Archive for December 4, 2013

US court orders Iran to pay $9 million to families of 1997 Jerusalem terror attack victims

December 4, 2013

US court orders Iran to pay $9 million to families of 1997 Jerusalem terror attack victims | JPost | Israel News.

By YONAH JEREMY BOB, JPOST.COM STAFF

12/04/2013 14:23

NGO wins 1st potential seizure of Iranian funds in US; Actual transfer of funds could still be blocked by appeal and the current diplomatic process.

Friends and relatives of Samdar Elhanon mourn her death

Friends and relatives of Samdar Elhanon mourn her death Photo: REUTERS

For the first time in US history, victims of Iranian financed terror operations in Israel won a potential seizure of Iranian funds to satisfy a default judgment against Iran relating to a 1997 triple suicide bombing in Jerusalem, NGO Shurat Hadin – Israel Law Center announced on Wednesday.

The $9 million judgment entered in favor of the families of the five victims of the attack by a US federal court in California on November 27, is the first time that such victims have found Iranian assets in the US which could be and may actually be transferred to them.

The organization helped the American families of five of those wounded in the attacks to begin legal proceedings against Iran in 2001 for their sponsorship of Hamas, the Palestinian Islamist group which claimed credit for the attack on Ben Yehuda Street.

On September 4, 1997, three Hamas operatives set off explosives attached to their bodies as they wandered into the packed Ben Yehuda Street promenade in the middle of the afternoon, killing five Israelis and wounding scores of others. Three of those killed were 14-year-old girls.

“This is a tremendous victory for the victims of Islamic terrorism,” Nitsana Darshan-Leitner, founder of Shurat HaDin, said in a statement. “While the the US and EU are rushing out to economically bolster the outlaw regime in Tehran,  we and the families we represent do not forgive nor forget the Iranian funded terror that devastated Israel.”

“We still remember the heinous murders carried out by the Iranian proxy, Hamas, in 1997. We are still fighting every single day for a measure of justice and compensation from the outlaw regimes that supported the terror organizations.”

Still, in a complex decision, the court simultaneously rejected Shurat Hadin’s request for the immediate transfer of the funds, explicitly staying any transfer until Iran files its appeal.

An appeal involving the numerous complex legal issues and decades of history in the case, which has pieces nearly dating back to the 1979 Iranian revolution itself, could take an undefined amount of time.

Also, the court explicitly recognized that any final transfer of the funds would have to take into account the current diplomatic process with Iran, another potential roadblock to the funds transfer.

Still even an order officially giving the victims’ families title to the funds in theory, if not in practice, is a first in Shurat Hadin’s decade long struggle to not only win judgments on Iran-related terror financing cases for the victims’ families, but to also find actual assets to satisfy the judgments.

Bibi and Barack, the Sequel – NYTimes.com

December 4, 2013

Bibi and Barack, the Sequel – NYTimes.com.

( Friedman takes a break from bashing Israel to concoct this nonsense.  It would appear he’s taking his support for IranScam by a notch.  Could the universal loathing he generated in the Jewish community have something to do with it? – JW )

The thought sounds ludicrous on its face, I know. The two do not like each other and have radically different worldviews. But as much as they keep trying to get away from each other, the cunning of history keeps throwing them back together, intertwining their fates.

That will be particularly true in the next six months when the U.S.-led negotiations to defuse Iran’s nuclear bomb-making capabilities and the U.S.-led negotiations to reach a final peace between Israelis and Palestinians both come to a head at the same time. If these two leaders were to approach these two negotiations with a reasonably shared vision (and push each other), they could play a huge role in remaking the Middle East for the better, and — with John Kerry — deserve the Nobel Prize, an Emmy, an Oscar and the Pritzker Architecture Prize.

Let’s start with the Iran talks. After his initial and, I believe, wrongheaded outburst against the U.S.-led deal to freeze and modestly rollback Iran’s nuclear program in return for some limited sanctions relief, Netanyahu has quieted down a bit and has set up a team to work with the U.S. on the precise terms for a final deal with Iran.

I hope that Bibi doesn’t get too quiet, though. While I think the interim deal is a sound basis for negotiating a true end to Iran’s nuclear bomb-making capabilities, the chances of getting that true end are improved if Bibi is occasionally Bibi and serves as our loaded pistol on the negotiating table.

When negotiating in a merciless, hard-bitten region like the Middle East, it is vital to never let the other side think they can “outcrazy” you. The Jews and the Kurds are among the few minorities that have managed to carve out autonomous spaces in the Arab-Muslim world because, at the end of the day, they would never let any of their foes outcrazy them; they did whatever they had to in order to survive, and sometimes it was really ugly, but they survived to tell the tale.

Anyone who has seen the handy work of Iran and Hezbollah firsthand — the U.S. Embassy and Marine bombings in Beirut, the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in Lebanon, the bombing at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, and the bombing of the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires   — knows that the Iranians will go all the way. Never negotiate with Iran without some leverage and some crazy on your side. Iran’s leaders are tough and cruel. They did not rise to the top through the Iowa caucuses.

While you need some Obama “cool” to finalize a deal with Iran, to see the potential for something new and to seize it, you also need some Bibi crazy — some of his Dr. Strangelove stuff and the occasional missile test. The dark core of this Iranian regime has not gone away. It’s just out of sight, and it does need to believe that all options really are on the table for negotiations to succeed. So let Bibi be Bibi (up to the point where a good deal becomes possible) and Barack be Barack and we have the best chance of getting a decent outcome. Had Bibi not been Bibi, we never would have gotten Iran to the negotiating table, but without Barack being Barack, we’ll never get a deal.

Just the opposite is true on the Israeli-Palestinian front. Had Kerry not doggedly pushed Bibi and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to the negotiating table, Bibi would not have gone there on his own. As Stanley Fischer, the widely respected former Bank of Israel governor, told a New York University forum on Tuesday: “The approach that we have to be strong, because if we’re not strong we will be defeated, is absolutely correct but it is not the only part of national strategy. The other part is the need to look for peace, and that part is not happening to the extent that it should,” the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported.

I believe Europeans, in particular, would be more sympathetic to a harder-line Israeli position on Iran if they saw Israel making progress with the Palestinians, and if some of them did not suspect that Bibi wants to defuse the Iranian threat to make the world safe for a permanent Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Moreover, if Israel made progress with the Palestinians, it could translate the coincidence of interests it now has with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arabs — which is based purely on their having a common enemy, Iran — into a real reconciliation, with trade and open relations.

On the Iran front, Netanyahu’s job is to make himself as annoying as possible to Obama to ensure that sanctions are only fully removed in return for a verifiable end to Iran’s nuclear bomb-making capabilities. On the Israeli-Palestinian front, Obama’s job is to make himself as annoying as possible to Netanyahu. Each has to press the other for us to get the best deals on both fronts.

This is a rare plastic moment in the Middle East where a lot of things are in flux. I have no illusions that all the problems can be tied up with a nice bow. But with a little imagination and the right mix of toughness and openness on Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian issue, the Israeli prime minister and American president could turn their bitter-lemon relationship into lemonade.

Prepare for the Iranian tide to turn

December 4, 2013

Israel Hayom | Prepare for the Iranian tide to turn.

Ron Tira

The interim deal with Iran is a bad one, for two reasons. Firstly, Iran did not abandon its policy of acquiring the ability to build a nuclear weapon and did not relinquish its capabilities in this regard. It only promised to change its behavior for a specified period of time (for example, limiting uranium enrichment and the like) and it can change this behavior again at a time of its choosing.

Secondly, the deal revealed (yet again) the sides’ strategic DNA, and this almost certainly assures Iranian success. Despite the economic hardships inflicted by sanctions, Iran never projected weakness and did not blink first, maintaining ambiguity in its position and preserving room to maneuver in negotiations. And despite its status as the only global superpower, the U.S. was eager to strike a deal and prevent a crisis almost at any cost, and its conduct during negotiations was devoid of any depth and sophistication.

There is a clear clash between Iran’s policy of acquiring a nuclear weapon and America’s declared policy of preventing this. In a head-on collision of this sort, the strategy must revolve around coercion: The U.S. needs to force Iran to change its policy. Meanwhile, however, the U.S. is seeking to avoid risks, even to the point of willing to forego the realization of its own declared policy. The U.S. has put risk management and cost analysis above reaching its own objectives. This is why it is not looking to force policy change on Iran, preferring to reach an agreed upon point of balance with it.

Israel, too, has lost control of the crisis and where it is headed: It did not attack at the optimal time (2010-2011); it stipulated red lines and was then forced to wait passively while watching Iran successfully maneuver without crossing them; and primarily, it acted to internationalize the crisis by painting Iran’s nuclear program as a problem for the international community. But the international community recoils from conflicts, and therefore gives up its declared goals while coming to terms with Iran’s non-provocative and gradual nuclearization. From the moment that diplomacy became the main channel for managing the crisis and the American administration put its faith in an interim deal, Israel ran out of options, and it now finds itself watching from the stands without the ability to maneuver or influence.

The only thing that plays to Israel’s advantage is that the current situation is liable to change. The strategic environment is dynamic, and within a short period of time the circumstances can transform. Iran could become drunk on its successes and make a mistake, and new intelligence information could come to light. What is crucial now is for Israel to prepare in advance for the moment the tide turns, if and when it happens. Israel must reclaim its ability to influence matters as they pertain to this crisis and how it ends. It needs to develop parallel diplomatic avenues where it can exert influence, and be able to dictate the levels of threat posed by this crisis.

The way to all of these can be found on the path of military action.

Lt. Col. Ron Tira (res.) is the author of “The Nature of War: Conflicting Paradigms and Israeli Military Effectiveness.”

Agree to disagree

December 4, 2013

Israel Hayom | Agree to disagree.

Zalman Shoval

My friend Uri Elitzur, while summarizing the negotiations in Geneva, wrote that U.S. President Barack Obama had “really messed up” and that he was “taking nonsensical steps.”

This is indeed one way to analyze things, but a different analysis, more disconcerting, is that what was agreed upon there is actually what the American administration sought to achieve from the onset: the first stage of a new comprehensive deal between Iran and the U.S., which deviates from the issue of Iran’s nuclear program. In subsequent stages, Washington will be prepared to grant Tehran special status in the Middle East, even at the expense of the “special relations” it has with its long-standing partners, Saudi Arabia, the oil emirates and Jordan.

While Israel’s situation is different in many ways, it cannot, of course, calmly come to terms with the possibility of a geopolitical and strategic reshuffling of this sort. One cannot ignore the possibility that the sanction relief offered to Iran, as it pertains to its uranium enrichment as well, testifies to America’s intention to establish a wider set of understandings with Tehran. As Mark Landler recently wrote in The New York Times: “‘Regime change,’ in Iran or even Syria, is out; cutting deals with former adversaries is in.”

Had Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not expressed his criticism of the deal with the appropriate clarity and toughness, he would almost certainly be receiving more support from the public and in the media. And by the way, if at first the majority of the American press supported the deal, in recent days more reticent voices are being heard.

The main line adopted by the administration to justify its moves is “we prevented a war,” and “diplomacy is preferable to war.” There is no one debating this, obviously, in Israel as well. The question is what exactly was the goal of Washington’s diplomatic maneuvers, including the recently revealed secret channel: Was it to block, once and for all, Iran’s path toward a nuclear weapon or just to try and slow it down, and while doing so also reaching diplomatic achievements in other areas?

While the administration adamantly claims that this is a deal to prevent a clear and defined security threat, and nothing more, many commentators believe this is an American push to strike a partnership with Iran that pertains to broader matters, including Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and so on. The Iranians are not signaling that they are not overly thrilled at this stage to accept the American courtship, but this attitude could change if the costs and benefits suit them.

In any case, writes Roger Cohen of The New York Times, Washington is prepared to “redraw the strategic map of the Middle East,” a map on which Iran will claim an agreed upon place. It is an exaggeration to speak of a real alliance between America and a terror state such as Iran, but one cannot completely discount the possibility that specific understandings could emerge.

It appears, therefore, that Israel could find itself in the coming years in a new and worrying geopolitical situation, one that it must be prepared for on more than one level, and our special relations with the U.S. is one of the main elements in this regard. Israel’s ability to influence the administration’s steps, considering where the winds in the White House are blowing today, is not great, but it is not hopeless either. From our perspective there is no replacement for the U.S. and surely no one is “declaring war on it,” but this special relationship we share is precisely what allows us to occasionally deviate, to agree to disagree and even to try persuade in different ways, including through the Congress, media and public opinion. We will not always see eye to eye, and sometimes we will also have to compromise on our position, but this is the nature of an alliance.

ZOA Questions Why AIPAC Urges No Criticism of Obama Admin. Iran Deal & Claims Deal Merely A “Difference of Strategy”

December 4, 2013

Zionist Organization of America | ZOA Questions Why AIPAC Urges No Criticism of Obama Admin. Iran Deal & Claims Deal Merely A “Difference of Strategy”.

Israel Calls Obama Deal “Historic Mistake” While Iran’s Rouhani, Hizballah, Lebanon Thrilled With Deal

ZOA has questioned the positions taken by AIPAC CEO, Howard Kohr, in opposing any American Jewish criticism of President Obama or anyone in his Administration for the deal signed with Iran in Geneva and stating that the Obama Administration only has a “difference of strategy” with Israel and American Jewry on how to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.

 
ZOA has questioned the positions taken by AIPAC CEO, Howard Kohr, in opposing any American Jewish criticism of President Obama or anyone in his Administration for the deal signed with Iran in Geneva and stating that the Obama Administration only has a “difference of strategy” with Israel and American Jewry on how to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.

The Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) has questioned the positions taken by AIPAC CEO, Howard Kohr, in opposing any American Jewish criticism of President Obama or anyone in his Administration for the deal signed with Iran in Geneva and stating that the Obama Administration only has a “difference of strategy” with Israel and American Jewry on how to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. We are also troubled that Mr. Kohr declared that the only path that should be taken now is more sanctions, refusing to accept a questioner’s statement that military action must now be seriously considered. Mr. Kohr took these positions in a meeting of AIPAC leaders and activists last week.

The Obama Administration Iran deal is a very dangerous act of appeasement that that leaves intact all the vital elements of Iran’s illegal nuclear weapons program. It dismantles nothing and allows continued uranium enrichment and construction of Iran’s Arak plutonium facility, which gives Iran an alternative means for developing nuclear weapons, while providing it with $10-30 billion in sanctions relief.

The AIPAC position clearly implies that the Obama strategy is a legitimate position, simply an alternative path that can be taken. AIPAC has ignored that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has criticized President Obama and his Administration for making this “very, very dangerous … historic mistake.” So much for AIPAC claiming that it always supports the positions of the democratically-elected Israeli government.

AIPAC has ignored that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has criticized President Obama and his Administration for making this “very, very dangerous … historic mistake.”

It tells you all you need to know that Iranian president Hasan Rouhani has crowed that “In this agreement, the right of Iranian nation to enrich uranium was accepted by world powers … With this agreement … the architecture of sanctions will begin to break down.” Daniel Pipes, president of the Middle East Forum, observes, “As Iran’s chief negotiator, Mohammad Javad Zarif, brought home a deal worth about US$23 billion to Iran, Arab Shiites fell into step with Tehran. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki of Iraq expressed his ‘full support for this step.’ President Bashar al-Assad of Syria welcomed the agreement as ‘the best path for securing peace and stability.’ Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri of Lebanon called it the ‘deal of the century.’ And Hezbollah considered the agreement a ‘great victory for Iran.’”

The Iran deal is not merely the product of a “difference in strategy,” it is a deal that will clearly facilitate Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons. Respected Wall Street Journal columnist Bret Stephens has written that the Geneva deal “has many of the flaws of Munich and Paris [peace accord with North Vietnam]. But it has none of their redeeming or exculpating aspects.” The Washington Post’s Charles Krauthammer has said that “This is a sham from beginning to end. It’s the worse deal since Munich.” Even liberal Democrat Alan Dershowitz has said that the Geneva deal “could turn out to be a cataclysmic error of gigantic proportions.” By calling this merely a “difference in strategy,” AIPAC seems to be whitewashing and camouflaging this act of appeasement as a legitimate path with which most pro-Israel supporters disagree. AIPAC should not only be calling for more sanctions, which, if passed, would not be implemented for at least 6 to 7 months, they should be explicitly criticizing the Obama deal as a horrific and intolerable mistake. Such an AIPAC position would inspire more Members of Congress to do the same and better understand the reality of this frightening situation.

The ZOA has released the following public statement: “We express deep disappointment at, and are perplexed by, AIPAC’s imprudent, deeply troubling words, that are odds with Israel’s position. This is not a deal –– it’s a disaster, an act of appeasement that threatens us all.

“This is not a mere ‘difference of strategy’ –– of that let there be no mistake. The Iran deal is a repudiation of the need to stop Iran, not simply another way of attempting to stop Iran with which we happen to disagree. We must be unalterably opposed to it and say why, loudly and clearly, not prattle about mere disagreements. The pro-Israel community must speak out against this policy and thus against President Obama, Secretary Kerry, Wendy Sherman and the other officials who negotiated, and are responsible for, this deal.

“How can one have a final agreement on Iran’s nuclear weapons program if the Geneva deal specifies no requirements and machinery for ascertaining the extent and nature of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile research and development?

“If we can’t obtain a comprehensive agreement on ending Iran’s nuclear weapons program ––which is the goal –– when sanctions now are at their peak, causing Iran great economic pain, how can we expect Iran to end its nuclear weapons program later, when sanctions have been significantly eroded? We must speak out against this deal.

“As Mark Dubowitz and Orde Kettrie of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies explain in the Wall Street Journal, ‘even if Iran faithfully implements each of its commitments under the [Geneva deal], it could find itself, in May 2014, a mere month further away than it is now from having weapons-grade uranium—but six months closer to having the rest of a deliverable nuclear weapon.’

“Last week, in fact, during the negotiations leading to the deal, Iran’s top leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, called Israel a ‘rabid dog’ and declared that ‘Zionist officials cannot be called humans, they are like animals …The Israeli regime is doomed to failure and annihilation.’ He has called America an ‘enemy that smiles.’ He also promised that Tehran would not step back ‘one iota’ from what he called Iran’s nuclear rights; and professed to be interested in American friendship even while his militiamen chanted ‘Death to America.’ Who on earth can persuade themselves to believe that this is a regime willing to cease its march to becoming a nuclear power and acting on its many threats to destroy Israel? We must speak out.

“American Jews, and American pro-Israel and Jewish organizations are under no obligation to keep silent when they see an agreement concluded with Iran that facilitates, rather than impedes, Iran’s march towards possessing nuclear weapons.

“On the contrary, they are obligated to speak out if –– as we do –– they believe the deal is bad and dangerous for the U.S. and Israel. What could possibly be AIPAC’s rationale at this time of immense danger to Israel, most likely unprecedented at any time in its history, including 1948, 1967 and 1973?

“The ZOA disagrees with AIPAC’s directive to American Jewry to be silent, except for pushing for more sanctions. It is apparent that AIPAC wants all in the pro-Israel community to believe that the U.S./Israel relationship is as good as it always was. It is AIPAC’s raison d’etre to maintain strong U.S./Israel relations. We appreciate that it is difficult for AIPAC to acknowledge that this relationship has been eroded in recent years, but this truth must be told, not least by AIPAC itself, in order to alert American Jewry and friends of Israel to better understand what steps must now be taken.

Many Members of Congress, Democrat and Republican, strongly disagree with AIPAC that the Geneva deal marks merely “a difference in strategy.” They are speaking out; why isn’t AIPAC explicitly criticizing this Iran deal? 

Richard Blumenthal (D-CT): “Past Iranian conduct gives little cause for hope. Without strong sanctions, tough enforcement and vigilant monitoring and inspection, my fear is that even this interim agreement may encourage or embolden countries or companies that seek to exploit loopholes or weaknesses in the existing sanctions”

Lindsey Graham (R-SC): “Unless the agreement requires dismantling of the Iranian centrifuges, we really haven’t gained anything.”

John McCain (R-AZ): “I am … concerned by particular elements of this agreement and some other elements that are left out. For example, this agreement does not require Iran to resolve some of the outstanding concerns of the IAEA, which has rigorously documented Iran’s pattern of lies and deceptions regarding its nuclear program. Iran also would not have to stop building completely its Arak nuclear facility and may never have to destroy it altogether… Problems and omissions such as these are compounded by an easing of sanctions that could make it harder to sustain the international will and cooperation to continue enforcing existing sanctions …  I am concerned this agreement could be a dangerous step that degrades our pressure on the Iranian regime without demonstrable actions on Iran’s part to end its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability – a situation that would be reminiscent of our experience over two decades with North Korea.”

Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA):“I remain concerned that this deal does not adequately halt Iran’s enrichment capabilities. Numerous U.N. Security Council resolutions have called for the full suspension of Iran’s nuclear activities, so it is troubling that this agreement still permits the Iranians to continue enriching.”

Tom Cotton (R-AR): “With this agreement, the United States has suffered an unmitigated, humiliating defeat and Iran has won a total victory.  The United States will ease sanctions and give the mullahs billions of dollars in return for their empty promises.  Iran will keep enriching uranium, keep its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, keep its plutonium-producing reactor, and keep its missile program…”

Michele Bachmann (R-MN): “The Obama negotiators have virtually turned the hinge of history, by guaranteeing a nuclear Iran with the near certainty of future threatened nuclear strikes. Usually two parties enter into a deal to improve their respective situations.  In the case of the recent Iran agreement, it appears U.S. negotiators forgot which nation’s best interests they were looking to secure. One can find virtually no benefit in this agreement for either the U.S. or any nation, other than Iran.  That may force Israel into the unenviable position of taking action to stop Iran’s stated intentions of effecting a nuclear holocaust.”

Eliot Engel (D-NY), House Foreign Affairs Committee member: “It’s disappointing to me that Iran is still going to be allowed to enrich [uranium)] while they’re talking. I would have thought that that should be a prerequisite to any kind of talks.”

Mike Rogers (R-MI): “We may –– we may have just encouraged more violence in the future than we have stopped. That’s why I hope we reconsider where we’re at, certainly in six months. You have now given them a permission slip to continue enrichment. That’s what the whole world was trying to stop them from doing.”

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL): “The agreement accepted by the Administration simply does not go far enough to ensure our national security interests and those of our allies, like the democratic Jewish State of Israel. I’m particularly troubled by this agreement’s failure to force Tehran to completely stop uranium enrichment and dismantle its existing centrifuges, whose operation can be resumed quickly, allowing Iran to potentially reach nuclear capacity in a brief amount of time …This deal falls short of our primary national security objectives, and it puts into unnecessary danger the security of our friends and allies.”

Ed Royce (R-CA): “I have serious concerns that this agreement does not meet the standards necessary to protect the United States and our allies. Instead of rolling back Iran’s program, Tehran would be able to keep the key elements of its nuclear weapons-making capability. Yet we are the ones doing the dismantling –– relieving Iran of the sanctions pressure built up over years. This sanctions relief is more lifeline than ‘modest.’ Secretary Kerry should soon come before the Foreign Affairs Committee to address the many concerns with this agreement.”

Charles Schumer (D-NY) complained about the  “disproportionality of this agreement.”

Scott Garrett (R-NJ): “President Obama’s ‘deal’ with Iran is no deal for the United States or our ally, Israel.  Rather, it continues this administration’s pattern of negotiation, where the United States gives but receives nothing in return. I am deeply dismayed that we are so quick to free up billions of dollars in assets and revenue streams that Iran can use to further finance international terror or restart its nuclear program.  If, months from now, Iran wants to renege on this ‘deal’ and resume its pursuit of nuclear weapons, it won’t be any further from developing a bomb than it is today. Once again, President Obama’s foreign policy ‘win’ weakens America, her allies, and our position in the world.”

Buck McKeon (R-CA): “Apparently, America has not learned its lesson from 1994 when North Korea fooled the world. I am skeptical that this agreement will end differently.”

Luke Messer (R-IN): “We all want a world free from a nuclear Iran. Unfortunately, the deal announced yesterday may make that less likely. The deal provides billions of dollars of sanctions relief to the Iranian regime while requiring only cosmetic changes in their nuclear program.”

Mike Pompeo (R-KS): “The negotiated deal with Iran, which allows Iran to keep developing nuclear materials, is a major step backwards for America’s national security and the safety of the American people. Iran now has more time to enrich its uranium stockpiles, as well as researching weaponization and fabrication, which are not covered under this deal. Iran has also gained legitimacy, despite bankrolling international terrorism and proliferating nuclear weapons. And Iran has also gained at least $7 billion thanks to the easing of sanctions that were intended as punishment for violating the regime’s nuclear pledges in the first place. Promising the Iranians that they can keep their nuclear weapons is not a foreign policy. It’s surrender.”

‘Iran in talks with Russia for two more nuclear plants at Bushehr’

December 4, 2013

‘Iran in talks with Russia for two more nuclear plants at Bushehr’ | The Times of Israel.

Tehran and Moscow are discussing the construction of second and third facilities in southern province, says report citing Iranian official

December 4, 2013, 1:24 am
The existing nuclear facility in Bushehr province, Iran (photo credit: AP/Mehr News Agency/Majid Asgaripour/File)

The existing nuclear facility in Bushehr province, Iran (photo credit: AP/Mehr News Agency/Majid Asgaripour/File)

Iran is talking to Russia about building two more nuclear plants in Bushehr province, according to a senior official who spoke to an Iranian media outlet on Tuesday.

The head of the Iranian Parliament’s Energy Committee Jalil Jafari Boneh Khalkhal told the semi-official Fars news agency that the second and third atomic power plants will be similar to the existent facility in the southern province, but with higher safety standards.

President Hassan Rouhani announced on Saturday that Iran would build a second nuclear plant at Bushehr.

“Our first nuclear power plant is active in the (Bushehr) province which will develop, God willing,” Rouhani said in a speech Saturday night to officials in Bushehr province, Iran’s Fars news agency reported Sunday.

The current Bushehr reactor was built by Russia and reached full capacity last year. “Based on our estimates, the second nuclear power plant will be built in the same province and I hope that we can use the facilities of this province,” Rouhani said.

The head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization Ali Akbar Salehi said Sunday that the Islamic Republic needs more nuclear power plants, the country’s official news agency reported.

Salehi said the additional nuclear power would help the country reduce its carbon emissions and its consumption of oil, IRNA reported. He said Iran should produce 150 tons of nuclear fuel to supply five nuclear power plants.

“We should take required action for building power plants for 20,000 megawatts of electricity” in the long term, Salehi said.

The comments come after Iran agreed to freeze part of its nuclear program in return for Western powers easing crippling economic sanctions.

Last month, Salehi spoke of building several new nuclear power plants and added: “We are not obliged to introduce to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the nuclear facilities that we are to build in the future. And only 180 days before entry of nuclear substances there, we will inform the IAEA of them,” Salehi said, according to Fars.

His deputy said in 2012 that Iran had identified 34 potential sites for building additional nuclear power plants.

Iran says its nuclear program is for peaceful energy purposes. The US, Israel and other Western allies are concerned that Iran is bent on building nuclear weapons.

In an interview with the Financial Times on Friday, Rouhani said the scale of Iran’s nuclear program would be determined by its civilian energy needs.

Rouhani said that while weapons of mass destruction were not on Tehran’s agenda “as a matter of principle,” it would go on enriching uranium to meet its energy needs.

He spoke less than a week after Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif signed a deal with the P5+1 limiting its ability to install new centrifuges and enrich uranium beyond 5 percent.

Rouhani said the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program could be confirmed by IAEA cameras monitoring Iran’s nuclear activities.

The Associated Press contributed to this report.

Slaying Hizballah commander ratchets up Saudi covert war on Iran and Lebanese proxy

December 4, 2013

Slaying Hizballah commander ratchets up Saudi covert war on Iran and Lebanese proxy.

DEBKAfile Exclusive Report December 4, 2013, 12:40 PM (IDT)
HIzballah's Hajj Hassan Hollo al-Laqqis, slain in Beirut

HIzballah’s Hajj Hassan Hollo al-Laqqis, slain in Beirut

The gunning down of Hajj Hassan Hollo al-Laqqis, a high-ranking Hizballah commander and close crony of Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, raised the stakes of the clandestine war running between Saudi Arabia and Iran, two weeks after two suicide bombers blew themselves up outside the Iranian embassy in Beirut.

The Hizballah officer was killed by five shots to the head and throat in the underground parking lot of his home in the Hadath neighborhood southwest of Beirut, when he returned home from work after midnight Tuesday, Dec. 3. The Hizballah statement, which said: “Israel is automatically held responsible for the crime,” described al Laqqis as an elite member of the organization’s military wing who for many years served as its technology and arms chief.

A photo published by the Lebanese state news agency shows a man in his mid-40s in military clothing.

debkafile’s counterterrorism sources report: It seems obvious that the al-Laqqis hit was timed to take place shortly after the Hizballah leader went on the air for an extraordinarily arrogant television interview, during which he made a point of sneering after every reference to the US, Saudi Arabia or Israel. He also appeared to glorify in the big power status conferred on the Islamic Republic (and himself) by the Obama administration after the signing of the Geneva nuclear accord.

Nasrallah praised that accord as signaling “the end of the US monopoly on power” and preventing war in the region. He said Israel couldn’t bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities without a green light from the US. But, he said, America is tired of war. The Saudi war against Iran, he said, has never stopped. He accused a “Saudi-backed group” of being behind the Iranian embassy bombing in Beirut.

The killing of a high-placed Nasrallah insider was intended to illustrate to Hizballah members and the rest of the region that the Hizballah leader’s outburst of hubris was hollow, that his own innermost command elite is deeply penetrated, and that whoever sent the assassins could at any time sow mayhem within the pro-Iranian organization’s ranks.
It also carried a wider message for Tehran and Gen. al-Soleimani: Your own Hizballah holds wide sway over Lebanon and its capital. If you can’t nonetheless keep the symbols of Iranian power in Lebanon and your proxy’s commanders safe, neither can you guarantee the security of Syrian president Bashar Assad in Damascus.

Accusing Israel of the deed and threatening revenge apparently made more sense to Hizballah that accusing Riyadh, which is out of its reach for punishment. Its leaders were even willing to allow people to deduce that Israeli intelligence had penetrated Hizballah’s top ranks and center of government in Beirut deeply enough to pick off its commanders.

There is little doubt in Tehran or Beirut that Riyadh’s hand was behind the slaying of the Hizballah commander, or that Saudi and Israeli intelligence agencies are working hand in hand against Tehran in Iran, Syria and Lebanon.

Israel’s New Strategic Position – Forbes

December 4, 2013

Israel’s New Strategic Position – Forbes.

By George Friedman

Israel has expressed serious concerns over the preliminary U.S.-Iranian agreement, which in theory will lift sanctions levied against Tehran and end its nuclear program. That was to be expected. Less obvious is why the Israeli government is concerned and how it will change Israel’s strategic position.

Israel’s current strategic position is excellent. After two years of stress, its peace treaty with Egypt remains in place. Syria is in a state of civil war that remains insoluble. Some sort of terrorist threat might originate there, but no strategic threat is possible. In Lebanon, Hezbollah does not seem inclined to wage another war with Israel, and while the group’s missile capacity has grown, Israel appears able to contain the threat they pose without creating a strategic threat to Israeli national interests. The Jordanian regime, which is aligned with Israel, probably will withstand the pressure put on it by its political opponents.

In other words, the situation that has existed since the Camp David Accords were signed remains in place. Israel’s frontiers are secure from conventional military attack. In addition, the Palestinians are divided among themselves, and while ineffective, intermittent rocket attacks from Gaza are likely, there is no Intifada underway in the West Bank.

Therefore, Israel faces no existential threats, save one: the possibility that Iran will develop a nuclear weapon and a delivery system and use it to destroy Israel before it or the United States can prevent it from doing so. Clearly, a nuclear strike on Tel Aviv would be catastrophic for Israel. Its ability to tolerate that threat, regardless of how improbable it may be, is a pressing concern for Israel.

In this context, Iran’s nuclear program supersedes all of Israel’s other security priorities. Israeli officials believe their allies, particularly those in the United States, should share this view. As a strategic principle, this is understandable. But it is unclear how Israel intends to apply it. It is also unclear how its application will affect relations with the United States, without which it cannot cope with the Iranian threat.

Israel understands that however satisfactory its current circumstances are, those circumstances are mercurial and to some extent unpredictable. Israel may not rely heavily on the United States under these circumstances, but these circumstances may not be permanent. There are plenty of scenarios in which Israel would not be able to manage security threats without American assistance. Thus, Israel has an overriding interest in maintaining its relationship with the United States and in ensuring Iran never becomes a nuclear state. So any sense that the United States is moving away from its commitment to Israel, or that it is moving in a direction where it might permit an Iranian nuclear weapon, is a crisis. Israel’s response to the Iran talks — profound unhappiness without outright condemnation — has to be understood in this context, and the assumptions behind it have to be examined.

More than Uranium

Iran does not appear to have a deliverable nuclear weapon at this point. Refining uranium is a necessary but completely insufficient step in developing a weapon. A nuclear weapon is much more than uranium. It is a set of complex technologies, not the least of which are advanced electrical systems and sensors that, given the amount of time the Iranians have needed just to develop not-quite-enough enriched uranium, seems beyond them. Iran simply does not have sufficient fuel to produce a device.

Nor it does not have a demonstrated ability to turn that device into a functioning weapon. A weapon needs to be engineered to extreme tolerances, become rugged enough to function on delivery and be compact enough to be delivered. To be delivered, its must be mounted on a very reliable missile or aircraft. Iran has neither reliable missiles nor aircraft with the necessary range to attack Israel. The idea that the Iranians will use the next six months for a secret rush to complete the weapon simply isn’t the way it works.

Before there is a weapon there must be a test. Nations do not even think of deploying nuclear weapons without extensive underground tests — not to see if they have uranium but to test that the more complex systems work. That is why they can’t secretly develop a weapon: They themselves won’t know they have a workable weapon without a test. In all likelihood, the first test would fail, as such things do. Attempting their first test in an operational attack would result not only in failure but also in retaliation.

Of course, there are other strategies for delivering a weapon if it were built. One is the use of a ship to deliver it to the Israeli coast. Though this is possible, the Israelis operate an extremely efficient maritime interdiction system, and the United States monitors Iranian ports. The probability is low that a ship would go unnoticed. Having a nuclear weapon captured or detonated elsewhere would infuriate everyone in the eastern Mediterranean, invite an Israeli counterstrike and waste a weapon

Otherwise, Iran theoretically could drive a nuclear weapon into Israel by road. But these weapons are not small. There is such a thing as a suitcase bomb, but that is a misleading name; it is substantially larger than a suitcase, and it is also the most difficult sort of device to build. Because of its size, it is not particularly rugged. You don’t just toss it into the trunk, drive 1,500 miles across customs checkpoints and set it off. There are many ways you can be captured — particularly crossing into Israel — and many ways to break the bomb, which require heavy maintenance. Lastly, even assuming Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon, its use against Israel would kill as many Muslims — among them Shia — as Israelis, an action tantamount to geopolitical suicide for Tehran.

A Tempered Response

One of the reasons Israel has not attempted an airstrike, and one of the reasons the United States has refused to consider it, is that Iran’s prospects for developing a nuclear weapon are still remote. Another reason is difficulty. Israel’s air force is too far removed and too small to carry out simultaneous strikes on multiple facilities. If the Israelis forward-deployed to other countries, the Iranians would spot them. The Israelis can’t be certain which sites are real and which are decoys. The Iranians have had years to harden their facilities, so normal ordnance likely would be inadequate. Even more serious is the fact that battle damage assessment — judging whether the site has been destroyed — would be prohibitively difficult.

For these reasons, the attack could not simply be carried out from the air. It would require special operations forces on the ground to try to determine the effects. That could result in casualties and prisoners, if it could be done at all. And at that the Israelis can only be certain that they have destroyed all the sites they knew about, not the ones that their intelligence didn’t know about. Some will dismiss this as overestimating Iranian capabilities. This frequently comes from those most afraid that Tehran can build a nuclear weapon and a delivery system. If it could do the latter, it could harden sites and throw off intelligence gathering. The United States would be able to mount a much more robust attack than the Israelis, but it is unclear whether it would be robust enough. And in any case, all the other problems — the reliability of intelligence, determining whether the site were destroyed — would still apply.

But ultimately, the real reason Israel has not attacked Iran’s nuclear sites is that the Iranians are so far from having a weapon. If they were closer, the Israelis would have attacked regardless of the difficulty. The Americans, on the other hand, saw an opportunity in the fact that there are no weapons yet and that the sanctions were hurting the Iranians. Knowing that they were not in a hurry to complete and knowing that they were hurting economically, the Iranians likewise saw an opportunity to better their position.

From the American point of view, the nuclear program was not the most pressing issue, even though Washington knew it had to be stopped. What the Americans wanted was an understanding with the Iranians, whereby their role in the region would be balanced against those of other countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, the Arabian emirates and to some extent Israel. As I’ve argued, the United States is still interested in what happens in the region, but it does not want to continue to use force there. Washington wants to have multiple relations with regional actors, not just Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Israel’s response to the U.S.-Iran talks should be understood in this way. The Israelis tempered their response initially because they knew the status of Iran’s nuclear program. Even though a weapon is still a grave concern, it is a much longer-term problem than the Israelis admit publicly. (Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has tried hard to convince the United States otherwise, the United States isn’t biting.) Since an attack has every chance of failing, the Israelis recognize that these negotiations are the most likely way to eliminate the weapons, and that if the negotiations fail, no one will be in a more dangerous position for trying. Six months won’t make a difference.

The Israelis could not simply applaud the process because there is, in fact, a strategic threat to Israel embedded in the talks. Israel has a strategic dependency on the United States. Israel has never been comfortable with Washington’s relationship with Saudi Arabia, but there was nothing the Israelis could do about it, so they accommodated it. But they understand that the outcome of these talks, if successful, means more than the exchange of a nuclear program for eased sanctions; it means the beginning of a strategic alignment with Iran.

In fact, the United States was aligned with Iran until 1979. As Richard Nixon’s China initiative shows, ideology can relent to geopolitical reality. On the simplest level, Iran needs investment, and American companies want to invest. On the more complex level, Iran needs to be certain that Iraq is friendly to its interests and that neither Russia nor Turkey can threaten it in the long run. Only the United States can ensure that. For their part, the Americans want a stronger Iran to contain Saudi support for Sunni insurgents, compel Turkey to shape its policy more narrowly, and remind Russia that the Caucasus, and particularly Azerbaijan, have no threat from the south and can concentrate on the north. The United States is trying to create a multipolar region to facilitate a balance-of-power strategy in place of American power.

Israel in 10 Years

I began by pointing out how secure Israel is currently. Looking down the road 10 years, Israel cannot assume that this strategic configuration will remain in place. Egypt’s future is uncertain. The emergence of a hostile Egyptian government is not inconceivable. Syria, like Lebanon, appears to be fragmented. What will come of this is unclear. And whether in 10 years the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will remain Hashemite or become a Palestinian state is worthy of contemplation. None have military power now, but then Egypt went from disaster in 1967 to a very capable force in 1973. They had a Soviet patron. They might have another patron in 10 years.

Right now, Israel does not need the United States, nor American aid, which means much less to them now than it did in 1973. They need it as a symbol of American commitment and will continue to need it. But the real Israeli fear is that the United States is moving away from direct intervention to a more subtle form of manipulation. That represents a threat to Israel if Israel ever needs direct intervention rather than manipulation. But more immediately, it threatens Israel because the more relationships the United States has in the region, the less significant Israel is to Washington’s strategy. If the United States maintains this relationship with Saudi Arabia, Turkey and others, Israel becomes not the anchor of U.S. policy but one of many considerations. This is Israel’s real fear in these negotiations.

In the end, Israel is a small and weak power. Its power has been magnified by the weakness of its neighbors. That weakness is not permanent, and the American relationship has changed in many ways since 1948. Another shift seems to be underway. The Israelis used to be able to depend on massive wellsprings of support in the U.S. public and Congress. In recent years, this support has become less passionate, though it has not dried up completely. What Israel has lost is twofold. First, it has lost control of America’s regional strategy. Second, it has lost control of America’s political process. Netanyahu hates the U.S.-Iran talks not because of nuclear weapons but because of the strategic shift of the United States. But his response must remain measured because Israel has less influence in the United States than it once did.

Saudis Bristle at Obama’s Outreach to Iran :: Daniel Pipes

December 4, 2013

Saudis Bristle at Obama’s Outreach to Iran :: Daniel Pipes.

by Daniel Pipes
The Washington Times
December 3, 2013

The “Joint Plan of Action” signed with Iran by the so-called P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the U.K., and the U.S.) on Nov. 24 in Geneva caused Shiite Arabs to celebrate, Sunni Arabs to worry, and Saudis to panic. The Saudi response will have far-reaching and unpredictable consequences.

Jubilant crowds welcomed the Iranian negotiator home from Geneva.

As Iran’s chief negotiator, Mohammad Javad Zarif, brought home a deal worth about US$23 billion to Iran, Arab Shiites fell into step with Tehran. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki of Iraq expressed his “full support for this step.” President Bashar al-Assad of Syria welcomed the agreement as “the best path for securing peace and stability.” Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri of Lebanon called it the “deal of the century.” And Hezbollah considered the agreement a “great victory for Iran.”

Syria’s Assad, here scratched out, praised the Geneva deal.

Among Sunni Arabic-speakers, in contrast, responses ranged from politely supportive to displeased to alarmed. Perhaps most enthusiastic was the Egyptian governmental newspaper Al-Ahram, which called the deal “historic.” Most states stayed mum. Saudis expressed the most worry. Yes, the government cabinet officially stated that “If there is goodwill, then this agreement could be an initial step toward reaching a comprehensive solution to Iran’s nuclear program,” but note the skepticism conveyed in the first four words.

If that was the mildest response, perhaps the most unbuttoned comment came from Alwaleed bin Talal, a Saudi prince who occasionally sends up trial balloons for the royal family: He called Iran “a huge threat” and noted that, historically speaking, “The Persian empire was always against the Muslim Arab empire, especially against the Sunnis. The threat is from Persia, not from Israel,” a ground-breaking and memorable public statement.

Saudi prince Alwaleed bin Talal on his airplane throne, sitting under the logo of his company.

Alwaleed then detailed how the Iranians are “in Bahrain, they are in Iraq, they are in Syria, they are with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas, which is Sunni, in Gaza.” As this listing suggests, Saudis are fixated on the danger of being surrounded by Iran’s agents and are more scared by the non-nuclear implications of the joint plan than the nuclear ones. Gregory Gause of the University of Vermont sees Saudis worrying that the accord opens the way “without any obstacles” for Iran to achieve regional dominance. (This contrasts with the Israeli and Western position, which focuses on the nuclear danger.)

Abdullah al-Askar, foreign affairs committee chairman of the kingdom’s appointed Shura Council, elaborates: he worries “about giving Iran more space or a freer hand in the region. The government of Iran, month after month, has proven that it has an ugly agenda in the region, and in this regard no one in the region will sleep and assume things are going smoothly. … The people of the region … know that Iran will interfere in the politics of many countries.”

Saudi media reiterated this line of analysis. Al-Watan, a government newspaper, warned that the Iran regime, “which sends its tentacles into other regional countries, or tries to do so by all means necessary,” will not be fettered by the accord. Another daily, Al-Sharq, editorialized about the fear that “Iran made concessions in the nuclear dossier in return for more freedom of action in the region.”

Some analysts, especially in the smaller Persian Gulf states, went further. Jaber Mohammad, a Bahraini analyst, predicted that “Iran and the West will now reach an accord on how to divide their influence in the Gulf.” The Qatari government-owned Al-Quds Al-Arabi worried about “a U.S.-Iran alliance with Russian backing.” Rumors of Obama wanting to visit Tehran only confirm these suspicions.

The Saudi ambassador in London, Prince Mohammed bin Nawaf bin Abdulaziz, drew the most overt public conclusion, threatening that “We are not going to sit idly by and receive a threat there and not think seriously how we can best defend our country and our region.” To put it mildly, this is not how Saudi diplomats normally speak about fellow Muslims.

What does this unwonted rhetoric amount to? Iranian bellicosity and the Obama administration’s pro-Iran policies have combined to end many decades of Saudi strategic reliance on Washington and to begin thinking how to protect themselves. This matters, because as Alwaleed rightly boasts, his country is leader of the Arabs, enjoying the most international, regional, cultural, and religious clout. The results of this new-found assertiveness – fighting against fellow Islamists, allying tacitly with Israel, perhaps acquiring Pakistani-made nuclear weapons, and even reaching out to Tehran – marks yet another consequence of Barack Obama’s imploding foreign policy.

Mr. Pipes (DanielPipes.org) is president of the Middle East Forum. © 2013 by Daniel Pipes. All rights reserved.

Analysis: In West Wing, a long-sought rapprochement with Tehran

December 4, 2013

Analysis: In West Wing, a long-sought rapprochement with Tehran | JPost | Israel News.

By MICHAEL WILNER

12/04/2013 06:07

A negotiated settlement with Iran over its nuclear program has been the “overwhelming preference” of President Obama for months now.

US President Barack Obama and Iran's President Hassan Rouhani.

US President Barack Obama and Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani. Photo: REUTERS

WASHINGTON – For months, at least one core aspect of White House policy on Iran has been clear: A negotiated settlement with the Islamic Republic over its expansive nuclear program is the “overwhelming preference” of US President Barack Obama.

The White House sees Iranian President Hassan Rouhani as a moderate force in Tehran politics, with an imperative to negotiate with the West for economic sanctions relief. Upon Rouhani’s election, Obama tasked a handful of key figures on his national security team to plan and execute a measured outreach program, the first of its kind in over three decades.

Those figures included National Security Adviser Susan Rice, who personally oversaw a broader effort in the West Wing this past summer to identify and clarify America’s priorities in the Middle East; Puneet Talwar, a special assistant to the president and the senior director for policy on Iran, Iraq and the Gulf States on the national security team; and Tony Blinken, deputy national security adviser to the president.

Rice worked with Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations to set up a call between Obama and Rouhani after the UN General Assembly in September. Before her current post, Rice served as the US ambassador to the UN in New York.

The White House has flatly denied media claims that special adviser to the president Valerie Jarrett was directly involved in negotiations leading up to the public rapprochement in September.

“Valerie Jarrett has never been involved in any talks with Iran,” White House spokeswoman Bernadette Meehan told The Jerusalem Post on Tuesday. “Any reports to the contrary are false.”

Jarrett’s father worked as a doctor in Iran for several years, but the country’s nuclear program is not a part of her portfolio, nor is she trained as an expert on the topic. Reports of her involvement offer no evidence that she is involved in any capacity beyond her role as general adviser to the president on a wide range of issues.

The Post could not independently confirm reports that Talwar participated in direct talks in Oman with Iranian Foreign Ministry officials.

“Certainly, all the members of the P5+1 have direct contact with the Iranians,” State Department deputy spokeswoman Marie Harf told reporters on Tuesday. “We’ve had discussions to help move those talks forward.”

Harf engaged more speculation on Tuesday over rumors that top US officials, or the president himself, were planning a visit to the Iranian capital.

“I know there’s lots of rumors out there, but not at all,” Harf asserted.

The last time American diplomats had a presence in Iran was during the hostage crisis of 1979-81.

At the White House on Tuesday, spokesman Jay Carney said that the administration opposes any new sanctions against Iran passed through Congress – including legislation that would implement sanctions at the end of a self-imposed, six-month deadline to the interim deal negotiated in Geneva last month.

“If we pass sanctions now, even with a deferred trigger which has been discussed, the Iranians, and likely our international partners, will see us as having negotiated in bad faith,” Carney told reporters.