▶ “Shalom Aleichem” on violin from an IDF soldier boy… – YouTube.
“Shalom Aleichem” ( Peace be to you ) is the song sung by Jewish families before sitting down to the Sabbath meal.
The words are beautiful, but this boy’s musical rendition makes them superfluous.
Shabbat shalom !
JW
Rachel Maddow sacrifices her credibility to defend IranScam – YouTube.
Maddow purposefully distorts the intent and the effect of the bill in the Senate.
The bill strengthens Obama’s negotiating position by making clear to Teheran the cost of violating the terms of the agreement. It has NO impact if there are no violations.
Maddow says outright that it is an attempt to force the US into another war.
Huh?
Oh, right… WH Talking point.
For good measure she stresses that he bill is the result of “outside groups” like (surprise !) AIPAC.
(Those dirty Jews are trying to force America into another war for their benefit…)
Say it ain’t so, Rachel…. Say it ain’t so.
JW
_______________________________________________________________________________
In a show of defiance to President Obama, 13 Democratic Senators joined 13 Republicans in introducing a new Iranian sanctions bill that includes language forcing the US to support Israel in the event they attack Iran’s nuclear facilities.
The president has threatened to veto the bill, and it is uncertain if Majority Leader Harry Reid will even allow the bill to come to the floor for a vote.
Republican Mark Kirk is leading the charge.
Associated Press:
“Current sanctions brought Iran to the negotiating table and a credible threat of future sanctions will require Iran to cooperate and act in good faith at the negotiating table,” said Sen. Bob Menendez, D-N.J., who spearheaded the effort with Sen. Mark Kirk, R-Ill.
Kirk called the draft law “an insurance policy to defend against Iranian deception.”
The Obama administration has furiously lobbied Congress not to impose new sanctions, even on a conditional basis, saying the increased economic pressure could force Iran to withdraw from the negotiating process and strain ties between the United States and its key negotiating partners — Britain, China, France, Germany and Russia. Washington is banking on these countries to persuade Tehran into accepting a final package that would ease trade, financial and oil restrictions if the Iranian government severely rolls back its uranium enrichment activity and other elements of its nuclear program.
Iran’s foreign minister also has said new sanctions could scuttle hopes of a diplomatic resolution. Iran maintains its program is solely for peaceful energy production and medical research purposes, but the United States and many other countries harbor severe doubts. Israel is perhaps most adamant in insisting Iran’s true intentions are to develop an atomic weapons arsenal.
The White House said it didn’t think the Senate bill would be enacted and didn’t think it should be enacted.
“We don’t want to see action that will proactively undermine American diplomacy,” press secretary Jay Carney told reporters.
The bill would require the administration to certify Iranian compliance with the terms of the interim agreement every 30 days.
Without that certification, the legislation would re-impose all sanctions that have been eased and put in place the new restrictions. Foreign companies and banks violating the bans would be barred from doing business in the United States.
Mark Dubowitz, a sanctions advocate at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said the new economic penalties could cost Tehran $55 billion annually in lost exports of petroleum, fuel oil and other industrial products.
“This should be incentive enough for Iran, if it is serious about saving its economy from a deep recession, not to cheat on its nuclear commitments and to move quickly to conclude a final deal,” he said.
Beyond the economic measures, the bill includes potentially contentious language requiring strong American action if Israel decides to launch a pre-emptive strike against Iran’s nuclear program. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has regularly issued such threats.
“If the government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran’s nuclear weapon program, the United States government should stand with Israel,” the bill states. It calls for “diplomatic, military and economic support” to Israel in such an eventuality.
Significantly, if 13 Democratic Senators were to support the bill, that would give the Senate an excellent chance of overriding any veto coming from the White House. But politics would almost certainly come into play, as some of those Democratic Senators would be under enormous pressure not to cut the legs off of Obama so early in his second term.
At the very least, this sends a strong message to the Iranians that at least some in Washington haven’t been bamboozled by the “moderate” President Rouhani. They are going to have to demonstrate with deeds, not words, their commitment to the agreement as well as their stated desire to conduct a “peaceful” nuclear program.
( The left continues to paint itself into its own special corner of hypocritical naivete. They have always gotten most of their strength from their Jewish members. How far can they push it before they lose even these self-haters? – JW )
A screenshot of the headline and accompanying picture and article that was deemed offensive by Jewish groups.
Popular internet newspaper, The Huffington Post, is under fire yet again for a headline and accompanying image that offended major Jewish groups.
Both the Simon Wiesenthal Center (SWC) and the American Jewish Committee (AJC) criticized the article, headlined “Saboteur Sen. Launching War Push,” which featured a picture of New Jersey’s Senator Robert Menendez addressing pro-Israel lobby the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).
In the article, the publication attacked Senate leaders who backed a bill which calls for new sanctions against Iran in response to the country’s nuclear program. The bill threatens “to push the United States toward war with Iran,” the paper claimed.
Confident that the choice was a deliberate “editorial decision,” Rabbi Abraham Cooper, Associate Dean at the Simon Wiesenthal Center sharply criticized the presentation as reminiscent of anti-Jewish tropes.
“It goes back to the age old canard,” he told The Algemeiner, “that certain people have never seen a war that they can’t find a way to blame on the Jews.”
“Conscious or subconscious it just screams out ‘there they go again,’ meaning Jews, ‘they are bringing the country to war,’” he added.
The AJC said it was “dismayed” and “appalled” by the article, and spoke out in defense of Senator Menendez.
“The Huffington Post has launched a shameful, unjust assault on Senator Menendez,” said AJC Executive Director David Harris.
“Why this incendiary attack on a respected and experienced legislator, who has every right to express his viewpoints, without being depicted in such toxic terms?” Harris continued. “Senator Menendez believes, as do many of his Senate colleagues and a majority of the American people, that the best way to reach a diplomatic solution with Iran is through a hard-nosed, clear-eyed approach to a dangerous and wily adversary. So do we.”
The Huffington Post has often been accused of anti-Israel bias and tolerating anti-Jewish sentiment. Two anonymous blogs, HPMonitor and Huff-Watch have extensively recorded the allegations.
The site “has become a home to a sub sect of commentators expressing anti-Israel hate speech and anti-Semitism,” says the mission statement of HPMonitor. Huff-Watch goes a step further, writing: “…for at least the past two years, Israel and Jews have been HuffPost’s secondary ‘targets.’”
Earlier this year Huffington Post editor Roy Sekoff told Israel’s channel 2 that the publication was planning to open an Israeli branch of the site.
George Washington Spinning In Grave Over Senate Iran Resolution | MJ Rosenberg.
( The self-hating Rosenberg joins forces with the professional lefty anti-Semite Andrew Sullivan to attack even this meager attempt to reign in Obama’s appeasement policy. – JW )
Just when President Obama was starting to believe that it was safe to go back into the water, the lobby has come out with a new Iran sanctions resolution designed to torpedo negotiations with Iran. And, once that is accomplished, it provides for automatic U.S military backing for Israel if Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu decides to bomb.
This may be the lobby’s most brazen attempt yet at subverting negotiations and, in Andrew Sullivan’s words, “handing over American foreign policy on a matter as grave as war and peace to a foreign government….”
The resolution, introduced by Senators Robert Menendez (D-NJ), Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Mark Kirk(R-IL), seemingly responds positively to President Obama’s request that Congress hold off on new sanctions during the negotiations. It does that by giving Obama the authority to waive its proposed new sanctions until the two sides successfully reach an agreement. It is only at that point, with the agreement in hand, that the new sanctions would go into effect, effectively killing the deal.
The bill is almost like an exploding Christmas present. It looks pretty under the tree, all wrapped up nicely, but then in six months it blows down the house.
Here is how it would work, according to an exclusive report in Foreign Policy by Ali Gharib, who obtained a copy of the resolution.
The Menendez-Schumer-Kirk resolution would expand current sanctions to include all aspects of its petroleum trade and its shipping and mining sectors. However, these new sanctions would not take effect so long as Obama certifies that Iran is negotiating in good faith and that imposing them would not be in the U.S. national interest.
That is all well and good. Other than threatening to further damage Iran’s economy while in the midst of negotiations, the new sanctions remain theoretical so long as the president can waive them.
Although damaging (there is no telling how the Iranian government will react to such an insulting action by Congress while it is in the midst of negotiating with the administration) the resolution is par for the course. If it’s not one donor-backed lobby dictating policy, it’s another.
But then the bill goes off in a truly unprecedented direction. It states that if negotiations fail (it defines failure as leaving Iran with the capacity for any nuclear enrichment at all) and Prime Minister Netanyahu decides to dispatch his bombers, the United States is automatically at war too. Here is the language of the resolution:
If the government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran’s nuclear weapon program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide in accordance with the laws of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic, and economic support to the Government of Israel in the defense of its territory, people and existence.
It is difficult to know where the deconstruction should start.
First, is the resolution’s assumption that the existence of an Iranian weapons program makes Israel “compelled” to take “military action of legitimate self-defense” against Iran. That is absurd. The mere possession of a”weapons program” by any state does not give any other country a “legitimate” right to respond militarily.
If it did, the United States would have had the right to bomb the Soviet Union when it ended our atomic bomb monopoly in 1949. In fact, given that there are today nine states with nuclear arsenals (including Israel), recognition of such a right would have meant that the last 60 years would have seen one war after another as various nations felt “compelled” to attack when they suspected that an unfriendly state was on the verge of a nuclear breakthrough. Accepting the logic of the Menendez bill, Iran has the right to attack Israel right now, given that Israel not only has nuclear weapons but is openly hostile to Iran.
And then, of course, is the resolution’s acceptance of Binyamin Netanyahu’s view that any Iranian capacity to enrich uranium is tantamount to nuclear weapons development. This is not the view of any nation on earth but Israel’s and yet the resolution would have us “stand with Israel” in combined “military action” should Netanyahu decide that Iranian enrichment at 5 percent or 10 percent or whatever means a nuclear bomb is being developed.
But worst of all is the fact that this resolution would empower Israel to make the decision to go to war for us. Israel would decide it feels threatened and we would have to back an attack on Iran with “military force,” not to mention all the other forms of support the resolution spells out.
Never in American history have we permitted another government to decide such matters of life and death for us. Israel is a friend but the United Kingdom was our foremost ally in 1940 when it was under constant bombing by Nazi Germany (50,000 British civilians were killed in the so-called Blitz).
Nonetheless, President Roosevelt could not join the war alongside Britain until Nazi Germany declared war on the United States. Not even Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor automatically brought us into the war against Germany. No, it took Germany declaring war on us before Roosevelt was able to go to Congress and ask for a declaration of war, this despite the fact that FDR considered the survival of Britain indispensable to our own survival.
This resolution would dispense with all that in the case of Israel, giving Netanyahu a power that not even FDR had.
Andrew Sullivan has it exactly right:
For the US Senate to proactively bless future aggressive military action by a foreign government when it is not justified by self-defense is an appalling new low in the Israeli government’s grip on the US Congress.
But to proactively commit the United States as well to whatever the Netanyahu government might want to do in a war of choice against Iran is more staggering. Yes, this is non-binding language. But it’s basically endorsing the principle of handing over American foreign policy on a matter as grave as war and peace to a foreign government, acting against international law, thousands of miles away. George Washington would be turning at a rather high velocity in his grave.
Follow MJ Rosenberg on Twitter: www.twitter.com/mjayrosenberg
Jerusalem’s Itchy Trigger Finger.
Forget sanctions. If there’s one thing that should convince Tehran not to go nuclear, it’s that Israel might use its own nukes — first.
BY Yonatan Touval
DECEMBER 19, 2013
Of all the dangers associated with a nuclear-armed Iran — from the onset of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and an Iranian extension of “a nuclear umbrella” to regional proxies, from a nuclear bomb falling into terrorist hands to an Iranian nuclear attack on Israel or even on the United States — the one we should take most seriously goes virtually unmentioned: a miscalculated nuclear exchange between Israel and Iran. It’s a risk that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei should consider carefully; when push comes to shove, having a bomb might only make a conflict between the two countries more likely. In fact, when considering how this chain of events might unfold, the basic strategic calculus would suggest that it is Israel — rather than Iran — that would be more liable to make the calamitous mistake of initiating a nuclear conflagration.
This assessment is not invoked lightly, let alone accusingly. Since Israel first obtained nuclear military capabilities in the late 1960s, it has proven itself to be an extremely responsible nuclear power. In fact, given the level of threat the country has faced — including the perceived threat to its very existence during the 1973 Yom Kippur War — Israel might well be deemed the most responsible nuclear power in the world.
The case of the Yom Kippur War is particularly enlightening. Fearing it might be overrun by the combined Syrian and Egyptian armies on its northern and southern fronts, Israel came close to making use of its nuclear arsenal — though not as close as many believe. In the most illuminating testimony to have come out in recent years about the deliberations that took place among Israel’s top political and military echelons during the first days of the war, a former Israeli official who was an eye-witness to the exchange recounted how Defense Minister Moshe Dayan asked Prime Minister Golda Meir “to authorize him to start making the necessary preparations so that if we have to make a decision to activate [the nuclear option], we could do it in a few minutes, rather than wandering around for half a day in order to prepare everything.” According to this official, Meir rebuffed Dayan out of hand.
In other words, even at the fateful moment when Israel’s defense minister assessed that the country was in imminent danger of collapse — so imminent, as he explained to his prime minister, that “half a day” might not be enough lead time to activate the ultimate deterrence — Israel’s top leader opted for restraint.
However reassuring Israel’s record is to date, it is hard to extrapolate from it about the future, especially one in which Iran possesses military nuclear capabilities. After all, the prospect of invasion by enemy armies pales in comparison to that of nuclear annihilation. And that is a threat that neither Israel — nor any other nation — has ever really faced before. (While the specter of a nuclear exchange was raised during both the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis, none of the various powers involved feared complete nuclear annihilation.)
How would Israel conduct itself when faced with a nuclear foe — and one, moreover, that continued to spew exterminationist rhetoric against it? While restraint may well rule the day, the danger of a catastrophic mishap cannot be discounted. And although this may hold true for other nuclear rivals — such as India and Pakistan — the case of Iran and Israel is particularly acute, with Israel being the more liable actor to make the calamitous error.
The reasons are multiple and mutually reinforcing. And they have little to do with safeguards. First, Tehran’s explicit hatred for Israel — the latest display of which was offered by Khamenei last month when he declared that “the Israeli regime is doomed to failure and annihilation” — is extreme even among the bitterest of adversaries. (By comparison, the most prevalent context in which the term “annihilation” crops up in the context of Indian-Pakistani relations is cricket.) Backed up by new military nuclear capabilities, such threats could, under certain circumstances, push an Israeli leader to take desperate action.
In addition, Israel is uniquely vulnerable to nuclear annihilation on account of its small size — a size that has earned it the horrific epithet “a one-bomb country.” With no margins for error, Israel may sooner choose to act than risk having to react.
In the face of a nuclear scare, the asymmetry in second-strike capabilities would give Israel an added incentive to go ahead and initiate an attack on Iran rather than the other way around. After all, if the aim is to successfully eliminate the nuclear arsenal of the other, Israel could hope to destroy the handful of weapons Iran could make, leaving it unable to retaliate with nukes of its own. Iran, though, could not hope to eliminate Israel’s entire arsenal.
Israel’s military history also suggests a penchant for preemptive action. The heroic example of the 1967 Six-Day War stands in stark contrast to the dire lesson of 1973 and informs a military ethos that prioritizes proactive measures.
Finally, in the absence of a hotline between the Iranian and Israeli leaderships — the kind of quick and secure communication link that was set up following the Cuban Missile Crisis between Washington and Moscow, and which exists today between such foes as Delhi and Islamabad and even Seoul and Pyongyang — any accident or misunderstanding would be difficult to address speedily and effectively before triggering a potentially nuclear action.
None of this is to shift the focus from the need to roll back Iran’s nuclear program; on the contrary, such a sobering perspective on the real risks at stake should only firm up international resolve to reach a permanent agreement with Iran in the next 6-12 months.
Nor should world powers turn their attention to Israel’s nuclear status, either in parallel to negotiations with Iran or immediately following an agreement. Assuming Iran’s nuclear program is successfully constrained, Israel can be counted on to remain a highly reliable nuclear player. On other hand, pressing Israel toward greater nuclear transparency — such as by joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty — is certain to be met by stiff Israeli resistance. Worse, it may set off a dynamic that risks only undermining the overarching goal of preventing the nuclearization of the Middle East. After all, whether or not one buys into the argument that Israel’s policy of nuclear opacity has indeed served to stave off a nuclear arms race in the region, the counter argument that Israeli transparency will serve better the cause is even more fanciful.
What the world needs to realize — and especially Iran and the Western powers trying to forge more constructive dialogue with Tehran — is that the risk of a nuclear Iran is not so much Iran itself as it is the co-presence of two nuclear-armed enemies in the region. At the very least, such honesty might begin to address — even if not defuse — Iran’s longstanding claims of a Western double standard toward its nuclear program. And it might just convince Iran that, with a foe like Israel, the danger of acquiring military nuclear capabilities far outweighs the benefits.
Of all the dangers associated with a nuclear-armed Iran — from the onset of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and an Iranian extension of “a nuclear umbrella” to regional proxies, from a nuclear bomb falling into terrorist hands to an Iranian nuclear attack on Israel or even on the United States — the one we should take most seriously goes virtually unmentioned: a miscalculated nuclear exchange between Israel and Iran. It’s a risk that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei should consider carefully; when push comes to shove, having a bomb might only make a conflict between the two countries more likely. In fact, when considering how this chain of events might unfold, the basic strategic calculus would suggest that it is Israel — rather than Iran — that would be more liable to make the calamitous mistake of initiating a nuclear conflagration.
This assessment is not invoked lightly, let alone accusingly. Since Israel first obtained nuclear military capabilities in the late 1960s, it has proven itself to be an extremely responsible nuclear power. In fact, given the level of threat the country has faced — including the perceived threat to its very existence during the 1973 Yom Kippur War — Israel might well be deemed the most responsible nuclear power in the world.
The case of the Yom Kippur War is particularly enlightening. Fearing it might be overrun by the combined Syrian and Egyptian armies on its northern and southern fronts, Israel came close to making use of its nuclear arsenal — though not as close as many believe. In the most illuminating testimony to have come out in recent years about the deliberations that took place among Israel’s top political and military echelons during the first days of the war, a former Israeli official who was an eye-witness to the exchange recounted how Defense Minister Moshe Dayan asked Prime Minister Golda Meir “to authorize him to start making the necessary preparations so that if we have to make a decision to activate [the nuclear option], we could do it in a few minutes, rather than wandering around for half a day in order to prepare everything.” According to this official, Meir rebuffed Dayan out of hand.
In other words, even at the fateful moment when Israel’s defense minister assessed that the country was in imminent danger of collapse — so imminent, as he explained to his prime minister, that “half a day” might not be enough lead time to activate the ultimate deterrence — Israel’s top leader opted for restraint.
However reassuring Israel’s record is to date, it is hard to extrapolate from it about the future, especially one in which Iran possesses military nuclear capabilities. After all, the prospect of invasion by enemy armies pales in comparison to that of nuclear annihilation. And that is a threat that neither Israel — nor any other nation — has ever really faced before. (While the specter of a nuclear exchange was raised during both the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis, none of the various powers involved feared complete nuclear annihilation.)
How would Israel conduct itself when faced with a nuclear foe — and one, moreover, that continued to spew exterminationist rhetoric against it? While restraint may well rule the day, the danger of a catastrophic mishap cannot be discounted. And although this may hold true for other nuclear rivals — such as India and Pakistan — the case of Iran and Israel is particularly acute, with Israel being the more liable actor to make the calamitous error.
The reasons are multiple and mutually reinforcing. And they have little to do with safeguards. First, Tehran’s explicit hatred for Israel — the latest display of which was offered by Khamenei last month when he declared that “the Israeli regime is doomed to failure and annihilation” — is extreme even among the bitterest of adversaries. (By comparison, the most prevalent context in which the term “annihilation” crops up in the context of Indian-Pakistani relations is cricket.) Backed up by new military nuclear capabilities, such threats could, under certain circumstances, push an Israeli leader to take desperate action.
In addition, Israel is uniquely vulnerable to nuclear annihilation on account of its small size — a size that has earned it the horrific epithet “a one-bomb country.” With no margins for error, Israel may sooner choose to act than risk having to react.
In the face of a nuclear scare, the asymmetry in second-strike capabilities would give Israel an added incentive to go ahead and initiate an attack on Iran rather than the other way around. After all, if the aim is to successfully eliminate the nuclear arsenal of the other, Israel could hope to destroy the handful of weapons Iran could make, leaving it unable to retaliate with nukes of its own. Iran, though, could not hope to eliminate Israel’s entire arsenal.
Israel’s military history also suggests a penchant for preemptive action. The heroic example of the 1967 Six-Day War stands in stark contrast to the dire lesson of 1973 and informs a military ethos that prioritizes proactive measures.
Finally, in the absence of a hotline between the Iranian and Israeli leaderships — the kind of quick and secure communication link that was set up following the Cuban Missile Crisis between Washington and Moscow, and which exists today between such foes as Delhi and Islamabad and even Seoul and Pyongyang — any accident or misunderstanding would be difficult to address speedily and effectively before triggering a potentially nuclear action.
None of this is to shift the focus from the need to roll back Iran’s nuclear program; on the contrary, such a sobering perspective on the real risks at stake should only firm up international resolve to reach a permanent agreement with Iran in the next 6-12 months.
Nor should world powers turn their attention to Israel’s nuclear status, either in parallel to negotiations with Iran or immediately following an agreement. Assuming Iran’s nuclear program is successfully constrained, Israel can be counted on to remain a highly reliable nuclear player. On other hand, pressing Israel toward greater nuclear transparency — such as by joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty — is certain to be met by stiff Israeli resistance. Worse, it may set off a dynamic that risks only undermining the overarching goal of preventing the nuclearization of the Middle East. After all, whether or not one buys into the argument that Israel’s policy of nuclear opacity has indeed served to stave off a nuclear arms race in the region, the counter argument that Israeli transparency will serve better the cause is even more fanciful.
What the world needs to realize — and especially Iran and the Western powers trying to forge more constructive dialogue with Tehran — is that the risk of a nuclear Iran is not so much Iran itself as it is the co-presence of two nuclear-armed enemies in the region. At the very least, such honesty might begin to address — even if not defuse — Iran’s longstanding claims of a Western double standard toward its nuclear program. And it might just convince Iran that, with a foe like Israel, the danger of acquiring military nuclear capabilities far outweighs the benefits.
– See more at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/19/burmas_senseless_census#sthash.OiMujKn7.dpuf
Of all the dangers associated with a nuclear-armed Iran — from the onset of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and an Iranian extension of “a nuclear umbrella” to regional proxies, from a nuclear bomb falling into terrorist hands to an Iranian nuclear attack on Israel or even on the United States — the one we should take most seriously goes virtually unmentioned: a miscalculated nuclear exchange between Israel and Iran. It’s a risk that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei should consider carefully; when push comes to shove, having a bomb might only make a conflict between the two countries more likely. In fact, when considering how this chain of events might unfold, the basic strategic calculus would suggest that it is Israel — rather than Iran — that would be more liable to make the calamitous mistake of initiating a nuclear conflagration.
This assessment is not invoked lightly, let alone accusingly. Since Israel first obtained nuclear military capabilities in the late 1960s, it has proven itself to be an extremely responsible nuclear power. In fact, given the level of threat the country has faced — including the perceived threat to its very existence during the 1973 Yom Kippur War — Israel might well be deemed the most responsible nuclear power in the world.
The case of the Yom Kippur War is particularly enlightening. Fearing it might be overrun by the combined Syrian and Egyptian armies on its northern and southern fronts, Israel came close to making use of its nuclear arsenal — though not as close as many believe. In the most illuminating testimony to have come out in recent years about the deliberations that took place among Israel’s top political and military echelons during the first days of the war, a former Israeli official who was an eye-witness to the exchange recounted how Defense Minister Moshe Dayan asked Prime Minister Golda Meir “to authorize him to start making the necessary preparations so that if we have to make a decision to activate [the nuclear option], we could do it in a few minutes, rather than wandering around for half a day in order to prepare everything.” According to this official, Meir rebuffed Dayan out of hand.
In other words, even at the fateful moment when Israel’s defense minister assessed that the country was in imminent danger of collapse — so imminent, as he explained to his prime minister, that “half a day” might not be enough lead time to activate the ultimate deterrence — Israel’s top leader opted for restraint.
However reassuring Israel’s record is to date, it is hard to extrapolate from it about the future, especially one in which Iran possesses military nuclear capabilities. After all, the prospect of invasion by enemy armies pales in comparison to that of nuclear annihilation. And that is a threat that neither Israel — nor any other nation — has ever really faced before. (While the specter of a nuclear exchange was raised during both the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis, none of the various powers involved feared complete nuclear annihilation.)
How would Israel conduct itself when faced with a nuclear foe — and one, moreover, that continued to spew exterminationist rhetoric against it? While restraint may well rule the day, the danger of a catastrophic mishap cannot be discounted. And although this may hold true for other nuclear rivals — such as India and Pakistan — the case of Iran and Israel is particularly acute, with Israel being the more liable actor to make the calamitous error.
The reasons are multiple and mutually reinforcing. And they have little to do with safeguards. First, Tehran’s explicit hatred for Israel — the latest display of which was offered by Khamenei last month when he declared that “the Israeli regime is doomed to failure and annihilation” — is extreme even among the bitterest of adversaries. (By comparison, the most prevalent context in which the term “annihilation” crops up in the context of Indian-Pakistani relations is cricket.) Backed up by new military nuclear capabilities, such threats could, under certain circumstances, push an Israeli leader to take desperate action.
In addition, Israel is uniquely vulnerable to nuclear annihilation on account of its small size — a size that has earned it the horrific epithet “a one-bomb country.” With no margins for error, Israel may sooner choose to act than risk having to react.
In the face of a nuclear scare, the asymmetry in second-strike capabilities would give Israel an added incentive to go ahead and initiate an attack on Iran rather than the other way around. After all, if the aim is to successfully eliminate the nuclear arsenal of the other, Israel could hope to destroy the handful of weapons Iran could make, leaving it unable to retaliate with nukes of its own. Iran, though, could not hope to eliminate Israel’s entire arsenal.
Israel’s military history also suggests a penchant for preemptive action. The heroic example of the 1967 Six-Day War stands in stark contrast to the dire lesson of 1973 and informs a military ethos that prioritizes proactive measures.
Finally, in the absence of a hotline between the Iranian and Israeli leaderships — the kind of quick and secure communication link that was set up following the Cuban Missile Crisis between Washington and Moscow, and which exists today between such foes as Delhi and Islamabad and even Seoul and Pyongyang — any accident or misunderstanding would be difficult to address speedily and effectively before triggering a potentially nuclear action.
None of this is to shift the focus from the need to roll back Iran’s nuclear program; on the contrary, such a sobering perspective on the real risks at stake should only firm up international resolve to reach a permanent agreement with Iran in the next 6-12 months.
Nor should world powers turn their attention to Israel’s nuclear status, either in parallel to negotiations with Iran or immediately following an agreement. Assuming Iran’s nuclear program is successfully constrained, Israel can be counted on to remain a highly reliable nuclear player. On other hand, pressing Israel toward greater nuclear transparency — such as by joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty — is certain to be met by stiff Israeli resistance. Worse, it may set off a dynamic that risks only undermining the overarching goal of preventing the nuclearization of the Middle East. After all, whether or not one buys into the argument that Israel’s policy of nuclear opacity has indeed served to stave off a nuclear arms race in the region, the counter argument that Israeli transparency will serve better the cause is even more fanciful.
What the world needs to realize — and especially Iran and the Western powers trying to forge more constructive dialogue with Tehran — is that the risk of a nuclear Iran is not so much Iran itself as it is the co-presence of two nuclear-armed enemies in the region. At the very least, such honesty might begin to address — even if not defuse — Iran’s longstanding claims of a Western double standard toward its nuclear program. And it might just convince Iran that, with a foe like Israel, the danger of acquiring military nuclear capabilities far outweighs the benefits.
– See more at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/19/burmas_senseless_census#sthash.OiMujKn7.dpuf
Of all the dangers associated with a nuclear-armed Iran — from the onset of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and an Iranian extension of “a nuclear umbrella” to regional proxies, from a nuclear bomb falling into terrorist hands to an Iranian nuclear attack on Israel or even on the United States — the one we should take most seriously goes virtually unmentioned: a miscalculated nuclear exchange between Israel and Iran. It’s a risk that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei should consider carefully; when push comes to shove, having a bomb might only make a conflict between the two countries more likely. In fact, when considering how this chain of events might unfold, the basic strategic calculus would suggest that it is Israel — rather than Iran — that would be more liable to make the calamitous mistake of initiating a nuclear conflagration.
This assessment is not invoked lightly, let alone accusingly. Since Israel first obtained nuclear military capabilities in the late 1960s, it has proven itself to be an extremely responsible nuclear power. In fact, given the level of threat the country has faced — including the perceived threat to its very existence during the 1973 Yom Kippur War — Israel might well be deemed the most responsible nuclear power in the world.
The case of the Yom Kippur War is particularly enlightening. Fearing it might be overrun by the combined Syrian and Egyptian armies on its northern and southern fronts, Israel came close to making use of its nuclear arsenal — though not as close as many believe. In the most illuminating testimony to have come out in recent years about the deliberations that took place among Israel’s top political and military echelons during the first days of the war, a former Israeli official who was an eye-witness to the exchange recounted how Defense Minister Moshe Dayan asked Prime Minister Golda Meir “to authorize him to start making the necessary preparations so that if we have to make a decision to activate [the nuclear option], we could do it in a few minutes, rather than wandering around for half a day in order to prepare everything.” According to this official, Meir rebuffed Dayan out of hand.
In other words, even at the fateful moment when Israel’s defense minister assessed that the country was in imminent danger of collapse — so imminent, as he explained to his prime minister, that “half a day” might not be enough lead time to activate the ultimate deterrence — Israel’s top leader opted for restraint.
However reassuring Israel’s record is to date, it is hard to extrapolate from it about the future, especially one in which Iran possesses military nuclear capabilities. After all, the prospect of invasion by enemy armies pales in comparison to that of nuclear annihilation. And that is a threat that neither Israel — nor any other nation — has ever really faced before. (While the specter of a nuclear exchange was raised during both the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis, none of the various powers involved feared complete nuclear annihilation.)
How would Israel conduct itself when faced with a nuclear foe — and one, moreover, that continued to spew exterminationist rhetoric against it? While restraint may well rule the day, the danger of a catastrophic mishap cannot be discounted. And although this may hold true for other nuclear rivals — such as India and Pakistan — the case of Iran and Israel is particularly acute, with Israel being the more liable actor to make the calamitous error.
The reasons are multiple and mutually reinforcing. And they have little to do with safeguards. First, Tehran’s explicit hatred for Israel — the latest display of which was offered by Khamenei last month when he declared that “the Israeli regime is doomed to failure and annihilation” — is extreme even among the bitterest of adversaries. (By comparison, the most prevalent context in which the term “annihilation” crops up in the context of Indian-Pakistani relations is cricket.) Backed up by new military nuclear capabilities, such threats could, under certain circumstances, push an Israeli leader to take desperate action.
In addition, Israel is uniquely vulnerable to nuclear annihilation on account of its small size — a size that has earned it the horrific epithet “a one-bomb country.” With no margins for error, Israel may sooner choose to act than risk having to react.
In the face of a nuclear scare, the asymmetry in second-strike capabilities would give Israel an added incentive to go ahead and initiate an attack on Iran rather than the other way around. After all, if the aim is to successfully eliminate the nuclear arsenal of the other, Israel could hope to destroy the handful of weapons Iran could make, leaving it unable to retaliate with nukes of its own. Iran, though, could not hope to eliminate Israel’s entire arsenal.
Israel’s military history also suggests a penchant for preemptive action. The heroic example of the 1967 Six-Day War stands in stark contrast to the dire lesson of 1973 and informs a military ethos that prioritizes proactive measures.
Finally, in the absence of a hotline between the Iranian and Israeli leaderships — the kind of quick and secure communication link that was set up following the Cuban Missile Crisis between Washington and Moscow, and which exists today between such foes as Delhi and Islamabad and even Seoul and Pyongyang — any accident or misunderstanding would be difficult to address speedily and effectively before triggering a potentially nuclear action.
None of this is to shift the focus from the need to roll back Iran’s nuclear program; on the contrary, such a sobering perspective on the real risks at stake should only firm up international resolve to reach a permanent agreement with Iran in the next 6-12 months.
Nor should world powers turn their attention to Israel’s nuclear status, either in parallel to negotiations with Iran or immediately following an agreement. Assuming Iran’s nuclear program is successfully constrained, Israel can be counted on to remain a highly reliable nuclear player. On other hand, pressing Israel toward greater nuclear transparency — such as by joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty — is certain to be met by stiff Israeli resistance. Worse, it may set off a dynamic that risks only undermining the overarching goal of preventing the nuclearization of the Middle East. After all, whether or not one buys into the argument that Israel’s policy of nuclear opacity has indeed served to stave off a nuclear arms race in the region, the counter argument that Israeli transparency will serve better the cause is even more fanciful.
What the world needs to realize — and especially Iran and the Western powers trying to forge more constructive dialogue with Tehran — is that the risk of a nuclear Iran is not so much Iran itself as it is the co-presence of two nuclear-armed enemies in the region. At the very least, such honesty might begin to address — even if not defuse — Iran’s longstanding claims of a Western double standard toward its nuclear program. And it might just convince Iran that, with a foe like Israel, the danger of acquiring military nuclear capabilities far outweighs the benefits.
– See more at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/19/burmas_senseless_census#sthash.OiMujKn7.dpuf
Senators defy Obama in bid to back Israel | TribLIVE.
By The Associated Press
Published: Thursday, Dec. 19, 2013, 9:33 p.m.
WASHINGTON — More than a quarter of the Senate introduced legislation on Thursday that could raise sanctions on Iran and compel America to support Israel if it initiates a pre-emptive attack on the Iranian nuclear program, defying President Obama and drawing a veto threat.
The bill, sponsored by 13 Democrats and 13 Republicans, sets sanctions that would go into effect if Tehran violates the nuclear deal it reached with world powers last month or lets the agreement expire without a long-term accord. The measures include a global boycott on Iranian oil exports within one year and the blacklisting of Iran’s mining, engineering and construction industries.
The goal, according to supporters, is to strengthen the negotiating leverage of the Obama administration as it seeks to pressure Iran into a comprehensive agreement next year that would eliminate the risk of the Islamic republic developing nuclear weapons. But it could also cause added complications for U.S. negotiators, who promised Iran no new economic sanctions for the duration of the six-month interim pact that was finalized on Nov. 24 in Geneva.
“Current sanctions brought Iran to the negotiating table and a credible threat of future sanctions will require Iran to cooperate and act in good faith at the negotiating table,” said Sen. Bob Menendez, D-N.J., who spearheaded the effort with Sen. Mark Kirk, R-Ill.
Kirk called the draft law “an insurance policy to defend against Iranian deception.”
The Obama administration has furiously lobbied Congress not to impose new sanctions, even on a conditional basis, saying the increased economic pressure could force Iran to withdraw from the negotiating process and strain ties between the United States and its key negotiating partners — Britain, China, France, Germany and Russia. Washington is banking on these countries to persuade Tehran into accepting a final package that would ease trade, financial and oil restrictions if the Iranian government severely rolls back its uranium enrichment activity and other elements of its nuclear program.
Iran’s foreign minister has said new sanctions could scuttle hopes of a diplomatic resolution. Iran maintains its program is solely for peaceful energy production and medical research purposes, but the United States and many other countries harbor severe doubts.
Israel is perhaps most adamant in insisting Iran’s true intentions are to develop an atomic weapons arsenal.
The White House said it doesn’t think the Senate bill will be enacted and didn’t think it should be enacted.
“We don’t want to see action that will proactively undermine American diplomacy,” press secretary Jay Carney told reporters.
Report: Putin Backs Israel in Middle East Issues – Defense/Security – News – Israel National News.
( Russia has plenty of oil but trails the West in high-tech. Putin follows Russia’s interest. No mention of an Israeli quid pro quo for Putin’s commitment. Hmmm…. – JW )
Maariv report claims in private meeting Netanyahu and Putin forged security pact for Israel’s safety.
By Tova Dvorin and Ari Yashar
First Publish: 12/20/2013, 10:44 AM
PM Binyamin Netanyahu with Russian President Vladimir Putin
A pact was forged between Moscow and Jerusalem to ensure Israel’s security during a private meeting last month, according to a Friday Maariv report.
The report claims that a 90-minute conversation took place between Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Russian President Vladimir Putin during Netanyahu’s last-minute attempt to prevent an interim nuclear deal between Western powers and Iran.
While Moscow – which has been rumored to be involved in a nuclear arms deal with Tehran – refused to accede to Israel’s stance on the nuclear Iran issue, Putin did allegedly promise to ensure Israel’s security in the region.
Netanyahu asked Putin “not to push” the demilitarization of the Middle East from all nuclear weapons, according to the report. Israel has faced mounting international pressure to sign the UN’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Netanyahu stressed to Putin that threats to disarm Israel of its nuclear weapons – which have never been officially confirmed by Israeli officials but are widely thought to be in Israel’s possession – would harm Israel’s interests in the Middle East.
Putin, surprisingly, agreed to the proposal. “Russia will block efforts to convene the nuclear arms conference,” he allegedly promised Netanyahu.
Putin even made it clear to Netanyahu that Russia will not do anything to harm Israel. He added that despite the close relationship between Israel and the US – with whom Russia’s relationship is strained – Russia would nonetheless stand by Israel’s side and offer aid in the event of a conflict against it, according to the report.
US President Barack Obama reportedly objected to the pressure on Israel in 2010, but later backed down, in a move widely panned by Israeli officials. The Obama administration’s policy of non-intervention in the Middle East – including failed threats of a Syria strike and ambivalence about a nuclear Iran – has irked Russia and strained the relationship, the report claims. Putin and Netanyahu allegedly united over the common dissent with the US’s policy over the region.
The newly revealed pact with Russia coincides with a growing rapprochement between Israel and China. The deepening ties were highlighted in Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s first visit to Israel this week.
The report contradicts evidence indicating that Russia is involved in arming some of Israel’s most formidable threats, including Iran, Syria, and Egypt. Russia was reportedly among the most vocal supporters of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and came out against Israel’s rumored possession of nuclear weapons earlier this year.
Before last month’s meeting, an expert from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem dismissed claims that Israel has been playing off tensions between Russia and the US.
“I very much hope that (Netanyahu) will not try such an exercise,” Amnon Sela, professor emeritus of international relations, told AFP. “I think he has already taken some steps which are very harmful to Israel, with his opposition to President (Barack) Obama and trying to enlist (US) public opinion and Congress against the president, and in particular the American Jewish community which immediately raises the question of dual loyalties.”
Even if Russia would like to fill the gap, it lacks the resources, he said.
“It is not capable of playing any role beyond that which it already has, in Iran, Syria and (Lebanese terrorist group) Hezbollah.”
“It has no possibility; not economically, nor diplomatically,” he said, adding that “it could act only together with the United States.”
WarSclerotic 
Recent Comments