Archive for October 4, 2013

The power of an illusion

October 4, 2013

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Iran's Head of Atomic Energy Organization Fereydoon Abbasi-Davani (R) and ambassador to IAEA
Photo by: REUTERS

Few epigrams are as hackneyed as George Santayana’s “those who forget the past are doomed to repeat it.” Yet that warning remains fully apt as one surveys the failures of American and Western policy regarding Iran since Ayatollah Khomeini’s 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Again and again policymakers who pride themselves on their sophistication and knowledge have professed to detect moderate forces among the ruling mullahs and their chosen representatives, with whom one can do business, as Neville Chamberlain once said of Adolph Hitler.

President Barack Obama’s expressed confidence, during his 15-minute chat last Friday with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, in the possibility of working out a “comprehensive solution” to the impasse over the Iranian nuclear program is but the most recent example of a Western leader who believes himself the soul of urbane sophistication falling prey to the illusion of Iranian moderation.

Yet the conviction that Iran can be persuaded to shutter its nuclear weapons development by anything other than a credible and imminent threat of having its nuclear facilities laid waste by US bombers ignores the crucial importance of nuclear weapons in the strategic vision of Iranian leaders from Khomeini to the present.

President Obama, to an even greater degree than his predecessors, is unable to credit Khomeini’s frequently expressed vision for the spread of his particular brand of Shi’ite Islam worldwide even at the cost of the destruction of Iran.

Khomeini, according to long-time US Defense Department analyst Harold Rhode, saw nuclear weapons as a means of reversing the humiliation of Muslim subservience to the West. Possession of nuclear weapons, in Khomeini’s vision, would place Iran at the forefront of the world-wide war to spread Islam of which he constantly spoke. And crucially, those weapons would represent a triumph of Shi’ite Muslims over their Sunni rivals.

For while Sunni leaders have for decades whipped their populations into paroxysms of hatred for the West and Israel, largely to distract from their own failures, they have done nothing to reverse the theological humiliation of Muslim weakness vis-à-vis the West.

Nuclear weapons would allow Iran to provide more effective cover for its terrorist allies, such as Hamas, and exercise control over the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, and thus over the world economy.

Proof of Iran’s steadfast commitment to the development of nuclear weapons does not depend solely on understanding the theological logic of the Islamic Revolution. It is evident on its face. Iran possesses the world’s second or third largest oil and gas reserves – enough to meet its energy needs for 200 years – and has no need of nuclear energy. And even if it did, it would be far cheaper to purchase from Russia all the enriched uranium needed to power civilian reactors rather than build its own vastly more expensive nuclear enrichment program.

That Iran has nevertheless maintained its nuclear program in the face of international isolation and crippling economic sanctions proves two things: Iran’s nuclear program is not about energy and that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khameini has no intention of surrendering that program.

Not least, a November 8, 2011, report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) detailed Iranian work on nuclear triggers, mathematical modeling of missile trajectories for the deployment of nuclear weapons, and implosion experiments. It confirmed that Iran has sophisticated knowledge of nuclear weapon design and has tested some of the components of a nuclear weapon.

THAT IRANIAN presidents are “moderate” is an ofttold tale, which gets no better by virtue of repetition.

Most importantly, the moderation or lack thereof of the Iranian president is irrelevant to the regime’s decision- making about its nuclear program. Only one person has the power to halt Iran’s development of nuclear power: Supreme Leader Khameini. The new president is no more than the public face that Khameini wears.

That lesson should have been learned over 30 years ago, during the Iran hostage crisis. The United States conducted lengthy negotiations with President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, though the only one with the authority to order the release of the American hostages was Supreme Leader Khomeini. Bani Sadr did, however, manage to extract crucial concessions from the Americans, which were viewed as a humiliation of the US in the honor-obsessed Islamic world and served to increase the prestige of the Islamic Revolution in Muslim eyes.

Moderate, in any event, is a relative term, and one that has proven useless as an analytical tool when applied to successive Iranian presidents. The 1989 election of “moderate” Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani generated much excitement in the West, particularly in Germany, which opened up a new “critical dialogue” in 1992. Two months after the opening of that dialogue, three leaders of the Iranian Democratic Party of Kurdistan were gunned down in a Berlin restaurant. Five years later, a German court implicated Supreme Leader Khameini and president Rafsanjani as among the masterminds of the assassination. As a result every EU member nation withdrew its ambassador from Tehran.

In response, the mullahs had another “moderate” – Mohammed Khatami was elected president in 1997.

He trumpeted a “Dialogue of Civilizations.” Yet in the first two years of his “moderate” rule, a dozen writers and political leaders were murdered, and in 1999, student uprisings were brutally put down. Overseeing the suppression of the student protests, incidentally, was Hassan Rouhani, the latest incarnation of an Iranian “moderate” president.

Nor did the moderation of the “moderates” extend to Israel or abhorrence of nuclear weapons. Rafsanjani referred to Israel as a “one-bomb country” and mused in a public sermon at Tehran University that “one atomic bomb would wipe out Israel.” Khatami spoke of Israel as an “old wound in the body of Islam that cannot be healed.

Under “moderates” and “fanatics” alike, long-range missiles were paraded in Tehran bedecked with banner proclaiming, “Israel must be wiped off the face of the earth.”

The idea that Rouhani’s alleged moderation will prove any more relevant is far-fetched. He has been a loyal senior servant of the Islamic Revolution for three decades. And he has openly boasted of the usefulness of a “moderate” façade in fooling the West. In a speech to the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council in 2005, he noted cheerily, “While we were talking to the Europeans in Teheran, we were installing equipment in parts of the [uranium conversion] facility in Isfahan…. In fact, by creating a calm environment, we were able to complete the work in Isfahan.”

A September 3 editorial in the Iranian newspaper Baher, which has close ties to the regime, made clear that the same tactics are being employed today. The editorial criticized Rouhani’s predecessor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for adopting an aggressive stance guaranteed to engender Western resistance. The thrust of the editorial, according to Ray Takeyh, an Iran specialist with the Council on Foreign Relations, was that Iran’s nuclear aspirations are best served not by concessions on the scope of its program but by improving its image as a trustworthy and accountable state. Thus Rouhani’s current charm offensive.

EVEN THE same tired evidence of Iran’s potential flexibility keeps getting recycled. In his speech at the UN last week President Obama, following in the path of former secretary of state Clinton, hopefully cited Supreme Leader Khameini’s mythical fatwa against the use of nuclear weapons. A MEMRI search of the various official websites of Khameini, however, failed to discover any such fatwa. And in response to a question submitted to him as to whether it would not be permissible under Islamic law to use nuclear weapons to deter aggressors against Islam, Khameini pointedly made no reference to any such fatwa.

In addition, The Washington Post’s Jody Warrick revealed the existence of an internal UN document showing that Khameini embraced the concept of an Iranian bomb during a meeting of the country’s top leadership more than two decades ago on the grounds that a nuclear arsenal would “serve Iran as a deterrent in the hands of God’s soldiers.”

Moreover, Ali Reza Forqani, a close ally of the supreme leader, has written of the duty to annihilate Israel and outlined how Iranian missiles could do so in nine minutes.

What next? A citation of the 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate – described by John Bolton as a “soft coup” by the US intelligence community against the possibility of military action – which opened with a bombshell announcement of “high confidence” that Iran has suspended work on a nuclear weapons program? A footnote explained that by “weapons program” the NIE only referred to weapon design and “secret” efforts– not to the 3,000 centrifuges then spinning in broad daylight, and even with respect to those the IAEA subsequently found both conclusions to be wrong.

AT ROOT of the never-ending hope for a diplomatic solution is the fallacy that diplomacy is always preferable to military action or the credible threat thereof.

David Wurmser, a former adviser to both vice-president Dick Cheney and chief arms negotiation John Bolton, recalls a conversation with one of his successors in the incoming Obama administration, who outlined an approach to Iran “eerily identical” to the failed policy pursued by president Bush.

Wurmser asked what the backup plan was in the event that diplomacy and sanctions proved ineffective. His opposite number confessed there was none. At some point “pressure must work,” he insisted. That point has still not been reached – and never will be.

Churchill never stopped lamenting how tens of millions of lives could have been spared had England and France shown some backbone at Munich. The German High Command would likely have overthrown Hitler.

The lesson of Munich is that sometimes the application of force in time can spare far greater devastation later.

What was that Santayana said, again?

The writer is director of Jewish Media Resources, has written a regular column in The Jerusalem Post Magazine since 1997, and is the author of eight biographies of modern Jewish leaders.

America and the good psychopaths

October 4, 2013

Column One: America and the good psychopaths | JPost | Israel News.

10/03/2013 23:51

Israel the party pooper is Obama’s greatest foe, because it insists on basing its strategic assessments and goals on the nature of things even though this means facing down evil.

Iran's President Hassan Rouhani

Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani Photo: Reuters

In his speech on Tuesday before the UN General Assembly, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu tried to get the Americans to stop their collective swooning at the sight of an Iranian president who smiled in their general direction.“Ladies and gentlemen,” the premier warned, “I wish I could believe [President Hassan] Rouhani, but I don’t because facts are stubborn things. And the facts are that Iran’s savage record flatly contradicts Rouhani’s soothing rhetoric.”

He might have saved his breath. The Americans weren’t interested.

Two days after Netanyahu’s speech, US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel issued a rejoinder to Netanyahu. “I have never believed that foreign policy is a zero-sum game,” Hagel said.

Well, maybe he hasn’t. But the Iranians have.

And they still do view diplomacy – as all their dealings with their sworn enemies – as a zerosum game.

As a curtain raiser for Rouhani’s visit, veteran New York Times war correspondent Dexter Filkins wrote a long profile of Iran’s real strongman for The New Yorker. Qassem Suleimani is the head of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. It is the most powerful organ of the Iranian regime, and Suleimani is Iranian dictator Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s closest confidante and adviser.

Rouhani doesn’t hold a candle to Suleimani.

Filkin’s profile is detailed, but deeply deceptive.

The clear sense he wishes to impart on his readers is that Suleimani is a storied war veteran and a pragmatist. He is an Iranian patriot who cares about his soldiers. He’s been willing to cut deals with the Americans in the past when he believed it served Iran’s interests. And given Suleimani’s record, it is reasonable to assume that Rouhani – who is far more moderate than he – is in a position to make a deal and will make one.

The problem with Filkin’s portrayal of Suleimani as a pragmatist, and a commander who cares about the lives of his soldiers – and so, presumably cares about the lives of Iranians – is that it is belied by the stories Filkins reported in the article.

Filkins describes at length how Suleimani came of age as a Revolutionary Guard division commander during the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988, and how that war made him the complicated, but ultimately reasonable, (indeed parts of the profile are downright endearing), pragmatist he is today.

As the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Suleimani commands the Syrian military and the foreign forces from Iran, Hezbollah and Iraq that have been deployed to Syria to keep Basher Assad in power.

Filkins quotes an Iraqi politician who claimed that in a conversation with Suleimani last year that the Iranian called the Syrian military “worthless.”

He then went on to say, “Give me one brigade of the Basij, and I could conquer the whole country.”

Filkins notes that it was the Basij that crushed the anti-Islamist Green Revolution in Iran in 2009. But for a man whose formative experience was serving as a Revolutionary Guards commander in the Iran-Iraq War, Suleimani’s view of the Basij as a war-fighting unit owes to what it did in its glory days, in that war, not on the streets of Tehran in 2009.

As Matthias Kuntzel reported in 2006, the Revolutionary Guards formed the Basij during the Iran-Iraq War to serve as cannon fodder. Basij units were made up of boys as young as 12.

They were given light doses of military training and heavy doses of indoctrination in which they were brainwashed to reject life and martyr themselves for the revolution.

As these children were being recruited from Iran’s poorest villages, Ayatollah Khomeini purchased a half million small plastic keys from Taiwan.

They were given to the boys before they were sent to battle and told that they were the keys to paradise. The children were then sent into minefields to die and deployed as human waves in frontal assaults against superior Iraqi forces.

By the end of the war some 100,000 of these young boys became the child sacrifices of the regime.

When we assess Suleimani’s longing for a Basij brigade in Syria in its proper historical and strategic context – that is, in the context of how he and his fellow Revolutionary Guards commanders deployed such brigades in the 1980s, we realize that far from being a pragmatist, Suleimani is a psychopath.

Filkins did not invent his romanticized version of what makes Suleimani tick. It is a view that has been cultivated for years by senior US officials.

Former US ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker spoke at length with Filkins about his indirect dealings with Suleimani through Iranian negotiators who answered to him, and through Iraqi politicians whom he controlled.

Crocker attests that secretary of state Colin Powell dispatched him to Geneva in the weeks before the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 to negotiate with the Iranians. Those discussions, which he claims involved the US and Iran trading information about the whereabouts of al- Qaida operatives in Afghanistan and Iran, could have led to an historic rapprochement. But, Crocker maintains, hope for such an alliance were dashed in January 2002, when George W.

Bush labeled Iran as a member of the “Axis of Evil,” in his State of the Union address. Supposedly in a rage, Suleimani pulled the plug on cooperation with the Americans. As Crocker put it, “We were just that close. One word in one speech changed history.”

Crocker told of his attempt to make it up to the wounded Suleimani in the aftermath of the US-led overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in 2003. Crocker was in Baghdad at the time setting up the Iraqi Governing Council. He used Iraqi intermediaries to clear all the Shi’ite candidates with Suleimani. In other words, the US government gave the commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards control over the Iraqi government immediately after the US military toppled Saddam’s regime.

Far from convincing Suleimani to pursue a rapproachment with the US, Crocker’s actions convinced him that the US was weak. And so, shortly after he oversaw the formation of the governing council, Suleimani instigated the insurgency whose aim was to eject the US from Iraq and to transform it into an Iranian satrapy.

And yet, despite Suleimani’s obvious bad faith, and use of diplomacy to entrap the US into positions that harmed its interests and endangered its personnel, Crocker and other senior US officials continued to believe that he was the man to cut a deal with.

The main take-away lesson from the Filkins profile of Suleimani is that US officials – and journalists – like to romanticize the world’s most psychopathic, evil men. Doing so helps them to justify and defend their desire to appease, rather than confront, let alone defeat, them.

Suleimani and his colleagues are more than willing to play along with the Americans, to the extent that doing so advances their aims of defeating the US.

There were two main reasons that Bush did not want to confront Iran despite its central role in organizing, directing and financing the insurgency in Iraq. First, Bush decided shortly after the US invasion of Iraq that the US would not expand the war to Iran or Syria. Even as both countries’ central role in fomenting the insurgency became inarguable, Bush maintained his commitment to fighting what quickly devolved into a proxy war with Iran, on the battlefield of Iran’s choosing.

The second reason that Bush failed to confront Iran, and that his advisers maintained faith with the delusion that it was worth cutting a deal with the likes of Suleimani, was that they preferred the sense of accomplishment a deal brought them to the nasty business of actually admitting the threat Iran posed to American interests – and to American lives in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Expanding on Bush’s aversion to fighting Iran, and preference for romanticizing its leaders rather than acknowledging their barbarism, upon entering office Barack Obama embraced a strategy whose sole goal is engagement. For the past five years, the US policy toward Iran is to negotiate. Neither the terms of negotiation nor the content of potential agreements is important.

Obama wants to negotiate for the sake of negotiating. And he has taken the UN and the EU with him on this course.

It’s possible that Obama believes that these negotiations will transform Iran into a quasi-US ally like the Islamist regime in Turkey. That regime remains a member of NATO despite the fact that it threatens its neighbors with war, it represses its own citizens, and it refuses to support major US initiatives while undermining NATO operations.

Obama will never call Turkey out for its behavior or make Prime Minister Recep Erdogan pay a price for his bad faith. The myth of the US-Turkish alliance is more important to Obama than the substance of Turkey’s relationship with the United States.

A deal with Iran would be horrible for America and its allies. Whatever else it says it will do, the effect of any US-Iranian agreement would be to commit the US to do nothing to defend its interests or its allies in the Middle East.

While this would be dangerous for the US, it is apparently precisely the end Obama seeks. His address to the UN General Assembly can reasonably be read as a declaration that the US is abandoning its position as world leader. The US is tired of being nitpicked by its allies and its enemies for everything it does, he said. And therefore, he announced, Washington is now limiting its actions in the Middle East to pressuring its one remaining ally, Israel, to give up its ability to protect itself from foreign invasion and Palestinian terrorism by surrendering Judea and Samaria, without which it is defenseless.

Like his predecessors in the Bush administration, Obama doesn’t care that Iran is evil and that its leaders are fanatical psychopaths. He has romanticized them based on nothing.

Although presented by the media as a new policy of outreach toward Tehran, Obama’s current commitment to negotiating with Rouhani is consistent with his policy toward Iran since entering office. Nothing has changed.

From Obama’s perspective, US policy is not threatened by Iranian bad faith. It is threatened only by those who refuse to embrace his fantasy world where all deals are good and all negotiations are therefore good.

What this means is that the prospect of Iran becoming a nuclear power does not faze Obama. The only threat he has identified is the one coming from Jerusalem. Israel the party pooper is Obama’s greatest foe, because it insists on basing its strategic assessments and goals on the nature of things even though this means facing down evil.

caroline@carolineglick.com

Netanyahu says he would consider meeting with Rouhani

October 4, 2013

Netanyahu says he would consider meeting with Rouhani | The Times of Israel.

Israeli leader tells NPR he would ‘stick’ question about Iran’s willingness to continue enrichment ‘in face’ of counterpart

October 4, 2013, 1:57 am
Netanyahu speaking to the Jewish Federation of North America on Wednesday. (photo credit: Kobi Gideon/Flash90)

Netanyahu speaking to the Jewish Federation of North America on Wednesday. (photo credit: Kobi Gideon/Flash90)

Two days after excoriating Hassan Rouhani as a wolf in sheep’s clothing who lies about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and 10 days after he instructed Israel’s UN delegation to leave the General Assembly hall rather than hear Rouhani speak, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said he would “consider” meeting the Iranian president, in comments published early Friday.

Netanyahu, speaking to National Public Radio as part of a media blitz while in the US, said he would question Rouhani on Tehran’s nuclear program, which the Israeli leader has called to be completely shut down.

“I don’t care about the meeting. I don’t have a problem with the diplomatic process,” Netanyahu said to NPR’s Steve Inskeep.

“I haven’t been offered. If I’m offered, I’d consider it, but it’s not an issue,” he clarified. “If I meet with these people I’d stick this question in their face: Are you prepared to dismantle your program completely? Because you can’t stay with the [nuclear] enrichment.”

He also called Rouhani, considered a relative moderate, the “least bad” candidate of those who were allowed to run in Iran’s June presidential elections.

Netanyahu told NPR that Iran’s overtures toward a deal with the West to curb its uranium enrichment were “hogwash,” but said he would be “delighted” by a “real” deal, according to excerpts published by NPR. The full interview was to air on Morning Edition later Friday.

In his speech to the UN on Tuesday, Netanyahu had depicted Rouhani in withering terms, and set out what he said was the Iranian president’s strategy: “First, smile a lot. Smiling never hurts. Second, pay lip service to peace, democracy and tolerance. Third, offer meaningless concessions in exchange for lifting sanctions. And fourth, and the most important, ensure that Iran retains sufficient nuclear material and sufficient nuclear infrastructure to race to the bomb at a time it chooses to do so. You know why Rouhani thinks he can get away with this? I mean, this is a ruse. It’s a ploy… Because he’s gotten away with it before, because his strategy of talking a lot and doing little has worked for him in the past.”

A week earlier, the prime minister instructed the Israeli delegation to exit the General Assembly hall before Rouhani addressed the forum — the only country to do so. Later, facing criticism at home, including from inside his own coalition, Netanyahu said he was vindicated. To have the Israeli representatives in the hall listening to Rouhani’s speech, he said, “would have given legitimacy to a regime that does not accept that the Holocaust happened and publicly declares its desire to wipe Israel off the map.” As Israel’s prime minister, he said, “I won’t allow the Israeli delegation to be part of a cynical public relations charade by a regime that denies that Holocaust and calls for our destruction.”

Aides to Netanyahu had no comment on the prime minister’s remarks about meeting Rouhani. Those around Netanyahu said that the question about a meeting was hypothetical, and stressed that the prime minister’s stance on Iran, its ambition to destroy Israel, and the duplicity of its outreach to the West was unchanged.

Meanwhile Thursday, Netanyahu made his first effort at direct outreach to the Iranians, giving an interview to BBC Persian peppered with Farsi sayings.

In the BBC interview, he said the ayatollahs’ regime was responsible for the harsh sanctions and socioeconomic situation they are enduring.

“I would welcome a genuine rapprochement, a genuine effort to stop the nuclear program, not a fake one, not harf-e pootch [‘nonsense’ in Farsi]. We are not sadeh-lowe [‘suckers’ in Farsi],” said the prime minister.

Jerusalem, which enjoyed friendly relations with Tehran before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, has made efforts to avoid any contact with the Iranians, with Netanyahu ordering the Israeli delegation to leave the United Nations plenum when Rouhani spoke there on September 24.

On Tuesday, Netanyahu warned the United Nations General Assembly about Rouhani who, he said, was trying to charm the West while nuclear enrichment, widely believed to be for military purposes, continued in Iran as it did under his predecessor.

“[Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad was a wolf in wolf’s clothing. Rouhani is a wolf in sheep’s clothing, a wolf who thinks he can pull the eyes — the wool over the eyes of the international community,” he said.

Israel sees an Iranian nuclear weapon as an existential threat and has lobbied the world to keep pressure on Tehran, though the US has recently made moves to open negotiations for lifting sanctions in exchange for concessions on the nuclear program.

Attempts at detente between the US and Iran, which cut off relations in 1980 following the Islamic Revolution and hostage crisis, reached fever pitch late last month, with US President Barack Obama speaking to Rouhani in a historic phone call. Rouhani rejected requests by Obama for a meeting, though, with officials saying the Iranian leader’s schedule did not allow for it.

On Wednesday, Rouhani responded unequivocally to Netanyahu’s UN speech, promising to continue what Iran insists is a peaceful nuclear program with “full power.”

“Israel is upset to see that its sword has gone blunt and Iran grows more powerful day by day,” Rouhani told reporters in Tehran, according to the semi-official Fars News Agency.

Since the speech, Netanyahu has been engaged in a PR offensive, giving interviews to a number of Western news outlets designed to present Israel’s position on Iran.

Speaking to NBC Wednesday, Netanyahu dismissed the notion that Rouhani was freely elected, saying Iranians would topple the regime if they could.

“These people, the Iranian people, the majority of them are actually pro-Western,” he stated, adding, “But they don’t have that. They’re governed not by Rouhani, they’re governed by Ayatollah Khamenei. He heads a cult. That cult is wild in its ambitions and its aggression.”

On Wednesday night, meanwhile, Netanyahu spoke to American Jewish leaders at a closed media event, telling his audience that Rouhani’s charm offensive was not proving as successful as many observers assume.

Netanyahu said press coverage of the Iranian leader’s efforts to woo the West — notably in a UN speech 10 days ago, and a series of media interviews — might have exaggerated the effect it had on the public.

The prime minister also rejected critics who said his policies on Iran and the Palestinians isolated Israel, and said his stance on Iran is closer than many might imagine to that of many worried Arab states in the region.

Israel’s Channel 2 reported Wednesday that Netanyahu was presiding over “intensive contacts” with unnamed Arab and Gulf leaders to form a new alliance against Iran, amid fears that the US would be duped by Tehran in the nascent diplomatic process.

Raphael Ahren, Ricky Ben David and Yoel Goldman contributed to this report.

After the Iranian smiles wear off, a host of questions

October 4, 2013

After the Iranian smiles wear off, a host of questions | The Times of Israel.

The Iranian president’s ‘charm offensive’ may have piqued interest in the West, but back in Tehran his liberal policies will be a hard sell

 

October 4, 2013, 2:26 pm
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani speaks during a news conference at the Millennium Hotel in midtown Manhattan in New York, on Friday, September 27, 2013 (photo credit: AP/John Minchillo)

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani speaks during a news conference at the Millennium Hotel in midtown Manhattan in New York, on Friday, September 27, 2013 (photo credit: AP/John Minchillo)

 

The smiles and festivities ended for Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani almost as soon as his flight from New York landed in Tehran. Alongside hundreds of “charm offensive” advocates, there were also dozens of young supporters of Iran’s conservative parties. These flung shoes and eggs at Rouhani to protest the seemingly liberal approach he’s taken toward the West and, worst of all, his telephone conversation with US President Barack Obama.

Although the Iranian parliament, the Majlis, expressed its confidence in Rouhani on Tuesday – some 230 of its 290 members signed a petition that praised the president — the support and approval were accompanied by considerable criticism, particularly in regard to Rouhani’s conversation with Obama. Iranian parliament Chairman Ali Larijani, for example, praised Rouhani, but intentionally made no mention of his conversation with Obama.

 

But the minimal public objections and one debate or another in the parliament need not be of great concern to Rouhani. What should trouble him is the unexpected public declaration made by the commander of the Revolutionary Guards Corps, General Mohammad Ali Jafari. Jafari is considered one of the most powerful people in Iran’s political, economic and security circles and is a close confidant of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. It was Jafari who made it clear to the elected president of Iran that he should have refused to accept Obama’s phone call.

 

We can only imagine how difficult it would have been for Rouhani to refuse to take the call. On the previous day, he refused to meet with his American counterpart. His foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, reported that the White House had made five attempts to connect the presidents before the call finally took place. Rouhani certainly may have believed that a conversation of this kind was a positive and necessary step toward easing sanctions on Iran. The problem that he faces is the large number of officials, including top-ranking members of the Revolutionary Guards, who are carefully and suspiciously eyeing his every step. From their perspective, even the policy of smiles and amiability that Israel was so skeptical about is excessive and puts Iran’s nuclear goals at risk. Indeed, only two days after returning to his homeland, Rouhani and his people have already begun to speak far more cautiously about negotiations regarding their nuclear program and are particularly insistent in their firm refusal to stop enriching uranium on Iranian territory.

 

To the average Israeli or Western observer, the internal criticism against Rouhani seems to serve the regime’s purposes, driving home the impression that Iran’s recent overtures are no more than a great performance at the ayatollah’s theater. But it is far from that simple. Rouhani is the loyal representative of the moderate, pragmatic population that exists today in Iran, a population that is willing to make certain concessions on Iran’s nuclear program if that is the price to be paid to end the sanctions.

 

Religious leaders such as Mohammad Taghi Rahbar, one of the leading Shiite adjudicators in Isfahan, support Rouhani’s policies. In an article in an Iranian newspaper, Rahbar wrote that “the slogan ‘Death to America’ does not appear in the Koran,” hinting at the possibility of normalizing relations with the US. Several Iranian political analysts support the new trend as well. Sadegh Zibakalam, for example, wrote that “those that support hostility toward the US can no longer restrain the improvement in the relations between the two countries… It is becoming increasingly difficult for the conservative groups to convince Iranians that hostility toward the US is necessary.”

 

Such moderates, however, haven’t yet succeeded in changing Iran’s policies, and have thus far sufficed with declarations. They’re certainly gaining in popularity among the Iranian public and even some of its politicians, but the elitist leadership, comprising spiritual leaders and Revolutionary Guards, takes a far warier approach to interaction with Western countries — and it’s even more leery when it comes to nuclear concessions. Thus, Khamenei has thus far avoided coming out in favor of Rouhani’s more open policies.

 

In any case, it is important to note that Rouhani and his people take every opportunity to declare that they have no intention of acceding to demands to stop enriching uranium or to terminate Iran’s nuclear project. This makes it all the more difficult to understand The New York Times editorial that immediately followed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech this week at the United Nations General Assembly. “It could be disastrous if Mr. Netanyahu and his supporters in Congress were so blinded by distrust of Iran that they exaggerate the threat, block President Obama from taking advantage of new diplomatic openings and sabotage the best chance to establish a new relationship since the 1979 Iranian Revolution sent American-Iranian relations into the deep freeze,” the paper warned.

 

Suddenly the cause of a potential disaster for Israel and the United States becomes clear. It isn’t Iran’s clear determination to obtain a nuclear bomb, but rather Netanyahu being “blinded” and “exaggerating the threat.” Considering the steps that Iran has taken over the past decade to promote its nuclear program, it is quite likely that Netanyahu is not the one who is blinded.

The US knows the truth

October 4, 2013

Israel Hayom | The US knows the truth.

The U.S. and many other Western countries have suffered blows at the hands of Iranian terrorism. One would expect that an Israeli demand to curb Iranian terrorism would fall on receptive ears and put the Iranians to yet another test.

Iran’s terrorist network spreads far

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Photo credit: Bulfoto, KOKO, AP, AFP

The battle against Iran: What happens behind the scenes?

October 4, 2013

Israel Hayom | The battle against Iran: What happens behind the scenes?.

Netanyahu returns from the U.S. after telling the U.N. and Obama that Israel will not allow Iran to become a nuclear threshold state and stressing the sanctions’ importance • The ball is no longer just in the Americans’ court.

Shlomo Cesana
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivers an address to the U.N. General Assembly

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Photo credit: Shahar Azran

The end of the Iranian fantasy

October 4, 2013

Israel Hayom | The end of the Iranian fantasy.

For a week, Iranian President Hasan Rouhani peddled a rosy picture around New York, and the world applauded • Until Netanyahu came along and brought everyone back down to earth • The world was reminded that Iran is an extreme nation that seeks mass destruction.

Boaz Bismuth
Iranian-Americans protest outside the White House against warming relations with Iran

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Photo credit: Reuters

Netanyahu made us proud

October 4, 2013

Israel Hayom | Netanyahu made us proud.

Isi Leibler

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made us proud when he addressed the U.N. General Assembly this week. True to form, once again he employed his extraordinary oratory skills to superbly present the case for Israel.

He was focused, factual, logical and persuasive as he implored the U.S. administration and world leaders not to be deluded by Iranian President Hasan Rouhani’s “charm” campaign.

He interspersed his address with sensitive Jewish historical and biblical references, citing the Maccabees, the prophets, Jewish powerlessness and pogroms and the determination of Jews to live in their own land. As a Jew and as an Israeli, I was proud to be represented by a leader presenting our case with such dignity and eloquence.

Netanyahu neutralized the critics who accused him of opposing or “spoiling” diplomatic efforts. But he warned of the dangers of letting the duplicitous Iranians off the hook unless they genuinely abandoned their nuclear ambitions.

He declared that the fate of the Jewish state would not replicate that of Czechoslovakia in 1938. In his words, Israel would “never acquiesce to nuclear arms in the hands of a rogue regime that repeatedly promises to wipe us off the map. Israel will not allow Iran to get nuclear weapons. If Israel is forced to stand alone, Israel will stand alone.” His speech may well prove as prophetic as Winston Churchill’s warnings about the Nazis.

Unfortunately but not surprisingly, with the exception of Israelis, Diaspora Jews and our close friends, Netanyahu’s words appear to have fallen on deaf ears. The applause at the conclusion of his address was noticeably muted, a predictable response from an international body which only hours after Netanyahu’s speech elected Iran as rapporteur for its Disarmament and International Security Committee.

The U.S. Congress is currently focusing its attention on the federal government shutdown. Besides, most Americans are weary of wars and have lost confidence in U.S. President Barack Obama’s leadership qualities, especially after his appalling handling of the Syrian issue.

In general, world leaders are in denial and seek to avoid facing the Iranian nuclear threat and resist the possible need to resort to military action. In this as on many other issues, Israel remains a nation that dwells alone.

In contrast, Rouhani was practically embraced at the General Assembly and by the global media. He smiled and talked about diplomacy, with global leaders grasping his empty gestures and hailing his purported moderation, despite his public record of cheating and his blatant lies from the U.N. podium denying that Iran had ever sought to obtain the nuclear bomb. Other than voicing sweet words, Rouhani made no concessions. The response to his glib assurances of Iran’s peaceful intentions was chillingly reminiscent of the behavior of world leaders following Chamberlain’s 1938 “peace in our time.”

If only those world leaders were right. Israel, the nation on the front lines, which Iran repeatedly describes as a cancer that needs to be eliminated, would have the greatest cause to celebrate if diplomacy could persuade Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to abandon his country’s nuclear ambitions.

But as Netanyahu articulated so well at the U.N. and elsewhere over the last several years, diplomacy alone is not enough to stop the Iranians. Netanyahu can claim the credit for having persisted in a global campaign to warn the world of the dangers of Iran becoming a nuclear power. He has not been warmongering, as his critics accused, but rather recognizing reality as he urged world leaders to impose sanctions and threaten military action unless the centrifuges stop spinning.

Netanyahu has left the door open to diplomacy. He simply reminded the U.S. and the world of Rouhani’s duplicitous record, referring to him as “a wolf in sheep’s clothing.” He recalled that when Rouhani was Iran’s chief national security adviser and head nuclear negotiator between 2003 and 2005, he lied and stalled, and subsequently even boasted about his success in “creating a calm environment.” He occupied this position when Iran orchestrated the terrorist bombings of the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires.

Netanyahu has appropriately warned that unless there is a dramatic turnabout (which Rouhani has never intimated he would make), the Iranian strategy is to procrastinate with negotiations and con the U.S. and euphoric global leaders into providing them the time required to achieve their objectives. As it now stands, the U.S. has yet to receive an Iranian response to Obama’s efforts to “engage” and the delays could take us into 2014.

Netanyahu reminded world leaders that this was precisely the route successfully travelled by the North Koreans who delayed and duped the U.S. until they achieved their goal. He warned that a nuclear Iran would be like “another 50 North Koreas.”

Netanyahu also cautioned against “partial” solutions, which Israel would not accept. He urged that until such time as an agreement is set in stone and implemented, there should not be the slightest easing of sanctions which, if prematurely lifted, would be almost impossible to reapply in the current climate. He also called for the imposition of strict deadlines and demands for total transparency in terms of implementation.

Obama has, in a sense, given a nod to Netanyahu’s demands. In a joint press conference prior to Netanyahu’s U.N. address, both parties took care to avoid recriminations or display tensions. In fact, Obama told Netanyahu what he wanted to hear. He gave assurances that he was “clear-eyed” and that Rouhani’s charm offensive and nice words would not bring about an end to sanctions. He promised to implement “the highest standards of verification in order to provide the sort of sanctions relief they are looking for.”

However, he declined to provide any assurance not to ease sanctions until the Iranians demonstrated that they had fully dismantled their nuclear weapons program. Yet, he made it clear that “as president of the United States … we take no options off the table including military options” — expressions he had not used in his own U.N. General Assembly address.

Nevertheless, in light of Obama’s behavior over the past month and the virtual groveling to Rouhani, many will view his statement about the military option remaining on the table as yet another hollow threat. However, should Obama genuinely resolve the problem by way of diplomacy, Netanyahu and the people of Israel will be cheering him all the way. But we should not hold our breath. The odds of this happening are exceedingly remote.

Netanyahu is also painfully aware that the Israeli military option is off the agenda as long as the U.S. is engaged in diplomacy with the Iranians.

Israel therefore faces a daunting diplomatic and political challenge over the next few months. Our prime minister will once again be walking a tightrope and also facing increasing pressures to make further unilateral concessions toward the Palestinians — posing security risks for our future.

Netanyahu’s challenge is to convey his message directly to Congress and the American people. He must continue on his mission and penetrate the American psyche until they accept that the threat Iran poses is real and immediate, and if left unchecked, will allow history to repeat itself in a terrible way.

Poll: Two-thirds of Israeli Jews back unilateral Iran strike

October 4, 2013

Israel Hayom | Poll: Two-thirds of Israeli Jews back unilateral Iran strike.

Poll comes days after Prime Minister Netanyahu tells U.N.: “If Israel is forced to stand alone, Israel will stand alone” • Most Israelis do not believe talks can put an end to Iran’s nuclear ambitions • Netanyahu deemed by far most fit for leadership.

Israel Hayom Staff
Israelis say that if necessary their country should launch its own strike on Iran

Should the need arise to attack Iran, an overwhelming majority of Israeli Jews would support a unilateral Israeli strike even without international support, a new Israel Hayom-New Wave Research poll shows.

According to the poll, 65.6 percent would be in favor of such a move and 21.8% would oppose it. Some 12.5% had no opinion. This week Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told the U.N. General Assembly that Israel would not allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, and that “if Israel is forced to stand alone, Israel will stand alone.”

The poll, conducted on Oct. 2 using a representative and random sample of 500 Hebrew-speaking Jews aged 18 and over, had a margin of error of 4.4%.

Asked to rate Netanyahu’s speech at the U.N. General Assembly this week, 51.4% said it was “good,” and 10.9% said it was “not good.” 37.7% had no opinion.

A majority of respondents — 84% — said they did not believe the talks with Iran could convince Iran to abandon its military nuclear program. Only 6.6% said this would be the outcome, and 9.3% had no opinion.

Asked whether they believed that U.S. President Barack Obama would deliver on his promise to consult with Israel on the issue of Iran, 46.9% said they did not believe the U.S. president, while 38.4% said they did. Some 14.7% expressed no opinion.

Asked to rate who is most qualified to serve as prime minister at present, a vast majority of 52.7% chose Netanyahu, 8.1% named Labor Party Chairwoman and Opposition Leader MK Shelly Yachimovich, 7.6% said Habayit Hayehudi leader Naftali Bennett, 6.6% said Hatnuah Chairwoman Tzipi Livni, and 2.9% said Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid. Some 22.1% of respondents expressed no opinion.

A political fatwa against nuclear weapons – Alarabiya

October 4, 2013

A political fatwa against nuclear weapons – Alarabiya.net English | Front Page.

Friday, 4 October 2013

Sometimes there isn’t much difference between politicians and clergymen. The art of speech is their profession. They can justify or evade issues with their eloquence in speech. The Iranian regime is currently saying that it does not intend to build a military nuclear power because the supreme guide issued a fatwa (religious edict) prohibiting nuclear weapons! You must be a pious Shiite Iranian person to believe this pledge. But the region’s governments cannot believe such statements.

I will use the phrase my colleague Eyad Abu Shakra used in his article on Wednesday: “mistrust is of the most powerful [forms of] intelligence.” The supreme guide’s fatwa increases our suspicions. The issue doesn’t require a fatwa. It requires that facilities and reactors be open to international inspectors, and it requires that we accept their judgment and guarantees. As neighbors of Iran, we will not demand Benjamin Netanyahu’s conditions, announced during his U.N. General Assembly speech, which stipulated: “halting uranium enrichment, giving up the entire stockpile of already enriched material, dismantling all the infrastructure that speeds up producing nuclear weapons like the facilities of Qom and Natanz and halting work at the heavy water facility in Arak.”

It appears to us that the current gestures on the part of Iran are simply part of a PR project aiming to appeal to the sentiment of the White House

 

Abdulrahman al-Rashed

The guide’s fatwa of prohibiting nuclear weapons was motivated by religion and politics. Islam considers that “whoever kills a soul unless for a soul, it is as if he had slain mankind entirely.” One nuclear warhead is enough to annihilate thousands of innocent people. But the guide’s fatwa is not that different from the Pope’s edict prohibiting contraceptives. Iran is about to give birth to its prohibited weapon. Iran spent a lot of money and scarificed a lot over the period of a decade and a half for the sake of its nuclear program. It is therefore not possible to believe that all of this was geared towards lighting Tehran’s streets using nuclear energy. The West has offered rewards, alternatives and incentives to consecutive Iranian governments in order to allow Iran to attain the energy it needs. But, Iran refused them and resumed implementing a project which is impossible to be considered anything but a military one.

Avoiding war

The Middle East, which has become accustomed to war, is capable of engaging in other wars. But after eliminating tyrants like Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi and currently fighting against Bashar al-Assad, hope increased that the day the region will rid itself of war is nearing. Hope increased that regimes like the one in Iran’s will give up their expansionist schemes and dreams of establishing regional empires and thus free themselves to build their countries from within. The threat against Iran comes from within it and not from Arabs or Israelis. This is something the Islamic Republic’s lecturers say in order to justify the misery the Iranian people are put through for the sake of attaining the holy bomb.

The irony is that the Americans, who spent a lot of time and effort to build an expanded alliance which succeeded in restraining Iran’s regime politically and economically, are currently destroying this alliance. The former aimed to achieve its goal peacefully by forcing Tehran to give up its military dreams. It used banks and petroleum, travel and technology companies, in addition to its security and military means, for that purpose. Banks were shut down, economic interests were obstructed, airline companies were prohibited, and various products were prohibited from being exported to Iran. This is what pushed the Iranian leadership to choose Hassan Rowhani, the man with the smiling face, to replace Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the man with the frowning face, to act as president and peace activist.

We, the ones who live within a stone’s throw from Iran, will be happier than the Americans or the Israelis if the Iranian regime really wants peace and has really reached the conviction that it should give up its nuclear weapons. Attaining them will cost Iran much more than it would benefit Iran. Unfortunately, we do not sense any of this humbleness. Instead, it appears to us that the current gestures on the part of Iran are simply part of a PR project aiming to appeal to the sentiment of the White House.
This article was first published in Asharq al-Awsat on Oct. 4, 2013.

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Abdulrahman al-Rashed is the General Manager of Al Arabiya News Channel. A veteran and internationally acclaimed journalist, he is a former editor-in-chief of the London-based leading Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat, where he still regularly writes a political column. He has also served as the editor of Asharq al-Awsat’s sister publication, al-Majalla. Throughout his career, Rashed has interviewed several world leaders, with his articles garnering worldwide recognition, and he has successfully led Al Arabiya to the highly regarded, thriving and influential position it is in today.