Archive for September 18, 2014

Messy realities

September 18, 2014

Messy realities.

Ira Sharkansky

It’s been a week since the great speech, and there has been little beyond solemn statements of support, along with reservations about doing anything concrete. 

The President boasted of a multi-nation coalition. In one statement it was claimed that 40 nations had signed on, with no American boots on the ground.

So far there are no boots headed for the ground.

The coalition may now be down to 10 or a dozen, depending on who is talking, but with little more than talking involved. Several Muslim countries have offered their support, but without troops. Turkey has forbid that American planes use NATO facilities in Turkey for their missions.

Among the nastiness of various comments are

coalition of the uncertain
coalition of the unwilling to be identified by name
coalition of the willing and unable
lackluster coalition of the willing
how willing is Obama’s coalition?

It could have been predicted by all perhaps except the Secretary of State, noted for his ponderous platitudes that have produced a minimum of results here or throughout the Middle East.

UK Prime Minister David Cameron has weighed in with another blessing of Islam. Perhaps we should be forgive him, bothered as he must have been by the threat of Scotland’s secession along with the ugliness of his countryman’s beheading.

“They boast of their brutality. They claim to do this in the name of Islam. That is nonsense. Islam is a religion of peace. They are not Muslims, they are monsters,”

On the same day I had been on the fringe of a conversation between Muslim friends, which they conducted in Hebrew for my benefit.

One said that violence has been inherent in the history of Islam. Another said that Sunnis have generally been more peaceful than Shiites, but that there were too many factions within Islam for him to comprehend.

Arabic speaking Israeli commentators, supposedly experts of the subject, speak about a multitude of groups whose names they do not know for sure, competing for headlines, recruits, money and body counts across Syria and Iraq, as well as in the Sinai and various other spots across Africa and the Middle East.

The rest of us should admit that we cannot comprehend the continued blather of Cameron, Obama, and others about Islam being a religion of peace.

Sure, they do not want to ignite the millions of Muslims already among their voters, or the billion Muslims worldwide. At the same time, a simple standard of intellectual honesty suggests that they should avoid fibbing about the obvious. Cameron’s speech writers could have crafted something that condemned murder without that nonsense about a religion of peace.

The more honest among us should admit that none of the religions is without the blemish of violence in its history, doctrines, or the current practices by some of those claiming to be faithful. However, those saying that they are the most faithful of Muslims are now the most violent, brutal, or barbaric individuals operating under the umbrella of a religion.

We should not envy the task of Obama, Cameron, and whoever might join them, perhaps determined by whose citizens find themselves the center of a filmed beheading.

The coalition mentioned includes European countries with competing economic interests in the Middle East, and Muslim countries competing on a variety of theocratic and political issues.

Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia are potential allies of the US with military assets to oppose ISIS and other extremists, but each have strong reservations about cooperating with one another or with the United States.

Those intent on understanding Turkey must reckon with its concern for Kurds, as well as whatever may happen right over its borders with Iraq and Syria. The Turks are most likely assessing the prospects, including the chance of American bungling.

Figuring out who to aid in Syria is its own set of mysteries, given the record of the Assad regime as well as the multitude of groups claiming to fight Assad and/or one another.

Obama’s promise of keeping American boots off the ground in Syria and Iraq may already be crumbling.

According to General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

“My view at this point is that this coalition is the appropriate way forward . . . I believe that will prove true. If it fails to be true and there are threats to the U.S., then of course, I would go back to the president and make the recommendation that may include the use of U.S. military ground forces.”

With no Muslim countries sending their boots to the American led coalition, one can imaging the tensions within the Obama White House with competing assessments and pressures about what is good for the President and for his country. The President followed Demsey’s comment with his own affirmation of not sending troops, but we have learned never to say never.

On another front, President Obama has announced plans to send 3,000 military personnel to Liberia to fight the spread of Ebola.

The mission is to construct and staff care centers and supply medical kits meant to protect from, or cure Ebola..

One can hope that Obama’s advisers have done the analysis that weighs the benefits of this action to the President and the United States, against the prospect of easing the passage of Ebola to the United States.

The director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota has said that it is difficult to care for Ebola patients without becoming infected, and there is no proof that the kits being sent will work.

There is no shortage of messiness closer to home.

A Palestinian, UN, Israeli agreement on construction materials for Gaza, without a commitment to de-militarize the area, but with UN supervision to assure that they will be used for civilian purposes.

Israeli officials say that the move is meant to dampen the prospect of suffering among Gazans that would work to provoke further violence against Israel.

A missile landed in an Israeli field late on Tuesday, followed by Hamas claims of good intentions and the arrest of the perpetrators.

One measure of Gaza’s misery appears in the 15 migrants drowned on their way from Egypt to Italy. According to a report by Aljazeera, they were among the 10,000 Palestinians who have fled Gaza via tunnels under the Egyptian border.

We can couple our mourning for 15 dead Palestinians with the concern for still-functioning tunnels to Egypt, and worries about what flows in them to Gaza with munitions from Iran or Libya.

Assuming the UN will monitor the use of construction materials in Gaza is equivalent to declaring that Islam is a religion of peace.

In case no one noticed, UN personnel allowed their schools in Gaza to be used for storing weapons and fighters, as well as launching missiles toward Israel. And UN troops are the ones recently seen going to safety in Israel from their posts in Syria.

 

How Peace Negotiator Martin Indyk Cashed a Big, Fat $14.8 Million Check From Qatar, and No One Noticed

September 18, 2014

How Peace Negotiator Martin Indyk Cashed a Big, Fat $14.8 Million Check From Qatar, and No One Noticed – Tablet Magazine.

One Middle Eastern nation does indeed pay to influence U.S. foreign policy. Hint: It’s not Israel.

By Lee Smith|September 17, 2014 12:00 AM

Martin Indyk and John Kerry, 2013. (Paul J. Richards/AFP/Getty Images)

The New York Times recently published a long investigative report by Eric Lipton, Brooke Williams, and Nicholas Confessore on how foreign countries buy political influence through Washington think tanks. Judging from Twitter and other leading journalistic indicators, the paper’s original reporting appears to have gone almost entirely unread by human beings anywhere on the planet. In part, that’s because the Times’ editors decided to gift their big investigative scoop with the dry-as-dust title “Foreign Powers Buy Influence at Think Tanks,” which sounds like the headline for an article in a D.C. version of The Onion. There is also the fact that the first 10 paragraphs of the Times piece are devoted to that highly controversial global actor, Norway, and its attempts to purchase the favors of The Center for Global Development, which I confess I’d never heard of before, although I live in Washington and attend think-tank events once or twice a week.

Except, buried deep in the Times’ epic snoozer was a world-class scoop related to one of the world’s biggest and most controversial stories—something so startling, and frankly so grotesque, that I have to bring it up again here: Martin Indyk, the man who ran John Kerry’s Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, whose failure in turn set off this summer’s bloody Gaza War, cashed a $14.8 million check from Qatar. Yes, you heard that right: In his capacity as vice president and director of the Foreign Policy Program at the prestigious Brookings Institution, Martin Indyk took an enormous sum of money from a foreign government that, in addition to its well-documented role as a funder of Sunni terror outfits throughout the Middle East, is the main patron of Hamas—which happens to be the mortal enemy of both the State of Israel and Mahmoud Abbas’ Fatah party.

But far from trumpeting its big scoop, the Times seems to have missed it entirely, even allowing Indyk to opine that the best way for foreign governments to shape policy is “scholarly, independent research, based on objective criteria.” Really? It is pretty hard to imagine what the words “independent” and “objective” mean coming from a man who while going from Brookings to public service and back to Brookings again pocketed $14.8 million in Qatari cash. At least the Times might have asked Indyk a few follow-up questions, like: Did he cash the check from Qatar before signing on to lead the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians? Did the check clear while he was in Jerusalem, or Ramallah? Or did the Qatari money land in the Brookings account only after Indyk gave interviews and speeches blaming the Israelis for his failure? We’ll never know now. But whichever way it happened looks pretty awful.

Or maybe the editors decided that it was all on the level, and the money influenced neither Indyk’s government work on the peace process nor Brookings’ analysis of the Middle East. Or maybe journalists just don’t think it’s worth making a big fuss out of obvious conflicts of interest that may affect American foreign policy. Maybe Qatar’s $14.8 million doesn’t affect Brookings’ research projects or what the think tank’s scholars tell the media, including the New York Times, about subjects like Qatar, Hamas, Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other related areas in which Qatar has key interests at stake. Maybe the think tank’s vaunted objectivity, and Indyk’s personal integrity and his pride in his career as a public servant, trump the large piles of vulgar Qatari natural gas money that keep the lights on and furnish the offices of Brookings scholars and pay their cell-phone bills and foreign travel.

But people in the Middle East may be a little less blasé about this kind of behavior than we are. Officials in the Netanyahu government, likely including the prime minister himself, say they’ll never trust Indyk again, in part due to the article by Israeli journalist Nahum Barnea in which an unnamed U.S. official with intimate knowledge of the talks, believed to be Indyk, blamed Israel for the failure of the peace talks. Certainly Jerusalem has good reason to be wary of an American diplomat who is also, or intermittently, a highly paid employee of Qatar’s ruling family. Among other things, Qatar hosts Hamas’ political chief Khaled Meshaal, the man calling the shots in Hamas’ war against the Jewish state. Moreover, Doha is currently Hamas’ chief financial backer—which means that while Qatar isn’t itself launching missiles on Israeli towns, Hamas wouldn’t be able to do so without Qatari cash.

Of course, Hamas, which Qatar proudly sponsors, is a problem not just for Israel but also the Palestinian Authority. Which means that both sides in the negotiations that Indyk was supposed to oversee had good reason to distrust an American envoy who worked for the sponsor of their mutual enemy. In retrospect, it’s pretty hard to see how either side could have trusted Indyk at all—or why the administration imagined he would make a good go-between in the first place.

Indeed, the notion that Indyk himself was personally responsible for the failure of peace talks is hardly far-fetched in a Middle East wilderness of conspiracy theories. After all, who benefits with an Israeli-PA stalemate? Why, the Islamist movement funded by the Arab emirate whose name starts with the letter “Q” and, according to the New York Times, is Brookings’ biggest donor.

There are lots of other questions that also seem worth asking, in light of this smelly revelation—like why in the midst of Operation Protective Edge this summer did Kerry seek to broker a Qatari- (and Turkish-) sponsored truce that would necessarily come at the expense of U.S. allies, Israel, and the PA, as well as Egypt, while benefiting Hamas, Qatar, and Turkey? Maybe it was just Kerry looking to stay active. Or maybe Indyk whispered something in his former boss’ ear—from his office at Brookings, which is paid for by Qatar.

It’s not clear why Indyk and Brookings seem to be getting a free pass from journalists—or why Qatar does. Yes, as host of the 2022 World Cup and owner of two famous European soccer teams (Barcelona and Paris St. Germain), Doha projects a fair amount of soft power—in Europe, but not America. Sure, Doha hosts U.S. Central Command at Al Udeid air base, but it also hosts Al Jazeera, the world’s most famous anti-American satellite news network. The Saudis hate Doha, as does Egypt and virtually all of America’s Sunni Arab allies. That’s in part because Qataris back not only Hamas, but other Muslim Brotherhood chapters around the region and Islamist movements that threaten the rule of the U.S.’s traditional partners and pride themselves on vehement anti-Americanism.

Which is why, of course, Qatar wisely chose to go over the heads of the American public and appeal to the policy elite—a strategy that began in 2007, when Qatar and Brookings struck a deal to open a branch of the Washington-based organization in Doha. Since then, the relationship has obviously progressed, to the point where it can appear, to suspicious-minded people, like Qatar actually bought and paid for John Kerry’s point man in the Middle East, the same way they paid for the plane that flew U.N. Sec. Gen. Ban Ki-Moon around the region during this summer’s Gaza war.

Indeed, the Doha-Brookings love affair has gotten so hot that it may have pushed aside the previous major benefactor of Brookings’ Middle East program, Israeli-American businessman Haim Saban. The inventor of the Power Rangers will still fund the annual Saban forum, but in the spring Brookings took his name off of what was formerly the Haim Saban Center for Middle East Policy, so that now it’s just Center for Middle East Policy. Maybe the Qatari Center For Middle East Policy didn’t sound objective enough.

Another fact buried deep inside the Times piece is that Israel—the country usually portrayed as the octopus whose tentacles control all foreign policy debate in America—ranks exactly 56th in foreign donations to Washington think tanks. The Israeli government isn’t writing checks or buying dinner because—it doesn’t have to. The curious paradox is that a country that has the widespread support of rich and poor Americans alike—from big urban Jewish donors to tens of millions of heartland Christian voters—is accused of somehow improperly influencing American policy. While a country like Qatar, whose behavior is routinely so vile, and so openly anti-American, that it has no choice but to buy influence—and perhaps individual policymakers—gets off scot free among the opinion-shapers.

It turns out that, in a certain light, critics of U.S. foreign policy like Andrew Sullivan, John J. Mearsheimer, and Stephen Walt were correct: The national interest is vulnerable to the grubby machinations of D.C. insiders—lobbyists, think tank chiefs, and policymakers who cash in on their past and future government posts. But the culprits aren’t who the curator of “The Dish” and the authors of The Israel Lobby say they are. In fact, they got it backwards. And don’t expect others like Martin Indyk to correct the mistake, for they have a vested interest in maintaining the illusion that the problem with America’s Middle East policy is the pro-Israel lobby. In Indyk’s case, we now know exactly how big that interest is.

IS ‘mafia’ cash flow poses difficult target for West

September 18, 2014

IS ‘mafia’ cash flow poses difficult target for West

Western governments are facing an uphill battle trying to squeeze the finances of Islamic State militants, as the extremists operate like a “mafia” in territory under their control in Syria and Iraq, experts said Wednesday (Sep 17).

WASHINGTON: Western governments are facing an uphill battle trying to squeeze the finances of Islamic State militants, as the extremists operate like a “mafia” in territory under their control in Syria and Iraq, experts said Wednesday (Sep 17).

Unlike the Al-Qaeda network, which has relied almost exclusively on private donations, the IS group holds a large area in Syria and Iraq that allows it to generate cash from extortion, kidnapping and smuggling of both oil and antiquities, analysts said.

As a result, the group’s funding presents a much more difficult target for Western sanctions compared to Al-Qaeda’s finances, said Evan Jendruck, an analyst at IHS Jane’s consultancy.

A sanctions regime of more than 160 countries eventually succeeded in limiting Al-Qaeda’s ability to move funds through charities and banks, he said, but IS has its own sources of cash in areas under its grip.

“While such robust sanctions could somewhat limit the follow of funds to IS from outside Iraq and Syria, the groups organic funding inside its areas of control – oil fields, criminal networks, smuggling – are very difficult to curtail,” Jendruck told AFP.

Even conservative estimates portray IS as the world’s richest extremist organization, raking in at least a million dollars a day. US officials acknowledge the group has plenty of cash and is relentless about securing it.

“It is flush with cash from a variety of illicit activities such as extortion, kidnapping, robberies, and the like,” said a US intelligence official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The group is “merciless in shaking down local businesses for cash and routinely forces drivers on roads under its control to pay a tax,” the official said. “Its cash-raising activities resemble those of a mafia-like organization.”

IS has allegedly extracted multi-million dollar ransoms from some European governments after taking several reporters hostage, despite Washington’s appeals not to pay off the militants. The French government has denied making ransom payments.

Although IS is awash in cash, reports that the group got a hold of hundreds of millions of dollars from banks in Mosul are overstated and inaccurate, experts said.

OIL SMUGGLING NETWORK

The most crucial source of income for the group comes from an estimated 11 oil fields it has seized in eastern Syria and northern Iraq, allowing the militants to sell crude at cheap prices for cash or refined fuel products in neighboring countries.

The revenue from the oil sales could come to as much as US$2 million a day, according to Luay al-Khatteeb at the Brookings Doha Center.

Exploiting an area long known for smuggling, the oil is treated at rudimentary refineries, transported by truck, boat or mule to Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Jordan and sold at bargain basement prices – between US$25 to US$60 per barrel instead of the going world rate of about US$100, Khatteeb said.

“It has successfully achieved a thriving black market economy by developing an extensive network of middlemen in neighboring territories and countries to trade crude oil for cash and in kind,” Khatteeb wrote in a recent commentary.

The US Treasury Department has vowed to crack down on the group’s funding from oil smuggling, extortion and other criminal activity, without specifying how it will go about it.

Since 2003, Washington has imposed sanctions on more than 20 people affiliated with IS or its predecessor, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and in recent months added two more names to the list, according to David Cohen, the Treasury Department’s undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence.

Washington also hopes to undercut IS’s access to the international financial system, Cohen said in a statement last week.

But it remains unclear if Gulf countries will fully back the effort. Qatar and Kuwait in particular have been widely accused of allowing money to be funnelled to the jihadists, despite denials from those governments.

TERRITORY HOLDS KEY

In any case, the IS does not rely heavily on rich donors, and financial sanctions hold little promise of shutting off its cash flow, said Howard Shatz, a senior economist at the RAND Corporation think tank.

Oil sales possibly could be restricted if Turkey and Jordan tightened border controls, or if middle men for the smuggling could be identified, he said.

The group is not invincible, however, and IS suffered setbacks in the past, said Shatz, who studied the ledgers of IS’s precursor organizations.

The militants started running out of money in 2009, after losing hold of territory amid an uprising by Sunni tribes and an offensive by Iraqi and US forces that killed senior leaders. “It does come down to territorial control,” Shatz said.

Todays Zaman: Turkish sanctuary for MB leaders may further strain regional relations

September 18, 2014

Turkish sanctuary for MB leaders may further strain regional relations
Turkish sanctuary for MB leaders may further strain regional relations

Former Prime Minister Erdoğan and Egyptian then-President Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood are seen together in this file photo from 2012.(Photo: AP)

September 16, 2014, Tuesday/ 10:38:23/ DENİZ ARSLAN / ANKARA

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s statement welcoming Egypt’s banned Muslim Brotherhood (MB) leaders, who have recently been asked to leave Qatar after pressure was placed on the oil-rich state by other Gulf Arab countries, is expected to further strain Turkey’s already troubled relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

“If they [the Muslim Brotherhood leaders in exile in Qatar] request to come to Turkey, we will review these requests case by case,” Erdoğan was quoted as saying to a group of journalists late on Monday on his return flight from an official visit to Qatar.

According to international press reports, several members of the group are attempting to relocate after Qatar came under enormous pressure from other Gulf Arab states to cut support for the Islamist group.

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt accuse Turkey and Qatar of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups in the region.

“If there are no reasons preventing them from coming to Turkey, we can facilitate their requests [to come to Turkey]. They can come to Turkey as any foreign guest comes,” Erdoğan was quoted as saying.

Turkey and Qatar are known as the two staunchest supporters of the MB, while other regional countries see the MB as a threat, especially after its role in the Arab Spring. Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi designated the MB as a terrorist organization last year.

A number of the MB’s exiled leaders have been living in Qatar since the ouster of Morsi, but after being asked to leave, they may relocate to Turkey. The MB insists it is a peaceful group.

Main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) Adana deputy Faruk Loğoğlu told Today’s Zaman on Tuesday that Erdoğan’s welcoming remarks may further strain Turkey’s regional relations.

“Qatar was finally forced to expel Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leaders under pressure from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Now, President Erdoğan has opened the door for their admission to Turkey. Certainly we are a country with a tradition of extending our hand to those in need. However, national interests should prevail over other considerations in the case of political personalities,” said Loğoğlu.

Loğoğlu continued: “It is clear that hosting Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leaders in Turkey would be source of added strain to our relations with Egypt, relations that are at their lowest point at the present time. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and perhaps others in the region might also express discomfort. Turkey needs friends, not new enemies. In short, granting refugee status to the persons in question would be counter to Turkey’s interests. Turkey cannot and should not be the protector of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology.”

Erdoğan’s ‘diplomatic statement’

 

Sinan Ülgen, a former Turkish diplomat who chairs the İstanbul-based Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), has pointed out that Erdoğan’s statement on the MB has a “diplomatic tone.”

Speaking to Today’s Zaman on Tuesday, Ülgen said: “If you read his [Erdoğan’s] remarks carefully, there is no blank check. He welcomes them under certain conditions and says it will be evaluated case by case.”

Ülgen said that Erdoğan’s diplomatic tone is a sign that Turkey wants to leave its troubled relationship with Egypt in behind and start afresh to build a new relationship. Asserting that Turkey’s close ties with the MB was one of the factors behind the country’s troubled relationship with Egypt, Ülgen said: “Of course Turkey will not withdraw its support to the MB but it seems Turkey understands the need to pursue a more balanced foreign policy. They [AK Party officials] have long been supporting the MB and could not tell them not to come. But Erdoğan’s rhetoric was diplomatic and he said possible arrivals will be reviewed case by case, rather than embracing all without any conditions.”

Turkey has been very critical of the Egyptian administration, which came to power after the military ousted former President Mohamed Morsi, a politician from the MB, last summer. Turkey’s refusal to accept his ousting prompted the new Egyptian leadership to cut ties with Turkey and expel the Turkish ambassador to Cairo. Ankara responded in kind, declaring Egypt’s ambassador to Turkey persona non grata.

Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Ankara deputy Özcan Yeniçeri has expressed support for Erdoğan’s welcoming of MB members who are asked to leave Qatar.

“It is the right approach for Turkey to embrace these people who can’t enjoy their democratic rights and freedoms,” Yeniçeri told Today’s Zaman on Tuesday.

Yeniçeri added that he thought it sad that MB members are being forced out of their own country just because they have different political views to an Egyptian government which came to power after a military coup.

Erdoğan has repeatedly said that it is not possible for him to accept the military coup in Egypt that took place only a year after Morsi was democratically elected.

On Tuesday, local media reported that a senior leader from the banned Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) of Egypt — a party affiliated with the MB — left Qatar and moved to Turkey.

In the meantime, the head of the Egyptian Judges’ Club, Ahmad El-Zend, lashed out at “terrorists” in reference to the MB, which is thought to be supported by Turkey and Qatar, the Al-Ahram news website reported on Sept. 11. El-Zend claimed that the MB is behind the recent deadly attacks against Egyptian judges.

“Go to Turkey and fill your bellies with money generated by prostitution, and it will lead you to hell. Go to Qatar and kneel at the feet of its rulers so you can obtain the crumbs of humiliation,” said El-Zend, addressing “terrorist groups” in his speech.

President Erdoğan was in Qatar on Sept. 14-15 for an official visit upon the invitation of Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.

Erdoğan landed in Doha on Sunday evening. Energy Minister Taner Yıldız, National Intelligence Organization (MİT) head Hakan Fidan and Erdoğan’s senior advisers Binali Yıldırım and Yiğit Bulut accompanied Erdoğan during his first visit to the Arab world as president.

Before departing for Doha, Erdoğan described Turkey’s approach toward regional developments as closely aligned with Qatar’s.

Al Monitor: Turkish villages smuggle IS oil through makeshift pipelines

September 18, 2014

Villagers in Hacipasa lay new pipelines for the oil, September 2014. (photo by Fehim Taştekin)

Turkish villages smuggle IS oil through makeshift pipelines

HACIPASA, Turkey — For some time now, Turkey has been accused of either supporting or tolerating the activities of the Islamic State group (IS). Turkey’s hesitation to contribute to the coalition Washington is trying put together has only intensified the accusations. Since Turkey opened its borders without restriction to those fighting against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, others have been exploiting the lax border control. More than facilitating the crossings of militants, the security loophole has also contributed to substantial financial resources for the armed groups dominating the liberated areas of Aleppo, Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. The group profiting the most has been IS, which has been transporting to Turkey the oil it’s extracting with primitive methods in its occupied areas.

Анотация⎙ печать In the village of Hacipasa, almost every house is connected to an illegal oil pipeline smuggling IS oil into Turkey.
Автор Fehim TaştekinОпубликовано Сентябрь 15, 2014

In the Hacipasa village of Altinozu in Hatay province, the scope of this oil smuggling mechanism is clear. On the Turkish side of the Asi river, which forms the border with Syria, lies the village of Hacipasa, with the village of Ezmerin on the Syrian side. The saga of Hacipasa is surely one of the most telling outcomes of the Syria policy then Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu so passionately defended in parliament when he boasted, “We will lead the wave of change in the Middle East. A new Middle East is being born. We will continue to be the owner, pioneer and servant of this Middle East.”

Here is how the oil trade fills IS coffers:

From Ezmerin, about 500 illegal oil pipelines, small-diameter plastic pipes normally used for irrigation, extend to the Turkish side of the Asi River. On the Turkish side, they are buried under agricultural fields to reach the village. Just like the village’s underground water distribution lines, oil pipelines crisscross under streets to reach the back yards of private houses. Diesel fuel pumped from a tanker on the Syrian side fills the private tanks. Simple “pump” and “stop” commands are given over cellular phones.

1

Villagers laying the makeshift pipeline. (photo by Fehim Taştekin)

Consumers come to the houses of sellers and buy the diesel for 1.25 Turkish lira per liter ($0.56). This is how the system worked for a long time.

The state began to intervene only after the international media started to question whether Turkey was supporting IS and whether IS oil was being sold in Turkey. At the end of March, soldiers that had until then been watching the goings on from a hilltop about 100 meters from the river began digging up the pipes from the fields and cutting the ones that lay visible in the streets. Checkpoints were established to prevent the diesel from leaving Hacipasa. But the smugglers always found ways to bypass the gendarmerie, the latest being shipping the fuel in barrels.

Confessions of smugglers

After seeing the pipelines, Al-Monitor’s correspondent spoke to a villager involved in the smuggling operation. From the balcony of his house, five or six pipelines are visible going into other houses. Six people in the house told Al-Monitor that some 80-90% of the village’s families are involved in the diesel fuel smuggling. Many pipelines have been cut, but some fuel still comes through, which is why the price went up to 3 lira ($1.36) from 1.25. There is a saying in the village: “If you have not been in smuggling, you won’t find a bride.”

The state knows what is going on, said the villagers. Everything was happening in front of its soldiers. Some people even imported machinery from Japan to dig and lay the pipes. That can’t be done secretly. Every day, about 30-50 tanker loads of diesel is transferred. In Hatay, there are 4,500 semi trucks. They all use this fuel. Trucks come from central Anatolia to buy cheap fuel.

One man said that he once got stuck in mud next to a pipeline, and soldiers came and towed him out. He said, “We were legal then but illegal now? What changed?”

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Soldiers dismantle a pipeline (Fehim Taştekin)

When pipes and oil barrels were confiscated and some people were detained, there was popular reaction. The villagers demonstrated and soldiers beat up a few people.

The villagers said that when the Syrian refugees came, they opened their houses to them. They carried that burden for three years, they said, without any help. “We helped to transfer relief supplies over the Asi to Syria. We evacuated the wounded to hospitals. One night, there was a call from the minaret loudspeakers of our mosque asking for people with cars to go and evacuate wounded people from the river.” One man added, “That night, I transferred three casualties to the hospital. In return for all that, we made money from oil. Everyone looked the other way. Things changed after March. Soldiers now fire on people going near the border. People have been killed.”

People now watch for the changing of the guards, sometimes waiting up to three days for the right time to get to work.

They said, “We helped everyone in Syria. We even helped Turkish officials to cross the border but suddenly, we are criminals. Fine, they punished us, now they should leave us alone. They should allow us to return to our work, to our fields. But soldiers now want to see our land deeds to before they let us go to the fields. Not everyone has a land deed. Some of the deeds are under the names of their relatives in Syria. I am running around in courts for years to get my own deed.”

Free Syrian Army, not IS

The villagers of Hacipasa who voted for the ruling AKP in the last elections consider the illegal income they make from oil a fee for their support of Syrian refugees. When reminded that the oil smuggling has made IS rich, they object, protesting, “If it was illegal, why did the state allow it?” They prefer to think of the Free Syrian Army, not IS, as benefiting from the trade.

From Hacipasa, where the streets smell of diesel fuel, Al-Monitor went to Cilvegozu, a border crossing near Reyhanli, and spoke with truck drivers protesting the new restrictions. Their problem, they say, is that drivers who use smuggled oil and fuel are fined heavily. Those caught a second time can lose their trucks. Drivers say it is not only Hacipasa making money from smuggling, but also the village of Besaslan. One driver said, ”There still two pipelines operating in Besaslan. Villagers share the money they make. But because the flow of oil has decreased, you may have to wait two days.”

When asked, “You are objecting to the measures taken, but aren’t you uncomfortable with the money IS makes from this business?” their answer was: “Fine, let’s say they cut off the oil as a measure against IS. But militants are crossing the border freely. Go to Esentepe and you will see it.’’ Esentepe is a Reyhanli neighborhood where most cars have Syrian license plates. People believe many militants reside in that neighborhood.

In the province of Hatay, Altinozu and Reyhanli both carried the burden of the civil war in Syria and also made a living from it. Those whose incomes are now affected by the measures taken by the state talk nostalgically of the unique situation they dealt with and made a living from.

 

Turkey’s ILLEGAL trade deal with Iran

September 18, 2014

ABDULLAH BOZKURT

a.bozkurt@todayszaman.com

ABDULLAH BOZKURT
September 15, 2014, Monday

Turkey’s bad trade deal with Iran

The last action Parliament performed in terms of legislation before going into recess on Sept. 10 was to approve a controversial preferential trade agreement (PTA) with Iran when, in fact, a large number of crucial bills and international agreements had been piling up on the agenda, waiting to be debated.

The fact that the PTA with Iran represents the first concession agreement Turkey has ever committed to with any other country — with the exception of the customs union with the EU as part of accession talks and free trade agreements (FTA) with 17 countries — is by itself an indication of how the Iranian regime has accumulated a significant amount of political capital in the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, which is heavily dominated by political Islamist zealots.

The pro-Iranian lobby in the government has been silently pushing the legislation through the Turkish Parliament after Iran ratified it in its own legislature, or Majlis, in May. Cevdet Yılmaz, the development minister who made no secret of his love affair with the Iranian revolution, is the chief architect of this deal and has worked very hard to carry it through. As the co-chairman of the Turkey-Iran Joint Economic Commission, and with the blessing of his boss President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Yılmaz pushed the legislation through the bureaucratic channels and made it happen.

The agreement was signed during Erdoğan’s visit to Tehran at the end of January this year when he was still serving as the prime minister. It almost fell apart, though, when the Iranians played a last-minute Persian diplomacy trick. In fact, the whole saga was recorded by reporters. The scene captured on camera revealed how Economy Minister Nihat Zeybekçi, who was visibly uneasy at the ceremony, refused to sign the deal when Iranian Minister of Industries and Mines Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh produced no Turkish version of the agreement.

But in the end Zeybekçi had to put his name on the document, albeit reluctantly, after Erdoğan instructed him to do so with a hand signal in front of the Iranian delegation present at the bilateral meeting in Tehran. This was completely against established diplomatic protocols and received a harsh rebuke from Turkey’s main opposition party at the time.

The timing of the agreement also raised questions about Erdoğan, who openly called Iran his second home during this visit, despite a host of policy differences Turkey has with the country ranging from Syria to Iraq. Moreover, Erdoğan poked the eye of his key ally, the United States, by disregarding the friendly warning from Washington that was conveyed to his government by visiting US Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen just a day before Erdoğan went to Tehran.

The US official urged Turkey to be cautious, saying there are still significant sanctions in place against Iran and that business deals with Iran should be postponed. “Iran is not open for business. Sanctions [on Iran] remain in place and are still quite significant, and businesses that are interested in engaging with Iran really should hold off,” he said publicly in Ankara. “The day may come when Iran is open for business, but that day is not today,” Cohen emphasized.

Negotiations on the agreement started in the first term of the AKP government and took 10 years to conclude. When looking at the details of the agreement, one may get the feeling that the Turkish side has been cheated and has offered more concessions than Iran.

For example, Iran received tariff and quota reductions on 140 agricultural products, while Turkey obtained discounts on only 125 industrial products. Considering the fact that in 2013 Turkey exported a total of $4 billion worth industrial goods to Iran, the agreement covers only $612 million worth of this trade (or some 15 percent of Turkish exports to Iran), leaving a substantial amount of industrial goods out of the scope of the PTA.

In fact, the percentage of goods covered by the PTA was higher in 2010 and 2011 (28 percent and 27 percent, respectively). That means Iran recognized an area where Turkey was already losing competitiveness and took advantage of it.

I’m not sure that what the Iranians say on paper will actually be enforced on the ground. Turkish firms have been facing significant red tape in Iranian markets despite the agreements to the contrary, and Turkish truckers have effectively given up crossing through Iran en route to Central Asia because of illegal fuel subsidies, fees and technical hindrance by Iran. The fact that the trade volume between Iran and Turkey is mostly based on hydrocarbons purchased by Turkey — and that it fails to reflect the true strength of both economies in terms of gross domestic product — is a testament to Iran’s consistent efforts to block Turkey’s penetration of Iranian markets.

The trade volume between Turkey and Iran was $14.6 billion in 2013 and dropped a sharp 47 percent from $21.9 billion in 2012, when Iran had moved gold through Turkey to circumvent financial sanctions. The trade imbalance heavily favors Iran, with a $6.2 billion surplus as of 2013 figures.

In the first seven months of 2014, the trade volume took another dive, declining 17 percent to $7.8 billion from $9.4 billion in the same period last year. As the trade volume dropped two consecutive years, the trade imbalance working against Turkey grew bigger. Under the circumstances, the target of reaching a trade volume of $30 billion by the end of 2015 — a target announced publicly by Erdoğan in 2009 and later reconfirmed during his January visit this year.

But this trade deal holds advantages for Tehran. It enables Iranian firms to get a firmer hold on the Turkish market, and many of the companies are simply fronts for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). That is why the pro-Iranian lobby in the Turkish Parliament carefully navigated the deal through parliamentary commissions in order to not attract any noise. Since this is essentially a trade agreement, first and foremost, it should have gone through the parliamentary Commission on Industry, Trade, Energy, Natural Resources and Information Technology. Instead, it was sent to the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Commission on June 24, 2014 for review. The Planning and Budgetary Commission must have also examined the deal to conduct “impact analyses.”

That did not happen, either. Instead, the Foreign Affairs Commission debated the agreement and approved it on July 3, 2014. It was interesting that the commission met only to discuss this deal and that it was approved in half an hour without much debate, before Volkan Bozkır, the chairman of the commission (now the EU minister), closed the session.

The key person who managed the traffic between Erdoğan’s government and Parliament was Beşir Atalay, who served as deputy prime minister from 2011 until the end of last month, when he became the AKP deputy chairman and party spokesperson. Atalay has been a long-time Iranian sympathizer, according to the anonymous Twitter account @ACEMUSAKLARI, which posted documents, photographs and video footage of what appears to be the original investigation file into the deadly Iran-backed terrorist organization, Tawhid-Salam. The leak claims that Atalay’s family origins extend to Iran, even though his family settled in the Keskin district of Kırıkkale province, an hour’s drive to the east from Ankara.

Atalay’s family has been very active in the Shiite Bab-ı Ali (Ehl-i Beyt) İlim Vakfı foundation in the province. The contact address for this foundation in Kırıkkale is listed as the Çile Bookstore, whose owner, Bahattin Atalay, is the brother of Beşir Atalay. The file on Atalay revealed that he was exposed to Iranian propaganda throughout his youth. He even went to Iran to attend annual celebrations of the Iranian revolution.

A confidential police document dated Feb. 26, 1982 indicates that Atalay, at the time a research assistant in the department of sociology at the faculty of management and economy of Erzurum Atatürk University, went to Tehran to attend the third annual celebrations for the Iranian revolution. He was arrested on April 27, 1983 in Erzurum when police raided different cells of an Iranian-linked network in the eastern province. Police found Iranian revolutionary documents and materials in Atalay’s house. He told the police he had spent 12 days in Iran.

In 1984, police sent a confidential memo on Beşir Atalay to the rector’s office at Erzurum University, detailing his activities, which included seminars in student houses praising the Iranian revolution and recruiting for an Iranian group at the university. He reportedly espoused a doctrine claiming Turkey could also be saved through a similar revolution. The police also exposed Atalay’s links to then-Iranian Consul M. Tahari at the Iranian Consulate in Erzurum.

Atalay also served as the rector of Kırıkkale University between 1992 and 1997 and appointed pro-Iranian sympathizers to key positions at the university. The investigation file claims that he also established the Fifth Way group at Kırıkkale University, which was officially organized under the Fifth Season Association. Its members subscribe to a radical Shiite doctrine and praise Shiite ideology as the fifth true school of thought in Islamic law, which generally accepts the Maliki, Hanafi, Shafii and Hanbali schools as the leading Sunni schools of thought in Islamic jurisprudence.

Atalay is also believed to have been the architect of Turkey’s tilt toward Iran during AKP rule. He was identified as the key pro-Iranian official in helping Iran sympathizers move to senior positions in the Turkish government. Intelligence chief Hakan Fidan and Interior Minister Efkan Ala are among many of his protégés, according to @ACEMUSAKLARI. He publicly admitted in 2012 that he was the one who helped Fidan make a name for himself in the government.

Hence, Turkey’s trade agreement with Iran, though it appears to be an innocent deal at first glance, raises a lot of questions as to the way it was managed, how it was pushed through Parliament and the extent of involvement of pro-Iranian figures in Turkey. It smells bad, and I would say having no deal with Iran is certainly better than having a bad deal.