Israel Hayom | Anatomy of a crisis.
The U.S.’s eagerness to strike a deal with Iran says a lot about the way the Obama administration deals with the Israeli-Palestinian crisis • The American president might cross a few more red lines before he is done.
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U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
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Photo credit: AP
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This past week was overshadowed by a nasty diplomatic row between Washington and Jerusalem, sparked by what Israel perceives as American zeal to clinch an interim agreement with Tehran. On paper, it is an agreement that is supposed to put in motion a chain of events that will eventually lead to an easing of the sanctions imposed on Iran in return for Tehran’s generous willingness to make do with low-grade uranium enrichment. This would allow Iran to become a nuclear threshold state with the blessing of the international community, enabling it to make a sprint for the bomb without much technological difficulty if it makes the decision to cross the Rubicon.
A subplot of this crisis is the nature of the personal relationship between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The fact that the draft agreement drawn up by the Obama administration has been altered constantly — with the original outlines presented to Israel having undergone a dramatic metamorphosis almost overnight — set off alarm bells in Jerusalem.
Have “all the president’s men” come to the irrevocable decision to cross all previously drawn red lines on the nuclear issue, despite the oft-repeated, impassioned commitments made in the not-too-distant past to block all paths leading to a bomb through diplomacy and other means if necessary?
The immediate source of friction, which was revealed for all to see, is the administration’s mad dash for an agreement at any price. This raised numerous question marks as to the credibility and firmness of Washington’s promises and guarantees on numerous strategic and diplomatic matters. Nonetheless, one should not ignore the deeper roots of this crisis, which can be traced to the fundamental worldview of U.S. President Barack Obama, who positions himself at the polar opposite of his predecessor, George W. Bush. It is this worldview that has spawned the seeds of this latest calamity.
While Bush’s conduct on the international stage was anchored by a clear-cut, aggressive ideological base from which he was never willing to waver, even when it entailed making tactical gains, Obama has from the outset refrained from any attempt to unilaterally shape the outside world. Like John F. Kennedy in the early 1960s, the current president sought to open a channel of communication with sworn adversaries and revolutionary forces, such as Iran.
Obama’s goal is to employ incentives in hopes of coaxing them into accepting the current world order and remaking themselves into moderates who gradually disengage from their radical worldview. Indeed, since Obama was sworn in as president on Jan. 20, 2009, he has shown a willingness, if not an eagerness, to demonstrate the logic of this approach in every context and every arena. His goal is to stabilize the international system of relations in an era when the use of “hard power” is no longer accepted by the White House as a practical means to cope with the challenges and threats of radicalism and terrorism.
The result of this aversion to military force, which was no doubt contributed by the trauma of the Iraqi experience as well as the continued fighting in Afghanistan, was clear and unequivocal. The U.S. seeks to minimize its involvement in overseas affairs and tend to matters at home to the highest degree possible.
Not only has the Obama administration extended its outstretched hand to Iran from the day it assumed power, but it has also refrained from exercising minimal force on the Syrian front, even after the Assad regime completely violated the unwritten rules of the game and deployed chemical weapons. The administration also was careful to keep a low profile in the Libyan question, making do with playing second fiddle to the leadership exhibited by Britain and France in their campaign against forces loyal to Moammar Gadhafi.
Beware of the honeymoon
It is not surprising then that following Hasan Rouhani’s election as the president of Iran in 2013 and the subsequent messages of conciliation emanating from Tehran, Obama spotted a window of opportunity to reach a breakthrough with the new government just a few years after Washington’s overtures (which included a speech by the president replete with apologies to the Iranian people) were met by a wall of obstinacy.
Indeed, in light of the signs of tactical flexibility being cooked up by Rouhani, the White House began to gallop toward its cherished goal of an interim agreement — irrespective of whatever price needs to be paid — that would allow it to train its attention on its domestic matters while at the same time putting behind it any prospects of a flare-up and escalation in the Persian Gulf, a nightmare scenario for Washington.
Indeed, the president’s worst nightmare would be a situation in which he would have to essentially travel back in time to the era of his hated predecessor, George W. Bush, and preside over another conflict in the Middle East that is liable to sprout another campaign of terrorism and bring America back to its position of a barricade democracy that it assumed a decade ago.
In light of these circumstances, the current dust-up between the U.S. and Israel was inevitable, and it stems in large part from the administration’s “code of operations,” on the one hand, and the results of the elections for president in Iran on the other.
For Obama, the Iranian elections were the trigger that infused him with a greater sense of motivation to at least try and translate part of his ethos, expectations, and regional goals into reality. Hence we are now witness to an anomaly of American conduct whereby the president is seen as aggressively courting Rouhani, and his energetic secretary of state is showing his impatience toward his Israeli ally and its demands (which include a symmetrical agreement as it relates to the essence and scope of bilateral concessions).
Netanyahu is thus portrayed as someone who is spoiling the festive atmosphere, threatening to ruin the planned honeymoon between Washington and Tehran, which is designed to allow Uncle Sam to remove himself from a high-tension tinderbox. At this stage, it remains unclear as to how this controversy will resolve itself and whether the final draft of the interim agreement (which is due to be approved by both the P5+1 powers and Iran) will be more balanced than the draft which was discussed in Geneva (and which was surprisingly turned down by Tehran despite the far-reaching concessions made by the West).
Behind the scenes tensions
In light of these circumstances, it would be prudent to examine the last crisis which erupted in 2010 and which cast a pall on the special relationship between the two allies. A re-examination would yield insights into the manner in which this administration conducts itself as it relates to the current controversy. The 2010 episode was the “construction freeze crisis” that blew up in the spring but eventually died down as summer came along.
Like the dispute over the Iranian talks, the “construction freeze crisis” derived from a wider regional context, and it was completely detached from the emerging dynamics in the Israeli-Palestinian question. Just as settling the dispute over the Iranian nuclear program is perceived as a necessary lever for advancing regional stability, Obama’s thought process also adopted the view that the Palestinian issue had a direct impact on American regional goals, particularly in the Gulf.
Indeed, the president saw a hurried march toward an Israeli-Palestinian accord as the key to the formation of a wall-to-wall Sunni Arab coalition of moderate states that would unite to form a bulwark against radicalism in the region. Such a coalition would enable Washington to militarily disengage from this theater.
In Obama’s view, removing the Palestinian albatross from the Arab world’s agenda would enable key regional players like Egypt and Saudi Arabia to expand their cooperation with Washington (and to act as the American subcontractor) without any fear that their internal stability would be in danger. In light of this philosophy, which required Israel to take the first step on the road toward the formation of a pan-Arab partnership, the “construction freeze crisis” exploded out into the open.
While Israel did agree to sign onto the new regional order that the administration sought to promote, declaring a 10-month freeze in construction in November 2009 (in all of the territories except for east Jerusalem), American pressure on Israel was unrelenting. In March 2010, following the government’s announcement of new construction plans for the Ramat Shlomo neighborhood during Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to the area, the row erupted with full ferocity.
The high-point came a week afterward during Netanyahu’s trip to Washington, which was overshadowed by news that the government had approved more construction plans for the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in east Jerusalem. During the prime minister’s visit, the president took a combative tack toward Netanyahu, which was manifest in Obama’s demand that construction plans for Jewish areas of east Jerusalem be frozen and that the settlement freeze remain in effect beyond the ten-month period.
The president’s harsh criticism was sounded in a very chilly atmosphere that greeted Netanyahu in the White House. At the time, leaks were made to the American press whereby the administration warned that the continued stalemate in the peace talks would prompt the U.S. to put together its own peace plan that would be presented to both sides without any prior consultation.
Despite the combative tones — and despite the Palestinian Authority’s decision to postpone the start of proximity talks with Israel as a means to pressure the administration — tensions between Washington and Jerusalem gradually eroded. At the same time, any talk of an imposed peace plan was shelved.
While this flashpoint of disagreement between the two sides — construction in the settlements and east Jerusalem — took its place behind the scenes, it is still simmering, bubbling beneath the surface. On occasion, it will rear its head publicly, like last Tuesday, when the White House and the State Department reacted harshly to reports about plans to construct 20,000 new housing units in the settlements, including E1.
Between positions
The fact that the administration’s regional strategy, which was drawn up upon Obama’s entry into the White House, has completely fallen apart with the violent eruption of the Arab Spring of December 2010, took the sting out of the idea that the Palestinian and the pan-Arab arenas were linked. It shelved — at least temporarily — any designs of a new regional order that Uncle Sam wished to promote under his sponsorship.
Nonetheless, even before the Arab Spring came to the fore, pushing aside American designs and creating new rules of the game, the White House’s attempts to compel the Netanyahu government to make more unilateral concessions on the issue of settlement construction hit a bipartisan wall of Congressional opposition. As such, Obama gave the Republican Party another lever with which to attack the White House in the run-up to mid-term elections for Congress (Nov. 2, 2010). The president discovered that the strategy of pressure is a limited one when faced with Israel’s traditional base of support.
Nonetheless, the Republicans were more restrained in their criticism than in the past. In an open letter which assailed the president, they urged the administration to handle areas of disagreement with Israel far from the public eye. Aside from the demand for a more discrete handling of these issues, the administration was also urged to refrain from stating its position on an issue that was on the agenda. This letter unquestionably played a role in cutting down Obama’s room to maneuver in his dealings with the Netanyahu government.
Despite the context and the circumstances, it seems that the current disagreement over the Iranian nuclear negotiations will also be settled in large part to the Zeitgeist on Capitol Hill. After the House of Representatives already approved legislation designed to stiffen sanctions against Iran in both the energy and financial sector, the ball is now in the court of the Senate Banking Committee. Eventually, the issue will be put before the entire House for a vote.
Despite Congress’ dissatisfaction with the Obama administration over its eagerness to sign an interim agreement with Iran — which would legitimize its nuclear program — there is no certainty that it will be translated into legislation. Like in years past, the legislative branch could once again serve as a restraining agent that will only bolster Israel’s position and lead the White House — even if it is against its will — to a more aggressive course of action.
Nonetheless, when it comes to the Palestinian issue, it appears we are in store for a return to the days of 2010, that is if one were to judge the harsh response that awaited Israel a few days ago after reports emerged regarding new construction plans. Time will tell if this response was just the opening salvo of a new Palestinian-related crisis, despite the fact that Netanyahu ordered a re-evaluation of the plans.
We will also discover whether a new, direct linkage will be created between the Iranian issue and the Palestinian question. If so, we will also learn what the consequences of such a linkage will be on Israel’s room to maneuver in both areas.
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