WarSclerotic

Former hard-line Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has asked President Hassan Rouhani to resign.

In a video published on his Telegram account Thursday, Ahmadinejad said that Iranians do not trust Rouhani. He said, “Your continued presence is at the expense of the country.”

Uncertainty resulting from the U.S. pulling out of the 2015 nuclear deal with world powers has led Iran’s already anemic economy to worsen.

On Wednesday, Iranian lawmakers voted to fire Rouhani’s labor minister, a victory for hard-liners opposed to the relative moderate amid the worsening economic crisis.

Ahmadinejad has brought attention to himself since being blocked from running in last year’s presidential election.

While president, he famously questioned the Holocaust and claimed there were no gays or lesbians in Iran.

Israel has exhibited maximum restraint in recent weeks in the face of incessant rocket fire from Gaza. This restraint is a testament to the country’s self-confidence and might, not to mention capable leadership and sound judgment on the part of the political and military echelons.

This restraint affords Israel many advantages, as it prevents an unwanted escalation while allowing for substantial diplomatic and military achievements.

Sometimes, however, such restraint can backfire and have the opposite of the desired effect. On the eve of the 1967 Six-Day War, for example, the Israeli government’s restraint emboldened the enemy to the point of sparking a regional conflagration.

There is no doubt that Hamas are listening to the experts and commentators in Israel, who are constantly saying that for Israel, there is no better alternative than Hamas in Gaza, and that Israel needs to avoid toppling Hamas and retaking the Strip. Hence the unbearable lightness of Hamas’ trigger finger.

So Hamas is projecting a willingness to reach an agreement with Israel, which will ensure relative calm along the Israel-Gaza border. But at the same time, they mistakenly assume that they have enough wiggle room to continue walking on the ledge and firing projectiles at Israel. They believe this will improve their bargaining position, enhance their image as a force capable of twisting Israel’s arm and, most importantly, establish new ground rules, similar to the ones in Lebanon – which would restrict Israel’s freedom of action in Gaza.

Israel and Hamas are on the verge of spiraling back into a familiar pattern, in which a new round of violence would be utterly devastating for Gaza and ultimately leave the Palestinian population and Hamas’ leadership in the same position they are now, or possibly worse off.

Every day that passes, new red lines are being crossed. For example, just yesterday, a rocket was fired into Beersheba for the first time since 2014. The intensity of the latest round of violence can be lowered, as the current cease-fire demonstrates, but generally speaking, every attempt to bring the violence to an end will be harder than ever.

Despite the serious escalation in the southern ‎sector on Thursday, both Israel and Hamas have been ‎careful not to break all the familiar rules of the ‎game, thus allowing for the possibility of a cease-fire.‎

The operational scope exercised by both sides may ‎indicate otherwise – Hamas has fired over 180 ‎projectiles at Israel and the IDF ‎has struck dozens of targets in Gaza – but an ‎analysis of the targets shows both parties “played ‎by the rules”: Hamas aimed at the Gaza-vicinity ‎communities and Sderot (the rocket fire on Beersheba ‎was the work of a rogue terrorist group in Gaza) and ‎the IDF did its best to minimize Palestinian ‎casualties.‎

It is, however, clear to both sides that they are ‎playing with fire – literally. Every Hamas rocket or ‎Israeli strike have lethal potential, which in turn, ‎could cause the situation to spiral out of control.‎

There is also the issue of critical mass: The ‎Israeli communities near the Gaza border are already ‎on edge and another sleepless night or two is all it ‎would take for the public to demand immediate action. Gaza’s ‎residents also have nothing to lose at this point, ‎but contrary to what some in Israel hope, pushing ‎Gazans into a corner with the hope that they will ‎turn against Hamas may only cause them to rally ‎around the Islamist terrorist group and support its ‎war. ‎

Meanwhile, as of Thursday night, efforts to mediate ‎a cease-fire were less than enthused. The Egyptians ‎are sitting on the fence, perhaps because they are ‎fed up and perhaps because they want to teach Hamas ‎a lesson. ‎ Earlier this week, Egypt allowed a delegation of ‎exiled Hamas officials, including Deputy Hamas ‎leader Saleh Arouri, to travel to Gaza through ‎the Rafah crossing to discuss a cease-fire, but as ‎soon as the delegation left violence flared-up.‎

Israel hopes Egypt will realize Hamas is ungrateful ‎and restrict the delivery of fuel and goods through ‎Rafah into Gaza, but it is unlikely that this ‎measure would be in Israel’s interest in the long-‎run, as it prefers Egypt maintain the role of ‎mediator.‎

What should concern Israel most is the fact that it ‎once again misunderstood Hamas’ intentions. The ‎standing assessment in recent weeks was that the ‎terrorist group was not interested in war and would ‎go to great lengths to avoid it, and those who ‎supported this view cited Hamas leaders’ frantic ‎rush to seek a truce after every border skirmish ‎over the past few weeks. ‎

Recent days have shown that the organization’s ‎intentions are different. The elimination of two of ‎its snipers on Tuesday gave it the pretext for war, ‎but Israel should not feel too bad – Hamas knows how ‎to relay information to Israel and if it wanted to, ‎it could have made it clear that it was conducting a ‎drill near the border. Since it didn’t, the IDF ‎deemed the snipers an imminent threat and ‎eliminated them. ‎

This was just the excuse Hamas needed to ignite the ‎border. Gaza’s rulers have failed to effect change ‎using the diplomatic route, so they naturally ‎reverted to the familiar military one, just like ‎they did in 2014, on the eve of Operation Protective ‎Edge.‎

Israel has made it clear to Hamas that the path on ‎which it is on is doomed to fail, as its offer of ‎cease-fire will not extend beyond the opening of the ‎Kerem Shalom cargo crossing and the expansion of the ‎fishing zone off Gaza’s coast. All other demands – ‎the construction of air and sea ports and an ease of the restrictions placed on the types of goods delivered into Gaza – will require a broader agreement that will have to ‎include the return of the two Israelis and the ‎remains of two soldiers held in Gaza, as well as an ‎end to Hamas’ armament efforts. ‎

For the moment, Hamas seems to believe that ‎continued rocket fire will break Israel. The IDF, ‎for its part, continues to strike Hamas targets to ‎convince the terrorist group to stop. The next 24-48 ‎hours are critical, and if the fighting continues, ‎it is highly likely that Israel will significantly ‎increase the scope and range of its strikes, which ‎would necessarily spell escalation. ‎

While neither side is ready to declare war, the ‎distance between these skirmishes and a full-fledged ‎conflict is short, and crossing the line between ‎them could prove instantaneous.‎

This prospect requires the Israeli military to ‎significantly bolster defenses, as Hamas may try to ‎launch a surprise attack – most likely using a ‎terror tunnel – to abduct soldiers and/or civilians, ‎as it did in 2014.‎

Additional forces have already been deployed on the ‎ground, and the military said that if need be, Gaza-‎vicinity communities would be evacuated so as to ‎ensure no harm comes to their residents.‎

From an offensive standpoint, the IDF will have to ‎come up with creative solutions, given that it has ‎been denied a significant opening move. Hamas’ ‎leaders in Gaza have gone underground and the group ‎has cleared all major headquarters and posts, and ‎while destroying Hamas’ operational infrastructure ‎has its value, it is not as effective as razing a ‎high-rise.‎

For these reasons, if Israel wants to end the next ‎round of violence quickly and effectively it should ‎wage a far more intense military campaign than ‎before to make sure that Hamas understands the price ‎it will be made to pay.

In his book “To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949,” Ian Kershaw, one of the great historians of our time, writes an amazing sentence that sums up the last two weeks before the beginning of World War I, the war that wiped out nearly 100 years of prosperity and destroyed Europe: “There was no chance of stopping the war. Considerations of prestige alone created a situation in which neither side could retreat.”

It is important that we remember this sentence because in Israel – a small state that has to invest its (considerable) resources in battles that are necessary to ensure its existence and security – decision-makers must pick not only their battles but also where to forego military moves.

The rationale is simple: you cannot fight all disruptive elements all the time. Clear priorities must be set and Israel cannot afford to launch wars over considerations of “prestige.”

This is not simple, and Israel’s captains can error exactly where the rulers of Germany and Russia, France and Britain did. The real challenge is to identify, among the many threats in the region, the ones that must be dealt with in order to ensure Israel’s survival, and if need be, to fight them to the brim.

On the other hand, when it comes to “prestige,” Israel would be wise to exercise restraint and opt for minimal activity, so as not to interfere with the main objective.

For this reason, for example, the military’s extensive capabilities cannot be “wasted” on a minor threat such as kite terrorism, regardless of how annoying it is, or how much of an affront it is to Israel and the IDF’s pride.

Kite terrorism is nothing to discount but, so far at least, it has not caused any serious harm. It has not cost human lives, the financial damage it has caused has been minor, and it has not infringed on the IDF’s freedom of operation in the southern sector.

Arson terrorism is the default option of a beaten organization that is unable to mark any substantial achievement opposite the Israeli military’s success in neutralizing its offensive abilities. Israel must devise a solution to this nuisance, but we cannot confuse this relatively unimportant situation with the other challenges Israel faces, especially vis-à-vis Iran in general and particularly the Iranian presence in Syria. Keeping a cool head and the correct perspective is vital for a realistic decision-making process.

The widespread use of terms like “pride” and “national honor” date back to a time when Israel struggled to cement its global position and its ability to deter its enemies despite being a small, poor, and underpopulated country.

Back when Israel’s overall position was precarious the softer issues of pride, prestige and honor were also an important part of building an image of power, both domestically and internationally. Now that Israel is the strongest country in the region militarily and economically, when its relations with most of the world’s countries, including some Arab states, are stronger than ever, one can set pride somewhat aside and focus on more significant things.

Clearly, when there is an important interest, even in a secondary sector like the Gaza Strip, it must be protected even if it comes at the price of possible escalation. This was also the case on the day Hamas threatened that thousands of Palestinians would rush the Israel-Gaza border and the IDF did not hesitate to mount a forceful response.

While there is a place for these considerations even during negotiation with Hamas on some sort of cease-fire, the main issue remains that, for the duration of the agreement, Hamas has something of a guarantee that Israel will not interfere with its efforts to improve its arsenal and capabilities as long as Israel enjoys peace and quiet on its border with Gaza.

In the face of this grave weakness, the broader consideration must be taken into account: A cease-fire deal with Hamas will allow Israel to focus mainly on stopping Iran’s efforts to entrench itself militarily in Syria. Iran would very much prefer that Israel focus on the Gaza Strip. The advantage of an agreement with Hamas is that it postpones Israel’s need to deal with Gaza at this time. This is very important and that is why this option must be considered seriously.