WarSclerotic

Russia’s strategic nuclear forces to hold major exercise this month
MOSCOW Wed Sep 3, 2014 9:09am BST

(With the announcement of planned American military drills in the Ukraine, Mr. Putin announces planned Russian Armageddon drills.-LS)

(Reuters) – The forces responsible for Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal will conduct major exercises this month involving more than 4,000 soldiers, the Defence Ministry said on Wednesday, in the latest sign of rising tension with NATO over the Ukraine crisis.

In an announcement a day before the start of a NATO summit in Wales, RIA news agency quoted the ministry as saying the exercises would take place in Altai in south-central Russia and would also include around 400 technical units and extensive use of air power.

The agency quoted Dmitry Andreyev, a major in the strategic rocket forces, as saying troops would practice countering irregular units and high-precision weapons, and “conducting combat missions in conditions of active radio-electronic jamming and intensive enemy actions in areas of troop deployment.”

He said enemy forces would be represented in the exercises by spetsnaz (special forces) units.

Supersonic MiG-31 fighter-interceptors and Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft would take part, Andreyev said, saying the scale of air power involved was unprecedented for exercises of this kind.

Both Russia and NATO have stepped up military manoeuvres since the outbreak of conflict in Ukraine between government forces and pro-Russian separatists in the east of the former Soviet republic.

A Kremlin security adviser said on Tuesday that Russia would update its military doctrine this year in the light of the Ukraine crisis and the sharp deterioration in relations with NATO.

Gen. McInerney: ‘We Helped Build ISIS’
By Paul Joseph Watson September 3, 2014
Weapons from Benghazi ended up in the hands of Islamic State radicals

(“Igor…come quick. We’ve created a monster! It’s alive….alive…” All joking aside, I think it’s kind of arrogant to say ‘we’ created ISIS aka ISIL aka IS (whatever). Afterall, ‘we’ created democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan and look where that got us. Bottom line is…the Islamists created ISIS. It’s what they wanted all along and it’s what they got. Had they not been behind this movement, it would have never happened. So before you blame the US for every damned thing wrong with this planet, take a look at who’s doing the blaming and then take a look at who’s doing the beheading, killing of innocents and basically being a huge pain the ass. As most of you already know, the Mideast is a convoluted mess. Helping one hurts another who may or may not be an enemy one day. Like Israel, the US must step back and take a defensive posture while exerting whatever influence it can without getting drawn into the fight…until attacked of course.-LS)

During an appearance on Fox News, General Thomas McInerney acknowledged that the United States “helped build ISIS” as a result of the group obtaining weapons from the Benghazi consulate in Libya which was attacked by jihadists in September 2012.

Asked what he thought of the idea of arming so-called “moderate” Syrian rebels after FSA militants kidnapped UN peacekeepers in the Golan Heights, McInerney said the policy had been a failure.

“We backed I believe in some cases, some of the wrong people and not in the right part of the Free Syrian Army and that’s a little confusing to people, so I’ve always maintained….that we were backing the wrong types.”

He then made reference to a Bret Baier Fox News special set to air on Friday which will, “show some of those weapons from Benghazi ended up in the hands of ISIS – so we helped build ISIS,” said McInerney.

In May last year, Senator Rand Paul was one of the first to speculate that the truth behind Benghazi was linked to an illicit arms smuggling program that saw weapons being trafficked to terrorists in Syria as part of the United States’ proxy war against the Assad regime.

“I’ve actually always suspected that, although I have no evidence, that maybe we were facilitating arms leaving Libya going through Turkey into Syria,” Paul told CNN, adding that he “never….quite understood the cover-up — if it was intentional or incompetence”.

At the same time it emerged that the U.S. State Department had hired an Al-Qaeda offshoot organization, the February 17th Martyrs Brigade, to “defend” the Benghazi Mission months before the attack.

Senator Paul was vindicated less than three months later when it emerged that the CIA had been subjecting its operatives to monthly polygraph tests in an effort to keep a lid on details of the arms smuggling operation being leaked.

CNN subsequently reported that dozens of CIA agents were on the ground in Benghazi during the attack and that the polygraph tests were mandated in order to prevent operatives from talking to Congress or the media about a program that revolved around “secretly helping to move surface-to-air missiles out of Libya, through Turkey, and into the hands of Syrian rebels.” Key Syrian rebel leaders later defected to join ISIS.

In addition to ISIS obtaining weapons from Benghazi, many members of the group were also trained by the United States at a secret base in Jordan in 2012.

Aaron Klein was told by Jordanian officials that, “dozens of future ISIS members were trained at the time as part of covert aid to the insurgents targeting the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Syria.”

As we have previously documented, many of the United States’ biggest allies in the region, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey and Qatar, have all bankrolled and armed ISIS militants.

UN probe into Iran nuclear activity stalls — again | The Times of Israel.

Chances of reaching a nuke deal depend on the investigation, which has not advanced in years, diplomats say

By George Jahn September 3, 2014, 2:40 pm

Steinitz tells FADC: Unlikely that there will be a nuclear deal with Iran.

Earlier Wednesday, the minister said Israel was lobbying world powers anew against any Iranian nuclear deal that would let Tehran retain potential bomb-making technologies.

Yuval Steinitz. (photo credit:MARC ISRAEL SELLEM/THE JERUSALEM POST)

Strategic Affairs Minister Yuval Steinitz briefed the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Wednesday, ahead of the Iran nuclear talks.

Steinitz told the MKs that he is not “delusional” enough to think all of Israel’s demands will be attained.

The minister expressed skepticism that any agreement could be reached.

“It seems that the Iranians will not dramatically change their stance and will not compromise on the issue of centrifuges,” Steinitz explained. “Assuming that [US President Barack] Obama will continue to stand by his statement that no agreement is better than a bad agreement – there won’t be an agreement.”

Earlier Wednesday, Steinitz said Israel was lobbying world powers anew against any Iranian nuclear deal that would let Tehran retain potential bomb-making technologies.

Negotiators hope for a comprehensive agreement by Nov. 24 under which Iran, which denies seeking nuclear weaponry, would curb its disputed activities in exchange for an easing of economic sanctions crippling its economy.

The next round of talks between six world powers and Iran is expected to be held later this month in New York, possibly on the sidelines of the annual United Nations General Assembly.

Steinitz said in a radio interview he would head a government delegation to Washington next week to press the Jewish state’s demand that the Islamic republic be stripped of all nuclear capacity – something Tehran rules out and many Western diplomats deem unfeasible.

While not a party to the negotiations with Iran, Israel wields influence in foreign capitals given its veiled threats to launch preemptive war to prevent Iran getting the bomb.

“Next week I will be leading a very large delegation to two days of talks in the United States ahead of the main, the central and possibly the last round of talks between the world powers and Iran,” Steinitz told Israel Radio.

He saw no sign of Iran significantly scaling back uranium enrichment, a process that can make fuel for nuclear warheads, despite diplomatic outreach by its President Hassan Rouhani.

“What Rouhani has done is concede on all kinds of secondary issues, partial concessions, but protected the project’s core, which is what threatens us and the whole world,” Steinitz said.

“This means that in substance Iran’s positions have remained as tough as before, and if there is no dramatic development in the coming month then either there will be no deal – or there will be a bad deal leaving Iran a nuclear threshold state, and this is of course something we are not willing to accept.”

Fourth advanced German submarine en route to Israel | The Times of Israel.

Commander of Israel’s navy says Dolphin-Class INS Tanin ‘can operate at a level we have not seen until today’

By Times of Israel staff September 3, 2014, 11:12 am

11 Aeroplanes Missing in Libya, Feared Could be Used to Stage Similar Terror 9/11 Attacks – Intelligence – International Business Times.

By Esther Tanquintic-Misa

Intelligence authorities from the United States have warned the global community the aeroplanes now reported missing since August when Islamic militants overtook Libya’s international airport in Tripoli could be used to stage 9/11-style terrorist attacks in the region.

Harvard National Security Journal – Staying Strong: Enhancing Israel’s Essential Strategic Options.

By Louis René Beres*

In early 2014, Washington and Moscow competed openly for influence in Egypt: Putin even promised expansive arms packages to now-President Sisi. With this in mind, Sisi is apt to play the U.S. and Russia off against each other, a cold war strategy that has implications for Israel’s security doctrine, including perhaps its nuclear doctrine.(1)

Israel operates within a global system(2) that appears to be falling back into some form of earlier bipolarity. This inchoate era may even devolve into a cold war between the US and Russia.(3) Jerusalem should consider this developing power shift in setting its nuclear policy.(4) Hardening bipolarity could lessen anarchy (good),(5) but also increase levels of adversity (bad). Jerusalem and Washington, inter alia, may need to recalculate certain nuclear posture policies with Moscow’s actions more in mind.

Since its inception, Israel’s central war-fighting tenet has been that any national war must be fought and won quickly. Today, avoiding protracted war is more urgent than ever as the correlation of forces(6) in the Middle East could become increasingly unfavorable to Israel – the result of a steady confluence of several intersecting factors, most notably enemy rocket proliferation, inconclusive regional fragmentations, and uninterrupted Iranian nuclearization. Israel’s nuclear forces and strategy must soon begin to assume expanded importance, not for actual combat,(7) but rather for stable and reliable deterrence.(8)

This shift raises two questions: Should Israeli nuclear weapons and strategy remain undeclared or ambiguous? Could some nuclear disclosure compensate for Israel’s lack of mass?

Israel’s Nuclear Deterrent: Historical Development

In the 1950s, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion fixed certain ultimate hopes of national survival on developing Israeli nuclear weapons and doctrine. His rationale was simple: he reasoned that merely having nuclear weapons would likely deter at least those enemies who could employ weapons of mass destruction or large-scale conventional arms. Ben-Gurion’s successors have adhered, more-or-less openly, to this line of strategic reasoning.(9)

The “bomb in the basement” strategy made evident sense at the time: strategists believed Jerusalem did not need to be more explicit because everyone knew that Israel had nuclear weapons.

Enemy perceptions of Israel’s nuclear capacity that are too general do not necessarily create credible nuclear deterrence and may even undermine Israeli nuclear deterrence. For example, if Israel’s enemies believe it holds only very high-yield/strategic nuclear forces, they may reasonably doubt whether Israel would always be willing to activate such forces to retaliate against an enemy’s first-strike. Ironically, there could be an inverse relationship between Israel’s perceived nuclear capability and its deterrent credibility.

Nonetheless, deliberate ambiguity(10) has endured as the invariable core of Israel’s nuclear doctrine. Ignoring the potentially lethal deterrence shortcomings of any such opacity, Jerusalem seemingly remains convinced that removing the bomb from Israel’s basement – ending the deliberate ambiguity policy – could prompt widespread and corrosive global condemnation. These concerns are valid, but they pale in significance to the costs of any failure of Israel’s nuclear deterrent.

In the world of Israeli nuclear strategy, it is not sufficient for enemy states to acknowledge Israel’s nuclear status; they must also believe that Israel has usable nuclear weapons that it is willing to employ in specific threat situations.

Israel’s Non-Nuclear Defenses

Israel needs nuclear weapons.(11) It may not possess adequate landmass or conventional armed forces to prevail in a protracted conflict. As Carl von Clausewitz famously said in On War, there could come a military tipping point when mass counts. At such point, Israel would require adequate strategic substitutes for the strategic depth it lacks due to its small size and population (Israel is half the size of America’s Lake Michigan).

Israel faces specific, tangible risks from any proposed denuclearization. This is in part because the country’s regional adversaries may be joined by: A new enemy Arab state of Palestine(12) and/or a newly-nuclear enemy Iran.(13) Together, these three groups of risks could create conditions more harmful to Israel than the sum of the separate threats. Without its nuclear weapons, Israel could not credibly threaten to retaliate against such a hazard.(14)

However, even possessing nuclear weapons cannot necessarily ensure successful Israeli deterrence – its enemies must also believe that the Jewish state can and will employ them. Carefully ending deliberate ambiguity by providing limited information about its weapons and its strategic posture could therefore improve and sustain Israel’s nuclear deterrent. Skeptics argue that Israel’s nuclear ambiguity has thus far kept the country’s enemies from mounting authentically existential aggressions. Why rock the boat? Won’t Israel’s strategic future merely replicate the country’s strategic past?(15)

Even if Israel’s enemies remain non-nuclear, they could still carry out lethal assaults against the Jewish State, particularly if they work in concert with insurgent proxies. Speaking in late January, 2014, Major General Aviv Kochavi, head of the IDF Intelligence, indicated that 170,000 rockets are already pointed at Israel.

These are staggering, and sobering, numbers. In any joint military attack, Israel’s enemies would have superior mass.(16) To counter even certain non-nuclear threats, Israel could need to better exploit its nuclear deterrence.

Israel protects itself by implicit and explicit threats to retaliate, and by inter-penetrating elements of national defense. Specifically, its ballistic missile defense system (primarily the Arrow or “Hetz“) is designed to protect soft targets as well as the country’s indispensable nuclear retaliatory forces and infrastructure. No BMD system is perfectly leak proof, however, and even a single nuclear missile that penetrates Arrow defenses could potentially kill tens or even hundreds of thousands of Israelis. Israel could mitigate this threat by diminishing its traditional reliance on deliberate ambiguity.(17)

Deterring Iran

In order to deter a newly-nuclear Iran, Israel must show that its own nuclear weapons are sufficiently invulnerable and capable of penetrating Iranian defenses. Iran’s judgments about Israel’s capability and willingness to retaliate with nuclear weapons would depend largely on its own prior knowledge of Israel’s weapons, including how effective and well protected they are.

Oddly, if Israeli nuclear weapons appear too large and too powerful, this could actually weaken Israel’s nuclear posture. If Iran knows only of presumptively mega-destructive Israeli nuclear weapons – those that could reach thresholds of destructiveness beyond which no retaliatory threat appears credible – this misperception could effectively undermine the credibility of Israel’s core nuclear deterrent. In this scenario, Israel would benefit from certain limited and residual forms of expanded nuclear disclosure. This would mean slowly, purposefully, bringing Israel’s bomb out of the basement.(18)

A fully nuclear Iran now appears to be a fait accompli. The international community, Israel and the United States all have not displayed sufficient willingness to support preemption when such anticipatory self-defense(19) might still have been plausible.

At some point, a nuclear Iran might decide to share some of its nuclear components and materials with Hezbollah or another terrorist group. To prevent this, Israel would need to convince Iran that it possesses a range of viable nuclear options, as well as the will and capacity to retaliate against any Iranian-supported nuclear aggression. Accordingly, Israeli leadership must determine the exact extent to which it should reveal elements of its nuclear positions, intentions, and capabilities. To ensure that its nuclear forces appear sufficiently usable, invulnerable, and capable of penetrating the defenses of all prospective attackers, Israel should prepare to selectively release broad outlines of strategic information, including the hardening, dispersion, multiplication, basing, and yields of certain Israeli nuclear forces. Deploying these pieces of pertinent information at the proper moment could strengthen Israel’s nuclear deterrent.

Israel has probably adopted a counter-city or counter-value nuclear targeting policy. Under this policy, the nation targets an enemy’s population and certain noncombatant infrastructures. Although seemingly more aggressive than a counter-force or counter-military targeting posture, it is apt to reduce the probability of any nuclear engagement. Counter-city/counter-value policy should be communicated to Israel’s enemies in advance to put them on notice.

This strategy is unlikely to help Israel succeed against an irrational enemy,(20) however, that does not value its national survival more highly than any alternative preference or combination of preferences.(21)

As a last resort, Israel might also consider the Samson Option,(22) wherein it would signal that it is prepared to do whatever it takes to survive by threatening massive nuclear retaliation against certain enemy aggressions. Such a policy could be invoked credibly only when the aggression would plainly pose an existential threat to Israel’s physical existence and involve more destructive and high-yield nuclear weapons than might otherwise be thought usable for deterrence.

Israel could better exploit the benefits of a Samson Option by selectively ending its nuclear ambiguity. By emphasizing that it is committed to using its high-end weapons in some circumstances, for example, Israel could communicate to its enemies the viability of its full arsenal.

The time to begin such an end has not yet arrived. Israel’s overriding security objective is to seek stable nuclear deterrence at the lowest risk of military conflict. But, at the moment that Iran is verifiably presumed to cross the critical nuclear threshold, Israel should remove the bomb from the basement. Importantly, by the time this particularly urgent moment arrives, Israel should already have configured its planned reallocation of nuclear weapons assets and the measurable extent to which this up-to-date configuration should now be disclosed. This advance planning could enhance the credibility of Israel’s nuclear deterrence.(23)

U.S. President Barack Obama believes that nuclear weapons are inherently undesirable and destabilizing, and favors “a world free of nuclear weapons.”(24) Yet, there are obviously times when these most powerful weapons can suitably help preserve peace and prevent war. To understand this conceptually, we must first understand the differences between violence and power.

Machiavelli’s The Discourses advances the principle of an economy of violence, here, of course, on a more basic, interpersonal level: “For it is the man who uses violence to spoil things, not the man who uses it to mend them, that is blameworthy.”(25) Israel’s nuclear weapons can still be structured as a more effective deterrent for the prevention of large-scale war, including nuclear war. If shaped by a proper and comprehensive doctrine going forward,(26) including a properly calculated termination of deliberate ambiguity, these weapons could serve to mend the increasingly dangerous military cleavages between Israel and some of its enemies.

*Dr. Louis René Beres (PhD, Princeton) is a Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue.

—————

1. Both Russia and the United States are focused upon security threats from an effectively common enemy, that is, Islamic radicalism. Recognizing this, Egyptian President Sisi is apt to exploit this joint `superpower’ concern by playing off one side against the other, in his inevitable search for increased foreign aid and military assistance.

2. From an international law perspective, this fundamentally anarchic system has its origins in the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which concluded the Thirty Years War, and created the still-extant state system. See: Treaty of Peace of Munster, Oct. 1648, 1 Consol. T.S. 271; and Treaty of Peace of Osnabruck, Oct. 1648, 1, Consol. T.S. 119.

3. See: Louis René Beres, “Israeli Strategy in the Case of a New Cold War,” The Jerusalem Post, March 5, 2014.

4. In this connection, Israeli planners should once again consult Clausewitz, On War (1812), especially his call for “audacity” in conflict. Although obviously not susceptible to any forms of precise measurement, this quality could still make an important difference for Israeli strategy going forward.

5. See: Louis René Beres, “What Rough Beast? Israel, Anarchy, and the Shape of Chaos,” The Jerusalem Post, July 3, 2013.

6. See, on this issue: Louis René Beres, “Understanding the `Correlation of Forces’ in the Middle East: Israel’s Urgent Strategic Imperative,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, Vol. IV, No. 1, 2010 (pp. 77-88).

7. The Israeli imperative to avoid nuclear war-fighting wherever possible was a major conclusion of the Final report of Project Daniel, Israel’s Strategic Future, ACPR Policy Paper No. 155, ACPR (Israel), May 2004, 64pp. See also: Louis René Beres, “Facing Iran’s Ongoing Nuclearization: A Retrospective on Project Daniel,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 22, Issue 3, June 2009, pp. 491-514.

8. On this requirement, see: Louis René Beres and Isaac Ben-Israel (Major-General/Res./IDF), “The Limits of Deterrence,” The Washington Times, November 21, 2007; Louis René Beres and Isaac Ben-Israel, “Deterring Iran,” The Washington Times, June 10, 2007; and Louis René Beres and Isaac Ben-Israel, “Deterring an Iranian Nuclear Attack,” The Washington Times, January 27, 2009.

9. At the same time, all of Israel’s prime ministers have adhered to a posture of deliberate nuclear ambiguity with regard to any and all pertinent details. This posture is sometimes known as nuclear opacity, or, in Hebrew, amimut. See, on this point, Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller, “Bringing Israel’s Bomb out of the Basement,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2010.

10. See Louis René Beres, “Looking Ahead: Revising Israel’s Nuclear Ambiguity in the Middle East,” Herzliya Conference Policy Paper, Herzliya Conference, March 11-14, 2013 (IDC Herzliya, Israel).

11. For a partially contra view, however, see Zeev Maoz, “The Mixed Blessing of Israel’s Nuclear Policy,” International Security (Harvard), Vol. 28, No.2., Fall 2003, pp. 44-77. For my response to Maoz in the same journal, see: Louis René Beres and Zeev Maoz, “Israel and the Bomb: A Dialogue,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1., Summer 2004, pp. 1-4.

12. There are vital legal as well as strategic aspects to the Oslo Agreements, which could still be the effective jurisprudential foundation of any new Palestinian state. For an early consideration of these legal aspects, see: Louis René Beres, “The Oslo Agreements in International Law, Natural Law, and World Politics,” Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 14, No. 3., 1997, pp. 715-746, and Louis René Beres, “Why the Oslo Accords Should be Abrogated by Israel,” American University Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 12, No. 2,.1997, pp. 267-284. A particularly urgent legal problem with Palestinian statehood remains the naive expectation of Palestinian “demilitarization.” On this specific issue, see Louis René Beres and (Ambassador) Zalman Shoval, “Why a Demilitarized Palestinian State Would not Remain Demilitarized: A View Under International Law,” Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, Winter 1998, pp. 347-363; and Louis René Beres and (Ambassador) Zalman Shoval, “On Demilitarizing a Palestinian `Entity’ and the Golan Heights: An International Law Perspective,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 28, No.5., November 1995, pp. 959-972.

13. See Louis René Beres, “Like Two Scorpions in a Bottle: Could Israel and a Nuclear Iran Coexist in the Middle East?” The Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1., 2014, pp. 23-32.

14. In narrowly jurisprudential terms, Jerusalem would need to identify all such threats as an expression of self-defense (which could be lawful and law-enforcing), rather than as a reprisal (which in all cases, would not be legally permissible). For authoritative international law clarifications, see: Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028, at 121 (Oct. 24, 1970)(“States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force.”).

15. For a discussion of those who make this counter-argument, see Cohen and Miller, op. cit., “Bringing Israel’s Bomb Out of the Basement: Has Nuclear Ambiguity Outlived Its Shelf Life?” Cohen and Miller themselves make an argument for ending nuclear opacity, but their argument has nothing to do with enhancing Israel’s nuclear deterrent. On the contrary, its particular rationale is to encourage Jerusalem to join cooperatively in the global nonproliferation regime, and to keep the Government’s faith with Israeli democracy.

16. On the related issue of “strategic depth,” see, for example, Brig-GEN. Michael Herzog (IDF/ret.), “Minding the Gap: Territorial Issues in Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking,” available at   http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus116.pdf.

17. Inevitably, it would be better for Israel to successfully deter any nuclear attack on its territory and populations than to intercept incoming missiles once deterrence had already failed. With this in mind, and with the essential understanding that national deterrence and defense needs are mutually reinforcing – not mutually exclusive – Israel should continue with its documented progress on Arrow and related interception systems. For more on the usually-underreported function of ballistic missile defense in protecting Israel’s nuclear deterrent forces (that is, in hard target protection), see  Louis René Beres and Lt. General Thomas McInerney (USAF/ret.), “After Years of Delay, What Can Israel Do About Iran,” Israel National News, October 13, 2013.

18. For a very early treatment of this issue, by this author, see: Louis René Beres, Security or Armageddon: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath/Lexington Books, 1986), 243 pp.

19. In law, the customary right of anticipatory self-defense has its modern origins in the Caroline incident, which concerned the unsuccessful rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada against British rule – a rebellion that aroused sympathy and support in the American border states. Following this landmark case, the serious threat of armed attack has generally been taken as sufficient justification for an appropriate defensive action. In an exchange of notes between the governments of the United States and Great Britain, then U.S. Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, outlined a framework for self-defense that did not require a prior attack. Here, a military response to a military threat was judged permissible, so long as the danger posed was presumed “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”

20. See: Louis René Beres, “Facing Myriad Enemies: Core Elements of Israeli Nuclear Deterrence,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Fall/Winter 2013, Vol. XX, Issue 1., pp. 17-30.

21. Under international law, a permissible preemption would be known as “anticipatory self-defense.” For more strategic (rather than jurisprudential) aspects of any such defensive first strike by Israel, see: Louis René Beres, and Major-General/Res./IDF Isaac Ben-Israel, “Think Anticipatory Self-Defense,” The Jerusalem Post, October 22, 2007.

22. See Louis René Beres, “Israel and Samson: Biblical Lessons for Israel’s Strategy in the Nuclear Age,” Israel Affairs, Vol. 1, No.3., July 2005, pp. 491-503.

23. See, also, Professor Beres and General Chain, “Living with Iran,” available at http://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Loius-Rene-Beres-and-General-John-T-Chain-Living-with-Iran-PP249-May-28.pdf.

24. See Louis René Beres and (Lt. Gen/Ret./USAF) Thomas G. McInerney, “Obama’s Inconceivable, Undesirable, Nuclear-Free Dream,” U.S. News & World Report, August 29, 2013.

25. Niccolo Machiavelli joined Aristotle’s plan for a more scientific study of politics with certain assumptions of power politics, or realpolitik. His most well-known conclusion underscores the dilemma of seeking to practice goodness in a generally evil world: “A man who wishes to make a profession of goodness in everything, must necessarily come to grief among so many who are not good.” (See: The Prince, Chapter XV). Machiavelli proceeds to construct his political theory on the assumption that “all men are potential criminals, and always ready to realize their evil intentions whenever they are free to do so.” This is a theory that Israel’s principal strategic decision-makers should now consider very closely.

26. In this connection, see: Louis René Beres, “Why Israel Must be Self-Reliant,” The Washington Times, March 28, 2014.

Support for Hamas rises after Gaza war, poll findsx
Published September 02, 2014 Associated Press

(Even rats jump off a sinking ship.-LS)

JERUSALEM – The popularity of the Hamas militant group among Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has spiked significantly following the 50-day war with Israel, according to an opinion poll released Tuesday.

The poll, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and headed by leading Palestinian pollster Khalil Shikaki, indicates that 61 percent of Palestinians would choose the Islamic militant group’s leader, Ismail Haniyeh, for president if Palestinian presidential elections were held today.

Only 32 percent would vote for current President Mahmoud Abbas, Hamas’ rival, the survey suggested.

The support for Haniyeh marks a stark increase from a poll in June, conducted by the same pollster, which found only 41 percent of Palestinians backed the Hamas figure. At the time, Abbas had 53 percent support.

The poll also suggests a majority of Palestinians — 72 percent — support adopting Hamas’ armed approach in the West Bank.

The research center said it is the first time in eight years that a majority of Palestinians has voiced such support for the Hamas leader. But, it said, Hamas’ popularity might fall in coming months, as it did following previous Israel-Hamas conflicts.

Polling started on the last day of the war, on Aug. 26, and continued during the first four days of the cease-fire, the research center said.

The poll said 79 percent of respondents believe Hamas won the war, and 86 percent support the renewal of rocket fire on Israel if a blockade on Gaza is not lifted, one of Hamas’ main demands.

But 25 percent said armed groups in the Gaza Strip should give up their weapons after the blockade ends and elections are held.

The latest poll, and the poll in June, both surveyed 1,270 Palestinians and had a margin of error of 3 percent.

Also Tuesday, Israeli Finance Minister Yair Lapid criticized Israel’s expropriation of West Bank land announced this week, calling for “a more reasoned approach” in Israeli diplomacy following Israel’s military operation in Gaza.

The expropriation of about 1,000 acres of West Bank land could help clear the way for new Jewish settlement construction. Lapid said such moves create “redundant arguments with the United States and the world” and criticized the timing of the announcement following the Gaza war. Israel’s Justice Minister, Tzipi Livni, also criticized the move this week.

Other leading Israeli Cabinet ministers have criticized Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s conduct in the recently concluded war, with many saying he did not go far enough to neutralize Hamas’s fighting ability.

The land announcement drew strong criticism from around the world, with the U.S., EU, Ireland, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation — which represents 57 Muslim countries — and others condemning it.

German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier issued a strong rebuke to Israel on Tuesday over the decision and called for it to be revised.

“The decision, should it remain, sends a wrong signal at the wrong time,” he said.

Netanyahu has spoken vaguely about a new “diplomatic horizon” that has emerged following the 50-day Israel-Hamas war. He has given few details on what he means.

But Netanyahu has said that he is not willing to renew peace talks with Abbas unless the Palestinian leader distances himself from Hamas militants. Hamas and Abbas’ Palestinian Authority recently agreed to a unity deal that saw the formation of a government backed by both factions.

“He has to choose,” Netanyahu told Israeli Channel Two in a weekend interview. “It’s either yes to Hamas or no to Hamas.”

Later Tuesday, the Israeli military said a Palestinian tried to run over Israeli soldiers and civilians, injuring one person, near Qalqiliya in the northern West Bank. It said soldiers opened fire on the vehicle, injuring the driver and a passenger.

MISSING LIBYAN JETLINERS RAISE FEARS OF SUICIDE AIRLINER ATTACKS ON 9-11
BY: Bill Gertz September 2, 2014 4:55 pm

In this image made from video by The Associated Press, smoke rises from the direction of Tripoli airport in Tripoli, Libya, Sunday, July 13, 2014. Rival militias battled Sunday for the control of the international airport in Libya’s capital – AP

(Nothing to worry about…right?.-LS)

Islamist militias in Libya took control of nearly a dozen commercial jetliners last month, and western intelligence agencies recently issued a warning that the jets could be used in terrorist attacks across North Africa.

Intelligence reports of the stolen jetliners were distributed within the U.S. government over the past two weeks and included a warning that one or more of the aircraft could be used in an attack later this month on the date marking the anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against New York and Washington, said U.S. officials familiar with the reports.

“There are a number of commercial airliners in Libya that are missing,” said one official. “We found out on September 11 what can happen with hijacked planes.”

The official said the aircraft are a serious counterterrorism concern because reports of terrorist control over the Libyan airliners come three weeks before the 13th anniversary of 9/11 attacks and the second anniversary of the Libyan terrorist attack on the U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi.

Four Americans, including Ambassador Christopher Stevens, were killed in the Benghazi attack, which the Obama administration initially said was the result of a spontaneous demonstration against an anti-Muslim video.

A senior State Department counterterrorism official declined to comment on reports of the stolen jetliners.

A second State department official sought to downplay the reports. “We can’t confirm that,” he said.

Meanwhile, officials said Egyptian military forces appear to be preparing to intervene in Libya to prevent the country from becoming a failed state run by terrorists, many with ties to al Qaeda.

Libya remains an oil-rich state and if the country is taken over completely by Islamist extremists, U.S. counterterrorism officials believe it will become another terrorist safe haven in the region.

The officials said U.S. intelligence agencies have not confirmed the aircraft theft following the takeover of Tripoli International Airport in late August, and are attempting to locate all aircraft owned by two Libyan state-owned airline companies, as security in the country continued to deteriorate amid fighting between Islamists and anti-Islamist militias.

Video surfaced on Sunday showing armed fighters from the Islamist militia group Libyan Dawn partying inside a captured U.S. diplomatic compound in Tripoli. The footage showed one fighter diving into a pool from a second-story balcony at the facility.

Tripoli airport and at least seven aircraft were reported damaged during fighting that began in July. Photos of the airport in the aftermath showed a number of damaged aircraft. The airport has been closed since mid-July.

The state-owned Libyan Airlines fleet until this summer included 14 passenger and cargo jetliners, including seven Airbus 320s, one Airbus 330, two French ATR-42 turboprop aircraft, and four Bombardier CJR-900s. Libyan state-owned Afriqiyah Airways fleet is made up of 13 aircraft, including three Airbus 319s, seven Airbus 320s, two Airbus 330s, and one Airbus 340.

The aircraft were reportedly taken in late August following the takeover of Tripoli International Airport, located about 20 miles south of the capital, by Libyan Dawn.

Al Jazeera television reported in late August that western intelligence reports had warned of terror threats to the region from 11 stolen commercial jets.

In response, Tunisia stopped flights from other Libyan airports at Tripoli, Sirte, and Misrata over concerns that jets from those airports could be on suicide missions.

Egypt’s government also halted flights to and from Libya.

Military forces in North Africa, including those from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt have been placed on heightened alert as a result of intelligence warning of the stolen aircraft.

Egyptian military jets reportedly have conducted strikes inside Libya against Libyan Dawn positions recently, and U.S. officials said there are signs a larger Egyptian military incursion is being planned.

Egyptian President Abdel-Fatah al-Sisi was quoted as denying Egyptian air strikes into Libya have taken place but suggested that military action is being considered.

Secretary of State John Kerry last week told his Egyptian counterpart that the United States would speed up the delivery of Apache attack helicopters, although it is not clear the Apaches would be used in any Libyan operations.

Egypt’s military-backed government appears to be seeking a more significant role in regional security after the Obama administration helped engineer the ouster of Libyan strongman Moammar Qaddafi in 2011. Since then, the Obama administration, through its announced policy of “leading from behind,” has stood by while Libya gradually has spiraled into chaos.

The Libyan government announced Sunday that it no longer controlled the capital of Tripoli.

“We announce that the majority of the ministries, institutions, and associations in the capital Tripoli are no longer under its control,” a government statement said.

Libya’s parliament in August declared both Ansar al Sharia and Libyan Dawn as terrorist organizations working to overthrow the government.

Ansar al Sharia, which is based in Benghazi, recently publicized on social media that it has obtained large numbers of more sophisticated weapons, including SA-6 surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft guns, rocket-propelled grenades, shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, assault rifles, and armored vehicles. The group is closely aligned with al Qaeda-linked rebels in Syria.

Abderrahmane Mekkaoui, a Moroccan military expert, told Al Jazeera television, which first reported the airline theft Aug. 21, the alert regarding the stolen jetliners was preventive and covers the region from Cairo to Lagos Nigeria.

Mekkaoui said the jets being held by the Libyan group called Masked Men Brigade that was designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in December.

The Masked Men Brigade is linked to al Qaeda and Ansar al Sharia—the group behind the Benghazi terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2012.

Until the Libya Dawn takeover of the airport, announced Aug. 24, two other militia groups, known as Al Qaqa and Al Sawa controlled the airport and all aircraft belonging to Libyan Airlines and Afriqiyah Airways.

Mekkaoui said “credible intelligence” reports given to states in the region indicated the Masked Men Brigade “is plotting to use the planes in attacks on a Maghreb state” on the 9/11 anniversary.

Counterterrorism expert Sebastian Gorka said that if the theft is confirmed, the stolen aircraft could be used in at least two ways.

“The first would be how commercial airliners were used on Sept. 11, 2001, literally turning an innocent mode of mass transit into a super-high precision guided missile of immense potency,” said Gorka, who holds the Maj. Gen. Charles Horner chair at Marine Corps University in Quantico, Va.

“The second tactic could be to use the airframe with its civilian markings as a tool of deception to insert a full payload of armed terrorists into a locale that otherwise is always open to commercial carriers,” he said.

Michael Rubin, a counterterrorism specialist with the American Enterprise Institute, said commercial jetliners in the hands of terrorists could be formidable weapons.

“Who needs ballistic missiles when you have passenger planes? Even empty, but loaded up with fuel they can be as devastating,” Rubin said.

“Each plane could, if deployed by terrorists to maximum devastating effect, represent 1,000 civilian casualties.”

Among the potential targets are urban areas and economic targets, like Saudi Arabia’s oil fields.

“Anyone who has ever flown over Saudi Arabia at night can see refineries like Yanbu lit up like Christmas trees against the blackness of the desert,” Rubin said. “One Saudi security officer once told me that they would only have about 90 seconds to shoot down a hijacked plane from the time it left international airspace to impact in one of the region’s most important refineries.”

Rubin said in 2003 a Boeing 727 went missing in Africa fueling concerns about a terror attack on the U.S. consulate in Karachi.

“What is striking is that more than a decade later, the United States hasn’t taken the need to safeguard what are effectively giant guided missiles seriously,” he said.

A former Libyan general, Khalifa Haftar, has been leading anti-Islamist forces. His group has access to Libyan air force MiG jets that have conducted strikes on Libyan Dawn positions in recent days. Haftar also has conducted military raids in Benghazi.

The United Nations Security Council on Aug. 27 announced plans for new sanctions on Libyan militias and terrorists. In a resolution the U.N. warned of the “growing presence of al Qaeda-linked terrorist groups and individuals operating in Libya.”