Archive for March 27, 2014

Off Topic: Russian Troop Movements Near Eastern Ukraine Trigger Fears of Imminent Invasion

March 27, 2014

Off Topic: Russian Troop Movements Near Eastern Ukraine Trigger Fears of Imminent Invasion – The Washington Free Beacon.

House leaders voice ‘alarm,’ urge Obama to take action

BY:
March 27, 2014 5:00 am

Ukrainian soldiers transport their tanks from their base in Perevalnoe, outside Simferopol, Crimea

Ukrainian soldiers transport their tanks from their base in Perevalnoe, outside Simferopol, Crimea / AP

U.S. intelligence agencies warned Congress late Wednesday that Russian military forces are massing near Ukraine’s borders and appear ready to launch an invasion with little or no warning.

According to defense and intelligence officials, Russian military forces include more than 20,000 troops massing along Ukraine’s eastern border, with some units within 10 miles of the border.

“We’re certainly watching the buildups very, very closely,” said a senior defense official. “They are reinforcing their forces in the southern and eastern portions of Ukraine.”

According to the officials, buildup is alarming because of the numbers and the level of readiness.

“Based on both the size and the types of forces, they certainly have the capability and the readiness level to move into Ukraine should they choose to do this,” the defense official said.

Adding to the war fears are signs the Russians are positioned to carry out an invasion with little or no warning.

Another intelligence indictor was the Russian military announcement Wednesday that an undisclosed section of airspace was closed for “military exercises.”

However, the officials said concerns about the massed troops were heightened by the lack of signs that the troops, tanks and armored vehicles are not conducting in exercises.

“What we’re seeing is not a lot of exercising, but a lot of reinforcing and setting in place,” the defense official said.

One theory of possible Russian military action is that the troops and tanks in eastern Ukraine are preparing to invade and take control of three major eastern Ukrainian cities of Kharkov, Loans, and Donetsk, and then create a land bridge that would allow easy access to Russia’s recently annexed Crimea, on the Black Sea. Currently, Russia has access to Crimea only by ship.

At the Pentagon Wednesday, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel was asked about military action by Russia and said he spoke last week with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoygu. “I asked him specifically why the Russians were building up their western border, and I asked him specifically what the intentions were as to that buildup,” Hagel said. “He told me that they had no intention of crossing the border into Ukraine.”

Ukrainian military forces have been mobilizing for the past several weeks since the Russians forcibly annexed Crimea. Crimea then held a referendum to join the Russian Federation. Among the Ukrainian military action in recent days has been the digging of an anti-tank trench along borders.

A classified intelligence briefing for members of Congress Wednesday afternoon prompted the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, and seven other committee members to issue an urgent appeal to President Obama for the administration to take steps to head off a military attack.

“We write today with urgency and alarm, based on new information in the committee’s possession,” the lawmakers stated in a letter to Obama. “We are gravely concerned about the aggressive posture of Russian forces along the eastern border of Ukraine, as well as reports that Moscow may be making threatening moves towards allies in the Baltics.”

The congressmen asked the administration to share intelligence with Ukraine’s government to take steps to protect the country.

“We also believe it is imperative that the United States take precautionary steps to improve the posture and readiness of U.S. military forces in the region, and pursue additional measures to bolster the security of our eastern and central European allies and partners,” they said.

Details of the intelligence remain classified. However, a congressional aide said the letter to the president was based on intelligence indicating a military action could take place soon.

The Russian forces include large-scale troop movements under the guise of military exercises, along with the presence of significant numbers of Russian Spetsnaz special operations commandos operating in eastern Ukraine that are engaged in fomenting unrest, the congressmen stated in their letter.

Additionally, there are troop and naval movements by the Russians near the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, they said.

“There is deep apprehension that Moscow may invade eastern and southern Ukraine, pressing west to Transdniestria [near southwestern Ukraine], and also seek land grabs in the Baltics,” the letter stated.

According to the letter, the commander of U.S. forces in Europe, Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, who is also NATO forces commander, and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, are alarmed by the potential for new Russian military action.

Breedlove has been in Washington this week for congressional testimony and has raised concerns with senior U.S. officials. “The [Russian] force that is at the Ukrainian border now to the east is very, very sizeable and very, very ready,” Breedlove said earlier this week in Brussels. “There is absolutely sufficient [Russian] force postured on the eastern border of Ukraine to run to Transdniestria if the decision was made to do that and that is very worrisome.”

The lawmakers urged the president to increase the alert posture of U.S. forces in Europe “without delay” including the stationing of forward-deployed U.S. quick reaction forces.

“A failure to take such deterrent actions in the face of continued Russian aggression will certainly risk the very diplomatic and peaceful outcome that we all desire,” they stated. “Inaction by the U.S. and NATO will only further embolden Russian military planners, making further escalation more–not less–likely.”

The members also called for the United States to call an emergency session of the North Atlantic Council to request that NATO allies bolster their force posture and readiness “in the event that an Article V response is required.”

Article V is the section of NATO’s charter that directs the use of military forces.

“Mr. President, we still have opportunity to deter Russia aggression, but President Putin must see our commitment to Ukraine and to our European allies and partners,” the letter said. “He must visibly see our resolve, including our military resolve, and clearly understand the costs.”

In addition to McKeon, the letter was signed by Committee Vice Chairman Mac Thornberry (R., Texas), Rep. J. Randy Forbes (R., Va.), Rep. Joe Wilson (R., S.C.), Rep. Michael R. Turner (R., Ohio), Rep. Mike Rogers (R., Ala.), Rep. Robert J. Wittnam (R., Va.), and Rep. Joseph J. Heck (R., Nev.).

Verification in Iran: No Substitute for Prevention

March 27, 2014

Verification in Iran: No Substitute for Prevention – INSS.

INSS Insight No. 533, March 26, 2014
Ephraim Asculai , Emily B. Landau

Ephraim Asculai Emily B. Landau

The claim by US negotiator Wendy Sherman that “verification” is the key element in ensuring that the Iranian nuclear program is and remains completely peaceful has resonated in a string of US statements in the same vein, aimed to reassure skeptics that the United States will be able to detect and deal in a timely manner with an Iranian breakout to nuclear weapons. However, while verification is no doubt an essential component of any comprehensive deal with Iran, it should not be regarded as the linchpin of a successful agreement. Placing so much weight on successful verification is a dangerous proposition, and raises the concern that the P5+1 may be willing to entertain a deal that does not dismantle all the key components of Iran’s program that support military ambitions. The role of verification is to ensure that Iran upholds its commitment to remain non-nuclear, but verification is no substitute for the commitment itself.
Arriving in Israel after the first round of talks with Iran on a comprehensive nuclear deal, US negotiator Wendy Sherman said, “There is only one measure of success of a comprehensive agreement with Iran, and that is if an agreement means that Iran will never obtain a nuclear weapon.” While this sounds all very well and good, she also noted that the key element in ensuring that the Iranian nuclear program is and remains completely peaceful is “verification.” Sherman’s remarks on verification are only the latest in a string of US statements in the same vein, aimed to reassure skeptics that the United States will be able to detect and deal in a timely manner with an Iranian breakout to nuclear weapons. The administration has been keen on insisting that it will be in total control of any ominous development in the Iranian nuclear project. From President Obama’s assertion that the US will detect Iran in time if it moves to break out, to statements by other White House and State Department officials as well as Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, this theme has dominated the US approach to any agreement with Iran.
While verification is no doubt an essential component of any comprehensive deal with Iran, it should not be regarded as the linchpin of a successful agreement.

US Under Secretary Wendy Sherman (center) at the P5+1 talks with Iran, Vienna, February 18, 2014 AFP/Getty Images

Placing so much weight on successful verification is a dangerous proposition, and raises the concern that the P5+1 may be willing to entertain a deal that does not dismantle all the key components of Tehran’s program that support Iran’s military ambitions. Indeed, why insist on dismantling if the nature of all activities can be verified? In fact, however, the true key to a successful deal with Iran is not verification; it is, rather, clear indication that Iran has opted to abandon its military nuclear ambitions. If Iran decides to do so, the problematic aspects of its program would be rendered unnecessary. Moreover, verification, while helpful, is not guaranteed to stop Iran in time. The history of intelligence in general, and of verification in particular, is replete with instances of failure. The limitations inherent in verification attempts as well as past experience in actual verification missions demand extreme caution in this regard.

The role of verification is to ensure that Iran upholds its commitment to remain non-nuclear, but verification is no substitute for the commitment itself. In order to convince Iran to back away from its military intentions, the leverage that accrues from strong international pressure is critical. In addition, it must be made fully clear that for decades Iran has been working on a military nuclear program while cheating on its NPT commitment. Iran’s current and consistent narrative is that it does not have, and never had, military nuclear ambitions. Yet Iran cannot be allowed to hold onto the claim that it has done no wrong; otherwise it can say that it is being required to back away from something that does not exist. As such, clarifying what is known as the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program must be an integral part of any comprehensive deal.

On this critical PMD issue, Sherman has not communicated a determined, unequivocal US stance. She reportedly said that “the more” Iran works with the IAEA on the PMD, “the better chance” of getting a comprehensive deal. That is not the same as saying that the PMD are an essential (sine qua non) component of any final comprehensive deal. And in another report, an unnamed US official (likely Sherman herself) diluted this less-than-resolute message even further by adding (to a statement almost identical to that attributed to Sherman above) that “we don’t want to do the job that belongs to the IAEA.” This should go without saying. Does this mean, then, that it is not certain that the P5+1 will demand that Iran provide answers to the IAEA? As the leading entity confronting Iran, the P5+1 should make it clear that while the IAEA will handle the PMD investigation, the interest of the P5+1 in getting those answers is identical to that of the IAEA. Ironically, in 2013 the P5+1 actually weakened (at least implicitly) the hand of the IAEA: according to recent reports, the Agency inexplicably scrapped a new report on Iran’s PMD – with additional information corroborating its previous conclusions regarding Iranian military activities – due to the election of Rouhani and a new round of negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran.

IAEA verification is based on the Agency’s own verification mechanism, conducted by its inspectors, supplemented by information provided by IAEA member states, and carried out according to agreements concluded with the inspected state. With Iran, this is still based on the outdated “Full Scope” mechanism. In the 1990s this mechanism was superseded by the more advanced Additional Protocol (AP); however, while Iran signed the AP in late 2003, it still does not adhere to its requirements. Moreover, even the AP lacks two major conditions: it does not permit the IAEA to conduct general searches for undeclared facilities, activities, and materials, nor does it cover the weaponization and delivery aspects of the development of nuclear weapons.

These shortcomings serve Iran’s interests quite well. For example, Iran did not declare concealed facilities until it was forced to admit their existence, and Iran has indeed been consistent in not acknowledging or revealing any details of its military-related nuclear project, even after evidence to this effect was disclosed by the IAEA in an open report in late 2011. Iran has admitted to falsifying facts and misleading the IAEA inspectorate because of allegations that the IAEA does not keep essential information secure.1 There can be no doubt that this kind of behavior will continue even if a permanent agreement is signed. Vital information could be withheld by the Iranians, causing the world to be complacent when the agreement is actually breached.

IAEA verification activities are carried out only with the goodwill of the inspected state and with its consent. Moreover, consent can be withdrawn, including in cases where verification is part of a binding international treaty. The inspectors must be accepted by the inspected state, and are subject to visa requirements that can be withdrawn, or denied in the first place. There have been cases in which Iran (ab)used its privileges and accused inspectors of wrongdoings, including withdrawing their accreditation. In short, if goodwill and cooperation are lacking, verification suffers.

Acting in a timely manner on the basis of information received is another thorny issue for effective verification, especially if the information is provided by an international organization, which necessitates ascertaining the facts, their correct interpretation, and the agreement of many partners to the discussion. All of the shortcomings, loopholes, and imperfections of IAEA verification mechanisms, as well as their dependence on intelligence information, mean that putting one’s confidence in these mechanisms to provide timely warning of an Iranian nuclear breakout is highly problematic.

Exaggerated and unwarranted expectations regarding the ability of the IAEA to verify Iranian compliance with a nuclear deal could end in disaster. The only true basis for a comprehensive deal with Iran is if it owns up to its military program and agrees to dismantle – as Assad did in the chemical realm last summer. Excessive reliance on verification as the key to a successful deal is an illusion. There is no basis in reality for the expectation that verification and intelligence – which are not actions in and of themselves, but only the basis upon which international actors can then take action – will enable these actors to coordinate and respond to an Iranian breakout in time.
_______________________________________________
1See Steven Ditto, “Iranian Suspicions About the IAEA,” PolicyWatch 2227, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 21, 2014, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iranian-suspicions-about-the-iaea.

Key Envoy Leaves Open Possibility of Unaccounted Syrian Chemicals

March 27, 2014

Key Envoy Leaves Open Possibility of Unaccounted Syrian Chemicals – Global Security Newswire.

Workers handle a mock grenade during a March demonstration at a German facility expected to support the destruction of warfare chemicals from Syria. A U.S. diplomat on Wednesday avoided publicly stating whether the international community is aware of the full extent of Syria's chemical arsenal.

Workers handle a mock grenade during a March demonstration at a German facility expected to support the destruction of warfare chemicals from Syria. A U.S. diplomat on Wednesday avoided publicly stating whether the international community is aware of the full extent of Syria’s chemical arsenal. (Nigel Treblin/Getty Images)

A senior U.S. envoy declined to publicly say if the full extent of Syria’s chemical arsenal is known to other governments, ABC News reports.

Thomas Countryman, U.S. assistant secretary of State for international security and nonproliferation, on Wednesday told lawmakers that he would discuss the matter only in a classified briefing. Syrian President Bashar Assad’s government last year gave international authorities what it said was a comprehensive declaration of its chemical arms as part of a plan to eliminate the entire inventory by June. But outside issue experts have surmised that small numbers may remain unaccounted for, even after the disarmament effort draws to a close.

Countryman issued the statement in response to Senator Tim Kaine (D-Va.), who had asked “whether there are undeclared weapons we need to isolate and identify.”

The diplomat said he could “only offer to brief [Kaine] on that in a closed session.”

“It will be illuminating,” Countryman added during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Syria’s three-year-old civil war.

Assad’s regime agreed to give up its chemical arms late last summer, as it faced threats of an international military response to a nerve-agent strike weeks earlier in an opposition-controlled area near Damascus.

Meanwhile, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said two March rocket strikes on a Syrian coastal city “did not stop the removal” of chemical weapons through the port, the Associated Press reported on Wednesday.

The U.N. chief issued the assurance in his introduction to a new report by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which is overseeing the disarmament operation. The document notes that more than 49 percent of Assad’s declared chemical inventory has left Syria through the regime-controlled Latakia seaport.

Ban warned, though, that “the precarious and unstable nature of the security situation further underlines” a need to quickly transfer out the remaining warfare chemicals.

Opposition forces seized portions of the port city’s province over the last week, the Christian Science Monitor reported on Wednesday.

Iran Oil Sales May Outstrip Sanctions Cap for Fifth Month

March 27, 2014

Iran Oil Sales May Outstrip Sanctions Cap for Fifth Month – Global Security Newswire.

A technician works as a helicopter lands at an Iranian oil platform in the Persian Gulf in 2004. Iran appears poised for a fifth month to sell more oil than the average it is permitted to export under an interim nuclear deal with six world powers, according to observers.

A technician works as a helicopter lands at an Iranian oil platform in the Persian Gulf in 2004. Iran appears poised for a fifth month to sell more oil than the average it is permitted to export under an interim nuclear deal with six world powers, according to observers. (Behrouz Mehri/AFP/Getty Images)

Iran appears poised for a fifth month to sell more oil than the average it is permitted to export under a short-term nuclear deal, Reuters reports.

An industry observer said Iran has sent out oil at an overall pace of 1.3 million barrels a day this month, the news agency said on Wednesday. However, the nation agreed not to average more than 1 million barrels in sales each day for the six-month duration of the atomic accord that took effect on Jan. 20.

The limits are intended to help pressure Tehran to accept restrictions on its nuclear program, which Washington and other Western capitals consider a potential vehicle for achieving a nuclear-weapons capability.

Obama administration officials expect Iran to cut its petroleum sales in coming months to bring its average exports down to the cap it accepted in November, according to Reuters.

Still, advocates of stringent economic penalties said Iran’s burgeoning oil sales show that the interim accord has loosened financial restrictions on the country more than negotiators intended. Tehran insists its nuclear program is peaceful, but agreed to limit the atomic effort in return for sanctions curbs under the agreement with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

“Iran will have to reduce exports by over 40 percent over the next three months in order not to exceed the average of last year,” said Tim Wilson, an analyst with the pro-sanctions Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Tehran sold an average of 1.1 million barrels of oil each day in 2013.

Meanwhile, a high-level Iranian government insider said his nation intends to boost its purchases of gasoline within the next 12 months, Reuters reported in a different article. U.S. economic penalties have separately targeted Iran’s ability to obtain gas from abroad.

Israel must stay out of Ukraine crisis

March 27, 2014

Israel must stay out of Ukraine crisis – Israel Opinion, Ynetnews.

Op-ed: Our relationship with Russia is not perfect, but Putin combats anti-Semitism, has kept his promise not to complete delivery of anti-aircraft systems to Iran and Syria.

Elyakim Haetzni

Published: 03.27.14, 10:03 / Israel Opinion

In the cold war between the West and Russia, there is also a battle for global public opinion, an issue that has an impact – mainly from a moral perspective – on the Jewish state’s stance.

Now is the time to plead with our decision-makers to resist temptation and remain completely neutral at all costs. There are hundreds of thousands of Jews living both in Russia and in Ukraine, and each community sides with its own country. Only the independent Israel is in charge of what is called “the Jewish people,” and there is no black and white here.

Putin‘s claims on the issue have yet to be countered. For example, he says that when Crimea was handed over to Ukraine, “the residents were not asked and were dragged about like a sack of potatoes. They went to sleep in one country, and woke up in another.” He has also questioned why Ukraine was allowed to secede from the Soviet Union, but Crimea was not allowed to secede from Ukraine. After all, there is no disputing the fact that that is what the majority in Crimea had wanted.

Putin has also raised difficulties on the issue of Kosovo – indisputably a sovereign Serbian territory conquered by NATO armies, which later ma de a Western-sponsored declaration of sovereignty.  “Why are the Russians banned from doing what the West is allowed to do?” Putin has asked.

Granted, there was a reason for the NATO invasion – the expulsion of thousands of Kosovo Muslims by the Serbs – but Putin is arguing that the coup in Kiev, the strings of which were largely pulled by the West, ousted a legally elected ruler in order to “get NATO to station its forces on the border.”

Putin stated that, “Crimea is part of Russia’s national ethos. It was and has remained in our hearts. Many places in it are full of Russian history, in addition to being a strategic territory. In the people’s hearts and spirit, Crimea is an inseparable part of Russia.”

We will still remind him of these words, although instead of 250 years of Russian history in Crimea, we have 3,000 years of Jewish history in Jerusalem, next to the Western Wall beside which Putin, on his second visit to Israel, warmly wished a Russian immigrant that he would get to see the construction of the Temple.

The comparison to Hitler’s annexation moves is unfounded. Crimea was conquered by Catherine the Great, and was henceforth part of Russia until 1954, when Khrushchev “handed it over” for administration by Ukraine, as part of an internal arrangement within the Soviet Union. Austria, on the other hand, was never part of Germany, and the German speakers in Sudetenland never belonged to Germany.

Nor are Putin and his regime suspected of an ideology of expansion to “conquer the world.” They are acting out of a position of weakness and in defense of a country that has already lost the Baltic states, not to mention the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland to NATO. In Georgia too, Russia only used force after Georgia fired first and invaded South Ossetia.

Today, unlike during the Cold War, Russia is not hostile towards Israel. On the contrary. Putin is vigorously combating anti-Semitism, he is not withholding any gestures of affinity and friendship toward his country’s Jews, and is popular among many of his Jewish subjects. Putin’s Passover greeting to the Jewish people included warm words that we never heard from either the tsars nor the Bolsheviks.

He was one of the first visitors to the new Jewish museum in Moscow, the biggest in the world, and donated to the museum – as a public symbol – one month’s salary. He bought an apartment in Tel Aviv for his Jewish German teacher, an old woman whom he encountered years later in Israel.

Immediately after his reelection, Putin found a reason to visit Israel again, and until now he has kept his promise to our prime ministers and has not completed the delivery of S-300 anti-aircraft systems to Iran and Syria.

Of crouse, none of this is anywhere near our special relationship with the US, and our relationship with Russia is not perfect. And yet, we must not get dragged into this cold war.