group of world powers, the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany.

“What I can promise is that we will go to those negotiations with the political will and good faith to reach an agreement, because it would be foolish for us to only bargain for six months — that would be [a] disaster for everybody,” Zarif said.

Zarif said Iran and the international community needed to restore mutual trust, and said Tehran’s end goal was “a good solution – a balanced solution.” He added that “an unbalanced solution is inherently not stable.”

“Believe me, you do not possess the monopoly on mistrust — there is a lot of mistrust in Iran,” he told the audience. “Iranians believe, with good reason, that the West wants to deprive Iran of its ability to have access to technology.”

Zarif said that “the answer at the end of the day is you need to put aside all narratives and take concrete steps.”

Implemented Jan. 20, the agreement with world powers will be in effect for six months while further negotiations are held aimed at reaching a permanent agreement eliminating concerns that Tehran might use its nuclear program to build nuclear weapons.

Tehran denies such aims but says it is ready to reach a deal in exchange for full sanctions relief.

Under the six-month deal, Iran has agreed to halt its 20 percent enrichment program, which produces uranium just steps away from military grade, but will continue enrichment up to 5 percent. It also will convert half of its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium to oxide, and dilute the remaining half to 5 percent.

In return, the U.S. and the EU simultaneously announced the lifting of sanctions on petrochemical products, insurance, gold and other precious metals, passenger plane parts and services. They also plan to release $4.2 billion in Iranian assets of oil revenues blocked overseas, in eight installments over six months.

Off Topic: Ya’alon: If we won’t reach deal with Palestinians, ‘we’ll manage’

February 2, 2014

Off Topic: Ya’alon: If we won’t reach deal with Palestinians, ‘we’ll manage’ – ynetnews.

After surprisingly not leaving plenum hall when Iran’s top diplomat addressed conference, defense minister says Israel, moderate Arab states share common enemy – Iran, stresses settlements are not obstacle to peace

Eldad Beck

Published:  02.02.14, 19:03 / Israel News
 
 
“I hope we can reach an agreement with the Palestinians. If not, we’ll manage,” Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon concluded the recent developments in the negotiations on Sunday.

Under the threat of boycott against Israel and the American initiative to compensate Arab Jews, Ya’alon brought about another piece in the Middle East puzzle, noting that Israel and the Mideast’s Sunni-Arab camp, led by Saudi Arabia, share many interests and common enemies, such as Iran, Shiites, radical Islam and al-Qaeda .

Contrary to the years-long tradition in which Israeli leaders ostentatiously left conferences and events in which Iranian officials spoke, Defense Minister Ya’alon stayed in the Munich security conference plenary hall as Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif addressed the conference and spoke about the situation in his country.

Defense Minister Ya'alon stays in plenary hall as Iranian Foreign Minister addresses conference. Photo: Ariel Hermoni

Defense Minister Ya’alon stays in plenary hall as Iranian Foreign Minister addresses conference. Photo: Ariel Hermoni
 

Ya’alon even took a seat in the front row and listened to the top Iranian minister, as he was invited to address the conference immediately after the debate on Iran.

Despite the alleged gesture, Ya’alon made clear in his remarks that Israel sees Iran as an enemy shared with more moderate Arab states. In the past, as well as in this event, representatives from Middle Eastern countries, even those who hold ties with Israel, avoided publicly appearing with Israeli officials in any one of the Munich conference’s panels.

Ya’alon stressed in his speech that “I support the negotiations, I support any political engagement, but we should tell the truth to ourselves and not delude ourselves and to deceive ourselves regarding President Mahmoud Abbas ‘ intentions,” who he claims is “running away” as Yasser Arafat did during the 2000 Camp David Summit.

He further emphasized that Abbas was forced to join the negotiations table by US Secretary of State John Kerry and refuses to answer basic questions regarding the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and the matter of right of return.

 

According to him, “settlements are not the obstacle to peace. The settlements include today less than 5% of the territory in the Palestinian arena. If we are going for peace – we have Arabs living side by side with us in Galilee and Jaffa and Acre – we don’t deny this right.

“Why does the Palestinian leadership insist on getting the territory without Jews? If we have to live together, we can benefit from each other.”

Report: Hamas Gives ‘Green Light’ For More Rocket Attacks

February 2, 2014

Report: Hamas Gives ‘Green Light’ For More Rocket Attacks – israelnationalnews.

Hamas forces preventing rocket fire on Israel withdrawn from their posts, may give free reign for more attacks on Israel.

By Tova Dvorin

First Publish: 2/2/2014, 10:23 AM

Illustration: Gaza terrorists manufacturing rockets

Illustration: Gaza terrorists manufacturing rockets. Flash 90

Hamas has ordered its forces preventing against rocket fire into Israel to retreat, Walla! reports Sunday – giving various terrorist groups a green light to attack Israel. 

Palestinian Arab insiders revealed to the daily that Hamas’s military wing ordered the preventative forces to withdraw in retaliation to the Israeli Air Force’s air strike on the Islamist-controlled territory last Thursday. That strike was Israel’s retaliation measure after rockets from Gaza landed near Netivot.

The move provides a virtual “green light” for terrorists of various groups to fire on Israel, worsening an already precarious defense situation. Major General Aviv Kohavi revealed Wednesday night that some 170,000 rockets and missiles are already aimed at Israel. 

In the meantime, rocket fire has not escalated since the order was made Saturday night, leading experts to believe that the move is more political rather than military. Analysts theorize that the move is symbolic; in actuality, Hamas anti-rocket forces are still working behind-the-scenes to prevent rocket fire until Hamas clarifies its stance on escalation. 

Not all is well on the Gaza front, however. On Saturday, Intelligence Minister Yuval Steinitz warned that Israel will need to enter Gaza to destroy Hamas if attacks continue. 

“In the last year or two there has been an improvement in the security situation, fewer rockets have been fired at Israel and fewer Israelis have been injured,” noted Steinitz. “But if the trickle of rockets from Gaza continues, we’ll have no choice but to enter and eliminate the Hamas rule, allowing the Palestinian Authority (PA) to rule Gaza again.”

Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon warned Friday that he holds Hamas responsible for the attacks. 

“We view Hamas as responsible for what is happening in Gaza, and if it doesn’t know how to impose its authority over the [terror] cells that fire [rockets] and attack Israel, it will pay a heavy price,” Ya’alon declared.

“The IDF and security forces will continue to pursue anyone who shoots at Israel or tries to carry out attacks against it, and will not hesitate to hurt him and the people who send him.”

Off Topic: Navy considers purchasing ships from Germany to defend gas fields

February 2, 2014

Off Topic: Navy considers purchasing ships from Germany to defend gas fields – israelhayom.

Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon meets with German counterpart Ursula von der Leyen in Berlin • Ya’alon: “The situation in the Middle East is very complex and unstable, and we expect there will be chronic instability in the coming years.”

Lilach Shoval, Israel Hayom Staff and Reuters 

German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen with Defense Minister Moshe (Bogie) Ya’alon in Berlin on Thursday
Photo credit: Ariel Harmoni / Defense Ministry

Defense Minister Moshe (Bogie) Ya’alon met with German counterpart Ursula von der Leyen in Berlin on Thursday and discussed the possible purchase of surface ships to defend natural gas fields in Israeli waters.

The Israeli Navy has recently begun evaluating naval vessels for defending the valuable natural gas installations off the Israeli coast. The navy intends to purchase four ships, though it has yet to be determined from which country it will purchase them.

“The situation in the Middle East is very complex and unstable, and we expect there will be chronic instability in the coming years,” Ya’alon told von der Leyen. “We are great supporters of democracy and I wish there were more democratic states around us. We have experience in the Palestinian arena, in Gaza, where Hamas won the elections but there is no democracy. This was also the case in Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood.”

Ya’alon also spoke about Iran, warning that the “messianic-apocalyptic” regime’s nuclear program must be stopped “one or way another … otherwise it will become a nightmare for the Middle East and the entire world.”

Ya’alon thanked Germany for its support and said he “appreciated very much the cooperation between Germany and Israel.”

“Knowing very well the relationship, the good cooperation between our two countries, looking back to the dark past but looking to the bright future, these two democracies sharing the same values, I believe sharing the same interests, challenged by common threats like terror, rockets, missiles, weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and beyond,” Ya’alon said.

Der Leyen, Germany’s first female defense minister, said, “This is the first foreign guest I have the pleasure of welcoming here in my function as defense minister. It shows the special relationship between Germany and Israel.”

Iran receives $500 million installment, says it won’t give up centrifuge research

February 2, 2014

Iran receives $500 million installment, says it won’t give up centrifuge research – Jerusalem Post.

Funds unfrozen in first phase, others to be distributed throughout six-month period; Zarif says Iran not willing to give up centrifuges research.

By JPOST.COM STAFF, REUTERS

02/02/2014 05:52
Geneva nuclear talks, November 24, 2013.
Geneva nuclear talks, November 24, 2013. Photo: REUTERS/Denis Balibouse

Iran has received the first portion of unfrozen funds, $500 million,  that they are set to receive as the beginning phases of the nuclear deal between Iran and six world powers sets into motion, AFP reported on Sunday.

Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi told ISNA news agency Saturday that the transfer of funds was all done according to the agreement.

“The first tranche of $500 million was deposited in a Swiss bank account, and everything was done in accordance with the agreement,” Araqchi said.

The first of six installments of sanctions relief, prior to the funds transfer described by the White House as “restricted,” were not accessible by Iran’s government until February 1. Each installment interval is $450- 550 million. Iran will receive a final bulk installment of $4.2 billion on the last day of the six-month period.

The Geneva agreement struck on November 24 requires Iran to begin diluting its stockpile of uranium already enriched to nearly 20% – considered the hardest part of the enrichment process, unnecessary for purposes of civilian power but required for the construction of a warhead

The IAEA is tasked with not only ensuring that Iran disable its centrifuge cascades producing near-20% enriched material, but also that it begins the dilution process.

Other concessions by the P5+1 will not go into effect until “the IAEA has confirmed Iran is implementing its commitments,” the White House said last week.

In what some might see as a step backwards, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said on Saturday in Munich that Iran is not prepared to give up research on centrifuges used to purify uranium as part of a final deal.

Diplomats have said that one sticking point in the talks has been over the research and development of a new model of advanced nuclear centrifuge that Iran says it has installed.

Centrifuges are machines that purify uranium for use as fuel in atomic power plants or, if purified to a high level, weapons.

Asked if Iran would be prepared to give up research on centrifuges as part of a final deal, Zarif said: “No, but I am not prepared also to negotiate over the air.”

“We are going to discuss various aspects of the nuclear program and I do not think technology and science has anything to do with proliferation,” he said in an interview with Reuters and The International Media Associates, a television production company.

ADVANCED CENTRIFUGES

Diplomats now say, however, that Iran has told the six countries it wants to press ahead with the development of even more advanced centrifuges than the IR-2m.

The November agreement allows Iran to engage in research and development, but bars it from installing new centrifuges.

Western diplomats say they are uncomfortable with the idea of Iran pressing ahead with the development of more advanced centrifuges. But Iran says centrifuge research is crucial.

Asked his expectations for the Feb. 18 talks and how long he thought it would take to reach a final agreement, Zarif said: “It’s just the beginning of the negotiations for a final agreement. It is the first step of the final step and I expect it to take some time.”

“Of course, in our view it is not that difficult to reach an agreement provided there is good faith and the willingness on the part of all parties to try to examine various options to address the common objective of the Iranian nuclear program being exclusively used for peaceful purposes,” he said, speaking on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference.

“We are ready because we believe it is in our interests and we have no other intention. So theoretically it shouldn’t be that difficult. The detail may be a bit more difficult to achieve, so we will see,” said Zarif, speaking in English.

On Jan. 20, the United States and European Union suspended some trade and other restrictions against the OPEC oil producer after the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog confirmed that Iran had fulfilled its side of the Nov. 24 agreement.

The announcements allowed six months of negotiation on a definitive accord.

Iran should be able to recover $4.2 billion in oil revenues frozen in foreign accounts over the six months of the interim deal, as well as resume trade in petrochemicals and gold and other precious metals.

TOO EARLY

Zarif said the six powers had “pretty much” kept their side of the bargain in suspending some sanctions, but it was too early to see the results on Iranian trade.

“The psychological impact is there but the practical implications on petrochemicals and other trade is yet to be seen,” he said.

Responding to reports  that Iran would receive the first $550 million installment of the blocked overseas funds on or about Feb. 1, Zarif said he believed Iran had received the installment but was not sure.

Off Topic: Assad said to be hoarding chemical weapons

February 2, 2014

Off Topic: Assad said to be hoarding chemical weapons – The Times of Israel.

Syrian leader squirreling away advanced arms in the Alawite regions in case country partitioned, report says

By Times of Israel staffFebruary 2, 2014, 6:26 am
Syrian President Bashar Assad during an interview broadcast on al-Manar television on Thursday, May 30, 2013. (photo credit: AP/al-Manar television)
Syrian President Bashar Assad during an interview broadcast on al-Manar television on Thursday, May 30, 2013. (photo credit: AP/al-Manar television)

Syrian President Bashar Assad has been stockpiling chemical, biological and other advances weapons in Syria’s Alawite areas so that they will remain in his hands in the event that the country is partitioned, London’s Sunday Times reported.

According to the report, among the weapons Assad has been squirreling away are chemical warheads.

Assad is a member of the minority Alawite sect, a mystical offshoot of Shiite Islam largely concentrated in northwestern Syria. He has been fighting an almost three-year-long civil war against rebel forces of mostly Sunni origin.

Sources close to the world’s chemical watchdog said last week that less than five percent of the around 700 tons of chemicals that, according to a deal with the West, were supposed to have left Syria by December 31 last year have done so.

A source quoted by the Sunday Times said that Assad “probably will miss the June 30 deadline when the entire 1,300 tons of lethal chemical weapons were due to be destroyed.”

According to the report, Assad has recently been consolidating his hold on the Alawite regions.

“This region is now totally fortified and isolated from the rest of Syria,” an unnamed Israeli military intelligence source was quoted as saying. “The most advanced weapons manufactured in Syria and imported from Russia are kept there.”

Peace talks between the Assad regime and the Western-backed opposition ended in Geneva on Friday with no concrete progress and no immediate commitment from Assad’s envoys to return on February 10 for more meetings.

The US has insisted that Assad cannot be part of a transitional government, while Russia has been a key ally of Assad’s government.

News agencies contributed to this report

 

In Iran We Trust?

January 31, 2014

In Iran We Trust? – The Weekly Standard.

If Tehran breaks its promises, we’re unlikely to know.

Feb 10, 2014, Vol. 19, No. 21 • By GABRIEL SCHOENFELD

President Obama is rushing to implement the six-month interim agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran that went into effect last week. Together with five other world powers, he is now working to negotiate a long-term agreement aimed at keeping Iran from developing a nuclear bomb. He regards his opening to Iran as a signature achievement of his presidency and has proudly declared that diplomacy opened a path to “a future in which we can verify that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful and that it cannot build a nuclear weapon.”

Syria’s camouflaged reactor

Syria’s camouflaged reactor

If we assume that negotiations do not collapse and some sort of long-term accord is struck, there will still be thorny questions. A preeminent one concerns Iranian compliance. How much confidence can we have that the ayatollahs will not press ahead with their nuclear program in clandestine facilities, as they have done in the past? And if they do press ahead, how much confidence can we have that our intelligence agencies will catch them?

Obama’s faith that “we can verify” Iranian compliance glides over the fact that the U.S. track record in unmasking covert nuclear programs is checkered at best. This is not because our intelligence agencies are incompetent—although sometimes they are—but because the task is exceptionally hard. Just last week, a three-year study by a Pentagon subunit, the Defense Science Board, concluded that U.S. intelligence agencies “are not yet organized or fully equipped” to detect when foreign powers are constructing nuclear weapons or adding to existing arsenals. What is more, their ability to find “small nuclear enterprises designed to produce, store, and deploy only a small number of weapons” is “either inadequate, or more often, [does] not exist.”

Past intelligence lapses in the nuclear realm go back to the dawn of the atomic age and include a failure to foresee the first Soviet A-bomb test in 1949, the first Soviet H-bomb test in 1953, and the first Indian nuclear test in 1974. After the first Gulf war, the U.S. intelligence community was astonished to learn that Iraq was only months away from putting the final screw in a nuclear device. In the run-up to the second Gulf war, the CIA blundered in the opposite direction, declaring with high confidence—“a slam dunk” in CIA director George Tenet’s notorious phrase—that Saddam Hussein was developing nuclear weapons. He was not. More recently, North Korea constructed a uranium enrichment facility that, despite intense scrutiny by American intelligence, went unnoticed until the North itself chose to reveal it.

The case of Syria is especially pertinent to our efforts to monitor Iran.
By the late 1990s, U.S. intelligence detected glimmerings that Syria might be embarking on some sort of nuclear project. But the agency had trouble making sense of the evidence it was gathering. It perceived that North Korea was helping Syria with a joint venture involving North Korean nuclear experts, but as a senior U.S. intelligence official explained in a briefing, we “had no details on the nature or location of the cooperative projects.” By 2003, U.S. intelligence had concluded that the activity involved work at sites “probably within Syria,” but they “didn’t know exactly where.” The fog of intelligence had set in: “We had this body of evidence, kind of almost like a cloud of, boy, there is something going on here but we can’t get a whole lot of precision about it.”

By 2005, the United States had made more progress in determining what was transpiring. Satellite photos revealed a “large unidentified building under construction” set in a canyon in eastern Syria near the Euphrates River at a juncture called al Kibar. But American intelligence analysts could not say much more. All they had was images of a structure that was “externally complete,” but it was “hard to figure out, looking at that building, what its purpose is.”

One problem was that “it certainly didn’t have any observable, externally observable characteristics that would say, oh, yeah, you got yourself a nuclear reactor here—things like a massive electrical-supply system, massive ventilation, and most importantly a cooling system.” Another problem was that though the structure closely resembled North Korea’s plutonium reactor at Yongbyon, America’s highly skilled photo-interpreters could not connect the dots between the two facilities. The oversight was not their fault; the Syrians had erected curtain walls and a false roof to disguise the building’s shape and conceal typical features of a reactor. The multibillion-dollar, ultra-high-tech tools of U.S. intelligence were foiled by one of the most low-cost and ancient techniques of warfare: camouflage.

Only in 2007, just as the reactor was ready to be loaded with uranium fuel, did U.S. intelligence conclude that Syria had built a gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor. It reached this judgment not by dint of its own collections efforts but thanks to incontrovertible evidence provided by Israel: photographs of the building’s interior. Under our eyes but without our seeing, the Syrians had come breathtakingly close to possessing an operational generator of the nuclear bomb ingredient plutonium.

“This was a significant failure on the part of U.S. intelligence agencies,” writes former defense secretary Robert Gates in his new memoir. Gates notes that “Syria for years had been a high-priority intelligence target for the United States” and that “early detection of a large nuclear reactor under construction in a place like Syria is supposedly the kind of intelligence collection that the United States does superbly well.” The failure clearly shook Gates and led him to ask President Bush: “How can we have any confidence at all in the estimates of the scope of the North Korean, Iranian, or other possible programs?”

That was the right question to ask in 2007 and it remains the right question to ask about Iran today.

It is especially significant that the CIA was undaunted by its own lapse. After Israel presented the United States with photographs of the interior of the building at al Kibar, the CIA told President Bush that while it now had high confidence that the structure was a nuclear reactor, it still had low confidence that Syria was engaged in a project to develop nuclear weapons. The reason for the low confidence estimate: It had scoured Syria and not been able to locate or identify any other components of a Syrian nuclear program. This was not a conclusion without consequences. In the wake of the WMD intelligence fiasco that precipitated the second Gulf war, President Bush was reluctant to strike the Syrian reactor without a rock-solid CIA judgment behind him. Israel was not so reluctant. It destroyed the reactor in an air raid on September 6, 2007.

What does all this mean for our dealings with Tehran? “With respect to Iran, the Syrian episode reminds us of the ability of states to obtain nuclear capability covertly,” is what U.S. intelligence itself has said about its own failure. But President Obama does not appear to take the reminder all that seriously. Even if inspectors were free to roam Iran at will, the ability of American intelligence to monitor a country whose territory is nearly 10 times larger than Syria’s would be in doubt. But under the preliminary agreement with Iran struck by President Obama in November, International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors are not free to roam at will; it appears they will be confined to those nuclear facilities that the IAEA already knows about. 

In any longer term agreement with Iran, far-reaching and highly intrusive verification provisions are going to remain crucial. But even in the unlikely event that the United States and its negotiating partners persuade Iran to grant inspectors unlimited access to all potential nuclear sites on its territory, our ability to detect violations will still be limited. It may be difficult to conceal a large structure like a nuclear reactor from the lenses of American satellites (although Syria found it easy enough for a time). It is far easier to conceal facilities housing centrifuges for uranium enrichment, which can be underground and do not require the kinds of cooling facilities that reactors demand. The leaders of our spy agencies may boast of the kinds of intelligence collection that they have been reputed to do “superbly well.” But history shows that their tools are limited and their record spotty.

For more than 20 years, Iran has violated IAEA safeguard agreements, developed covert nuclear facilities, and sought to mislead the West about the scope and pace of its activities. As the American people weigh the value of an agreement with a regime that has a consistent record of cheating on international accords—not to mention lying, inciting hatred, terrorizing, and murdering—they would do well to understand that if the agreement is violated, we may not find out until it is far too late to rectify our oversight, for at that point, Iran will already have achieved its terrible goal.

Gabriel Schoenfeld, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, is the author of Necessary Secrets: National Security, the Media, and the Rule of Law and, most recently, A Bad Day on the Romney Campaign: An Insider’s Account

Are Syria, Iran playing Obama for a fool?

January 31, 2014

(The bigger question is: Does he care about being fooled? “Tell me lies. Tell me sweet little lies …” Artaxes)

Are Syria, Iran playing Obama for a fool? – CNN Opinion.

By Frida Ghitis
January 31, 2014 — Updated 1355 GMT (2155 HKT)
 

Editor’s note: Frida Ghitis is a world affairs columnist for The Miami Herald and World Politics Review. A former CNN producer and correspondent, she is the author of “The End of Revolution: A Changing World in the Age of Live Television.” Follow her on Twitter @FridaGhitis.

(CNN) — Remember Syria’s chemical weapons? Yes, those, the ones the Syrian regime agreed to give up after President Obama threatened to bomb.

All of the “priority one” the most dangerous of those weapons, were supposed to be gone by December 31 last year. They’re not. Almost all of them — more than 95% — are still in Syria despite a commitment by the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to get rid of his deadly arsenal.

The deal to remove Syria’s stock of WMD was the one tangible accomplishment of the Obama administration’s approach to the Middle East’s multiple crises. Now that deal looks to be failing, even as red flags also start flying along the path to a deal with Iran.

Frida Ghitis

Frida Ghitis

It’s hard to escape the impression that Iran and its close ally, Syria, are toying with the U.S.

America is earnestly seeking a diplomatic solution. And we should all hope diplomacy succeeds in securing an agreement that stops the carnage in Syria and one that prevents Iran from becoming a greater threat to its neighbors. But there is a reason these efforts are already running into trouble.

Secretary of State John Kerry is valiantly pursuing the suit-and-tie approach to peace, but Kerry is handicapped by the growing perception that Obama will not use military force under any circumstances. The U.S. doesn’t need to release bombs to show it is powerful. What it needs to do is remind its adversaries, its enemies, that it has options beyond the well-appointed rooms of hotels along Lake Geneva.

Obama can do this by speaking directly and firmly about those choices. That alone would go a long way in reshaping some points of views, and could produce results. If it doesn’t, more concrete steps would be required, from increasing material support for specific anti-al-Assad forces to a tightening of sanctions against Iran and other steps.

Diplomats can help concentrate the mind of their interlocutors when the people on the other side of the table worry about the possible cost of failure.

This is true of Syria’s al-Assad, who has heard Obama’s threats on the use of chemical weapons starting in the summer of 2012, and is still playing games with America while relentlessly slaughtering and starving his people.

And it is true about Iran, which just heard Obama during the State of the Union threaten to veto a plan to set the stage now for additional sanctions against Iran if negotiations fail in the next six months. Iranian officials presumably also heard the president state what so many have stopped believing: that he is prepared “to exercise all options to make sure Iran does not build a nuclear weapon.”

Iran foreign minister says Obama’s remarks are for “domestic consumption”

The more we hear from the Iranians, the less likely it seems that a successful agreement can be reached.

After CNN’s Fareed Zakaria talked to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani last week, he concluded there’s a “train wreck” on its way in negotiations. The U.S. is moving forward on the assumption that a deal would involve the dismantling of some key nuclear facilities, but Rouhani, the moderate face of the Islamist Republic, made it “categorically, specifically and unequivocally” clear that Iran has no intention of ever rolling back its nuclear program. 

On Syria, I had heard rumors that the removal of its most terrifying weapons was not going as scheduled. Then an anonymous source told Reuters that the regime has delivered a dismal 4.1% of the 1,300 tons of toxic agents it has reported, “and there is no sign of more,” on the way.

Then the U.S. confirmed it.

On Thursday, Ambassador Robert Mikulak, who heads the U.S. delegation to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, told the group that Syria is ignoring the timeline for removal of banned weapons and displaying “a ‘bargaining mentality’ rather than a security mentality.” In addition, he said, there is little progress on Syria’s commitment to destroy its chemical weapons production facilities.

If Syria’s games over its chemical weapons sound familiar — agreements followed by “misunderstandings” and endless delays — it is because we see much the same already unfolding with Iran.

Iran’s President and foreign minister are well versed in their communications strategy with the West. They are charming and fluent, speaking directly to Western publics who would like nothing better than to be done with the threat of a confrontation. And how great it would be to truly resolve the issue diplomatically.

Hope, however, is not a strategy any more than closing your eyes when you don’t like what you see, as when Iranian President Hassan Rouhani tweeted that in the Geneva agreement the “world powers surrendered” to Iran. That’s when the White House dismissed the worrisome statement as a play for a domestic audience.

Since then, however, one after another Iranian official has maintained they have no intention of taking apart any of their nuclear program. Without destroying any centrifuges, reactors, or other facilities, Iran can negotiate with the West, and receive political, diplomatic and economic benefits from the loosening of sanctions, as it already has. And then, as top Iranian officials have said, it can reverse any freeze and resume high-level enrichment in 24 hours. That’s the vow from the top nuclear negotiator and the foreign minister.

Making matters worse, much worse, we have just learned that American intelligence officials believe Iran has essentially already reached the “nuclear breakout” capability it sought. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told Congress this week that Iran has made “technical progress in a number of areas — including uranium enrichment, nuclear reactors, and ballistic missiles — from which it could draw if it decided to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons.” In other words, he concluded, the only thing between Iran and nuclear weapons is a political decision to build the bomb. Everything else is already in place.

That extraordinary revelation received little attention in the U.S., where the headlines were consumed with the crisis in ice-logged Atlanta. In other places, the news was cause for alarm. “Heaven help us,” tweeted a respected Israeli journalist, “Iran can now build and deliver nukes.”

How is it possible that Iran and Syria are getting away with this?

Iran and Syria are not the only countries convinced that the U.S. will not take military action. Saudi Arabia apparently has reached much the same conclusion.

After his 2012 red lines became blurred, the deal to get rid of al-Assad’s chemical weapons allowed Obama to claim he had succeeded in showing consequences for their use, even if al-Assad stayed in place and the killing continued. But now it looks as if essentially nothing has changed. Except that tens of thousands more have died.

To support American diplomacy, Obama needs to erase that image of a weak America. Again, there is no need to launch attacks and deploy troops. But there is a need to show to America’s enemies they cannot play the U.S. for a fool. The President needs to assert convincingly that he will be able to exercise power if that becomes necessary. Nothing would be more helpful to the chances for diplomatic success.